The Pacific War - week by week

- 91 - Pacific War - Fall of Kiska & Battle of Vella Lavella, August 15-22, 1943

Last time we spoke about the Komiatum Offensive in New Guinea. The drive to Lae and Salamaua was raging on New Guinea. Mount Tambu was assaulted and the allies received hellish casualties trying to take it. The legendary Bull Allen saved countless lives during this action, but Mount Tambu simply couldn't be captured. The allies chose to isolate and surround mount Tambu instead. The allies secured took the sugarcane knoll, the timbered knoll and then found a path heading to Komiatum. Nakano ordered his men to hold Komiatum ridge, but their situation became more and more desperate. Allied artillery and aerial bombardment alongside the enveloping maneuvers were taking a toll, the Japanese had suffered 900 casualties since July 23rd. With more men dying minute by minute, Nakano ordered a withdrawal from Komiatum still believing the primary target of the allies was Salamaua.

This episode is the Fall of Kiska & Battle of Vella Lavella 

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

So before venturing back to the frigid northern aleutians, we have a lot of action to talk about in the south Pacific. On August 3rd, General Sasaki was forced to order a withdrawal from Munda. General Griswold sent a message over to Admiral Hasley declaring “Our ground forces today wrested Munda from the Japs and present it to you as sole owner”. Halsey in his typical fashion replied “keep ‘em dying”. Despite the blood, sweat and tears taking Munda, as a whole, operation cartwheel had fallen a month behind schedule. As Griswold noted “the months fighting had not been the Americans’ finest hour in the Solomon islands campaign”. Halsey would add to it “the smoke of charred reputations still makes me cough”. Now just because Munda had fallen did not mean the work was all done, there was to be cleanup operations of course. General Sasaki ordered his forces to retreat northwards, most were enroute to the Kure 6th farm; the 13th regiment and Sasaki’s HQ were going to Bairoko; the 3rd battalion, 23rd regiment and Yokosuka 7th guns were heading to Baanga island. The Americans would be in hot pursuit.

General Griswold divided the cleanup operations, giving the 25th division the task of advancing across New Georgia to seize Bairoko Harbor and the Piru Plantation. General Hodge 's 43rd division was given the task of seizing the islands of Arundel and Baanga. General Collins would deploy the 1st battalion, 27th regiment and Colonel Dalton’s 161st regiment to advance up the Bairoko trail; the rest of Colonel Douglas Sugg’s 27th would advance along the Zieta Trail towards the Piru plantation. General Sasaki learnt on August 6th, the American navy had scored a small but conclusive victory when 6 US destroyers sunk 3 IJN destroyers, the Arashi, Kawakaze and Hagikaze during the Naval battle of Vella Gulf. This of course meant the Japanese reinforcement convoy had failed, thus Sasaki wasted no time ordered a general withdrawal to Kolombangara by the way of Baanga Island. Sasaki needed to give the men more time, so he reinforced the Yano battalion with the 12th company of the 3rd battalion, 23rd regiment who were left to defend the Kure 6th farm. Major Yano Keiji, a veteran of Guadalcanal, selected a rough terrain east and south of Zieta village and the Kure 6th farm to dig in. The Americans would later refer to it as “Zieta Garden”. The garden was to be Yano’s first line of defense across the Zieta river. There was a bit of high ground due north of Zieta Village which would have been easier to defend, but he needed his men to protect the trail running to Lulu Channel and Baanga, his only line of communications. The 3rd battalion, 23rd regiment in the meantime were securing Baanga. General Sasaki radioed his plans to the 8th Fleet, but to his surprise was told to hold onto New Georgia until late September for “future operations”. Sasaki was bewildered by this, but understood Admiral Samejima then commanding the 8th fleet was trying to direct a land battle, and obviously he was not experienced in such things. What Sasaki did not know at the time was Samejima was being instructed by General headquarters to do this. On August 7th, the Army and Navy had agreed to pull out of the Central Solomons and would cooperate to bolster Bougainville’s defenses. A revisión later on August 13th would instruct Koga, Kusaka and Imamura to hold onto as much of New Georgia as possible while Bougainville was being reinforced. Full evacuation of New Georgia was set for late September to early October, but the actual dates were dependent on the Bougainville progress.

On August 8th Sugg’s 2nd battalion advanced through a deep ravine going roughly 2 miles up the trail when his men were met with heavy machine gun fire. The Yano battalion was defending the barge supply route through the Lulu channel as their comrades and supplies made their way to Baanga. On August 9th, the 27th began their assault upon the Kure 6th Farm, employing a envelopment maneuver. The Yano battalion was holding them at bay, but gradually the allied forces were confining the Japanese into a smaller and smaller pocket. Meanwhile the 1st battalion was advancing north along the Munda-Bairoko trail where they joined Colonel Liversedge’s men. On the 10th, Hodge ordered the 169th regiment to hit Baanga and on the 11th patrols from their 3rd battalion had located the Japanese strongpoint on its southwest tip. By nightfall, the American assault of the Kure 6th Farm forced Colonel Yano to withdraw back across the Zieta River to form a new defensive perimeter. His men performed a fighting withdrawal throughout the night seeing many Japanese scream and throw rocks at the Americans. The usual night time activities that kept the allied forces miserable. 

On the 12th the Americans unleashed an artillery bombardment upon the Kure 6th Farm positions not realizing they had already been abandoned. The 89th had fired 2700 rounds, the heaviest concentration of the operation on completely empty positions. The Americans advanced over Yano’s old positions, crossed the river and fell upon Yano’s new defensive perimeter. On that day General Barker assumed command of the 43rd division as General Hodge returned to his command of the Americal Division. Barker began by sending L Company of the 169th regiment to occupy Baanga. L Company were met with unexpectedly heavy Japanese fire suffering 28 casualties before they were forced to pull back. 

 

Meanwhile on August 13th, Sugg’s 3rd battalion with E company managed to launch their main assault against the Yano battalion. They were attempting a envelopment maneuver against Yano’s flanks, but heavy resistance saw Yano’s right flank repel the attack. On the left there was a marshy plain that hindered the American advance forcing them to go too far left and thus failing to apply enough pressure. Although the assault failed, the unexpected left advance saw some gain. A patrol from H company stumbled across a heavily used trail leading to the Lulu channel. They established a roadblock that night allowing ambush efforts to hit the trail. The roadblock convinced Yano he was soon to be cut off, so he immediately prepared a withdrawal to Baanga. 

 

In the meantime, Barker decided to use Vela Cela island as a launching point for an assault against Maanga. On August the 14th, the 3rd battalion, 169th regiment began occupying the small island before using it as a springboard to land at Baanga. However the Americans quickly found themselves surrounded by a mangrove swamp and the Japanese began tossing counter attacks until night fell.  Yano’s forces repelled numerous American attacks from the 3rd battalion throughout the day, afternoon and night. The Japanese threw back one attack led by four marine tanks, which had crossed the river on a bridge engineers built. While doing this his men also began their retreat westwards. H Company met a brief exchange with Yano’s men, but Yano decided not to seriously clash with them and withdrew his battalion to Baanga by the 15th.  The 27th occupied Zieta village, making contact with Schultz 3rd battalion, 148th infantry over on Zieta Hill to the north. After this the 27th would advance upon Piru plantation and Sunday Inlet, too which they also ran into mangrove swamps greatly hindering them. The fight for the Zieta area had cost them 168 casualties, the americans were seeing a continuous flow of fierce counterattacks at Baanga, prompting Barker to decided he would reinforce the beachhead with the 2nd battalion 169th regiment and the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 172nd regiment.

 

At this point General Griswold and Admirals Halsey and Wilkinson were trying to figure out what to do next. Halsey’s original plan after the taking of Munda was to attack Kolombangara, but the recent performance of the Japanese defenders made the Americans quite skittish about performing an amphibious invasion. The battle for Munda point was one of the fiercest defenses the Japanese had put up. More than 30,000 troops had been brought over to face 5000 Japanese defenders within their network of entrenchments. As pointed out by the commander in chief of the US Navy planning memorandum “If we are going to require such overwhelming superiority at every point where we attack the Japanese, it is time for radical change in the estimate of the forces that will be required to defeat the Japanese now in the Southwest and Central Pacific.” Munda Point airfield would become a landmark victory because of the 6000 foot runway it would soon provide, alongside taxiways and its capacity as a base of operations. Halsey would later declare its airfield “to be the finest in the south pacific” and the Seabees would be awarded with a citation for their great efforts. Commander Doane would receive a special mention “by virtue of his planning, leadership, industry, and working ‘round the clock’ to make serviceable the Munda Airfield on August 14th, 1943, a good four days ahead of the original schedule.” The seabees work was a testament not only to their morale and organization, but also the fact they held superior equipment. Admiral Nimitz would go on the record to state “one of the outstanding features of the war in both the North and South Pacific areas has been the ability of US forces to build and use airfields, on a terrain and with a speed which would have been considered fantastically impossible in our pre-war days.” Overall the Georgia campaign would go on the be an essential component in the strangulation of Rabaul, as pointed out by historian Eliot Morison “The Central Solomons ranks with Guadalcanal and Buna-Gona for intensity of human tribulation. We had Munda and we needed it for the next move, toward Rabaul; but we certainly took it the hard way. The strategy and tactics of the New Georgia campaign were among the least successful of any allied campaign in the Pacific”.

 

Allied intelligence indicated Kolombangara had roughly 10,000 Japanese defenders, thus Halsey was inclined to seek an alternative method rather than slugging it out. He thought perhaps they could bypass Kolombangara completely and instead land on Vella Lavella. If they managed to pull that off, it would cut off the Japanese supply line to Kolombangara which was basically surviving on fishing boats and barges based out of Buin. Halsey noted “Kolombangara was 35 miles nearer the Shortlands and Kahili. According to coast-watchers, its garrison numbered not more than 250, and its shoreline would offer at least one airstrip.” A reconnaissance carried out back on July 22nd reported very few enemy troops on the island and that it held a feasible airfield site at Barakoma which also had beaches capable for LST’s to land at. Thus Halsey approved the plan and Griswold formed the Northern Landing Force, placed under the command of Brigadier General Robert McClure. The force consisted of the recently arrived 35th regiment of the 25th division attached to the 25th cavalry reconnaissance troops, all led by Colonel Everett Brown; the 4th defense battalion, the 58th naval construction battalion and the Naval base group. 

To hit Vella Lavella they would require air supremacy and artillery planted upon Piru Plantation and the Enogai-Bairoko area. General Twinnings AirSols had 161 fighters back on July 31st, but by August 18th they would have 129 functioning. Twining had sufficient strength in bombers as the number of light and medium bombers had dropped by less than a dozen, at around 129. For heavy bombers his increased from 48 to 61. It was critical Munda airfields be fully operational by mid august, sothe Seabees of the 73rd and 24th naval construction battalions went to work. Admiral Fitch’s plan for Munda airfield called for a 6000 long foot runway with a minimum 8 inch coral surface and taxiways and revetments ready for over 200 fighters by September 25th. Eventually this would also include 48 heavy bombers. The immediate job was the fighter strip as always, you prepare your defenses against air attacks before you bring in the heavy bombers. He had a week to make the field operational. Commander Doane of the 73rd Seabees had two critical assets. The first was Munda was by far the best airfield site in the Solomons. Beneath one to 3 feet of topsoil was solid coral and there was a plentiful supply of live coral which hardened like concrete, great for the surfacing. Second the 73rd was the best equipped battalion yet to arrive to the solomons with D-7 and D-8 bulldozers, ¾ yard power shovels, 8 yard carryalls and 7 ton rollers. Weather was good and the moon was bright for the week permitting night time work without lights. The immediate threat would have been a 12cm of the Yokosuka 7th SNLF at Baanga, but they never fired upon them. Again, wars are won by logistics and it can't be expressed enough what a colossal amount the Seabees did for the Pacific War. By August 14th, Mulcahy flew over to set up his HQ and the VMF-123 and VMF-124 flew into the base with a R4D carrying their gear and personnel. For the incoming invasion P-40s would be coming from Segi while Corsairs would be launched from Munda. 

Admiral Kusaka had reformed his 1st Base air force thanks to the arrival of his long-sought reinforcements. In mid July reinforcements arrived to the Solomons in the form of the 201st Kokutai Aerial Bomb group and carrier Division 2’s naval bombers from Ryujo. The overall strength of the 1st base air force was now at around 230 aircraft of various types. The land-based bombers would go to Rear Admiral Ueno Keizo’s 25th air flotilla over in Rabaul. They were tasked with night bombing raids against Guadalcanal and New Georgia now. Naval fights and bombers would be merged into the 1st combined air attack force, later reformed into the 26th air flotilla led by Rear Admiral Sakamaki Munetake. There job was to destroy any enemy shipping in New Georgia and to conduct interceptions over the Munda-Buin areas. It was understood the Americans held numerical superiority, but the Japanese were willing to take them on hoping their fighting spirit would prevail.

Meanwhile, back on the night of August 12th, Admiral Wilkinson deployed an advance party of 14 men led by Captain George Kriner to perform a reconnaissance of Vella Lavella. They would be reinforced by Companies E and G of the 103rd regiment when the scouts found 40 Japanese around Biloa and another 100 5 miles north of Barakoma. They had reached the island secretly using 4 PT boats, though Japanese floatplanes would made to bomb one of them. After the successful arrival of the advance party at Barakoma, F Company of the 103rd landed on August 14th to reinforce the beachhead. 

The main invasión force designated Task Force 31 led by Admiral Wilkinson  would consist of 10 destroyers, 5 destroyer transports, 12 LCI’s, 3 LST’s and two subchasers. At 3:05am  the 1st transport group of the force departed consisting of the destroyer transports with 6 escort destroyers were carrying the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 35th regiment. Captain Ryan led the group aboard Nicholas while Wilkinson was aboard Cony. The second transport group made up of the smaller vessels carried the Seabees and support personally following an hour behind with 4 destroyer escorts led by Captain William Cooke. After the force departed Guadalcanal they were to approach the Gizo Strait around midnight, before beginning to unload in the early hours of august 15th, under the cover of fighters. 

However Wilkinson would not be aware his force was spotted by a G3M Betty bomber which reported back to Admiral Samaki who immediately launched a strike force. By 8am, the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 35th regiment had landed. While the 3rd battalion began their unloading process enemy aircraft appeared. 48 Zeros and 6 Vals were intercepted by American fighters. By 9:15 all the troops were landed, now the equipment began to be unloaded. The Japanese launched two waves from Buin, the first appeared at 12:30, made up of 48 Zero’s and 11 Vals. They were intercepted leading to no damage being done to the landing forces. 7 Zeros came in low to strafe the beach but were turned away by fire from 65 automatic weapons aboard the LST’s. LST’s in the past lacked adequate anti aircraft protection, thus 20 20mm guns were borrowed from Guadalcanal and set to use. At 5:30 32 Zero’s and 8 Vals showed up but they too were intercepted. By 6pm the LSTs were beginning to retract. The strikes had amounted to 12 men killed on the beach and 40 wounded, it could have been much worse. The Japanese reported losing 9 Zeros and 8 Vals for the day while the Americans would claim to have lost a total of 5 fighters. Without any real land battle the amphibious invasion of Vella Lavella was a resounding success.

After darkness settled in, Admiral Ueno’s 5th air attack force over in Rabaul launched their final attempt against the American convoys. At 5:30pm, 3 Betty’s that had launched out of Vunakanau were spotting the convoy and reporting their movements. They came across the LCI’s southeast of Gatukai and the LSTs as they were approaching the Gizo strait. 23 Bettys in 3 Chutai’s, one armed with torpedoes the other two with bombs approached. The torpedo armed Betty’s attacked the LCI’s while the bombers went for the LST’s. The American destroyers tossed up a lot of anti aircraft fire as the torpedoes and bombs failed to hit targets. 4 Betty’s would be damaged badly for their efforts. The Japanese reaction to the terrible results was to form an unrealistic plan to wipe out the American invasion by sending a single battalion to the island. When the landings became known, officers of the 8th fleet and 17th army formed a conference. They estimated, with accuracy surprisingly, that the landing force was around a brigade in strength. One officer proposed the idea to send a battalion to counterland. General Imamura’s HQ calmly pointed out that sending a single battalion against a brigade would be like “pouring water on a hot stone”. The men were desperately more needed for the defense of Bougainville.

The Japanese knew they were vastly outnumbered in the Solomons and that the fight for the central solomons was pretty much lost. They believed their only chance to successfully defend the rest of the solomons was to carry out a slow retreat in order to build up forces in Bougainville and Rabaul.  It was decided that two rifle companies of the Miktami battalion and a platoon from the Yokosuka 7th SNLF would be sent to Horaniu on the northeast corner of Vella Lavella. These forces would establish a barge staging base between Kolombangara and the Shortlands. Alongside this Rekata bay would be evacuated and its 7th Kure SNLF would set up a relay base at Choiseul. Imamura nad Kusaka planned to hold Horaniu for as long as possible, trying to establish a new supply route along the west coast of Choiseul. 

For the Horaniu operation, Admiral Ijuins destroyer squadron of Sazanami, Shigure, Hamakaze and Isokaze were going to escort 22 barges, supported by 3 torpedo boats and two subchasers. The small armada departed Rabaul on August 17th, but Ijuin’s destroyers were spotted quickly by an allied search plane 100 miles out of Rabaul. In fact, Wilkinson was anticipating the Japanese heading for Kolombangara or perhaps Barakoma. He sent 4 destroyers, the Nicholas, O’Bannon, Taylor and Chevalier under Captain Thomas Ryan. Ryan had been an ensign in Yokohama during the 1923 Great Kanto earthquake, where he saved the love of one Mrs. Slack from the burning Grand Hotel. This earned him the medal of honor making him 1 of 18 men to receive the medal of honor during the interwar period of 1920-1940. Ryans force departed Tulagi while the other American convoy, the 2nd echelon led by Cooke were landing equipment at Barakoma. By nightfall Ryans squadron were coming up the slot while the enemy convoy was being harassed by 4 Avengers. The Avengers failed to score hits, but the anti aircraft gunfire alerted Ryan, as the Japanese were reversing course heading in his direction.

At 12:29am on August 18th O’Bannon made radar contact and a few minutes later the Americans could see the Japanese ships. At 12:32 the Japanese spotted Ryans force, prompting Ijuin to order a 45 degree turn northwest to try and lure the enemy away from the convoy. As his ruse succeeded there would be a pretty ineffective long range gun and torpedo duel seeing Hamakaze and Isokaze taking slight damage. Meanwhile the Japanese barges were racing to the coast. Ryan believed he had foiled the reinforcement when he engaged the destroyers . But because Chevalier was facing some mechanical failures and could not keep up speed to chase the Japanese destroyers, Ryan decided to turn back to engage the already landed reinforcements at Horaniu. However they managed to escape north too quickly, thus the Horaniu operation was quite a bit of success, with a lot of luck at play. Now we are shifting over to the frigid north waters of the Aleutians.

The fall of Attu and Munda were pivotal moments of the Pacific war that completely changed the course of their respective campaigns. When Munda was taken, the Japanese realized the central solomons were a lost cause and began to move all resources and men they could to Bougainville. When Attu was taken, the Japanese realized the Aleutian islands campaign was a lost cause and decided to evacuate the forces on Kiska. The battle of the pips and miraculous evacuation of Kiska was completed by the end of July. Kiska was pummeled on July 26th and 27th under clear sunny weather. 104 tons of bombs hit Kiska’s installation on the 26th in a large attack consisting of 32 B-24’s, 24 P-38 lightnings and 38 P-40’s. On the 27th it was hit with 22 tons of bombs. On August 1st Lt Bernard O’Donnel conducted the first reconnaissance sweep since the July 27th bombing and observed no Japanese fights, no anti aircraft fire and no ships at harbor. Meanwhile the blockade was being performed by Giffen and Griffen’s task force who bombarded Kiska. Intelligence crews working on aerial photographs of the island and its installations noted a number of odd features. Practically all the buildings around 23 in all appeared destroyed, but with rubble patterns suggesting demolition rather than bombing. The Japanese also appeared to have done no repair work on the craters in the north head runway, which was very odd, it was around the clock kind of work for them. All the garrisons trucks seemed to be parked on the beach in clusters and it seemed they were not moving day to day. Some pilots reported a bit of activity, like narrowly missing flak and some vehicles and ships seen moving below, but Kinkaids HQ noted all these reports were coming from green pilots. Experienced fliers were not reporting such things. Radio traffic had vanished, some wondering if the bombing was so tremendous it destroyed all the radios. Generals Butler and DeWitt believed the Green pilots, but Generals Buckner and Holland Smith were very suspicious, pointing out that the Japanese had already carried out a secret massive evacuation at Guadalcanal. In fact Buckner and Smith kept asking Kinkaid to toss some Alaskan scouts ashore in rubber boats at night prior to an invasion to report if the island was abandoned or not. But Kinkaid had the last say in the matter and declined to do so. Kinkaid’s decision was to go ahead with a full scale invasion of the island. In his words “if the enemy had evacuated the island, the troop landings would be a good training exercises, a super dress rehearsal, excellent for training purposes”. 

On August 12th, Captain George Ruddel, leading a squadron of 4 fighters circled low over the anti aircraft gun positions on Kiska, received no flak so he landed on her North head runway dodging nearly 30 craters. The 3 other fighters followed suit and the pilots performed a tiny expedition for some time. They found no sign of people, just destroyed buildings and abandoned equipment. Nonetheless Ruddels report would not stop Kinkaid, only some scolding for doing something so dangerous. The invasion of Kiska, codenamed operation cottage, was set for August 15th. The invasion force was 30,000 Americans and 5300 Canadians under the overall command of Major General Charles Harrison Corlet. It consisted of Brigadier General Archibald Arnolds 7th division; Buckner’s 4th regiment; Colonel Roy Victor Rickards 87th mountain infantry regiment, the 13th Canadian Brigade known as the Greenlight Force which consisted of the Canadian Fusiliers regiment, the 1st Battalion of Winnipeg Grenadiers, the Rocky Mountain Rangers regiment and Le Regiment de Hull led by Major General George Pearkers; there was also Colonel Robert Fredericks 1st Special Service force consisting of 2500 paratroops of elite American-Canadian commandos. Kiska marked the first time Canadian conscripts were sent to a combat zone in WW2. The men were equipped in Arctic gear, trained mostly at Adak, practicing amphibious landings using LCI’s and LCT’s.

The naval forces were commanded by Admiral Rockwell were more than 100 warships strong, with Admiral Baker leading a group to bombard Kiska with over 60 tons on August 14th. The journey to the abandoned island was pretty uneventful. On August 15th, Admiral Rockwell dispatched the transports to gather off Kiska during a period of light fog. Major General Corlett’s plan was to stage a diversionary landing using a detachment of Alaskan Scout led by Colonel Verbeck to hit Gertrude Cove which was assumed to be heavily fortified. While this occurred an advance force of the 1st, 2nd and provisional battalions of the 1st regiment, 1st special service force would secure the western side of the island, known as Quisling cove. The main force would land at a beach on the north near the Kiska volcano.

Colonel Verbecks scouts and Colonel Robert Fredericks commands were the first to come ashore. They were met by empty machine gun nests as they climbed Lard Hill, Larry Hill and Lawson Hill, interesting names. They investigated caves and ravines only to find destroyed equipment. But perhaps the enemy was simply further up in the hills saving their ammunition to ambush them. During the morning the main force landed on Kiskas northern side whereupon they immediately began climbing some cliffs to reach objectives. In the process each battalion of the 87th mountain regiment captured Robber Hill, Riot Hill and Rose Hill. US Army Lt George Earle recalled this of the unique landscapes of Kiska “At one end was a perfectly shaped steaming volcano, cloudcushioned, well- wrapped […] all around were cliff-walled shores and, when visible, a bright green matting of waist-high tundra scrub and deep lush mosses – a great green sponge of slopes rising to a rocky knife-edge crest nearly eight hundred feet above the shore up in the fog, and zigzagging its ridge-line backbone toward the […] four-thousand foot cone of the volcano”. Lt Earle also noted the incessant rain and fog, Kiska saw roughly 250 days of rain per year on average and held a ton of clouds blotting out sunshine. On the day the allied force landed the island was blanketed with a thick fog. As the allied forces advanced they ran into a variety of booby traps the Japanese had taken a lot of time to leave behind, these included; typical land mines, improvised 155m shells with trigger wires, M-93 mine’s laid upside down wired to blocks of TNT, timed bombs, candle bombs, and the classic grenades with trip wire. There was to be several casualties from booby traps. In the fog as timed bombs or other traps went off, allied forces opened fire towards noises believing the enemy was upon them. There was some friendly fire incidents amongst the Americans and Canadians, but not as much that has been perpetuated by quite a few videos on Youtube mind you. Its actually a myth thats been perpetuated in many books, in fact the main source I have been using for the Aleutian islands campaign is guilty of it sad to say. The friendly fire incidents on Kiska was not a large skirmish between American and Canadian forces that resulted in many deaths or wounded, no that was pretty much summed up to booby traps, a lot of them. If you want to know more about this, I did a podcast interview on my youtube channel, the Pacific War channel with Brad St.Croix, a historian focused on Canadian military history. The episode is titled the Canadian experience during the Pacific War, and Brad had a lot of, going to admit, vented anger about debunking this myth haha. Please go check it out, I have to admit of all my podcast episodes it has not received many views and I am sad at this because there’s a lot of interesting stuff, like how Canada was going to be part of Operation Downfall. Anyways.

The Americans and Canadians suspected the Japanese might be retreating into the interior or hiding in fight pits, so they were tense the entire time, after the stories from Attu who could blame them. The crack of a single rifle fire, would be met with more, but it always died down quickly. Corlett’s forces continued to climb uphill towards Link Hill and Ranger Hill in the direction of the main enemy camp at Kiska harbor. They found all the fortifications they came across abandoned. The second wave of the main force were brought over consisted of the 1st regiment, 1st special service force who landed at Little Kiska Island unopposed. By August 18th Corlett was confident the enemy was not on Kiska, but he continued the search nonetheless, into the caves and ravine, until August 22nd. To quote Ian Toll’s 2nd book of his pacific war trilogy 

“Considering the expenditure of naval ordnance and aerial bombs on an

island that had been vacated by the enemy, and the tremendous investment

of shipping and troops in a bloodless invasion, the Kiska operation had been

slightly farcical. In Pearl Harbor, the news was received in good humor.

Nimitz liked to tell visitors how advance elements of the huge invasion

force, creeping inland with weapons at the ready, were warmly greeted by a

single affable dog that trotted out to beg for food”

Indeed the capture of Kiska which ushered the end to the Aleutians campaign, was kind of a enormous blunder when you consider the amount of resources allocated to it. You always have to consider these resources could have been brought to the south pacific, but hindsight is hindsight. After the battle of Attu, the allies expected an absolute bloodbath on Kiska. For Corlett’s men, the americans suffered 18 deaths, 170 wounded, the Canadians 4 killed and 4 wounded, 130 men also got trench foot. The destroyer Abner Read struck a Japanese mine on August 18th, suffering 70 dead and 47 wounded to bring the total casualties to 313. Generals Buckner and DeWitt sought an invasion of Paramushiro, but the joint chiefs of staff would gradually reject the idea because it was simply seen to be easier to drive through the central or south pacific to Japan. But I would like to point out, if the south and central pacific campaigns did not go well, the idea of hitting the Japanese home islands from the Aleutians could have been a very real thing. Kinkaid, Butler, Eareckson amongst many others would leave the north pacific to deploy in other theaters. It was only really Buckner who remained, DeWitt returned to the west coast, as did the majority of forces.

Wanted a feel good end to this one. So the allied forces on Kiska found more than just booby traps, turns out the Japanese had abandoned a number of dogs on the island, so the allied troops adopted many of them and turned them into unit mascots and pets. Surviving photos of the soldiers and the dogs are abundant and cute.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

The amphibious assault of Vella Lavella was a huge success, though now the battle for the small island was on. The farcical battle of Kiska had ushered in the end of the Aleutian islands campaign, birthing a long persisting myth to this very day of an incredible friendly fire battle. 

- 90 - Pacific War - Komiatum Offensive, August 8-15, 1943

Last time we spoke about the intense battle for Munda. The most important objective of the New Georgia campaign, the seizure of Munda had come at long last. The 43rd, 37th and 25th divisions all performed an envelopment offensive against Munda, but in their way were extremely formidable Japanese fortifications. It was a real slogfest seeing tremendous casualties for both sides of the conflict. However the Americans were able to breakthrough some of the Japanese bunkers, tunnels and pillboxes thanks largely to the use of flamethrowers which were becoming more and more popular on the battlefield of the Pacific. Munda was finally captured and now the Japanese had to withdraw to other areas like Vila to keep the fight alive. On the seas, commander Frederick Moosbrugger unleashed some improved mark 14 torpedoes at the IJN and scored a major victory sending 3 destroyed to their grave and countless sailors and soldiers. 

This episode is the Komiatum Offensive

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

 

So last week we talked exclusively about the New Georgia campaign, so today as you guessed it we are diving back over to New Guinea. You know when it comes to the big and popular aspects of the war, Guadalcanal usually takes the leading role, but campaigns like New Guinea seem to always fall to the wayside as they say. Yet the battle for New Guinea was just as important, it took significant resources away from the Empire of Japan. We are soon to reach the climax of the Lae-Salamaua campaign, things are really starting to heat up.

Now the last time we were over on Green Hell, Brigadier Moten had just ordered the 2/6th battalion to secure Bobdubi ridge, while the 2/5th assault Mount Tambu. By the end of July, the Coane Force was beginning to occupy Tambu Bay. The 3rd battalion, 162nd of Archibald Roosevelt were securing the Boisi area with two of their companies hitting slopes west of Tambu Bay, while the 2nd battalion assembled itself at Tambu Bay. By seizing Tambu Bay, the artillery could now take up a good position to better support the troops. Further north, Brigadier Heathcote Hammer was reorganizing his 15th brigade for a new attack against the Old Vickers position. On July 24th, he held an officers conference at Gwaibolom. Hammer laid out plans to employ the 58/59th battalion against Erskine Creek and Old Vickers. The commander of the 58/59th, Lt Colonel Patrick Starr received the order from Hammer, but also a letter directed at him. In the letter Hammer laid out a ton of criticisms against his unit, some of his officers and by implication Starr himself. The main criticisms were based largely on ineffective ground operations such as the unit lacking adequate knowledge of where their neighboring units were or that of the enemy. But as we know, this unit had not received proper training and it really was a baptism under fire kind of situation. But like they say about swimming, sometimes you gotta be thrown into the pool, and boy were they. Following some rather poorly planned and failed attacks back on June 30th, the 58/59th now adopted a more measure approach against the Old Vickers position. Hammer also helped with his reorganizing efforts. Hammer ordered Company A to head further north, while Major Warfe’s commandos would take over the defenses for Gwaibolom; General Savige was assigned the 2/7th to help reinforce the 15th brigade; the 2/6th were ordered to advance along the Sugarcane Ridge to clear a way forward, but would run into a 100 Japanese strong position north off the ridge. On July 26th, the Australians concentrated their 25 pounders upon the ridge before launching a frontal assault.

Meanwhile Brigadier General Ralph Coane renewed their attack against Roosevelt Ridge on July 27th. Coane ordered the still assembling 2nd battalion, 162nd regiment for the task. 100 men of E company advanced using a creek line parallel to the ridge, going through some thick jungle. They marched single file, hooking back towards a spur that led towards a small knoll on its crest, looking for a way to break the Japanese defenses. But once they reached the crest, they began taking heavy fire and although they established themselves firmly on a shoulder of ground below the ridge, they could advance no further. Meanwhile the 2/6th were lobbing 25 pounders accurately over the Old Vicker’s position, forcing the Japanese to flee to the refugee of their underground shelters. It basically had become a routine of taking a bombardment and awaiting some screaming Australians or Americans afterwards for most of the Japanese defenders by this point. However no assault came.

On July 28th another bombardment was on its way, but this one was directed on the Coconuts area. Starting at 2:45, two 25 pounders from Tambu Bay fired hundreds of rounds alongside some 3 inch mortars in an attempt to thwart the Japanese from sending reinforcement over to the Old Vickers position. During the final 5 minutes of what was a 15 minute bombardment, it turned into a creeping barrage allowing C Company of the 58/59th to advance. The bombardment made a ton of smoke aiding the men. Three platoons attacked the Old vickers position simultaneously. Platoon 7 of Butch Proby charged across some exposed ground at the center of the position; Platoon 13 of Lt Jack Evans attacked the left; while Platoon 15 of Sergeant Vic Hammond attacked from the right. The platoons managed to successfully overrun the Japanese forward bunkers and reached the crest just as the unsuspecting Japanese there were emerging from their dugouts. A heavy firefight broke out, but it was the defenders who began fleeing for their lives towards the Coconuts area. As the men consolidated the Old vickers position they found 17 dead Japanese, but also a large amount of abandoned booty. A 70mm gun with 300 shells, 4 light machine guns, 1 medium machine gun and 28 rifles which the Australians gladly grabbed.

Hammer expected the Japanese to launch a vicious counterattack so he rapidly ordered the 2/7th battalion to send the fresh A Company of Captain Septimus Cramp over to relieve the exhausted C Company. Meanwhile B Company of the 2/6th were assaulting Sugarcane Ridge being supported by 3 inch mortars and 4 Vickers guns from the 2/6th field regiment along the Tambu Bay coast. Coming from Ambush Knoll, Platoon 10 led by Lt Clive Trethewie made a frontal assault, but machine gun fire from atop Sugarcane Ridge halted them quickly. Platoon 12 led by Sergeant Stan White and Platoon 11 of Lt Ted Exton were hooking around the ridge to attack the enemy’s rear. The Japanese defenders had assumed the ridge was too steep in its rear position and were completely taken by surprise by the attack, seeing Extoons Platoon 11 overrun them. The Japanese were forced to flee for their lives. The Japanese attempted a dusk counterattack to reclaim the ridge, but it failed.

On July 28th, with E Company stalled, F company was brought up to help out, taking up a position to E Company’s left. They both tried to assault the ridge together, but gained little ground and were forced to dig in as the Japanese harassed them with counterattacks. The problem really was the Japanese were simply too well dug in. They held a steep narrow crest on the ridge, with the typical camouflaged pillboxes, mutually supporting machine gun nests, an intricate network of underground tunnels, lets call it the “Japanese special” haha, it will be seen quite often going forward into this war. The allied artillery and mortar bombardments could do little to actually hurt the Japanese, but it did cause them to take shelter within their tunnels, then there was the hope the assaulting forces got close enough before the Japanese stormed out again, which feels a lot like battles from WW1.

In the meantime Major Roosevelt’s battalion were working to cut off the Japanese supply routes to the ridge. He dispatched multiple patrols to take up positions along junctions and tracks between Scout ridge, Roosevelt Ridge and Mount Tambu. The men ran into skirmishes with Japanese supply efforts, greatly hindering them. But with the lack of progress by Coane’s force concerned certain commanders like General Savige who began to criticize Coane for a lack of control and discipline over the men. Savige ordered him to push on immediately to capture Roosevelt Ridge, but in response Coane protested that he needed more reinforcements to seize the heavily fortified position. Likewise the lack of progress over at Mount Tambu was also annoying commanders. Taylor Force had just relieved the exhausted 2/5th battalion on the 28th. Several companies consisting of around 400 men from the 1st battalion, 162nd regiment coming over from Nassau Bay took up positions around Mount Tambu. Australian mortar crews and stretcher bearers remaining in the line to support their American comrades with one company of the 2/5th staying behind likewise. Moten planned for a new attack, slated for the 30th, to be followed with attacks against Goodview Junction and Orodubi by the 2/5th and 2/6th respectively. To open up the new attack, 8 105mm guns positioned at Buigap Creek Valley alongside 5 25 pounders position at Tambu Bay opened fire in the morning firing around 200 rounds per gun for an hour and a half.

The Americans began their assault with Platoons 2 and 3 charging the ridge while Platoon 1 awaited in reserve. For 45 minutes the two leading platoons moved 150 meters across the Japanese front’s right shoulder. They managed to knock out 6 out of 8 bunkers on the shoulder before attempting to advance further, but the defenders second tier line three meters higher up opened fire upon them and numerous grenades came rolling down the slope. The fire was too much, with the defenders using their tunnel and trench system to deadly effect taking up numerous positions to fire down on the Americans. The two platoons were halted dead in their tracks as the third platoon was brought up, but it made no difference. A legendary figure emerged from this action.

For those of you from down unda, you probably already know the story, but for those of you who down, Corporal Leslie Bull Allen became a hero this day. Bull Allen was born in 1918, in Ballarant Victoria and when WW2 broke out he volunteered for service with the 2nd Australian imperial force. He served the 2/5th in Palestine where he became a stretcher bearer. He served in Libya and Syria where he received the nickname Bull for getting a reputation to having a cool head under fire. He was a fairly big boy, 5”11, laborer type build and he had a really deep laugh his comrades would remark “you could hear him a mile off! Bull was thus one of the battalion’s most recognisable…and one of its most popular characters”. After facing the Italians, French and Germans, Bull was sent to New Guinea. He had served during the Wau battle where he received a Military medal for carrying out comrades under intense fire, his citation read “Private Allen’s bearing and his untiring efforts in tending the wounded and helping with rations and stores were an inspiration”. On July the 30th when the Americans were storming Mount Tambu and got botched down, Allen was one of the stretcher bearers who came running up and by himself carried 12 American servicemen to safety. There’s a famous photograph of Bull carrying an American soldier over his shoulders who had been knocked unconscious by a mortar, I do recommend googling it. And of course, I am a Sabaton fan and I would be remiss not to mention there is a song dedicated to Bull Allen, worth a listen. I got to sit down with Sabaton at a bar once in Montreal, the first time they came to north america, by the way, just gloating. Bull Allen received the Silver Star for his heroism from the United States. But as much as I’d like to end it there, I would also like to mention the reality of war. Bull put on a straight face and showed no fear as he saved the men, but as early as 1941 he was showing psychological issues. He had been admitted to a hospital in Libya, suffering from anxiety neurosis, again what we call acute combat stress or combat stress reaction. By the time he saved those boys on Mount Tambu his health was being taxed heavily. Towards the end of 1944, Bull would begin lashing out at superior officers and got himself court martialed and demoted to private. His psychological health, alongside a few bouts of malaria took a horrible toll on him creating numerous anxiety ridden episodes seeing him discharged from duty as he was not deemed medically fit. Bull found it difficult in the post war years suffering from post traumatic stress, and during one point he lost the ability to speak for 6 months. He spent his life after the war working as a laborer and then as a theater nurse at the Ballarat Base hospital. Bull became quite a popular fellow around Ballarant and would pass away on May 11th of 1982 from diabetes and other complications. He is a staple on Anzac Day and a famous image of the Australian war effort during the Pacific War. Mount Tambu was not taken that day, though the first line of bunkers were battered. Moten realized frontally attacking such fortifications was suicide, so he elected to cut off Mount Tambu instead. With the Americans failing, the 2/5th and 2/6th planned attacks changed to taking up positions to surround Mount Tambu.

Back on the 29th, Major Warfe took his men to attack what was known as the Timbered knoll held by some Japanese. He sent A Platoon led by John Lewin south along its ridge. They were supported by artillery from Tambu Bay. At 4pm the artillery and mortars started blasting away for 15 minutes. The commandos assaulted the knoll from its northern side, but were quickly pinned down by machine gun fire. Around 10 men advanced along the Bench Cut track east of the Timbered Knoll and attacked it from the south, successfully surprising the defenders, forcing them to flee. Following the capture of the Timbered Knoll, Warfe wanted to press onwards to Orodubi, but Brigadier Hammer ordered his commandos to hold their position as he did not want to open up any gaps along the ridge.

Also on the 29th, General Herring for the first time informed General Savige of the true offensive going on which was against Lae rather than Salamaua, indicating to him that the role of his 3rd division was to hold the enemy down in the Salamaua area. Likewise Moten had devised a new plan to drive the enemy from Mount Tambu. It turned out a patrol from the 2/6th had discovered a route going from Ambush Knoll to the Buirali Creek which would allow forces to cut off the Komiatum track, thus isolating the Mount Tambu and Goodview junction. The 2/6 sent 4 patrols out searching for how to ford the Buirali Creek going up to the Kiamatum ridge, some of which probed Japanese positions. 

To the north, Captain Edwin Griff’s B Company of the 58/59th advanced to Buggert preparing to attack the Coconuts area. On the 30th as they began their attack, they were met with heavy fit around 80 yards south of the South Coconuts. Forced to dig in the Australians spent the night repelling 3 counterattacks with a handful of men receiving some nasty bayonet and knife wounds. By the morning of the 31st Griff was down to 38 effective men and at 7:20am a 4th Japanese counterattack consisting of a hundred or so men overwhelmed his position. Griff was forced to withdraw to a village west of the Old Vickers position. While this was going on, Hammer had sent companies over to cut the Komiatum and Bench tracks using his A company and C Company. Moten reinforced him with A company of the 2/7th in the hopes such actions would press the Japanese to move more units from Lae over the Salamaua area. It was a huge success as by the end of July the Salamaua area counted with more than 8000 troops. However with all of these troops at Salamaua also required the allies to boost up their commitment in the area, thus Brigadier Raymond Monaghan with the 29th brigade were landed at Nassau Bay for the task. They were assigned to reinforce the Coane force which was still struggling against Roosevelt ridge.

Over on the Japanese side, General Adachi decided to reinforce Lae’s defenses. He deployed the 2nd battalion, 80th regiment who would be coming over from Finschhafen, however they would never make it to Lae as by the time they were going to depart they were forced to stay put because the Australians were threatening  the region. Adachi also ordered the Shoge detachment of Major General Shoge Ryoichi to depart Wewak. His force consisted of the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 238th regiment and a battalion of the 41st mountain artillery regiment. Elements of the 238th regiment began leaving Wewak traveling in groups of 3 motor landing crafts every two nights. Each MLC had 50 men and their supplies packed in like sardines. Soon small fishing boats were also carrying 20 men, by late July the 2nd battalion, 238th had all moved from Wewak to Alexishafen. From Alexishafen they traveled again by night and by MLC to Finschhafen and from there finally to Lae. However due to increased attacks and losses upon the MLCS countless men would be left at Finschhafen. Some were ordered to march overland to Lae, but it was a nightmare of a trip.

On August 1st, the 1st battalion, 80th regiment had taken up positions along the side of the Old Vickers position and began firing upon its defenders. They were covered by mortars as they charged up the steep terrain in an enveloping movements towards Grassy Knoll. Captain Edwin Griff’s B company harassed them from the west, and by the following morning the 2/7th battalion were able to push the Japanese back. To the north in the Coconuts, Pimple Knoll and the Sugarcane Knoll more Japanese attacks were occurring, but the defenders held the former Japanese fortifications giving them a distinct edge. By the afternoon the Japanese were sniping men in the Old Vickers and Sugarcane Knoll, trying to cover their assault units. By August 3rd, the Japanese unleashed another assault against the entire perimeter, seeing the fiercest fighting take place in an area in front of the 8th Platoon led by Corporal Alan Naismith. Alan ended up crawling forward with grenades in hand before tossing them down the steep slopes of Old Vickers killing many Japanese. Seeing the battle going nowhere, the Japanese unleashed a banzai charge at night as a last ditch effort to break through, but were ultimately forced to withdraw. Seeing three full days of frontal assaults fail, the Japanese then elected to advance further south along a ridge and dug in between the Old Vickers and Buggert. This threatened to encircle the 2/7th, so Griff’s B Company were ordered to restore the line of communications to Old Vickers.

Griff ordered a concentrated bombardment of 30 mortars before his company stormed the slope the Japanese dug in on. Two platoons quickly broke through towards Sugarcane Knoll and in the process forced the Japanese to withdraw back over to the Coconuts area. Griff then ordered his company to perform mop up operations as some Japanese had stayed in their foxholes. Yet the performance overall for the 58/59th had displeased Hammer who now decided to place them under Major Warfe’s command. They would also be redeployed over to the Gwaibolom area, while the commandos would take over their Old Vickers position. For a few days the 2/7th performed patrols around the Coconuts area to prepare for a final attack against it.

Over at Mount Tambu, on August 4th, Captain Cam Bennett’s B Company and Walters A Company of the 2/5th successfully surprise attacked the defenders atop a small knoll known as Hodge’s Knoll. However they were soon met with heavy counterattacks from three sides dislodging them in the late afternoon. The next day, Moten ordered the 2/6th battalion to advance along the Stephens Track, while its D company led by Captain Harold Laver would take an alternate path towards the Komiatum ridge heading north of Goodview. During the afternoon, a forward patrol of Company D found a route through the jungle to Komiatum village, but the route proved very difficult for the full company to traverse. Alongside this discovery, a patrol from Taylor Force found a small ridge north of Komiatum that was unoccupied named Davidson ridge. By August 6th, Moten and Savige concluded their plan to isolate and reduce Mount Tambu. The 2/6th would secure Komiatum ridge to the northwest; Coane Force would hit Roosevelt and Scout ridge; Lt Colonel Charlie Davidsons 42nd battalion would hit a key ridge to the north, Ie: the one that was to be called Davidson; the 2/5th would hit Goodview junction and the 15th brigade would contain assault the Coconuts area containing the enemy at Tambu knoll and Orodubi.

General Herring liked the plan and urged General Savige to quote "drive Coane on to the capture of Roosevelt Ridge even if the cost is higher than he cares about". Herring also added that he could take Savige’s requests to the higher authorities and upon stating that Savige immediately requested Coane and Major Roosevelt be relieved of their commands. Again a lot of the interpersonal and command issues were due to MacArthurs tampering with Alamo Force. Brigadier Coane was told by Fuller he was a separate command from MacKechnie and Colonel Roosevelt continuously refused to obey orders from MacKechnie stating he was not under Australian command. It took until July 19th, for Herring to clarify things that the Australians were in charge of operations in the Nassau Bay area. Combine this with the lack of progress and it was no surprise people were gunning to sack another. On August 7th the first units of Davidsons 42nd battalion landed at Nassau bay at 2am and Coane requested that Davidson immediately march north. Davidson refused to do so until his men got a hot meal and some sleep angering Coane. Then when Davidson and his men reach Duali he was informed Major Stephen Hodgman was waiting with orders from Moten that it was he who was taking operational command. Coane was only to have command over supply communications and rations. When Davidson reached Tambu Bay on the 8th he met with Coane who was greatly frustrated that he was unable to use Davidsons units to hit Roosevelt ridge. Coane told him “If I can’t do as I want with you, I don’t consider you under my command at all”. It was quite fortunate as MacArthur soon relieved Coane and Roosevelt of their commands. As General Savige would later write “MacArthur asked me for my views on Coane and Roosevelt and I gave them strongly…I had my bags packed but MacArthur supported me”. Thus MacArthur sides with Herring and Savige and as a result Colonel MacKechnie was given back command over the 162nd regiment which was taken away from the 41st division directly under Savige’s command. So much sneaky maneuvering going on by MacArthur’s team. On August the 9th Savige visited Motens HQ, then Hammers, then the 58/59th battalions and finally the 2/6th. He was making a tour of the front lines trying to raise morale for the Australians. The next day, the 42nd battalion finally got into position at Tambu Bay where they received confirmation of their orders to seize Davidson ridge. By the 11th the men were climbing the ridge, facing no opposition and it was fully occupied by the 12th.

Also on the 12th, MacKechnie began his attack against Roosevelt ridge deploying his 2nd battalion on the right flank and the 3rd on the left. The 2nd battalion established a position on the ridge crest rappelling several counterattacks throughout the day. After a 1.5hr artillery barrage of over 2000 rounds the 2nd battalion charged the ridge and successfully breached the Japanese line in three points. Meanwhile the 3rd battalion, 66th regiment were fighting for their lives, but by nightfall two Australian companies were now occupying high knolls around 500 yards apart. The 3rd battalion, 238th regiment had just begun arriving to Salamaua and were quickly redirected to help out the men on Roosevelt ridge. It would all be for naught however as by the 14th, the Australians pushed the Japanese to the eastern end of the ridge. From a Historian who covered the 41st division “At about 13:15 the jungles north, south and west of Roosevelt Ridge shook and shivered to the sustained blast. The mountains and ridges threw the echo back and forth, down and out, and the quiet white-capped sea to the east, ringing the outer third of Roosevelt Ridge, grew dark a s it received the eruption of earth and steel on that stricken shoulder of land. Scores of guns—75-mm howitzers, Aussie 25-pounders, 20-mms, Bofors, light and heavy machine-guns, even small arms—had opened up simultaneously on the enemy-held ridge. A score or more Allied fighters and bombers had swooped low to strafe its dome and tons of bombs released from the B-24s and B-25s fell straight and true, to detonate, shatter, rip and tear and to deliver certain death at that moment on an August afternoon. Those who watched from the beach saw the top fourth of the ridge lift perceptibly into the air and then fall into the waiting sea. In a scant twenty minutes all that remained of the objective was a denuded, redly scarred hill over which infantrymen already were clambering, destroying what remained of a battered and stunned enemy.” By the late afternoon, Roosevelt Ridge was finally firmly in the hands of the allies. MacKechnie could not however advance any further as his lines were already overextended. The Japanese withdrew to the nearby Scout Ridge where the 238th regiment reinforcements also came to defend. 

While this was occurring the 2/7th were advancing upon the Coconuts area. Captain Andrew Rooke led the Bena platoon of Company A alongside Platoon 9 to hit the steep eastern approaches of the South coconuts; Captain Fred Barr’s B company advanced upon the North Coconuts from the west. August the 14th began with a heavy airstrike made up of 22 B-24’s and 7 B-17’s. Starting at 9:30am as told to us by Axel Olsen observing from the Old Vickers “with a noise like the rushing of a great wind’, the bombs passed over the heads of the waiting assault troops. ‘Trees, logs and other rubbish flew through the fall [sic] of dust which now cloaked the target.’ The observers at Old Vickers observed, ‘It seemed that nothing could have lived in the midst of devastation loosed by the planes.” At 10:10 artillery began to bombard the area for an hour and half. As the artillery ceased, 3 inch mortars continued to fire covering the approach of the infantry who were using smoke bombs. As Axel Olsen wrote observing from the Old Vickers  “came a terribly fierce raking with Vickers guns firing through the haze from smoke bombs”. The Australian assault battered the north coconuts position which was guarded by two pillboxes connected to weapon pits using crawl trenches. The area had suffered hard from the bombardments easily allowing the Australians to seize it. However the southern defenses of the south Coconuts found defenders resisting hard in their trenches. The center Coconuts position like the north had nearly been obliterated by the bombing allowing B company to make progress, but soon they were pulling back to the north coconuts position. During the night, allied platoons came across a Japanese communication line going over the Salamua-Bobdubi track, so they cut it to prevent reinforcements. For the next two days, patrols and mortar fire were harassing the south coconuts defenders gradually forcing them to evacuate. By August the 17th the Coconuts and northern end towards Bobdubi were firmly in Australian hands.

With all of these gains in hand, Moten was finally ready to attack Komiatum. On August the 15th,  Captain Edgar’s A Company, Captain Laver’s D Company of the 2/6th battalion took up a position due west of Laver’s Knoll. Yes the future names of these knolls and ridges really does seem to give away what happens in the stories haha. Laver’s Knoll was a key feature of the Komiatum ridge and taking it would allow the allies to apply more pressure upon the enemy. On the morning of the 16th, the 2/5th battalion performed a diversionary attack against Goodview, while A and B Companies advanced up the Komiatum ridge under a creeping barrage. The men were fortunate as the Japanese were forced to flee during the artillery fire, allowing Laver’s knoll to be seized quite easily. The men dug in immediately allowing Lt Les Johnson’s platoon 17 to capture, you guessed it Johnson’s knoll. During WW2 if you really wanted something named after you, all you had to do was travel to Green Hell. Johnson and his men dug in on the knoll and soon Japanese fire was directed at them. Japanese counterattacks were lobbed from their south and west before nightfall, but they managed to hold on. During the night the 42nd battalion began using Vicker guns and mortars from Davidson ridge to help harass the enemy. Around dawn on the 17th, the Japanese unleashed another counter attack against Johnson knoll, this time the enemy got within just meters of the Australian defenders. After dusk even more counterattacks were made seeing 217 deaths, 380 wounded and 301 sick Japanese after all was said and done. The attacks were tossed back and soon Vickers machine guns were brought up to Laver’s Knoll to add to the Japanese misery. Unable to break the allied push onto the Komiatum ridge, the Japanese began to become more and more desperate. Artillery and aerial bombardment on top of enveloping maneuvers by the Australians were taking a heavy toll. The Japanese had suffered over 900 casualties since July 23rd and with more and more men dying by the minute, General Nakano ordered a withdrawal from Komiatum to be carried out on the night of August 19th. Nakano was still under the illusion Salamaua was the main target.

The next day the Taylor Force and 2/5th found Mount Tambu and Goodview suddenly unoccupied and finally seized their objectives. General Savige personally came over to congratulate the men who took Laver’s knoll, but this was to be his last action in command of the 3rd division. Blamey decided to replace  Savige with the commander of the 5th division General Edward Milford. Milford would later find out the reason for Savige’s sacking was because General Herring was greatly annoyed that a supply line to the coast had not been opened, which was desperately needed to relieve supply aircraft for the upcoming attack on Lae. Herring told Milford that Savige had never visited the front line because he was too old, but as I just mentioned this was false, Savage had in fact visited Mubo and Komiatum. Major General Frank Berryman working in Blamey’s HQ, who remained quite close to the man, who often sought out his advice believed General Herring was unjustified in his sacking of Savige. Berryman would point out “ Herring ‘not giving Savige a fair burl… Savige having to fight Herring as well as Japs. Savige had done well and we had misjudged him’.Savige bitterly handed over his command, greatly disappointed he would not get to see the final capture of Salamaua. But he did not depart unrewarded, as he received a Companion of the order of Bath for his services during the campaign with his citation reading;

Maj-Gen. Savige had control of the Battle for Salamaua from 30 Jun. 43 till his relief on 26 Aug. 43. The battle was finally won on 11 Sep. 43—the credit for victory must rest with Maj-Gen. Savige during whose period of command, the back of the enemy's defence was broken. The nature of the country rendered great assistance to the defender, and careful planning alone enabled the defences to be overcome. The supplying of our forward troops was also a terrific problem.

Maj-Gen. Savige triumphed over all these difficulties, his men were kept supplied, they were encouraged to endure the most dreadful hardships, and to overcome great difficulties of terrain. Maj-Gen. Savige's plans were well conceived and he saw them carried through. The success achieved is of the greatest importance to the Allied cause, and Maj-Gen. Savige by his fine leadership has made a very real contribution to the ultimate success of the United nations.

The victories won over the enemy at the battles for Mubo and Komiatum were due to his well conceived plans and energetic execution.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

The battle for Salamaua and Lae was drawing ever closer. The boys down unda had seized control over vital positions forcing the Japanese into more and more desperate defensive measures taking horrifying casualties in the process. 

- 89 - Pacific War - Fall of Munda, August 1-8, 1943

Last time we spoke about the drive to Lae and Salamaua on New Guinea and the mysterious battle of the Pips. The boys on Green Hell were having a hell of a time trying to capture Mount Tambu. The Japanese had made a pillbox nightmare around Mount Tambu and reclaimed Ambush Knoll. Ambush Knoll was once again taken by the allies, by Warfe’s commandos to be exact, but Mount Tambu was proving to be a much tougher nut to crack. Then in the frigid northern waters of the Aluetians, the allies had just successfully retaken Attu, but at a horrifying cost. The heavy cost convinced the allies, Kiska would be a similar bloody affair so they sought some Canadian help for its invasion. Yet before the invasion would occur one of the strangest battle of WW2 happened, the mysterious battle of the pips. The Americans found themselves firing at ghosts. But today we are venturing over to New Georgia.

This episode is the Fall of Munda

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

The New Georgia campaign in many ways was akin to Guadalcanal. The Americans had suddenly invaded the island, landing numerous troops before the Japanese could coordinate a way to thwart them. Once the troops were landed, then the Japanese decided to react, and by react I mean tossing troops of their own on the island to dislodge the Americans. But just like with the Guadalcanal campaign, the war of transportation was not one the IJN could seemingly win against the Americans. By 2nd of July US forces led by the US 43rd Division, held an overwhelming advantage of 15,000 troops compared to 9,000 Japanese, who had landed at Zannana with a view to attacking westwards towards Munda Point. It was a battle that took far longer than the Allies had envisaged. Stubborn Japanese resistance and their ability to infiltrate US lines and cut supplies meant an advance at a snail’s pace, despite their control of the air and sea. Yet while the Americans were chipping away, bit by bit at the outskirts of New Georgia, the real defensive position was of course, Munda. Up until this point Major General Minoru Sasaki had done a great job of delaying the Americans while pulling his forces back to make a stand at Munda. Indeed the Americans had a terrible time fighting the Japanese and mother nature, as Sergeant Antony Coulis described one advance thus “We alternatively crawled up and down greasy ridges. We forded numerous jungle streams and swam three of them. The repeated torture of plunging into icy streams; the chopping away of endless underbrush and foliage; the continuous drizzle of rain; the days without hot food or drink; the mosquitoes tormenting us at night. It was sheer physical torture …”

Sasaki had constructed a barrage of defensive entrenchments around the airport around Munda to halt the US advance. As Admiral Halsey recalled “Rugged as jungle fighting is by now we should have been within reach of our objective, the airfield. Something was wrong.” The now deceased Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s plan to turn the Solomons into a killing machine in order to force the United States to parley for a negotiated peace, seemed to be working. With the battle turning into a stalemate, on 15 July Halsey sent the famously tough Major-General Oscar Griswold, of the 14th Army Corps to New Georgia. Major-General John Hester, who had turned down help from the Marines, was relieved from command of the 43rd Division and replaced by Guadalcanal veteran Major-General John Hodge.

A Landing Craft Tank Captain named Jack Johnson  described the operation as a “screw-up. General Hester was army. I had him aboard one time. He was a little fart. He wore these high lace-up boots and carried a riding crop.” However, a lot of the blame would be placed on Rear-Admiral Turner, the commander of the amphibious forces who had insisted that Hester should retain divisional command as well as overall command of the landing operations.It also did not help that the 43rd “National Guard Division” were untested in battle. Griswold would find them in a state of near psychological collapse, prompting him to request reinforcements from the 37th division.

The 37th division was led by General Beightler who was manning Reincke Ridge while to the south near the beach were the 43rd division under General Hester's command until the 29th and the 25th division of General Lawton Collins. Additionally Marine tanks of the 10th defense battalion from Rendova were arriving to replace recent losses and they would be critically needed to face the nightmarish Japanese pillboxes the Americans would be facing.

In front of the Americans was a complex of camouflaged and mutually supporting pillboxes and fortifications amidst thick jungle. These defenses dominated several high features including Shimizu Hill, Horseshoe Hill, Kelley Hill and Reincke Ridge. They were made out of crushed coral and coconut logs dug several feet into the ground, with just a small portion poking out for their machine gunners and riflemen. It was these types of defenses that had plagued Hesters assaults. Across a frontage of around 3200 yards, Sasaki had established a series of these defenses along a northwestern axis going from the beach to Ilangana. Before the offensive could be kicked off, 161st regiment led by Colonel James Dalton discovered the Japanese held the Bartley ridge due east of Horseshoe hill. Their reconnaissance indicated double-logged pillboxes. Bartley ridge would be the most forward of the defensive positions and thus needed to be seized first. 

To meet the enemy Sasaki ordered Colonel Tomonari’s forces to launch a second counterattack against whatever allied forces showed up on the northern flank and he also requested the recently landed Yano battalion to reinforce the northern flank. However Tomonari’s men had suffered tremendous casualties and he was still trying to rally the scattered men along the rugged highlands. Meanwhile Colonel Yano was only able to send his 7th company to take up a position northwest of the 3rd battalion holding Sankaku hill, because his other men were needed to defend Vila. Because of this Sasaki ordered the depleted 1st battalion, 229th regiment to reinforce the Ilangana line. Colonel Hirata placed the 1st battalion along the line between Sato’s 2nd battalion and Kojima’s 3rd, which would turn out to be a key position.

The offensive kicked off at first light on July 25th. Commander Arleigh Burke took 7 destroyers through the Blanche Channel and bombarded the Lambete plantation for 43 minutes firing more than 4000 5 inch shells. Nearly at the same time, the new commander of AriSols, Brigadier General Than Twining sent 171 bombers and 100 fighters to hit Munda, the largest air strike thus far in the area. As Burke’s destroyers were firing 5 inch shells, B-24’s and B-17’s led the air attack, followed by B-25’s, Dauntless and Avengers. It was described by many eyewitnesses as “the greatest show on earth”. The Japanese were only able to toss back 57 Zeros at 9:40am who were intercepted quickly by a Rendova patrol of 29 fighters who shot down 6 zeros and lost 4 of their own. But from 6:30-7am, the 254 aircraft managed to drop 500,800 lbs of fragmentation and high explosive bombs over the target area, a roughly 1500 by 250 yard strip. The result was enormous clouds of smoke hanging all over Munda, but Japanese casualties were considerably light.

As the bombardment was quieting down, Griswold unleashed the ground forces supported by the 43rd divisions artillery who were firing more than 2150 105mm howitzer shells and 1182 155mm howitzer shells. Colonel Brown's 103rd regiment advanced upon Ilangana point while the 172nd tried to envelop Shimizu Hill, supported by 5 tanks. The 172nd tossed their 2nd and 3rd battalions around the left and right of Shimizu hill, but by 10am, even with the 5 tanks the Japanese pillboxes had halted them in their tracks. 3 of the tanks were disabled because of vapor lock and a ton of time was wasted by infantry trying to extricate them. THe 3rd battalion on the lefthand side, tried to fight through machine gun and mortar fire, but found it impossible. The men tried to move around the pillboxes but found themselves fired upon by other machine gun positions. The 2nd battalion, 103rd regiment attacked in the center of the 43rd divisions zone and managed to progress 300 yards against lighter opposition. bY 10:40am Company E managed to advance 500 yards and by noon reached a beach near Terere. As Company E tried hastily to create a defendable position, the Japanese moved behind them cutting their telephone lines back to the battalion HQ.

Seeing the opening, General Hester tossed in some of his reserves in the form of Ramsey’s 3rd battalion, 169th regiment. They were ordered to charge through the same gap made by 3 Company. But as they marched towards the gap they were met with enfilade fire from the southern part of Shimizu hill and from some pillboxes to the south. The 169th were unable to exploit the gap and now E company was forced to pull back lest they be encircled and annihilated. To the north, Beightler kept his 145th and 148th regiments in reserve until Bartley ridge was neutralized. Dalton sent I Company to contain the Japanese pocket by attacking it frontally while the 1st battalion and rest of the 3rd battalion performed a double envelopment. The 1st battalion went around the left while the 3rd took the right, seeing both driving southward and northward for 200 yards. The 1st battalion led by Lt Colonel Slaftcho Katsarky advanced 700 yards with only light opposition, but over on the other side the 3rd battalion of Lt Colonel David Buchanan were halted at the offset by heavy machine gun fire. By the 2nd of the day the 3rd battalion would establish itself in a containing position north,south and east of Bartley ridge. E Company had to be taken out of reserve and sent into the line on some high ground due north of Bartley ridge to secure the right flank of the 161st zone. The 1st battalion advanced a further 400 yards west of Bartley and took up a position on a small rise northeast of Horseshoe hill.

With the southern advance stalling somewhat, Colonel Stuart Baxter of the 148th was ordered to help the 161st’s efforts at reducing the pocket on Bartley ridge. He performed a limited advance and his 2nd battalion led by Lt Colonel Herbert Radcliffe gained 600 yards without meeting Japanese resistance. Meeting no resistance, the 1st battalion led by Lt Colonel Vernor Hydaker took up the 2nd battalions position as they advanced further, allowing engineers of the 117th engineer battalion to construct a supply trail behind them. 

Despite all of this Griswold was frustrated by the failure of his 43rd division performance. Ultimately Griswold blamed General Hester who he wrote about in his diary that night  “I am afraid Hester is too nice for a battle soldier. He is sick and all done in. Tonight I am requesting his relief from the division.” The next day he ordered the exhausted 172nd to hold their position while the 10rd would advance 800 yards from Ilangana for Terere. To support them the artillery bombarded for over an hour, allowed the 103rd to advance with some tanks in the vanguard. A crucial component of their advance would be the 118th engineer battalion led by 2nd Lt James Olds an acting corps chemical officer, whose men were equipped with flamethrowers who went to work spilling fire over enemy pillboxes. This led to the vegetation over and around them being incarcerated in a matter of seconds and many pillboxes were simply wiped out. 

As I had said a few times in this series, the flamethrower would be one of the most devastating weapons in island hopping warfare. The flamethrower was gradually employed by both assault and mop up operations. However useful as it was, it did hold some disadvantages. The equipment as you can imagine was quite large and heavy, required the operator to get very close to the enemy positions and thus extremely vulnerable. For flamethrower personnel to be able to close the distance required rifle team protection. But what if you could alleviate these vulnerabilities by slapping a big flamethrower to a tank? Generals like Griswold and Harmon at this point began mounting flamethrowers to tanks and although it would not see the limelight at Munda, the Firetank as they would become known would become the most devastating weapon against Japanese defenses. By the midafternoon, Browns 10rd regiment managed to reduce around 74 pillboxes along a 600 yard front, successfully occupying Ilangana and continuing the coastal advance until Kia. While it was a great victory for Hester, it failed to change Griswolds mind about relieving him.

Back over in the north, Beightler ordered another assault of Bartley’s ridge. 6 light marine tanks of the 10th defense battalion led the charge at 9am. Companies L and K advanced in columns behind the tanks, tossing heavy fire from .30 caliber Browning automatic rifles (known as BAR’s for my Call of Duty world at war veterans) and 2 flamethrowers. Unfortunately for the two guys carrying the flamethrowers, they were not properly protected by their rifle teams and were killed quickly. Very much like the learning of how to perform amphibious landings, it would take time to learn how to effectively use flamethrower units. The man managed to overrun a dozen or so pillboxes, but the terrain soon forced Dalton to frantically order men to extricate stuck tanks. During the morning hours a Japanese soldier burst out of the brush and planted a magnetic mine to one of the stuck tanks disabling it. A second tank was hit in its fuel line by gunfire while the remaining tanks managed to pull back and reorganize by 11am. After 5 hours of combat, Buchanan’s 3rd battalion had lost 29 men and only progressed 200 yards and thus was forced to pull back again. 

On the 27th, Beightler committed his 2nd battalion, 145th regiment to reduce the defenders on Horseshoe hill. They managed to occupy a knoll connecting Horseshoe hill called Wing Hill, but heavy fire from Horseshoe hill eventually dislodges them. Meanwhile Colonel Tomonari finally managed to rally his men together for an attack against the 148th northern flank, while Sasaki sent a machine gun detachment, which was actually some anti-aircraft gunners to ambush the 148th engineers causing Colonel Baxter to order Companies A and D to rush over to protect them. Further south, General Hester began tossing some more aggressive actions in combination with artillery and mortar bombardments, gradually pushing the Japanese off high grounds. The 43rd division was slowly advancing yard by yard on the right flank, now reaching within 500 yards of the coast, but the 8 tanks of the 9th defense battalion were demolished in the attacks.

On the 29th, the 1st battalion, 169th regiment had to be brought over from Rendova to take up a position between the 103rd and 172nd regiments. Alongside 4 tanks from the 10th defense battalion and some engineers wielding flamethrowers, Hester now had enough hardened forces to push the Japanese. Because of the continuous fighting, all the American regiments were becoming veterans. Pockets of Japanese that would have once held back an entire american battalion, possibly even a regiment were not being reducing quickly and efficiently. The technique for reducing pillboxes, whether it be from isolating them or overwhelming them was becoming mastered. Broken down this process began with a complete non-combative reconnaissance of the Japanese defenses. This was followed up by a reconnaissance in force, usually by a platoon with extra units who would uncover a portion of the Japanese positions. The assault consisted of  parts: preparing an artillery bombardment usually consisting of mortars, firing off the bombardment, then storming in. The bombardments usually got rid of the brush and foliage improving visibility so the enemy could be targeted and damaged. If done efficiently, the Japanese would flee their pillboxes to take refuge. Flamethrowers and tanks made the process a lot easier for the finishing touch part. Soon the Japanese were being pushed to the crest of Shimizu hill. However while Hester was definitely picking things up better with the 43rd division, Griswold was determined to relieve him of command, feeling the man had exhausted himself. Now Major General John Hodge would take over the 43rd.

Meanwhile to the north, the Beightlers 161st regiment infiltrated abandoned pillboxes on Bartley ridge near its crest. Over on Horseshoe Hill the Japanese were being hit with heavy bombardments while the 2nd battalion reoccupied Wing Hill and Companies G and F crept their way up the crest of the hill. However once near the crest they began to be pinned down by machine gun fire. The 1st battalion was hitting the hill from the southeast meeting heavy fire as well and they managed to reach 15 yards on top of the crest before being halted. By 5:30pm, the 2nd battalion was forced to withdraw to the foot of the hill, but two companies from the 1st battalion dug in on the crest. The americans lost 24 men died with 40 wounded.

On the other side, during the night, Tomonari’s main forces of 400 men arrived ready to attack at dawn. They attempted to move behind the rear of the 148th as Baxter’s troops were advancing to Bibilo Hill. Baxter’s force was spread out quite thinly across 1500 or so yards and they happened to be around 800 yards west of their main regimental ration and ammunition dump. The Japanese from a high ground position began firing down upon them with machine guns, rifles and grenades as forward units stormed the rations and ammunition dump. A ragtag group of service company soldiers rush over to defend the dumb returning fire upon the Japanese. Major Frank Hipp of the 148th took command of the force managing to hold back the Japanese. However as a result of this near catastrophe, Beightler ordered Baxter to withdraw on the 29th. Beightler believed the enemy was coming through a gap between the 148th and 161st greatly worrying him. 

Back over at Horseshoe hill, Companies G and F reached the crest while E company was hitting its northern side, supported by machine gun crews from H company. The fighting for the north side resulted in hand to hand combat seeing E company make some progress. But by nightfall the 2nd battalion again was again withdrawing down the hill. The actions ended disastrously, as the men were hit hard as they withdrew down the hill taking enormous casualties and gaining nothing in the process. On the 30th, Bartley Ridge and Shimizu Hill remained in Japanese hands as Beightler and Hodge were reorganizing their exhausted forces. That morning, Baxter finally began his withdrawal, miserably under heavy rain, with Tomonari’s troops harassing them with ambushes. The ambushes caused Baxter to order the men to dig in around the supply dump and that night saw numerous soldiers dying for water begin to use their helmets as rain catchers. The next day the 148th attempted another break through, but Tomonari’s machine gun crews hammered them back towards the supply dump for another night.

At this point Sasaki received new orders instructing him to keep the supply lines to Kolombanagara secure. He elected to prepare his men to withdraw to a new defensive line that would be anchored at Kokenggolo Hill to the right, running east of Bibilo hill towards the Munda-Bairoko trail, then it would pass north to Hachiman Hill. Yano and his battalion were ordered to come over from Kolombangara to take up a position at Sankaku hill; Hirata’s 229th regiment would hold Kokenggolo Hill and Tomonari would take up a position at Hachiman Hill. These orders came after the Japanese defenders had suffered tremendous losses over days of fighting. In truth the Japanese defensive line was formidable facing the American 14th corps, and indeed the Americans had been held back for a long time. But the Americans brought terrible power, their naval, artillery and aerial bombing was constant and hammered the Japanese. By late July most of the Japanese emplacements near Munda were in shambles. Rifle companies that were typically 170 men strong had shrunken significantly, some down as low as 20 men. The 229th regiment numbered only 1245 effective men. The hospitals could not hope to care for all the sick and wounded as constant shelling rained hell from above. Aside from the sick and wounded, as a major result of the shelling, many men were suffering nervous disorders, to use the old term shell shock, but today we’d call it  Combat Stress Reaction “CSR”. To compensate for the losses, Colonel Hirata simply ordered his men of the 229th to kill 10 americans for every Japanese and to do so to the death. That’s the kind of, I guess what the Japanese at the time would call fighting spirit, something that made the Japanese armed forces during WW2 unique, perhaps rather tragically. 

General Imamura decided to reinforce Vila with the 3rd battalion, 23rd regiment and six companies to buff up the 1th and 229th regiments. This freed up the Yano battalion to take up their new position on the new defensive line. Yet still in the meantime, Japanese were still defending Shimizu and Horseshoe Hill to give the rest of the forces time to withdraw. On the 31st Major Francis Carberry’s 2nd Battalion, 161st charged up Bartley ridge finding no resistance. Then at 4:45pm the 15th field artillery began firing on Horseshoe Hill while the American forces near its crest tried to dislodge the Japanese. Again they were unsuccessful. By the afternoon Japanese were withdrawing from the Ilagana line, covered by fire from Horseshoe hill. During the night Tomonari led his men to withdraw, but a Avenger spotted his force fleeing through a valley overheard and called in an artillery strike. One of the shells hit Tomonari’s HQ killing a lot of his staff and nearly him. Tomonari’s force had to abandon a lot of equipment, but by dawn of August 1st they had managed to assemble at Kokenggolo and Bibilo Hills. His 2nd battalion alongside Hara’s quick fire battalion went into the tunnels of Kokenggolo Hill while the rest of the 1st and 3rd battalions dug in on Bibilo Hill. 

Baxter received a message over radio on the 1st of August from General Beightler “time is precious, you must move, get going haste is essential”. The order was to get every man Baxter had and take Shimizu hill. Baxter rallied Companies A, E, B and G into a skirmish line with bayonets fixed and charged at 850am. By 9:30am the exhausted Americans reached Katsarsky’s position where they handed the weary men fresh water and some hot food. Shimizu hill was theres. Meanwhile the 103rd regiment began their own attack. Hodge sent Companies E, F and G to march upon Lambeti which they did, finding no opposition. The rest of the 43rd found no opposition as they marched across Shimizu Hill, by 3pm they advanced 700 yards. Beightlers men captured Horseshoe Hill without firing a shot and as darkness fell on the 1st of august, Griswold ordered a general advance for the next day. Admiral Wilkinson brought a convoy bearing fresh troops of the 27th regiment to aid Beightlers right flank, but it took them until August the 3rd to get into combat assembly.

In the meantime August the 1st would bring with it a significant increase in artillery bombardment. The 43rd divisions artillery commander, Brigadier General Harold Barker fired 2000 rounds on the 1st, followed by 2000 more on the 2nd, an incredible 7300 rounds on the 3rd and 3600 on the 4th. The Munda area was turned into an inferno. Yano lost the commander and all platoon leaders of the 8th company; 5 officers died atop Bibilo hill; Hara Masao was killed leaving his 1st battalion to be commanded by Sato on August 2nd; the tunnels of Kokenggolo Hill were one of the few safe planes, but a direct hit collapses an entrance to Sato’s tunnel, burying him along with 60 men, requiring an entire day to dig them out. The Japanese were forced to take refuge wherever they could, preventing Sasaki from stabilizing his new defensive line. Captain Sugiura Kaju brought reinforcements from the 7th and 8th combined SNLF to Erventa where he loaded up the 3rd battalion, 23rd regiment to head for the Vella Gulf under the escort of Admiral Nishimuras cruisers Susuya, Chokai, Kumano, Sendai and destroyer Amagiri. However the naval force was intercepted by PT boats near the Blackett strait. The PT boats fired torpedoes at the Japanese destroyers, but none hit a target. Sugiura was able to land the reinforcements around Webster Cove, but the Amagiri rammed PT 109 just forward of her starboard torpedo tube ripping away the starboard aft side of the boat. Two men were killed, and one John F Kennedy, yes the future president was tossed around the cockpit of PT 109. Kennedy got the rest of the men to abandon ship around 11 in all. A few of them had serious burns and they were forced to swim for an islet 3.5 miles away known as Plum Pudding Island. Kennedy was the first to reach the island and he proceeded to help tow others to the island. The island was unoccupied, but a company of Sasebo 6th SNLF were nearby on another islet called Gizo. Seeing Japanese barges moving around, the Americans would make their way east to an island near Ferguson passage called Leorava island. It would not be until the night of August 7th when the coastwatch Lt Reginald Evans found them and helped them reach PT 157. For his courage and leadership Kennedy received the Navy and Marine Corps Medal alongside a purple heart for injuries he suffered. However the medals would pale in comparisons to the story written about the event by John Hersey for the New Yorker and Reader’s digest which would give Kennedy a strong foundation politically. 

Back to the battle, on August 2nd, Griswold’s forces advanced across the entire front and by the late afternoon the 103rd regiment had already reached the outer taxiways of Munda airfield; the 169th were approaching Bibilo Hill; and the 37th division were 700 yards ahead of Horseshoe hill. By the end of the day, the Japanese defensive line was basically Kokenggolo to Bibilo Hill and the Americans were closing in on both. The 103rd and 169th had units around the eastern end of the airfield, many men using wrecked Japanese aircraft as defendable positions. The 145th and 161st were on the eastern ridges of Bibilo hill and the 148th were about to cut the Munda-Bairoko trail. The Yano battalion’s position was taken so quickly, the Americans had failed to notice they had overrun it. Thus Yano withdrew northwards.

On August 3rd, the general advance continued and with more open terrain present, mortars became a lot more effective speeding it up. The 169th were advancing up the eastern end of Kokenggolo Hill; to the north, the 145th were advancing up the eastern ridges of Bibilo Hill the 161st were breaking through on the right and the 148th were now along the Munda-Bairoko trail. The situation was desperate that night so Sasaki was forced to order the men to withdraw yet again, now towards Zieta. Hirata’s 229th regiment was to hold their position until sundown to give everyone time, then act as a rearguard until they could withdraw to Kongo Hill. Sasaki likewise moved his HQ to the Kure 6th Farm at Zieta. The next morning brought further misery upon the Japanese in the form of an airstrike. At 7:20am 25 Dauntless, 24 Avengers and 24 B-25’s bombed Gurasai-Kindu Point, which is just due west of Munda airfield were the Japanese had constructed fortifications and emplaced many anti aircraft guns.

Griswold did not let up seeing perhaps the final push against Munda before him. Hodge’s 43rd division with marine tanks leading the way attacked Kokenggolo Hill. Beightler’s 25th division were striking against the Japanese northern flank, freeing up the 148th and 161st to advance west towards the beach. The defenders at Kokenggolo Hill offered strong resistance as they withdrew towards Kong Hill before the 161st managed to break through to the sea. The fiercest fighting would be found on Bibilo hill, where the 145th were fighting against the dug in 229th regiment. By the end of the day, both the 148th and 161st broke through to the sea north of Kokenggolo hill and the 145th nearly cleared Bibilo hill as the Japanese fled along a trail going to the Kure 6th farm. With Bibilo Hill reduced, the Japanese began abandoning Kong Hill to continue retreating northwards. 

Griswold’s 43rd division tossed mortars, infantry and tanks across Kokenggolo Hill driving away the last of the Japanese from tunnels, bunkers and pillboxes. Their forces soon crossed the western part of the Munda airfield. General Wing grabbed a military telephone and called General Hodge from Bibilo Hill stating “Munda is yours at 2:10 today”. Inturn Griswold radioed the good news over to Admiral Halsey "...Our ground forces today wrested Munda from the Japs and present it to you… as the sole owner…" Halsey then replied with "a custody receipt for Munda… Keep 'em dying." Munda had fallen at long last. The Americans had suffered  4994 casualties since July 2nd, the Japanese had 4683 death with a untold amount of wounded.

With Munda captured, Tomonari was ordered to withdraw to Kolombangara to take command of the Vila defenses while Sasaki would move his HQ to Bairoko then move by barge to Vila as well. The 3rd battalion, 23rd regiment was deployed at Baanga island to cover the Japanese withdrawal using mountain guns. Admiral Ota’s SNLF marines were to defend Arundel island. While these forces made their retreat, Admiral Samejima elected to carry out another reinforcement run. He would transport the Mikami battalion and on August the 6th with Admiral Ijuin carrying two other companies of replacements to Buin, Sugiura was once again sailing for Kolombangara. Sugiura had the destroyers Hagikaze, Kawakaze and Arashi while Ijuin had the destroyer Shigure. Meanwhile Admiral Wilkinson received reports from a PBY that sighted Sugiura’s ships passing by the Buka Passage, so he ordered Commander Frederick Moosbrugger to depart Tulagi and sweep the Vella Gulf. Moosbrugger had the destroyers Stack, Sterret, Lang, Dunlap, Craven and Maury. He sailed south of Rendova to enter the Vella Gulf. He took his time going 15 knots to create as little wake as possible so Japanese floatplanes would not spot him and he was northwest of the coast of Kolombanaga by 11:25pm. Moosbrugger’s plan  was to divide his force into two formations; a torpedo division consisting of Dunlap, Craven and Maury, and a Gun division consisting of Lang Sterett and Stack. The torpedo group would attack first once rader contact was made while the Gun group would cut across the bows of the enemy and open fire as the torpedo’s were expected to hit.

This was to be the first time in the Solomons campaign that the US navy planned to use torpedo’s as its primary weapon. All 6 of Moosbruggers destroyers held SG radar, but much more importantly at this time an advancement had been made to fix the idiotic mark 14 torpedoes. The defective magnetic exploder was fixed and the settings that made them run too deep was fixed. Admiral King was responsible for the first fix while Moosebrugger on his own accord ordered the torpedoes to be set at a minimum running depth of 5 feet. Sugiura knew fell well he most likely did not hold the element of surprise, but he was prepared to fight as he entered the Vella Gulf with his destroyer Hagikaze in the lead. Moosebruggers force was passing through the Gizo strait before turning southeast towards Blackett strait. Then the Americans turned north up the gulf with the torpedo group leading the way during the dark hours when at 11:33 Dunlaps radar made a contact, bearing 19700 yards away.

Moosbrugger immediately changed course to close in and began to line-up his torpedo attacks. For once the Japanese lookouts failed to spot the Americans, most likely due to a lack of moonlight. At 11:41 at a range of around 4500 yards Moosebrugger fired 22 torpedoes and at 11:46 turned his ships 90 degrees as the Gun group made a course to cross Sugiuras T. aT At 11:42 Sugiura’s lookouts spotted the American ships silhouettes and torpedo wakes, but it was too late. At 11:45 7 out of the 22 torpedoes found targets. Two torpedoes hit Hagikaze, 3 hit Arashia and 2 hit Kawakaze. Hagikaze was hit aft her engine room bringing her to a stop; Arashia’s machinery spaces were destroyed and Kawakaze was hit under her bridge detonating her forward magazine sending her ablaze. Shigure would be found later to have been hit by a torpedo which failed to explode. The 3 destroyers were disabled and burning wrecks. The Japanese fired 8 torpedoes in return, none finding a target as they frantically tried to turn northwards to escape. The Gun group opened fire sinking the 3 crippling destroyers in the course of an hour killing 820 of the 940 troops on board. The Japanese would later send 4 large barges to try and rescue survivors with around 310 out of 1520 Japanese sailors and soldiers being rescued including Sugiura. The IJN received a night action defeat which also killed and prevented reinforcements for New Georgia. The American torpedoes would soon strike fear into the IJN.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

Munda has fallen at last, though it came at a terrible price. Now with the airfield in American hands, the battle for New Georgia would come to a swifter end. The US Navy finally got the chance to deliver a torpedo blow to the IJN and a devastating one it was.

- 88 - Pacific War - The Mysterious Battle of the Pips, July 25 - 1 August, 1943

Last time we spoke about the allied drive to Munda and General Sasaki’s major counter offensive. General Wing began the drive upon Munda Point, but General Sasaki predicted many of the routes the Americans would take and ordered his forces to create tedious roadblocks and defensive positions to foil their advances. The allied progress was brutally slow, despite having the enormous advantage in artillery, naval and aerial bombardment support. The Japanese pillboxes were proving to be devastating to the allied infantry, requiring tanks to be brought over to New Georgia. When things began to halt, suddenly General Sasaki performed a counter offensive seeing a daring attack directed at the headquarters of the 43rd division. The attack nearly broke the lines of communications, but luckily the Fijian commandos outperformed the japanese at their own game of night fighting. Lastly the IJN suffered terrible losses to allied aircraft collapsing their reinforcement efforts.

This episode is the Mysterious Battle of the Pips

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

The battles in New Guinea and New Georgia were particularly bloody, in all honesty things had begun to really escalate when you look at it from a numerical point of view. Over on Green Hell, General Savige had just seized Mubo, the Pimple, Green Hill and Observation hill taking them out of Japanese hands. The Japanese had withdrawn to Komiatum while simultaneously trying to defend the Bobdubi ridge area against Brigadier Hammer’s 15th brigade. General Savige, still unaware Salamaua was not the main target and in fact was being used as a deception to cover for Lae, continued his offensive, hoping to drive the enemy north of the Francisco River.

Over on the other side, General Nakano’s 1st battalion of the 80th regiment had managed to  push Companies B and A off their ambush position on the Bench Cut Track. They were forced to withdraw towards Gwaibolom by July 10th. Meanwhile to the south Major Warfe launched an attack along Goodview junction. Captain Wally Meares of C platoon marched up Stephens Track while Captain John Winterflood’s B platoon took Walpoles track. Lt Hugh Egan created a blocking position using just 7 men around 800 meters south of Goodview Junction. The platoons went to work advancing down the steep ridges dislodging Japanese from outposts. Captain Meares platoon were continuing along the Stephens track when they suddenly encountered strong resistance from some Japanese who took a position along the Tambu Saddle which is at a junction between Stephens track and the Mule track. After engaging the Japanese, the platoon was forced to bypass them moving along the Mule track towards the Komiatum track where they ran into more Japanese. Meares men killed 13 Japanese on the Mule track before deciding to withdraw back to the Stephens track and dug in.

The Japanese had surprised Warfe’s men. The forces they were running into were mainly the 1st and 2nd companies of the 66th battalion along with Araki’s HQ staff who had been on the run from Mubo to Komiatum. The Japanese tried to press on with a counter attack aimed at Winterflood’s B platoon. The Japanese tossed mortar and machine gun fire, but received terrible losses to the commandos, forced to pull back up Walpole track. The next day Warfe ordered Winterflood’s platoon to make a frontal assault, but quickly found themselves pinned down by machine gun fire and during the night received a heavy counter attack that forced them to dig in. The Japanese continued to block the way, covering their withdrawal further east, but all the mayhem prompted General Savige to relieve the commandos by tossing up companies C and B of the 2/5th who adopted the name Bennett force as they were led by Captain Cam Bennett. The rest of the 2/5th marched up the Buigap.

Meanwhile General Herring was dealing with a supply issue for the 3rd Australian division. The 3rd division was too far from the coast and thus had been relying on supply via airdrops, which we have seen during this series to not be particularly accurate and quite inadequate. The supply problems mounted more when the decision was made to target Lae as such a campaign required building up reserve dumps. Warfe’s men were critically low on supplies; the 58/59th had nearly used up all the supplies they received, being brought up via the Missim Track and from airdrops. Getting further and further away from the source of supplies and with declining carrier capacity, Warfe’s men were reaching starvation point. Further back, Companies A and C of the 2/6th battalion got drafted the job of moving the supplies from Mubo to Buigap creek. General Herring considered it extremely difficult, but not impossible to maintain further units in the Salamaua area, if they were closer to the coasts. To solve the problem General Herring designated Tambu Bay as a new coastal base for supplies and it would also help as an artillery position.

And thus, the 3rd battalion, 162nd regiment of Major Archibald Roosevelt landed at Nassau Bay back on July 12th commencing with their coastal advance. They were accompanied by Brigadier General Ralph Coane’s artillery that had landed prior to them. Yet their advance would begin in an extremely confused and chaotic manner. The question of command was at the core of the issue, General Fuller had decided to separate units such as Archibald Roosevelts from the MacKechnie Force, and thus they were now placed under the command of the Coane Force. General Herring was forced to intervene, placing the Coane Force under General Savige. At the same time, Colonel MacKechnie was relieved of his command because Fuller felt that he had favored the Australians over the Americans. To dig depper into this mess, what occurred was General Savige and Colonel MacKechnie were both unaware that two-thirds of the 162nd regiment had been allocated to the Coane Force when General Herring sent the a confusing message to try and clarify things “all units MACK force are under operational control of 3 Aust Div”. Troubles began at Moten ordered Major Roosevelt to advance north, but Roosevelt had also been told by General Fuller that he was not under Australian command. Thus Roosevelt bluntly replied to Moten “For your information I obey no orders except those from my immediate superior”. Then MacKechnie tried to smooth things over with Moten when he was informed of Fuller’s position. He apologized for Roosevelt’s message, and tried to speak about how great all the Australian/American cooperation was going. Fuller and Herring then tried to clarify the situation by placing the Coane Force under General Savige, but Fuller also decided to dismiss MacKechnie, mostly because he had relinquished command of his men to the Australians and thus had failed to protect American interests. As I say on my personnel channel, often when talking about China’s Warlords in the 1920’s, this is some kindergarten bullshit.

Back to the action at hand, the Coane Force was being aided by a Papuan company who were scouting ahead of the Americans. They managed to confirm that Tambu Bay and the Dot Inlet were occupied and fortified by the Japanese. A platoon of the 5th Sasebo SNLF and the 3rd battalion, 66th regiment were holding a position on Tambu Bay while the remnants of the 3rd battalion, 102nd regiment were on a ridge overlooking the bay, which would later be named Roosevelt Ridge. On July 18th, Roosevelt led the troops with Companies L and I taking the lead, guided by two Papuan platoons. L Company with a Papuan company advanced along an inland track while K Company likewise did so along the coast. K Companies’s Papuan guides hit a Japanese outpost south of Boisi on July 18th. On the morning of the 20th, the Papuan platoon managed to kill four Japanese before K Company helped destroy the outpost. By the 20th they seized Boisi and Roosevelt with the others approached the Tambu bay. Roosevelt had Coane’s artillery support, they brought up four 25 pounders of the 2/6th Australian field regiment originally placed at Nassau Bay along with 2 batteries of the 218th American field artillery battalion, 8 75mm guns from north Salus, a battery of the 205th American field artillery battalion and 4 105mm guns. Under the cover the artillery they attacked the enemy, but they were met with heavy mortar fire coming from Roosevelt Ridge. Roosevelt Ridge extended westwards from the sea for nearly 2000 yards, forming kind of bulwark that shielded the northern end of Tambu Bay. Thus Tambu Bay could not be secured unless the ridge was taken first. The Australian broadcasting commission correspondent, Peter Hemery described the ridge like this “a piece of old style razer blade jutting into the sea”. According to some Japanese sources they had this to say of it “The area around Boisi had a lay of land most suitable to the arrest of the enemy advancing northward along the coast”

General Nakano had also decided to reinforce the ridge with 250 men of the 1st battalion, 115th regiment, but of course this came at the coast of Salamaua’s defense. By this point the bulk of the 102nd regiment was at the Malolo-buang coastal area and the bulk of the 115th regiment, the 2nd Maizuru SNLF, two companies of the 5th Sasebo SNLF and the 14th field artillery regiment were at Salamaua, around 150 men in total. On the other side, after the fall of Mubo Brigadier Moten had the men advance north. The Bennet Force took over Goodview Junction; Companies A and D of the 2/5th advanced to Mount Tambu. Mount Tambu was the highest feature along the route between Mubo and Salamaua. It consisted of a series of razorback ridges covered in dense jungle, ideal for camouflage pillboxes. Its area was defended by roughly 700 Japanese from the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 66th regiment led by Lt Colonel Fukuzo Kimura and Major Sakai Sugiyama. On July 16th, Captain Mick Walter led 60 men of Company A up the steep track leading to the south crest of Mount Tambu. Walter led the men to storm the two forward knolls, taking the Japanese by complete surprise. The two knolls were captured, but during the night the Japanese counterattacked in force. The Japanese crawled up the knolls through some heavy undergrowth before they unleashed mortars and mountain gun fire. Walters men however had captured some Japanese pillboxes upon the two knolls and thus the turn tables. 8 counterattacks were tossed at Walters men, each repulsed with heavy losses, around 39 casualties for the Australians and 350 for the Japanese. The following day, D company came up to help the Australian defenders, bringing much needed mortars. They dug in on a knoll around 300 yards back on the track. Alongside D company also came much needed supplies and an additional platoon to reinforce his men who he deployed on his western flank. 

On July 18th, Walter ordered an advance going northwest in an attempt to secure the southern portion of Mount Tambu. The advance was spearheaded by Lance Corporal Jackson who alongside his comrades tossed grenades into a Japanese pillbox. Jackson then stormed inside killing 3 Japanese with this Tommy gun. Alongside Jackson, mortar and mountain gun fire aided Walters men to gain 80 additional yards, securing the southern portion of Mount Tambu. They could advance no further however as it became much more difficult from this position as the Japanese basically were encircling them upon razer back ridge to their north. Walter would write later on “we dug in on the new ground and shortened our perimeter to the narrowing plateau”. For this action the Australians paid with 6 lives, 13 wounded while the Japanese lost 82. At this point Walter had D company with one of his platoon holding the western flank; A company held the northern knoll and two platoons from D company held the eastern knolls.

The Japanese had been devastated, losing hundreds of men and allied artillery was becoming a nightmare. Captain Newman’s C Company of the 162nd battalion had come to a junction of the Buigap and Bui Eo. From there a reconnaissance patrol found suitable artillery positions northwest of the junction. With the help of native carriers and 80 men of the 2/6th battalion, two guns were hauled over the Buigap track and by July 17th another 4 guns of the American 218th battalion were hauled up from the southern arm of the Bitoi river to Green Hill. From these positions the allies could smash multiple Japanese defensive positions. General Nakano realized Mount Tambu was an essential component of General Muroya’s defensive line so he sent the remainder of the 3rd battalion, 66th regiment to reinforce Colonel Araki’s men.

Then during the early hours of July 19th a large earth tremor startled the Australian defenders. It was the prelude to an assault led by Captain Kunizo Hatsugai’s 9th company of the 66th regiment. They had crept up silently managing to get behind the southern knolls then suddenly charged up under the cover of darkness. But the defenders had their guard up and were not taken by surprise. A Bren gunner managed to knock out one of the Japanese raiders machine guns with a lucky hit in the dark. As the Japanese scrambled to try and recover it they were met with fire causing severe casualties. The Japanese surprise attack was a failure, forcing them to withdraw by first light, leaving 21 dead across the knoll. While this raid was occuring, Walters men were also repelling a series of attacks against the Northern Knoll. During these attacks, Walter was injured. Luckily for Walter and his company, they were relieved on the 19th by D Company. Another American unit, C Company of the 1st battalion, 162nd regiment led by Captain Delmar Newman also arrived to take up a position on the southern knolls. Until july 23rd, the Australians limited their actions to patrols. On the 20th, Bennet led a patrol making contact with a strong Japanese position on the Walpole track; Another company led by Morse found a Japanese position in the Goodview area dug within 100 yards of their own. Meanwhile the Japanese also limited their actions to a few patrols proding Mount Tambu for weaknesses.

 

On July 23rd Moten ordered the 2/5th battalion to attack the remaining Japanese positions on the Tambu Knoll, but it was the most heavily fortified yet. Basically it was like a castle keep, complete with a ravine for a moat, near vertical walls and deep tunnels going through the knoll. Mount Tambu’s peak held  10 log reinforce bunkers connected by the tunnels which could shelter half a battalion or so. They also had a chain of weapon pits set up on lower ledges. Later on when investigating the entire system, the allies found weapon pits to be around 4 logs thick, interconnected by crawl trenches. Many of these weapon puts had been carefully sited within the roots of large trees, making them impervious to allied artillery fire. The tunnel entrances were dug into the side of the peak directly behind the defensive positions, allowing the defenders to storm out from their shelters underground within seconds. It was these kind of ingenious defensive works that would be built upon later on in the war to create absolute nightmares for the allies.

 

Moten had not carried out a thorough reconnaissance of the Japanese positions prior to ordering the attack and thus many of his subordinates elected to make a frontal assault instead of encircling them. D company took the center for the frontal attack while to the left were the 16th platoon led by Sergeant Alvin ‘Hungry’ Williams and the 18th platoon led by Lt Bernard Leonads; and A company advanced along a Caffins track heading for the western flank of Mount Tambu to try and cut off the main Japanese supply route going back to Komiatum. 15 minutes before they charged, Australian and American artillery and mortars fired upon Mount Tambu. Two Australian mountain guns fired 90 rounds while the 4 75mm American guns fired 60 per gun from Green hill. D company began their attack around midday, trying to drive a wedge between two lines of pillboxes. Corporal John Smith laid cover fire as Captain Lin Cameron crept forward, getting within 15 yards of the pill boxes on the left side of the track. Cameron counted around 7 pill boxes in two lines of defense going across both sides of the track. The steep slopes on both sides gave little venues of approach, allowing around just a platoon at a time. There was also sharpened bamboo pickets on the left flank, leading Cameron to believe that an attack was expected there.

 

The Japanese knowingly let two platoons reach their line of forward pillboxes before unleashing hell upon them. The casualties were terrible. As Cameron recounted, “we were within 20 meters of the enemy bunkers before all hell let loose”. One of the men in the forward sections was killed outright, Cameron was wounded, his right elbow was shattered by a machine gun bullet. As he saw his men hesitate, he screamed out “forward! Get stuck into them!” With his right arm now useless and his eyesight dimming, Cameron handed command over to Lt Martin. Despite the horror, the Australians pressed on. Corporal Carey led his depleted platoon forward in a great dash and swept the outer ring of the Japanese pillboxes. On his left were Leonards men who stormed two pillboxes before heavy enfilade fire pinned them down. Then the 17th platoon led by Corporal John Smith charged up Mount Tambu from behind with their bayonets fixed. Smith screamed out “follow me!” as he charged. 3 other men out of the 11 managed to keep up with Smith, but soon Japanese grenades began to rain down on them. The grenades caught them just as they passed a third line of pillboxes. Smith was hit, but he kept charging and when he reached the peak of Mount Tambu with his back to the enemy he screamed “come on boys! come on boys!”. Without additional support and with no indication A company were making progress over on the left flank, the 4 men on the peak were forced to withdraw. The gallant Smith had to be dragged down and would die from severe wounds two days later. Smith was decorated for bravery in Syria in 1941, when he cleared out 3 machine gun nests at a roadblock and despite being wounded during the battle of Wau he still had gas left in the tank for some more.

 

Scouts had made their way towards the Tambu saddle track and spotted Japanese soldiers, around 125 of them a full company or so. The scouts quickly realized they were outnumbered, thus when the artillery began to open up and Walter’s company moved in for the attack across the saddle, no sooner then they started the enemy halted them in their tracks. Walter had no choice but to withdraw around 500 yards south east as the Japanese were too strong. Walter’s inability to make progress in the west ultimately ruined the entire attack. Despite the defeat, Companies A and D had done very well against such a heavily fortified position.

 

Meanwhile, Warfe and his men were marching when they discovered Ambush Knoll had come back under the hands of some Japanese from the 2nd battalion, 66th regiment. On July 15th, Warfes commandos launched an attack, with C Platoon performing a frontal assault along the narrow ridge top track. There were 16 men in the attack and they found themselves face to face with well dug in Japanese. The Japanese were behind a bamboo barricade with some pillboxes scattered about. The platoon got within 50 feet of the main barricade, but the Japanese fire was too much and casualties were mounting quickly. Meanwhile B Platoon was maneuvering around the Japanese eastern flank. At 5:30 B Platoon began attacking the eastern side of the knoll. The men got behind an enemy pillbox covering the track from Orodubi, but the Japanese quickly saw the Australians and began tossing grenades at them. Despite the resistance, B Platoon managed cut off the Japanese supply line to Ambush Knoll. With their supply lines cut the Japanese were forced to withdraw

 

With Ambush Knoll back under allied control, Brigadier Hammer ordered A company of the 58/59th battalion to depart Gwaibolom and attack Orodubi from its southern flank. Even with the help of the 58/59th company, the commando’s yet again failed to dislodge the Japanese. On the night of July 19th, fresh troops of the 1st company, 80th battalion used the light of the full moon to come up the ridge. This became a staging point for them to attack Ambush Knoll, seeing artillery fire beginning in the morning to support their attack. Warfe’s commandos were manning the trenches on Ambush Knoll, turning the tables on the Japanese and inflicting heavy casualties upon them. The Japanese were forced to retreat. The next day Warfe reinforced Ambush Knoll with two Vickers guns, which gave the Japanese a nasty surprise when they attacked again. On the 20th, the Japanese opened fire with mortars and artillery before charging the ridge. They managed to get as far as to cut the Australian lines of communication, but were ultimately repealed once again. Over 14 consecutive attacks would be made on the 20th, and even more on the 21st, but it all came to nothing, Warfe’s commandos held their ground. Facing such pressure from the Japanese, Hammer still felt the greater weight of their attention was directed at Bobdubi and not towards Tambu, believing it to all be a consequence of Moton’s lack of progress. General Savige decided to order Motens 2/6th battalion to take responsibility over Bobdubi ridge. The 2/6th then came across the Japanese rear near the slopes of Ambush Knoll and began harassing them. On the 22nd the Japanese tried yet again to attack Ambush Knoll, but were beaten back firmly, forcing them to finally withdraw to Sugarcane Ridge. By July 23rd, Warfes’ exhausted commandos earned a relief by the 2/6th and were sent to relieve A company at Gwaibolom, while A company advanced north. The 2/6th likewise would advance north. But now we are moving away from the troubles of New Guinea and heading back up north to the frigid Aleutians.

After the successful seizure of Attu, now Admiral Kinkaid and General Buckner needed to plan the invasion of Kiska. Kiska was the last Japanese bulwark in the Aleutians and held an incredible underground city. There were miles of tunnels, buried ammunition dumps, barracks,  3 hospitals, dental clinics, mess halls, machine shops, warehouses, photo labs, telephone rooms, all shoved and shored with wood. Ventilation pipes connected the maze of caves and tunnels, with Japanese troops wearing great fur lined coats busy at work. The Americans had experienced hell, on Attu, over 2872 Japanese had been killed or committed suicide, just 28 men were captured and it cost 549 american lives, 1148 wounded and nearly another 2000 ill or battered by harsh climate. The American leadership expected Kiska to be another hellscape and did not want to come at it lightly. The 7th division led by Brigadier General Archibald Arnolrd, Buckner’s 4th regiment, the 87th Mountain infantry regiment, the 13th Canadian Brigade, consisting of the 6th Canadian division led by Major General George Pearkes, the Canadian Fusiliers regiment, the 1st battalion of Winnipeg grenadiers, the Rocky Mountain rangers regiment and e Regiment de Hull along with the 1st Special Service Force led by Colonel Robert Frederick were to be part of the invasion of Kiska, codenamed Operation Cottage. Unfortunately, the actual invasion will not be happening in this episode, you will actually have to wait  weeks for that one, but I just so happened to have recently done a podcast with a Canadian Military Historian named Brad St.Croix from the Youtube channel OTD Military History, the same gentleman who I interviewed for this series about the battle of Hong Kong. The podcast we recently did was on the Canadian experience of the Pacific War and the battle of Kiska is 1/3rd of it, so if you are, impatient and want to learn some neat stuff about how Canadians had to change their entire military organization and use American equipment for the battle of Kiska, check out my Youtube channel, the Pacific War channel for the full episode. 

Now the last time we spoke about Kiska, the Japanese were forced to perform a bit of a miracle to evacuate their boys. After Attu had fallen, Rear Admiral Akiyama Monzo alongside 6000 men were ordered to evacuate Kiska. To try and do this, the Japanese began by sending 13 I-class submarines of the 1st submarine squadron of Rear Admiral Kouda Takeo. Despite these Type C submarines being enormous in size, they could only carry around 150 men per trip, thus it would have took 40 successful journey’s to evacuate the entire Kiska garrison. With the US Navy fully decked out with sonar, this was not going to be a walk in the park. The efforts had begun on May 27th and by July, the submarines had managed to get 800 men safely back to Japan, but lost 300 due to american attacks. 

Meanwhile Admiral Giffen had a considerable armada to work with consisting of a trio of older battleships; the Mississippi, Idaho and New Mexico, a quintet of cruisers; Louisville, Portland, San Francisco, Santa Fe and Wichita and 9 destroyers. He was ordered to bombard Kiska who already had been smashed with aerial attacks all throughout June and early July. On July 6th, Giffen steamed towards Kiska with 4 cruisers and 4 destroyers and bombarded the island for 22nd minutes causing a handful of casualties. It was not all that impressive, but it convinced Admiral Kawase that the Americans were about to invade Kiska at any moment.Admiral Kawase Shiro realized the futility of the submarine effort and was forced to come up with a new plan. Kawase came up with a bold plan, he was going to wait for a night when a thick fog was occurring and would take a surface fleet to sneak over into the Aleutians to assault enemy warships and evacuate all the remaining men on Kiska in a single go. To be blunt, it was a dumb idea. The American warships were equipped with radar that would pick up any surface ship with ease despite any type of fog, but what was about to occur can only be described as spectacular and bizarre. 

Rear Admiral Kimura, the victor of the battle of the bismarck sea, would lead the force and he had at his disposal Destroyer Squadron 1: consisting of Yugumo, Kazagumo, Asagumo, Akigumo, Usugumo, Hibiki (one of my favorite whiskeys), Shimakaze, Samidare, Naganami, Wakaba, Hatsushimo and light cruisers Abukuma and Kiso. In close support of these there was also a covering force consisting of heavy cruisers Nachi, Maya, light cruiser Tama and destroyers Nokaze and Namikaze. The large convoy force departed from Paramushiro on July 7th with Takeo’s 1st submarine squadron performing reconnaissance. The covering force departed Paramushiro on July 10th and by July 12th the fleet was around 500 miles south of Kiska. When they took up this assembly position, the sailors were in despair to see the fog was quite low. While it did not matter for warships with radar, Kimura knew full well what allied aircraft could do to his forces if they were not better concealed. Thus he elected to wait until the fog reappaered to cover his force. But the weather did not change, the skies remained clear forcing him to head back on July 15th. Meanwhile on Kiska, Rear Admiral Monzo was frantically ordering his troops to lay out a road from the underground base to the harbor piers to help facilitate the impending evacuation. All of the Japanese on Kiska felt an impending doom placed upon them. If the Americans landed first, it was all but over for them.

Luckily, Japanese weather stations reported a dense fog would emerge over Kiska by July 25th, and unlike here in Montreal Canada, I guess these weather reporters are accurate. Kimura once again departed Paramushiro on July 22nd, accompanied by Admiral Kawase aboard cruiser Tama. Yet a few days prior, on July 19th, Admiral Kinkaid had ordered Admiral Giffen to bombard Kiska again. This time Giffen took a two pronged naval attack force consisting of battleships Mississippi and Idaho, cruisers Portland, Wichita, San Francisco, Louisville, Santa Fe and destroyers Abner Read, Farragut, Monaghan, Perry, Aylwin, Bache, Hughes, Morris and Mustin. Giffen’s force reached Kiska on July 22nd and his ships smashed the island with 424000 lbs of high explosive shells. Just an hour later, a PBY suddenly detached with her radar 7 radar pips southwest of Attu. The PBY maintained contact for around 6 hours before low fuel forced her to return to base. These radar pips alarmed Admiral Kinkaid which was being reported in conjunction with a massive increase in Japanese radio activity on Kiska. Kinkaid believed a major Japanese fleet had just entered Aleutian waters, most likely a reinforcement convoy. Kinkaid immediately ordered Rear Admirals Giffen and Griffin to intercept the suspected enemy. However, by doing this he had also done something extremely favorable for the Japanese, he had left Kiska Harbor open and unguarded. Kinkaid dispatched a quartet of PT boats to try and provide a makeshift blockade, but the terrible weather forced the smaller vessels to return to port as trying to dash over to Kiska would probably see them all sunk.

While this was occurring, Kimura’s ships were traveling through the dense fog separately. The fog prevented the Americans from intercepting them initially, and having failed to make contact with the enemy, Kinkaid became nervous the Japanese might escape the blockade and ordered the force to return to Kiska at maximum speed on July 25th. The American ships dutifully turned back while Kinkaid sent the Oiler Pecos out to meet them for refueling. By dusk of the 25th, the American ships were around 90 miles from Kiska, when the fog had all but disappeared showing a cloudless sky. Kimura’s vessels seeing their fog betray them, all reunited as a single force, now bearing 400 miles south of the American warships. At precisely 12:43am on July 26th the American warships picked up 7 strong radar pips around 15 miles northeast. It was Mississippi’s SG radar that first picked them up, the American destroyers were actually unable to detect any pips on their radar due to the curvature of the ocean's surface at such a distance. The New Mexico, Portland, San Francisco and Wichita began picking up the same radar pips. The radar pips zigzagged across the sea surface, changing direction in much the same way ships attempting to evade detection might. The ships were being detected all at different angles, verifying to the Americans there were physical presences of some kind occupying definite points in space. On top of this, the immobile radar signature of Kiska’s volcano at a range of 78 miles appeared clearly the entire time, verifying the validity of the pips moving with a fixed landmark. The radar pips converged 22,000 yards ahead of the Americans forcing them to spring into action.

Admiral Giffen called for the entire fleet to turn left to intercept the pips on their southerly heading and in the hopes of foiling a possible torpedo attack. All of the American ships turned their guns to fire salvo’s into the night. Great flame lances stabbed into the darkness as destroyers launched volleys of torpedoes and radar plotters frantically calculated salvo corrections. For 67 minutes the Americans tracked the 7 radar pips firing wildly at them. At 1:30am the Mississippi’s log recorded zig-zags and a 20 degree course change, but not a single sailor saw an enemy ship. Cruisers San Francisco and Santa Fe registered shell splashes, but never an enemy target.  75 miles over on Kiska, the Japanese were watching a spectacle. From their point of view it was like a night-time light show over the horizon. By 2:22am the radar pips thinned, faded and vanished completely. During the morning surface ships and aircraft fanned out looking for wreckage, ships, floating papers, oil slick, anything to indicate something was even out there! The American warships reported no return fire, it was as if they faced ghosts. With a lack of fuel and ammunition, the US ships began refueling on the 28th and resumed their blockade of Kiska.

What famously has become known as the battle of the Pips left the US Navy with a mystery that remains unsolved to this very day. The radar equipment was operating at times where there was a cloudless night with no fog, zero reasons for false radar echoes. An Aleutian crab fishing captain named Captain George Fulton may have solved the mystery in 1991 when he managed to duplicate the radar signatures observed during the battle by using his radar on a natural phenomenon common to the area. He presented his findings to the Alaska War Symposium in 1993 in a letter “I […] duplicated the Battle of the Pips using color radar. Sure enough there were blips on the tube and their density changed from red to orange to yellow and finally to black, providing an exact replication of the Battle of the Pips. What you described fits exactly the […] pattern of dense flocks of mutton birds or dusky shearwaters […] As mutton birds fly they veer left and right. This accounts for the zigzagging that was reported on the radar logs” Captain Fulton further went on to say how these huge flocks continue until they see large schools of fish, such as pollack. When the birds see them they begin landing on the sea surface then dive for their prey. This maneuver causes them to vanish from radar screens entirely. In the 1990s Aleutian fishing crews use this trait to locate large concentration of pollack, identifying the blips by their zigzagging motion and cast their nets accordingly. Were the Japanese saved by shearwater birds?

Another answer came from the US Navy who officially stated that atmospheric echoes, a sort of phenomena caused the radar pips, that explanation has been highly contested. Its also been speculated that the American radar pips were 7 IJN submarines running reconnaissance. What we do know is Kimura made it to Kiska on the 28th undetected and unharmed while the US warships were enroute miles back. No American ships were anywhere near Kiska on the 28th. Admiral Kimura pulled the ships into Kiska anchorage and evacuated the entire remaining forces on the island, all 5183 men onto 8 vessels all within 55 minutes. The Japanese soldiers made sure to spend their last moments on the island setting up a plethora of booby traps. Four days later Kimura and Kawase were back in Paramushiro, successfully evacuating Kiska without firing a single shot. The Americans had no idea the evacuation occurred. In the words of one disgruntled American Colonel after the Kiska ordeal ““How I hate those bastards but I've got to give them credit for the most masterly evacuation by any army at any time and I'm not forgetting Dunkirk”

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

The drive to Lae and Salamaua rages on New Guinea as the American Navy in the frigid northern seas fought perhaps a ghost ship army. Or perhaps some pesky birds looking for tasty pollock saved the entire Japanese garrison on the island of Kiska. 

- 87 - Pacific War - Drive on Munda point, July 18-25, 1943

Last time we spoke about the allied offensive against Mubo and the naval battle of Kolombangara. The Australians and Americans were continuing the drive towards Salamaua and Lae, but in their way was the once heavily fortified area of Mubo. Because of intricate diversionary attacks in multiple places, the Japanese gradually lifting their defensive positions in Mubo, until the time was ripe for the allies to seize it. The Pimple, Green Hill and Observation hill, places that caused suffering and hardship were finally seized, Mubo was secured. Over in the Solomons, the New Georgia campaign was continuing, forcing the Japanese to make another daring Tokyo Express run like they did at the battle of Kula Gulf. Yet again Admiral Ainsworth went out to face the enemy, completely ignorant of their torpedo capabilities and he paid for it dearly. Today we are going to continue these stories.

This episode is the Drive on Munda Point

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Today we are starting with the main drive towards Munda. We are picking up from last time where General Wing had finally begun his main advance on Munda on July 9th. Now the landings had occurred on July 2nd, from then on the Americans were busy making another landings such as at Rice Anchorage, getting forces to assembly points and trying to hinder any efforts by the Japanese to reinforce Munda. If you were looking down upon a map it would basically look like multiple forces taking up positions that cut off trails and ports that extend towards Munda. Everyone had a unique task and a time table, but as we all know not everything goes according to plan. When General Wing ordered the main advance, two infantry regiments were greatly delayed, those being the 172nd who moved a grand total of 1100 yards and the 169th who made zero ground at all. The war planners had not considered how difficult it would be for ground forces to travel the single narrow tracks, dense jungles, mangroves, creeks, ridges and ravines. The men found navigation difficult and whenever the terrain seemed to narrow they found Japanese defenses. The 172nd were ordered by Major Genera Hester to carry out flanking maneuvers against a roadblock set up by the 9th company, 3rd battalion, 229th regiment while the 169th attacked them frontally. They were supported by heavy artillery, naval bombardment and aerial bombing. But General Sasaki correctly predicted the American commanders intentions and responded to them rather quickly with his own counter flanking maneuvers. His forward area was held by Japanese snipers, well concealed in baskets in trees whom employed rifles that gave little to no muzzle flashes, something that was turning into a real trait of the Japanese. 

The 172nd progressed a few hundreds yards with its 1st battalion leading the way, the 2nd behind them and the 3rd following from a distance. They were assaulting a point where the Munda trail intersected another trail running southwest to a beach and southwest of this were the native villages of Ilangana and Laiana. The Japanese managed to keep them 1500 yards away with this defenses. The Artillery was not working to dislodge the Japanese from their roadblock and during the night the Japanese were reinforced with some units of the 11th company who took up some high ground later called Reincke Ridge. This made things ever worse for the inexperienced and pretty brutally shaken 169th who had the unfortunate job of meeting them in a front assault.

Things were becoming even worse for General Wing. Despite the slow progress, the American forces had actually overstretched their logistics by July 10th. The 118th engineer battalion had been making some good progress building a jeep trail going from Zanana to the Barike River. They relied on information provided by native scouts, and the engineers built the trail over high dry ground, averaging around half a mile or so per day. But the 5 foot deep fast running stream east of the Barike caused a ton of soft mud, not  very engineer friendly. To get the ground firm enough for footbridges and such they were forces to swing the road northward parallel to the river for over 2 miles. This gap between the end and front of the road meant near half of the combat troops were forced to carry forward ammunition, food, water and other supplies and let us not forget everyone who gets sick or wounded needed to be carried back on the same roadways. Again, logistics are not as sexy as the combat and don’t usually get much time of day, but its important for any war effort, hell look at Russia today.

To solve his logistical headache, General Hester decided to divert the 172nd infantry regiment south towards Laiana, while the 169th would continue their miserable advance up the Munda trail. Now Laiana was just 500 yards east of the main Japanese defensive line at Ilangana, currently held by the 2nd and 3rd battalion of the 229th regiment and 2nd independent Quick-fire battalion all under the command of Colonel Hirata Genjiro. The 172nd would have the support of the 3rd battalion, 103rd regiment and 8 M3 Stuart tanks of the 9th defense battalion who were expected to land at Laiana by July 13th.

On the morning of the 11th, the 172nd began turning south wading through knee deep mud and having the Japanese fire mortars upon them. By midway they had advanced 450 yards when they came across some Japanese bill boxes. While this was going on the 169th were pushing against the Japanese upon the high ground leading to a stalemate. Because of this Colonel Temple Holland replaced Colonel Eason as commander of the 169th and Colonel Frederick Reincke took command of its 3rd battalion which was being led by Major William Stebbins. On July 12th the Colonel Holland began a plan calling for the 1st battalion to attack frontally while the 2nd battalion enveloped the Japanese left flank. The 3rd battalion who were in reserve were released to engage the enemy, but the entire thing bogged down immediately as units became intermingled with the 172nd who were on their way to Laiana.

Meanwhile Rear Admiral Aaron Merrill with task force 36 was ordered to depart Ironbottom Sounds and provide naval bombardment from the Blanche Channel in coordination with heavy artillery in Rendova and aerial bombing from AirSols. Merrill took 4 light cruisers Columbia, Cleveland, Denver and Montpelier into the narrow channel while his two destroyers Farenholt and Buchanen took up a position near the Munda Bar to shell the Kokenggolo Hill Area. Merrills force fired 8600 shells for 40 minutes, which did clear the jungle in front of the advancing troops, but ultimately did little else as they were forced to fire a mile in front of the American positions, but within that mile were the said Japanese defenses. As you can imagine, the boys on the ground were all too excited to now advance, only to find the same unhampered enemy facing them. The 1st battalion, 169th regiment managed to gain about 300 yards; the 2nd battalion received enfilading fire from a ridge to the north, unable to progress and the 3rd battalion assaulted the southern ridge for several hours enjoying some artillery and aerial support. To the south the 172nd were stuck in front of the pill boxes. These pill boxes were not made out of concrete, but instead coconut logs and coral, pretty ingenious stuff. They ranged from 10-12 feet square, with 3-4 layers of logs banked with 6-8 feet of weathered coral. Their ceilings were usually around 10 feet from the floor, dug into the earth so that 2-4 feet of the pill box projected above the ground. Each had several firing slits for riflemen or machine guns. Outside the pill boxes were foxholes, and trenches connected all positions. All of this was well camouflage using earth, grass, vines, palm fronds and such, leading Americans to stumble onto a pill box without even noticing it. One remark made by the 43rd division after coming across them was that they had an easier time smelling them than seeing them. So if you ever watched classic Pacific War films or the Pacific Series and wondered how some of these pill boxes were made, there you go. 

On the morning of the 13th Colonel Holland requested some aerial support and he got some at 10am. 12 Dauntless dropped 1000 pound daisy cutters upon some smoke markers laid out by the 169th. The dive bombers manage to hit the target perfectly before Holland ordered the men to charge. The 2nd battalion went through the center, while the 1st battalion took the right and the 3rd battalion took the left. They hit the north and south ridges trying to envelop the Japanese. E and F companies of the 2nd battalion ran into heavy machine gun fire, causing a halt. The 1st battalion tried to climb the north ridge but were obstructed by a ton of felled trees and craters due to the bombing. The Japanese who survived the bombardments opened fire from their pillboxes keeping the Americans in check. The charging Americans now without artillery or mortar support tried to push forward with rifle and bayonet, seeing many killed upon the crest or wounded. Company B would lose 3 of its 4 officers alone. The 3rd battalion now led by Colonel Reincke fought for some hours managing to progress 500 yards into the Japanese lines securing the south ridge. They fought pillbox through pillbox, it was a terribly bloody affair, resulting in 100 casualties. When they took the ridge they held the position, beating back several counterattacks during the night, to which the men named the ridge Reincke. Soon the 1st and 2nd battalions took up positions on the 3rds flanks securing Reincke ridge, while the Japanese concentrated on the northern ridge and to the west they held a higher ground called Horseshoe hill.

Meanwhile the 172nd had their lines of communication cut off in their rear by the Japanese forcing them to quicken up the pace as they were running low on food. They made it to Laiana beach in the late afternoon successfully securing the beach and organizing defensive positions. The following morning General Hester landed the 3rd battalion, 103rd regiment and the tanks to back them up at Laiana. This came also with some much needed supplies for the worn out men. Having supplied the men to the southern beach, now the men in the northern front required resupply. Reinckes men were tossing back more counterattacks. One morning Japanese artillery fired upon the ridge bursting a tree that killed 4 men and wounded 23. Alongside this 5 men were reported to have a case of shell shock, 7 others war neurosis. Machine gun fire claimed 2 men, wounded another 5. At 8pm artillery began again killing another 8 men and wounding 26. There were no medical officers with the battalion, leaving medics to do what they could. Despite the hardship the 3rd battalion held their ground, and gradually the Japanese evacuated the northern ridge which the 2nd battalion quickly seized.

By July 15th, the 4rd divisions engineers had managed to complete the jeep trail from Laiana to the 169th area. Telephone lines crews began to lay underwater cables between Zanana, Laiana and General Barkers artillery teams. Engineers also finished a bridge over the Barike on the 12th and on the 14th had extended the trail within 500 yards of the 169th front lines. Supply lines were finally being secured, and more importantly the wounded would be able to be safely transported. By July 17th, the 43rd division had 90 deaths, 636 wounded in actions and over 1000 cases of sickness ranging from the ever present friend malaria, but also diarrhea, dysentery and such. As mentioned, cases of psychological problems were also very apparent. Half of the 43rd division were suffering war neurosis, which we call today Combat Stress Reaction “CSR”. This is an acute reaction from the stress of war that causes the combatant to feel fatigued, have slower reactions, be indecisive, and can become disconnected from one's surroundings. It’s classic psychological trauma, kind of similar to what I assume many of you listeners would think of as PTSD, but it is not the same thing, PTSD can see durations lasting months if not even years, while CSR has a short duration. Small tidbit of info since my first degree is in neuroscience, a fairly recent study in the later 2000’s was done to look at the issue of CSR, shellshock and such from a neurological point of view. The idea was to figure out if specific physical damage was being done to parts of the brain during blast trauma that caused combat stress reactions. The reason the study was done was because the symptoms from such maladies often overlap with things you see in traumatic brain injuries, anyways was interesting reading back in my uni days.

As pointed out by historian Samuel Eliot Morison, it seemed General Hester’s choice of sending the 172nd infantry regiment south, had greatly exposed the inexperienced 169th. In his words “This was perhaps the worst blunder in the most unintelligently waged land campaign of the Pacific war (with the possible exception of Okinawa). Laiana should have been chosen as the initial beachhead; if it was now required, the 172nd should have been withdrawn from Zanana and landed at Laiana under naval gunfire and air support. Or Hester might have made the landing with his reserves then waiting at Rendova. As it was, General Sasaki interpreted the move correctly and by nightfall had brought both advances to a standstill.” In order to break the deadlock that was occurring, some of the command structure would be reorganized. This coincided with half of the 4rd division being knocked out of commission, prompting General Hester to request reinforcements for the drive against Munda.

General Harmon performed a inspection of the situation and reported back to Admiral Halsey on Guadalcanal. He advised sending forward General Oscar Griswold of the 14th corps with a forward echelon of staff so he could begin building up the administrative, supply and planning for the future New Georgia occupation force. Once Munda had fallen, this would allow General Hester to carry on against Vila. Harmon justified this by stating Hesters force was too small to do it, but there was another rationale. By doing this it would relegate Admiral Turner to a supporting role, whom the army and marines were resenting because of what they deemed to be his meddling of ground operations. Admiral Turner opposed the idea, and Halsey replied to Harmon he could simply increase Hester’s staff. This prompted Harmon to fly back to COMSOPAC HQ on Noumea to personally talk to Halsey and force the issue.

Griswold showed up at midnight on the 15th assuming command of the occupational force, leaving Hester to focus on the actions of his 43rd divisions offensive. Griswold began his new task by directing Major General Robert Beightler to the rest of the 37th division to New Georgia alongsideColonel Collins 161st regiment of his 25th division. Over at Zanana, the 1st battalion of the 145th regiment arrived at 5pm, which Colonel Holland tossed up to help reinforce the 169th.Now that Admiral Turner was relieved as commander of the South Pacific Amphibious force, his new orders were to take command of the central pacific offensives, replacing Admiral Wilkinson.

Now General Hester was preparing for a corps level offensive, but it would take over 10 days to build up and in the meantime the Japanese began to prepare a major counter offensive. On July 16 and 17 some small attacks were performed against the Ilangana line, supported now by the newly arrived tanks, but a lack of coordination between the 172nd regiments infantry and tanks led to only a bit of gain. Nonetheless the tanks did help against the pillboxes. The tanks took up a wedge formation and used their 37mm guns with high explosive shells to dislodge the panicking Japanese trying to fight back with their machine guns from many of the forward pillboxes. However the Japanese were only phased by the arrival of the tanks for about a day as on July 18th they started to employ anti tank strategies to great effect. The Japanese defenders began tossing a mixture of mines, molotov cocktails and flame-throwers, forcing Griswold to withdraw the remaining tanks and ordered the transportation of the 10th defense battalions tanks to reinforce them. 

Meanwhile the 169th regiment were advancing southwest towards Kelley Hill located 400 yards southwest of Reincke Ridge. They faced little opposition, but would soon see wave after wave of Japanese counterattacks to dislodge them. On the other side, the 1st and 3rd battalions of Colonel Tomonari’s 13th regiment had arrived at the scene and managed to bypass Colonel Liversedge’s roadblock. General Sasaki planned to toss Tomonari around the American’s right flank near the east bridge over the Barike river. From there they could advance upon Zanana Beach. By July 14th, the 1th regiment were marching to the upper Barike, but the men lacked maps and were hacking their own trail. Tomonari said of this  “If we had to go round and round in circles in the jungle, not having been able to find the enemy, nor having been able to help the 229th Regiment and let them die, it would really hurt the reputation the 13th Infantry Regiment had had for a long time, since the Sino- and Russo-Japan War. That was why most soldiers were feeling the pressure. Finally meeting the enemy at that point was like meeting Buddha in hell.” It would take them  days to march through the thick jungle. On the night of July 17th, Tomonari and the men found a jeep trail heading towards General Hesters HQ on Zanana Beach. He ordered his men to attack the area which at this time was being guarded by a platoon of the 4rd reconnaissance troops and 70 Fijian commandos led by Captain David Williams. General Hester was not at the HQ at this time he was at Laiana, but Generals Wing and Barker were. The Japanese launched simultaneous raids against the engineer and medical bivouacs and 43rd divisional command post. At the same time Captain Kojima of the 229th regiment launched an attack against Kelley Hill on the 18th. At 10am Japanese machine guns north of Kelley opened fire as riflement charged the its western slope. The 1st battalion fired upon the charging Japanese as the 3rd battalion fired upon the machine gunners to the north. The Japanese assault was threatening to break the line. Many of the Japanese managed to crawl within grenade tossing distance of the northern line of the 1st battalion, but mortar fire forced them back. It was an extremely bloody attack and the 1st battalion reported finding 102 dead Japanse upon the slopes at daybreak. Another predawn attack was launched by the 2nd battalion 229th infantry against the 3rd battalion, 103rd infantry but they repulsed it. The attacks were done to prevent the American troops there from helping the Zanana defenders. If all went well, Sasaki could destroy the 43rd divisions rear installations cutting off major lines of communications to the surrounding front line forces.

Tomonari’s raids however were chaotic and disorderly. Rather than a organized assault, it fell into a series of separate smaller raids allowing the few reconnaissance and Fijian commandos to fend off the invaders. The reconnaissance forces repelled the attacks upon the engineer and medical bivouacs while the Fijian commandos manned a perimeter alongside Headquarters personnel such as drivers, medical orderlies, clerks, everyone grabbed a rifle despite many not even using one since basic training. The Fijians had better eyesight at night than anyone else and showcased their abilities to the Japanese who were certainly not used to being contested in this field of expertise. Tafa a Tongan, was firing from his foxhole when a Japanese officer wielding a katana and a grenade in the other hand charged at him. Tafa used his Owen gun to mow the man down killing him. The Japanese officer was found later to be carrying documents showcasing the full strength of the Japanese force and details of their mission. The Japanese were screaming as they charged from all directions as the close quarters melee raged on. The Japanese managed to infiltrate the perimeter multiple times, destroying communications equipment, but they could not reach the most important part of the area, General Barkers artillery. Barker unleashed a tight box barrage from extremely close range to devastating effect. The Japanese had no other option than to flee up the jeep trail they came from. Tomonari had his surviving forces erect some road blocks for the next 3 days, but Sasaki’s hopes of knocking out the 43rd divisions HQ were thwarted.

Having survived the major counter offensive, the 148th regiment was quickly landed at Zanana on the 18th and were soon sent over to Reincke Ridge to relieve the poor 169th regiment. Colonel Stuart Baxter of the 148th regiment was surprised by the roadblocks as Griswold never warned him about them. His advance parties were ambushed leading to 2 deaths and some wounded. During the night the Japanese were found drunk off looted whiskey they had taken from a rations dump near the bridge on the Barike. There was a clash where a platoon from the 169th were bringing wounded men down. The drunken Japanese managed to kill many of the wounded men being carried on litters alongside 2 medics. The bridge henceforth was called “Butchers bridge”. The next morning at 8am, Baxter sent his 1st battalion and his HQ up the jeep road to fight the Japanese, but as they went up it seemed the Japanese had withdrawn. Baxters men crossed the east bridge without incident, but as they went further up the road suddenly Japanese machine guns opened up on them. A company lost over a dozen men to this ambush and soon the Japanese were attacking his flanks forcing Baxter to dig in. By July 21st the Japanese would finally depart the area allowing the 148th regiment to relieve the 169th.

As for the 169th, they were sent over to Rendova and General Beightler took command of the 37th division whom he reshuffled for an offensive. A 1300 yard line was formed north of Ilangana with Hester’s 43rd division to the south and Beightler’s 37th division to the north. By this point Hester moved his 43rd divisional command post from Zanana to Laiana where many trails were created to help with the supply lines. Griswold now planned to start an offensive on July 25th, opening up with a naval, artillery and aerial bombardment, before the infantry and tanks performed a frontal assault upon the Japanese line. The 43rd division would hit from the left to take Lambete plantation and its airfield while the 37th division would hit from the right against Bibilo Hill, thus enveloping the Japanese north of the airfield.

Meanwhile, Colonel Currin’s 4th Raiders had secured the Enogai inlet, allowing Liversedge to launch his attack against Bairoko. For the attack on Bairoko, Liversedge planned to use the 1st and 4th Raiders along the ENogai-Bairoko trail to hit the Japanese frontally, while the 3rd battalion, 148th regiment would take the Triri-Bairoko trail to hit their southern flank. Liversedge appeared to have expected aerial bombing support, but did not request or failed to request the air support in time. On the morning of the 20th, the forces began their advance. At 10:00am, Colonel Griffiths 1st Raiders ran into some Japanese outposts manned by just a handful of Japanese. They fired upon them sending them fleeing, as they continued their advance they soon came across a larger force. Eventually they were forced to a halt as they came upon the Japanese main defensive line at around Noon. Commander Okumura Saburo had created 4 successive lines of mutually supporting pillboxes on low parallel ridges running north to south. Meanwhile the 4th raiders advanced within 300 yards short of the shore of Bairoko harbor meeting the Japanese lines of defense.

At 2:30pm, Griffiths D company managed to break into the first line of defense, but an hour later, Okumura ordered heavy mortar fire from the ridges pushing the Americans back and turning the area into a killing field. The 1st raiders were unable to move forward, now resting their hopes on the 4th raiders making a breakthrough in the south. The 4th raiders ran into the Japanese main line during the midday and were not making any progress. Liversedge called the forces at the front and consequently ordered the two raider battalions to take up defensive positions further east on some high ground. The raiders had suffered 200 casualties before they retired to the south shores of Leland Lagoon. The next day, reinforcements came over from Enogai along with air support. At 9:50am 24 Dauntless, 25 Avengers and 8 B-25’s swooped in to bomb Bairoko. This was followed up at noon by 37 Avengers, 6 B-25s, then at 4pm 48 Dauntless and 25 Avengers. 130 tons of bombs his Bairoko alongside an estimated 24,000 rounds of machine gun bullets. Liversedge ordered the men to sit tight and hold their positions for now along a line stretching from Enogai, Triri and Rice Anchorage. 

Meanwhile, after the victory during the battle of Kolombangara, Admiral Samejima formed a new Night battle unit, consisting of  Heavy cruisers Kumano, Suzuya and Chokai; light cruiser Sendai; and destroyers Yugure, Kiyonami, Yukikaze and Hamakaze, led by Admiral Nishimura. Their unit was given the task of harassing American transportation efforts. Rear Admiral Ijuin Matsuji was now commanding the reinforcement unit who were going to make a run on the 17th, but this was greatly hampered by an American air strike against Buin. On the 17th, 7 B-24s, 32 P-38’s and P-40’s, 37 Dauntless, 36 Avengers and 64 Wildcats and Corsairs hit Buin. 48 Zeros began to take off from Kahili, but they could not scramble fast enough as the Americans bombed the shipping, setting a cargo ship on fire, before the Hatsuyuki took a direct hit to her forward magazine sinking her and 3 other destroyers were damaged. 13 Zeros were shot down while the Americans lost 6 aircraft. Many of Ijuins transports received some minor damage delaying his departure. On July 19th, Nishimura attempted a reinforcement run to New Georgia, but his force was intercepted northwest of Kolombangara by a pack of Avengers. Nishimura’s ships scattered at high speed upon seeing the enemy aircraft, but Yugure was successfully torpedoed and sank as a result. The Kiyonami stuck behind to grab survivors. Meanwhile cruisers Chokai and Kumano were also heavily damaged. The Kiyonami was later attacked by 8 B-25’s who bombed her at masthead level, leaving her dead in the water. The B-25’s also attacked the transports doing some minor damage to the Matsuzuki and Minazuki. 582 men, 102 tons of supplies and 60 drums of fuel were successfully delivered, but the terrible losses led to the newly formed Night Battle unit to be canned.

On the 22nd another reinforcement convoy consisting of Seaplane tender Nishin and destroyers Arashi, Isokaze and Hagikaze made a run to Bougainville led by Rear Admiral Osugi Morkazu. They were carrying 630 men of the South Seas 4th guard unit, 22 tanks and 8 artillery pieces. They were intercepted by a huge force consisting of 12 B-24’s, 16 Dauntless, 18 Avengers, escorted by 134 fighters flown by US army, Marine and New Zealanders. The Nisshin was devastated by bombs, torpedoes and strafing attacks leading her to sink within 14 minutes from the start of the interception. Of her 633 crewmen and 630 troops onboard, only 178 would be rescued later on by destroyers who faced considerable attacks from aircraft doing so. Despite the rather insane levels of allied aircraft attacks, General Imamura continued to commit more forces to the defense of the Central Solomons now assigning the elite 2nd battalion, 230th regiment “Yano Battalion” led by Lt COlonel Yano Keiji to reinforce Vila. They were sent aboard the destroyers Yukikaze, Mikazuki and Hamakaze on the night of the 23rd. Instead of sailing through the slot, they used the Wilson straight which was very fortunate as Admiral Merrill was coming up the slot with a large task force to supply Liversedge at Enogai. At Least the poor Japanese transports dodge one bullet.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

The American drive upon Munda was seeing significant delays as the Japanese proved themselves very capable at defense, especially in pillboxes. However the battles to reinforce New Georgia were costing the Japanese defeats or pyrrhic victories. 

- 86 - Pacific War - Fall of Mubo & battle of Kolombangara, July 11-18, 1943

Last time we spoke about the amphibious assaults in New Georgia, New Guinea and the naval battle of Kula Gulf. The boys on New Guinea were edging ever closer to their objective of Lae while drawing the Japanese attention elsewhere. In the Solomons, Admiral Kusaka tossed as many aircraft as he could to thwart the multiple allied landings, but it was to no avail. Having depleted his airpower, now he turned to the navy to see if they could reinforce New Georgia before another Guadalcanal situation occurred. Rear Admiral Teruo Akiyama was given the task of launching a Tokyo Express to New Georgia while also trying to give some fight to the enemy. Aboard his flagship the Niizuka, Akiyama did indeed give a fight to the Americans, showcasing a brand new type of radar and the ever trusty type 93 long lance torpedoes. The Japanese landed a few of their boys and now the real fight for New Georgia would begin. 

This episode is the Fall of Mubo & battle of Kolombangara 

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

So the past few weeks we have been chaotically juggling multiple events across the Solomons and New Guinea and this week it shall be no different. So let's first jump into New Guinea. General MacArthur’s forces managed to pull off the Nassau Bay landing, getting General Savige some much needed reinforcements on his eastern flank and a new supply route. Now the landing at Nassau Bay was part of an ongoing operation codenamed Doublet, aimed at dislodging the Japanese from Bobdubi and Mubo. Taking these were necessary for the future push against Lae and Salamaua. Mubo held an airfield and its capture would greatly facilitate troop movements towards Salamaua. The movement in the interior towards Mubo was complicated by rough terrain. There were a series of ridges that could be defended sternly by the Japanese. As we have seen for weeks, Roosevelt ridge, the pimple, Green Hill, Observation hill, Lababia ridge and Bitoi ridge proved to be very heavily defended. For the Japanese headquarters, all of the allied offensives were confusing as to where exactly the main target was to be. General Nakano remained confident, Salamaua was the main target and he acted accordingly by beefing up the defense there. He ordered Major General Chuichi Muroya, the commander of the 51st infantry division to fortify and defend Salamaua. As part of this, he also ordered Muroya to dispatch around 1000 men to halt American forces trying to move up the coast towards Lake Salus.

Now by July 2nd Brigadier Moten’s plan was for the 2/6th and 2/5th battalions to take Mubo and Observation hill. While the new Taylor Force would capture Bitoi ridge and then the ridge between Bui Alang and Bui Kumbul Creeks. After this the forces would link up and the Japanese lines of communications along the Buigap Creek would be severed. While this was going on the 15th brigade who was working in conjunction with the newly landed troops, were performing an offensive directed at reducing the Japanese presence around Lae and Salamaua. Part of this offensive involved the inexperienced 58th/59th battalion who had a hell of a time facing the Japanese at Bobdubi ridge. The 58th/59th battalion were two previous militia battalions from Victoria. Initially they were a defensive force in Australia, not meant to go to places like New Guinea, but as they say times were tough. They got a taste of hand to hand combat in late june and while they did not make much progress, they still impacted the campaign, forcing General Muroya to request reinforcements so he could maintain a firm defense for the approaches to Salamaua. Nakano made it clear Bobdubi was of grave importance stating “this location is the last key point in the defense of Salamaua”. Muroya received Major Otoichi Jinno’s 1st and 3rd companies of the 80th battalion. They marched through the Coconuts area to Bobdubi bringing with them 2 mountain guns of the 26th field artillery regiment. Meanwhile Colonel Araki his 1st battalion over to the Old Vickers position. By early July Muroya now held 5 infantry companies, around 500 men strong in all. But with all the activity hitting the north, Araki became worried and ultimately decided to move his regimental HQ and 1st battalion to Komiatum, leaving only his 2nd battalion to hold Mubo. 

On July 4th, Brigadier Heathcote Hammer took command of the 15th brigade. He was a veteran of the second battle of El Alamein, one of the most iconic battles of WW2, yours truly actually wrote quite a large episode for Kings and Generals on that one, and I think by the time this podcast comes out it should as well. Anyways Hammer had taken a German bullet right through both of his cheeks, but he did not lose a single tooth in the process, I guess lucky on that count. He earned a distinguished service order for his time in the middle east and in june of 1943 was promoted to Brigadier and given command of the 15th brigade. He was considered one of the most original and magnetic leaders of the Australian Infantry. “Hard as Nails” was said to be his motto, and “as you train, so you fight” his creed. When the 58/59th battalion stalled, he was tossed into the thick of it. Now do remember he was coming directly off the victory at Alamein, so he was I guess you can call it “desert minded” when he was tossed into the unforgivable jungles of New Guinea. He would have to deal with completely different terrain, different types of troops and a different enemy than the Italians and Germans.

Another result of the delays at Bobdubi saw General Saviege dispatched Major Warfe’s commands over to stop the Japanese from escaping Mubo. On July the 5th, General Savige ordered Hammer to send the company towards Tambu Saddle and Goodview Junction where they could cut off the Komiatum Track, thus preventing the Japanese from escaping Mubo to the north. Meanwhile B Company were on the Bench Cut Track carrying out ambush attacks. The two mountain guns brought up to the old vickers position were sporadically hitting Australian positions to their misery. C Company was performing a diversionary attack, while D Company was trying to capture the Coconuts and were successful at taking its northern region by nightfall on July 6th. The next day, the 80th regiment were pushing the 58/59th battalion back as air attacks from 6 Bostens hit the Old vickers allowing C Company to charge in with further support from D Company’s mortars. The men charged up the steep ridge into Japanese machine gun nets and pillboxes. Likewise the 1st company of the 80th regiment with support of the 1st battalion, 66th regiment were launching counterattacks out of Komiatum. The Japanese managed to ambush some Australian supply lines inflicting casualties. On July 9th, the Australians tried to charge again into the Old Vickers, through a Sugarcane Knoll, but it went the exact same as last time, the machine gun nests and pillboxes were simply too much. Bobdubi ridge proved a tough nut to crack, but all of the activity was causing more and more Japanese units to move away from Mubo. By this point Mubo was being defended by 950 men and of those 770 were front line soldiers of the 66th regiment and the 14th field artillery regiment.

And so the time was ripe to hit Mubo. Moten tossed Companies A and B from the 2/6th and C Company from the 2/5th towards Buiapal Creek; C Company of the 2/6th at Lababia ridge; D company of the 2/6th at the Saddle and the remainder of the 2/5th battalion into reserve. Warfe’s commands went to work cutting off the escape route along the Komiatum track at Goodview Junction, but his forward units were spotted by Japanese patrols. As the commandos approached the area the Japanese came down from Orodubi ambushing them at Ambush Knoll…because of course its named that, silly Aussies, and this resulted in some lost supplies. Hammer was determined not to be thwarted by any delays so he ordered Warfe to launch a counterattack immediately. The Commandos were able to push the enemy back and reclaim their lost supplies, some of which were mortars and machine guns. On the night of the 6th, Warfe was ordered to leave a force to secure Wells junction while the rest of his men would proceed to cut off the escape route.

During the morning of July 7ty, Moten’s leading companies were wading through waste deep water in the Buiapal Creek due south of Observation Hill. The allied assault against Mubo was set to begin at 9:30am on the 7th, with Mitchell bombers coming in to strafe Kitchen Creek, Woody Island and Observation Hill. After this some Botsons and liberators would likewise bomb and strafe the same targets. The view from the ground was quite the spectacle for Moten’s men. It looked like the entirety of the Mubo valley was being enveloped in thick black smoke and flames as the bombers dropped their payloads. Over 159 bombers and fighters dropped 109 tons of bombs over the Mubo area. Even if the bombs did not directly cause casualties among the Japanese in the area, it still caused chaos.

Once the air attacks dissipated, the ground forces opened up their artillery and charged. A company of the 2/5th advanced without encountered any opposition, successfully climbing the northern slopes of Observation Hill. The southern slopes proved much more difficult with the Japanese putting up a fight against B company. B Company were forced to take a defensive position in a Kunai patch southwest of the slopes of Observation Hill. During this time, the Artillery over at the beaches of Nassau Bay were being moved further inland and would arrive at Napier by July 8th. This allowed Taylor Force to have the guns necessary to launch an assault of Bitoi ridge. Taylors men managed to get to the southern slopes of the ridge by 3pm while A Company touching its forward crest. B Company likewise broke through to the north and got to a point between Kitchen and Bui Savella Creek. A Company attempted another assault against Observation Hill but was repelled again, prompting Captain Dexter’s D company to be sent to reinforce them. July 9th saw numerous patrol clashes as the Australians prodded deeper and deeper into the area. In the afternoon the Japanese sent a strong counterattack against the 2/5th companies seeing fierce fighting. As noted by Arthur Pearson of D company “In most cases we were firing blind, but sometimes we were abl to pick up the smoke from their rifles”. Pearson  at one point jumped into a weapon pit, trying to draw the Japanese fire his way. A bullet came at him, piercing the stock butt of his rifle, before slamming into one of the soldiers beside him killing the man. Pearson had no idea where the bullet had come from and frantically fired into the jungle hoping to hit the Japanese sniper. The next day saw a lot of the same, more patrol clashed. On the 10th, B Company engaged the enemy around Kitchen Creek. Meanwhile US infantry had cut the main track north of Bui Alang Creek on the 9th. The Americans began advancing down to Buigap Creek, then south to the Komiatum Track by July 10th, before hitting Buigap where they drove off a bunch of Japanese. The Americans now guessed the Japanese on Mubo were using a route north east along the Buikumbul to withdraw to Mount Tambu. With the Australian and now Americans infiltrating the sector, General Nakano ordered the Mubo garrison to pull out on the 11th, back over to Komiatum. To mask their withdrawal the Japanese planned to begin moving after sundown. By July 13th, they made their way along the Saddle to Mount Tambu, but the Americans had spotted them and gave them hell using artillery. The Japanese got out, but suffered many casualties doing so.

On July the 12th, with the Japanese leaving the area, the Australians seized the Pimple, Green Hill and Observation hill with little opposition. Thus the allies had finally driven the Japanese out of their positions near Mubo, but they had also allowed them to escape. It turned out to be quite the fiasco with General Savige and Herring both believing they controlled the US troops of the 162nd, but in truth General Fuller refused to relinquish command to either. This confusion helped the Japanese squeeze out, though they did suffer 313 deaths and 981 casualties. The Australians received around 300 casualties. Mubo had fallen, its airfield was captured, mop up operations would go on for sometime, but most of the Japanese outposts were cleared. The path to Salamaua and Lae was ever closer. But now we are heading east over to the Solomons.

General Wing’s 172nd and 169th regiments were assembling at Zanana by July 6th. Their task now was to advance along the Barike River towards Munda. Meanwhile on the northern coast of New Georgia Colonel Liversedge’s men successfully landed at Rice Anchorage by July 5th. His force was the 1st Marine Raider battalion, the 3rd battalion, 148th infantry and Companies K and L from the 145th infantry. His men began their advance south towards what is known as the Dragons peninsula. At the same time, as a result of the battle of Kula Gulf, the Japanese were able to land some men of the 13th regiment over at Vila. Defending Vila were forces led by Colonel Tomonari Satoshi. With more men on hand, General Sasaki intended to move the troops via barge through Bairoko so they could reinforce Munda. Sasaki had already brought his 3rd battalion, 229th regiment from Vila using barges. He was lucky the first time but now he felt the Americans would try to attack the airfield directly, perhaps by setting up artillery on the nearby Hopei island. Roviana island likewise could be used as a staging area for amphibious tanks to charge over. Thus Sasaki brought over some 8cm dual purpose guns and 13mm anti aircraft machine guns to try and defend the beaches. He also ordered Major Sato’s 2nd battalion of the 229th regiment to dig some anti-tank ditches along the beach with the intent to smash any enemy tanks at the waters edge. He received word of the landings made at Zanana on July 3rd, prompting him to quickly reinforce his eastern line that ran north from Ilangana point. By July 6th, he had the 3rd battalion, 229th regiment and Sato’s 2nd battalion holding positions along the the Ilangana line with a roadblock position held by a company who were using felled trees and barbed wire in front of Barike. Sasaki also had at his disposal a company of the Kure 6th SNLF led by Commander Okumura Saburo at Bairoko with a small detachment of the 2nd battalion, 13th infantry led by Major Obashi Takeo. 

Meanwhile General Wing managed to get most of his 172nd regiment to the mouth of the Barike, but the 2nd battalion of the 169th remained on Rendova and the 1st and 3rd battalions were moving inland towards the Japanese roadblock. Unfortunately for the 3rd battalion, they had not found the roadblock by the night of july 6th and dug in just a bit east of it. They did not establish a good perimeter for their fox holes, there were no trip wires or barbed wires anywhere. Thus when the darkness came, so did the Japanese from the roadblock. The Japanese performed their classic infiltration tactics. The men in the foxholes began to hear random screaming, the odd firing of rifles all around them. The Japanese began to infiltrate their perimeter with one soldier reported that Japanese troops were approaching while calling out company code names in English. It was a brutal night to be sure. The shaken men of the 3rd battalion advanced with I company leading the way. They found themselves running into Japanese machine gun positions by 10:55pm around the Munda trail. They retaliated with mortars and machine guns, but could not properly see where the enemy was. Luckily B company from the 172nd showed up attacking the roadblock from the rear. In the carnage 3 platoon leaders were wounded, K Companies commander was killed, no progress was being made. Firing lanes were drawn out, the Americans were trying to find the enemy but their muzzle blasts were tiny. Some of the Americans tossed grenades, but they could not get close enough to effectively do it. By 3:30 the 3rd battalion withdrew from what they called “blood hill” to dig in for the night, but the Japanese continued to harass them. According to the 169th infantry “it was a sleepless night spend under continued harassment from enemy patrols speaking English, making horror noises, firing weapons, throwing hand grenades, swinging machetes and jumping into foxholes with knives” 

On the 8th, the roadblock was overrun costing the 3rd battalion, 169th regiment and B company of the 172nd 6 deaths and 13 wounded. The next day the 169th finally got to their assembly point at the Barike line, while Colonel Liversedge and his men were crossing the Tamaku river. Colonel Liversedge planned to send Colonel Griffiths 1st Raiders with 2 companies of the 145th regiment to swing around the west shore of the Enogai Inlet prior to assaulting Bairoko while the 3rd battalion, 148th regiment would advance over to the Munda-Bairoko trail to cut off Munda from reinforcements. Liversedge estimated taking the Enogai Inlet and cutting off the trail would be done by July 8th, and it was critical it was done speedily as his men only had 3 days rations on hand. In the late afternoon of the 7th, the 148th managed to reach the trail and created a roadblock the following day. Griffiths team and secured the villages of Triri and Maranusa, clashing with a few Japanese patrols along the way. After capturing the villages the men came across some Japanese documents showcasing the defense plan for Enogai. On the 8th, the Raiders moved out of Triri enroute to Enogai only to run into an impassable mangrove swamp. Meanwhile Major Obashi launched a counterattack against Triri which would be eventually repelled. Griffith got the men to resume the advance using another trail west of the swamp and found themselves around Leland Lagoon where they clashed with some Japanese. 

The morning of the 9th, saw General Wings main advance began. At 5am General Barkers 3 battalions of artillery positioned on both shores of the Honiavasa passage and some 155mms on Rendova opened fire on Munda. The artillery put several thousand rounds of 105mm and 155mm high explosives upon Munda. This was followed up by a naval bombardment by the USS Farenholt, Buchanan, McCalla and Ralph Talbot who were firing from the Blanche Channel, showering Munda with over 2000 5 inch shells. Then on top of all that 107 Dauntless and Avengers dropped 79 tons of bombs over Munda, Enogai and Bairoko harbor beginning at 8:30am. The Japanese recorded that the area was lit up as if it were daytime. The 172nd regiment forded the Barike, the 169th was unable to move because of the battle against the Japanese roadblock.

On the night of July 6th, Admiral Samejima sent the rest of the troops that were supposed to be transported during the battle of Kula Gulf, the 2nd battalion of the 13th regiment, some 1200 men. They were aboard 4 destroyers, the Matsukaze, Yunagi, Mikazuki and Satsuki escorted by the cruisers Sendai and Chokai and 4 other destroyers the Yukikaze, Hamakaze, Tanikaze and Yugure. They only saw some harassment from a small strike force consisting of 5 PBY’s as they made their way to Vila and safely returned. Admiral Kusaka requested some naval reinforcements from the Combined Fleet, so Admiral Kogo send Admiral Nishimura’s Cruiser division 7, arriving on the 11th. Alongside this, Rear Admiral Izaki Shunji came over with light cruiser Jintsu and destroyer Kiyonami, taking command of the reinforcement unit.

Back on land, the Kure 6th’s batteries were firing upon Rice Anchorage prompting Griffith to begin the assault of the Enogai Inlet. Supported by mortars, B Company stormed the village of Baekineru. The Japanese began withdrawing from Enogai allowing the Americans to seize it by the 11th. This came just in time as the Raiders had run out of food and water. The raiders had paid heavily, suffering 47 deaths, 80 wounded and 4 men missing. The Kure 6th SNLF would report 81 deaths and a platoon of 50 men lost. The heavy losses forced Liversedge to request the 4th raiders be landed for the capture of Bairoko, but they would only arrive on the 18th. Meanwhile Colonel Tomonari brought forward his 1st and 3rd battalion to Bairoko to help reinforce Munda. At around 4pm, the 3rd battalion led by Colonel Takabayashi attacked the American roadblock, nearly dislodging them. By nightfall the Japanese took up a position on a ridge to the 148th’s northern flank. There was a series of counterattacks until the next day saw a bit of a stalemate, then the morning after that the Japanese backed off. The 148th regiment would hold onto the roadblock for more than a week, but would quickly run low on food. It mattered not however as the Japanese just advanced along another trail further west, prompting Liversedge to order the roadblock abandoned on July 17th.

Now Admiral Kusaka wanted to reinforce the important volcanic island of Kolombangara. Kolombangara was a perfectly round stratovolcanic cone soaring out of the sea to an altitude of 5800 feet. The Japanese had a garrison at Vila airfield on the islands southern shore. The island was often to put men and supplies upon barges that would make nighttime transits across the straits to Munda point. Kusaka sought to toss another 1200 troops, Major Yamada Tadaichi’s 2nd battalion, 45th regiment and the 8th battery, 6th field artillery. Transporting them would be Matsukaze, Yunagi, Minazuki and Satsuki coming from Buin, escorted by Admiral Izaki’s aboard the Jintsu alongside 5 destroyers Mikazuki, Yukikaze, Hamakaze, Kiyonami and Yugure coming from Rubaul. Unfortunately for the IJN, allied coastwatchers saw reported their movement and Admiral Halsey responded by ordered Admiral Ainsworth and task force 18 to intercept them. Ainsworth had light cruisers USS Honolulu, St Louis, the Royal New Zealand light cruisers HMNZS Leander; destroyers USS Nicholas, O’Bannon, Taylor, Jenkins, Radford, Ralph Talbot, Buchanan, Maury, Woodworth and Gwin. Half of Ainsworth’s forces came from Captain Ryan’s Destroyer squadron 12 who were quite inexperienced. Ainsworths set up his force making his vanguard the Nicholas followed by O’Bannon, Taylor, Jenkins and Radford. Honolulu, Leander and St Louis followed in the center. Ainsworth specifically placed Leander in the middle because she held inferior radar, he preferred St Louis to take the lead out of the Cruisers. Ryan’s destroyers would take up the rear with Ralph Talbot, followed by Buchanen, Maury, Woodworth and Gwin. By 5pm task force 18 was sailing once again for the Kula Gulf.

Task Force 18 had left Tulagi at 5pm on July 12th under clear skies and calm seas. As they passed Savo Island, Ainsworth took a course along the west coast of Santa Isabel island hoping to use it to hide his force from Japan reconnaissance aircraft. At 12:35am a PBY reported the course and composition of Izaki’s force, and Ainsworth heading in for the intercept. As the two forces were converging, Izaki dispatched his Destroyer transport through Vella Gulf to unload the troops but at 1am he was alerted of the approaching enemy. It was actually the Americans who established radar content first, but the Japanese gained visual contact by 1:08am

As the two forces converged, Izaki sent his destroyer transports through Vella Gulf; yet by 01:00, the Americans detected his force. However it was actually the Japanese who detected the Americans first for almost 2 hours or so because of the electromagnetic impulses the American radar systems emitted. The Japanese crews had managed to gain a fairly accurate picture of Ainsworths disposition. At 1:08 the Japanese made visual contact and were the first to attack, launching 29 torpedoes by 1:14am. Ainsworth’s vanguard increased speed to engage the Japanese with their torpedoes while the cruisers turned to deploy their main batters and engage to starboard. Ainsworth yet again ignorant of the type 93 long lance capabilities had no idea the fish were already in the water coming towards his force as they watched the Japanese destroyers turn away. The American destroyers tossed 19 Mark 15 torpedoes, but the Japanese were over 10,000 yards away and turning north thus completely wasted the volley. When the Japanese were 10,000 yards or so Ainsworth cruisers began opening fire, concentrating on the Jintsu.

When the Japanese column closed to 10,000 yards at 01:12, Ainsworth ordered his cruisers to open fire, concentrating on the Jintsu which was leading. Honolulu and St Louis fired an incredible amount of shells for 18 minutes at 1100 and 1360 6 inch rounds joined by 350 5in rounds. The Leander fired 160 6 inch rounds. The Jintsu was hit first to her rudder, then her bridge killing Izaki, followed by 10 or more shells to her engineering spaces. She was a doomed burning ship, that came to a dead drift quickly. The Americans then launched another volley of torpedoes, 21 in all, but they would all fail to hit a mark. By this time, the Japanese torpedoes were finally arriving. Leander was hit at 1:22 forcing Ainsworth to detach Radford and Jenkins to help her limp away. The rest of Ainsworth forces managed to avoid the torpedoes.

While this was occurring the destroyer transports had successfully unloaded the 1200 troops and were moving north to withdraw with Izaki’s other destroyers. The Japanese were not running away however, they were getting to a safe position to reload torpedoes and re-engage. After finishing off the Jintsu at 1:45, Ainsworth ordered the force to pursue the enemy going northwest. They made radar contact again at 1:56, but Ainsworth doubted the blips to be the enemy, but rather his vanguard ships. Instead of opening fire, Ainsworth attempted making contact with the vanguard force and began firing starshells, this would prove to be a fatal error. The Japanese launched another volley of 31 torpedoes. At 2:08 the first to be hit was St Louis, it opened her bow, next Gwin was hit near her No 2 engine room; Honolulu was third receiving a hit to her starboard bow at 2:11, with another hitting her stern without exploding. Honolulu’s rudder jammed and she nearly smashed into Gwin coming within 50 yards of her. That effectively ended the battle as Ainsworth ordered the task force to withdraw back to Tulagi. The Gwin had lost 61 men and was forced to be scuttled, Leander lost 28, the Jintsu 482 and another Japanese Admiral was dead. 21 survivors of the Jintsu were rescued later on by the I-180, a few others were picked up by American ships. The Japanese had won a tactical victory and demonstrated yet again their superior night fighting techniques. But it was a pyrrhic victory in many ways as well, the Americans could afford to lose ships, the Japanese could not.

 

After the defeat, Admiral Nimitz decided to change tactics and not confine anymore cruisers to the Solomons as they could not hope to chase the IJN destroyers and their troublesome torpedoes were a major threat. Nimitz wrote a letter to Halsey suggesting that a well trained squadron of 2100 ton Fletcher class destroyers would be better suited to such waters rather than cruises. Halsey argued despite the Japanese having superior torpedoes, he believed Ainsworth’s night battle plan A, that had employed SG radar with radar directed gunnery were still superior to anything the IJN had. He thought the solution “appears to be the greatest volume and weight of gunfire that can be incorporated into a highly maneuverable unit–and a unit that is certainly not appreciably weaker than the enemy unit.” Regardless Halsey went to work designating two squadrons of 2100 ton destroyers to take over New Georgia operations and would not risk anymore of his cruisers going up the Slot on any more missions.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

The New Guinea and New Georgia campaigns were seeing gradual progress for the allies, but the naval battles were much less to be desired. While the Japanese were earning some victories, they were rather pyrrhic in nature as American production was winning the day.

- 85 - Pacific War - The battle of Kula Gulf, July 4-11, 1943

Last time we spoke about the amphibious assaults for Operations Chronicle and Toenails. General Douglas MacArthur finally performed his landings at Nassau Bay, Woodlark and Kiriwina islands. Woodlark and Kiriwina proved to be cake walks, while Nassau Bay proved a tougher nut to crack. Then over in the Solomons, Admiral Halsey unleashed his landings at Wickham Anchorage, Segi Point, Viru Harbor and Rendova. Now the Japanese were more alert to the invasions and offered some resistance, although ultimately Sasaki would order many forces to simply withdraw from the invaders. Admiral Kusaka tossed a ton of airpower at the incoming allies only to lose a disastrous quarter of his air fleet, forcing him to ask his Army colleague Immamura for additional support. However with all of these landings came a large amount of allied warships to bring them, and such actions could only bring about one conclusion, another naval battle for the pacific war.

This episode is the Battle of Kula Gulf 

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

 

Before we jump into the naval battle of Kula Gulf a lot was occurring in New Guinea and the Solomons. Over in the Bobdubi front, the Australian 15th brigade under the temporary command of Colonel Guinn were preparing for the main offensive, hoping to trap the Japanese defending Mubo. To support the Nassau Bay landing, Colonel Guinn ordered the untested 58/59th battalion to advance upon the Japanese high ground position at the Old Vicker’s, Coconuts and Bobdubi area. They would be marching from Orodubi to the Coconuts while Major Warfe’s commandos would raid Malolo and Kela. Company A and C of the 58/59th would make the initial attack seeing A attacking Gwaibolom and C the Old Vicker’s position. Following close behind them was B company who were to advance across the ridge to gain control over the Bench Cut Track. D Company were to be held in reserve at the Kunda-vine. On June 26th, A company set off from Missim heading towards their forming up point at Namling. On the 28th, the other remaining companies made departed Meares Camp heading for the New Bobdubi kunda bridge. The next day 17 of Warfe’s commandos were ambushed by 30 Japanese. They managed to escape, but were forced to abandon a Bren gun. By the night of June 29th, the 58th/59th crossed the Francisco River and began preparations for the launch of the main attack which would occur the next morning. The next morning saw lackluster allied air strikes against Gwaibolom, Salamua, Old Vickers and the Coconut area. Companies B and C left their start up point of Uliap Creek, seeing C attack Buggert village, just a bit south of the Old Vickers position being held at this time by a company of the 115th regiment led by Lt Ogawa Takeshi. They successfully outlanked the Japanese and captured the village, suffering only 2 casualties for their efforts. From there the Australians assaulted the Old Vickers position, but the Japanese defenders repealed them right back to Buggert village. The Japanese defenders had well established positions, hiding in dugouts 40 feet down from the top. The failure to seize the Old Vickers position, prevented B Company from reaching their objective, the Bench Cut Track and now they were being met with Mortar fire as they crossed the ridge.

Meanwhile A Company began their assault on Orodubi, but anticipating booby-traps the men had left on the Bench Cut Track around 70 yards south of Orodubi, they chose to climb a 40 foot kunai slope to join the main track just 10 yards within the enemy. Around 80 men of Company 10 led by Lt Gunji Toshio saw the Australians doing this and promptly began tossing grenades at close range and fired down upon them. The Australians were forced to flee back to Namling as a result. The next day it was decided they would use a platoon to contain Orodubi while the others bypassed it to go onwards and capture Gwaibolom and Erskine Creek, which they managed to do by July 2nd. While this was occurring, B Company was trying to find another way across the ridge, but were failing to do so. So on July 2nd, they were ordered to move across the ridge via the newly established positions at Gwaibolom and Erskine Creek, and would reach the Komiatum Track / bench track junction where they would prepare an ambush by the 3rd. At around 5pm on the 3rd, B company managed to ambush a party of 20 Japanese trying to move towards Old Vickers and this quickly fell into hand to hand combat killing half the Japanese and one of their officers.

Meanwhile Colonel MacKechnie’s men were fighting to keep their beachhead alive at Nassau Bay. AA and C Companies had fought through the night against Japanese until their 300 yard perimeter was secured. At dawn on June 30th, C company began advancing south to find the Papuan infantry battalion who were around Cape Dinga. C Company made their way to a place just due west of Cape Dinga, following the Tabali River, while A Company was patrolling north and south of an arm of the Bitoi river where they ran into the 3rd battalion, 102nd regiment. A Company backed by some other units attempted to hit the Japanese western flank, but they were overwhelmed and forced to turn back. It would actually be Amphibian engineers who would save the day, who came in at the last minute to help A company out just as the Japanese tossed a banzai charge at them. Upon receiving word of the Japanese attacks, C company rushed over to join A by 3pm. Yet unbeknownst to them, the Japanese were not actually trying to break through, they were trying to withdraw by crossing the Tabali river. General Nakano had ordered them to withdraw to a new position at Lake Salus when he heard word over 1000 men had landed at Nassau Bay. Nakano also had ordered the 3rd battalion of the 66th regiment to send 150 men to march south from Salamua to help out in the Nassau Bay area. These men were tasked with carrying out only limited attacks against the allied forces around Nassau Bay, such as delaying actions to help the Nassau Bay garrison withdraw towards Lake Salus. Nakano was also coordinating with Colonel Araki who was now operating out of an HQ in Mubo, he had likewise brought forces over to Mubo from Salamua. 

As for the Papuan infantry, they were marching north and they ran into the 3rd battalion, 102nd regiment around Cape Dinga as well. They managed to attack their rear killing at least 26 Japanese who were holding out in a bunker. After this they continued their march to the Nassau Bay beachhead.

At around 4:30pm C company began sending reports that they were seeing some Japanese crossing over the Tabali River just south of their position. They were ordered to return to the beachhead perimeter to take the southern flank, but before they were able the Japanese attacked their rear taking 5 men and a platoon commander.

Around the beachhead a hastily prepared defensive line was established by an ad hoc force of Engineers, Australian infantry and Headquarters personnel. As the night fell on, C company reached the southern part of the perimeter, quickly taking up positions. The Japanese began a series of attacks throughout the entire night from all sides using machine guns, grenades, mortar and rifle fire. Smaller parties of Japanese were trying to infiltrate positions. It was a terrifying experience for the defenders who would dub it “guy fawkes night”. Many of the men had itchy fingers which led to tragic accidental casualties throughout the night. It was a pitch black night and the noises of the jungle and Japanese screaming stuff in english unnerved the allied forces. The Japanese had tossed a ton of stuff into the perimeter trying to get the allies to use up their own munitions in response. As a result the allied forces had 18 deaths and 27 wounded several of which were the result of friendly fire. The Japanese it seems to have around 50 deaths during the night.

Back over in the north, on June 30th, Captain Dexter was leading forward a number of patrols in preparation for an assault upon Duali. However as they advanced they ran into a Japanese ambush along the Bitoi track, thus canceling their planned assault. The next day, Brigadier Moten ordered Dexter’s exhausted men to move forward regardless. With some support of Beaufighters strafing the Japanese positions, the Australians charged straight through the enemy positions, and to their shock they found them abandoned. As Dexter recalled ‘We advanced through the Japanese position with fixed bayonets and searched the scrub on each side. Everywhere was evidence of a hasty evacuation, dropped equipment and personal rice bags, and evidence of extensive bomb damage. But of the Japs, no sign.’ Thus Dexter and his men captured the mouth of the Bitoi by early afternoon.

Shortly after the capture, Dexter made contact with MacKechnie who was busy expanding his perimeter northwards. By nightfall, PT boats led by Lt Commander Barry Atkins covered the landing of 11 landing craft full of reinforcements. The PT boats staffed nearby villages to cause a lot of ruckus, hoping to dissuade nearby Japanese from firing on the vulnerable landing craft. The reinforcements were mostly from B company who had failed to land during the third wave. On July 2nd, Moten began to pressure MacKechnie, stating he had to get his troops moving inland at once. Thus MacKechnie decided to leave C company to defend the perimeter while Lt Colonel Harold Taylor would lead the rest of the men towards Napier. Luckily for the men, 4 75mm pack howitzer m1 artillery guns had been unloaded that night with the reinforcements giving them ample firepower. The gun were positioned on the beach and immediately went to work shelling targets at the mouth of the Tabali River, Cape Dinga and the area between Duali and the Bito River’s southern arm.

On July the 3rd, the men now designated the Taylor Force accompanied by Dexter’s company were marching for Napier, but their march was a slow one as the jungles were thick and they were carrying heavy equipment. While this was occurring the 3rd battalions of the 102nd and 66th regiments were consolidating around Lake Salus looking to create a defensive position. The coastal area however proved to be too difficult to fortify, so they moved over the Tambu where they joined a SNLF platoon of the 5th Sasebo to make a position there.

At this point General Savige decided to send the Papuans north along the coast to keep pressuring the enemy’s retreat. By the 4th, Taylor Force had taken a position at Napier and were now under the direct command of Moten’s 17th brigade. Back over on the beaches at Nassau Bay a total of 1477 troops had been landed, thus securing the beachhead. Dexters company marched back over to Guadagasal taking a coastal route, getting themselves ready for a future assault against Mubo slated for July 7th. MacKechnie believed the loss of some of his landing craft had greatly delayed the entire operation, perhaps up to 3 weeks. He did not think he would be able to move artillery or large quantities of supplies further inland. He also did not think it was tactically sound to leave his base, as the Japanese proved to be quite a nuisance in the area. Orders from the top were demanding a artillery road be built, but his troops at the assembly area would probably run out of rations in a day or two and he had no native carriers on hand. In his words "To be very frank we have been in a very precarious position down here for several days and my sending the rifle troops inland was contrary to my own best judgment. Troops had gone inland stripped to the bone. Without heavy weapons and mortar and machine-gun ammunition. "Therefore, these troops who are up there now are in no position to embark upon an offensive mission until we are able to get food, ammunition and additional weapons up to them." In response to the situation, on July 6th, Moten ordered 1000 rations and 100 boy loads of ammunition…god you have to love the australians, boy-loads haha. Anyways this was to be dropped over Napier.

Moving over to the Solomons, Admiral Halsey had successfully occupied Rendova, Segi point, Viru Harbor and Wickham anchorage forcing the smaller number of Japanese to withdraw to their main base at Munda. Admiral Kusaka tossed a series of air strikes against the invaders, suffering horrible losses whereupon he had to request General Immamura reinforce him with the 21st air flotilla at Saipan and from the 6th air division.

For the battle of Munda, Admiral Halsey had assembled the largest air force ever assembled in the Solomon islands campaign. It was a force that was needed as the Japanese in Rabaul tossed every bomber that was available to try and thwart the US amphibious invasion. The June air battles had greatly depleted the Japanese air power, but they were not done. On July 1st the Japanese hit Kahili using 6 Vals and 34 Zeros. They were trying to knock out the 3rd battalion, 103rd infantry who were unloading at Poko plantation on the west coast of Rendova. However they were met by 20 P-40’s and F4Fs that ripped them to pieces taking down 3 Vals, 5 Zeros and losing 5 P-40’s in the process. Although the allies were scoring massively high success against the Japanese in ratios, by this point it reached 7 to 1, they were still unable to sustain round the clock 32 fighter or more CAP. To do this required a total of 96 operational aircraft and after 10 days of fighting in the skies over New Georgia the pilots were also becoming increasingly exhausted. Colonel Merrill Twining requested more P-38 Lightnings, the aircraft that had become the most comfortable fighter to those in the south pacific by this point. But Hap’s Arnold over in Washington was heavily committing forces for General Patton and Montgomery’s invasion of Sicily at the time so he had to deny this request. As Arnold stated back “every trained unit must be thrown against the German until he is beaten”. 

Regardless, with Rendova secured, General Hester was landing the bulk of his forces for the final push against Munda. The unloading process had been heavily hampered by poor planning and a failure to allocate adequate personnel for beach control and unloading duties however. To clear the new beachhead and distribute the combat stores, infantrymen were detailed to carry out the work. When transports carrying the next echelon arrived, many of the boats grounded offshore and had to be unloaded manually by troops wading ashore. On July 2nd, Admiral Kusaka coordinating with General Itahana formed a combined strike led by Major Endo Misao consisting of 18 Ki-21 bombers, 23 Ki-43’s and Ki-61s with 29 Zero escort. Unfortunately for the allies, Admiral Mitscher had recalled the Rendova patrol due to bad weather, so a total of 18 Ki-21 bombers came to the scene unmolested and hit the congested area around the harbor. The strike caused 200 or so casualties, mostly upon the 2nd battalion, 172nd, the 24th seabees, the 9th defense battalion and staff officers of various headquarters. The strike also knocked out a lot of equipment and supplies.

With the failure of the June air battles to hold back the allied invasion, Admiral Koga turned to the Navy for the task of providing new supplies to the defenders at Munda Point. The Tokyo Express was back in business, a convoy of 10 destroyers were sent to New Gerogia led by Rear Teruo Akiyama aboard his flagship Niizuki. His force was ordered to attack Rendova and he had with him the old Yubari, Yunagi, Mikazuki who would operate south of the Treasuries as a diversion, while Niizuki, Amagiri, Hatsuyuki, Nagatsuki, Satsuki, Mikazuki and Mochizuki would hit the allied shipping and shell the harbor. The Japanese destroyers were spotted right away, but bad weather prevented 3 American strike forces consisting of PBY’s and B-25’s from hitting the incoming enemy. In the meantime, Akiyama closed in on the southern tip of Rendova. She circled the island and opened fire on a point due west of the harbor. The bombardment was quite ineffective, but some allied PT boats rushed in to attack her which caused a wild 10 minute mini battle seeing 2 of them running aground.

On the ground, General Hester ordered the 1st battalion, 172nd regiment and A company of the 169th regiment now designated Southern Landing Group to land at Zanana beach. Led by General Wing on the afternoon of the 2nd they made a crossing over Blanche Channel using 16 landing crafts. With the support of Brigadier General Harold Barkers artillery they successfully formed a perimeter. Now the Japanese air and naval attacks were worrying Halsey. He expected the Japanese to launch a major counterlanding with substantial forces perhaps on the 3rd. Therefore he ordered Admiral Ainsworth to lay in wait off the west coast of Rendova for the enemy. However July the 3rd would not bring an enemy, this was because General Imamura and Admiral Kusaka agreed with the lack of air and naval forces on hand at this time they could not perform such a feat, to the disgust of General Sasaki who had assumed command over the defense for Munda on the 2nd. Sasaki was so adamant about landing reinforcements at around midnight on July 3rd he proposed violating orders to simply make a counter landing using the 13th regiment and Ota’s barges. He had a crazy idea to simply bring the vessels in and mix them with the American landing craft who were making rountrips to the mainland through the Honiavasa passage. He thought even if half his forces perished, the attack would be worth it. Ota objected to this on the grounds the barges would be needed for other transports scheduled for July 4th and 5th, apparently this made Sasaki visibly upset, who adjourned the meeting and left the room. Ota pushed Sasaki to write his plans down and submit them to Rabaul, which he did, and Rabaul squashed it immediately. 

On July 3rd the Japanese performed an unsuccessful fighter sweep over Rendova and the next day reconnaissance reported the island was secured by the Americans who had heavily reinforced it with anti aircraft guns and radar. They also reported landings on Zanana and that it looked like Rice Anchorage would be next, thus cutting off Japanese reinforcements from coming down the Munda trail from Bairoko. Imamura and Kusaka had to wait for an accumulation of forces to bring reinforcements to New Georgia; they had no intention of losing it like Guadalcanal. 4000 soldiers of the 13th and 45th regiments were earmarked for departure. Kusaka ordered Itahana to launch another combined strike, this time aimed at Roviana island. However the Japanese were intercepted by 32 F4F’s causing the loss of 6 Ki-21s, 3 Ki-43’s and a zero without a single loss for the Americans. This would be the fateful end of the joint air operations as Itahana needed to take his forces to help the Salamaua area. Luckily for Kusaka he received reinforcements in the form of the 201st Kokutai from the 25th flotilla which would allow him to gradually rebuild his air strength by mid july.

Meanwhile Admiral Turner had assigned 7 destroyer transports, 2 fast minesweepers and 4 Destroyers to carry the 1st raider battalion, the 3rd battalion, 145th infantry regiment and the 3rd battalion, 148th infantry regiment of the 37th division led by Colonel Liversedge into the Kula Gulf. Their escort cover was Ainsworth task group 36.1 consisting of the Cruisers Honolulu, St Louis, Helena and destroyers Nicholas, O’Bannon, Strong and Chevalier. They were also tasked with bombarding Vila and Bairoko. On July 4th, Ainsworth led the group up the slot while the Rear Admiral Teruo Akiyama’s Tokyo Express were on their way to Vila carrying 1300 troops of the 13th regiment towards Vila.

At around midnight Ainsworth entered Kula Gulf carefully avoiding the mindfield laid back in May. His force proceeded to shell Vila, but they failed to detect the Japanese who were heading south. The Japanese detected the Americans at 12:15 thanks to their brand new radar system; the 1-shiki 2-go radar which was outfitted on the Niizuki. The IJN were eager to test out the radar so they fastened it to the flagship of Destroyer squadron 3. Oh how the turn tables as they say. The radar indicated they were heavily outnumbered, so Akiyama decided to abort the mission, but before doing so he ordered 14 torpedoes to be launched at a range of 10 miles. The type 93 long lance torpedo remained the best weapons of the kind in the Pacific theater and one his destroyer Strong at 12:43 practically cutting her in two. Can’t stress it enough what an immense advantage Japan had over the Americans in terms of torpedo power during the first half of the war, hell if any of you play World of Warships, you know Japanese DD is base as hell. 

When the torpedo hit, the Japanese were already heading back up the Slot and Ainsworth thought he was being attacked by IJN submarines. Thus while Liversedge’s men were landing on the southside of the Pundokono River, Ainsworth dispatched destroyers O’Bannon and Chevalier to rescue the survivors of Strong. The Strong was settling fast off the Enogai inlet. When Chevalier and O’Bannon came to the scene picking up survivors a gun duel emerged between them and some batteries on Enogai. By 1:22am Chevalier had 239 men come aboard before her commander said it was time to go. His ship was getting battered by the batteries and he unfortunately was forced to ram the Strong to keep it from capsizing which ripped a 10 foot fash in Chevaliers bow. A near miss from one of Enogai’s guns had opened her seams aft and another shell knocked out her NO 3 gun mount. When Chevalier was pulling away from the Strong, breaking her in two in the process, 3 of Strong’s depth charges went off under Chevalier lifted the entire boat out of the water causing her to flood in forward sections, talk about bad luck.

Over in Rice Anchorage, despite the terrible stormy weather and some gunfire from Enogai, Turner ordered the transport group to clear the Gulf by 7am so they could quickly unload their cargo. 300 men of the 148th regiment landed further north at Kobukobu inlet because of the terrible weather. It would take them until July 7th to meet up with the main body. Though the USS Strong had been sunk, the Tokyo Express failed her run, thus Akiyama elected to bring the bulk of his shipment to Vila the following night, but this time he brought 10 destroyers; Niizuki, Suzukaze, Tanikaze, Mocizuki, Mikazuki, Hamakaze, Amagiri, Hacujuki, Nagacuki and Sacuki. Halsey got advance word of this and ordered Ainsworth to return to Kula Gulf to wait for the Japanese to show up. Halsey also reinforced him with destroyers Jenkins and Radford. Ainsworth went into this with a simple but ultimately flawed plan. He overestimated the capabilities of radar guided 6 inch guns against fast moving targets. On top of that he seemed to be totally ignorant of the IJN’s Type 93 Long Lance torpedo’s capabilities. His plan was to wait passively until radar detected the enemy than he would toss his cruisers at the enemy using their 6 inch guns, hoping to fire over 8,000 yards or so. He believed that was the effective Japanese torpedo range, why he believed this I do not know. For his destroyers, they would launch torpedoes at the enemy.

 

Akiyama’s Tokyo Express departed Buin after sundown divided into a covering force of 3 destroyers in the front and the main bulk behind them. Around midnight on July 6th, Ainsworth’s force were just northwest off New Georgia, entering the mouth of the Kula Gulf. The Japanese were also arriving to the Kula Gulf whereupon they detached the first transport unit to land 1600 troops. By 1:06am, Niizuki’s radar detected Ainsworth’s force, but this time Akiyama was prepared for a fight. Akiyama detached his second transport unit at 1:43am and 7 minutes later American radar picked up the Japanese. Ainsworth took his force in closer until the enemy was 7000 yards away. Then at 1:56am at around a range of 6800 yards the Americans Cruisers began to open fire. Akiyama quickly recalled the second transport unit before he engaged the enemy. Unluckily for Akiyama the Americans concentrated their fire upon the Niizuki which was pulverized quickly. She became a burning wreck before she was sunk by 6 inch shell fire taking Rear Admiral Akiyama’s life alongside 300 sailors. Within 20 minutes the Americans would fire 612 shells, 6 of which smashed the Niizuki.

 

Despite the loss of of their commander, the well drilled torpedo crews pulled off a salvo of 16 torpedoes at the American gun flashes. Ainsworth ignorant of the long lance range could do little to avoid it. The light cruiser USS Helena was the first to be struck, her bow was blown off virtually up to the number 2 turret, nearly cracking her in two as she sank taking 190 of her 1177 crew with her. St Louis was hit by a torpedo that fortunately did not detonate and another nearly missed Honolulu. The Japanese fled as fast as they could for Buin as Ainsworth directed his two remaining cruisers to shell the second transport unit. Of the four destroyers in this group, Amagiri escaped with minor damage, while Hatsuyuki was hit by 2 6inch shells, but luckily for her they were duds and she limped away. Nagatsuki was hit by a single 6 inch shell to her rear ship which would force her to run aground near Bambari Harbor. The next morning she would be destroyed by American aircraft.

At 3:30am, Ainsworth ordered his forces to return to Tulagi as he dispatched the Radford and O’Bannon to pick up survivors while Nicholas chased the fleeing Japanese. The Japanese dispatched Amagiri to pick up their survivors and she would be intercepted by Nicholas taking 4 hits before she made her retreat. While this was going on the First transport unit completed unloading its 1600 troops and bolted through the Blackett Strait and Kula Gulf. The Japanese had managed to land their reinforcements and sunk the USS Strong and Helena, so they considered it a tactical victory, though the loss of the Niizuki and her commander was terrible. The battle for New Georgia was nowhere near done.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

The landings and early offensives were well on their way on New Georgia and the drive upon Lae was closing in. The Battle of Kula Gulf gave the Americans a bloody nose and now the Japanese had more forces at their disposal to try and dislodge the Americans from New Georgia.

- 84 - Pacific War - Invasion of New Georgia, June 27 - July 4, 1943

Last time we spoke about the extensive plans involved in Operation Cartwheel. The allies were crossing their T’s and dotting their I’s. MacArthur was getting closer to unleashing Operation Chronicle, the invasion of Woodlark and Kiriwina islands. MacArthur’s Navy, that being the 7th amphibious fleet are now prime and ready to go. Over in the Solomons, Admiral Halsey’s Operation Toenails likewise had finalized their plans for a full scale invasion of New Georgia. The invasion would consist of multiple amphibious assaults done by countless units all with important missions. It was to be a extraordinary complex operation that would showcase to the Japanese how far American production had come and just how doomed the empire of the rising sun was. In the words of a great wizard “The board is set, the pieces are moving. We come to it at last, the great battle of our time”

This episode is the Invasion of New Georgia

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

 

I do want to just start off with a bit of an apology. I am well aware the past few episodes have been extremely heavy on the planning rather than the doing as they say. Again this is the reality of the week by week schedule and this podcast as I hope all of you know follows the Youtube series almost to a T, well almost, I do like to wander off now and then. But today I assure you we are diving into the fray of battle. Ever since the conclusion of operation KE and the allied victory at the Bismarck Sea, the war in the South Pacific had gotten a bit more quiet, but certainly tense. Both sides were looking at another, expecting a major offensive to kick off at any moment. But it would be the allies who would kick off everything by unleashing the start of Operation Cartwheel. The opening shots of Cartwheel would begin with the invasion of Woodlark and Kiriwana islands just off the southeast coast of New Guinea and due south of New Britain.

Colonel MacKechnie’s 162nd regiment continued to prepare their Nassau bay landings just 11 miles south of Salamaua. Ever since April of that year their 1st battalion had been carrying intensive amphibious training at Morobe Harbor. They were being reinforced with the 532nd engineer shore regiment, 542nd engineer amphibian regiment, the 592nd engineer boat regiment under Brigadier William Heavey and with a Papuan infantry battalion who had marched to Buso by mid june. Under orders not to proceed any further north, the spent their time carrying out long-range patrols, gaining valuable intelligence on the enemy. From their intelligence, MacKechnie believed there were about 75 Japanese near the mouth of the Bitoi river, an outpost or two along the beach at Nassau Bay and about 300 Japanese on Cape Dinga which also held an outpost. MacKechnie decided to use Mageri point as a staging base, which held an excellent beach 12 miles north of Morobe with good cover for their landing crafts.They had with them 2 LCMS, 2 captured Japanese barges and 29 Higgens boats. To further augment them, 4 PT boats were assigned to help transport the men, around 150 of them from Morobe.

In the meantime, Brigadier Moten planned to send Captain Dexter’s D company who had just achieved an incredible victory at Lababia ridge where they repelled a Japanese force 10 times their size to march to the Bitoi rivers mouth to divert Japanese attention away from Nassau bay. On top of this one of their platoon’s led by Lt Dave Burke would guide the Americans to the landing beach. Now operation Chronicle was expected to go unopposed, though Krueger did not tell his men that. The Woodlark group consisted of Colonel Cunningham’s 112th cavalry regiment while Kiriwina would receive Colonel Herndon’s 158th regiment. Admiral Barbey’s 7th Amphibious force with the support of Admiral Carpender’s 7th fleet would transport them.

On June the 20th, Krueger set up the 6th Army HQ at Milne Bay. The 6th Army was codenamed the Alamo Force as it assumed control of the majority of US Army units involved in operation Cartwheel. General Kruegers command was actually a bit awkward. Instead of operations being conducted directly by the 6th army, the Alamo force, which was purely an operational entity, basically administration, was in charge…and it was directly under the control of Douglas MacArthur. So as you can imagine for Krueger …well it was like having two of the same hat kind of? In his own words "the inherent difficulties faced by my dual headquarters in planning and administration were aggravated by the command setup, which was a novel one to say the least." Thus Alamo force was on New Guinea while the main body of the 6th Army HQ, the real one was in Brisbane until February 1944, when upon they were merged together. Yes this was a sneaky maneuver by MacArthur to seize control. Ever since the Buna campaign, MacArthur was increasingly unhappy with having to depend primarily on Australian troops. Although on the surface he look to be in a great harmonious relationship with Blamey, in truth MacArthur was extremely critical of the man and the Australians in general. Alamo Force was his way of wedging himself into the chief role for planning and conducting the later stages of the war, thus bypassing Blamey as the allied ground force commander. 

To kick off the operation, Krueger sent advance parties of the regiment groups to secure beachheads in the two islands. At 4pm on June 22nd an advance party of the 112th cavalry regiment led by Major McMains left Milne Bay aboard the destroyer transports Humphreys and Brooks bound for Woodlark. They arrived in the dead of night at Guasopa and unloaded 200 men using 6 Landing crafts. The destroyer transport departed by 4am for Milne Bay. It turned out a Australian coastwatcher, not having been informed of the landing nearly attacked the force with his locally recruited guerrillas. But upon hearing the accents of the troops he quickly realized them to be friend and not foe. The advance party went to work performing reconnaissance, establishing defenses and facilities for the incoming invasion force and clearly marked the beaches for them to land. The next day the 158th infantry regiments advance party led by Lt COlonel FLoyd Powell departed Milne Bay at 6:10 aboard the two destroyer transports. They were accompanied by a detachment of the 59th combat engineer company. They arrived to Kiriwina around midnight, taking their landing craft through a small channel that passed through a reef to the beach at Losuia, code named Red Beach. Their unloading was quite slow due to lack of experience, bringing them the threat of aerial attack by the enemy. Thus the ships were forced to depart partially loaded. 

On June 25th Operation Chronicle officially began. 2600 troops of Colonel Cunninham’s Woodlark force departed Townsville Australia aboard 6 Landing ships, a subchaser and the destroyers Bagley and Henley. As the Woodlark Force slowly and stealthily made its way, 2250 troops of Colonel Herndon’s Kiriwina Force departed Milne Bay aboard 12 Landing crafts, 2 coastal transports and were escorted by Admiral Brabeys destroyers. They successfully landed at Losuia beach at dawn on June 30th completely unopposed and the unloaded process was quite slow. Around the same time, Colonel Cunninghams force landed at Woodlark, also unopposed, but their unloading went much faster. The problem for the team at Kiriwina was an extremely spiny necklace of coral. The landing craft had grounded several hundred yards short of the beach, with only a single one passing over the sandbar to land offshore. Heavy rain and a low tide were hampering the vehicles and thus making it a nightmare. It was the complete opposite story over at woodlark. Their supplies were already loaded onto trucks which drove straight off the landing crafts allowing for an efficient unloading process so the vessels could depart before enemy air attacks might occur.

Meanwhile, B-25’s of the US 5th air force bombed Japanese strong points along the Bitoi river as A-20 Bostons hit supply dumps on the southern side of Nassau Bay on June 29th. The amphibious landing force known as MacKechnie Force departed Mort Bay at dusk on the 29th. PT boats of the 7th fleet took around 210 men of Lt Colonel Harold Taylors 1st battalion, 162nd infantry regiment while 29 of the captured Japanese barges took the 770 men of 2nd Engineer special brigade and two mechanized landing craft took the 532nd engineer boat and shore regiment to Mageri point. They landed in 3 waves and just like woodlark and Kiriwina, it went unopposed seeing all 770 safely landed at Nassau bay. The Japanese defending the immediate area were just 6 guys at an observation post, and offered only a few shouts in defiance before they fled into the jungle. 

On June 30th the men went to work clearing up the beach to create a defensive perimeter, while some units of C company marched south to link up with the incoming papuan infantry battalion. Some other patrols ran into Japanese and were turned away near the bitcoin river. Upon receiving news of the landing, General Nakano ordered the 3rd regiment of the 66th battalion to march south from Salamaua. However the Australians were also applying pressure near Bobdubi so the 3rd regiment could only carry out limited attacks on the allied forces around Nassau bay, before they would perform delaying actions to allow the Nassau garrison to withdraw towards lake salus. The Papuan battalion began attacking the rear of the Japanese 3rd regiment of the 102nd battalion around Cape Dinga causing some casualties when they stormed a Japanese bunker. Nassau Bay would see some minor Japanese air attacks but for the most part things were going smoothly, allowing the seabees to work on the new facilities and airstrips for Woodlark and Kiriwina. Now thats it for MacArthurs half, time to go over to the Solomons.

As you will remember, Admiral Haley’s plan for New Georgia consisted of 5 different landings scattered about the island. Four of these landings were to occur on June 30th. These landings were 1) Wickham Anchorage on the southeast coast of Vangunu 2) Segi Point on the southeastern tip of New Georgia 3) Viru harbor on the southwest coast of New Georgia just a few miles up from Segi and 4) Rendova Harbor on Rendova island just across the Blanche channel from Munda. As a preliminary, Halsey sought to land some reconnaissance teams. The first one to arrive was at Segi point on June 14th consisting of units from the 47th seabees tossed over by PBY’s. They began constructing landing sites for heavy equipment to come over. The next saw units go over to Viru Harbor, then Oloana Bay on Vangunu just a bit west of Wickham Anchorage, another at Rendava harbor and a last one at Rice anchorage. These teams all prepared the way for the future landing teams. However all did not go smoothly, for on June 16th over at Segi Point a dozen scouts being led by the New Zealand coastwatcher Donald Kennedy unsuccessfully ambushed a Japanese patrol. Kennedy had established a defense zone around the village of Segi used local native forces who were using scavenged weapons and they often tried to ambush and kill small Japanese patrols. This patrol they had stumbled upon was a platoon from the 4th company, 229th regiment operating around Viru harbor. They didnt manage to kill any of the Japanese, but instead alerted Colonel Sasaki of allied activity near Segi point and Viru harbor. Sasaki responded by ordered Major Hara Masao the new commander of the 1st battalion with his 3rd company and a machine gun platoon over to Viru harbor the following night. His orders read “settle things”. Luckily Hara had no idea where exactly Kennedy and his guys were so they would have difficulty finding them, but this did mean Japanese activity in the area increased. On June 20th Kennedy made an inaccurate report indicating the Japanese had landed troops in Nono Lagoon prompting Admiral Turner to react. That night Turner sent Companies O and P of Colonel Currins 4th raiders to occupy Segi Point with companies A and D of the 103rd regiment following them the next day. This meant Kennedy and his men were saved, but it also alerted the Japanese of the incoming offensive as allied destroyer transports were spotted around Wickham. This prompted Admiral Kusaka to put the Southeast Fleet on high alert, but further reconnaissance failed to find anything, thus by the 27th the IJN relaxed. This was also partly due to the fact that the IJN believed no invasions would come until late July or August.

It would only be Lt General Sasaki who believed the allies might invade as early as late June, so he had set to work preparing New Georgia’s defenses. Sasaki did not have much time, nor much capable labor as there was a large case of malaria going around. Added to this materials and equipment were hard to come by as supply missions were failing to arrive on time. The terrain on the island was quite an obstacle also. The Japanese dug into coral on the south side of their airfield and establishing communication lines towards the east. In the northern sector Sasaki placed 4 Kure 6th 14cm guns at Enogai point, but Bairoko had basically nothing. East of the airfield practically no defense existed. Sasaki managed at the last minute to construct some gun emplacements at Bairoko ingeniously using blocks of coral, something that the Japanese would really build up in later island warfare. To establish a main line east of the airfield he had the men build extremely strong bunkers to face frontal assaults across the Munda Bar. Communications would be a major issue as all they had to work with was a motor vehicle road that ran along the beach to Lambete and 1000 meters of completed road between the southeast Detachment HQ and 229th infantry HQ. Other than that there were no roads, just some trails which Sasaki described “that turned into slush ponds after rain”. To keep in contact with the troops spread everywhere, Sasaki requested they use an underground cable, but it seems he never got it. Sasaki was forced to spread his men in multiple places seeing company sized units in exposed locations at Wickham Anchorage, Viru harbor and Rendova harbor. These units would have been better used at places like ENogai, Bairoko and Ilangana.

To help with the landings, General Kenney ordered the 5th air force  to launch a heavy raid against Rabaul while Admiral Merrill’s cruisers escorted minelayers up to the Shortland islands to mine the southern entrance to Buin. Merrill’s cruisers also took the time to bombard Faisi, Ballale and the Poporang islands while he dispatched some destroyers to hit Vila. Early on june the 30th B-24’s and B-17s from AirSols hit Kahili and further raids would be made against Munda and Vila throughout the day. 

The night of June 29th was a very stormy one hindering the AirSols and 5th air forces abilities and even Merrill’s ships had difficulty carrying out their tasks. Admirals Turner and Fort departed from Guadalcanal, Tulagi and the Russels to land the forces. Two groups of infantry units code named“barracudas”; 2 companies of the 172nd regiment enroute for Rendova and Companies A and B of the 169th regiment and 1st Commando Fiji Guerillas enroute for Honiavasa went ahead of Turner aboard the faster transports Ward, Lang, Talbot and Zane. They were going to seize Rendova Harbor’s beaches and the Honiavasa passage. The convoys continued their voyage to New Georgia in the early hours of the 30th facing no difficulties and would reach their jump off points in the early morning. The Barracuda groups arrived at 2:25an, successfully landing the first infantry group at Baraulu, Honiavasa and the Sasevele islands securing their staging base. The Rendova group however got a bit lost, leading to a bit of disorder, but they landed nonetheless. 

By 6am the 43rd division begun its landing which was described by the US Marine corps official history as “hurried and having the appearance of a regatta rather than a coordinated landing, it was chaotic in the extreme”. Troops from the 103rd field artillery battalion, Marines from the 9th defense battalion and Seabees from the 24th naval construction battalion secured the beach even though Japanese sniper of the 1st rifle company, Kure 6th and 7th company, 229th regiment were making pot shots at them. There was also the appearance of Japanese Betty’s overhead who circled the landing zone, but did not attack. The Japanese reported back to their commanders “that due to the tenacious interference by enemy fighter planes, a decisive blow could not be struck against the enemy landing convoy. And that the landings were an absolutely miraculous and speedy disembarkation of the enemy”. I believe this showcases another major disparity between the allies and the Japanese, that of amphibious assaults. The allies and Japanese were on par at the beginning of the conflict, neither side understood the science per say, but particularly the American began to really study how it to do it, designing and employing multiple different vehicles to help in its efforts. Meanwhile the Japanese would do little to improve their methodology, thus from their perspective to see how the allies were doing it in mid to late 1943 probably looked like magic. General Hesters 2nd battalion, 172nd regiment quickly established a defensive perimeter around the beachhead. His men had a rough time of digging in due to the ground being heavily waterlogged, nothing like a wet foxhole eh?

Outnumbered and taken by surprise, the Japanese were gradually pushed into the interior suffering heavy casualties in the process. They initially assembled in a coconut plantation behind the initial landing beach known as the Levers plantation. They took up a position hoping to launch a counter attack on the American perimeter. However a week of heavy rain left them fighting miserably in knee deep water and eventually they could not bare it any longer so they withdrew further into the hinterland. Troops of the 172nd regiment pursued many of them shooting down several snipers and machine gun positions as they advanced towards the Pengui river. Near the river the Japanese tried to remain firm meeting the Americans with all they had, but the US mortars rained hell upon them eventually forcing them into a rout. The Japanese would scatter, many aboard makeshift rafts trying to head for the mainland. These efforts would be in vain however as American patrol vessels caught many of them.

Over on Baanga island and around Munda Japanese artillery began opening up on 4 US destroyers sailing through the Blanche channel. The USS Gwin was hit, killing 3 and wounded 7 before the USS Farenholt and Buchanan began to return fire upon the batteries neutralizing them. Just before noon a force of 27 Zeros of the 11th air fleet performed a fighter sweep over the beachhead, but it resulted in nothing more than a few delays and the loss of 4 Zeros to allied fighters. 6000 Americans were soon landed on Rendova. It was grueling work to create the beach head, in the words of the Seabees leader, Commander Roy Whittaker about the conditions his men had to work in “They ceased to look like men; they looked like slimy frogs working in some prehistoric ooze. As they sank to their knees they discarded their clothes. They slung water out of their eyes, cussed their mud-slickened hands, and somehow kept the stuff rolling ashore.” Indeed it was a hell of a time. Tons of bulky B rations, hundreds of barrels of petroleum, thousands of barrack bags filled with personnel items were piled all over the beach. People don’t often ever think about the logistics of war, its usually seen as the unsexy stuff, but it was of critical importance as we have seen countless times in this series. The Seabees were missing heavy bulldozers, army engineers, adequate medical personnel, military police, because yes boys will be boys and a lot of men were stealing stuff. It turned out the reason for a lot of the lack was because Turner loaded the operation for an unopposed landing rather than an offensive one. As reported by Lt COlonel McNenny “equipment and stores carried in the New Georgia operation were excessive. It appears the forward base must be considered as an assembly area for launching the assault.” Colonel George W. McHenry wrote in his notes, “Believe too much gear for initial landing. Stress what [is] necessary to fight and eat. Bring other up after secure.” By 3pm, most of Turners stuff was unloaded and his vessels were preparing their withdrawal.

Admiral Kusaka and General Imamura had already been alarmed by the landings at Nassau Bay, and were shocked to find out at 6:50 Rendova was seeing landings. In response they unleashed an air strike at around 3:45pm. Led by Lt Commander Nakamura Genzo, 26 Betty’s and 24 Zeros came in to attack the departing convoy. they were intercepted by 48 allied aircraft made up of F4U Corsairs and F6F Hellcats and were met with heavy anti aircraft fire. The Japanese lost a 10 Zeros and 19th Bettys in the mayhem. However a single Betty was able to release a torpedo which struck Turners flagship McCawley, killing 15 sailors and wounding 8 others. Turner luckily survived the hit and transferred his flag to Farenholt. Rear Admiral Theodore Wilkinson remained aboard the McCawley as she began being towed by the cargo ship Libra. Later in the afternoon, another Japanese wave of 21 Zeros, 9 Vals and 13 F1M Floatplanes showed up attacking the convoy. The McCawley was strafed, but managed to fight back with their anti aircraft guns shooting 3 planes down. By 6:60pm it seemed the McCawley was going to sink so Admiral Wilkinson ordered her abandoned. Later on at 8:22 a PT boat would actually misidentify the doomed McCawley as an enemy ship and torpedoed her twice, sinking her. The poor fleet tug Pawnee who was tugging her at the time narrowly was hit as well. At 5:20, 21 Zeros and 9 Vals would launch their last attack, but it was extremely disorderly and amounted to nothing. By the end of the day, AirSols had destroyed nearly a quarter of Kusaka’s air strength while only losing 17 fighters in the process. The losses were so grave, Kusaka was forced to ask Imamura to commit the 6th air division to help out in the future. When the IJN is asking the IJA for help, you know the shit has really hit the fan.

Now over to the east, Admiral Fort was performing his 3 simultaneous landings. At Wickham Anchorage, Fort was going to land Companies N and Q of the 4th raiders along with Lt Colonel Lester Browns 2nd battalion, 103rd regiment. They would touch down on a 500 yard strip of beach at Olona Bay. The 4th raiders would lead the charge heading their in the first destroyer transports, but mother nature was cruel that day leading to 6 Higgins boats getting wrecked and seeing Raiders scattered all over the area. One platoon got stranded on a reef 7 miles west of the landing point, not fun at all. Brown’s landing craft infantry meanwhile had no difficulty in landing on the marked beach. After reuniting with the scattered Raiders, Brown learnt there were enemy bases at Kearuku Village and Vuru. In response to this he sent Company E of the Raiders to hit Vuru while the bulk of his forces would capture Kearuku. The advance was slowed by rain, allowing Colonel Sasaki to send word to his men over at Wickham to withdraw to the northern coast of New Georgia as they were outnumbered and outgunned. However there was no way for them to do this as their barges were scattered in the Marovo Lagoon. Thus the Japanese found themselves under fire from the north side of the Kairuku river and by nightfall were being pushed towards Segi Point where their artillery was set up. The men defending Vuru had it worse and were easily scattered by E Company.

The next day the Japanese began unleashing their artillery, prompting Brown to request air and naval support to allow his men to hit Segi. However the support would only be able to come on July 3rd and by that time the Japanese had managed to escape. When July 3rd came, some US destroyers and 18 Dauntless dive bombers bombed Segi point. When Browns troops went in they killed 7 dazed Japanese and captured one. Because of the preemptive capture of Segi, the plans had to change in regards to Viru harbor. On the morning of june 28th, Colonel Curren ordered a single company to use rubber boats and go up the Choi river all the way to the western end of Nono Lagoon. From there the Raiders would march overland to hit the Japanese bivouacs at Tombe and Tetemara, hoping to link up with B company of the 103rd regiment. But now with Segi point taken, Currin instead left with his two companies to land at a village just a bit west of Nono Lagoon. However along the Choi river they would run into Japanese patrols, delaying them heavily. By june 30th, some of Forts destroyers would enter Viru Harbor expecting to find Currins Raiders, only to be met with 3 inch field gun fire from the Japanese at Tetemara. The destroyers left in haste and landed a company at Segi point to help the Raiders out. Currin that morning split his forces, sending P company to attack Tombe while the rest would circle west of the harbor, cross the mango river and attack Tetemara.

After marching through endless swamps, by July 1st Currin and his men were prepared to attack, but Sasaki had also decided to order the withdrawal of forces at Viru who were now marching overland towards Munda. At 8:45 the Raiders stormed Tombe, overwhelming the few defenders there. 15 minutes later, 17 Dauntless began bombing Tetemara disrupting Japanese artillery crews. An hour later the Japanese artillery opened fire against the raiders, but they fought through the rain of shells and machine gun bullets. Taking the Japanese machine gun nests caused heavy casualties. At 4pm Currin ordered a final push, seeing Tetemara taken after 30 minutes. Major Hara alongside 160 Japanese would manage to escape into the jungle, heading for Munda. Though the eastern landings saw some heavy resistance, all of the objectives were met. 

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

The allies' successful amphibious assaults proved how far they had come and the Japanese could only look on in wonder at the marvel it was. Now the allies would keep pressing further and further north, one island at a time until the Solomons and New Guinea were liberated. 

- 81 - Pacific War - The entire Guadalcanal campaign with Dave Holland SPECIAL

- 83 - Pacific War - Battle of Lababia Ridge, June 20-27, 1943

Last time we spoke about operation Cartwheel, developments in Green hell and some new adventures in Burma. General Douglas MacArthur had his work cut out for him as he developed his original Elkton plan into what would become Operation Cartwheel. Alongside the US Navy, MacArthur set out the blueprints for seizing parts of New Guinea and the Solomons before taking the ultimate prize that was Rabaul. The Japanese meanwhile extended their efforts to hammer allied airbases in the south pacific with lackluster results. Over on New Guinea the allied forces were drawing closer to seizing Lau, by using Salamaua as a distraction. Over in the Burma front, the disastrous Arakan campaign had resulted in some shuffling of leadership and now the Auk was working with General Slim to see if they could prepare the Indian Army for another go at the Japanese. And today we are going to be venturing back into all of these stories. 

This episode is Battle of Lababia Ridge

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

 

Last time we were speaking about Operation Cartwheel and part of phase one for Admiral Halsey in the Solomons was to move north from Guadalcanal to hit New Georgia code named Operation Toenails. Halsey planned to perform four simultaneous landings. One was directed at Wickham Anchorage by the 2nd battalion, 103rd regiment plus two companies from the 4th raider battalion to be led by Lt Colonel Lester Brown. Wickham would become a new landing craft layover base. A second landing would be made at Segi Point by Companies O and P of the 4th Raider battalion and Companies A and D of the 103rd regiment would garrison Segi point and its airfield afterwards. Another landing would be made at Viru Harbor by Company B of the 103rd regiment for its small craft base. And a final landing would be made at Rendova Harbor by the 172nd regiment and 24th naval construction battalion Seabees which would become a stage for further troops coming over to New Georgia before an assault on Munda was made.

The 43rd infantry division led by Major General John Hester were going to take the lead against Munda. The 43rd were actually a national guard division from Connecticut, Maine, Rhode island and Vermont who were mobilized and reorganized as a “triangular” division. This meant they were going to be 3 regiments rather than 4. They would be brought up to strength, but in reality the only real experience they by this point was some unopposed landings on the Russell islands early in 1943. They had several months to prepare for the campaign. Hester got the men to construct pill boxes modeled after the Japanese one’s found on Guadalcanal for training exercises. However the terrain found on Guadalcanal or on the Russell Islands did not really bear much resemblance to that of New Georgia. In April 1943, the 14th corps arranged for the 147th regiment, veterans of the Guadalcanal campaign who had chased the Japanese west during Operation KE to conduct several training exercises with the 43rd division. However as noted by many of the men in the regiment the terrain was not very similar to what was expected on New Georgia hampering the training. By mid june the 103rd infantry and the 169th infantry also began training exercises on Guadalcanal using landing craft.

Now you probably noticed in my listening there was mention of the 4th raiders. Two new Raider battalions were entering the fray; the 3rd Raiders led by Lt Colonel Harry Liversedge were coming over fresh from Samoa; and the 4th Raiders led by Lt Colonel James Roosevelt from Camp Pendleton of California. And yes you are probably wondering, James Roosevelt II was the eldest son of FDR. Since 1936 he had been serving as his fathers military aide, under the commission of a captain in the Marine Corps Reserve. When the war broke out in 1939 he entered active duty and starting in April of 1941 FDR sent him on a secret mission. James traveled around the world on a diplomatic mission to assure other governments that the US would soon join the war despite the official neutrality stance. He met with Chiang Kai-shek in China, King Farouk of Egypt, King George of Greece, Sir Winston CHurchill of Britain and such. After the attack on Pearl Harbor he sat right beside his father as he gave the legendary Day of Infamy speech, and soon he requested an active combat assignment. He was transferred to the Marine Raiders by January of 1942 and became the 2nd in command of the 2nd Raiders under Carlson. He took part in the Makin Island Raid in August of 1942 where he earned a Navy Cross. He had some health issues, such as flat feet, and got the special privilege of being allowed to wear sneakers while the other Marines wore boots.

On March 15th the 4 Raider battalions were reorganized as the 1st Raider regiment, stationed at Espiritu Santo with Liversedge as their commander and Carlson executive officer. Carlson infused his fire team and squad models into the raiders, while Edson molded them into a highly trained, lightly equipped force who could accomplish special missions or fill a line battalion on the fly. The 1st Raider Regiment was no guerilla outfit, though it felt like that initially. For Operation Toenails, Halsey assigned both the 1st Raiders led by Colonel Griffith and the 4th Raiders led by Lt Colonel Michael Currin, supported by the 9th defense battalion which was carrying a 155mm gun units and light tank platoon. The Navy was also sending the legendary Seabees; Acorn 7, the 24th and a single section of the 20th naval construction battalions. It can’t be said enough how much the Seabee’s brought to the table in the Pacific. During the war theSeabee's would receive 5 Navy Crosses, 33 Silver Stars and over 2000 Purple Hearts alongside numerous citations and commendations. They performed legendary deeds in the Atlantic and Pacific creating over 400 advanced bases along the 5 figurative roads to victory.

 

Lastly and quite interesting to note, the Americans would have a unique commando units of 130 Fijians known as the 1st Commando Fiji Guerillas. When the Pacific War broke out, Japan had seized numerous territory going as far south as the Solomon islands getting just 8 hours flight time away from places like Fiji. At this time Britain was too preoccupied with the Atlantic and America was scrambling to recover from Pearl Harbor. Fiji was in a critical position and for several months while the US was organizing her forces so was Fiji. Fiji possessed 2 good harbors and 2 airfields and her position on earth put her smack dab on the way between America and Australia / New Zealand. The allies knew the Japanese would love to take such a territory and thus she needed defense. Small numbers of troops were garrisoning Fiji, many from New Zealand, but she had little to spare as she became heavily committed to Africa and the Middle East. Thus the Americans came to Fiji to relieve the New Zealanders and they helped expand Fiji’s forces. The result were commando units who proved themselves uniquely equipped for combat on pacific islands like the solomons. For New Georgia the Fiji guerillas were tasked with locating enemy soldiers scattered about the island.

The eastern landing force consisted of the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 103rd regiment alongside the 4 raider battalion to be led by Colonel Daniel Hundley. Their job was to secure the lines of communication to Rendova directly across from Munda. The Western Landing Force consisted of the 172nd and 169th Regiments; 3rd Battalion, 103rd Regiment; 9th Marine Defense Battalion; 24th Naval Construction Battalion (Seabees) and 1st Commando Fiji Guerrillas, to be led by General Hester. They had the initial mission of securing the island of Rendova and afterwards the 3 islets in the Blanche Channel opposite of Munda. For the islets it would be the job of Companies A and B, 169th Regiment; and 1st Commando Fiji Guerillas. Once all of that was done, the 172nd and 169th regiments led by Brigadier General Leonard Wing would advance to Zanana through the Honiavasa passage, then take a overland route over the Barike River for the final drive upon Munda supported by destroyer bombardment. Hester also planned to use the 3rd battalion, 103rd regiment to hook around Munda’s from the west coast.

For all of these amphibious landings, Admiral Turner was in charge with his task force 31. He divided his forces into two groups; the Western Force under his personal command which would make the Rendova landings; and the Eastern Force led by Rear Admiral George Fort would perform the landings at Wickham, Segi Point and Viru Harbor. For the Rendova harbor landing, Turner employed 4 Attack transports and 2 Aka’s; during WW2 Aka’s referred to merchant ships that were modified for combat use. These took the 172nd regiment and 24th seabees over on June 30th, while Turners larger landing craft, LST’s (landing ship tank), LCT’s (Landing craft tank) and LCI’s (landing craft infantry) would move Hesters initial units over the next few days.

The Amphibious forces would be covered by Halsey’s Task Force 36 constituting of forces that had previously been under the command of Admirals Ainsworth and Merrill, destroyers, cruisers, some battleships and a few carriers. Merrill would help the landings by performing a bombardment of the Shortland islands as minelayers created minefields across the southern entrance to Bougainville, and a smaller detachment of destroyers hit Vila as a diversion. Ainsworth would get himself into position in the seas around Rendova while Admiral Fitch would grant the operation a total of 1182 aircraft, including 626 from Admiral Mitschers Airsols as cover. To gain air supremacy, 17 air missions were assigned such as PBY crews for rescue operations and last minute supply drops over New Georgia. AirSols aircraft would be assigned to New Georgia missions with a few SBDS set aside for Russell operations. Fitch also went ahead and created the New Georgia Air force commanded by General Mulcahy who would direct missions from the ground.

Closing in on Operation Toenails, Halsey and Turner also decided to add a last minute landing directed at Rice Anchorage on the Kula Gulf. Designated Northern Landing Group, the landing was to be performed by the 3rd battalions, of the 145th and 148th regiments alongside the 1st raider battalion led by Colonel Harry Liversedge. This would occur on July the 4th to create a base from which the allies could launch an attack against the Enogai inlet and Bairoko harbor. By seizing these the allies could interdict Japanese supply lines and prevent reinforcement efforts for Munda. Now that is all for the plans for the Solomons, but Operation Cartwheel had other plans over on New Guinea being handled by General Douglas MacArthur and Kreuger, code named Operation Chronicle, the invasion of the Woodlark and Kiriwina islands.

The two Trobriand islands held airfields and were only 125 miles from New Britain and 200 miles from Bougainville. Capturing them would allow the allies to launch bombers with fighter escort to hit Rabaul, Kavieng and the northern solomons. It was also a great opportunity to test what was colloquially known as “MacArthur’s Navy”, officially known as the 7th amphibious force. Now Lt General Krueger had sent reconnaissance missions to the islands which indicated there were no Japanese present on them in May. Nonetheless he instructed the men to prepare for a fight and at the least to expect aerial attacks when they approached them. Kruegers plan of attack was simplistic, Colonel Julian Cunningham would lead the Woodlark force. This consisted of the 112th Cavalry Regiment; 134th Field Artillery Battalion; and 12th Defense Battalion. Also, the 20th and 60th Naval Construction Battalions and ARGUS 1. They would depart Townsville Australia on June 25th and land on Woodlark by June 30th. The Kiriwina Force would be led by Colonel Prugh Herndon consisting of the  158th Regiment; and 148th Field Artillery Battalion. They would depart from Milne Bay on June 30th and quickly land at Kiriwina that same day. To get them to the beaches, Admiral Barbey would have 4 destroyer transports, the Gilmber, Sands, Humphrey and Brooks alongside 6 LSTS, a subchaser 7 mechanized landing craft, 2 small coastal transports and a survey ship, a real hodge podge. Escorting them would be Barbey’s task force 76 consisting of the destroyers Mugford, Bagley, Conyngham, Henley and helm along with Carpenders task force 74 consisting of cruisers Australia and Jobart with destroyers Arunta and Warramunga. For aerial support they had multiple squadrons from Australian Wing 73 operating off Goodenough island.

Now on the grounds of New Guinea in mid June, Generals Savige, Herring, Berryman and Colonels Archibald MacKechnie met with Brigadier Moten to hear about his plans for the 17th brigade’s salamaua offensive. Moten laid out a 5 phase plan, phase 1 consisted of the 1st Battalion, 162nd Regiment creating a beach head at Nassau Bay, with the support of a company from the 2/6th battalion. Phase 2 would see the 2/6th reinforced by a company of the 2/5th who would capture Observation Hill and a ridge between Bui Savella and Kitchen Creeks. From there they would be able to move through Mubo Valley to Archway while American forces captured Bitoi ridge. Phase 3 would see the capture of Green Hill and the Pimple by American forces and some of the 2/6th. From there they could advance towards Komaitum and Lokanu. Phase 4 would see the 2/5th advance from Mubo through the 2/6th position to occupy Mount Tambu, linking up with the 15th brigade at Komiatum. Lastly Phase 5 would see the capture of Lokanu and Boisi, clearing the enemy away from the Francisco river area. The plan looked good to all present. But nothing was mentioned about the capture of Lae, nor the critical fact, that Salamaua needed to fall prior to Lae, lest they all lose the element of surprise for Operation Postern. This was done for security reasons, it all had to be held under wraps, but despite this General Savige remained convinced he had to capture Salamaua as soon as possible. His subordinate, Brigadier Moten was aware of the grand plan created by Blamey.

Yet while all of these allied commanders were planning, a war was still afoot and the Japanese tossed a counter offensive on the night of June 20th. The Japanese commanders had determined in late May that they needed to dislodge the Australians from Lababia Ridge. General Nakano had brought forward the 1500 men of 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 66th regiment. He concealed their movements by ordered heavy airstrikes and ordered the men to make no fires. This also allowed the exhausted 102nd infantry regiment to rotate back a bit as they had been fighting the Australians ever since the battle of Wau. On the 20th, Nakano began sending patrols made up of the 66th with a few guides from the 102nd who probed the Australian position on Lababia ridge, at that time being held by just 80 men. The Japanese patrols defused many booby traps the Australians laid out for them, made up of piano wire attached to hand grenades. However the Japanese were not too familiar with the Australian hand grenade, so instead of pocketing them to use against the enemy they simply left them. Some sporadic skirmishes occurred that day alongside some bombing missions aimed at Guadagasal, Mat Mat and the Mubo Valley. 83 Japanese aircraft caused some casualties and damage against the 2/6th and spooked a ton of native carriers. The next day the Australians would be searching for native carriers who fled, losing around 578 of them for over 3 days. This greatly delayed the movement of rations, ammunition and other supplies.

On the morning of June 21st, the 1st battalion of Araki, guided by some men of the 102nd regiment, began advancing around the eastern flank of the Australian position on Lababia, getting into position for a dawn attack set for the following day. Behind them was the 2nd battalion who were doing a similar maneuver but on the Australians left flank. The Japanese were extremely careful as they advanced having learnt bitter lessons throughout the war about how much the Australians liked to hang grenades attached to piano wire just about anywhere one would think to walk. Oh and it was not limited to fragment grenades, they hooked up thermite grenades, cans of petrol and other goodies. Now they were going to be attacking 80 men as I said, which were being led by Captain Walter Dexter’s D company. He had two platoons in a forward position on the Jap track and two others to the back guarding his HQ. Further north he set up listening posts to watch for enemy activity around the Pimple.

Dexter figured he was holding a decent enough position going on to say ”if you’ve got to fight them you’ve got to see them’. Around noon Australian patrols began to notice signs of Japanese activity along the track towards the observation post just a bit due east along the ridge. At 7:30 the telephone line to that observation post was suddenly cut and the Japanese could be seen approaching. The Australians went to work setting off booby traps that had been rigged up as early warning devices and a small firefight emerged. Then at 2pm the Japanese launched an assault from the north and north east of the Australian position, firing off mortars. The Japanese were repelled, but they came right back later in the afternoon screaming into a bayonet charge. Over the course of the afternoon 3 major attacks were made to the sound of Japanese bugles. This was a classic Japanese strategy to intimidate the enemy, but it actually aided the Australians as it warned them of the incoming attack each time. The attacks were turned back and during the night the Australians were reinforced by another platoon,  70 men of C company led by Corporal Keith Mew. As the night wore on, the Australians sent out some patrols to try and make contact with their forward positions only to find out they had been wiped out in the attacks. Meanwhile under heavy rain, the Japanese were recovering their wounded and trying to get rid of more pesky booby traps in front of the Australian positions. 

 

The next morning came screams and charging Japanese setting off booby traps all morning long. Dexter responded by ordered the men to shoot mortars and rifle grenades at anything that looked like a Japanese position. At 2pm on the 21st, the Japanese began a heavy attack on one of the forward positions held by Sergeant John Hedderman lying between the Jap track and Lababia track. The attack spread to Roach’s and Lt Edward Exton’s front sending a rain of automatic and mortar fire into the two forward platoons. A bayonet charge along the Jap track was halted within just 10 yards of the forward positions and another one to the right flank got within 20 yards before being stopped. The Australians tossed lead in all forms into the banzai charges, but no matter how much mortar, bullets and grenades were tossed, the Japanese were closing in. Sensing a breakthrough, Moten ordered forward more men from the 2/5th battalion allowing Dexter to reinforce his left flank using a small reserve he had at his HQ. They arrived at the flank just in time to repel another banzai charge. By the late afternoon the Australians had 12 dead men and 10 wounded, they were down to just 55 abled bodies, but the brunt of the Japanese attack was done. The arrival of C company allowed Dexter to reinforce his forward positions, now bolstered to 150 men. 

 

The Japanese did not give up however and continued their attack during the late afternoon. Suffering so many casualties, it looked like the Japanese might break through Exton’s position. Exton and Corporal Martine charged forward to rally their men, getting them through the brunt of another assault. By dusk the attacks began to decrease until the gradually stopped. The night saw a ton of rain, making it miserable for the Japanese who were dragging their wounded and dead comrades through booby trapped jungle. On the morning of the 22nd, Araki sent some patrols to probe Dexter’s left flank who were met by Australian sniper fire. An attack was launched against Dexter’s rear, held by Smiths platoon who overwhelmed the Japanese causing them to give up after 5 minutes. Frustrated by the lack of progress, Araki ordered his two mountain guns from the 14th artillery regiment to start shelling Lababia. However the foliage was too much and only two shells actually landed within Dexters perimeter. Thus when the Japanese recommenced their attacks they were met by the full brunt of the defenders. By night, Araki was forced to toss in the towel and he ordered the men to begin a withdrawal. To cover the retreat, Araki ordered his men to fire heavy automatic guns and motors into Dexter’s position on the morning of the 23rd. The Australians responded the same way, but then Dexter unleashed a nasty surprise. He ordered his units to mark the forward lines with smoke. Soon the RAAF send Bristol Beaufighters in who strafed the Japanese up and down the Jap Track. 

It was an incredible defense, the defenders had been outnumbered 10-1. The Japanese had received 42 dead, 131 wounded while killing 11 and wounded 12 Australians. As Moten would go on to say ‘the engagement is noteworthy and is a classic example of how well-dug-in determined troops can resist heavy attacks from a numerically superior enemy”. Dexter had been pretty much left to his own to defend Lababia and for his excellent leadership he was later awarded the Distinguished service order while some of his platoon commanders; Lt edward Exton, Laurence and Roach received Military crosses and Sergeant John Hedderman received a military medal. Dexter was praised by Moten for “taking every trick during the battle” and one of his colleagues, Captain Jo Gullet described him as“he was too exacting to be popular, although he was a thorough soldier, a good trainer of men and a painstaking tactician”. Lababia was secured, and in the next week major operations were about to begin.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

Operation Cartwheel was getting its ducks all in order for a major push set on June 30th. The boys down unda fought like lions to protect Lababia ridge. Outnumbered 10-1 they proved, well dug-in positions sometimes made all the difference.