The Pacific War - week by week

- 111 - Pacific War - Landing at Saidor , January 2-9, 1944

Last time we spoke about Operation Backhander, the landings at Cape Gloucester. General Douglas MacArthur unleashed another cog in the machine that was his drive back to the Philippines. The 1st Marines under General Rupertus were back in the action, spearheading the landings at Cape Gloucester. The landings were successful and multiple allied units began advancing towards the airdrome.  Colonel Sumiya realized the futility of attempting a defense upon the open ground against American armor, so he pulled his units away towards Razorback Hill from which they could launch harassment maneuvers against the new American perimeter. Over on New Guinea the Australians continued their drive towards Sio, pushing the Japanese even further north in the process. The Japanese were being attacked in multiple places without the ability to contest them everywhere. What would the Japanese commanders do to establish a proper defense?

This episode is Landing at Saidor

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Last week we left off with General Nakai unleashing a counteroffensive against Kesawai. The counteroffensive was successful at pushing the Australian commando’s out of the area to prevent them from encroaching upon Madang. These actions worried General Vasey who thought the Japanese might follow them up with an offensive against Dumpu. Vasey elected to carry out a punitive attack along Shaggy Ridge. Perhaps a refresher as I think I did once describe it, but Shaggy Ridge is located six miles north of Dumpu. The razorback ridge has one elevation of more than 5,000 feet, running roughly southeast to northwest. The highest point on the ridge is known as the Kankirei Saddle. There are also three high elevations along the ridge that the Australians named the Pimple, the Intermediate Snipers' Pimple, and the Green Sniper's Pimple. The Japanese had constructed four miles of defenses along the northern part of the ridge. These positions dominated the trail along which the Australians would eventually have to cross. The trail was narrow, only two to three feet wide, and there were drops on either side of 300 to 500 feet. The Japanese had also constructed a rough road on the coast side to a point between the Mindjim and Faria Rivers, making supply to the defenders much easier. The Pimples were the strong points, and the Japanese had built fortified posts with machine guns and deep trenches on each.

Vasey’s punitive force consisted of the 2/16th battalion under the temporary command of Major Garth Symington. Patrols had been sent to figure out decent approaches for an attack against the Pimple, but everything indicated there was only a narrow path to perform a frontal assault from. Thus Symington planned to assault the Pimple and exploit for about 400 yards along the ridge with Captain Christian’s B Company while Captain Anderson’s D Company maneuvered behind to consolidate the ground gained. Fortunately Symington would be receiving aerial support from the American 41st Squadron and Australian No. 4 Squadron, artillery support from the 8th battery and 54th battery and back up from the 2/27th battalion who would launch a diversionary attack against the Japanese along the Faria River and Mainstream area.

During the morning of December 27th, the assault began with 16 Kittyhawks and two Boomerangs bombing the Pimple followed by artillery. Dive bombing, strafing and artillery fire was intense causing reverberation and roars that could be heard up and down the Ramu Valley. An hour later, B Company’s leading platoon departed their startline under the foliage of the rainforest to scale the rock face leading to the pimple. Although the bombardment was stunning, the dazed Japanese defenders quickly responded to the invaders by tossing grenades from the well sited pillboxes atop the pimple. The Australians dashed forward and wiped out the forward pillbox, securing their toehold on the ridge. With the artillery firing further forward the Australians were soon able to capture the second pimple feature just 100 yards ahead, successfully clearing the Japanese from their entrenchments. However at this point, B company came across a strong rock bunker. They first allowed the artillery to smash it, then they tossed grenades while trying to outflank the defenders. A Japanese defender refusing to surrender, covered the entrance to his pillbox with a groundsheet and for about two hours flicked away the grenades thrown at him before they could explode. Eventually he was blasted out when a grenade was tied to the end of a bamboo pole which was poked into the pit, the pin being pulled out by a length of string. More than 100 grenades were thrown during the day at the rock bunker in front of the second pimple. As hard as they tried it was impossible to outflank as the sides of the razorback guarding the bunker were almost perpendicular. Christian was forced to pull B company back and dig in on the second pimple.

Meanwhile, D company came up to relieve the exhausted men of B company. To deal with the bunker menace, Australian Pioneers chiseled a track along the cliff face towards it and designed a special bomb consisting of a grenade placed in a chemical and sealed in a field ration tin. During the morning of the 28th, D company advanced over their newly cut track and hurled the new bombs successfully blowing up the enemy bunker. While this was occurring, Lt Scott’s 18th Platoon was advancing down the eastern slope of Shaggy Ridge attempting a encircling maneuver against the third pimple. At 10.50 a.m Scott reported being at the base of the third pimple and a quarter of an hour later the artillery and mortars began firing smoke to cover his Platoon’s advance. At the foot of the objective Scott ordered his platoon sergeant, Longman, to take a small party of Owen gunners up the third pimple. Under heavy enemy machine-gun fire Longman and three men charged an enemy machine-gun post near the top. Two of his men were wounded but Longman and the other man continued to advance upon the enemy post and eventually silenced it with Owen-gun fire. To reach the enemy post they had to pull themselves up a steep slope with one hand and fire their Owens with the other. Still under heavy fire from other enemy posts the two men covered the evacuation of the two wounded and neutralized the fire of another enemy post 40 yards away which was opposing the advance of the rest of the platoon, led by the wounded Scott, up the cliff face. Nine minutes after Longman led the first assault, Scott was in possession of the third pimple and was covering the advance of Lieutenant McCaughey's 16 Platoon to the fourth and highest pimple, later named McCaughey's Knoll, farther along the ridge. The two platoons then dug in on the newly-won ground. During the afternoon, the battered Japanese attempted a counterattack but were easily repelled, suffering a total of 28 dead during the battle against Symington’s three killed and eight wounded.

 

After the pimples were captured, the fighting fell into a series of artillery duels and patrol skirmishes. With the Pimples in hand the Australians could observe Madang. Vasey at this time acquired further support from General MacArthur who relieved his exhausted brigades with the 18th and 15th brigades. Meanwhile General Adachi sensed key points in the Madang area were not defended well enough, so he ordered the bulk of the 41st division to advance from Wewak to Madang. In early december, the 2nd battalion, 237th regiment and 2nd mountain artillery battalion of the 41st group were deployed at Karkar island. However the movement of the rest of the division was sent to the Gogol area and was heavily delayed by storms that caused numerous rivers to overflow. But now we are shifting gears and heading over to the Huon Peninsula where a new allied landing was about to occur. 

 

In early December, General MacArthur finally decided to act upon a suggestion put forward by his assistant chief of staff Lt General Stephen Chamberlain. Chamberlain argued Saidor on the south side of the Huon Peninsula should be occupied in order to construct an advanced air and naval base. MacArthur waited until two days before the Arawe expedition, before giving orders to Krueger to prepare plans for a landing against Saidor. Because of limited landing craft the landings would need to be pushed until January 2nd. The operation was code named Michelmas and initially it was thought the 503rd parachute infantry could be airdropped over Saidor, but a limited number of aircraft killed this one in the crib. Thus the 32nd division who had been earmarked for the canceled Gasmata landings were chosen for the task. The general outline for the operation was discussed at a conference held on Goodenough island on December 20th attended to be Barbey, Major General William Gill, Whitehead commanding the 32nd division, Colonel Clarence Martin commanding the 126th regiment and other staff officers. Allied intelligence reports indicated the Japanese had few forces in the Saidor region. Nevertheless, the plans called for landings in force on three beaches codenamed Red, White and Blue on the west shore of Dekay’s bay.

 

If the Americans could successfully seize Saidor, this would cut the Japanese retreat from Finschhafen and therefore would trap another Japanese division at Sio. Krueger selected the 126th Regiment for the task after they were rebuilt following the Battle of Buna-Gona and retrained in amphibious warfare. Brigadier-General Clarence Martin would act as the commander of the new Michaelmas task force. MacArthur did not have much time to carry out ground reconnaissance, thus the 3 beaches selected were chosen primarily from aerial photograph data. They would prove to be quite narrow, rocky and exposed to heavy seas. Because the allied intelligence indicated few Japanese forces in the area, MacArthur elected not to perform a preliminary aerial bombardment. 

Admiral Barbey’s amphibious force were now well experienced veterans with amphibious landings, so the last minute notice did not hinder them too much. On January the 1st, Martin’s men were tossed onto 9 APD’s, 17 LCI’s and two LST’s supported by 9 of Barbey’s Destroyers and Admiral Crutchley’s Cruiser force, hoping to intercept some IJN forces. Yet Crutchley would be disappointed as Admiral Koga had his hands full with something cooking up at Rabaul and Kavieng and could not afford to dispense units to Saidor. What could hinder the landings was air forces from the IJA at Wewak, though they were considerably weakened with just 39 fighters, 17 light bombers and 7 heavy bombers available after so many allied air strikes.

 

The landings went off smoothly. The beaches were hit by more than 2000 shells within 20 minutes prior to the first LCV landings at around 7am. Two battalions of the 126th landed abreast without opposition and quickly established a perimeter. Soon a 3rd battalion passed through and extended the perimeter further left upon high ground, just southwest of an unserviceable airfield. Captain Meredith Muggins, who played a key role in the capture of Sanananda, recalled his impressions of this seemingly uneventful landing: 

 

“When we landed at Saidor it was an amazing sight. There were dozens of warships bombarding the coast. The sound was like a rolling thunder and the smoke hung along the ground. As we approached the beach, air attacks began. Heavy bombers dropped their load of high explosive from a few thousand feet. Then came in the B-25 strafers shooting everything in sight, clobbering positions. Behind them came fighters to give the Japs a final working over. There was very little opposition when we landed. We found a few wandering around in shell shock. What a contrast from the days at Buna and Sanananda, only a year before, when we were fighting with rifles, grenades, and rocks!”

 

Thus 8000 troops were landed ashore by the end of the day. The only real resistance came in the form of some air raids from Wewak beginning at 4pm. 9 Japanese Nakajima Ki-49 (Helen) aircraft, escorted by up to 20 Zeros and Kawasaki Ki-61 (Tony) fighters bombed the beach area at 4:30pm. There were three more air raids during the night, and 49 over the course of the month, but most were quite small. Thus on Januaruy the 3rd MacArthur triumphantly stated  “We have seized Saidor on the north coast of New Guinea. In a combined operation of ground, sea and air forces, elements of the Sixth Army landed at three beaches under cover of heavy air and naval bombardment. The enemy was surprised both strategically and tactically and the landings were accomplished without loss. The harbour and airfields are in our firm grasp. Enemy forces on the north coast between Sixth Army and the advancing Australians are trapped with no source of supply and face disintegration and destruction.” The Saidor area and her landing strip were in allied hands and further men and supplies would be brought over without enemy interference.

 

Over on the Japanese side, General Adachi had the understrength and exhausted 51st division garrisoning Sio while the 20th division was retreating from the Finschhafen area. On December 30th, Adachi arrived to Kiari where he ordered the 51st to advance to Bogia, once the 20th had arrived at Sio. Since mid December, some units, such as the bulk of the 66th regiment had already made it to Bogia, where they could be rehabilitated, leaving just the 3rd composite battalion of the 66th regiment, the 3rd battalion HQ, the 10th company and one machine gun company to garrison Gali under the leadership of General Muroya. Just as Adachi was preparing to depart on January 2nd, he received word of the allied landing at Saidor which effectively opened up a new and important threat against his isolated forces. Adachi believed it was now useless to hold on to Sio and the Vitiaz Strait, since enemy troops were also landed on New Britain. Furthermore his main base at Madang was now vulnerable.

Thus Adachi placed General Nakano in command of both divisions now designated the Nakano force and ordered him to advance the forces to Gali by submarine to try and secure the new key supply point while the Shoge detachment would delay the Australian advance to Sio. Nakano would therefore have to break through or bypass Saidor overland to arrive safely at Madang. Additionally the 41st division was ordered to depart Wewak immediately and advance overland towards Madang. General Nakai was given orders to advance his detachment towards Saidor to try and contain the American advance as long as possible and this would only leave the 2nd battalion, 78th regiment under Colonel Matsumoto Matsujiro on the Kankirei Saddle-Shaggy Ridge area.  On January 3rd, Lt General Goro Mano was flown directly to Alexishafen to assume command of all units in the Madang region, including the Matsumoto detachment.

Back over in Saidor, the Americans began to send patrols and an outpost was setup at Sel on January the 5th while the 3rd battalion, 126th regiment skirmished with other American patrols at Teterei and Biliau. General Muroya managed to secure Gali without much difficulty. Meanwhile, upon receiving the news of the Saidor landing, Brigadier Windeyer’s 20th Brigade continued their advance, expecting the march to be a lot easier. After fording the Sanga River on January 3rd, the 2/17th battalion advanced to the Sazomu river while fighting off elements of Colonel Miyake’s rearguard. At this point General Katagiri’s forces were in a full retreat towards Kiari, only performing some rearguard against around Kelanoa. Thus the 2/17th advance went pretty much undisturbed as they reached the Dallman River on January 6th. Kelanoa offered more defensible positions, so Windeyer cautiously sent some patrols to scout the area out, trying to avoid unnecessary casualties. 

At 8 a.m. on the 8th the 2/17th resumed their advance and half an hour later their leading company was met with some fire from a track junction. There seemed to be about 40 determined Japanese with four machine-guns holding the area. The Australians killed 8 Japanese and lost 2 in the process with another 2 wounded. As the company could make no headway without further casualties they withdrew to a kunai patch south-east of the track junction so that artillery mortars and machine-guns could hit the Japanese. The position was hit with mortar heavily causing the Japanese to withdraw during the night. The next day at 9:30am the Australian battalion advanced through the position finding abandoned pill boxes, foxholes and several dead Japanese. Later during the day, a group of 30 heavily armed Japanese fire upon the battalion 1500 yards from the Buri River. The Australians unleashed artillery, mortars and machine guns upon them until 4pm when some tanks arrived forcing the Japanese to flee.

 

Meanwhile the Japanese were able to repair 12 barges which were quickly used to evacuate wounded towards Gali. Unfortunately, allied PT boats were lurking in the area like sharks. The PT boats unsuccessfully attacked Adachi’s submarine that was bringing him back over to Madang but managed to destroy one barge carrying 100 wounded near Herwath Point and damaged others. Most of the wounded would reach Gali by the 10th and 20th division advanced past Kiari on the 9th and were drawing closer to Gali. The 2/17th crossed the Buri River on the 10th and reached the Kapugara river the next day without opposition. General Nakano departed Kiari with his division heading for Gali. It was now only the Shoge detachment that stood in the path of the Australians. The Shoge detachment received orders on January 13th to withdraw towards Sio using an exhausting inland route going from Nambariwa to Nokopo. The Australians would soon enter the ruins of Nambariwa finding the Japanese had destroyed numerous large dumps. Nambariwa had been the principal Japanese supply base for the Finschhafen area, both banks of its river had been barge loading points. There were numerous facilities such as barge workshops, engineer store dumps, hospital areas and bivouac areas. By January 15th the Australian forces would occupy Sio uncontested.

 

General Wootten’s 9th division had completed its mission and it would be their last action in New Guinea. Wootten had received word in early January that the 8th Brigade led by Brigadier Claude Cameron was being brought over to Finschhafen to relieve the 24th Brigade. Now with the fall of Sio, General Berryman ordered the 5th division now under the command of Major General Alan Ramsay to take over the forward area. Mop up operations would continue for a week, until the 4th battalion, 8th brigade and 5th division officially took over Sio. The advance from Fortification Point to Sio saw the 20th Brigade suffer 3 deaths, 13 wounded and 958 sick from malaria, mosquitoes remaining a larger foe than the Japanese as usual. The 20th brigade had marched 50 miles in 24 days and counted a total of 303 dead Japanese and captured 22. Within the 4 months campaign going back to September 22nd, Wootten’s 9th division had suffered 283 deaths and 744 wounded, but estimated they killed 3099 Japanese, captured 39 and inflicted around 4644 wounded. Now we are heading back to the boys on New Britain.

With the airdrome secured and a strong defensive perimeter surrounding it, General Rupertus radioed the commander of the 6th Army “First Marine Division presents to you as an early New Year gift the complete airdome of Cape Gloucester. Situation well in hand due to fighting spirit of troops, the usual Marine luck and the help of God…” General Krueger expressed himself as "delighted." At his advance headquarters at Port Moresby General Douglas MacArthur, presented the airdrome to the people of the United States with his compliments and sent Rupertus the following dispatch: “I extend my heartiest congratulations to your officers and men. I am filled with pride and gratitude by their resourceful determination in capturing Cape Gloucester. Your gallant Division has maintained the immortal record of the Marine Corps and covered itself with glory.” General Rupertus raised the US flag on an improvised staff above the main strip with simple ceremonies on December 31. Soon American engineers were being brought over to repair the airfield as the Japanese sent nightly air raids to hamper these efforts. The Japanese still held several operational airfields within range, but their efforts to bomb the Americans positions were hampered by terrible weather. They also never massed air forces to attack in great strength, thus the damage was always minor and easily repairable.

To the east, assistant commander of the 1st Marines, Brigadier General Lemuel Shepherd assumed command of the forces within the Yellow Beach perimeter. Due to the lack of Japanese resistance around the airdrome, the Marine commanders were convinced General Matsuda was retaining the bulk of his strength in the Borgen Bay area, thus leaving Colonel Sumiya out to dry. Shepherd elected to take his force and use them to clear up the Borgen Bay area. On January 1st he proposed to hold fast on the left and center of the Yellow Beach perimeter, while his right line consisting of the 3rd battalions of the 7th and 5th Marines would advance southeast. On the other side, Colonel Katayama had just arrived at Magairapua with his 2nd battalion on January 1st. It seems at this point Matsuda made an error. Perhaps its because he was essentially a transportation expert rather than a combat leader, perhaps it was due to his failed initial attacks, but he decided to place Katayama in command of all the forces in the Brogen Bay area. Now designated the Katayama detachment, these forces were the 2nd battalion, 53rd regiment and 2nd and 3rd battalions 141st regiment.There would also soon be Major Tatsumi Asaschichi’s 3rd Battalion who were still en route from Nigol and Cape Bushing.

Katayama first tackled his command by underestimating his enemy’s strength. Katayama ordered an offensive in force against Target Hill to be led by Captain Mukai Toyoji’s 2nd battalion, 141st regiment. Major Takabe Shinichi’s 2nd Battalion, 53rd Regiment, would attack the center of the marine perimeter to confuse the Americans and prevent them from reinforcing the hill. At this time Target Hill was being defended by the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, more particularly their A Company . This unit was deployed with its 1st Platoon defending the area on the left between the beach and swamp, the 2nd Platoon holding a series of strong points on such dry ground as could be found in the swamp itself, and only the 3rd Platoon on the hill proper. Unbeknownst to Katayama, Shepherd had begun his offensive at 10:00am on the 2nd. The 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines, under the temporary command of Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis B. Puller and 3rd Battalion, 5th Marinesunder the command of Lieutenant-Colonel David S. MacDougal were advancing abreast southeast towards Suicide Creek.

The terrain they were traversing was particularly brutal. The 3rd battalion had to hack their way through the jungle going some 300 yards where they would come across well prepared Japanese positions. The 5th battalion had a longer distance to travel, but would encounter less resistance at the early phase. The 5th battalion attempted an encircling movement from the west, the assault troops soon encountered the face of the same Japanese pocket that was holding up the 3rd battalion and were halted in turn. As a result, the attacking lines on the night of 2 January, and throughout 3 January, resembled a huge letter "U", with the enemy strong point contained on three sides.

Recognizing Suicide Creek was a major obstacle, the Japanese had sited their positions skillfully to cover it. Time after time Marines attempted crossings, only to be fired upon from invisible positions. The Japanese had become experts at field fortifications.  The jungle curtailed both their attackers' freedom of movement and enhanced their own concealment: Marines would need get within just a few feet of the emplacements in order to locate them, by which time few were left alive to spot them for others. Even their lack of fortification materials--cement and steel reinforcing--reacted in favor of the Japanese, for the earth-and-log bunkers which they improvised were too soft-surfaced to detonate bazooka rockets, the heaviest weapons the infantry was capable of bringing to the point of contact. To support these bunkers, they had dug deep foxholes between and under the flaring buttress roots of the giant trees characteristic of the region, camouflaging them with foliage and cutting cunningly interlocking fire lanes. Artillery and mortar shells and air bombs were all but useless in reaching these positions, owing to the fantastically high forest cover that usually caused tree bursts, to which the deeply dug-in enemy was virtually invulnerable. The marines gradually surrounded the well prepared positions of the 2nd battalion, 53rd regiment during the night, but they could do little else as each attack brought failure. 

 

Under the cover of darkness and Marine mortar fire, Katayama’s assault troops and engineers hacked their way to the lower slopes of Target Hill. They did their best not to make any noise as they attempted scaling it, but the Marine defenders heard them. On January 3rd  they launched their attack, unleashing artillery, mortar and 20mm machine cannon fire from below the hill. However most of the artillery missed the hill altogether, and the 20mm cannon fire was not causing much damage. Company D's mortars replied from their positions behind the hill, but the high angle of fire precluded effective damage to the advance enemy elements which had actually worked their way to positions about 20 feet from the Marines' front emplacements by then. Katayama’s 5th company leading the assault fought bravely and with great determination, but against the steep terrain and inadequate support, against a very alert enemy proved too much for them. By dawn the attack had died down and the 5th company was virtually annihilated. Further to the west, the 53rd regiments secondary attack had achieved little more and suffered heavily for it. The Japanese were now trying to resist Shepherds attacks along the Suicide Creek while engineers of the 17th Marines were building a corduroy causeway across the coastal swamp to enable tanks to come into the action. By the morning of the 4th, following a 15 minute artillery bombardment, the first Sherman wallowed through the shallow water and mounted itself on the opposite bank. Soon the other Shermans followed and their 75mm guns began to absolutely devastate the Japanese emplacements from point blank range. Shepherd’s assault battalions surged forward across their whole front, encountering no further opposition. Encouraged by the victory and the apparent death or withdrawal of all Japanese in contact to the immediate front, General Shepherd ordered the advance to continue, changing direction to south-southeast. Meanwhile, the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, pinched out by the successful sweep of its former front and the tying-in of 3rd battalion and  1st battalion on their left, executed a wide swing inland, made contact with the right of 3rd battalion, 5th marines extending the line westward. By the nightfall, Shepherd held a 4 battalion strong front against Katayama’s positions at Aogiri Ridge and Hill 150.

 

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Operation Michaelmas, the landings at Saidor were a great success, forcing General Adachi to shift numerous units around, scrambling to remedy the situation. Yet with so many Japanese units trapped, isolated and continuing to retreat north, would they ever be able to halt the allied advance? 

- 110 - Pacific War - Landing at Cape Gloucester , December 26, 1943 - January 2,1944

Last time we spoke about the aftermath of the Arawe landing and the drive towards Sio. The Komori detachment did everything they could to bottle up the new American beachhead at Arawe. Meanwhile after the fall of Wareo, the Australians decided it was time to drive towards Sio. General Katagiri had just got his men to Sio, but would have little time to prepare defenses as the Australians were quick on their heels. Likewise the Australians were also expanding past Dumpu, seeing multiple patrols fan out, probing for where the Japanese were massing their forces. In Tokyo, Hideki Tojo invited Japan’s allies for the east asian conference, reiterating Pan-Asia unity against the west. Yet for all the talk, in reality Japan sought to dominate its Asian allies, really as a means to an end. In Cairo the allies held a conference of their own, trying to keep Chiang Kai-Shek in the fold.

This episode is Landings at Cape Gloucester 

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

General Douglas MacArthur faced daunting challenges during the Pacific War. One of these challenges was in the shape of Rabaul, one of Japan’s strong points from which she exerted force in the region. To neutralize Rabaul, MacArthur sought to seize some airfields in Western New Britain, but to do this would also require securing control over the Vitiaz strait between New Britain and New Guinea. General HQ sought to use airfields at Cape Gloucester and on the south coast to help neutralize Rabaul. Thus Operation Dexterity was born. It was to be twin landings against originally Gasmata, but then for necessity changed to Arawe and Cape Gloucester. This was but a cog in the major plan within MacArthur’s mind to return to the Philippines, one could argue within a greater plan for the white house.

The landings at Arawe were largely successful and with that in hand General Krueger felt his Alamo Force could now launch operation backhander. The battle-hardened 1st Marine division was earmarked for the landings against Cape Gloucester. It was to be their first action after a prolonged period of rest and recuperation in South Australia following their heroic campaign on Guadalcanal. The 1st marines were now under the command of Major-General Rupertus. You probably could not ask for better men for the job, they were well refreshed physically, mentally and militarily. They had acquired an enormous amount of experience on Guadalcanal and with it a high degree of morale. The marines began training with the new types of landing crafts available to them, things they did not have during the Gaudalcanal days.

Meanwhile Krueger carried out a programme of reconnaissance based on aerial photography, mosaics, older maps and some amphibious patrolling. There were 3 Australian officers who played key roles aiding in the effort. The first was Major John V. Mather, AIF, a former labor contractor in the Solomons who had been attached to the 1st Division for the Guadalcanal operation. He remained an integral component of the D-2 Section, where his proficiency with Pidgin English and grasp of native psychology proved most useful. The second was Sub-Lieutenant Andrew Kirkwall-Smith, RANVR, one of the versatile islanders who could turn his hand to nearly anything, and who had been a coastwatcher in the Cape Gloucester region at the time the Japanese first moved in. The third man and the one most more familiar with the ground and inhabitants was the Reverend William G. Wiedeman, who had operated the Anglican Mission at Sag Sag for several years prior to the war and, like Kirkwall-Smith, he was a commissioned Navy lieutenant to give military status to his present activities.

A number of amphibious patrols was performed by the Alamo scouts. The first patrol was led by 1st Lieutenant John D. Bradbeer, who set out for New Britain's western coast by PT boat on September 24th. Around midnight, he cut the motors off on his PT boat around a mile off Grass Point, and his scouts paddled in from there in an inflated rubber boat, landing on a beach at the mouth of the second stream to the south at 0100 on the 25th. After hiding their craft with great care, they proceeded inland through dense secondary jungle growth up the western slopes of Mt. Tangi. There they found enemy defenses in the vicinity of Aisega. After this they turned northward heading through heavy foliage to the upper Gima River and there interrogated the inhabitants. The natives had been excluded from the airdrome area and the coast since the previous July, but they had some information to impart. There was a motor road connected Ongaia and the airdrome, and 12 to 14 Anti aircraft guns were emplaced between these two points; radio stations were located at Aisega, the airdrome, Sakar Island and Rooke Island; barge traffic was heavy on the Itni River and along the coast. Relations between the native population and the Japanese had deteriorated to a low level, although a few quislings still operated in the area. The natives related that the enemy expected an invasion of the Cape Gloucester region. Finally, they retraced their steps; and in the early morning hours of 6 October the Alamo Scouts climbed on board the waiting torpedo boat and returned to Goodenough Island to make their report.

The next significant patrol was carried out on the night of 14 October by Captain W. A. Money, AIF, two other Australians, a Marine sergeant and six natives went ashore about one mile south of Higgins Point on Rooke and remained there until the early hours of 26 October. Captain Money reported there were few Japanese on the island, which doubtlessly influenced the later decision to defer a landing there. Shortly before midnight on November 20th two PT boats throttled down to a halt just south of Dorf Point on New Britain's west coast. Eleven men aboard had the general mission of reconnoitering the beach for an offensive landing, but more specifically they were to study beach approaches, beach conditions and inland terrain between Potni and Sumeru. They were commanded by Major Mather. With plans carefully laid the men stealthily made their way ashore, but luck under such conditions could not always hold up, and the Japanese became aware of the patrol's presence almost as soon as it reached the beach. Thirty minutes after leaving the PT boats, they were back on board, but in that time they had obtained enough information to declare the beach unfavorable for a landing operation. The significant patrol occurred on the night of 21 December, and was done to study two beaches at Tauali. Once again Major Mather acted as overall commander. Splitting the patrol into two seven-man groups, Bradbeer took the first on a reconnaissance of "South Beach" while First Lieutenant Joseph A. Fournier of the 1st Marines took the other for a look at "North Beach." The patrol recommended the latter as the more favorable of the two for a landing. It was duly labeled Green Beach, and 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, made its D-Day amphibious operation there. Such amphibious patrolling helped Krueger figure out where not to land.

Meanwhile the 7th fleet had just come under the command of Admiral Kinkaid and was assigned the naval responsibility for the Gloucester landing. Admiral Barbey would have at his disposal 12 destroyers, taking the USS Conyngham as his flagship, 3 minesweepers, 10 APDs, 16 LCIs and 24 LSTs for the main landings; with another two destroyers 14 LCMs, 12 LCTs and two rocket DUKWs for the secondary landing on Beach Green at Tauali. Covering them would by Admiral Crutchley’s task force 74 consisting of 4 cruisers, 8 destroyers and two rocket LCI’s.

The 1st echelon carried by the APDs Stringham, Crosby, Kilty, Dent and Ward was the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines; and APDs Brooks, Gilmer, Sands, Humphreys and Noa would carry the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines. The 2nd Echelon of six LCIs would carry the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines; and four LCIs for the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines. The 3rd Echelon was seven LSTs, each carrying 500 troops of 1st Marines and 150 tons of supply, escorted by destroyers Drayton, Lamson, Mugford and Bagley. The 4th Echelon was seven LSTs, each carrying 480 troops of 1st and 7th Marines and 150 tons of supply The 5th Echelon was five LSTs, each carrying 240 troops of 12th Defense Battalion and 250 tons of supply. And the 6th Echelon was five LSTs, each carrying 250 Marine engineers and 250 tons of supply.

 

For air support, General Kenney assigned Brigadier-General Frederic Smith’s 1st Air Task Force (FATF). The FATF contained about ⅓ of all the squadrons in the allied air force. It had flown fighter and bomber missions for all ground operations excluding those in the Ramu valley. To support the coming offensive, between November 19th to December 13th, 1241 tons of bombs were dropped over Brogen Bay. For the next 11 days, daylight bombings were intensified with over 1207 bomber sorties being performed, dropping more than 2684 tons of bombs.Their favored point of attack was Target Hill because it was so easily discerned. Gun positions at the airstrip were also given attention, with eighty 2,000-lb. bombs being dropped on 17 December. A few direct hits were claimed on gun positions. Bunkers and supply dumps, protected from view by the lush jungle growth, were fairly safe from air attacks, but the lines of supply suffered heavily. Daylight runs were not all that was performed, simultaneously the allies introduced harassing night tactics as well, to keep the enemy under additional mental strain. You see the Japanese anti-aircraft teams and pilots tried to sleep at night, but the B-24’s would continuously drop bombs, grenades and even beer bottles over bivouac areas simply to keep them dazed.

 

On December 21st, a final rehearsal was carried out at Cape Sudest and 3 days later, Colonel Julian Frisbie’s 7th marines boarded Barbey’s vessels at Buna Harbor. On Christmas day at 6am the convoy was moving. At 4pm the convoy rendezvous with Colonel William Whaling’s 1st marines at Cape Cretin while the 2nd battalion reinforced with H battery of the 11th marines proceeded to Beach Green in their own smaller convoy. 

 

However, as they made their way towards their objective, the main convoy was spotted by a Japanese reconnaissance plane. The convoy would arrive at its destination unmolested. Commander of the southeast area fleet, Admiral Jinichi Kusaka had incorrectly assessed the convoy was bound for Arawe bearing reinforcements and as a result ordered a heavy air strike against the Arawe area instead of Cape Gloucester. At 6am on the 26th Crutchley’s cruisers and destroyers began a naval bombardment followed up an hour later with Smith’s B-24’s, B-25’s and A-20’s. The 5th air force had tossed B-24’s from Dobadura who dropped their payloads all the way from Target Hill to Cape Gloucester. The B-25 medium bombers followed this dropping their heavier loads and the A-20’s focused on the landing areas making sure to strafe the beaches until the first wave would be just 500 yards away.

 

For the next hour and a half the landing craft launched towards the beaches. Two LCI’s outfitted with multiple rocket launchers led the first wave. A considerable amount of smoke screen was set over the area, hindering some of the landing craft from finding their marks. One group carrying elements of the 3rd battalion, 7th marines missed their beach altogether and hit the shore some 300 yards further west. The 3rd battalion led by Lt Colonel William Williams landed at Yellow at 7:46, with Lt Colonel John Weber’s 1st battalion doing the same at Yellow 2. The men charged down the lowered ramps of their LCVP’s seeing marines find unmanned trenches, abandoned guns and a handful of scared shipping engineers cowering in dugouts, too stunned by the naval and aerial bombardments to fight or flee. 

 

The allies had achieved tactical surprise as Matsuda was not expecting an invasion to come to these beaches. Major-General Iwao Matsuda’s had deployed his 53rd regiment around the Tsurubu airdrome and Natamo Point. Storming forward, the 3rd battalion reached a region known as the “damp plat” which according to one Marine “was 'damp' up to your neck”. To the Japanese this was known as “swamp forest” and it held some of the most treacherous terrain, thus the Japanese did not expect the enemy to come by it. The forward momentum was beginning to peter out as men were wading through thick mud, with vines tearing at their bodies. A heavy congestion hit the beaches, greatly hamping the unloading process. As the men advanced, trees literally fell around them, rotten to the core from the bombing. The first marine casualty would actually be a result of a falling tree.

 

Meanwhile the 1st battalion advanced towards Target Hill and Silimati Point. Company B seized their key elevation points by noon. Behind these men came the first echelon of LSTs bearing the 2nd battalion led by Lt Colonel Odell Conoley. They beached their LCI’s and drove straight inland some 900 yards through mud and water all the way up to the center of the new beachhead perimeter on a patch of dry ground. At 2:30 after the LST’s were pulling out a force of 25 Vals and 63 Zeros emerged at low altitude who made a very fast bombing and strafe run against the beaches and shipping. The back and forth firing from the Japanese aircraft and allied forces was intense.  A formation of FATF B-25s, coming in at treetop level, suddenly found themselves snarled up with the Japanese flight almost directly over the beach. In the excitement, two were shot down by friendly fire and two seriously damaged before the gunners aboard the LSTs could cool their trigger fingers. Possibly because they wanted to jettison their explosives, or possibly because they mistook their target, the B-25s then proceeded to bomb and strafe the Silimati point position occupied by 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, killing one officer and wounding 14 enlisted Marines. One correspondent had this to say "the most inexcusable small scale blunder of the war." The Japanese attacked Barbey’s vessels covering the retreat of the first echelon of LSTs tangling with allied CAP. The destroyer Brownson was sunk, destroyers Lamson, Shaw and Mugford were damaged and two LSTs were driven off. 13 vals and 4 zeros were destroyed, for the allies it was 4 fighters and 3 B-25’s. Meanwhile the 3rd battalion was still securing its right flank as Whaling’s 1st Marines supported by Sherman tanks were coming up behind on LCI’s. Their commander landed at 10:15 with the division command post in operation ashore within the hour as the 1st marines drove towards the airdrome.

Lt Colonel Joseph Hankins 3rd battalion ran into one of Colonel Sumiya’s roadblocks. It consisted of 4 fortified bunkers with machine guns and a system of rifle trenches manned by  1st, 2nd and 1st Machine-Gun Companies of the 53rd Regiment. The assault was quickly shattered. K company lost its commander and executive officer in a matter of minutes. Everything seemed to go wrong. Bazooka rockets did not explode in the soft earth covering the bunkers; flamethrowers malfunctioned and an LVT carrying ammunition got wedged between two trees. The Japanese defenders were so amped up seeing the chaos, they rushed out of their bunkers trying to swarm the trapped LVT. They managed to kill two men manning its machine guns, but the driver refused to lose his head and skillfully drove the vehicle right over the nearest bunker providing infantry to storm behind him with grenades. The daring LVT maneuver allowed the men to take the bunkers, stealing victory out of the chaos.

Behind them was Whaling’s 1st battalion led by Lt Colonel Walker Reaves who were bogged down in the damp flat. Whaling quickly changed his plan of advance as a result. He ordered his 3rd battalion to advance in a column along the narrow shelf of firm ground while the 1st battalion covered their left rear, speeding up the progress. Yet as the 3rd battalion moved out to expand their perimeter westwards, Sumiya’s men began infiltrating unoccupied gaps, forcing Colonel Julian Frisbie to recall his Marines and wait for reserves to pull up. By nightfall Frisbies Marines had secured the beachhead. The landing was so well scheduled that the big LSTs began dropping their ramps on the beaches 40 minutes after the first assault waves had landed. By 1pm, they had unloaded and cleared the area to make way for the second echelon. However, close encroachment of the "damp flat" greatly curtailed the area available for dump dispersal and necessitated some hurried improvising by the Shore Party. According to an officer of the 1st Motor Transport Battalion: “The true cause of the traffic congestion can be attributed directly to Army personnel who manned 150 odd 6x6 trucks with preloaded cargo. These drivers had been scraped up from an artillery regiment in New Guinea and supplied with salvaged trucks into which had been loaded practically all the supplies. The trucks theoretically were to discharge their cargo at the dumps, return to the LSTs they had debarked from and return to New Guinea for the second load. The plan failed in one respect, as there were no immediate dump areas to unload the trucks in due to the "Damp Flat." It was decided to leave the cargo in the trucks until dump areas were established. This caused consternation in the ranks of the Army drivers, who consequently abandoned their trucks in an effort to get back on the LSTs… This naturally left 150 trucks stranded on the beach exits for quite a time. Eventually the trucks were unloaded by Marines and proved to be a big aid to transportation starved organizations.”

Meanwhile Whalings battalions set up their own perimeter for the night with both flanks on the beach, a technique they repeated each evening until the airdrome was captured. Further to the west Lt Colonel James Masters 2nd battalion, 1st marines with H battery of the 11th marines codenamed STONEFACE group landed at Beach Green at 8:35. By 10am they had established a perimeter; E company held the left, G company the center and F company the right. The H battery unit was unable to emplace its 75mm pack howitzer satisfactorily on the rugged jungle terrain so they reorganized themselves into 3 platoons of infantry and took up a mobile reserve at the front line. Stoneface’s task was to cut off the coastal road. When Masters men looked around they found the beach completely unoccupied, numerous positions had been abandoned with their weapons. Masters figured the defenders must have fled to the hills during the bombardment, so he ordered patrols to fan out. The only contact made that day was a small group roughly 1000 yards north of the beachhead near the village of Sumeru seeing a small firefight. Yet unbeknownst to Masters, Sumiya had sent a provisional unit consisting of elements of the 3rd and 4th companies, 53rd regiment with the 3rd battalion ,23rd field artillery regiment to drive out the marines via a secondary road east of Mount Talawe. The force was led by 1st Lt Takeda, and was thus called the Takeda Provisional battalion

For Barbey the first day saw 13,000 troops and 7600 tons of materials landed on either side of the cape. However many men had landed in swamps so dense and deep that maneuvering out of such areas was quite difficult. General Matsuda was well aware of this and seized the opportunity. Matsuda ordered Colonel Katayama to leave token garrisons at Aisega, Nigol and Cape Bushing while he brought the bulk of his 141st regiment to Magairapua, this would take until December 30th to occur. Yet Matsuda had made one mistake, he thought he was facing just 2500 men. How the 65th brigade staff came to this conclusion is unknown. Perhaps it was became the smoke screen during the landings had made visual observation limited; perhaps the loss of Target Hill so fast also limited further observation of the enemy. The Marines had achieve tactical surprise by landing on undefended beaches, but other than that, they did not do all that much on the first day, perhaps the lack of activity also factored in Matsuda’s head. The only real fight of the day had been a brief affair at the roadblock where the invaders, instead of throwing infantry frontally against powerful bunkers in the glorious banzai manner, had awaited supporting weapons to knock out the position. Perhaps to Matsuda this spelled weakness or timidity, or both. Regardless, like most Japanese commanders Matsuda was obsessed by the then-current Japanese doctrine of "annihilate-at-the-water's-edge," so he ordered his own major assault unit hurled in an all-out attack against the center of the invaders' perimeter.

Thus instead of reinforcing Sumiyas forces at the airdrome, or withdrawing forces to more defensible areas like Borgen Bay, or even waiting for Katayam’s troops to arrive, Matsuda decided to make a daring attack directly at the center of the marine perimeter with only his 2nd battalion, 52rd regiment.

 

At 3am on December 27, the Japanese attacked the sector held by the 2nd battalion, 7th marines, during one of the worst monsoon storms the Americans had ever seen. Because of the storm, many of the Japanese failed to find gaps existing on each side of the battalions flanks. Thus instead the Japanese hurled themselves frontally against very well dug in positions. By 7am, the surviving Japanese finally began to pull out, Matsuda’s men suffered 200 deaths with over 100 wounded. The Marines suffered 8 deaths and 45 wounded, added together for the day the total loss for the Americans was 28 deaths and 68 wounded. After Matsuda’s terrible defeat, Whaling’s battalions resumed their drive towards the airdrome. While they advanced in columns along the road, patrols were sent into the jungle to hunt down the enemy, but they encountered no resistance. The 1st marines were able to dig in for the night after advancing 5000 yards.

 

To the east, Frisbie’s 2nd battalion had expanded their perimeter towards the bank of Suicide Creek where they would continue to face short and sharp attacks by Matsuda’s 2nd battalion. Despite the heavy punishment he was served, Matsuda continued to believe in the destroyer-at-the-water’s edge tactics. His men began constructing defensive positions, bunkers, trenches, rifle pits and so forth, so close to the American lines the Americans could hear them doing it. Meanwhile the engineers of the 17th marines performed their own work, widening the Japanese coastal road to allow the movement of supplies. Despite their valiant work, the volume of traffic was immense, coupled with the storm made the narrow coastal road a logistical nightmare. 

 

The next morning the Marines expected to encounter some heavy resistance. The marine artillery crews increased their rate of fire and General Kenney’s aircraft bombed Colonel Sumiya’s strongpoints. With tank support, Whaling resumed his advance at 11am, with Company I finally hitting the first enemy positions about 12:15. They ran into a Japanese strong point consisting of a system of mutually supporting bunkers and rifle trenches, well armed with anti-tank guns and 75mm guns. The way forward was littered with land mines and barbed wire. The defenders enjoyed an added advantage in the heavy jungle lying a short distance inland which limited the tanks' field of maneuver to the comparatively narrow area directly to their front, facing the flank of the Japanese position which thus became, in effect, a defense in depth for the entire extent of its east-west length: approximately 300 yards.

 

At 12:00, I Company was fired upon with small arms from the front, followed by 75mm shells along the road area. 15 minutes later the leading elements led by Captain Carl Conron began attacking the fortifications alongside the tanks. They were facing the  2nd Company, 53rd Regiment and the 1st Machine Gun Company, 53rd Regiment and the strong point was quickly nicknamed Hell’s Point. Later it would be renamed Terzi Point in honor of Company K’s commanding officer who died on the landing day. Within the heavy rain, the tanks surged forward and smashed Sumiya’s bunkers, while A company dashed to the left, emerging from kunai grass just 500 yards from the bunkers. Enjoying excellent cover, the defenders’ fire successfully stopped the American advance, although the Marines themselves also easily broke up two Japanese frontal assaults and one attempt to turn their flank. 

 

Ammunition began to run low, forcing A company to withdraw at around 3:45. Yet K Company closer to the beach held enormous firepower in the form of Sherman tanks that obliterated 12 bunkers rather quickly.  In the words of Company K’s commander: “I was given three tanks (the other two were out of action, one with engine trouble and one with a jammed breech of its 75) to accomplish this mission. I put one squad of the Second Platoon behind each tank and deployed the Third Platoon to set up a skirmish line behind the tanks. We encountered twelve huge bunkers with a minimum of twenty Japs in each. The tanks would fire point blank into the bunkers, if the Japs stayed in the bunkers they were annihilated, if they escaped out the back entrance (actually the front as they were built to defend the beach) the infantry would swarm over the bunker and kill them with rifle fire and grenades. By the time we had knocked out twelve bunkers the Second Platoon . . . were out of ammunition and had been replaced by the Third Platoon and they too were out or down to a clip of ammunition per man. I called a halt and sent for the First Platoon. By the time the First Platoon arrived and ammunition was resupplied forty-five minutes had elapsed. We continued the attack and found two more bunkers but the enemy had in the meantime escaped.” The immense power of the tanks forced the defenders to retreat. 

 

During this action the 1st marines suffered 17 deaths and 52 wounded and claimed to have counted 300 Japanese corpses. The capture of Hell’s Point enabled the Americans to establish a position at Blue Beach to reduce the distance for supplies. General Rupertus command post was also moved there by Deemer 28th. The next day the American advance was delayed until the arrival of Colonel John Seldens 5th marines. General Rupertus feared he might be outnumbered at the airdrome so he played it safe. During the fighting at Hell's Point, a curious misadventure befell Corporal Shigeto Kashida of the 1st Machine Gun Company. The trench in which he was defending suddenly caved in, burying him helpless up to the neck. An astonished Marine, observing Shigeto's apparently disembodied head blinking at him, paused to debate whether to shoot or shovel, which dilemma was resolved by the arrival of an intelligence officer who ordered the corporal disinterred and made prisoner. Shigeto painted a depressing picture of his battalion's situation, but he mentioned the original plan for the 2nd Battalion was to reinforce the 1st, something that might still be accomplished; he also mentioned the presence somewhere in the vicinity of the 141st and 142d Regiments, possibly within striking distance. Since Colonel Sumiya had conducted withdrawals following every action to date, it could be presumed that a good part of his force remained intact. Thus Rupertus was right in his belief the Japanese may have large numbers at the airdrome.

 

The 1st Battalion under Major William H. Barba and the 2nd Battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis W. Walt got aboard 9 APD’s at Cape Sudest and arrived off Cape Gloucester during the morning. However during the transit, there was a large storm that caused some confusion, leading some elements to land at Yellow 2 and others at Beach Blue. General Rupertus planned for the 1st Marines to continue their advance along the coastal road while the 5th Marines would perform a wide sweep on the left flank to attack airstrip No.2. At 3pm following the artillery and aerial bombardment, the Marines launched a fierce offensive. The 2nd battalion, 5th marines attacked simultaneously with the 1st Marines along the coast road and both ground immediately inland. Major William H. Barba's 1st Battalion was just struggling out of the swamp and jungle near the line of departure. The unexpected terrain difficulties, however, kept the plan from being carried out. Both battalions sent out patrols in an effort to establish contact, but a combination of darkness and unfamiliar territory prevented positive results. 

Supported by tanks, artillery, mortars and rocket launchers, Whaling’s 1st Battalion successfully reached the eastern end of Strip No. 2 at 5:55 and immediately commenced setting up a defensive perimeter. The 3rd battalion followed behind and extended the perimeter to the left, with Selden’s 2nd battalion arriving at 7:25pm extending the perimeter around airstrip No 1 towards the beach. It seemed Colonel Sumiya realized the futility of attempting a defense upon the open ground against American armor, so he pulled his units away towards Razorback Hill from which they could launch harassment maneuvers against the new American perimeter. The Japanese had begun firing artillery and mortars into the airdrome. The Marines, somewhat astonished by such goings-on, called for mortar and artillery support of their own. They reported that, according to their best estimates, the enemy had reoccupied the defenses in at least full company strength. 

The marines were formulating a plan to deal with the menace and the Japanese took advantage of the lull time to launch a banzai charge that failed to gain any ground. The Japanese continued their harassment, until the Marines received some tank support to launch an offensive. Platoons from different units got together to perform a sweeping maneuver, advancing 300 yards from the defensive line. They ran into bunkers, foxholes and trenches manned by Japanese. The marines mopped them up with grenades and automatic weapons, then at 11:30 suddenly all the fighting ceased. No more enemy seemed to remain near the front. The marines had suffered 13 deaths and 19 wounded, but counted 150 dead Japanese. With more tanks on hand, the Marines gradually pushed the Japanese to flee back towards Razorback Hill.

Meanwhile, because of the repeated attacks, Colonel Masters men had been patrolling, trying to pinpoint where the Japanese were concentrated. At 1:55am on December 30th, the 3rd and 4th companies of the 54th regiment had discovered an excellent approach towards the Marine perimeter. As was always the favored Japanese strategy, to concentrate force against a narrow sector, they chose to attack at this place called Coffin Corner, a natural causeway connected to ridges. The two companies attacked under the cover of a storm. The Japanese unleashed mortars and machine gun fire and quickly overran a machine gun position, but G company launched a counter attack pushing them back. The battle raged for nearly 5 hours, but by 7am it ceased. The marines had 6 deaths, 17 wounded and would count 89 Japanese dead with another 5 captured. Yet that concludes the action in Cape Gloucester for today, for now we need to jump back to New Guinea.

Back on December 8th, General Nakai commenced an offensive against Kesawai, dispatching the Saito Volunteer unit for the task. The unit had the aid of native guides who gave them detailed information on the terrain, allowing the Japanese to infiltrate behind a forward Papuan platoon led by Lt C.E Bishop. They explode all of their booby-traps, allowing the 1st battalion, 78th regiment to advance behind them into Kesawai 2 without much difficult, annihilating the Papuan platoon and securing the eastern portion of the highland. Meanwhile the 3rd battalion crossed the Boku River and captured Koropa, cutting off the commandos at Isaria; the 2nd battalion, 239th regiment crossed the Boku river and assaulted the commando position at Ketoba, but the Australians resisted until nightfall before withdrawing towards Isariba. Nakai’s enveloping maneuver was a success, forcing the commandos and Papuans to withdraw towards the Evapia River.

On December 9th, Brigadier Eather ordered A and C companies of the 2/25th battalion to advance forward as the commands pulled back towards the Mene River. Meanwhile at 7:15am at Isariba, the Japanese had begun a series of attacks. The attacks were repelled with vicker guns, grenades and a quick air strike from 20 Kittyhawks and Boomerangs that bombed and strafed the attackers. The 2/25th companies arrived at Evapia and one of their patrols managed to ambush several Japanese parties over the next few days. On December 12th, Nakai arrived at Kesawai where he ordered his 1st and 3rd battalions, 78th regiment to attack the 2/25th positions by nightfall. C Company's machine gun fire managed to halt the enemy assault from the north, but another came from the south. A Company found itself surrounded as the Japanese managed to get between the two Australian companies, firing their Woodpeckers from multiple directions. It was a 5 hour battle until the Australians repelled the enemy who gradually pulled back west.

At 5am on the 13th, the Australians were running low on ammunition and were forced to withdraw. The 2/25th advanced through think jungle and deep swamps, by 8am they had managed to get to safety after suffering 5 deaths and 14 wounded but killing an estimated 67 Japanese. The companies withdrew east of the Evapia River, rejoining the rest of their battalion. Nakai expected his enemy was attempting an offensive against Madang and ordered his men to return to their former defensive positions, leaving token garrisons at Koropa and Kesawai. Because of the heated attacked, General Vasey worried it was preliminary to something much bigger, so he ordered the 2/16th battalion to perform punitive attack along Shaggy Ridge and Eather’s 2/33rd battalion would retake Kesawai.

The 2/33rd Battalion advanced under the cover of darkness to the 5800 Feature to attack any Japanese there, and to move the Papuans across the Evapia to establish a patrol base for the Koben-Koropa-Solu River area . With three of his companies Colonel Cotton of the 2/33rd moved off an hour and a half after midnight on the 18th-19th December towards the summit of the 5800 Feature arriving just before dawn . At 2.10 p.m. a section made contact with the enemy about 700 yards south of the highest pinnacle on 5800. The patrol withdrew while the artillery fired 120 rounds. By 5 p.m. the enemy had had enough and withdrew enabling one company to occupy the pinnacle . Next day the battalion patrolled the whole area and found evidence of Japanese occupation and a hasty withdrawal. 

 

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

The allies finally unleashed operation backhander, the amphibious assault of Cape Gloucester. The 1st Marines had a long rest after Guadalcanal and would now be the spearhead to reconquer New Britain. However the Japanese were not going to just roll over easily.

 

- 109 - Pacific War - Drive on Sio , December 19-26, 1943

Last time we spoke about landings against Arawe, the continuation of the Bougainville campaign and some new action in the CBI theater. Despite a rubber boat disaster, the operation against Arawe went off successfully seeing another allied landing taking the Japanese by surprise. Now the Japanese would be forced yet again to launch a counter attack hoping to dislodge the allied forces from a new beachhead. Over on Bougainville the Marines performed some assaults against hills such as Hellzapoppin ridge to expand the perimeter enough so the Army boys would have an easier time of taking over. Over in the CBI theater, the onion man Wingate was given the task of expanding his chindits and the Americans wanted their very own chindit force. Stilwell decided the time was ripe to unleash a minor offensive in Burma and soon saw what looked like a weakened Japanese perimeter was in fact very strong.

This episode is Drive on Sio

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Last time we saw General Cunningham’s men successfully landing at Arawe where they hoped to build a new PT boat base. Troop A was supposed to land an hour before the main landing to cut the coastal road near Umtingalu village and Troop B would land at Pilelo island to cover the main passage to the harbor. Troop A was a disaster. Their 15 rubber boats were met with 25 mm dual purpose guns that sank 12 boats, killed 12 men and wounded another 70. Troop B was more successful landing on Pilelo and capturing the radio station before engaging in a fire fight. For the main landing at House FIreman Beach, there was little resistance. Sporadic machine gun fire was silenced by rockets as the men landed. The Japanese tossed some air strikes to hit further landings and convoys, but allied CAP managed to limit the damage. 

A few days after the landing, the Komori Detachment reached the village of Didmop along the Pulie River where they paused to reorganize and rally the incoming survivors fleeing the landing area. The difficult terrain and river crossings prevented Komori and his men from assembling into offensive positions until December 25th. Meanwhile back on the 18th, the 1st battalion, 141st regiment began an advance from the Itni region aboard 7 barges. Unfortunately for them, two LCVP’s bearing 19 men on patrol had been sent by Cunningham to Cape Peiho. The two forces ran into another and after an exchange of gunfire the US soldiers abandoned their LCVP’s and retreated back along the Arawe coast. Another patrol traveling by LCVP was also fired upon by Japanese barges near Umtingalu that same day, but was able to return to Cape Merkus.

On Christmas night, 100 men of the Komori detachment assaulted the main line of defense across the neck of the peninsula. The inexperienced American cavalrymen of the 112th managed to repel, albeit with some difficulty. The attack prompted General Cunningham to believe Komori was in charge of the lead element of a much larger force, most likely enroute from Gasmata. He therefore requested reinforcements and General Krueger responded by dispatching a company of the 158th infantry by PT Boats. Meanwhile the lack of results from the attack prompted Komori to defer further attacks until the arrival of Major Tobuse’s battalion. On the 27th, allied intelligence indicated the Japanese had retaken Meselia and Umtingalu, prompting Cunningham to withdraw all outposts and patrols within the main line of defense. The 2nd battalion, 158th regiment were sent to reinforce the beachhead while Komori and Tobuse finally made contact with another. The first order of business to contain the growing American perimeter. Both commanders believed the Americans sought to repair the unserviceable Lupin Aerodrome.

700 yards from the US line the Japanese established a series of alternate positions taking advantage of the terrain and concealment making it difficult to spot. Cunningham would remark "This is not an organized position in the accepted sense of the word, it consists apparently of shallow trenches and deep fox holes… The ground is covered with a thick green mat about 12 to 18 inches in depth which makes observation absolutely impossible… Officers and men… report that they have not seen a single Japanese and that they are unable to locate machine guns firing on them from a distance of 10 to 20 yards.” From these positions the Japanese harassed the Americans using mortar and automatic weapons fire. Whenever the Americans tried to pinpoint where the fire was coming from the Japanese would simply switch positions to another. Within these parameters only limited skirmishing was carried out for the next few days. 

On January 4th, Komori reported repulsing a strong American and two days later received his first citation from Emperor Hirohito for his heroic achievement. Meanwhile a much frustrated Cunningham began sending reports to Krueger he could not spot the enemy and was convinced continued attacks would simply result in further casualties. By January the 9th he reported 75 dead, 57 wounded and 14 missing. He requested Kreuger send him some tanks and on the 9th he received the 1st marine division's 1st tank battalion from Finschhafen. The 1st Tank Battalion had been left behind at Finschhafen because of transportation shortage and limited range for tank operations in the inhospitable terrain of the Cape Gloucester region. Eventually Rupertus would also release the rest of the tank company then in reserve at Cape Gloucester to help out.

The Marine tanks and Army infantry quickly worked out the details of how they would go about combined operations. The morning of January 16th kicked off with a squadron of B-24’s followed by another of B-25s bombing the Japanese positions. This was followed up by artillery and mortars and then two 5 tank platoons began their assault against a 500 yard front. Behind the tanks were infantry of the 158th and despite the swampy terrain and thick vegetation, the tank-infantry stormed forward. The Japanese resisted ferociously, grounding two tanks that had to be destroyed lest the Japanese seize them later. The Americans destroyed the enemy’s positions, crushing numerous automatic weapons and a 75mm mountain gun. But the Americans had no orders to hold any positions, so they destroyed and pulled back to their perimeter for the night.

The following morning the Americans resumed the attacks with flamethrowers eliminating small pockets of resistance still remaining. Komori still obsessed with defending Lupin aerodrome to the last man ordered a withdrawal, but not before radioing to the brigade HQ "fight till the glorious end to defend the airfield" which earned him a second Imperial citation on February 7. During these actions the Americans suffered 20 dead, 40 wounded and two tanks. For Komori’s men they had 116 dead and 117 wounded. For the next 3 weeks the fighting would deteriorate into a matter of patrol skirmishes, with Komori triumphantly reported back to HQ how the airfield was still in Japanese hands. The reality however was the Japanese were heavily outnumbered and lost control of the air and sea. How many men Komori commanded remains difficult to figure out as no documents were captured after the operation. It appears unlikely there were more than 1000 under his command. Early in the operation the Japanese were supplied by airdrop, often during daylight in view of the Americans. Yet as the Americans tightened their grip over the sea and air more, Komori became increasingly dependent on the trickle of supplies coming over the tortuous trail from Iboki. Carrying and distributing these supplies imposed still more of a drain on his manpower, and he withdrew his headquarters to Didmop to give more attention to this phase, leaving direct defense of the airfield to Major Tobuse. Yet that is all for Arawe for today, because we need to travel back over to New Guinea.

Wareo had fallen and now the Australians were advancing upon Fortification Point as General Katagiri’s 20th division were retreating towards the northern coast. The 20th division would arrive at Zagaheme and Orarako on the 22nd and 25th respectively. With these movements occurring the Australians now felt the time was ripe to launch an offensive against Sio. On December 20th, General Wootten ordered the 20th brigade to advance through the 4th brigade's positions and begin a rapid pursuit towards Sio. The next day, Brigadier Windeyer had his men advance towards Wandokai while Wootten was reorganizing his forces to allow the coastal advance to continue. Meanwhile the 24th brigade took over the Gusika-Wario-Sattelberg area; the 4th brigade took over the Fortification Point-Masaweng River area; the 26th brigade advance down the coast and would be ferried to the mouth of the Masaweng to support Windeyer’s advance.

The Australians enjoyed the advantage of aerial support in the form of Bostons, Mitchells, Marauders, Airacobras and Thunderbolts who continuously hammered the Japanese with bombs and strafing runs. Alongside this allied PT boats harassed the Japanese barge fleet, between the 9th and 13th they would sink 23 barges along the coast, mostly south of Sio. Despite the air and sea support the overland advances were particularly rough on the men. From fortification point to Kapugara gorge the coastal track ran along a flat kunai ledge some hundred yards wide, between the sea on each side with sharp coral terraces. They had little cover along the line of the advance. There were also few natives inhabiting the area. The men of the 20th brigade were not in great condition when they began the pursuit. They were stricken with malaria and Colonel Simpson anticipated the enemy might hit their left flank so he dispatched two companies to travel parallel with the main coastal advance and those guys had some even rougher terrain to travel. There was little water to be had along the coast and the long kunai fields increased the heat exponentially. The men occupied Hubika on the 22nd without opposition. The allied engineers would find the gorge beyond Hubika would prevent any progress by the tanks, so the troops would have to proceed without their support. By nightfall the 2/13th battalion would advance another 3000 yards facing no opposition. They got around 1500 yards past Wandokai when suddenly mortar and artillery fire rained down upon them. This was Captain Yoshikawa’s 1st battalion, 80th regiment who unleashed a bombardment for 2 hours upon the advancing Australians. Though it appeared like there was a major fight on their hands, it was only rearguard actions. Yoshikawa and his men were retreating towards Ago that night. 

Christmas would see Windeyer receive the gift of further artillery reinforcements for his advance. The 62nd battery and 2/12th field regiment came over and on Boxing day Colonel Miyake would decide to abandon Ago and continue the retreat towards Kanomi. On the night of the 26th a company from a boat battalion of the 592nd EBSR, alongside an Australian radar detachment landed on Long Island. This was Operation Sanatogen, the mission was to set up a radar station and observation post on Long Island to help with the landing at Saidor and thwart Japanese barge movements. The Japanese had never placed a garrison on Long Island, but it was used as a staging point for barges moving between Rabaul and Wewak. 

At 9am on the 27th, 18 Mitchells and 12 Bostons bombed and strafed the Walingai and Kanomi areas before Windeyers resumed his advance. The 2/13th advanced through Ago and occupied Walingai unopposed by the end of the day. The next day saw Australian patrols running into Japanese positions around Kanomi. At 11:15am a patrol of the 2/13th was fording a creek when they were fired upon. The patrol saw at least 14 Japanese retreating north around Blucher Point as they fired vicker guns and mortars upon them. During the afternoon the allied began a heavy artillery bombardment. The speed at which the Australians were advancing was providing results as the Japanese were forced to further withdraw towards Kalasa. Yet the Australians were stretching their logistical lines forcing Wootten to halt the forward units for 2 days.

The two day delay allowed General Katagiri to get his men past Kalasa and reach Sio without any hindrance. On new years eve the 2/15th resumed their advance finding slight resistance around Nanda. At 5:30pm the 2/15th were fired upon by a few bands of Japanese and responded with artillery fire forcing them away. To avoid unnecessary casualties the Australians halted at the last creek before Nanda and resumed the march on new years day. The 2/15th then passed through Kwamkwam and captured Sialum Island during the afternoon of the 2nd. Sialum lies around half way between Fortification Point and Sio and it afforded the Australians a decent area to build a large supply dump on its sheltered. Yet the advance to Sio was not the only one going on, on New Guinea.

 

Since the battle of John’s Koll and Trevor’s Ridge, General Nakai’s detachment were forced to withdraw farther back into the hills. The Nakai detachment were now clinging to Shaggy Ridge the Kankirei Saddle and the area between the Faria River, Madang and Bogadjim.

At Kankirei, Nakai dispatched Captain Ohata Masahiko’s 3rd Company of the 1st Battalion, 26th Field Artillery Regiment. General Nakai told Ohata that ‘the enemy is extremely sensitive to the use of artillery fire arms so that the artillerymen are expected to cooperate closely with the infantry men until the very end”.Ohata recalled “I realized what was expected from our commander, and he also said please take good care of your life. It took more than twenty years to train one artillery officer, but a gun is only material. We can replace the gun, but not an artilleryman.’ There is a very reasonable explanation for Nakai’s order. The IJA artillery field manual indicated their field guns were more valuable than artillerymen. In article 10 it said ‘The gun is the life of the Artillery. Therefore, the Artilleryman must live and die with the gun, and share the honor and shame together with the guns. One must continue to fight until the end’. Nakai at this time prohibited suicide and it seems was trying to save the lives of his artillerymen, lest they die for the sake of their guns.

The main Japanese position was at Shaggy Ridge, a 4 mile long spur dotted by several rocky outcrops where the Japanese troops established numerous strong points. From the Pimple, a large rocky peak rising around half way along the crest of Shaggy ridge, the Japanese found it extremely sturdy to defend. The feature often saw a mist envelope it adding to its defensive capabilities. 

As the Japanese clung to their heights, the Australians were busy developing their new main base at Dumpu. Airstrips, roads, bridge, culverts and numerous buildings were being worked on and with the recent acquisition of the Ramu valley they were also building a forward air base at Gusap. The only major offensive against Shaggy Ridge came in late October.  In accordance with Vasey's advice, Brigadier Dougherty prepared to attack the southernmost peak of Shaggy Ridge on the 20th. For three days from the 17th Dougherty’s patrols crept as near as they could, and early on the 20th, Captain Whyte the F.O.O. of the 54th Battery, directed the fire of his guns on to the Japanese position.  At midday forward units reported that they were within five yards of a four-strand barbed-wire fence; the Japanese position on a kunai covered Pinnacle was about 30 yards away. Between the enemy position and his men, there was a steep gully about 100 feet deep with precipitous slopes on both flanks . The Japanese hand cut fire lanes through the kunai and were dug in and heavily bunkered from the cliff face. Through the clever use of artillery fire, the Australians tricked the Japanese into retiring temporarily to gain shelter. The artillerymen varied the rate of fire so it was never the same, while platoons stormed specific ridges, gaining ground without casualties.To defend his western flank, General Vasey dispatched  the 2/7th to Kesawai 1 and the 2/6th to Kesawai 2.

Yet the role of the 7th division for the time being was really limited to patrol activities. On 23rd October a section of the 2/2nd Commando Squadron led by Lieutenant Doig crossed the Ramu and moved up the Urigina Track next day, seeking a way east to the Mataloi-Orgoruna area. Lt Doig entered this new territory on the 25th and by 9 a.m. trees across the track near Orgoruna suggested that the Japanese might be in possession. Between 25th and 31st October Captain Haydon's company of the 2/25th Battalion tried to reach the Japanese track between Paipa and Kankirei. After moving up the Evapia River and then through rugged unmapped country for 4 days the patrol leader was forced to return as he realized that it would be impossible for him to reach his objective without further rations. On the 29th the 2/7th Commando Squadron, an engineer, Captain Gossip of the 2/6th Field Company, and two others left to patrol a road from the Ramu Valley across the Finisterre Ranges towards the Japanese road. This patrol returned on 1st November reporting that there was no possibility of making a road from the Kesawai area towards the Japanese roadhead. 

Lieutenant Maxwell of the 2/6th Commando Squadron, performed a three-day reconnaissance towards Yokopi , walked right into an enemy defensive position on the first day out, saw five Japanese looking at him from about 20 yards away, and retired before they could fire at him.  Sergeant Berrell of the Papuan Battalion led his section, three men from the 21st Brigade, and 50 native carriers on a 13 days' patrol into the ranges to patrol enemy movement in the Kankirei area. He returned on 11th November without having found a worthwhile observation post near Kankirei. On the 20th October MacAdie sent a patrol from the 2/2nd Squadron to Josephstaal to find out whether the Japanese were there, and whether a strip could be constructed. Accompanied by Sergeant-Major England of Angau, Lieutenant Green's small patrol of five troopers, 32 native carriers and five police boys left for Sepu where it remained until setting out on the main journey on 3rd November. The route chosen by Green and England did not follow the known native tracks as the Australians wished to avoid any contact with Japanese patrols. The journey would take nine days. Over at Atemble, where the Japanese were known to be in some strength, was bypassed and, although there were tracks of Japanese horsemen at Sambanga and reports from natives that the Japanese did occasionally patrol the area between Atemble and Josephstaal and Madang, there were no encounters. On 13th November Green arrived at Josephstaal, which was not occupied and which had only been visited occasionally by small enemy patrols in recent months. The patrol returned to base on 26th November. 

 

On December 2nd a patrol of 42 men from the 2/33rd Battalion led by Lieutenant Scotts set out, urged on by Eather's hope that it would be able to blaze a track into the heart of the Japanese defenses at Kankirei from the west and get a prisoner. Moving up the Mene River Valley and across the 5500 Feature, Scott established a base on a steep ridge. The next day he moved down a spur to some native huts where the dense jungle was replaced by kunai and then crossed into another spur, where they established an observation post. Meanwhile a patrol from the 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion was attempting to observe the Kankirei Saddle area from the east. On the 7th Lieutenant White led out eight Pioneers, two Angau warrant-officers and 20 natives from Bob's Post following the Japanese Mule Track north to Toms' Post. Next day the patrol moved on along a well-surveyed track, and, about 1,500 yards beyond Toms' Post, saw a strong enemy position ahead on a high feature astride the track. On the 9th and the morning of the 10th White tried to work round to the north of the enemy position to carry out his original task, but dwindling rations, heavy rain, and rugged country forced his return to the track. Accompanied by two men White then advanced along the track but after 20 minutes he came under heavy fire. The three men ran back down the hill which they had been climbing but White was hit by machine-gun fire and fell.

All of these patrol actions helped prevent the Japanese from penetrating south and figured out generally where the Japanese were in numbers. On November 9th Vasey relieved the 21st brigade at the front with the 25th brigade. Along with this the 2/6th commando squadron and a Papuan company were sent to reinforce the front while the 2/7th command squadron was withdrawn. And with that, after nearly 10 months since Lt Rooke and his platoon of the 2/7th battalion had arrived on the airstrip at Bena, the Bena Force ceased to exist. They had 12 deaths, 16 wounded and 5 men missing but claimed to have killed over 230 Japanese. They helped build the Garoka airfield; over 78 miles of motor transport road between Bena and Garoka, Sigoiya, Asaloka and Kainantu and produced maps of completely unknown areas In his final report MacAdie wrote: “The force fulfilled its task. Every enemy patrol which crossed the Ramu River was driven back with casualties, and very determined enemy attacks were repulsed with heavy casualties. In addition the enemy lost many men in ambushes on tracks north of the Ramu River... There is no doubt that the enemy regarded this force as a menace to his flank, and little doubt that the size of the force was grossly overestimated.”

Now the 2/2nd Commando Squadron would assume the responsibility for the defense of the Bena-Garoka area. November would see the start of an intense hide and seek artillery duel. The Australian artillery was attempting to neutralize the Japanese 75mm guns. Captain Ohata’s had placed two gun emplacements on the outskirts of Shaggy ridge in a position that protected the ridgeline in the front. The first emplacement were not entirely concealed and thus quickly became a target. Fortunately the guns survived as the Australian fire hit their shields mostly. Captain Ohata thought he could conceal their muzzle flashes by firing lower. The second gun emplacement was completely covered by shelter yet Ohata would remark ‘However the footsteps of the soldiers who were coming in from the behind the position were spotted by the search airplane. We were indeed astonished by their way of finding the gun position.’ By the end of November General Nakai was preparing to hit Kesawai and counterattack towards Dumpu. In early December patrols from the 2/16th were probing Shaggy Ridge. Vasey intended to perform a diversion to attract the Japanese attention away from other pending operations in New Guinea and New Britain. An idea was floated around to have Brigadier Dougherty raid Kankirei, but that's it for New Guinea as major events were unfolding for the CBI theater.

Over in Tokyo, on November 5th and 6th the Greater East Asia Conference was being held. Attendees included Hideki Tojo for Japan, Zhang Jinghui for Manchukuo, Wang Jingwei for the Republic of China based in Nanjing, Ba Maw for Burma, Subhas Chandra Bose for Free India, Jose P Laurel for the Philippines and Wan Waithayakon for Thailand. Notable exclusions would be that of Korea and Taiwan, whom the Japanese had annexed and did not want to give any political autonomy to. There was also Vietnam and Cambodia who were not invited so as to not offend the Vichy French government who was still claiming French Indochina to be under their rule. There was also Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, but Japan figured they would be simply annexing these regions as their natural resources were now the lifeblood of the empire. Of the attendee’s, Suhas Chandra Bose was only present as an observer as India was still a British colony and the representative of Thailand under strict orders from Plaek Phibunsongkhram was to emphasize on every possible occasion that Thailand was not under Japanese domination, but in fact an allied nation. You might be asking why did Plaek Phibunsongkhram not attend such a grand event himself, well he actually feared if he were to leave Bangkok he would be ousted. 

Hideki Tojo made a grand speech, greeting each of the participants and praising the spiritual essence of Asia in opposition to the materialistic civilization of the west. To give you a taste of this meeting here are some of the dialogue amongst participants.

Tōjō Hideki stated in his speech: "It is an incontrovertible fact that the nations of Greater East Asia are bound in every respect by ties of an inseparable relationship".

Ba Maw of Burma stated: "My Asian blood has always called out to other Asians… This is not the time to think with other minds, this is the time to think with our blood, and this thinking has brought me from Burma to Japan."

Jose Laurel of the Philippines in his speech claimed that "the time has come for the Filipinos to disregard Anglo-Saxon civilization and its enervating influence… and to recapture their charm and original virtues as an Oriental people."

Subhas Chandra Bose of India declared: "If our Allies were to go down, there will be no hope for India to be free for at least 100 years".

 

Overall the meeting was characterized by praise of solidarity and condemnation of western imperialism, but in terms of how Asia was going to come together and economic development and such, there really was no meat to any of it. Tojo simply kept reiterating how great Pan-Asianism was against the evils of the white devils. Yet for all the talk of asian unity, the Japanese governments actions were anything but that. The Japanese viewed themselves as racially superior to that of the other asian nations. They saw themselves as the Great Yamato Race and that they were destined to rule over the other asian peoples, similar to a father and son relationship. To actually go off the script so to say, I happen to have covered this topic extremely thoroughly in a 4 part series I did on my patreon about General Ishiwara Kanji. You see, Hideki Tojo’s main military/political rival was Ishiwara Kanji, and all of the greater east asian stuff was literally stolen from Ishiwara.

 

Ishiwara, for those unfamiliar, is someone I believe had an unprecedented impact on global history. Ishiwara pretty much single handedly began WW2 I would argue. He was a very bizarre figure who came to the realization after WW1 that the entire world would be engulfed in what he called “the final war”. To prepare Japan against this apocalypse he believed Japan had to seize Manchuria for her resources, to empower the empire so it could face the United States. He also believed it was absolutely necessary to ally with China and that everything needed to be done to create a harmony between the two peoples. Ironically after Ishiwara caused the invasion of Manchuria, it all in his view got out of hand and he was tossed aside by people like Tojo. He spent the entire war openly criticizing Tojo and the policies of Japan while trying to create this Pan-Asian league, and Tojo simply copied what he was doing, gave it a different name and made sure to eliminate the elements about allying with China and stopping the war with her. Ishiwara is a fascinating figure and to be honest I was so happy with the 4 part series I told on my patreon I might be releasing it on my Youtube channel and on my personal podcast server soon.

 

Now back to the conference, in the words of Indian Historian Panjaj Mishara  “the Japanese had revealed how deep the roots of anti-Westernism went and how quickly Asians could seize power from their European tormentors”. Tokyo hoped that a major demonstration of Pan-Asianism would lead China to broker peace with Japan and thus join them in a war against the west. A major theme of the conference was that Chiang Kai-Shek was not a proper asian and that no Asian would ally themselves to the white devils. As you can imagine the speeches made by Tojo emphasized how evil Britain and the United states were, yet at the same time praised Nazi Germany. Here are parts of Tojo’s speech.

 

“The need of upholding international justice and of guaranteeing world peace is habitually stressed by America and Britain. They mean thereby no more and no less than the preservation of a world order of their own, based upon division and conflict in Europe and upon the perpetuation of their colonial exploitation of Asia. They sought to realize their inordinate ambition in Asia through political aggression and economic exploitation; they brought on conflict among the various peoples; they tried to destroy their racial integrity under the fair name of education and culture. Thus, they have to this day threatened constantly the existence of the nations and people of Asia, disturbed their stability, and suppressed their natural and proper development. It is because of their notion to regard East Asia as a colony that they harp upon the principles of the open door and equal opportunity simply as a convenient means of pursuing their sinister designs of aggression. While constantly keeping their own territories closed to us, the peoples of Asia, thus denying us the equality of opportunities and impeding our trade, they sought solely their own prosperity. The Anglo-American ambition of world hegemony is indeed a scourge of mankind and the root of the world’s evils.”

 

“As regards the situation in Europe, we are very glad that our ally, Germany, has still further solidified her national unity and, with conviction in modern times.

As regards the situation in Europe, we are very glad that our ally, Germany, has still further solidified her national unity and, with conviction in sure victory, is advancing to crush the United States and Britain and to construct a new Europe.

The War of Greater East Asia is truly a war to destroy evil and to make justice manifest. Ours is a righteous cause. Justice knows no enemy and we are fully convinced greater of our ultimate victory.”

 

Meanwhile the allies held the Sextant Conference in Cairo between November 22-26th. This conference established China’s status as one of the four world powers, kind of a cheeky jab at Japan and a means to sway Chiang Kai-Shek from surrendering. At the conference plans were made for an offensive in Burma codenamed Operation Champion with sub operations Tarzan and Buccaneer. Lord Mountbatten presented  three plans of action. First Operation Tarzan called for 4 Indian divisions of the British 14th army group's 15th army  to concentrate their forces in Chittagong and cross the Maungdaw-Buthidaung line in mid-January. The next year they would capture the Burmese coast in order to defend Chittagong and occupy Sittwe on the Burmese coast. Then three divisions of the 4th Army, would assemble at Imphal and move east with the objective of destroying Japanese lines of communication and advancing to Arak and various parts of Sidon in northern Burma. In March, the Chindits long-range infiltration force would be parachuted into Burma, behind the Japanese lines while the Chinese Expeditionary Force (CEF) in India would cross the Ho Kang Valley and advance eastward into Myitkyina. The Chindit special forces would then support the Chinese forces and occupy Bhamo in April, while the Yunnan Army would begin operations on March 15 and advance to Lashio in April to join the British forces at Lashio and Bhamo. In the Bay of Bengal, a massive amphibious offensive would also be launched, with 3,000 British and American long-range infiltration troops participating.

 

Operation Musket would see the capture of Cape Sumatra and Operation Buccaneer was to be an amphibious operation to seize the Andaman Islands in order to cut off the Japanese supply lines. Chiang kai-shek expressed support for Tarzan, but once again insisted for it to be coupled with a massive naval operation in the Bay of Bengal. Though the British were reluctant to do this, US pressure eventually convinced them to land on the Andamans. The Chiefs of Staff then agreed to drive Japan out of Burma and reopen land links with China, with Stilwell conducting the ground attack in the north and Mountbatten commanding the amphibious landings in the south.

 

 The American delegation told Chiang kai-shek that for the following six months, only 8900 tons of supplies could be flown to China via the Hump route each month, even though Chiang continuously pushed for 10000 tons. In the end, President Roosevelt promised to increase the airlift supply to China to 12000 tons, and also promised that B-29 Superfortress bombers would bomb Japan from Chinese bases. By the way if you are interested in the beginnings of the bombing campaigns against the Japanese home islands, please check out the podcast I did with Dave from the cold war channel over on my youtube channel. It is actually B-29’s operating in India and China that kicked it all off, and its not often talked about. 

 

Many of the resolutions and promises, would not be really implemented. Politically, many arrangements were also made for the postwar international situation. Roosevelt and Churchill supported the territorial claims of the Republic of China, such as returning Taiwan and Manchuria to the Republic of China and deciding to allow Korea to become independent "in due course". The Cairo Declaration, however, made no specific mention of the future of the Ryukyu Islands. China of course wanted them, but the US believed that the Ryukyu Islands could be left to Japan after the war if they were completely demilitarized. It was also agreed between China and the US that Lushun would be used as a public military port for the Americans after the war, and that Dalian would become a free port. Roosevelt also consulted Chiang kai-shek on the possibility of the abolition of the Japanese imperial system along with the emperor, Hirohito, but Chiang kai-shek mentioned that the cause of the war was the Japanese warlords, and that the issue could be left to the Japanese people to decide for themselves after the war. The Americans did not want France to return to Indochina and offered Chiang kai-shek control of French Indochina; but he publicly declined, as Chiang kai-shek strongly advocated the independence of Korea and wanted to assist in the independence of Vietnam. Roosevelt firmly supported Chiang kai-sheks efforts to end imperialism in East Asia. To end the conference off, on December 1, the Allies issued the Cairo Declaration, demanding Japan's unconditional surrender and the return of all occupied lands. 

 

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

And so the drive to Sio was raging on, the Japanese were not being given a moment to breathe as they continued their withdrawal further north. Back over in Japan, Tojo was trying to win over China, but the allies were making sure to keep Chiang Kai-shek firmly in the fold in a 4d game of global chess.

- 108 - Pacific War - Landing at Arawe , December 12-19, 1943

Last time we spoke about the two pronged offensive against Wareo and the ongoing operation on Bougainville. Katagiri’s men had lost the battle for sattelberg and were performing their long retreat to Madang, but the Australians were not going to let up. Wootten immediately ordered the capture of Wareo and soon the allies were right back on the Japanese heels. General Katagiri lacked manpower, supplies and even physical strength to fight the advancing Australians off. The Australian took Bonga, Horace, the Kalueng lakes, Nongora, the Christmas hills and Kuanko during the drive to Wareo. Katagiri could do little more than order his men to continue fleeing north. 455 Japanese were killed, while the Australians suffered 47 deaths and 332 wounded. On Bougainville, General Geiger expanded his perimeter and launched a bold and dangerous amphibious raid against Koiari. Luckily for the raiders, the Japanese were taken by surprise and the Americans were able to pull out before they were annihilated. 

This episode is The Landing at Arawe

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

The allies were edging ever closer to Rabaul as the Japanese were facing a long string of defeats in New Guinea and the Solomons. General Douglas MacArthur had elected to carry out two amphibious landings on western New Britain, in an effort to gain dominance over the Dampier strait. Codenamed Operation Dexterity, MacArthur was going to perform amphibious landings at Arawe and Cape Gloucester. Initially Operation Lazaretto called for an amphibious landing on southern New Britain 5km away from Gasmata in mid November. This would have been done to neutralize the Japanese base as Gasmata and protect the eastern flank for future operations, however the Japanese anticipated the attack and rapidly built up their  forces there. The 7th fleet was not capable of hitting both Gasmata and Cape Gloucester simultaneously, so instead Admirals Carpender and Barbey formulated the plan to invade Arawa that was thought to not be as heavily defended. With Arawe in hand the allies could establish a PT boat base with the objective to “establishment light naval forces and to protect the southeastern flank of our forces in the impending seizure of the Gloucester Peninsula”. But Morton C. Mumma, who commanded the motor torpedo boats in the Southwest Pacific Area, would have none of Arawe. He already had all the bases he could use, and the Japanese barges used mostly the north coast of New Britain. Apparently Morton spent days “camping on 7th Fleet’s doorstep to protest against setting up a PT base at Arawe”. Morton only left after he was assured by the Admirals that he need not have one if he did not want it. 

By November 22nd, MacArthur ditched Operation Lazaretto and created Operation Director. Operation Director was to land at Arawe was slated for December 15th, 11 days prior to the landings at Cape Gloucester. Operation Director would also act as a diversion for operation backhander. The operation would be performed by two squadrons of the 112th cavalry regiment combat team. This regiment had spent its time as a National Guard patrolling the Mexican border before they were shipped off to New Caledonia in July of 1942. They were assigned to General Patch’s Americal division and were deployed as a horse mounted security force on New Caledonia. General Patch initially thought horse mounted cavalry could be used in jungle warfare, but the torrential and muddy pacific weather, quickly changed his mind. The regiment was sent to Goodenough island for training and was tossed into Operation Director quite at the last minute. The regiment had not yet seen combat and was converted to an infantry units in late may of 1943. 

The regiment consisted of two squadrons: the 1st Squadron of A, B and C Troops and 2nd Squadron of D, E and F Troops. For combat support there was the M2A1 howitzer-equipped 148th Field Artillery Battalion and the 59th Engineer Company. The other combat units of the Director Task Force were two batteries of the 470th Anti-aircraft Artillery Battalion, most of the 236th Anti-aircraft Artillery Battalion, A Company of the United States Marine Corps 1st Amphibious Tractor Battalion and a detachment from the 26th Quartermaster War Dog Platoon. The 2nd Battalion of the 158th Infantry Regiment was held in reserve to reinforce the Director Task Force if required.

Not only was the 112th regiment's attachment to the operation rushed, its planning was as well. The allies lacked good aerial photographs and the troops would only have 10 days to practice amphibious warfare at Goodenough Island. After this the regiment would be embarking aboard the LSD Crater Hall, the LSI HMAS Westralia and the two APD’s Humphrey’s and Sands departing on December 13th. A and B of the 1st squadron would also have additional missions, A would land at Umtingalu and B would land on Pilelo island. They were going to hit the beaches in rubber boats from the APD’s while the main force would be hitting their beaches in LVT 10 Buffaloes and 29 Alligators. For those of you wondering, the Buffalo LVT were more heavily armed with 37mm, turrets from Stuart tanks and Howitzer Motor Carriages. The Alligator LVT were designed to operate in swampy areas and less armed. The LVT’s would be hitting the western shore at a place called Cape Merkus. 

The original plan was devised by General Krueger’s Alamo Force and called for the 7th marines to land east of the Tsurubu airdrome, the 2nd battalions, 1st marines west of it and the 503rd parachute battalion to land in a large patch of kunai grass southeast of it. The three units would work to converge on the airdrome. The plan was heavily criticized by General Kenney and Major General Rupertus. When they looked over the operational maps it seemed to them the planners had completely overlooked the mountains, swamps and jungle terrain. The marines were expected to drive though the jungle to link up with the paratroopers and that did not sit at all well with the air commanders. The Marines hated the plan because the converging of the 3 forces over the rough terrain, against a more than likely larger enemy would also see problems telling friend from foe. In early December General Kenney added his voice to their criticism on behalf of the air forces. Kenney argued the plan intended to use piecemeal paratroops instead of performing a mass drop, the piecemeal drops would require innumerable flights of troop carriers and these flights would require approaching enemy air reaction dangerously close. In conclusion he said "Commander, Allied Air Forces, does not desire to participate in the planned employment of paratroops for DEXTERITY." On December 14th, Colonel Edwin Pollock bluntly voiced his opposition of the plan to MacArthur who apparently walked out of the meeting quite pissed off. 

It is difficult to know why an invasion of the southern area was believed to be necessary. It is most likely because the Navy wanted a PT boat base at Gasmata to better operate against IJN barge traffic. However Captain Morton Mumma’s declaration of not needing a base as long as Cape Gloucester was secured made the decision to hit Arawe final. Kenney also found the Lindenhafen plantation at Gasmata unsuitable for an airfield. To twist MacArthur’s arm somewhat, an intelligence report indicated Arawa was only defended by 500 men of the 115th infantry of the IJA 51st division. MacArthur was much more worried over Operation Backhander so he agreed.

The use of paratroopers for operation Backhander was eliminated and instead they would concentrate strength for a potentially decisive stroke rather than a dispersal of forces. The 1st marines wold land immediately behind the 7th marines to hit the airdrome. Furthermore the 2nd battalion, 1st marines would make a secondary landing on the western shore of New Britain in order to block the Japanese from reinforcing the airdrome and to cut off the retreat of its garrison. After all was said and done the planning had finalized just 11 days prior to the landing date, it was quite a last minute ordeal. Given Backhander was a success, MacArthur also sought to hit Saidor on the northeastern coast of New Guinea, hopefully by the start of the new year. This would cut off General Adachi’s 18th army from retreating. Thus on December 10th, MacArthur ordered General Krueger to begin preparations for Operation Michaelmas with the 32nd division earmarked for this task.

Over on the other side, General Imamura deployed General Sakai’s 17th division in western New Britain with their command center being at Gavuvu. Units already in the region consisted of the Matsuda Detachment and the 2nd battalion, 228th regiment, both of whom would now be under Sakai’s command. The original mission of General Matsuda’s 65th mixed brigade had been maintaining the supply line to New Guinea. Thus his unit was quite topheavy with transportation personnel alongside an assortment of orphan units that had become separated from their parent units on New Guinea. Matsuda’s HQ was near Kalingi, his 4th shipping detachment were located between Tsurubu and Natamo and his 65th engineer regiment was at Tsurubu. Matsuda concentrated the majority of his strength along the south and west coasts at placed like Cape Bushing, Aisega, Nigol, Arawe and Cape Merkus. 

At Tuluvu, the name the Japanese used for Cape Gloucester, the detachment had been relieved by Colonel Sumiya Koki’s 53rd regiment in early november, successfully establishing defensive positions between Mount Talawe and Borgen Bay. Colonel Sumiya had prepared several small roadblocks to cover his eastward approaches while placing the bulk of his troops and weapons in and around two main strong points. The first point was the crescent shaped Borgen Bay around 1000 yards east of the airdrome. Over there he had an elaborate system of mutually supporting bunkers with mounting weapons up to 75mm guns, connected by a network of rifle trenches. The second point was in the broken foothills of Mount Talawe, dominating the flat grounds for several hundreds of yards to the south.

Further south, Colonel Katayama Kenshiro’s 141st regiment were defending Cape Bushing; Colonel Jiro Sato’s the 51st reconnaissance regiment were defending Rooke Island; an understrength provisional company was defending Cape Merkus; and the 3rd battalion of the 141st were defending Nigol alongside a few orphan units of the 51st division. General Sakai dispatched Colonel Hirashima Shuhei’s 54th regiment were sent to reinforce Gasmata and their 7th company was detached to garrison Talasea. In early  December Major Komori Shinjiro’s  understrength 1st battalion, 81st regiment landed at Iboki. Sakai was concerned with the safety of the Cape Merkus Garrison, so he sent Komori’s detachment to proceed to Arawe urgently. Komori’s men would have to traverse an extremely difficult trail that saw them going through jungles, swamps, mountains and rivers over the entire width of the island.

Back over with the allies, General Cunningham’s convoy rendezvoused with Admiral Barbey’s escorting force at Buna on December 14th. From there they would head for Arawe after dusk, also accompanied by Admiral Crutchley’s supporting force. On that same day, Kenney’s 5th air force performed bombing campaigns, dropping some 433 tons of bombs against Arawe. At 3:30am on the 15th Barbey’s convoy reached the transport area and prepared their assault. To get the vulnerable rubber boats ashore, General Cunningham had to rely on the element of surprise rather than strength. So he chose to land under the cover of darkness with no forewarning. According to Barbey "Although it was considered that the moonlight might prevent surprise, the Landing Force Commander desired to attempt it without any preliminary bombardment." Unfortunately an American party of amphibious scouts had landed on that beach back on the 10th, causing the Japanese to suspect another landing would soon take place. There would be machine guns ready to hit the boys.

At 5:05 Humphrey’s launched 15 rubber boats for Pilelo island while Sands launched 15 others for Umtingalu. The landing at Pilelo went off without a hitch. Troop B landed and immediately attacked a Japanese radio station near the village of Paligmete. Troop A came under attack from a small group of Japanese hiding in some nearby caves. One american and 7 Japanese would die in the fighting. The landing at Umtingalu was another story entirely. The Japanese defenders unleashed heavy enfilading machine gun fire upon incoming rubber boats. 12 out of the 15 were punctured and sank quickly. Most of the men swam for their lives seaward and were rescued by small boats later on near House Fireman Beach. Around 12 men would die, 4 went missing and 17 were wounded. The submarine chaser SC-699 would manage to rescue 71 from the water while under fire. Between 6:10-6:25 allied destroyers bombarded the beach with 1800 5 inch shells and B-25 mitchells made a bombing pass around House Fireman Beach. The main landing force approached the area on amphibious tractors, facing slight opposition that they easily silenced using the rockets.

The first wave consisted of 10 LVT-2 Buffalos that hit the beach in a chaotic fashion at 7:28am. The other waves of LVT-1 Alligators kept stalling and this caused the landing force to be strung out in columns for a couple of miles. Once ashore the cavalrymen stormed the Arawe peninsula's base. The two understrength Japanese companies there had little hope against them and withdrew northeast towards Didmop along the Pulie river. 

At 8:00am more troops aboard General Heavy’s  LCVP’s and LCM’s came over with the first echelon of supplies. This time however, Japanese aircraft had spotted the convoys coming to Arawe at around 4am. Admiral Kusaka dispatched a strike force of 8 Vals and 56 Zeros to try and break the landings. 16 P-38’s intercepted the strike force, but many got through. Barbey’s flagship Conyngham and the supplies ships managed to evade the bombs. By the end of the day, 1904 troops had been landed and a new base was being constructed. Over the next following days, naval convoys would bring over reinforcements to the Arawe area. The Japanese launched multiple attacks upon them resulting in the sinking of APc-21, and APc-12, Subchaser SC-743, minesweeper YMS-50 and 4 LVT’s being damaged. Despite that minor damage, 6287 tons of supplies and 451 guns and vehicles were landed at Arawe within 3 weeks. A defensive perimeter was established behind the main line of resistance as General Cunninghumas men began sending patrols towards the Pulie and Itni Rivers to establish outposts.

General Matsuda now realized he was facing a full blown invasion. He dispatched Major Tobuse Asayaki’s 1st battalion, 141st regiment while awaiting further reinforcements from the Komori detachment. There were no trails connecting the Itni and Arawe regions, thus the men were forced to travel by landing craft from Cape Bushing over to Omoi point a few miles west of the Arawe landings. From there they would travel overland to join up with Major Komori. Yet that is it for the Arawe operation as we now need to travel over to Bougainville. 

The last time we were speaking about Bougainville the raid against Koiari had been quite a blunder. Meanwhile the amtracs were busy cutting trails through the jungles and swamps to help the general advance. A small unit from the 21st marines occupied Hill 600 back on November 27th. Then on December 3rd an intense artillery duel began as the Japanese unleashed 150mm guns upon the forward slopes of Hill 600, forcing the Americans to pull back. On December 5th the general advance kicked off. Colonel Robert Williams paratroopers occupied a line stretching from the crest of Hill 1000 going across a series of ridges and ravines towards the junction of the East-West trail and the Torokina river. Now this line would begin to expand 3000 yards over a ridge named Hellzapoppin Ridge. The marines named it after the musical, because of its extremely difficult terrain. The 3rd marines captured Hill 500 with zero opposition. The American supplies lines had been extended as well, now there was a growing supply dump called Evansville established in the rear of Hill 600 to provide supply to the final defensive line.

December the 6th saw a severe earthquake hindering any advance. Commander of the 9th marines, Frazer West recalled “Being raised in Nevada I'd been through a lot of earthquakes so they were nothing new to me. We had one really severe earthquake on Bougainville. The big trees were just swaying around and we had built this fortification on this ridge, pillboxes, and such out of coconut logs and the roofs fell in on the pillboxes and some of the trenches caved in. The men got down and hugged to ground. It was impossible to stand up while it was going on. They were scared to death when these huge trees were breaking down around them. This went on it seemed for several minutes. The ground really rumbled and shook. It was the worst earthquake I'd ever been in.”

On December 7th Williams led a patrol east towards a 300 yard long spur being defended by the 23rd regiment in well dug positions. William twice attempted seizing the spur and was wounded alongside 7 of his men who had to retire back to the marine lines. On the 9th, three other patrols hit the spur again, but were likewise driven off. During the late afternoon of the 9th the Japanese launched a counterattack against the marine position on Hill 1000. The paratroopers with the support of some 105mm and 75mm howitzers managed to repel the attack which cost them 12 deaths and 26 wounded. The next day, General Geiger decided to relieve Williams with the 1st battalion, 21st marines and the 1st battalion, 9th marines. At first the Marines tried to neutralize the Japanese with artillery fire, but the reverse slopes on places like Hill 1000 made it difficult for the guns to hit their positions. On the 13th Geiger requested aerial bombardments and received 3 dive bombers and 3 torpedo bombers who hit the targets causing, but also on a marine position killing 2 men and wounded 5. The next day 17 torpedo bombers hit the ridge and the following day another 18 torpedo bombers landed some direct hits on the Japanese positions. 

On the 18th, 11 torpedo bombers loaded with 100 lb bombs with delay fuses managed to pin the enemy down while 155mm howitzers cleared much of the dense vegetation covering the crest of their ridge. Immediately after the air strike, the Marines stormed the ridge from Hill 1000 in a double envelopment, finding little resistance by the dazed survivors. The artillery and aerial bombing had been so heavy, most of the Japanese company were forced to retreat, leaving 50 corpses over Hellzapoppin ridge. Hellzapoppin ridge cost the marines 12 dead and 23 wounded. Meanwhile on the 21st a patrol of the 21st marines encountered a few Japanese upon Hill 600A. One platoon ran into some heavy fire from the Japanese requiring Company I to perform a double envelopment, but they were likewise pinned down.

On the 23rd, Company K, reinforced with a heavy machine gun platoon attempted a direct assault against Hill600A, but they were driven back. The marines poured more artillery fire upon Hill600A and tossed more attacks, but still they were driven off and with heavy casualties. Then on the morning of the 24th, scouts discovered the Japanese were inexplicably abandoning the position and had begun slipping away during the night. Hill600A was to be the last offensive by the Marines on Bougainville, the army boys were soon to take over. Geiger relinquished command to General Griswolds 14th corps on the 15 and now the Americal Division would be advancing up to relieve the 3rd marine division. The Army boys would be taking control of an inland perimeter extending 23,000 yards. Over 50,000 troops would be working to expand that perimeter. Yet that is all for Bougainville as we will now be covering some events in India and Burma.

As a result of the August Quebec Conference codenamed Quadrant, the allies created the combined South East Asian Command. This new command would have Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten as Supreme allied commander and General Joseph Stilwell as deputy supreme commander. They would hold overall strategic command of all air, sea and land operations for all the national contingents in the theater. Our old onion eating maniac friend Wingate had also returned from the Quebec Conference with the mission of expanding the strength of the Chindits. However Wingate refused to use Indian Army formations in his force, because he maintained that their training in long-range penetration would take longer and their maintenance by air would be difficult due to the varied dietary requirements of different Gurkha and Indian castes and religions. He couldn't get his way and was forced to accept the 111th brigade and two Gurkha battalions in the 77th brigade. Again this seems to be another point of evidence Wingate really did not like the Gurkha units. 

So Wingate now had the 77th Indian brigade, led by Brigadier Mike Calvert and the 111th Indian brigade led by Brigadier Joe Lentaigne. To increase the number of Chindits the 14th, 16th and 23rd British brigades were added, breaking up the experienced 70th british division much to the misery of General Slim. The 3rd west africa brigade was also snatched up from the 81st west africa division. Through the Quebec conference, Wingate also managed to obtain a “private” air force for the Chindits, designated 1st air commando group, consisting mostly of American aircraft. The new Chindit force became officially known as the 3rd Indian division, though it would be referred to as a special force or Chindit or Long Range Penetration group. The new recruits were tossed into the rigorous training of crossing rivers, demolitions and some bivouacking at Gwalior. Calvert and Fergusson had both been promoted to brigadier and took command of two brigades. Both men were responsible for a lot of the training program and the development of tactical planning while Wingate was promoted to Major-General. 

Inspired by Wingates onion force, the allied leaders during the Quebec conference decided to create an American deep penetration unit that would also harass the Japanese in Burma. On September 18th of 1943 a new American long range penetration force was announced to be created and it would be an all-volunteer unit. It received 960 jungle trained officers and men from the Caribbean defense command, 970 from the Army Ground Forces and 674 “battle tested” jungle troops from the South Pacific Command, those boys being veterans of Guadalcanal and the Solomons. General MacArthur handed over 274 Army combat experience volunteers from the Southwest Pacific command, veterans of New Guinea and Bougainville. These 3000 men were now the 5307th Composite Unit formed under the code named Galahad Project. The unit arrived to Bombay on October 31st where they were equipped and began training under the direction of Wingate at Deolali. Colonels Francis Brink and Charles Hunter trained the men from November to January of 1944. Then the 5307th moved to Deogarh where they received additional training in scouting, patrolling, stream crossing, weaponry, navigation, demolition, camouflaged, guerilla style warfare and the novel technique of airdrop supplying. 

In the meantime, Stillwell was in China, so the command of the operation fell to Brigadier General Haydon Boatner who was the commanding General of the Ledo Sector and the Chief of staff for the Chinese Army in India. Stilwell had been planning an offensive codenamed Albacore while the Ledo Road was being constructed. To exercise his command, Stilwell had his small staff of American officer advisers each grab a Chinese division. They kept in touch via radio teams who spoke both American and Mandarin. However these American officers did not have real authority of command, they were merely acting through the use of persuasion. Operation Albacore was an offensive aimed at protecting the Ledo Base and securing the Shingbwiyang area. General Sun Li-Jen’s 38th division was given the task of capturing the line of Tarung Hka, then later to join with Lt General Liao Yaoxiangs 22nd division to hit the Jambu Bum ridge line. Afterwards they would proceed towards Myitkyina in December. Stilwell assumed the Japanese were not particularly strong north of Kamaing and would not be able to reinforce the Myitkyina-Paoshan area, but in fact the Japanese Burma Area Army had received a large amount of reinforcement in the area. Anxious to prevent any interference with their ongoing offensive, the Japanese Burma HQ had dispatched reinforcements all around the Burma permeer. In OCtober of 1943, the 56th division had eliminated a Chinese bridgehead over the Salween north of Teng-chung; in late September the 18th division set up positions in the Hukawng Valley; and some elements of the 56th division had taken up a position at Maingkwan.

On October 24th, General Sun Li-Jen had the 112th regiment advance forward to shield the Ledo road builders, while the 2nd battalion advanced to Sharaw Ga and Ningbyen. Defending Sharaw Ga was the 5th company, 56th regiment with one platoon securing Ningbyen. The 1st battalion attacked Shingbwiyang before advancing upon Yupbang Ga. The 2nd battalion, 56th regiment stationed at Maingkwan upon receiving word of the allied offensive began moving towards Yupbang Ga. The 3rd battalion advanced from Hkalak Ha towards Ngajatzup in the northern edge of the Taro Plain. Due to supply difficulties, the 3rd battalion were making little progress.

These Chinese forces were marching over portions of the trail that the defeated army and refugees had used in 1942 to flee Burma from the Japanese. The paths were a horrifying sight. Skeletons were found around every water hole. Groups of bones were found en masse. Dr. Gordon Seagrave, a Surgeon moving with troops, recalled seeing  “hundreds and hundreds of skeletons”. The Chinese would encounter unexpected well-led and well entrenched resistance at all of their objectives. Defending Sharaw Ga was the 5th company, 56th regiment with one platoon securing Ningbyen. Two miles north of Sharaw Ga the Chinese ran into an outpost which they quickly dislodged. However when they attacked the village which lay between two hills, the Japanese fired down upon them from said hill causing 116 casualties. From november 1-3rd the Japanese inflicted 50 deaths upon the Chinese attackers receiving no casualties upon themselves. The 1st battalion had a similar experience at Yupang Ga. There they ran into a well entrenched and well led force who created roadblocks between Sharaw Ga and Ningbyen isolating them. Major Chen’s 3rd battalion while trying to clear the Taro Plain was so hampered by logistics, by November 1st he had only arrived toNgajatzup on the extreme north edge of the plain. When notified Stilwell commented “Sorry performance. Arrived about November 1. Sent one company forward. Pulled it back again. Thereafter did nothing. Maj. Ch'en cowered in dug-out. Terrific waste of ammunition. Told Sun to have him move or I would shoot or court-martial Maj. Ch'en. Sun sent [name illegible] to investigate. Ch'en killed by British grenade in his dug-out on December 27. (Report was during Japanese attack. There was none).”  The Japanese resistance ground the offensive to a halt as the Chinese forces were forced to dig in. At Yupbang Ga in particular the Japanese had cut off the Chinese from the river crossing and began encirclement maneuvers. The CHinese relying on air supply were powerless to cut their way out.

In response to the Chinese offensive, Lieutenant-General Tanaka Shinichi shifted the main strength of his 18th division to the Shingbwiyang area hoping to assemble there by the 15th of December. As the Japanese presence grew in the areas so did the casualties upon the Chinese forces. The 112th regiment had one of its companies annihilated on the 2nd of november. Their regimental command post was overrun on the 3rd as their guards were digging in for the night. The regimental commander, Colonel Chen, and junior US liaison officer Major General Laughlin managed to escape, but chief liaison officer Lt Colonel Douglas Gilbert was captured by the enemy. A company of the 114th rushed to aid the situation, but were halted by the Japanese just before reaching Yupbang Ga. In late November the situation for the 112th began to improve when the 114th regiment reinforced them. However when they began attacking Yupbang Ga their artillery batteries were driven away by four Japanese machine gun positions. More attempts were made in december, but the Japanese were simply outperforming them.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

The landings at Arawe was yet again another successful allied amphibious operation, but most assuredly it would soon be met with the typical Japanese counter attack. The Bougainville operation was now under new management, and the situation in Burma was starting to heat up again.

 

- 107 - Pacific War - Fall of Wareo , December 5-12, 1943

Last time we spoke about the learning process after the success, a very bloody one at that, of Operation galvanic, the continued operations in New Guinea, Bougainville and the naval battle of Cape St George. Galvanic was an extremely bloody experiment, one that would teach the allies bitter lessons of what to expect from the new phenomenon of “island hoping warfare” against the Japanese. On Bougainville, Japanese roadblocks were crushed and the Americans were extending their perimeters and advancing further inland. The IJN sought to help the IJA bolster Buka and this led to an absolutely disastrous engagement against Captain Burkes destroyer squadron. Burke won a near flawless victory. Then over on New Guinea, after the seizure of Sattelberg, the Australians were now beginning a new offensive heading north along the eastern coast. The Australians were in hot pursuit of the fleeing Japanese. 

This episode is Fall of Wareo 

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

 

After their latest defeat at the battle of Sattelberg, Lt General Shigeru Katagiri had his men begin the long retreat towards Madang. In response General Wootten launched a two pronged offensive aimed at Wareo and Gusika. By the end of November they captured Gusika with ease effectively cutting off the Japanese supply route to Wareo. “All that remained of the 20th Division in this area consisted of abandoned foxholes, entrenchments, ammunition and ration dumps, equipment, weapons, camps, medical aid posts and graves.” The advance continued, on December 1st, the 2/43rd’s tanks were blasting through Horace’s Ears. The tanks blasted out the light opposition and soon the 2/43rd were occupying Horace’s Jaws, Nose and Western Ear. Meanwhile the 2/15th attacked Nongora, but were unable to defeat its defenders and had to pull back. A company of the 2/23rd smashed the last line of opposition south of Kunako village allowing for its seizure. Over at the Kalueng river, after a artillery bombardment, the 2/28th sent Lt Rooke’s with a patrol to check out the Lagoon who advanced without any opposition. Later in the afternoon the Australian scouts pushed south around 600 yards and began to hear the sounds of digging and chopping. They killed a Japanese and wounded another advancing further southwest to avoid what was assumed to be an enemy position. Towards dusk a strong Japanese patrol ran into them causing a small firefight. Rooke had his men dig in for the night while he climbed up a tree to observe the Japanese northeast of them. Rook then sent two volunteers, Privates Hutton and Wadel to try and slip back to the battalion HQ to get help, both men were killed trying. At 8pm Rooke’s patrol snuck out under the cover of rain and darkness to dig in closer to Kalueng.

On December 2nd, while the 2/43rd consolidated all of Horace, they also began advancing towards the Lakes against slight opposition. Then some of the tanks were attacked by Japanese 75mm guns from atop some high ground to the north of a lake at around 200 yards. The 2/15th would find Nongora abandoned on the 2nd and seized what was once the 79th’s regimental HQ. At Kuanko, patrols of the 2/23rd would find the Japanese held a formidable position along a ridge near Peak Hill. At 8:30am the Japanese began firing machines guns upon the Kuanko area, only to be replied with Australian mortar and artillery. At dusk the Japanese suddenly charged using bombs made of gelignite that caused large blasts, but did little damage. The Japanese charge had surprised the forward Australian units who pulled back, thus the Japanese were able to seize ground north of Kuanko. It was a serious situation, so the Australians decided to launch a night attack. The leading platoons lost several men while charging the Japanese throwing grenades and explosives. The men of the 80th regiment however held their ground and repealed the Australian assault inflicting heavy casualties upon them.

For the past two days, Brigadier Edgars three battalions had been receiving training from AIF battalions about jungle fighting. Wootten then decided to attach AIF experienced jungle fighting units to Edgar’s battalions in an advisory role. Now the 20th, 24th and 26th brigades would each supply the 29th/46th, 37th/52nd and 22nd battalions with teams consisting of 3 officers, 9 NCO’s, 9 Privates all capable of leading sections. These men would be advancing up the coast towards Fortification Point, with the 20th brigade held back in reserve. To support this advance a new beachhead was required at the mouth of the Kalueng to supply them by sea. Men went to work removing all the underwater and hardwood obstacles, so a bridge could be built over the Kalueng to allow the tanks and jeeps to cross. Edgar sent the 22nd battalion on the 3rd to capture some high ground north and west of Gusika to secure the new beachhead. At 10:15am, Captain McFadden, Guild and Martin led companies across the Kalueng to assault some features held by Japanese. They were held back by heavy machine gun fire and quickly called in artillery support that blasted the Japanese positions until 12:45pm. After that the companies continued their attack, but without success. Then Guild’s company seized a knoll around a mile northwest of Gusika while Martins company pushed frontally and McFadden’s formed a circle around the Japanese. By 5pm the companies and artillery managed to dislodge the Japanese allowing the 22nd battalion to establish their bridgehead.

However the following day for the 22nd battalion would not be an idle one. A mixed force consisting of the 238th battalion, 33rd independent engineer regiment and 2nd battalion, 26th field artillery led by Major Tashiro had orders stating "the force, while avoiding any decisive engagement, will carry out successive resistance to try to delay enemy advance". The 22nd battalion had fought hard to clear the enemy positions south of the Lagoon, but their successes were few. Patrols discovered the enemy had dug in near a creek half way from Kalueng to the Lagoon. At 12pm, one of McFaddens platoons found a mine field along a track before being attacked. McFadden requested artillery support, but it failed to hit the mark. Lt Holdworths leading platoon 5 found themselves fighting hand to hand combat with some Japanese near the same track. Soon multiple platoons converged into the area forming an incoherent skirmish, while the Japanese enjoyed well established dug-in positions to face off against the multiple Australian groups. Because of the disorganizations, none of the Australian units managed to penetrate the Japanese positions.

 

Over along the track to Wareo, Brigadier Porter worried his 2/43rd battalion was too worn and torn, so he ordered two companies of the 2/32nd led by Colonel Scott to head up to bolster their strength. By the 3rd of december, Colonel Scott’s men began arriving to cover the 2/43rd, who were engaged in battle with multiple disabled tanks. By midday the Japanese could no longer withstand the Australian attacks and were forced to pull back 100 yards. Now Colonel Scott took command over the Lakes area, deploying his men and those of the 2/43rd up the main track half way between the Lakes and Christmas Hills. Back at Kuanko, the 2/23rd battalion were clinging on to their unfavourable position, being  battered by the Japanese all the while. They were suffering from a lack of supplies, which were painstakingly being brought to them all the way from Palanko by men of the 2/24th battalion. Kuanko was seeing a firing duel involving numerous Japanese snipers, prompting Brigadier Whitehead to reinforce the position with Captain Denny’s company of the 2/24th. 

 

On the 4th, Colonel Scott resumed the attack against the Lakes area with both his 2/32nd and 2/43rd companies becoming “exhausted and culled of semi-sick personnel”. Beginning at 7am the 4th and 24th batteries bombarded the Japanese positions along the track, an hour later this was followed up by 3 inch mortars. The Australian companies advanced parallel to the track over rough terrain, some managed to get 800 yards behind the Japanese where they began digging in. Despite being cut off the Japanese continued to resist until the cover of night allowed them to withdraw. To the west the 2/15th advanced north against Christmas Hills, but the terrain was so bad they eventually had to pull back to Nongora. At Kuanko, the 2/23rd discovered that elements of the 80th regiment had hooked around their rear during the night and were most likely trying to cut off their communications. Whitehead ordered the 2/24th company to clear the track. The 2/24th company advanced cautiously, going 75 yards south of the 2/23rds position near the main track. They began to dig in as patrols fanned out who quickly found the enemy occupying a track between Kuanko and the 2/23rd. They left the enemy unmolested for the moment as other patrols were sent to cut the Wareo-Kuanko track around Peak Hill linking up with the 2/23rd.

 

The next day with enough supplies carried forward, Whitehead sent the rest of the 2/24th to reinforce the flanking maneuver going west of the track between Kuanko and Peak Hill. Colonel Scott had his 2/43rd and 2/32nd advance towards Christmas Hills who only found dead men of the 79th and 80th regiment as they had pulled out during the night. There was a ton of abandoned equipment, rifles, anti-tank ditch and dumps of 81mm mortars. The men quickly dug in as some men were sent forward to try and outflank the Japanese who were just 50 yards or so beyond their new positions. The Australians found the Japanese had dug in on another ridge close to the track. On that same day, the bridge over the Kalueng was finally finished allowing the 4th brigade to advance to Fortification point, with Lt Colonel Kenneth Cusworths 29th/46th taking the vanguard. With three matildas in the front the vanguard advanced at a good pace through sporadic Japanese fire. At 10am the leading tank was disabled by a landmine south of the creek with its tracks blown off. The other two tanks were unable to cross the creek without engineering aid leaving the vanguard force to advance unsupported. Several abandoned positions were passed before they ran into significant enemy fire. Cusworth’s men were held up at the line of the first creek where the terrain turned into a large kunai field then jungle. By the afternoon the tanks were repaired and helped cross the creek, successfully brushing aside the enemy resistance allowing the Australians to advance halfway to the Lagoon. But the 238th regiment’s companies regrouped and began attacking the advancing columns using sniper fire. This eventually caused Cusworth to order his men to pull back 60 yards to dig in near the creek. 

 

Though the tanks were essential at pushing away the enemy, they also were causing significant delayed as they continued to run into tank ditches and mines. On December 6th, Cusworth resumed his advance along two tracks leading to the inland side of the Lagoon. Woodpecker and light machine guns pelted the Australian columns inflicting heavy casualties. On the left track the Australians fought a Japanese position upon Bald Hill near the northern end of the Lagoon. The leading platoons had to charge through artillery and machine gun posts, but they managed to dislodge the Japanese who were hastily fleeing. The Japanese fought like lions, but there was little they could do against superior artillery and tank supported infantry. The best the Japanese could hope for was to continuously fight delaying actions while trying to avoid decisive engagements.

 

General Katagiri lacked manpower, supplies even physical strength to fight the advancing Australians off. His units in the mountain and coastal areas were essentially cut off from the frontlines. The were relying heavily on Submarines and barges to move the meagre supplies that came from sea, and these were at the mercy of PT boat patrols. Overland the Japanese were failing to recruit native carriers because the Allies were extremely successful at bringing them to their side. Katagiri had no choice he ordered a gradual withdrawal from Wareo, lest it become a massacre. The 79th regiment began pulling back towards Lakona to reinforce the coastal area.

 

Colonel Scott ordered an artillery bombardment to kick off December 6th before sending his men to assault Christmas Hills. His men were able to easily seize the eastern slope near the top, but now faced Japanese defensive lines on the western slopes less than 100 yards away. Colonel Hayashia received orders to abandon the positions during the night and as was becoming a routine, Scotts men found them abandoned the next morning. Meanwhile the 2/23rd discovered the enemy in front of them had likewise pulled out during the night. The 2/24th began cutting the track between Kaunko-Kwatingkoo and Kuanko-Wareo. During the afternoon the 2/23rd and 2/24th coordinated an assault to take Peak Hill. The 2/23rd performed a diversionary attack at 5pm using 25 pounders as the 2/24th stormed Peak Hills western slopes. By 6:45 the 2/24th were digging in on the western slopes and when darkness fell the 80th regiment began withdrawing from Peak Hill, allowing the Australians to seize the feature entirely by the morning.

At this point the 2/23rd passed through the 2/24th position to hit the last Japanese defensive positions located 600 yards away from Wareo. Along the way the 2/24th discovered that Kwatingkoo was still held strongly by the enemy. The village still had at least 4 machine gun posts and mortars. The Japanese were only performing delaying actions as by December 8th the mountain area was finally abandoned altogether. The 2/24th occupied Kwatingkoo and the 2/23rd Wareo, quickly hoisted the Australian flag on the high ridge in the area. The fighting had cost the Japanese 451 dead, with 1 captured. For the Australians, they suffered 47 dead and 322 wounded. Knowing the Japanese were just going to take up more defensive positions, the 2/24th were ordered to pursue them as quickly as possible towards Bazuluo and east of the Christmas Hills area. The acting Japanese rearguard, units of the 2nd battalion, 79th regiment took up a position at a 2200 feature ambushing the Australians at every point possible. The Japanese rearguard would perform a delaying action against the 2/24th and 2/32nd battalions until December 12th, gradually pushed northwards. Their efforts earned them severe losses, but also valuable time for Katagiri to pull the forces back and assemble new positions.

On December 7th, Cusworths men were held up by heavy fire coming out of an enemy position halfway between the lagoon and Tunom River. Cusworth men had advanced far past their tank support who were continuously being bogged down by mines and tank ditches. Regardless, the Australians still enjoyed superior artillery support and continued their pursuit of the Japanese until they reached the Tunom by nightfall and dug in. The next morning, Cusworth ordered the forces to cross the river, but the 238th regiment had companies take up positions to hit them as they did. Well concealed Woodpecker guns unleashed havoc from the jungles upon the advancing Australians causing heavy casualties. The Japanese were desperate to delay the advance as much as they could to give their men a fighting chance to withdraw. Sniper fire and Woodpeckers were all they could toss back, but the Australian artillery was able to pinpoint and annihilate their positions systematically. 

Along the Australian left flank, the 37th/52nd were fighting their way towards Tunom, with one company managing to get across the river against fierce resistance. During the night the Tunom defenders pull out allowing Cusworth to advance towards the mouth of Tunom by November 9th. The next day saw the 37/52nd in a very dangerous position. They were under heavy fire including artillery and it was likely the Japanese would perform a hook to cut them off. Brigadier Edgar decided to toss his 22nd battalion into the center line. The 22nd battalions advanced to a creek junction and unleashed a large mortar bombardment and upon advancing further only found dead Japanese. Along the rest of the advancing line the men were facing less and less resistance, as most of the 79th regiment were nearing Lakona.

Cusworths men accompanied by the 29th/46th and some tanks advanced further and reached the Sowi river by 1:40pm. With heavy artillery and tank support they continued on until 3pm when they found Kilingia recently abandoned. The Engineer special brigade amphibious scouts rolled up to the Kiligia area and went to work forming a new beach head. This led to a new group constituting of AASC, medical and ESB detachments being brought up by landing crafts who constructed jeep tracks to help the infantry come over and to alleviate native carriers. The Australians did not rest however, the next day saw them continue the advance, with one company of the 22nd crossing the Sowi before digging in for the night. On December 12th, the rest of the 22nd crossed the Sowi with their tank support dispersing meager Japanese resistance. The 22nd advanced over numerous creeks where Japanese took up positions. By the 14th, the 22nd managed to force the Japanese back away from the 5th creek they came across. At this point the remnants of the 238th regiment withdrew to Lakona joining a garrison forming there and sent 50 infantry towards the Masaweng River to help Hayashidas rearguard. The 37th/52nd advancing on the left flank were meeting stiff resistance, but the Japanese rearguard could do nothing against their artillery and mortars. Now the 22nd were approaching a creek near lakona and began clashing with the growing garrison in the area.

The Japanese had dug in forming a strong position, but a company of the 22nd led by Howieson hooked around a cliff trying to block the Japanese escape route. While this was going on the 37th/52nd were pushing back the rearguard forces towards the fringes of Cape Sibida. The 50 Japanese there found themselves surrounded because of Howieson’s men and had no choice but to fight to the last man. Howiesons men from the cliff position tossed grenades down upon them to horrifying effect. At 5:30 on december 16th, 5 matildas rolled in towards the Cape Sibida pocket finding the doomed Japanese with their backs to the sea. At a range of 150 yards they began to fire upon the Japanese and with 8 minutes reached the cliff where they mopped them up to the last man. 

After further investigation it would turn out many Japanese had leapt off the cliffs around Cape Sibidia rather than die to the enemy. For the next day several stragglers were shot, including a few men who tried to swim out to sea heading for Sanga. 47 dead Japanese would be counted by the end of the 17th, though it was likely there were 70 or more. On the 17th, 14 more Japanese would be killed sheltering in some caves below Cape Sibida, it is theorised this was the area men had lept to the deaths. It was a decisive day, the Japanese had fought fanatically, but had lost Lakona, the pivot to their escape route. The next day the 29th/46th advanced along the coast and crossed the Sanga under a heavy artillery bombardment. The resistance from here on seemed only half hearted all the way until the Masaweng river.

Once at the Masaweng, remnants of the 238th regiment launched a counterattack forcing the Australians to dig in for the day. It seems it was the last ditch effort to delay the advance of the 4th brigade as both the 29th/46th and 37th/52nd battalions were able to reach the Masaweng unopposed on the 18th. On the 18th, Katagiri received orders from Generals Imamura and Adachi to officially cancel further operations to take back Finschhafen and to withdraw towards Sio, the very last key position on the west coast of the Vitiaz strait. For the new task at hand, Katagiri sent the 80th regiment to occupy the Ago-Kanomi area and guard the coastal area to allow the rest of the division to withdraw towards Kalasa and Sio. The rearguard would be provided by Colonel Hayashida’s 79th regiment. 

The 19th brought an intense artillery barrage as Cusworth’s men were hitting Hayashida’s main line. The Australians were met with a strong rain of fire and were unable to break through. Only the matildas were able to make some progress, but they were quickly held back by a steep ravine. On the left flank the 37th/52nd crossed the Masaweng unopposed during the day and marched to the southern slopes of FOrtification Hill by nightfall. This action forced Hayashia to withdraw during the night, the unpleasant routine his men had endured for days at this point. Facing no further resistance the 29th/46th and 37/52nd battalions occupied Fortification Hill. The 4th brigade had suffered 65 deaths and 146 wounded during their pursuit. For the Japanese it was a staggering 420 deaths, 6 prisoners and another 136 bodies would be found later having died of disease, malnutrition and suicide. However now we need to take a little detour over to the boys on Bougainville.

Last time we were talking about Bougainville, General Geiger had expanded his perimeter. The army troops on the left flank had reached their final inland line back on November 25th. The line was adjusted at this point. In the front were the 21st marines taking up various positions on high grounds, though a lot of the terrain was swampy. Artillery units were moved forward into better positions to support the frontline positions better. Every avenue of approach to the defensive perimeter was covered in length. Meanwhile daily patrols from platoon to company strength, fanned out of the perimeter scouring the area for Japanese outposts to the east and north. They would find countless abandoned outposts. An order was issued on November 28th that no further movements were to be carried out until December.

The line was now anchored in the north by Hill 1000 and extended southward paralleling the Torokina River to Hills 600 and 500. This denied the Japanese access to any high ground that would allow them to use artillery against the airfields and beachhead. To protect their general advance from any Japanese surprise attacks against their right flank, Geiger planned to launch a raid against the village of Koiari to the south. Geiger selected the 1st parachute battalion of Major Richard Fagan, reinforced with M Company of the 3rd Raiders. Their task was to launch a surprise attack against a Japanese position near Koiari, blow up any supply dumps they found, disrupt communications and harass the enemy as far into the interior as the East-West trail. A landing reconnaissance was carried out on November 27th, reporting no enemy anywhere near the target area, however these reports were unfortunately wrong. The paratroopers got aboard some LCM’s and LCVP’s at 4am on the 29th and would find themselves tossed nearly in the center of a Japanese supply dump. Major Fagan had estimated they would be opposed by at least 1200 Japanese, most likely the Japanese 6th transport regiment and elements of the 23rd infantry regiment.

Luckily for Fagans men, the Japanese were just as surprised as them. Fagans men quickly overran the dump and established a perimeter extending 200 yards inland. The Japanese then responded by tossing mortar, machine gun and rifle fire at the marine beachhead. Artillery from Torokina began to help the marines as they were met with a series of enemy charges through the night. The second landing party landed further south to meet up with the main party, but in the process would suffer 13 casualties. Fagan sent word to HQ that things were getting very hot and they needed to pull out quickly. He estimated 1200 Japanese would be storming his beachhead. Geiger fearing his mens annihilation quickly formed a rescue operation, though communications broke with Fagan.

The Japanese continued to toss attacks at the beachhead, but were kept at bay by gunfire from 155mm guns of the 3rd defense battalion. Meanwhile the craft used to get the paratroopers over were sent to rescue them, but they were hindered by Japanese artillery. This prompted Geiger to send an LCI gunboat and the destroyers Fullam, Lradner and Landsdowne which had just come back from convoy duties. During the night the Japanese began surrounding the beachhead firing into their perimeter. The 155mm “long toms” continued to offer a shield for the marines, barely managing to keep the Japanese pinned down. The paratroopers were running out of ammunition when just in the nick of time the boats arrived to the scene and all the boys were picked up by 8:40pm. 

In the end the raid was a complete failure, the Americans suffered 15 deaths, 99 wounded and 7 were missing out of a force of 614 that went over. They estimated they had caused 291 casualties upon the enemies, but there was no way to really gauge this. Nearly all the damage dealt to the enemy was done via artillery and naval bombardment, pretty much making the raid a complete waste of time.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

Over on Green Hell, the Japanese yet again found themselves on the run with the Australians biting at their heels. Wareo had fallen, now all that remained was Sio, but the Japanese would be no means make it a walk in the park for the allies. Over on Bougainville, the Americans proved once in awhile they could mess up to. 

- 106 - Pacific War - The Battle of Cape St George, November 28 - 5 December, 1943

Last time we spoke about operation Galvanic, the invasion of the Gilbert islands. The Americans finally assaulted Tarawa, Makin, Betio and the smaller islands of the Gilberts. Tarawa saw an estimated 4690 Japanese and Koreans killed, with 17 Japanese and 129 Koreans POWs captured. The Marines suffered 1009 deaths, 2101 wounded and 191 missing in action. Vandegrift would tell the New York Times on December 27th "Tarawa was an assault from beginning to end. We must steel ourselves now to pay that price". The heavy casualties would be met by an outraged american public who could not believe such losses were necessary to take such small and seemingly unimportant islands. Little did the American public know, the lessons of places like Tarawa, were just one of many more to come. Admiral Nimitz would spend considerable time reading furious letters from the letters of the dead boys on these islands.

This episode is battle of Cape St George

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

The Gilberts, specifically Tarawa, provided the first “wake up call” to American about the ferocity of the war ahead of them. Correspondents were not present at Henderson Field during the Marine battle for Gaudalcanal where the Americans found themselves defenders and the Japanese attackers. 6 months of grueling battle would see casualties approximating those incurred after three days on Tarawa. Correspondent Richard Johnston was one of the first to write of the action for Time magazine “It has been a privilege to see the Marines from privates to colonels, every man a hero, go up against Japanese fire with complete disregard for their lives.“Last week some two to three thousand US Marines, most of them dead and wounded, gave the nation a name to stand beside those of Concord Bridge, the Bonhomme Richard, the Alamo, Little Big Horn and Belleau Wood. The name was Tarawa.”” Johnston was one of 25 war correspondents, 5 photographers and two artists embedded with the marines in the Gilberts. Never in history had a battle been so fully covered by the press. The amphibious landings drew immense casualty rates and during the active fighting, the mortality rate per 1000 soldiers per day was 1.78 compared to 0.36 in europe, thats nearly 5 times more. Overall casualty rates, including the wounded were 5.5 per thousand per day compared to 1.74 for europe.

The war correspondents learnt a lot about the fighting qualities of their marines, but they also learnt a great deal about the enemy. The battles frequently saw hand-to-hand combat. The Americans were shocked to find the enemy were not in fact short, bucktoothed, bespectacled “Japs” as the propaganda cartoons had portrayed them. Private 1st class Robert Muhlbach recalled many of the enemy were over 6 feet tall and “They were good at defending themselves, and so we had to parry and thrust, and they were good! Those guys were so much bigger than the average Jap. They were naval landing forces [Rikusentai], like Japanese Marines, and they were larger. They were very accurate with their weapons, and good with their bayonets … They were good and we were pretty good, too. So it was two of probably the best military outfits in the war.” One Lt Thomas encountered some hand to hand fighting and said “ I had the field telephone in my hand when I was rushed by the biggest Jap I’ve ever seen. We grappled for a few seconds, and I managed to kick him off me and throw him to the ground. Then I picked up a 0.45 and finished him off.” General Holland Smith who commanded the marines had this to say about Tarawa “I don’t see how they ever took Tarawa. It’s the most completely defended island I ever saw … I passed boys who had lived yesterday a thousand times and looked older than their fathers. Dirty, unshaven, with gaunt sightless eyes, they had survived the ordeal, but it had chilled their souls. They found it hard to believe they were actually alive …” He was not to be the only high ranking commander stunned by what occurred on such a small island. Admiral Nimitz wrote to his wife  “I have never seen such a desolate spot as Tarawa. General Richardson, who saw battlefields in France last year, says it reminded him of the Ypres field, over which the battle raged back and forth for weeks. Not a coconut tree of thousands was left whole …” Nimitz would read countless letters beginning with “you killed my son on Tarawa”. The mothers of 1009 marines and 687 naval personnel would never see their sons again.

The invasion of the gilberts had ushered in what is commonly known as the “island hoping campaign” vs what was called Leapfrogging in the south pacific. As told to us by General Douglas MacArthur

“Although we’ve already seen many instances of American forces launching amphibious invasions against Japanese-held islands, particularly at the Solomons, there is one difference to be made. The strategy employed in the South Pacific is often referred to as leapfrogging, and the explanation comes from General MacArthur himself, who claimed to have invented this strategy despite it predating WW2 by many decades. 

 

My strategic conception for the Pacific Theater, which I outlined after the Papuan Campaign and have since consistently advocated, contemplates massive strokes against only main strategic objectives, utilizing surprise and air-ground striking power supported and assisted by the fleet. This is the very opposite of what is termed island hopping which is the gradual pushing back of the enemy by direct frontal pressure with the consequent heavy casualties which will certainly be involved. Key points must of course be taken but a wise choice of such will obviate the need for storming the mass of islands now in enemy possession. Island hopping with extravagant losses and slow progress ... is not my idea of how to end the war as soon and as cheaply as possible. New conditions require for solution and new weapons require for maximum application of new and imaginative methods. Wars are never won in the past.””

 

With the capture of the Gilberts, now the allies had an assortment of new air bases for land based aircraft to be used against the Marshalls. The seabees and 7th air force engineers rapidly went to work on airfield construction at Tarawa and Makin. Yet there were many who questioned if it really was all worth it, amongst them was General Holland Smith "Was Tarawa worth it? My answer is unqualified: No." He questioned whether 1772 lives and an escort carrier was worth the additional air fields.

The invasion taught a lot of bitter lessons, such as how to improve the preliminary naval bombardments and air strikes so they would be more successful; to improve the capability of naval fleets to move into a area and obtain control over it; for naval and aerial assets to remain in the area for the throughout the entire assault; the vital importance of maintaining good communications between land and sea and between the tanks and infantry which proved rather lackluster at Tarawa; the value of amphibian tractors when you had to face fortified beaches and most importantly Operation Galvanic proved to be a significant testing ground of established amphibious doctrine. The Americans had no illusions that the techniques, tactics and procedures set for in the basic US manuals for landing operations were workable under such difficult conditions. On the other side, the Japanese had prepared the Ko Brigade at Ponape consisting of the 3rd battalion, 107th regiment, 3rd battalion, 16th mountain artillery regiment, 2nd company, 52nd engineers and other units of the 1st south seas detachment to launch a counterlanding against the Gilberts, but this plan was quickly dropped. Instead the Japanese would focus their efforts on reinforcing other central pacific islands such as the Marshalls.

Over on Bougainville, the Americans were enjoying a rather quiet week after the battle of the Coconut Grove and they used this time to expand their perimeter. However there was a hiccup on November 17th when convoy 31.6 bearing the 3rd battalion, 21st marines were set upon by Betty bombers. 185 marines were aboard the destroyer transport McKean and as she approached Empress Augusta Bay a Betty hit her with a torpedo off her starboard quarter. This exploded her after magazine and depth charge spaces. Flaming oil engulfed her, she lost power and communications. Her commanding officer Lt Ralph Ramey ordered abandon ship at 3:55am as she began to sink stern first by 4am. 64 crew and 52 troops died as a result of the attack.

Meanwhile Colonel Hamanoue’s men had been busy constructing defenses around the forks of the Piva River. By the 18th, American patrols discovered two new Japanese roadblocks on the Numa Numa and East-West trails. This led the 3rd battalion ,3rd marines to be tasked with knocking out the Numa Numa roadblock. The marines opened the following day up with an artillery barrage before rolling in with some light tanks flanking and rousing the defenders of the roadblock. 16 Japanese would be killed. With the Numa Numa position secured, the men advanced over to hit the East-West roadblock. That same morning the 2nd battalion, 3rd marines crossed the Piva and captured the roadblock at the forks area. During the afternoon, a reinforced platoon seized some high ground to the left of the East-West Trail. The platoon led by Lt Steve Cibek dug in on top of the feature that would provide excellent observation over the area. The Japanese would toss attacks at their hill for 3 days prompting reinforcements to be brought up to help Cibeks men.

On the 21st, General Geiger decided to expand the perimeter again, this time to Inland Defense line “easy”. The 21st marines would now take up a position between the other two regiments. They would however run into some strong resistance from the bulk of Colonel Hamanoue’s focus with their 3rd battalion getting pinned down after crossing the Piva by heavy mortar fire. Their 2nd battalion in the center ran head on into a Japanese defensive line astride the East-West trail. There were around 20 pillboxes and the 2nd battalion were forced to pull back. Unexpectedly the Japanese pursued them, trying to envelop the line held by the 1st battalion, but they failed and were cut down by machine gun fire. This allowed the 1st battalion to extend their lines north towards what was now being called Cibek’s ridge. Geiger then halted the advances on November 22nd and shifted his units the following day to plug up some gaps in the line. He further planned to launch a new assault on the 24th.

The 24th began with a heavy artillery bombardment as the 2nd and 3rd battalions, 3rd marine began advancing under the supporting first of the 1st battalion. At H-hour, 9:00am, a Japanese battery located on the forward slope of a coconut grove began to accurately smash the 1st battalions assembly locations. As one observer noted  “Shells poured into the first lines, into the attacking battalions' areas, the forward Regimental C.P. area, the rear C.P., the trail. The noise was much greater now-not only the deafening roar, but, added to it, the sharp terrifying sound of a shell exploding close by ... the agonizing moans of men shouting for corpsmen, for help, for relief from burning torture ... the maniacal screams and sobs of a man whose blood vessels in his head have burst from the blast concussions of high explosives devised by the clever brain of civilized man. The Third Battalion took it. The C.P. area took it to the tune of fourteen men killed and scores wounded in a period of five minutes."

The 1st battalion quickly became pinned down. Fortunately Cibeks men were able to locate the battery and used 155mm howitzers to destroy it. At first the advance saw little resistance, as described by one historian of the 3rd marines "For the first hundred yards both battalions advanced abreast through a weird, stinking, plowed-up jungle of shattered trees and butchered Japs. Some hung out of trees, some lay crumpled and twisted beside their shattered weapons, some were covered by chunks of jagged logs and jungle earth, a blasted bunker, their self-made tomb. The Marines pressed forward on their destructive mission toward their clearly defined day's objective." Yet Japanese reserves were rushed to the scene and began engaging the 3rd marines. The 3rd marines were facing extremely accurate enemy artillery and mortar fire taking heavy casualties. The advancing americans would have to destroy a series of bunkers one by one while at the same time repelling the enemy's counterattacks. After already suffering 70 casualties going a quarter mile the Americans fired upon log bunker after log bunker one by one. The Japanese targeted American flamethrower units killing a number of them. Around every defense point Japanese snipers in trees and on elevated platforms fired upon them. Nambu machine guns were firing at all times. The terrain eventually dictated hand to hand and tree to tree combat. Though grueling, the Americans reached their first objective.

The men reorganized their positions and unleashed a new artillery barrage with the two battalion advancing yet again against fierce resistance. It was not just the enemy they faced, the terrain in this area was dominated by swamps. General Geiger then postponed the attack to secure the terrain above the proposed airfield site so he could provide his men with a Thanksgiving meal. For thanksgiving the turkey meals were sent forward to the front with parties organized, braving Japanese sniper fire. One observer recalled “Some of the meat got there, some didn't. But it was a good stunt and a necessity; no one would have been forgiven if it had been left to rot down at the Division Commissary just because we had a battle! The men sat on logs eating their turkey. Nearby a Jap lay rotting in the swamp. Heads and arms of dead Japs floated in the near-by jungle streams. Not a very enjoyable setting, but these were tired, ravenously hungry men who had been fighting all day. And it was Thanksgiving. Those who were able to get it enjoyed their turkey.” By nightfall the resistance was crumbling and the Americans were grabbing a mile beyond the objective line before digging in.

Mop up operations would be around the clock, but the battle of Piva forks had effectively come to an end, thus securing the site for a projected bomber field. The battle cost the Japanese dearly. Hamanoue’s 23rd regiment ceased to exist as a well organized fighting unit. The marines counted 1107 dead Japanese, though it is likely the number was much higher. The 3rd marines suffered 115 casualties, thus earning some relief from the 9th marines for many days. On November 25th, the 1st battalion, 9th marines advanced past Cibeks ridge and unexpectedly ran into heavy machine gun fire from a small feature directly in front. They charged at the feature and tossed grenades, but the Japanese were able to repel their attack, thus the feature was named Grenade Hill. 

Meanwhile General Hyakutake feared that the invasion of Cape Torokina was only a stepping stone for a large invasion against Buka. He persuaded Admiral Kusaka to further reinforce Buka. Previously Major General Kijima Kesao’s 17t infantry group had been dispatched on 5 destroyers to protect Bougainvilles northern sector. No Captain Kagawa Kiyoto would perform a run to Buka on the 24th. Luckily for him his run went uncontested and he was able to unload 900 men of the 1st mobile raiding unit and a detachment of the 17th engineer regiment. At the same time he evacuated over 700 aviation personnel no longer required on Buka as her airfield was destroyed. Kiyoto’s movement however was soon discovered by the Americans.

Admiral Halsey, never one to let up a fight, immediately dispatched 5 destroyers, the Ausburne, Claxton, Dyson, Converse and Spence under Captain Burke to intercept them. Kiyoto had departed Buka shortly after midnight, while Burke lurked near them. American radar gave Burke an enormous advantage in first detection and he knew how to use it. At 1:41am after the initial radar contact was gained at 22,000 yards, Burke turned east to close in more. The Japanese were oblivious as Burkes force closed in at just 5500 yards when at 1:55am he ordered all his destroyers to fire 5 torpedoes each before the force made a hard turn to the south to avoid retaliation. Lookouts on the Japanese flagship Onami only spotted the American destroyers when it was too late. Kiyoto’s force were absolutely shredded by the torpedo volley. Onami took several hits and sunk without a single survivor; Makinami took a single torpedo hit and managed to stay afloat, but greatly crippled. Burkes force pushed it to the limit going 33 knots to overtake the IJN vessels as they tried to flee while firing upon them using 5 inch guns. Yugiri turned to fire 3 torpedoes, but Burke foresaw the maneuver and executed a well timed evasion. The torpedoes exploded in the wake of Burkes flagship. It devolved into a running gun battle until 2:25 when the Japanese dispersed.

60 miles off Cape St George, Burke’s three destroyers concentrated their 5 inch guns on Yugiri which received a critical hit at 3:05am crippling her speed. Yugiri was outgunned and outmaneuvered, so her captain turned her around to fire their remaining torpedoes and engage in a suicidal gun battle. At 3:15 Yugiri received another hit causing a tremendous explosion and would sink by 3:28. Meanwhile the crippled Makinami was finished off with torpedoes and gunfire. The two other Japanese destroyers managed to flee westwards, but Burke could not pursue as it was too close to Rabaul. The Japanese suffered terrible losses, aboard Onami all but 228 men died; aboard Makinami all but 28 out of 200 perished, from Yugiri there were 278 survivors out of 497 crew and troops. For the Americans, it was a brilliant victory and it demonstrated how far the IJN’s super human night fighting ability had fallen to allied radar innovation. Burkes victory was described “as an almost perfect action” and he was awarded a Navy Cross. But now we have to head over to Green Hell where the battle for Sattelberg was raging.

General Katagiri’s counteroffensive that was launched back on November 22nd did not produce the results he was expecting. General Wootten predicted the 238th regiment would attack from the north while the bulk of the 79th regiment would hit from the northwest. Both of these forces had to cross the Song River to hit their main target, Brigadier Porters position at Scarlet Beach. The 2/43rd battalion took the lionshare of the assault with their B company under Captain Gorden successfully repelling the attempts by the 238th regiment to infiltrate. At around 8am, 15 Japanese tried to get between his right flank and the sea. By 9am some telephone lines to the HQ were cut, gradually the Japanese infiltrators were hunted and killed.

Meanwhile the Fujii detachment had been created to take back Pabu hill. Unable to get past the Australian machine gun positions, Japanese mortars and 75 mm guns from Pino Hill began to bombard them. The Australians took heavy casualties but would not budge. Lt Colonel Thomas Scott sent small parties to harass the Japanese rear when they attempted an offensive. Fearing the 2/32nd battalion would soon be trapped, Porter sent his reserve D company over to reinforce them. However as D company crossed the Song river, Colonel Hayashida began to attack the Australian perimeter, applying considerable pressure on the positions held by the 2/43rd. Around noon, D company intercepted a Japanese thrust across the Surpine Valley. At 1pm D company saw the enemy force near some huts and began calling artillery strikes down upon them. As they attacked the Japanese it forces them into a more confined area near a creek. The Australians surrounded them, but the Japanese used captured anti-tank mines as booby traps. The Australians backed off somewhat trying to contain the Japanese into a pocket as they hit them with mortars. By 5:40 the Australians dug in and during the night the Japanese would withdraw after losing 43 men. 

November 22nd saw the Japanese suffer 89 deaths while the Australians only had 1. With this Wooten felt the Japanese counteroffensive was most likely defeated and prepared to respond against what seemed to be Katagiri's last attempt to turn the tide of battle. For the Japanese, the attack of D company had completely disorganized their counteroffensive. They had estimated the Australians had sent 3 to 4 battalions instead of a single company to reinforce Pabu Hill and this action had the dual effect of cutting off the road between Wareo and Bonga. Colonel Hayashida had no choice but to redirect units of his regiment to defend the northern bank of the song and try to prevent the reinforcement of Pabu. Despite the actions of the Fujii detachment, the Australians stubbornly continued to resist and this led the Japanese to believe they were increasing in strength at Pabu Hill and enjoyed resupply via aircraft drops. Meanwhile the Japanese fighting power was decreasing due to their overfiring of guns and mortars from Pino Hill. Their rations were at a ⅓ standard amount, local supplies like potatoes were nearly all gone and casualties were high. The fighting around Scarlet Beach would continue until November 28th, when the Japanese withdrew towards Wareo. Katagiri’s counteroffensive was unable to affect the 26th brigades advance upon Sattelberg and fell apart.

Over at the Sattelberg front, Brigadier Whitehead resumed his advance on the 22nd, with the 2/48th, supported by Matilda tanks advancing up the Sattelberg road, while the 2/23rd advanced west to the Turn Off Corner position. The 2/23rd were attempting to go across a 3200 foot Feature to gain high ground over Sattelberg. The 2/48th reached a creek southwest of Sattelberg when suddenly they were halted by a landslide and four mines laid out by the Japanese. The 2/23rd after passing the corner, hit the enemy defending the 3200 feature by encircling and gradually annihilating them. Whitehead believed they held favorable terrain to dig in for the night, but would be met with strong artillery bombardment causing heavy casualties upon the 2/32nd and 2/48th. Further north the 2/24th were trying to break through towards Palanko but the 2nd battalion, 80th regiment managed to thwart their every effort at outflanking them. Both sides suffered heavy casualties of the course of a few days of battle.On the 23rd, the 2/48th spent the day trying to find a way through the rugged jungle grounds leading to Sattelberg, finally discovering an uncontested hairpin bend to the right that led to the Red Roof Hut Spur.

By this point Katagiri was aware his forces on Sattelberg were not being supplied well and could not hope to resist for much longer. He began preparing to withdraw the 80th regiment over to Wareo as a result. On the 24th Whitehead sent two companies to creep up the approach of Sattelberg from the south while the Japanese continued hammering them using artillery and bombers. Meanwhile the 2/23rd launched a diversionary attack. The attack would employ what was colloquially called a “chinese attack”, ie; to make as much noise as possible. However the action quickly turned into a real firefight over the 3200 Feature. The Japanese made a surprising counter attack from the feature which inadvertently led to the Australians seizing the feature to their surprise.

During the afternoon, the 2/48th reached Red Roof Hut where they found 20 Japanese deeply entrenched in two man pits with log covers. The Japanese opened fire upon them quickly pinning them down. The Japanese rolled grenades and fired machine guns at short range , as the Australians gradually surrounded them. Try as the might the Australians were unable to kill or dislodge the Japanese prompting White to signal at 5:50pm "Plan for tomorrow. 2/48 with tanks to go through Lyne 's company. 2/23 to hold firm." Just as the 2/48th were about to withdraw, Sergeant Tom Derrick made a daring attack against the right flank, rapidly advancing through Kunai grass before his men tossed their grenades into the Japanese entrenchments. By nightfall, Red Roof Hut was seized and the Australians dug in about 150 yards from Sattelberg itself. At the same time the 2/24th found the Japanese defenders who had halted them had abandoned their position. When they checked the area they found evidence the Japanese were eating ferns and the core of bamboo. The state of their corpses and the many documents and diaries they found indicated the Japanese supply situation was extremely dire. The men defending Sattelberg were being supplied from bases at Nambariwa which relied on fishing boats, submarines and airdrops, because their barges were too vulnerable to air and naval attacks. The supplies Australians saw airdropped to the Japanese were hardly enough. It was here the Australians found a diary entry from the 79th regiment I’ve read a few times  "Every day just living on potatoes. Divided the section into two groups, one group for fighting and the other to obtain potatoes. Unfortunately none were available. On the way back sighted a horse, killed it and roasted a portion of it… At present, our only wish is just to be able to see even a grain of rice." Another diarist of the 80th Regiment jubilantly wrote in mid-November: "Received rice ration for three days… It was like a gift from Heaven and everybody rejoiced. At night heard loud voices of the enemy. They are probably drinking whisky because they are a rich country and their trucks are able to bring up such desirable things—I certainly envy them." On the morning of the 25th, the 2/48th discovered the enemy positions in front of them also abandoned. Soon the Australians were entering the abandoned shell of Sattelberg. Meanwhile with the aid of tanks, the 2/24th were rapidly advancing towards Palanko, capturing it by nightfall. Further to the left, elements of the 2/23rd and 2/4th commando squadron found Mararuo abandoned. The 80th regiment was fleeing towards Wario as a broken force. With this the battle of Sattelberg had come to an end. 

The battle for sattelberg cost the Japanese roughly 2000 casualties. Once the Australians entered Sattelberg a signal was sent to the 2/32nd on Pabu that “Torpy sits on Sat”. Torpy was a nickname for Brigadier Whitehead, based on the Whitehead Torpedo. Whitehead had also been one of the commanding officers of the 2/32nd battalion. Such nicknames were used in signals to disguise messages in case the enemy intercepted them. The capture of sattelberg was another turning point in the New Guinea campaign. General Adachi would note “Local resistance in small pockets continued in order to keep the Australian troops in action and prevent the 9th Division from being free to make an attack on Cape Gloucester and Marcus Point (east of Gasmata) should resistance cease altogether. While delaying action was being fought at Finschhafen the 17th Division was being moved by land and sea from Rabaul to Cape Gloucester to resist the anticipated attack in that area… The most advantageous position (Pabu) for the launching of a successful counter-attack was given up; also Pabu provided excellent observation for artillery fire, and after its capture the position of the Japanese forces was precarious. Even after the failure of the attack on Scarlet Beach we still retained some hopes of recapturing Finschhafen, but at this point the idea was abandoned.” The Japanese now believed that Finschhafen was completely lost and there was not much hope of halting the Australian advance.

General Berryman now urged Wootten to begin a drive north along the coast to try and cut off the Japanese lines of retreat and secure the eastern coast before the expected American led invasion of New Britain. Thus Woottne next decided to clear the Wareo-Gusika ridge first, predicting the Japanese might launch a counterattack against his rear. On the 26th Wootten ordered the 24th brigade to seize the area from Gusika towards the Kalueng Lakes; for the 2-th brigade to seize Nongora and Christmas Hills; the 26th brigade to advance north from Sattelberg towards Wareo; and for the 4th brigade to guard the approach to Scarlet Beach and the Heldsbach area. Yet before the Australians could start their new offensive they had to first clear out Pino Hill and secure the road towards Pabu. Two companies of the 2/32nd with four matilda tanks led by Colonel Scott were given the job. 

Meanwhile Colonel Hayashida launched a last ditch effort to take back Pabu. Reserve company 8 of the 2nd battalion, 78th regiment with the support of two 75 mm guns and mortars were given the task. As the bombardment raged over Pabu, the 30 Japanese attempted to infiltrate from the northwest and southwest. The Japanese ran into well dug positions, and the Australians caused them 20 casualties for their efforts. The Australian defenders had called in artillery support which bombarded the ring area around Pabu successfully foiling the attack. Meanwhile Pino Hill was hit with 2360 artillery shells, then by fire from four matilda tanks, before the Australian infantry stormed the feature to find it abandoned. On the 27th Wootten altered his offensive plan. Now he sought a three pronged assault against the Gusika-Wareo ridge. Berryman, Whitehead and Wootten were visiting Sattelberg on the 27th when they looked at the rugged country towards Wareo. They all knew it would be another logistical nightmare. Berryman stated it would be unwise to commit the 20th brigade through the center and that instead they should launch a two pronged attack using the 26th and 24th brigades against Wareo proper and the Gusika-Wareo ridge. Thus now the 26th and 24th brigades would hit the Gusika Wareo area and the 20th brigade would support the coastal thrust.

On that same day, the 2/28th battalion advanced along the coast to take up a flanking position near the Gusika-Wareo ridge. The 2/28th made it just 500 yards south of Bonga when they were halted by strong Japanese resistance. It would take Matilda tank support to cross over a creek and begin reducing the Japanese positions. The Australians stormed over and a platoon seized a feature called “the exchange position” left undefended. The next day saw the relief of the 2/32nd battalion who advanced north while the 2/43rd took over their position on Pabu. The Pabu defenders had suffered 25 deaths and 51 wounded, but would count over 195 dead Japanese. On the 29th, the 2/43rd fanned out finding Japanese resistance west of Pabu. The Australians attempted to encircle and annihilate the Japanese positions, but were unable and gradually had to pull back to Pabu.

To the east the 2/28th seized Bonga and sent patrols towards Gusika who found it abandoned so the entire battalion moved forward and took up a position at a former Japanese supply base along the coast. Meanwhile the 26th brigade were advancing north of the Song River and managed to seize Masangkoo and Fior. On the 30th, Wootten commenced the main offensive; the 2/28th crossed the Kaleung river and advanced to the Lagoon area; the 2/43rd seized the Horace and Horse mountain area; the 2/15th crossing the Song River and advanced towards Nongora and th 2/23rd crossing the Song River to cut off the main Kuanko track. Only the 2/28th would be met with strong resistance from the Japanese who were now panicking as the fall of Gusika had completely cut off their supply route towards Wareo. It was a very dire situation for the Japanese as they retreated.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

The battle of Cape St George earned Captain Burke a incredible victory and yet again proved the IJN’s night fighting abilities were no longer up to par. The battle for Sattelberg was finally over and with it any hope for the Japanese to take back the Finschhafen area, yet agian they fled north in New Guinea.

 

- 105 - Pacific War - The Bloody Invasion of the Gilberts, November 21-28, 1943

Last time we spoke about the planning for operation Galvanic and the battle of Sattelberg. The Americans were finally going to make their thrust into the central pacific with operation Galvanic. Admiral Raymond Spruance was given command of the Central Pacific Force and began building his war machine. The Americans would be employing a arsenal of new toys to hit the Gilbert Islands. Meanwhile the Japanese did everything they could to fortify the Gilberts, Marshalls and Carolines for the incoming American offensives, they would make them pay with blood for every island. Over in Green Hell the Australians were advancing up the Sattelberg road seizing Green Ridge, Coconut Ridge and other features. General Katagiri was once again on the defensive and it was only a matter of time before Sattelberg was under siege. Today we are going to cover all of this and more!

This episode is The Bloody Invasion of the Gilberts

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Last week we went through in depth the planning behind Operation Galvanic. The time had finally come to invade the Gilberts islands. To soften up the islands, carrier-borne airstrikes were made against the Gilberts and Marshalls. One of the major impacts of the raids in September and October was the evacuation of aircraft from Tarawa. Just before the raids there had been three air installations in the 3rd Special Base Force area; two airfields at Nauru and one at Tara, with a seaplane base at Makin. One of the duties assigned to these installations was to maintain patrols in the southeast corner of the Central Pacific. Patrols from Nauru covered the area south of the island, patrols from Kain covered the east and patrols from Tarawa the southeast between the other two. Yet after the removal of so many aircraft from Tarawa, now Makin had to assume full responsibility for patrolling the Gilberts area. By November there were only four amphibious reconnaissance planes left at Makin and even worse they had the dual mission of reconnaissance and anti-submarine patrol. Thus in other words there were not enough eyes on lookout.

On November 10th, Admiral Spruance led out his Central Pacific force from Hawaii enroute for Tarawa aboard his flagship the heavy cruises Indianapolis. The Northern attack force, northern carrier group and interceptor carrier group all departed from the Hawaiian islands simultaneously, but they would not be traveling together. The two carrier groups moved in a parallel course followed by the Northern attack force at around 300 miles to their northwest. The two routes of approach would change around 800 miles east of the Gilberts with the Northern attack force turning to meet them. As the force made its way, Spruance warned “If … a major portion of the Japanese fleet were to attempt to interfere with Galvanic, it is obvious that the defeat of the enemy fleet would at once become paramount … the destruction of a considerable portion of the Japanese naval strength would … go far towards winning the war …” Even within the Navy there were critics of Operation Galvanic. While Spruance was taking the 5th fleet along with 30,000 marines, Vice Admiral John Towers grumbled “Spruance wants a sledgehammer to drive a tack.” The battle for Tarawa would be one of the most controversial engagements of the Pacific war. 

Over at Efate, Admiral Hill’s Southern force departed on November 13th to rendezvous with Turner by the 18th. On November 15th, the Relief carrier force consisting of two carriers, 3 cruisers and 4 destroyers departed Espirtu Santo and the New Hebrides. They were a last minute add-on, heading towards Nauru. Thus the southern carrier group and southern attack force moved parallel to another to rendezvous with the rest by the 18th. During the two days before the landings, both the navy and army aircraft delivered last minute airstrikes. At 3am on the 18th, Admiral Pownalls task force launched 18 fighters, followed 3 hour later by 20 more fighters then at intervals of 2-3 hours, dive bombers, torpedo bombers and more fighters. All day long these aircraft strafed and bombed Nauru. By the end of the day, 90 tons of bombs had been dropped. The pilots claimed the installations on the island were in ruins, a Japanese ship was a burning wreck and 3-4 medium bombers were destroyed on the ground. The next day saw the same carrier attack with the help of land based planes from the 7th air force bombers. The airfields on Nauru were hit, shipping as well and Nauru was thought to be neutralized. On the 19th, the interceptor carrier group of Admiral Pownalls task force launched a series of air strikes against Jaluit and Mille. Over 130 tons of bombs were dropped on them. Power stations at both atolls were destroyed, hangers burned down, buildings in ruins. The runways looked unserviceable at Mille and 3 vessels in her lagoon were heavily damaged, alongside 7 grounded aircraft destroyed. On that same day, 19 b-24’s from Nukufetau and Funafuti dropped 10 tons of bombs on Tarawa causing fires and damaging her airfields. 12 more B-24s from Nanomea dropped 23 tons of bombs on Makin. Aircraft from the Northern and southern carrier groups added 95 tons of bombs on Makin and 69 tons on Betio island. One enemy plane was shot down and 3 were hit on the ground near Tarawa.

Before noon on the 19th, Southern Carrier groups cruisers destroyers moved in closer to Tarawa to bombard the ground forces between the air strikes. One of the most important effects of the heavy air raids was getting the Japanese to waste a considerable amount of their ammunition against the aircraft. At Tarawa the Japanese expended an estimated 1437 rounds of 127mm AA, 1312 75mm, 51160 13mm, 46 8 inch and 104 14cm ammunition. At Makin it was perhaps nearly 10,000 rounds of 13mm. The loss of the 13mm machine gun ammunition would hurt the Japanese particularly hard since it was the base weapon for the ground defenses. Shortly before 11:30pm on the 19th the convoy entered the 17 mile wide channel between Maiana and Tarawa Atolls. The ships assumed positions west of Betio. Transports took up their debarkation positions and fire support ships moved into shore for another massive bombardment. 

At dawn on 20 November, the USS Maryland and Colorado, sister dreadnoughts from  World War I of the Colorado Class, laid down a barrage of fire upon the defenders of Betio. It provided a measure of revenge for the USS Maryland, which had been damaged during the attack on Pearl Harbor. Their combined fire power of sixteen 16-inch guns was able to quickly knock out three of the four 8-inch guns defending Betio both from the lagoon-side to the north and the open sea to the south and west. A fortunate hit on one of the Japanese guns’ ordnance stores sent up a massive fireball. Rear Admiral Howard Kingman, responsible for planning the bombardment of Tarawa, would tell the press aboard his ship, “Gentlemen, it is not our intention to wreck the island. We do not intend to destroy it. Gentlemen … we will obliterate it.” The air and naval barrage of the island would last 3 hours. Aboard the USS Ashland an officer boasted “They’ll [the Marines] go in standing up. There aren’t fifty Japs left alive on the island.” Lt Colonel Herbert Amey leading the 2nd battalion, 2nd marines boasted to his staff “As we hit the beach the planes will be strafing very close in front of you to keep the Nips down until you get in there and knock off what’s left of them. I think we ought to have every Jap off the island—the live ones —by the night of D-Day.” Despite the incredible firepower, Colonel David Shoup leading the assault troops shared some concerns with Robert Sherrod working for the Time and Life magazine “What worries me more than anything is that our boats may not be able to get over that coral shelf that sticks out about 500 yards. We may have to wade in.” Colonel ‘Red Mike’ Edsons went on to say of the upcoming battle “The enemy must endeavor to hold it and make sure its capture is as costly to us as possible. This will be the first attempt to defend an atoll … as it is our endeavor at seizing one.” 

Before dawn the Marines woke up to a last meal of steak and eggs with fried potatoes and coffee. They all gave a final check of their combat kits, their M-1 Garand’s, bayonets, 3 days of rations, water, the bedding, grenades, 125 bullets, gas masks, toiletry items, 3 pairs of socks and underwear, their entrenching tool, first aid kits and the most important item, their cigarettes. As the marines moved to their debarkation stations, military chaplains passed through the troops offering last minute homilies. “God Bless you—and go out there and bring glory to our Corps,” . Father Francis Kelley from Philadelphia and veteran of Guadalcanal ended his service with, “God Bless you and God have mercy on the Japanese.”

At 6:03am the transports began lowering their boats. At 6:15am the carrier borne Hellcat fighters, Avenger and Dauntless from the USS Essex and Bunker Hill began to strafed and bomb the western beaches. At 6:40 the aircraft began departing as the battleships, cruisers and destroyers opened fire. The damage from the aerial and naval bombardments was considerable. In the immediate region of the main beaches and eastward side, little real damage was inflicted. Coconut trees, native hurts and dummy gun positions took a lot of the hits. In the area of the west tank barrier, neither the ditches nor log barricades took much damage. Just east of the main tank trap was a trench system running to the beach, this area was smashed up pretty good. One trench received a direct hit from a 2000-pound bomb which, in the words of Admiral Turner, "considerably scrambled the trench, Japs and trees for some distance." 62 enemy dead were later counted in this one area, most of whom were the victims of a combination of concussion and air bursts. In the area south of Yellow Beach and east to the East Tank Barrier all buildings were reported destroyed. Three 80-mm. antiaircraft positions at the base of King's Wharf and two light tanks revetted to act as pillboxes were severely damaged. 41 enemy dead were counted, of whom 25 were apparently killed by concussion from heavy bombs. At 8:25 the naval bombardment ended and more aircraft came in strafing.

While the aircraft strafed, the 165th regiment began loading onto LCVPS and amphibian tractors carried men of the 105th regiment. At 8:15 the tractors started to head for the beach while firing rockets and machine guns against what they assumed were enemy positions. At 8:31 the tractors hit the beach and the men began to scramble ashore. Beach red 1 and 2 were quickly occupied forming the first beachhead. Following the tractors were the first three waves of landing craft at about 5 minute intervals. They were met with unfriendly studded reefs and coral boulders about 40 yards offshore. Some of the landing craft were unable to slip past the larger boulders, some were broached, stranded or forced to pull back out to sea. The failures of these landings would lead Rear Admiral Richmond Turner to create the Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT) a precursor to the US Navy Seals. The tanks were waterproofed for the landings, and managed to roll off the ramps into water.  The men struggled in swells sometimes over their heads and sought cover at the edge of the beach. At best, only three boats could be landed at one time, and the fifth wave was not able to get ashore until 10:00, over an hour behind schedule.

Facing the marines was 798 men led by Lt Seizo Ishikawa, the commander of the 3rd Special Base force Makin detachment. 284 of his men were from his detachment, alongside them were 100 air personnel, 138 men from the 11th construction unit and 276 men of the 4th fleet construction department detachment made up mostly of Korean laborers. They had established 3 defensive areas. The aviation personnel took up the east, the 3rd special base men the middle and the Korean laborers the west. Thus only 284 combat troops with the rest being support staff would face the onslaught. Ishikawa had established a perimeter defense around the seaplane base on the lagoon shore. They had three dual purpose 8cm guns at King’s wharf with a few machine guns. Running from the lagoon to the beach were two anti tank barriers. They were wide ditches with coconut log barriers going around 13 feet wide and 5 feet deep. Numerous anti tank guns were around them, behind were concrete pillboxes, machine gun positions, rifle pits and trenches. There were also trip wires with booby traps laid everywhere someone might creep up. Luckily for General Smith, Ishikawa’s defensive positions were between the two tank barriers as the Japanese had predicted the invasion of the island would be made there.

Over on Betio island were 4836 men led by Admiral Keiji Shibazaki. 1122 men were from the 3rd special base force, 1247 from the 111th construction unit, 970 of the 4th fleet construction department detachment and 1497 Sasebo 7th SNLF. The Sasebo 7th were known as the Rikusentai, elite marine paratroopers modeled on the German Luftwaffe paratroop brigades. During the Pacific war, 50,0000 Rikusentai troops were deployed. They work dark green uniforms modeled on the German paratrooper counterpart, dark-brown belts and harnesses with white anchor patches. Recruits were forced to learn by heart Emperor Meiji’s 1882 Imperial rescript to soldiers. The war song Umi Yukaba was also their prophetic line “Across the sea, corpses in the water … I shall die for the Emperor.” As Marine historian, Colonel Joseph Alexander concluded in his work, Utmost Savagery, three days of Tarawa in 1995 “American expeditionary forces would not encounter a more sophisticated series of defensive positions on any subsequent island until they reached Iwo Jima in 1945. Yard for yard, Betio was the toughest fortified position the Marines would ever face.” The Americans were about to see Japan's “water edge” strategy. The directive was simply “concentrate all fires on the enemy’s landing point and destroy him at the water’s edge.” Rear Admiral Keiji Shibazai was an aggressive young officer who demanded his troops build defenses to “withstand assault by a million men for a hundred years.” Yet it was his predecessor Rear Admiral Sichero who had 50 pillboxes and bunkers constructed across an island that was just 800 yards at its widest points and two miles in length. Shibazaki added kettle mines to impede landing boats or direct them to his kill zones. Double barbed wire fences were dug into coral shallows encircling the island 50 to 100 yards from the shore. Yet as noted by Warrant Officer Kiyosha Ota the only Japanese officer to survive the battle for Tarawa, rear admiral Shibazaki could not get a cargo ship to bring over cement and steel to reinforce to build his planned 4500 tetrahedrons to surrounded the island nor reinforce countless pillboxes. Nonetheless Betio was bristling with a armada of guns. Betio held 4 8 inch guns, 4 14cm, 4 12.7cm, 6 8cm, 10 75mm mountain guns, 6 70mm howitzers, 8 7cm dual purpose guns, 9 37mm field guns, 27 12mm guns, 4 13 mm guns and 7 tanks with 37mm guns. Betio was a fortress full of steel, concrete and coconut log emplacements, the entire island was organized for battle. Within their defensive positions the Japanese had bombproof ammunition and personnel shelters in depth. The allies would be facing beach guns, anti-tank ditches, beach barrices, numerous obstacles and booby traps. Tarawa would be the most heavily defended atoll ever invaded by allied forces in the Pacific. 

H hour, the landing of the first wave had been scheduled for 8am on November 20th, but Admiral Hill’s transports had run into some problems. They arrived to the scene around 5:50am and began lowering their boats, but it turned out they were too far south and in range of the enemy’s coastal guns. The Japanese opened fire on them forcing them back to the designated positions at the lagoon entrance. American warships meanwhile began bombarding the Japanese coastal guns and positions. The airstrikes arrived a bit late to the scene to add their payloads to the mix. Meanwhile two minesweepers the Pursuit and Requisite and two destroyers, Ringgold and Dashiell fought their way into the Tarawa lagoon to sweep for mines. The Japanese coastal guns fired upon them, seeing Ringgold suffering moderate damage from 5 inch gunfire. The choppy seas delayed the arrival of the amphibian tractors, thus H hour was moved to 9am. In the meantime at least one 8 inch coastal gun and two 120mm anti-aircraft batteries had been neutralized by the naval gunfire, and just about everything above ground or in open pits, like personnel, bombs, trucks and munitions were mostly likely destroyed. The camouflage screens over dugouts were wiped away and Shibasaki’s network of telephone wire, most laid above ground was obliterated, thus his system of communication was paralyzed. Despite all of this the damage was not nearly enough. Along the beaches were rows of pillboxes, some concrete, steel and coconut made. At Red beaches 2 and 3 there were at least 5 machine guns pointing towards where the troops would land over a reef towards the shore. As Admiral Hill put it, "that was five too many." 

By 8:55am the tractors were still late, but Hill ceased all naval gunfire anyway allowing them to begin their approach. The volume of intensity of fire grew as the boats motored in towards the landing beaches. Shibasaki’s 75mm field guns and 37mm anti-tank guns were positioned perfectly to hit the incoming boats. Neither the amtracs nor the Higgin boats had enough armor to stop the shells. William Rogal’s boat took a 37mm shell to her bow and Rogal recalled “the force of the explosion threw his body to the rear of the amtrac, showering everyone on the port side with blood and brains.” As Lt Lillibridges boat came under similar fire, the shells pierced their starboard and port sides simultaneously forcing the men to toss themselves on the flat bottom. Light mortars showered them all sending shrapnel into several marines.

Most of the first wave boats headed towards Red beach 1, in a cove tucked between the pier and northwestern point of the island. The approached to red beach 1 held a significant amount of crossfire by weapons of various calibers. The men began to hit the beach at 9:10am. Landing ashore was the 3rd battalion, 2nd marines who were met with tremendous fire. The marines quickly ran into a log barricade. Some of their tractors were smashed up and burning dead in the water. If those inside them were still alive they climbed over the sides to try and wade ashore. The vehicles that made it onto land soon were halted by the log barricade seen marines jump over under machine gun fire. K Company took so many casualties they were unable to move past the log barricade and now had to lie in an exposed area under constant fire. By 11am K company would push a few men over the coconut barrier, but by this point the two leading companies had suffered 50% casualty rates. Reserve company L led by Major Michael P Ryan were just landing to the east and would lose 35% of their strength before even touching the each. A platoon of M4 Shermans attached to the 3rd battalion were tossed into the water but 4 of them got stuck in potholes in the coral reef and drowned out, only 2 tanks actually made it to the beach.

Meanwhile at 9:22 the 2nd battalion, 2nd marines also landed in chaos and confusion at Red Beach 2. Company F was to hit the left while company E took the right and company G would act in support. Similar to Red Beach 1, a 4 foot high log barricade had been constructed to form a sea wall. Most of the barricade lay 20 yards from the waters edge, leaving a narrow open strip of deep coral sand for the marines to traverse. Numerous pillboxes and shelters lay around the barricade in intervals. Rogal’s amtrac headed to Red beach 2 through mortar bursts that showered his men with shrapnel. When the boat grounded on the sand Rogal shouted “Lets go!” and the men went over the side through machine gun fire. Rogal rushed forward and could see above the seawall to the left a machine gun emplacement, it was one of the major strong points and it would kill roughly 300 marines that day. The amtracs drove onto the beaches and lowered their ramps with most of the first wave units making it to the seawall providing some shield from enemy fire. However going any further was near suicide, a few brave souls climbed over and were shot or wounded. Men sat crouched around the wall with their heads down waiting for tanks and air support. The volume of Japanese mortar, artillery and automatic fire was tremendous. F company was decimated, but managed to grab the left half of the beach near the pier, digging in on the coral sand. E Company suffered heavy casualties and the reserve G company landed in the center and immediately pinned down. As the men were huddled along the coconut barrier they began systematically eliminating enemy positions that jutted out onto the beach.

Further to the east, at 9;17am the 2nd battalion, 8th marines of Major Henry Crowe began landing at red beach 3. They were backed up by 4 medium tanks of the 2nd tank battalion, 3 of the tanks would be put out of action within 2 hours. The marines at red beach 3 enjoyed more success than the other thanks to additional naval bombardment support that had lasted just until 7 minutes of their landing. They suffered just 25 casualties as the rapidly burst through the coconut barricade by driving LVTs through it. Company E led the way continuing as far inland as the triangle formed by the main airstrip and taxiways. 

 

Colonel David Shoups 2nd marines were in dire trouble at Red Beach 2 and had to commit the reserve 1st battalion who landed there and were ordered to work their way west towards red beach 1in the hopes of aiding the 3rd battalion. By 11am, two companies in amphibious tractors came over and suffered the same fire that had decimated the other waves, but managed to get their men ashore. When General Smith heard about Shoups call for reinforcements he also sent the reserve 3rd battalion, 8th marines to relief their right flank. Boated over in LCVPs, the battalion were halted by the reef line and forced to wade ashore under heavy fire during the afternoon. Supply barges were unable to reach the beaches, forcing the reserve troops to carry the most vital supplies. Colonel Shoup had radioed the transported intermittently throughout the day asking for more ammunition ,water and medical supplies, but these calls just caused more confusion amongst the shipping. The transport commanders had been tossing boat after boat carrying supplies, but they had no real picture of the situation between their boats and the beach. Captain Henry Knowles would end up sending Major Ben Weatherwax ashore just to determine what the supply situation was. It would literally take until dawn to get a complete picture, that picture being that Shoup had received virtually none of the supplies supposed to be dispatched to him.

Additionally two M4 shermans were brought up to help the battered 3rd battalion, 2nd marines who were driving across the island towards the south shore. The marines hit shelter to shelter making steady progress. The tanks got within 300 yards of the south shore when 40mm gunfire knocked them both out. The progress allowed Major Michael Ryan to discover that part of Green Beach, on the western coast of Betio was available for landing reserves. Unable to relay this to Shoup, he ultimately had to pull out and dig in to form a defensive position. While the Americans were suffering communication problems, the Japanese had a much worse one. The naval bombardment had destroyed their communications lines to the Japanese HQ, preventing Rear Admiral Shibazaki to lead, but that problem was soon solved. It was solved when a 5 inch air burst shell fired from either RInggold or Dashiell hit his HQ killing him and all the senior officers. The last message Shibazaki received before his death was from Emperor Hirohito “you have all fought gallantly. May you continue to fight to the death. Banzai”. Shibazaki had planned to launch a counterattack, but now his forces were for the first critical two days of the battle leaderless, demoralized and uncoordinated. 

Concurrently the 8th marines were fighting to hold the triangle position they acquired under heavy attacks from the Japanese. F Company was in a brutal fight around the Burns-Philp Wharf facing a Japanese counterattack supported by tanks. The buildings were all ablaze as tanks and flamethrowers were firing upon everything they could. By nightfall the Japanese counterattack failed. To their right Shoups 2nd marines were unable to organize a proper attack because their forces were all over the place. They held a pinned down toehold around the beach, but many units had penetrated some 125 yards inland and no pockets were fighting all over. Throughout the night, men were frantically carrying supplies ashore, but few supplies were actually reaching the beaches. There was an enormous failure in communications. Aboard the USS Maryland, the only information General Julian Smith was receiving came from reports of observers in planes, intercepted radio messages and a few direct reports from Colonel Shoup. By 1:43pm Smith ordered General Hermle to go to the end of the pier and get an estimation of the situation ashore. At 3:10 Hermle tried the best he could to relay the information but couldn't get through. Hermle recommended the 1st battalion, 8th marines be committed to Red Beach 2, but this message never made it to Smith. Meanwhile Smith ordered Hermle to take command of the troops ashore, but this message never reached him. At 4:25 Smith ordered Colonel Hall, command of the 8th marines to land on the eastern beaches, but he also never received the message so most of his men spent the night floating. Luckily by 8:19pm Colonel Hall received a message and landed at Red Beach 2, whereupon he didn't receive any further orders.

Over at Makin, Admiral Turner landed the 1st and 3rd battalions, 165th regiment. General Ralph Smiths plan called for the rapid capture of Flink point and Ukiangong Point, along with the occupation of the area east of Red Beaches to the first beachhead line around 1300 yards inland. The 1st battalion would hit Flink Point and the left half of the beachhead line. The 3rd battalion would hit Ukiangong village and Point and was responsible for the right half of the beachhead line. The 1st battalion advanced, overcoming some barbed wire, log barricades and an undefended observation tower. The3rd battalion made equal progress finding little resistance. By 10:30am the beachhead line was secured, Company A and Detachment Y had been dispatched northward to occupy Flink Point, L company with Detachment X were turning south to take Ukiengong Village and to clear the point beyond it. General SMith expected some resistance at Ukiangong, but it with the point were taken unopposed. Therefor Smith elected to establish artillery positions there. Flink Point was taken by 12:40, marking the operation quite an easy success.

After receiving word at 8am that the Kotabu detachment had taken the island without opposition, Turner decided to go ahead with the landings on Yellow Beach. At 10:05am the landing forces advances towards Yellow Beach. The destroyers MacDonough and Phelps began a bombardment using their 5 inch guns. The first wave of 16 amphibian tractors began approaching as they fired rockets against the beach. Following up would in a minute was the second wave of 8 LCMS carrying medium tanks, followed two minutes later by the third wave, 7 LCMs carrying medium tanks, then another 2 minutes after was the fourth wave carrying two LCVPS with troops and 4 LCMS with light tanks. The next four waves would consist of LCVPS carrying the bulk of the assault troops and a bulldozer.

At 10:25 the tractors were around 600 yards off the beach when the two destroyers ceased their firing to allow a last minute strafing run by carrier planes. As the approached, the men in the tractors crouched low to avoid the rain of bullets that began at around 500 yards. At 10:41 they hit the beaches and one amphtrack ran up the seaplane ramp on Kings Wharf. Enemy shellfire struck two amphtracks killing 5 men and wounding 12. One lone tractor lost control and drove straight across the island toward the ocean shore, directly through the main Japanese defenses. It ended up in a shell crater with two of its crew killed by enemy machine gun fire, but the others managed to jump into the brush. Upon jumping out of their tractors the Americans made their way inland by crawling along the western slope of the causeway. The pier was captured quickly, Detachment Z then divided into two groups, one to take King’s Wharf, the other On Chong’s Wharf. Kings Wharf was taken unopposed, but On Chong’s Wharf would offer some tough resistance. The 105th regiment fought their way through dugouts and bomb proof shelters to get to the Wharf by dusk. They then began mass throwing grenades into the Wharf emplacements killing many Japanese. 35 Prisoners would soon be captured and by noon On Chong’s Wharf was secured.

Back over at the beach, 15 medium tanks landed on the beach with two becoming stuck in shell holes in the reef. The other tanks split up advancing east and west against the two tank barriers. Unfortunately they were not very well coordinated and began operating independently. Behind the tanks was the 2nd battalion, 165th regiment whose LCVPS grounded themselves on the reef. The landing troops had little to no opportunity to locate the incessant fire being poured upon them from the right flank. At the offset they believed the fire was coming from two battered and scuttled hulks resting near On Chong’s Wharf. Their first effort to knock these out was made by a LCVP commanded by Joseph Kasper. The boat mounted three of its guns on the starboard side and ran for the hulks while firing all at once. Kasper was fatally wounded during the run and one of the guns jammed. The incessant fire was halting the men so at 11:25 and 12:50 carrier planes bombed and strafed the hulks. Alongside this the destroyer Dewey bombarded them scoring numerous hits, but by 12:07 was ordered to cease fire because a few hits hit friendlys. Finally at 12:57 Major Dennis Claire ordered a stop to the bombardments so he could lead E company to hit the eastern tank barrier. They met light resistance until they came to the area of Kings Wharf. There they ran into concealed pillboxes that would halt their advance for over 4 hours. The men tried rifle grenades, bazookas, artillery barrages, but the pillboxes kept returning fire. Then they tried a daring encirclement maneuver under artillery support. The men crawled and crept in a wide circle reaching the pill boxes 40 yards or so away. They attempted to use flamethrowers, but the defenders still fired back. Then some engineers brought over TNT which was tossed into the pillboxes and exploded just before some light tanks rolled up to fire using 37mm rounds. By 4pm the pill boxes finally ceased firing, 8 Americans had been killed taking them. E company advanced a bit before digging in for the night. F Company advanced across the atoll west to attack the west tank barrier. They did not encounter resistance, excluding the incredibly difficult jungle. By noon the reached the ocean shore where they reorganized their lines and made their way south alongside 5 Sherman tanks to assault the west tank barrier.

F Company and the tanks ran into a tanktrap with underground shelters full of Japanese defenders. Some labor troops were also there armed with knives and a few rifles. F Company proceeded to use TNT pole charges to blow up the shelters and flame throwers which quickly became the preferred weapon to face Japanese underground defenses. During the fight F Company had 8 deaths and 6 wounded. By 1:30pm they reached the barrier. The 3rd Platoon of F Company were attacking a section due south of On Chong’s Wharf where an enemy air raid shelter was. The shelter was around 30 feet long with blast proof entrances on either side. When they tossed hand grenades into the shelter the grenades were tossed right back at them. A sherman tank came up and started firing 75mm shells, but had no success. Then a flamethrower unit crept up and tried to fire, but the equipment was soaked from the landing and was not functioning. Thus they resorted to a TNT pole charge. The explosion did not collapse the shelter, but it killed all 12 Japanese inside it. Meanwhile countless units were dealing with machine gun positions aided by 3 shermans. The tanks gradually pierced the barrier and proceeded. 

Meanwhile the 1st battalion was advancing from the west passing Joan Lake by 2pm. From there they ran into some strong machine gun posts 150 yards west of the barrier. B Company of the 1st battalion rushed over to help F company from the east side of the west tank barrier. At this point the regimental commander, Colonel Conroy had taken a shot to the head and was dead leaving Lt Colonel Gerard Kelley, the commander of the 1st battalion in charge. Kelley’s first orders were for C company to bypass the pocket in the front, while A company would reinforce B company. The Japanese defenders were now trapped in the center being gradually eliminated by the 4 shermans. By 5:55pm F Company finally destroyed the last of the enemy in the center of the line and contact was made between the two battalions. 

After suffering 25 deaths and 62 wounded, the 27th division had gained a good foothold on Butaritari; the West Tank Barrier had been reduced; but the enemy forces in the east still needed to be cleared. The night was a very uncomfortable one. Japanese snipers harassed the Americans the entire time; Japanese infiltrators were up to their old tricks calling out in english, throwing firecrackers and trying to jump into foxholes with knives in hand. Trigger happy Americans fired away indiscriminately, causing chaos. A man of the 152nd engineered ran along the lagoon shore at daybreak from the direction of On Chong’s Wharf toward the 2nd battalions command post screaming “theres a hundred and fifty Japs in the trees!”. This caused a wave of hysteria.

That morning Kelley ordered his 1st battalion to clear the remaining enemy pockets west of the barrier while the rear of the west tank barrier area was finally mopped up. To the east an air bombardment smashed the area before the eastward advance commenced. Supported by 10 shermans the Americans advanced slowly against stiff resistance, successfully overran every enemy position. Between 12-2pm they were fighting through one of the most heavily defended areas on the island. Machine gun emplacements supported by rifle pits with double apron barbed wire running back and forth were everywhere they looked. By 5pm they advanced 1000 yards at the cost of 18 deaths and 15 wounded. The next day starting at 6am the 3rd battalion advanced along the island highway towards Yellow Beach. As they reached Yellow Beach 13 medium and light tanks with some engineers fell in line with them and together they advanced towards Ukiangong Point. At 7am artillery bombarded Ukiangong Point, first targeting the east tank barrier. Until 8:20 the artillery fired nearly 900 rounds then the 3rd battalion began their assault upon forward defenses that had been abandoned during the night. By 9;15 the men seized the first 250 yards meeting only light resistance, after that it became fierce fighting. Meanwhile two detachments of the 105th regiment led by Major Herzog were dispatched to cut off the Japanese line of retreat. They performed an amphibious encirclement maneuver going through the lagoon. The men embarked on 6 LVTS and made a 3 mile dash across the lagoon to the northeastern point where they met up with friendly natives who notified them the Japanese were fleeing eastward across the reef to Kuma. They quickly seized Kuma and now the enemy on Butaritari was entirely cut off from their retreat.

With artillery and tank support the 3rd battalion managed attacked the Stone Pier area. The tank commanders had learnt many lessons over the past two days and began using their big guns to reduce buildings ahead of them to infantry could toss grenades into the smaller shelters. Tank-infantry tactics were literally being developed ad hoc as the men learnt first hand lessons of war. Tanks opened up with 75mm shells knocking shelters and infantry stormed them with grenades. Soon the Stone Pier area was clear and now they began striking the east tank barrier. The east tank barrier was more heavily fortified than its western counterpart, yet the Japanese abandoned the barrier during the night. Only a few dead Japanese would be found, killed by earlier bombardments. The 3rd battalion continued past the barrier linking up with A company by 1:30pm finding no sign of the enemy. Together they advanced 2100 yards beyond the narrow neck of the island and dug in for the night. Each company created a separate defensive perimeter stretching across the width of the island in a line of about 300 yards in length. It was not long during the night when the Japanese got up to their old tricks. Following behind a group of friendly native guides, a group of Japanese infiltrators approached limiting the cries of babies. The ruse was recognized by a member of the engineer detachment who opened fire immediately killing 10 Japanese. For the rest of the night there was intermittent fire fights as infiltrators continuously attacked. The Japanese began to yell and sing songs, many sounding quite drunk.  It was not just there the Japanese attacked, over on Kuma Island at around midnight 10 Japanese attacked the defense line set up by Major Bradt’s men. Although certainly shaken by the night terror, over 60 Japanese would be killed by the morning of the 23rd. This nearly wiped out the remaining survivors allowing the Americans to have firm control over Makin. 

The Americans suffered 58 deaths, 152 wounded on Makin while the Japanese lost perhaps 800 men and the Americans captured 105 POW’s. The Americans had held an unbelievable superiority during this battle. The ratio of American combat casualties to those of the Japanese though was remarkably high. With the battle concluded, most of the 27th division departed Makin on the 24th leaving Colonel CLesen Tenney to lead garrison forces. Tragedy hit that morning when the escort carrier Liscome Bay was sunk by the I-175 who had been hunting around Makin since the arrival of the Americans. This left the death toll at Makin 644, including Rear Admiral Henry Mullinnix.

Back on Tarawa the marines were surprised the Japanese did not launch a major counterattack during the first night which was their typical strategy. General Smith landed his reserve 1st battalion, 8th marines on Red Beach 2, but they took some heavy casualties for this. Many of the men wading ashore were fired upon creating a scene of carnage. In central Betio Colonel Shoups marines unleashed a devastating artillery bombardment using delay fuzes in order to penetrate coral and log shelters to hit enemy positions around the triangle. A line just short of the taxiway on the airfield had formed, as the 1st battalion began to drive towards the south shore of Betio. The 1st battalion, 8th marines launched an attack against a strong defensive position at a juncture on the two right hand beaches to try and reestablish contact with the 3rd battalion 2nd marines. Other units of drove all the way across the island to secure Green Beach. The 8th marines were unable to make any progress against the strong Japanese positions. The major success of the day would be landing the reserve 1st and 2nd battalions, 6th marines at Green Beach and Bairiki island by the afternoon facing no opposition. 

At this point Colonel Edson landed at Red Beach 2 and took command of the marine forces until General Smith landed. Colonel Edson spent his first night consulting with Shoup and Hall before ordering a coordinated attack the following morning. Edson noted, until then air and naval gunfire had been ineffective because they did not have acute knowledge of american and enemy positions. So Edson ordered spotters to get a better picture of the area and for the 2nd battalion, 10th marines artillery to come over. The next morning the 10th marines began an artillery bombardment to aid the attack. At 8am the 1st battalion, 6th marines advance eastwards down a narrow hundred yard strip of heavily fortified ground between the airfield and south shore. They rapidly progressed and by 11:00a would reach an area held by the 1st battalion, 2nd marines. It was estimated they killed 250 Japanese during this action. After completing this action new orders were issued to continue the advance east to the end of the airfield. They began advancing at 1pm and hit strong resistance. It would take until the late afternoon to clear the way over.

During the afternoon the 3rd battalion, 6th marines landed at Green Beach and began advancing up the rear to aid in the assault. Elsewhere on Betio the 8th marines were making progress reducing the strong Burns-Philp Wharf position. The 18th marine engineers helped explode portions of steel pillboxes to let their colleagues storm them. One of the positions was a large blockhouse and when captured suddenly a large Japanese counterattack emerged to retake it. The 1st battalion, 8th marines on the western beaches proceeded slowly with fighting going on well into the night. Colonel Maurice Holmes 6th marines then relieved the 8th marines on the frontlines. By nightfall on the third day of the battle, the Americans now possessed all of the western end of Betio, going as far east as the eastern end of the airfield, except for some pockets between Red Beach 1 and 2. General Julian Smith finally came ashore on Green Beach just before noon assuming command. Despite the substantial gains, it was estimated that at least 5 more days of heavy fighting remaining before Betio was subdued. Smith gave Holmes the command for the final drive to the eastern tip of Betio.

With the new daunting task at hand, Colonel Holmes prepared his forces for the brutal final drive, when all of a sudden 50 Japanese launched a counterattack. By the night of the 22nd, most of the remaining Japanese, roughly 1000 men were squeezed on the eastern narrow tail of the island. At 7:30 a group of 50 Japanese began attacking American positions recently just established. The 1st battalion, 6th marines had just assumed responsibility for the whole cross island line and the Japanese managed to find a small gap in the line. The Japanese used grenades and bayonets trying to break through, but the Americans were able to quickly encircle and annihilate them. Thus the Japanese were forced to launch a second probing attack later that night bringing their artillery 75 yards near the Marine front lines in an effort to screen their charges. The second attack was a two pronged movement hitting B company on the right and A company on the left. Both Japanese groups were obliterated in what became a wild frenzy of hand to hand fighting. Then after this the heaviest counterattack was launched at around 3am. The Japanese made a frontal assault for over an hour. 300 Japanese troops hit both A and B companies and like their other comrades were obliterated come the morning. These three attacks were in effect banzai charges, last ditch efforts to break the Americans, it cost the entire Japanese garrison.

Holmes plans would be unnecessary to reach the eastern tip of Betio island as little opposition was found. By 10am the 1st battalion, 8th marines and 3rd battalion 2nd marines joined together to form a semicircular attack upon the last enemy pocket. They were supported by 75mm guns that unleashed carnage upon the pillboxes before marines grabbed prisoners through burst open holes from their shelters. Tarawa saw an estimated 4690 Japanese and Korean killed, with 17 Japanese and 129 Koreans POWs captured. The Marines suffered 1009 deaths, 2101 wounded and 191 missing in action. Vandegrift would tell the New York Times on December 27th "Tarawa was an assault from beginning to end. We must steel ourselves now to pay that price".

November 24th would see the rest of the Tarawa atoll get mopped up and by the 29th, Abaiang, Marakei and the Maiana atolls were occupied. On the 21st the 5th amphibious corp reconnaissance company landed on Apamama under naval gunfire support from their submarine and escorting destroyer. They would encounter resistance from 23 Japanese whom they neutralized by the next day. With this Operation Galvanic has successfully been accomplished. The operation as we will see in the future weeks provided dire lessons to the allies about what the rest of the war would look like. As Vandegrift would later remark “Tarawa was the first example in history of a sea-borne assault against a heavily defended coral atoll … In the final analysis … success at Tarawa depended upon the discipline, courage, and fighting ability of the individual Marine. Seldom has anyone been called upon to fight a battle under more difficult circumstances.” It was under these circumstances, where the de facto practice of taking no prisoners would easily become the norm. The Japanese soldiers were faking deaths, hiding grenades to take allied men down with them. Suicide attacks were increasing exponentially. Thus the age of phrase would be adopted by the marines “shoot first and ask questions later”.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

Operation Galvanic had finally been accomplished. It cost countless lives and would be one of the major bitter lessons learnt by the Americans during the Pacific War. The enemy was going to defend every single inch of their territory until the last man. Would America have the stomach to drive it home? 

- 104 - Pacific War - The Battle of Sattelberg, November 14-21, 1943

Last time we spoke about the Japanese counteroffensive against the Marine beachhead on Bougainville. Things were looking bad for the Japanese before they got even worse. The Japanese had underestimated the amount of Marines on Bougainville and sent Major Mitsuhiro with his special units to try and hit the marine left flank, later to join up with the Iwasa detachment. Mitsuhiro’s men were in for a hell of a surprise when they attacked a larger force than expected. They took heavy losses before pulling back into the interior of the island to search for Iwasa. Meanwhile Iwasa also bit off more than he could chew with a counteroffensive targeting the Piva trail. In the end the marines not only repelled the attacks, but also greatly expanded their perimeter. We also spoke about the battle of Changde seeing the forces of Yokoyama crush multiple Chinese armies and unleash chemical and biological warfare in the area.

This episode is the Battle of Sattelberg

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Vice Admiral John Henry Towers the commander of pacific air force circled a plan to recapture Wake island and use it as a springboard to latte assault the Marshalls that were around 500 miles south. Admiral Spruance favored opening a new campaign much father southeast, where the fleet could count on more land base air support in the south pacific. Spruance wanted to launch an offensive into the Gilbert Islands, some 600 miles southeast of the Marshalls. Admiral Nimitz was swapped by this and in turn twisted King’s arm. And thus was born Operation Galvanic, the simultaneous capture of the Ellice islands, the Gilbert Islands and Nauru set for November 15th. Since his victorious return from the battle of Midway a year earlier, Admiral Raymond Spruance had privately longed for a major command at sea. But it was an admirals way to lobby for a job and he would not be surprised when Nimitz told him one morning in May of 1943  “There are going to be some changes in the high command of the fleet. I would like to let you go, but unfortunately for you I need you here” Spruance replied “Well, the war is an important thing. I personally would like to have another crack at the Japs, but if you need me here, this is where I should be.” The next day the two met again and Nimitz said “I have been thinking this over during the night. Spruance, you are lucky. I’ve decided that I am going to let you go, after all.” Nimitz reported to King the new assignment during their meeting in San Francisco a month later. On May 30th, Spruance received the rank of vice admiral and shortly after was detached from the CINCPAC staff and placed in command of the Central Pacific Force, later to be designated the 5th Fleet. It would be the largest seagoing command in the history of the US Navy. 

Spruance would have little more than four months to plan the largest and most complex amphibious operation yet attempted. Naval forces and landing troops would be taken from far flung parts of the south pacific and USA mainland. His key commanders had not yet been identified. Spruance immediately recruited a chief of staff with a lot of experience and initiative, his old friend and shipmate, Captain Charles “Carl” Moore. Moore had been serving in Washington as a member of Admiral King's war planning staff. Spruance asked Moore to select other key staff officers, poaching many from naval HQ. Moore would arrive to Pearl Harbor on August 5th and took up a spare bedroom in Nimitz and Spruance house atop Makalapa Hill.

Now Spruance was the type of manager that delegated everything possible, he once said “Looking at myself objectively, I think I am a good judge of men; and I know that I tend to be lazy about many things, so I do not try to do anything that I can pass down the line to someone more competent than I am to do it.” Moore was perfectly fine with this philosophy. Some would say Spruance was a bit lazy, the man did seem to bore rather easily and was a compulsive walker, often spent days just walking, grabbing staff with him. Moore wrote about such an instance once that occurred a few days after he arrived to Hawaii  “Raymond is up to his tricks already, and yesterday took me on an eight mile hike in the foothills. It was hot and a hard pull at times, and particularly so as we carried on a lively conversation all the way which kept me completely winded.” On this occasion Moore tried to talk to Spruance about operation Galvanic, but Spruance kept changing subjects. A few days later Moore would write to his wife “Yesterday Raymond stepped up the pace and the distance and we covered over 10 miles in three hours. My right leg caught up with my left and both were wrecked by the time I got back. . . . If he can get me burned to a crisp or crippled from walking he will be completely happy.” Spruance wanted Kelly Turner to command his amphibious fleet. Turner at that point held a year of hard experience in the South Pacific. He was the navy's preeminent amphibious specialist. Spruance knew the man well both at sea and at the Naval War College. Spruance told Nimitz in Juen“I would like to get Admiral Kelly Turner from Admiral Halsey, if I can steal him,” However with the northern Solomons campaign in high gear, Halsey was not too keen to release Turner. Nimitz sent a personal note to Hasley explaining that he had been ordered to wage a new offensive in the central Pacific: “This means I must have Turner report to me as soon as possible.” Unfortunately for Hasley, Turner also took some of their best staff officers with him.

Major General Holland Smith would command the invasion troops, designated the 5th amphibious corps or ‘VAC”. Smith was one of the pioneers of amphibious warfare. He had persuaded the navy to adopt Andrew Higgen’s shallow draft boats as landing craft and successfully trained several divisions in amphibious operations over at Camps Elliot and Pendleton in California. He fought hard to get combat command in the Pacific and was backed up by Secretary Knox and Admiral King. Nimitz did not know the man well, but Spruance had worked with him in the 1930’s when they were both stationed in the Caribbean. Turner and Smith would make quite the combustible pair. Both men were aggressive, ambitious and quite overbearing. They were both used to running things without competition. Both were prone to fits of rage and this earned them the nicknames “terrible turner and Howlin’mad’smith”. At Guadalcanal Turner once offended General Vandegrift by infringing upon his command, this led Spruance to wonder “whether we could get the operation planned out before there was an explosion between them.”

Smith had met Kelly Turner once in Washington and he found the admiral to be precise and courteous, describing him as “an exacting schoolmaster, affable in an academic manner. He could be plain ornery. He wasn’t called ‘Terrible Turner’ without reason.” For Operation Galvanic, Turner expected to be above Smith in the chain of command. This was consistent with how Operation Watchtower went about. But Smith wanted direct command of all amphibious troops throughout the operation, prior, during and after the landings, and he wanted to directly report to Spruance. Spruance wanted nothing to do with such arguments and because of his laissez-faire style this meant Moore would be acting as referee between Turner and Smith. Here is what Moore had to say of it “Holland Smith particularly complained about Kelly Turner. He was a whining, complaining type. He loved to complain. He loved to talk and loved to complain, and he would come and sit on my desk and growl about Turner. ‘All I want to do is kill some Japs. Just give me a rifle. I don’t want to be a commanding general. Just give me a rifle, I’ll go out there and shoot some Japs. . . . I’m not worried about anything else around here.’ See, that kind of a line. I was trying to soothe him down, and Turner would come and complain about that blankety-blank Smith, couldn’t get any cooperation out of him, and so forth.”Through these referee’d battles a compromise was met. Turner would be in command of the landing forces until the shore commander went ashore and assumed command of the troops. When turner was informed, all the troops ashore would fall under the command of the 5th amphibious corps and thus report to Smith. This model was accepted by both men and would remain in force throughout the Pacific War. 

So at this point its important to note the US Navy had still not fully recovered from the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, and was still in the process of building the largest fleets the world had ever seen. You have probably heard this phrase many times: “World War Two would be won through British brains, American brawn, and Russian blood.” As said at the Tehran conference of December 1943 by Joseph Stalin. That brawn was simply incredible. From the start of the war until the end of 1943, the US would commission 7 aircraft carriers, the Essex, Lexington, Yorktown, Bunker Hill, Intrepid, Wasp and Hornet. Of the new Essex-class, 9 light carriers would be commissioned the Independence, Princeton, Belleau Wood, Cowpens, Monterey, Cabot, Langley, Bataan and San Jacinto. Of the new Independence class there would be 35 escort carriers, no worries not going to list them all haha. There would also be 6 new battleships the South Dakota, Indiana, Massachusetts, Alabama, Iowa and New Jersey; 4 new heavy cruisers, the  Baltimore, Boston, Canberra and Quincy; 16 light cruisers, 212 destroyers, 234 destroyer escorts and 92 submarines. To match this in the same period, Japanese commissioned two aircraft carriers the Junyo and Hiyo; one light aircraft carrier the Ryuho; 4 escort carriers the  Unyo, Chuyo, Kaiyo and Shinyo; 2 superbattleships the Yamato and Musashi; 4 light cruisers the Agano, Oyodo, Noshiro and Yahagi; 22 destroyers, 15 destroyer escorts and 61 submarines. Thus it was absolutely clear, the Americans had a significant advantage in naval production. 

On September 4th, the 5th amphibious corps of Smith were officially established. Smith proceeded to train and control the units assigned to operation Galvanic which included Major General Julian Smith’s 2nd Marine division and Major General Ralph Smith’s 27th division, that's a lot of Smiths. As the 5th amphibious force and corps were still undergoing organization during the planning phase of the Gilberts operations, much of the burden for tacticaling planning fell initially onto the staffs of the two divisions involved. Julian Smith was informed in august his job was to capture the Tarawa and Apamama atolls. Ralph Smith was told he was to invade Nauru, but Holland Smith believed Nauru offered too many problems. Nauru was 390 miles west of the Gilberts and would place strain on available shipping. Simultaneous landings in the two places would further widen the dispersal of supporting fleet element, a dangerous division of forces in view of the presumed possibility of a Japanese naval counterattack. Finally, the terrain on Nauru would make an amphibious assault and the land fighting extremely costly to be warranted by the strategic advantages to be gained. Makin Atoll was considered no less suitable than Nauru as an air base for operations against the Marshalls and was thought to be considerably less well defended. Makin was also only about 105 miles north of Tarawa making it possible to concentrate the supporting fleet in one area and thus avoid the danger of excessive dispersion. So in early October, Spruance and Nimitz made the decision to invade Makin Atoll instead.

Unfortunately the Americans did not have great intelligence on the Gilberts, so they had to do some photographic coverage of Tarawa and Makin between July and October 1943. The USS Nautilus contributed a lot to the intelligence effort by obtaining hydrographic and each conditions for both atolls, such as their surfs, reefs, beaches, lagoon entrance, current data, tidal data and so forth. The unsexy logistical stuff no one talks about. If you want to invade a beach, you have to know about said beach. During September and October a total of 16 former residents and travelers of the islands were attached to Turners staff to help out. Many of these were Australian, New Zealanders, Fijian naval reserve officers, officials of the Western pacific high commission, Australian army reserve officers and enlisted men and a few civilians. Another source of information was given by Lt Colonel James Roosevelt who had taken part in the raid upon Makin.

For the landings at Makin, Turner’s task for 54 and 53. He would have at his disposal 4 destroyer transports, one Cargoship, one LSD and 9 LSTS to transport the reinforced 165th regiment of Colonel Gardiner Conroy. He would be supported by the 7th army defense battalion, detachments of the 105th infantry regiment, 27th division, units of the 193rd tank battalion, 152nd engineer battalion, coastal artillery and anti-aircraft batteries of the 98th and 93rd Coastal artillery battalions, a platoon from the 5th Amphibious corps reconnaissance company, sundry medical, signal, ordnance, quartermaster and bomb disposal detachments. Their screening force would be 4 older battleships, 4 heavy cruisers, 13 destroyers and 3 escort carriers.

The Tarawa force would be given one destroyer transport, 1 attack transport, 12 Destroyer transports, 3 AKA’s, one LSD and 12 LST’s under Rear Admiral Harry Hill, screened by 3 battleships, 3 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers, 21 destroyers and 5 escort carriers. Turner would also make a legendary decision. He appointed Colonel Eareckson, the veteran of the Aleutian Islands campaign to be commander of the support Aircraft, thus establishing a centralized system of ground control for support aircraft in amphibious operations. Eareckson became famous for his innovative tactics such as using radar equipped B-17’s to guide P-38’s to attack Kawanishi flying boats during the Aleutian islands campaign. He also pioneered low level bombing raids through the brutal aleutian weather. Aerial support, both at the tactical and strategic level would be provided by Rear admiral Charles Pownalls carrier task force 50 formed around 6 lage and 5 small carriers and by Rear admiral John Hoovers shore based aircraft; consisting of task groups 57.2/3/4. Both forces had to destroyer aircraft and air/harbor facilities at Tarawa, Mille, Jaluit, Makin and Nauru while simultaneously providing air support. Hoover also was responsible for conducting photographic reconnaissance over the Marshalls.

After the air strikes and naval bombardment obliterated the Japanese defenses and installations, Turner planned to assault the beaches with the troops ferried using amphibian tractors, followed up by LCVPS and medium tanks in LCMS. For Tarawa, Ralph Smith’s plan was a bit more elaborate and extreme, he was going to attempt something never done before. The amphibious assault of Tarawa had unique problems. There was no immediate means of achieving depth of deployment. The landing forces would initially be pinned down on a long narrow beach. The island offered basically no room for flank maneuvers and the aerial and naval bombardments would do little. Ralph assigned a major role to troops of a different regiment than the one that made up the main landing force. Detachments X and Y, of the 3rd Battalion, 105th Infantry and 193rd Tank Battalion,  led by Maj. Edward T. Bradt would be the first to land on the west coast of Butaritari, designated Red Beaches. This would be followed up quickly by the 1st and 3rd Battalions. On the right, the 3rd Battalion Landing Team would land on Red Beach 2 and seize the right half of the division beachhead to about 1,600 yards inland. Then they would move right to clear the area around Ukiangong Village and Ukiangong Point. Over on the left, the 1st Battalion Landing Team would land on Red Beach 1, seize the division beachhead in its zone of action and move left to capture the area from the north end of Red Beach to Flink Point.

Meanwhile the reinforced 2nd Platoon of Company G, 165th Regiment, and 19 marines of the 4th Platoon of the 5th Amphibious Corps Reconnaissance Company were going to land on Kotabu island, lying just north of Flink point. This would secure the seward approaches into the lagoon. After two hours while the troops consolidated their beachhead the Z detachment of the 105th regiment led by Captain William Ferns would land on Yellow beach 2 on the north side of the island between On Chong’s and King’s Wharfs. The detachment would split into two groups, one heading east to clear Kings wharf the other west to clear On Chong’s wharf. After this a wave of the 165th battalion would advance west.

Comparing the two, Julian’s plan was a lot more simple, it called for the landing at Betio of 3 battalions; the 2nd battalion, 8th marines, 2nd battalion and the  2nd and 3rd battalions 2nd marines. Colonel David Shoup and Colonel Elmer Hall would lead the 3 battalions.The 1st battalion, 2nd marines would be held in reserve. The corps reserve for Tarawa, Makin or Apamama would be Colonel Maurice Holmes 6th marines. Once the beachhead was secured, troops would advance across the island to the south, seizing the airfield and mopping up enemy positions along the major beaches

To further prepare for Operation Galvanic, Admiral Pownall led three carriers, the Lexington, Princeton and Belleau Wood to strike the Gilberts on September 18th. Supported by 38 Liberators flying out of Canton, Funafuti and Guadalcanal, Pownall made 6 separate and unopposed air strikes against Tarawa. A ton of fuel and ammunition was destroyed, several buildings were wrecked and a small freighter was sunk. Attacks on Makin saw three flying boats lit on fire with some damage done to shore installations. What was more important than these strikes was the photographic coverage that accompanied them. Zero fighter interception was found at either, though two Japanese medium bombers were shot down northwest of Makin. According to the diary of a Japanese laborer, 28 laborers were killed during a strike on Makin, most likely from a direct bomb hit to a shelter. On Beito they hit a runway, though it would be quickly repaired. Pownall tried to keep the strikes going but now saw an interception from 18 zeros which shot down 5 of his aircraft. 

To follow up the raid on the Gilberts, Admiral Montgomery hit Wake with one of the largest carrie strike forces to date. The Essex, Lexington, Yorktown, Cowpens, Independence and Belleau Wood with support from land based aircraft hit Wake on October 5th and 6th. Over 67 Japanese planes were reported to be destroyed in the air and on the ground. Shore installations were also battered heavily. Then beginning on november 13th, land-based bombers of Admiral Hoover made nightly raids against Tarawa, Makin, Nauru and some central Marshall islands. Meanwhile between November 13-17th, Major General Willis Hale’s 7th air force's heavy bombers flew 141 bombing sorties against the Gilberts and Marshalls. They dropped over 173 tons of bombs, destroying at least 5 Japanese aircraft and inflicting heavy damage to their facilities and installations.

Against the Americans, the Japanese forces in the area initially were that of Rear Admiral Abe Koso’s 6th base force operating on Kwajalein. Koso commanded the 61st guard unit on Kwajalian, 62nd guard unit on Jaluit, 63rd guard unit on Taroa, 64th guard unit at Wotje,  65th guard unit at Wake, 43rd guard unit at Nauru, a detachment of the 63rd guard unit at Ocean island and another detachment of the 51st guard unit on Makin. For the Marshalls he had the 22nd air flotilla consisting of 46 Zeros, 40 kates, 3 vals, 5 flying boats and 11 reconnaissance aircraft. The raid of Makin back in 1942 alerted the Japanese to its significance so they sent the 6th Yokosuka SNLF to help occupy the Gilberts. During the spring of 1943, the IJN created the 3rd special base force of Rear-Admiral Shibazaki Keiji who would defend Tarawa, Makin, Apamama, Nauru and Ocean island. The Sasebo 7th SNLF would be sent to Tarawa, the 2nd Yokosuka SNLF to Nauru. The Japanese went to work on Makin and Tarawa constructing concrete and log emplacements for guns of all sizes. They used coconut tree logs to build tank barricade, tank pits, laid underwatch obstacles and dugouts for riflemen and machine gunners. On Makin the airbase was expanded and by july 1943 was able to take land based bombers. The Marshalls, Marianas and Carolines alongside other islands would be reinforced in preparation for expected American offensives. Four new south sea detachments were formed and tow mobile amphibious brigades that would be used for counterlandings. The Japanese were outmanned and outgunned, but they would make the Americans pay in blood for every inch of land, island by island. Now it is time for us to travel back to Green Hell as the allies were preparing to hit Sattelberg.

By November 9th, the Australians knew the Japanese had two out posts west of Jivevaneng, at Green and Coconut ridges with another strong patrol base at Steeple Tree Hill. Whitehead decided to deploy the 2/24th battalion on the right to guard the enemy along the Palanko road; the 2/48th would take up the center advancing along the sattelberg road supported by the 1st tank battalion and the 2/23rd would take the left advancing along Sisi. Major General Frank Berryman would be appointed the new commander of the 2nd corps, as General Morshead was appointed commander of the New Guinea Force. The date for the new offensive was set for November 17th. A preliminary advance was made by a company along the sattelberg road to seize the enemy held Green Ridge. Under the support of heavy machine gun and artillery fire. 

 

At 8:20am two batteries and the company of the 2/2nd machine gun battalion fired upon Green Ridge. Captain Isaksson’s company of the 2/48th then moved up, but were unable to properly follow up the bombardment. The men advanced at a slow rate up the ridge because of thick bamboo. Both the nearby near and far features were strongly defended and would only be captured by 10 and 12:4-pm respectfully. The capture of the Far feature took the machine gunners 26,000 rounds to keep the enemy heads down for the infantry to storm their positions. Captain Brocksopp’s company occupied Green Ridge, Isakssons took White Trunk Tree lying on the junction of Sattelberg road and the Sisi track by 1:40pm. 5 men were killed in the process, 18 Japanese died on Green Ridge.

At first light on November 17th, four Matilda tanks led by Major Samuel Hordern led the way to the start line converted under the noise of a deadly rocket barrage. Beginning at 6:30am  rocket propelled bombs were fired from jeeps. These 30 pound bombs had a maximum range of 1200 yards. Several of them ended up being duds, but those that did explode had a very lethal effect, killing within a radius of 50 yards. On top of this came artillery and mortar bombardments, until Horderns tanks began smashing Coconut ridge with the infantry close behind them. A company of the 2/23rd would find Sisi unoccupied and continued north to help defend Green Ridge. Around 50 yards up the track the Australians found the first signs of opposition, a heavy machine gun post. The tanks fired blindly at the enemy defenses, mostly pillboxes and foxholes. Despite the terrifying attack, the Japanese held their ground and replied using machine guns, mortars and grenades, until the tanks blew them and their defenses to pieces. Halfway to Coconut ridge, the Matilada’s had to halt to refill their ammunition. Within all of the excitement, the tank crews had run out of ammunition for their Besa guns. The Besa’s had been firing bursts of around 50 rounds when they could have been firing 10s. Three deeps loaded with ammunition at Jivevaneng rushed forward as the tanks backed up some 60 yards to protect their approach. All of this was coordinated using walkie talkies, an absolutely crucial technology of the war.

Meanwhile the 2/24th continued north to attack Japanese positions along the Palank road and to the south the 2/23rd met resistance halfway to Steeple Tree. At 10:20am, Horderns tanks were resuming their advance, eliminating pockets of resistance one by one. Upon reaching the Kunai Knoll on the southern Coconuts, two Matilda’s became disabled. Upon seeing the halting tanks, the Japanese unleashed as much firepower as they could pinning down the infantry alongside their tanks. Lt Colonel Robert Ainslie ordered the men to advance on without the tanks. The men stormed the slopes of the Kunai Knoll, forced to crawl forward under heavy fire. It became a fierce battle, the Australians were unable to make much ground and forced to dig in for the night. Two companies dug in on the slopes of the Kunai Knoll while a third dug in near White Trunk Tree. Despite the terrifying tank attack, the Japanese did not flinch and fought throughout the day to halt the Australian advance. However during the night the Australians unleashed an artillery bombardment forcing the Japanese to abandon the ridge.

The next morning, the Australians found the ridge abandoned and went to work repairing the two disabled tanks so they could continue the advance. Three more Matildas wielding 2 pounders and 3 inch Howitzers were brought up. The 2/2rd now advanced towards Mararuo, pushing the Japanese up a spur. The tanks advanced again, allowing the Australians to go another 250 yards until they were met again with heavy resistance. The Japanese held very strong positions upon the 2600 foot Steeple Tree Hill. Their system of defense was to have positions at every possible line of approach near bamboo obstacles. The Japanese would wait to fire until the infantry were just a few yards away to cause maximum damage. Armed with 37mm anti-tank guns the Japanese did all they could to neutralize the tank menace. By nightfall the attackers were forced to pull back to Coconut ridge and during the night the Japanese launched counter attacks using grenades and small arms. 

The next morning at 8am the Australians resumed their advance. The tanks led the way, but they were met with extremely fast and well coordinated anti-tank measures. At around 100 yards from the start line, the advance was halted by an anti-tank ditch 6 feet wide and 4 feet deep. Major Moodie’s engineers of the 2/13th field company were able to dislodge the tanks and soon the tanks were overrun an 81mm mortar position. The tanks ran havoc upon a Woodpecker and two light machine gun positions, then after another 150 yards ran into another tank ditch around 10am. Lt Farquhars platoon charged past the tanks to give the engineers room to dislodge them only to see the tanks hit another ditch when they came forward again. The men fashioned two fougasses out of 4 gallon drums filled with petrol to hit the defenders of one of the slopes later to be named Fougasse Corner. A fougasse by the way is a projectile weapon, typically using a 40 gallon drum with a flammable substance like petrol. They would be inclined and when triggered using an explosive charge, shot a flame going perhaps 10 feet up, 3 feet wide for about 30 yards. Picture a really big flamethrower burst. This was unleashed on the slope causing roughly 20 casualties. The Japanese would leave 46 of their dead abandoning the slope when the Australians charged into them. The Japanese then launched a counterattack against the Fougasse Corner leading to more casualties, but were repelled. To the north, the 2/24th launched an attack on a knoll near the summit of the 2200 Feature. After an artillery bombardment, Lt Caples platoon took the unoccupied knoll, but soon the Japanese began encircling them. They fought until 2:30pm when the Australians finally established a secure position on the knoll.

Meanwhile, General Katagiri was preparing to send the 79th regiment to attack the mouth of the Song River. Katagiri was facing a dire supply situation. Although 2-3 barges came up daily to bring supplies to Kanimi and Lakona, once the supplies landed they had to be carried overland and that was the crux of the problem. The main roads, Kanimi to Ago to Lakona to Wario to Sattelberg and secondary roads leading to Zageheme and Merikeo were all steep and mountainous, taking 5 days to traverse. This led the supply line to the front lines to be inconsistent. From the Diary entry of an unknown Japanese infantry man at Sattelberg October 15th "I eat potatoes and live in a hole and cannot speak in a loud voice. I live the life of a mud rat or similar creature" At the same time the 2/15th battalion had sent a diversionary force led by Major Newcomb with orders to "in conjunction with the opening of the attack towards Sattelberg… you are to command a diversionary force, broaden the apparent front of the attack on Sattelberg by simulating a new threat towards Wareo" The 2/15th set out on November 17th and reached Garabow the next day. They began bombarding it to  cause the distraction. This was done to support Whiteheads offensive while in the east Brigadier Porter was going to cut the enemy’s main supply line by attacking along the coast. Porter sent the 2/32nd battalion to take some high ground at Pabu.

On November 19th, the 2/32nd were able to seize Pabu, avoiding any enemy, finding the hill unoccupied. The next morning the 2/32nd began patrolling and found large numbers of Japanese 500 yards to their west, and that said enemy then found them. Katagiri feared a possible attack upon Bonga so he decided to launch a secondary counteroffensive on November 21st. Meanwhile the 2/48th resumed their advance, this time without Horderns tanks who could not traverse past 250 yards because of bamboo obstacles. By 9:30am the tanks were able to bypass the obstacles and caught up to the infantry. At 10am, Whitehead gave the order “Go ahead as fast as possible” and 50 minutes later the skirmishing began upon the first enemy positions. The Australians pushed on slowly in a sluggish battle but were able to capture Steeple Tree by the late afternoon. At the same time the 2/23rd were trying to drive the enemy away from the southern approaches to Steeple Tree, gradually linking up with the 2/48th. 

To the north the 2/24th once again found themselves halted. The Japanese had created strong bamboo obstacles along the slopes that were difficult to traverse. In an attempt to force the issue, Wootten committed another troop of tanks to assist the 2/24th, but it would take a lot of time before the Matildas could climb the 2200 Feature. But the Japanese were caught between two enemy forces and were forced to pull back to Sattelberg during the night. The next morning the 2/48th resumed their advance while the 2/23rd patrolled towards Mararuo. Meeting no opposition the troops moved ahead quickly. At 4:35pm the enemy unleashed machine gun fire at point blank range upon them. The 2/48th tossed mortars and their tank support who crushed the enemy defenses, rapidly overwhelming the enemy, sending them scattering. But on November 22nd, Katagiri finally launched his counterattack using the bulk of the 79th regiment against Porters positions along the Song. Katagiri also sent the Fujii detachment led by Lt Colonel Fujii to attack Pabu. It just so happened Davies Company  had left Pabu to search for the main Japanese supply road, and they came across Horace’s Hoof in the afternoon. A company sized force of the Fujii detachment began their attack forcing Davies company back towards Pabu. But that is it for New Guinea as we now need to travel over to Bougainville.

Generals Geiger and Turnage ordered a group of naval and marine engineers with construction personnel led by Civil Engineer corps officer Commander William Painter to construct airfields in the interior of the island. They were escorted by units of the 21st marines and used aerial photographs to find an area about 3 miles inland, roughly 1 mile beyond the defensive perimeter where suitable sites were located for two airstrips to be made. Unable to expand the perimeter properly because of the swamps around them, Turnage directed the 21st marines to establish a strong outpost at the junction of the East-West and Numa Numa trails to cover the new airfield sites. On November 13th, the inexperienced 2nd battalion, 21st marines of Lt Colonel Eustace Smoak set out with E company in the lead. Unbeknownst to them, Colonel Hamanoue had just realized the tactical value of said junction and sent a battalion to occupy Coconut Grove the previous day. The men had managed to establish a solid defensive perimeter. 

At 11:05 Company E ran right into an ambush. The Japanese unleashed machine gun and mortar fire with sniper support from the treelines. E companies commander sent a report back to Colonel Smoak, one of many panicked and incoherent reports he would receive from said company. This was the first combat experience for the 2nd battalion, 21st marines. Smoak rushed forward and established his command post close to the action. He ordered F company to relieve E company who had suffered heavy casualties. F company however, advanced too far to the right and suffered a lot of casualties in a disorganized manner. Unable to get artillery support, Smoak ordered his units to begin digging in for the night. The next morning, 5 light tanks of the 1st battalion, 21st regiment came up to support Smoak. While Smoak organized his forces, a air strike hit the Coconut grove area at 9:05am consisting of around 20 Avengers carrying 100lb bombs using 1 second delay fuses. The marines then performed an artillery barrage before resuming their advance upon the grove. The Japanese fired upon the tanks, managing to disable two of them. At this point Smoak ordered the disorganized assault to halt and began regrouping his men to attack again. This time they were able to break the Japanese resistance and by late afternoon established a perimeter around the Coconut Grove. The marines found 40 dead Japanese, the baptism under fire for the 2nd battalions, 21st marines cost them 20 dead men and 39 wounded.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

Operation Galvanic was being prepared and in the meanwhile, a large number of air raids were hitting numerous places in the central pacific. The advance to sattelberg was getting closer day by day, the boys on Bougainville were finding inhospitable Japanese around every corner. 

- 103 - Pacific War - The Counterattack on Bougainville, November 7 - 14, 1943

Last time we spoke about the naval battle of Empress Augusta Bay. Operation Cherry Blossom kicked off taking the Japanese by complete surprise. All of the diversionary actions had managed to confused the Japanese into thinking the Shortland Islands were the real target. Wilkinsons flotilla managed to land 14,000 men and 6200 tons of supplies at Cape Torokina. When the Japanese finally received news of the landings they tossed massive air attacks and prepared a counter landing force. The air attacks were not nearly enough to put a dent on the unloading process. Vice admiral Omori set out to intercept the Americans, but was caught off guard by Admiral Merrills figure 8 maneuver that saw two Japanese warships sunk, many heavily damaged and hundreds of Japanese killed. The Japanese tried a second time to hit the Americans, but Admiral Halsey unleashed his carriers to quell the action.

This episode is the Counterattack on Bougainville 

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Things were looking bad for the Japanese at the start of the Bougainville campaign. Many Japanese lay dead on the island from the futile attempt to counter the landings. In the depths of Empress Augusta bay lay other bodies and warships. Rabaul was being pulverized systematically. The Japanese needed to dislodge the enemy from the island lest it become another Guadalcanal. General Turnage’s marines had successfully made their landings and now they would expand their perimeter. The naval battle of Empress Augusta Bay combined with Admiral Sherman’s carrier raid against Rabaul’s harbor had delivered a crippling blow the IJN’s power in the region. Admiral Kusaka’s air force at Rabaul had been reduced to 270 aircraft including the last minute 100 aircraft he was loaned from the IJN carriers. To make matters worse, on November the 5th, Admiral Halsey received a new task group led by Rear Admiral Alfred Montgomery. Task Group 50.3 consisted of carriers Essex and Bunker Hill; light carrier Independence and destroyers Edwards, Murray, McKee, Kidd, Chauncey and Bullard. On November 8, the destroyers Stack, Sterett and Wilson were also given to this group, though they would be withdrawn by November 14.

These new carriers were packing heat. Essex carried 36 Hellcats, 36 SBDs and 19 TBFs; Bunker Hill 24 Hellcats, 33 SB2C Helldivers and 18 TBFs, plus 24 Corsairs ran CAP for her from Ondoanga and Segi Point; Light Carrier Independence carried 24 Hellcats and 9 TBFs, plus  12 Hellcats (CAP from Ondoanga and Segi Point). With all of that Halsey had an additional 45 torpedo bombers, 69 dive bombers and 120 fighters to continue putting the hurt on Rabaul. The only catch for all of this was Halsey lacked an adequate destroyer screen to protect these super weapons, thus he would be unable to fully utilize them until a bit later on.Halsey was also reinforced with Rear-Admiral Laurance DuBose’s Cruiser Division 13 consisting of light cruisers Santa Fe, Birmingham, Mobile and Biloxi; and destroyers Harrison, John Rodgers, McKee and Murray. Admiral Merrill’s exhausted task force was given some much needed R&R beginning on November 7th. 

Back over at the beachhead, General Vandegrift was so certain the operation was 100% successful he handed the keys to the car to Turnage and returned with Admiral Wilkinson to Guadalcanal, of course he was about to receive a promotion and would soon be on his way to Washington. Turnage now sought to expand the beachhead further inland to give the marines more defense in depth, as it was expected the Japanese would launch major attacks to dislodge them. He shifted the 3rd Marines, whose units had suffered the most casualties thus far to the left sector of the beachhead. He then moved the more fresh 9th marines to the right where he believed was the most likely area the Japanese would hit the hardest.

Still meeting no enemy resistance, these shuffling actions were accomplished by November 4th. Simultaneously many units also extended the perimeter. By the end of November 3rd, the 2nd raider battalion extended their part of the perimeter 1500 yards or so. The only real action anyone saw for awhile was patrol skirmishes and some fighting over roadblocks. The 2nd Raiders were under the temporary command of Major Alan Shapley who took responsibility for a few roadblocks; companies rotated out of their positions every couple of days. The key roadblock positions were found along the Piva and Mission trails. The 3rd raiders were working out ways to lure out a small group of Japanese holding out on Torokina island. On November 3rd, 3rd defense battalion and a 105 mm battery of the 12th marines fired upon the small island for 15 minutes. The 3rd raiders followed this up to storm the suspected Japanese position to find nothing but corpses. An outpost was established by M company of the 9th marines far to the left of the main perimeter which was hoped to guard against surprise attacks coming over the Laruma river.

Turnages patrols at this point became a daily chore for all units on Bougainville. These patrols would go on for 20 grueling months. The thick undergrowth and lack of well defined trails made it extremely easy for the Japanese to set up ambushes at their leisure. Thus to combat this, the marines had to turn to some very good boys, K9 companies. The war dogs used their superior senses to hunt and track down the enemy during patrols. During the early stages of the Bougainville campaign the dogs were able to locate a number of small groups of Japanese. The Bougainville campaign despite being a warzone would not see as brutal fighting as say places like Peleliu. On Peleliu many of the war dogs literally were driven mad, but for Bougainville the dogs had a less intensive time. The patrols scouted as far north as Laruma and south to the Torokina River finding no meaningful resistance.

By the 5th of November, the perimeter was extended inland a further 3 miles. Now 5 battalions were manning a 10,000 yard front, with the bulk of the raider battalions located on Puruata island and at cape Torokina in the reserves. Wilkinson’s convoy would bring over another 3548 troops of the 21st marines and 5080 tons of supplies on November 6th. Because the beaches were already so cluttered up with supplies everything and they still lacked developed facilities, the incoming LST’s had to land their cargo on Puruata island where there was open beaches. There was still no shore party to organize the unloading and a supply jam would hit the smaller island just like it was on Bougainville. Turnage now had nearly 20,000 men to man a pretty small beachhead.

On the other side, the Japanese were under the belief, no more than 5000 Americans hand landed on Bougainville, getting those guadalcanal vibes aren't we? Admiral Kusaka still sought to send over the specially trained amphibious 2nd mobile raiding unit of Major Miwa Mitsuhiro, 1000 men strong. He hoped to perform a counter landing north of the American beachhead. If the special unit could disrupt the marines enough perhaps the Iwasa detachment could march overland to join up and together they would dislodge the Americans. On the 6th the destroyers Amagiri, Uzuki Yunagi and Fumizuki departed Rabual carrying 475 of the special unit with 375 support troops. The small convoy was escorted by Admiral Osugi’s destroyer squadron consisting of Urakaze, Kazagumo, Wakatsuki, Makinami, Naganami, Onami and Hayanami. Fortunately for them, the naval force managed to sneak past a PT Boat guard force of 8 PT boats operating out of Puruata Island.

On November 7th and 4am the IJN destroyers doubled back and unloaded the troops onto 21 landing barges to make a run for the beach. The 8 PT boats operating patrols in the area had established a new base on Puruata island, but not a single one of the discovered the Japanese landing force. Sailors aboard one of the PT boats reported seeing a strange craft, which might have been one of the barges and consequently a PT boat did check out the report. Yet before it arrived the Japanese were already landed ashore and about to charge into the left flank of the perimeter. The landing craft was seen by a Marine anti-tank platoon along the beach, but they did not fire upon it, thinking it to be American. Thus in the end the amphibious assault was a complete surprise to the Americans. The small Japanese force had landed on the beaches between the Laruma and Koromokina rivers. Not only were the Americans surprised, the Japanese were also surprised to find out the American perimeter extended further west than expected, as a result they would be unable to assemble into a unitary force before a firefight broke out.

The Japanese had landed so close to the marine beachhead, the 5th company, 54th regiment were cut off from the Laruma outpost at 6am and were forced to attack the left flank of the perimeter. The Japanese raiders came ashore scattered along two miles of beach on either side of the Laruma River. Major Miwa Mitsuhiro gathered the men he could and sought to take advantage of the element of surprise they held. At 6:30am a skirmish broke out against Company K’s 3rd platoon. The platoon had been out patrolling inland towards the Laruma river right at the same time as the landing. The platoon ran right into the force killing some japanese before the platoon leader disengaged realizing the size of the enemy. He took his men into the swamps going eastward, it would turn into a 30 hour grueling adventure. Company K of the 9th marines then were attacked by company 5 of the 54th regiment in a 5 hour long firefight. The guns of the 12th marines and the 90 mm anti-aircraft weapons of the 3rd defense battalion managed to fire upon the invaders who were forced to pull back to some captured foxholes. Company K then launched a counterattack. They found the Japanese dug in 150 yards west of the Laruma river. Fierce fighting broke out, but Company K could not dislodge them.

At 1:15pm companies B and C of the 1st battalion, 3rd Marines came in to relieve the exhausted defenders and launched an attack through Company K’s position. Major John Brady’s men attacked the Japanese in the entrenchments. Company C hit the right flank as B hit the left. Both ran into heavy machine gun fire. The men requested tank support and soon the tanks 37mm were firing upon the Japanese at point blank range causing tremendous casualties. Meanwhile the 1st battalion of the 21st marine led by Lt Colonel Ernest Fry had just landed on Puruata island and they were given orders to spearhead a new assault upon the Japanese. Two LCPRS were sent to evacuate the Laruma outpost and by the night time the marines and Japanese were having shouting matches as they fired upon another. The Japanese yelled "Moline you die" and the Marines made earthy references to Premier Tojo's diet. Marine Captain Gordon Warner was fluent in Japanese, so he could quickly reply to the Japanese, apparently he even yelled believable orders prompting a bayonet charge. He would receive the Navy Cross for destroying machine gun nests with a helmet full of hand grenades, but lost a leg in the battle. Sergeant Herbert Thomas, would give his life near the Koromokina. His platoon was forced prone by machine-gun fire, and Thomas threw a grenade to silence the weapon. The grenade rebounded from jungle vines and the young West Virginian smothered it with his body. He posthumously was awarded the Medal of Honor. The attack would come to a halt, to allow a strong bombardment to hit the Japanese positions provided by the 12th marines.

The following morning saw another bombardment by 5 batteries of the 12th marines before Lt Colonel Fry led two companies through the 3rd marines position to attack. They crashed into a concentrated area around 300 yards wide and 600 deep. Light tanks supported the attack. However they would only find slight resistance alongside over 250 dead Japanese. Major Miwa had pulled the men out heading further inland to try and join up with Major General Iwasa Shun’s soon to be counteroffensive. The battle cost the marines 17 dead and 30 wounded, but took a hell of a toll on the Japanese. After this action the defensive line behind the Koromokina Lagoon was strengthened. On november 9th, allied dive bombers hit the area to clear it of possible Japanese infiltrators. Patrols in the area would find more Japanese dead and the Marines would ultimately claim over 377 dead Japanese. Over on the Japanese side, the Iwasa Detachment were marching towards the Mission and Numa Numa Trails. These two positions would allow them to thwart a lot of the possible American advance, which they still believed were smaller than they actually were. 

Back on November 5th the E company of the 2nd raiders had skirmished with some Japanese at the Piva Trail roadblock. The actions alerted Colonel Edward Craig and he ordered most of the raiders to head north to support the position. On November 7th, Colonel Hamanoue Toshiaki led the 1st battalion to hit part of the roadblock managed by H company. This would be occurring simultaneously with the amphibious assault on the Koromokina. H company supported by some mortars from the 9th marines were able to beat off the attack, giving Major Alan Shapley’s G company enough time to come and reinforce the position. By the afternoon, the raiders were forcing the Japanese to retreat over to Piva village where they dug in. Hamanoues men then began to use their new position to fire mortars and artillery into the marine perimeter. The next day, General Iwasa ordered two battalions to attack the position supported by a mortar barrage. However the swamp land on either side of the trail prevented proper flanking maneuvers so the Japanese were forced into a frontal attack. Companies E and F easily repelled the attack receiving aid from the 3rd raiders. The Americans formed a horseshoe defensive formation connecting the roadblock to the main perimeter. The new position was reinforced with mortars from the 9th marines and some light tanks of the 3rd tank battalion. The Japanese suffered heavy casualties for their efforts. E and F company then attempted flanking maneuvers through the treacherous swamps and did manage to hit the Japanese. The heavy fighting eventually resulted in a stalemate and both sides pulled back. The marines had 8 deaths and 27 wounded while it is estimated the Japanese had 125 deaths.

On November 9th Major General Roy Geiger arrived at Bougainville to take command of the 1st Marine amphibious corps. Turnage now turned his attention to clearing the Piva Trail as it could threaten the building of the planned airstrips. He ordered the 2nd battalion, 9th marines led by Lt Colonel Roert Cushman into a support position and two raider battalions to clear the trail. Beginning at 7:30am on the 9th, artillery of the 12th marines began to pound the area as the Raiders advanced forward through the narrow trail between the two swamps. Some Japanese had survived the artillery bombardment and began moving 25 yards within the marines position. The raiders ran directly into them beginning a firefight. The action saw a series of thrusts and counter thrusts at point blank range. The Japanese were trying to breakthrough the marine defenses just as the raiders were coming up to smash them. It was fierce fighting and Private 1st Class Henry Gurke of the 3rd raiders was maning one of the tow man foxholes in the forefront that met the attack. To protect his partner Private 1st class Donald Probst firing with a BAR, Gurke pushed Prost aside and tossed himself over a grenade that was thrown into their foxhole. Gurke was killed, saving his friend. Probst would receive a Silver Star Medal and Gurke posthumously received the Medal of Honor. As the brawl raged on Colonel Craig sent in his reserves to check a flanking maneuver right of the roadblock. The marines gradually overcome Iwasa’s men causing them to pull back again to Piva village.

By midafternoon, the Marines reached the junction of the Piva and Numa Numa trails and would dig in for the night. The marines suffered 12 dead and 30 wounded, while patrols would counter over 140 dead Japanese bodies. If accurate this meant the Japanese had suffered 500 casualties during this four-day combined counteroffensive. To strengthen their new position, bombers from Munda began bombing the 50 yard area on either side of the Piva trail going as far north as Piva village. Afterwards the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 9th marines settled into new defensive position along the Numa-Numa trail and began tossing patrols forward. Meanwhile Turnage and Geiger were seeing the arrival of the first echelon of General Beightlers 37th division. Wilkinsons transports landed the 148th regiment, 5715 troops and 3160 tons of supplies. In response Kusaka tossed 15 Kates and 60 zeros to try and hit the transports during the afternoon. They managed to land a hit on the transport Fuller, killing 5 men and wounding 20, but ultimately it did nothing much. The beach situation had improved a bit, so the 129th and 145th regiments, some 10,277 men were beginning to land alongside 8500 tons of supplies between november 11th and 12th. Im sure by hearing these numbers for the landings you are already realizing how dramatically things had shifted for the allies in the Pacific. There was no way for Japan to challenge such landings at this point, the Americans were simply out producing them in every imaginable way. 

Admiral Halsey now sought to smash Rabaul again on the 11th. He planned to launch a three pronged air raid. Sherman’s and Montgomery's carriers from the south and General Kenney’s bombers from New Guinea. Yet terrible weather hit New Guinea as it typically dose, preventing Kenney’s aircraft from participating. Thus the carriers would go it alone. Sherman launched his aircraft in the vicinity of Green island 225 miles from Rabaul. Shermans aircraft ran into 68 Zeros over the harbor. The bombers tried to hit the already damaged heavy cruisers Chokai and Maya, but missed. However within the inner harbor was the light cruisers Agano, and single torpedo landed a critical hit, blowing off a large portion of her stern, flooding her engine room. Montgomery launched his aircraft 160 miles southeast of Rabaul. Essex and Bunker Hill tossed 80 aircraft each, Independence tossed 25 and 24 additional Corsairs came to provide CAP. Lt Commander James Vose led 33 Curtiss SB2C Helldivers, the new dive bomber replacing the Dauntless throughout the fleet. The Naganami was hit by a torpedo and forced to be towed into the harbor. The Suzunami was hit by a dive bomb attack and would sink near the entrance to Rabauls harbor. Strafing from the fighters and bombers inflicted additional damage against light cruiser Yubari; and destroyers Urakaze and Umikaze. 6 zeros were also shot down.

While Shermans pilots had managed to withdraw from their raid using rain squalls, Montgomery’s group would not be so lucky. Admiral Kusaka responded to the raids by launching one of the largest anti-carrier strikes of the War. The wave consisted of 11 G4M bombers, 27 D3A dive bombers, 14 B5N torpedo bombers and 67 Zeros. Despite radar alerts of the incoming air strike, Montgomery decided to get his aircraft aloft and perhaps carry out another strike. Montgomery was confident in his CAP and his task force was operating a new carrier formation. The carriers were grouped together rather than separated, forming a triangle in a 2000 yard circle with 9 destroyers spaced around evenly around 4000 yards. They would also be utilizing new anti-aircraft fuses. The Japanese pounced on the task force in a battle that would last 45 minutes. The CAP engaged the zeros while the Japanese bombers tried to hit the carriers. Bunker Hill suffered 5 near misses, one one puncturing the hull of the Essec in a number of places. Independence received 4 near misses. It was minor damage and it came at the cost of 2 zeros, 14 kates and 24 vals, absolutely terrible for the Japanese. The action did however stop Montgomery from launching a second strike. In just a week Kusaka had lost 43 zeros out of 82; 38 vals out of 45; 34 kates out of 40; 6 D4Y Susui “comets” out of 6 and 86 pilots out of 192. Such losses were absolutely crushing. Admiral Koga would be forced into a terrible situation later with the invasion of the Gilberts due to a shortage of aircraft. Koga was forced to pull out his surviving carrier planes from Rabaul and replace them with inferior planes and pilots from the Marshalls. But that's it for Bougainville for we are now traveling back to the China theater. 

At dusk on November 2nd, General Yokoyam began his offensive into the Changde area. His 39th division advanced southwest of Yidu, followed by the 13th division headed to Nanmu; the 3rd division with the Sasaki detachment headed for Wanjiachangzhen; and the 68th and 116th divisions plus the Toda Detachment attacked the Anxiang. After routing some smaller forces out of the way, the 13th and 3rd divisions attacked the 79th army along the Nanmu-Wangjiachangzhen line on november 5th, while the 116th and 68th divisions hit the 44th army near Anxiang. Commander of the 10th army group, Lt General Wang Jingjiu assembled the 66th army at Niajiahezhen and ordered Major General Wang Jiaben to resist the enemy at all costs. The Chinese were absolutely crushed by the two Japanese divisions and were forced to retreat towards Moshi with the Japanese in hot pursuit. 

Meanwhile the 116th and 68th divisions hit both flanks of Anxiang breaking General Wang Zuanxu’s lines held by the 29th army. Zuanxu had to order a withdrawal and from that point the 116th pursued the 44th army towards Jinshi where they annihilated a small part of the unit. To the north on November the 9th the Miyawaki Detachment was advancing to Nanmu and the Sasaki detachment to Xinguanzhen, white the 3rd and 13th divisions were catching up to the 79th army in the Moshi area. The 13th division attacked Moshi while the 3rd division attacked Xinmin. During this battle the 79th army was effectively destroyed as a fighting force. After this, Yokoyama ordered the 3rd division and Sasaki detachment to attack Shimen where the 73rd army was defending. Yokoyama also ordered the 116th division to attack Chongyang and for the 68th division to advance by river towards Hanshou. This was all done in preparation for the upcoming attack against Changde, being defended by Major General Wang Yaowu’s 74th and 100th armies.

On November 14th, the Japanese offensive hit Shiman, seeing the defeat of the 73rd army in just two days. On the 19th, the second phase of the offensive began with the 3rd division joining up with the 116th to attack Chongyang. Simultaneously, the 13th division and Sasaki detachment began an occupation of Tzuli. On the 21st the assault of Chongyang began seeing the 51st and 58th divisions of the 74th army crushed. From Chongyang the Japanese forces immediately began an advance towards Changde. The 13th division met tough resistance from the remnants of the 29th army group led by Wang Zuangxu. The Chinese were able to utilize the mountainous terrain to their benefit hitting the Japanese with artillery. The 68th division defeated the 100th army at Hanshou and then annihilated its remaining survivors around Junshanpuzhen. This left only Major General Yu Chengwan’s 57th division defending Changde. 

Unbeknownst to Yokoyama, General Xue Yue had dispatched reinforcements led by Lt Generals Li Yutang and Ou Zhen to try and halt the Japanese offensive. By November 23rd, Yokoyama’s assault on Changde began. The 3rd, 68th and 116th divisions surrounded the city. Two days later the 30,000 Japanese began attacking Yu Chengwan’s brave 8300 defenders. The defenders were hit with artillery and aerial bombardment. With each attack the Chinese were pushed back little by little until they only held 300 meters around their main command post. Yu Chengwan’s only hope was to hold on until the reinforcements arrived to try and make a breakthrough, but by December the 1st the 3rd and 68th divisions performed a pincer attack defeating them. On December 2nd, Yu Chengwan was forced to evacuate the city.

Changde fell on the 3rd of December and Yokoyama celebrated the success by ordering chemical and biological units to attack cities in the region. Whenever the Japanese found too much resistance they had Unit 516 deploy chemical weapons in liquid or gas forms including mustard gas, lewisite, cyanic acid gas and phosgene. Some of the weaponry was still in experimental stages. Artillery was used to launch shells filled with the gas into cities inflicting massive civilian casualties. Most of the artillery shells contained mustard gas and lewisite. The effect of the chemical weapons caused massive panic to both humans and livestock. Its alleged bubonic plague was also deployed and spread within a 36 km radius of Changde city. It is estimated 300,000 civilians would be killed in Changde alone, alongside 50,000 soldiers. The Japanese began to withdraw on December 9th, but by this time Ou Zhen launched a counteroffensive and managed to reclaim the city. By December 24th, the 11th Army returned to their original positions, for the Japanese it was another hit and run offensive, aimed to cause massive death. The Japanese suffered 1274 deaths and 2977 wounded, though these are their claims and they most likely lost more. The Chinese estimated 14,000 had died with 10,000 being captured. 

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

The Japanese counteroffensive against the Marine beachhead on Bougainville was not going according to plan. Admiral Halsey gave Rabaul another crushing air raid and now the Japanese air power in the pacific was dwindling dangerously. Within China the horror of Japan and their chemical and biological units continued. 

- 102 - Pacific War - The Battle of Empress Augusta Bay, October 31 - 7 November, 1943

 

Last time we spoke about the invasion of the Treasury Islands. The time had come to begin operations against Bougainville, but in order to do so the allies had a few tricks up their sleeves. In order to make sure the landings at Cape Torokina at Empress Augusta Bay went safely, the allies would perform raids against Choiseul and the Treasury islands. It was hoped such actions would work as a diversion and confused the Japanese as to where the real operations were aimed. The landing on Mono saw some New Zealanders and Americans annihilate a 200 strong Japanese garrison. On Choiseul Paratroopers boldly raided a force 6 times larger than them. The raid was a success and thanks to John F Kennedy the Paratroopers were grabbed off the island before the Japanese could obliterate them. In the end the landings at Cape Torokina were a success and now a battle would be unleashed. 

This episode is the battle of Empress Augusta Bay

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

So last time we covered the planning behind Operation Cherryblossom, the landings at Cape Torokina. As a means of confusing the enemy, the allies also chose to invade the Treasury islands and raided Choiseul. With Operation Cherryblossom in full swing, so begins the Bougainville campaign which we are going to be diving into now. At the end of October, after successfully invading the Treasury islands and the extremely bold attack upon Choiseul where the Paratroopers were outnumbered 6-1, combined with General Kenny’s 5th air force and AirSols neutralizing Rabaul and nearly every airfield on Bougainville, the landings at Cape Torokina were finally launched. In a final act to aid operation cherryblossom, Admiral Sherman’s Task force 38 departed Espiritu Santo on October 28th and Admiral Merrills Task Force did the same from Florida island on November 1st. They hoped to rendezvous near the Buka Passage three days later so they could prepare an attack against the Buka and Bonis airfields. 

During the morning of November 1st, Admiral Merrill’s cruisers arrived to their station and began firing upon the arifields. Then Sherman’s carriers arrived off Buka passage to launch two separate air strikes. The first airstrike consisting of eighteen fighters, fifteen dive bombers, and eleven torpedo bombers hit Buka just after daylight. The second consisting of fourteen fighters, twenty-one dive bombers, and eleven torpedo bombers hit Buka again at midmorning. The airstrikes managed to shoot up a number of small ships within the harbor. Meanwhile after firing 2700 5 and 6 inch shells all over Buka and Bonis’s airfields, Merrils task force 39 departed the Shortlands to bombard Poporang, Ballalo and Faisi. 

On November 2nd, Sherman performed air strikes against Buka and Bonis’s fields before departing south for Guadalcanal. Within those two days the Americans estimated they had destroyed around 30 aircraft and several small ships at the cost of 11 aircraft lost. The attacks had rendered the two Japanese airfields closest to Empress Augusta Bay basically unusable for when the landings would be made. The Japanese were now convinced that any invasion of Bougainville would have to be countered with all the aircraft and ships available within the southern theater. Yet they could not concentrate their entire naval and air forces against the Solomons, because the American and Australian forces on New Guinea would most likely be performing a landing on New Britain at any moment. Admiral Koga also expected the Americans to attempt a landing in the Gilbert or Marshalls. Thus the two pronged allied strategy was serving to freeze the Japanese army units within the New Guinea and Solomon areas. 

Meanwhile Admiral Wilkinson’s task force 31 were making final preparations for transport the 3rd Marine division. The amphibious assault would be facing a landing area defended by roughly 270 men. Once they overcame them, a defense perimeter would have to be hastily made because it was certain the Japanese commander on Bougainville would hammer them hard. General Vandergrift's plan was to land the 3rd and 9th marine regiments of Colonel George McHenry and Colonel Edward Craig and the 2nd raider battalion of Lt Colonel Joseph McCaffery abreast on 11 designated beaches covering a distance of 8000 or so yards. The 3rd raider battalion lt be Lt colonel Fred Beans would land at the same time on Puruata island to overcome an estimated 70 Japanese defenders there. Wilkinson wanted to land the forces abreast as quickly as possible and to have the transport unload the supplies off the bay by nightfall because he expected a rapid Japanese response, similar to what had occurred at Savo island. 

On October 28th, General Turnage’s men departed the New Hebrides in 20 combat transports and cargo ships commanded by Commodore Lawrence Reifsnider. The convoy proceeded using different routes, hoping to prevent the Japanese from discovering the size of their force, the three transport divisions would rendezvous with Wilkinsons destroyers by October 31st. Once linked up they would approach Bougainville under the cover of naval PBYs and Liberators. During the morning of November 1st, Minesweepers led by the destroyer Wadsworth were sent in to clear mines from the landing areas and to determine how dangerous the shoals were. The minesweepers found no mines, but did find plenty of uncharted shoals. Wadsworth radar confirmed that Cape Torokina’s position within their naval charts was misplaced. Wadsworth had a number of tasks ahead of her. In addition to helping with the fire support at a range of around 3000 yards, she was to use her radar to confirm the actual location of Cape Torokina, Puruata island and the landing beaches. The coast of Bougainville had been chartered by the German Admiralty in 1890. The Germans had placed Cape Torokina and Mutupina Point around 9 miles southwest of their actual locations. Thankfully the submarine USS Guardfish reported that the air force and naval charts had misplaced Cape Torokina by around 7 miles and this is why Wadsworth was sent to investigate. Unsexy logistical stuff, but gravely important, as you don't want to waste any time during an amphibious landing searching for a lost beach. Wilkinson decided not the land the men until after daylight when it was possible to detect the offshore shoals.

Shortly before sunrise, the minesweepers and destroyers began their bombardment. The Sigourney and Wadsworth fired at ranges of 13,000 yards upon Puruata Island, while the Terry bombarded closer to the shore of Cape Torokina. As each transport passed the cape, they fired 3 inch anti-aircraft guns hoping to hit Japanese positions or at least minimize their artillery. By 6:45am the transports began arriving off the beaches around 3000 yards from the shore. At 7:10am the LCVP’s began taking men ashore. Simultaneously Wilkinsons destroyers began systematically bombarding the perimeter while 31 bombers from New Georgia bombed and strafed the landing areas. Within a few minutes around 7500 troops, roughly half of the total force were scrambling ashore and unloading with great speed and smoothness. The preliminary bombardment had failed however to smash the well concealed Japanese machine gun nests located on the southern beaches. These machine gun nests unleashed their lead upon the landing craft. The landing craft bearing a third of the force had immediately come under fire from Puruata island and some pillboxes on Cape Torokina. The 3rd raiders in particular were hit by machine gun fire from Puruata. Around 4 land craft were sunk from this, 10 others were badly damaged, over 70 men would be lost in the process. 

The 9th marines landed themselves on 5 beaches to the north and were lucky to find little resistance from the Japanese. Once ashore they sorted themselves out quickly and began to move inland to discover the terrain was a nightmare. The beaches where they were led straight into some impassable swamp land. Nevertheless where there is a will there is a way, the marines began using fallen logs and debris to traverse the swamp until they came across some solid ground. By midmorning they would establish a narrow perimeter and began patrolling the greater area. They would establish a strong outpost on the Laruma River by 1pm. The boat crews were experienced a lot of issues with the high surf, combined with a lock of experience amongst them. Some of the LCVPS found themselves smashing into another, some dropped their men in deep water, some did not lower their ramps properly and the marines were forced to toss themselves over the sides into waist deep water. More than 30 landing craft were wrecked during the initial phase of the operation. Around 64 LCVPS and 22 LCMS were beached, many with damage beyond repair. 

The 3rd marines and 2nd raiders would have a hell of a time landing. The 3rd marines landing south of the Koromokina river, they had no issues with shoals, nor the high surf, but they had landed directly in front of the main Japanese defenses. There was roughly 300 Japanese, but they did not have permanent defenses along the beaches of Yellow 2, Blue 2, and Blue 3. As the 3rd marines landed they began fighting with some Japanese killing many and sending them fleeing into the Jungle. Patrols were quickly organized who worked alongside the 2nd raiders patrols to fan out. The raiders upon landing found tougher resistance in the form of a reinforced platoon operating out of two bunkers and trenches located 30 yards inland. Once the raiders had blasted out the bunkers, the remaining Japanese began to retreat into the jungle. Like the 9th marines they would find swamp lands ahead of Yellow 1 making it difficult to advance. By midmorning the raiders reached the Buretoni Mission Trail. The main Japanese resistance hit the men who landed at Blue 1, just adjacent to Cape Torokina. There the Japanese had constructed 25 large and small log and earthen pillboxes around the perimeter of the cape. There were trenches connecting the pillboxes, some of the larger pillboxes measuring 6 feet by 6 feet, containing 75mm field guns. Each pillbox was covered by earth and camouflaged using jungle plants. Only 3 pillboxes had been hit by the naval and aerial bombardments prior to the landings. When the Americans hit the beaches in the area they immediately were forced to charge into the enemy bunkers. The Japanese 75 mm gun at Cape Torokina caused havoc upon the attackers. It was a well placed log and sand bunker and its approaches were protected by two smaller bunkers with a series of trenches manned by numerous Japanese. Sergeant Robert Owens of A company, 3rd marines grabbed 4 marines and charged the two small bunkers directly upon the mouths of some machine guns. The marines entered an emplacement through a fire port and drove the gun crew out. The surrounded trenches concentrated their fire on the brave marines, Sergeant Owns would be found later dead riddled with bullets. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for the action. Lt Colonel Joseph McCaffery was immediately mortally struck four times in the chest as he led the marines forward, he was replaced temporarily by Major Alan Shapley for the 2nd raiders.

Despite the horrible losses the Americans cleared the Japanese positions and pushed further inland to pursue and kill the fleeing defenders. It is worthy to mention over 24 Doberman Pinschers, the official dog of the USMC between 1943-1945 from the 1st marine dog platoon proved invaluable during this point of the battle. The dogs were able to point out hidden snipers concealed in underbrushed. 549 War dogs would return from the war with only 4 not being able to return to civilian life, all very good boys. The 3rd raiders landing at Puruta had nearly all their boats shot at, but it was mostly small machine gun fire and did little to no damage. The Japanese had 3 or 4 deep well sandbagged emplacement on the seaward side where their machine guns nests fired upon the raiders. It took the raiders two hours upon landing to secure their beachhead around125 yards inland. Beans committed his reserves early in the afternoon, supported by some 75mm guns borrowed from the 9th marines, they moved halfway across the island, encountering sporadic Japanese sniper fire. The Japanese were outnumbered, by 3:30pm their resistance all but ended. The marines suffered 5 deaths and 32 wounded, around 29 dead Japanese would be found. They estimated another 70 Japanese escaped to Bougainville. 

Soon after all the landing craft began to pull out, the Japanese began launching air strikes. For around two hours the transports and supply ships were zigzagging for their lives to evade dive bombers and fighters coming from Rabaul. The first air strike consisted of 9 Vals and 44 Zeros, they hit at around 7:35am almost immediately after the landings were made. General Twinning’s 8 Kittyhawks and 8 P-38s managed to fight them off, downing 7 Japanese aircraft. The Wedsworth received a near miss during the battle. 10 minutes later, AirSols beat off another attack taking down another 8 Japanese aircraft. During the last attack, roughly 70 Japanese aircraft came in around 1pm and were met by 34 AirSols fighters. After all three attacked, the Japanese has used around 120 aircraft and lost 26, inflicting no serious damage to allied ships nor the marines ashore. But the air attacks did result in major delays for the unloading of supplies for some hours.

To try and speed up the unloading process, Wilkinson stripped some men from the assault units to help unload cargo ashore. Additionally Wilkinson employed a method of light combat loading. It would take some days for the beaches to be fully sorted out, while the naval forces departed Empress Augusta Bay before nightfall to return to Guadalcanal. Thus 14,000 men and 6200 tons of supplies had been successfully placed ashore in 8 hours. By the end of the first day the marines had contested a ⅓ sector and reached their initial objectives, digging in uncomfortably for the night under torrential rain. The divisional perimeter was established by forward landing teams, who had very little to work with for maps. To the extreme left of the perimeter would be Company G of the 9th marines, who were in a vulnerable spot along the Lrauma river. Lucky for them the Japanese were quite disorganized and many were located southeast of Cape Torokina. At dusk there was only sporadic sniper fire directed at the ⅓ in the vicinity of the cape plantation and later an attack was made against the 2nd raiders at a roadblock they established along Mission Trail. General Turnage was now the official owner of a new lodgement on Bougainville.

Generals Imamura and Hyakutake were quite slow to react to the landings. They sent the Iwasa detachment led by Major General Iwasa Shun, commanding the 6th infantry group. Backing him up would be the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 23rd regiment. Their first task was to hit the new enemy beachhead. As predicted by the allies, Admirals Kusaka and Samejima mustered every naval and aerial strength they had to try and smash the invaders. As part of Operation RO, Admiral Koga had sent over 250 aircraft from the 5 carriers of Admiral Ozawa’s air fleet. Koga specifically stated the bulk of these were only going to be loaned for a short time, obviously they would have to return to the main fleet. Well the invasion of Bougainville certainly upset the plans, the planes would not be coming back on schedule. As Admiral Fukudome SHigeri, Koga’s Chief of staff would later note “although the planes were not originally to be used in such offensive operations, we could not just stand by and not employ them."

By midday on October the 31st, the Japanese had discovered the American task force that had departed Guadalcanal en route for Bougainville. The IJN were determined to interrupt the operation. Kusaka sent a cruiser-destroyer task force led by Vice admiral Omori Sentaro. Departing Rabual Omori had the two heavy cruisers, Myoko and Haguro; two light cruisers, Sendai and Nagara; and two destroyers. Now Omori was the commander of Cruiser division 5 of the Combined fleet, not of the 8th fleet. He just happened to be at Rabaul covering the movement of the 17th division at the time, he was given command of his division and the main strength of the 8th fleet. Omori sailed out at 3pm in the direction of the Shortland islands believing that to be the allied target. Poor weather hindered his force and his search planes failed to locate any allied ships. Thus by 9am on November the 1st he was on his way back to Rabaul. Yet right as his ships were turning around, suddenly they received reports that the Americans had hit the beaches of Cape Torokina.

Omori was quickly reinforced with a destroyer squadron and a destroyer transport group consisting of the Amagiri, Fumizuki, Uzuki, Yunagi and Minazuki each carrying 200 troops of a 1000 special trained raider group of the 17th division. This was the 2nd mobile raiding units from the 2nd battalion, 54th regiment led by Major Miwa Mitsuhiro. They were going to perform a counter landing against the marines at Mutupino point near the village of Toroko, due south of the marine beachhead. Within 6 hours, Omoro departed once again to hit the enemy fleet, but he lacked a real battle plan. At 6:30pm Omori rendezvoused with the transports at the St. George channel and together they proceeded towards Bougainville. At 7:20 the convoy was spotted by an american bomber who dropped a bomb nearly hitting the Sendai. Based on this Omori knew the Americans knew he was coming so he concluded a counterlanding was far too dangerous. Instead he decided to send the slower destroyer transports back to Rabaul. Omori believed the enemy transports were still in Empress Augusta Bay, thus if he could sneak in and destroy them, the marines would be stuck on the island without much of their supplies and without hope of quick rescue. 

Meanwhile Merrills task force 39 had retired to the vicinity of Vella Lavella, but soon received news of Omori’s incoming convoy. Halsey had to order his only naval force in the area to go out once again to protect the beachhead and intercept the enemy. Merrills crews had been at it for more than 24 hours by this point and were quite exhausted. Now Merrill’s force went in very cautiously, because they were aware the Japanese would be outgunning them and of course the IJN held the dreaded long lance torpedoes. Thus Merrill chose to detach his destroyers who would go out in front to see if they could intercept Omori’s forces before the long lances could be put to use. He intended to take the fight to the west of Empress Augusta Bay where he could block the enemy from the beachhead. He had his leading destroyers 3 miles ahead and deployed his forces along a north-south axis with the cruisers in the center, maintaining a range of 19,000 yards or more from the deadly IJN destroyers and their feared long lances. His plan was to exploit the offensive capabilities of his destroyers by letting them unleash their attacks before he would have his cruisers unleash their 6 inch guns. He hoped his destroyers would be able to sneak into range and hit the Japanese destroyers before they could launch their torpedo salvos.

Omori was at a disadvantage intelligence wise, he had no idea about Merrills forces whereabouts. Moreover he had to rely on spotter planes because he was forewarned their radar would give away their location to the enemy if used. As Omori would later tell interrogators  “We had some modified aircraft radar sets in action but they were unreliable. I do not know whether the sets or operators were poor, but I did not have confidence in them.” Thus he had no idea of the position or size of the American flotilla, still he believed the enemy transports were in the bay, though in reality they would be nearly 40 miles south.

Omori still lacking any real battle plan arrayed his force in three columns with his two heavy cruisers Myoko and Haguro in the center; Ijuins screen of light cruiser Sendai; and destroyers Shiratsuyu, Samidare and Shigure to the left and rear admiral Osugi Morikazu’s screen of light cruiser Agano; and destroyers Wakatsuki, Hatsukaze and Naganami. As the Japanese approached the area, task force 39 were sailing 20 miles west of the beachhead. Merrills flagship Montpelier was the first to make radar contact with the enemy at 2:30 on November 2nd. Omori’s fleet was 35,900 yards out. Merrill’s changed his course to head due north then reversed south with his cruisers to find a favorable position to try and cross Omori’s T. Merrill sent Commander Bernard Austins destroyed out to hit the Japanese southern flank while Captain Burke was ordered to take an intercept course that would force the Japanese to be in a vulnerable position for the destroyers to launch torpedoes into their left flank.

At 2:45am a Japanese aircraft finally spotted the Americans and began dropping flares over them to allowed the light cruiser Sendai to lead the northern column over. However by this point it was all but too late for the Japanese. Burke had closed in on their left flank and launched 25 torpedoes at Ijuin’s column. After launching the torpedoes Burke had his ships separate and it would be an hour before they could all be gathered again to form a full circle and return to their firing positions. The battle would be very chaotic, the US destroyers experienced a hard time trying to maintain contact with each other and several times would fire upon each other by accident. All 25 torpedoes would miss, because Omori ordered his ships to make a hard right turn.

At 2:50 the Samidare launched a full salvo of 8 torpedoes which missed their main targets but a single torpedo managed to hit the destroyer USS Foote blowing up a large part of her stern. Cruiser Cleveland and destroyer Spence would accidentally run into each other doing light damage trying to avoid the damaged Foote. Merrill could no longer wait for the results of the destroyer attacks and ordered his cruisers to open fire at 2:50am. Merrills cruisers would unleash a continuous fire using their 6 inch guns while maintaining a coordinated figure 8 pattern to confuse the enemy and avoid torpedoes. The tactic had been very well rehearsed and the commanders were perfectly in tune with another. James Fahey, a sailor aboard Merrill’s flagship Montpelier, described the long night illuminated by lightning, flares, star shells, and muzzle flashes. “The big eight inch salvos, throwing up great geysers of water, were hitting very close to us. Our force fired star shells in front of the Jap warships so that our destroyers could attack with torpedoes. It was like putting a bright light in front of your eyes in the dark. It was impossible to see. The noise from our guns was deafening.”

The Sendai was the first to be hit taking a 6 inch shell to her rudder before it exploded near her boiler rooms. Sendai experienced a series of explosions and quickly sank. The destroyers Samidare and Shiratsuyu behind the Sendai collided with another trying to evade the naval gunfire and would end up taking positions around the stricken Sendai already sinking by this point. Merrill then shifted the focus to the other two Japanese columns forcing Osugi’s column to head west running across Omori’s cruisers. The Hatsukaze tried to move between two heavy cruisers and collided with the Omori’s flagship Myoko at 3:07. Hatsukaze was so crippled by the collision she was much easier to hit as a result was found by Burkes reformed 45th destroyer division by 5:30am and 5 of the destroyers proceeded to batter her with shells until she sank at 5:40am. The Myoko meanwhile was hit by 6 shells, but fortunately for her 4 of them were duds, not causing enough damage to slow down the flagship.

Next the USS Spence and Thatcher ran into another, but were able to carry on the fight. Both sides were having trouble running into each other, Merrills cruisers performing the 8 pattern at high speed allowed them to evade most gunfire. At 3:20 Omori opened fire with his heavy armament, both torpedoes and naval gunfire from his cruisers. The torpedoes missed, but 3 dud shells hit Denver into her forward section, causing water to slow the ship down. The other cruisers were forced to slow their speed to match her. Light cruisers Columbia received a 8 inch shell hit, luckily it also failed to explode. The Japanese fire was becoming heavier and more accurate forcing Merrill to respond with a smoke screen in front of his cruisers. Merrill made sure to keep his distance from the Japanese. When their range closed in on 13,000 yards at 326 am he ordered a 180 degree turn to the north. The radical maneuvering by Merrills cruisers made it extremely difficult to accurately fire upon them, but also for Merrills cruisers to hit Omori’s. At 3:30am Omori decided to retire in the mistaken belief that his Long Lances had sunk or heavily damaged Merrill’s cruisers. Omori had received a false report claiming “one torpedo hit on leading US cruiser, two torpedo hits on second US cruiser, two torpedo hits on third US cruiser. Shell fire also reported on US Force.” In the meantime Burkes destroyers had re-entered the fray of battle and began firing upon the doomed Sendai. After they pursued the Shiratsuyu and Samidare but both destroyers got extremely lucky when Commander Austin confused Burke into believing that the ship he saw turning northwards was actually the Spence. By 4:00am the Sendai was sinking taking with her 185 crew. Ijuin and 311 other survivors would later be rescued on November 3rd by Submarine RO-104. The Hatsukaze would be the last to sink at 5:40am.

As dawn was breaking, Merrill urgently called for all available fighters to come to his aid as he expected the Japanese to toss the kitchen sink of air forces at him. Just before 8am a formation of 80 Zeros and 18 dive bombers arrived and began attacking his cruisers desperately performing anti-aircraft maneuvers. The allied aircraft were delayed by bad weather resulting in only 8 Hellcats, 1 marine corsair, 3 P-38s and 4 New Zealander P40s showing up. The allied pilots would claim to down 16 Japanese aircraft, though in reality it would only be 8. Merrills forces performing a defensive circular cordon would claim to down 17 further Japanese aircraft. The Japanese managed two hits, one causing minor damage to the USS Montpelier. The Japanese had lost their chance to stop the invasion of Bougainville. Merrills handling of the battle, particularly his figure 8 maneuver, had negated the dreaded super weapon of the enemy, the Type 93 long lance torpedo. It was to be the last major surface engagement of the Solomons area. Halsey would later reflect on the Japanese attempt to hit the landing forces at Cape Torokina  “was the most desperate emergency that confronted me in my entire term as COMSOPAC (Commander South Pacific).” Commodore Reifsnider was ordered to bring his transports back to Cape Torokina to resume the unloading. The unloading of the cargo would be completed by 3pm.

Vice admiral Omori’s force withdrew back to Rabaul. It was soon joined by four more cruisers and a number of destroyers from Truk. The reluctant Admiral Koga according to Admiral Fukudome decided to commit some of the very best units from the undamaged 2nd fleet “to cooperate with the carrier-based planes which had been sent from Vice-Admiral Ozawa’s fleet in order to check the [US] Bougainville operations.” 7 heavy cruisers, the Takao, Maya, Atago, Suzuya, Mogami, Chikuma, and Chokai; a light cruiser, the Noshiro; four destroyers; and a number of service ships would depart Truk on November 3. The once dominant IJN fleet so surely footed in the early days of the war now was hesitant and indecisive. Nevertheless, Koga would unleash another attack against Empress Augusta Bay. Koga placed the new naval force under Admiral Kurita who would attempt to intercept futher American forces enroute to Bougainville. On November 4th, Wilkinson would be bringing the 21st marines aboard 8 destroyer transports and 8 LSTs. 3548 men led by Colonel Evans Ames, alongside 5000 tons of supplies and equipment escorted by destroyers Waller, Saufley, Philip, Renshaw, Eaton and Sigourney. 

Halsey received word of the new Japanese force and realized the situation was critical. If Halsey did not turn back the incoming threat, his forces on Bougainville would not receive their planned reinforcements. Halsey was thus ready to take a risk, he was going to send carriers. As Halsey would later write “perhaps the success of the South Pacific War, hung on it being stopped.”. Against conventional wisdom, that carriers should not be exposed to land-based aircraft attacks, he ordered Rear Admiral Sherman’s task force built around the USS Saratoga and Princeton to face a force of possibly 200 Japanese aircraft. The risks for Hasley were personal as well as professional “I sincerely expected both air groups to be cut to pieces and both carriers stricken, if not lost. (I tried not to remember my son Bill was aboard one of them), but we could not let the men at Tokorina be wiped out while we stood by and wrung our hands.” Halsey’s Chief of Staff, Admiral Carney, recalled that before making the decision to attack with his carriers, his commander “suddenly looked 150 years old.” Shermans task for now designated Task Group 50.4 consisted of carrier Saratoga; light carrier Princeton; and destroyers Stack, Sterett, Wilson, Izard, Conner, Bell, Charrette, Boyd, Bradford and Cowell. He would be supported by General Twinings AirSols in any way possible. Halsey also requested MacArthur allow Kenney’s 5th air force to join in on the battle.

On November 5th, aided by some bad weather, a surprise air raid was performed against Rabaul. Sherman’s carrier force was 230 miles away from Rabaul near Cape Torokina when they began launching aircraft at 9am. The Saratoga launched 16 Avengers and 22 Dauntless. Princeton launched 7 Avengers. The carrier aircraft were escorted by 52 hellcats making a formation of 97 aircraft in all. This was their entire payload . The aircraft flew at a low level as they approached Rabaul anti-aircraft defenses by 10:20. They kept a tight formation, flying right through the flak which prevented the 70 Zeros from intercepting them properly. As we have seen during this series, the Japanese anti-aircraft guns were honestly pretty terrible. Added to this, the American aircraft enjoyed much better armor than their Japanese counterparts, particularly the Zero fighter.

Commander Henry Caldwell led the bombers towards Blanche Bay where they peeled off at 14,500 feet. The Dauntless dive bombed the targets before them as the Avengers time their approaches to hit the same targets at the same time. Within just 30 minutes the attack absolutely devastated the Japanese plans. Heavy cruiser Maya was trying to leave the harbor during the attack but took a 500 lb bomb hit to her catapult area which set off a series of explosions, blowing up her engine rooms and causing heavy casualties. As Maya was left fully disabled, the Mogami managed to clear the harbor but took a torpedo hit. Her number 1 and 2 turrets were flooded, forcing her crews to scramble to put out fires.  The Atago suffered three very near misses, which damaged her hull, armament, and machinery.  The Takao took a bomb to her starboard side, damaging her hull and machinery. TheChikuma received only slight damage and was able to depart for Truk at 20:38. The Suzuya, which was just preparing for refueling, tried to evade and was only slightly damaged. Aside from this the other light cruisers and destroyers did not receive any damage. 70 sailors died aboard the Maya, 23  died aboard the Mogami, Takao and Atago. Captain George Chandler, a P-38 fighter pilot described how “There were B-24 bombers up high and B-25 bombers attacking right down on the deck dropping ‘frag’ bombs on the airplanes along the runways … we did our best work at high altitude, but we also took part in combat a thousand feet off the ground.”

Taking advantage of Hasleys daring attack, General Kenney sent 27 B-24’s and 67 P-38s to bomb the warehouse area on the western side of the harbor. They were challenged by only 15 Zero’s who would lose two in the process. The Japanese facilities were wrecked by the attack. The Americans lost 5 bombers and 5 fighters while taking down 11 Zeros.

The cautious Admiral Mineichi Koga withdrew his forces back to Truk. The Japanese Naval threat to the invasion of Bougainville was ended. A Japanese naval officer later admitted that they had given up on Bougainville mainly because of “the serious damage received by several Second Fleet cruisers at Rabaul by carrier attack …” The success of the raid on Rabaul left Halsey ecstatic. “It is real music to me and opens the stops for a funeral dirge for Tojo’s Rabaul.”

Sherman grabbed all of his returning places expecting a Japanese counterstrike. A Japanese scout plane discovered Sherman’s task force around midafternoon and Kusaka immediately dispatched eighteen torpedo bombers after the Americans. At around dusk the Japanese discovered what they believed to be the task force and attacked. Although they later claimed a great air victory, in reality they hit at an LCI and a PT boat escorting an LCT back from Cape Torokina. A torpedo lodged in the engine room of the LCI and killed one man. That was the extent of the damage to the "task force." In return, the Japanese lost one plane. It was hardly an even exchange, and no compensation at all for the havoc wreaked earlier upon the 2nd Fleet. Halsey yet again showed what a formidable and aggressive commander he could be, his gamble paid off greatly. The Americans had secured their naval superiority in the South Pacific and it would remain that way for the rest of the war.

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Admiral Merrill performed an excellent battle against a larger IJN force. Admiral Hasley lived up to his reputation, he performed a bold gamble and it paid off big time. Now the Americans would dominate the South Pacific for the rest of the Pacific War.