The Pacific War - week by week

- 98 - Pacific War - Naval Battle of Vella Lavella, October 3 - 10, 1943

Last time we spoke about operation Se-Go and the continued drive on Finschhafen. The evacuation of Kolombangara, designated operation Se-Go showcased how the Japanese were becoming experts at large scale evacuations. Nearly 10,000 men were safely evacuated from Kolombangara at the cost of some barges. Then in New Guinea, the Allies became aware the taking of Finschhafen was not going to be a cake walk. In fact Wootten sent word to the other commanders that he believed he was facing the full 20th division at Finschhafen. The other commanders were sending their men through the Ramu and Markham valleys finding rearguards everywhere they looked. Rivers and ridges were being taken at a quick pace and Finschhafen was technically seized, but certainly not secured. Now the allies would have to attack the stronghold of Sattelberg. And Today we are going to see some action upon land and sea.

This episode is the naval battle of Vella Lavella

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

The Japanese had accomplished another astounding evacuation, managing to pull out nearly 10,000 men from the marooned and isolated Kolombangara. They managed this with limited craft and boldly under the nose of the enemy who enjoyed superiority over land, air and sea. Yet as you can imagine this certainly showcases how the tide of the war in the south pacific had decisively turned. Japanese naval operations were becoming increasingly concerned with evacuating troops as their positions grew hopeless. The campaign for the central solomons was falling apart for Japan, the invasion of Bougainville was imminent. However because of the evacuation of Kolombangara, one of its results would be the establishment of a staging base for barges and landing craft over at Horaniu, the northeast shore of Vella Lavella. 

Now in  last episode we spoke about the actions of the Tsuruya unit who were busy delaying Brigadier Potter’s New Zealander forces. The Japanese had their backs against the wall at Marquana Bay, holding by just a threat. They had little food or ammunition left with no possibility of re-supply or reinforcements. Despite insufficient resources, Admiral Samejima was determined to rescue the doomed Tsuruya unit. Samejima managed to convince Admiral Kusaka to carry out yet another evacuation, this time of Vella Lavella, slated for the night of October 6th. Before dawn on the 6th, Admiral Ijuin departed Rabaul with 9 destroyers divided into three groups. The first group led by Admiral Ijuin consisted of the Akigumo, Isokaze, Kazagumo and Yugumo. The 2nd group led by Captain Kanaoka Kunizo was aboard Fumizuki accompanied by Yunagi and Matsukaze and a transport unit of 6 barges, 30 folding boats and the transport Usaka Maru. The third group was led by Captain Hara Tameichi aboard the Shigure with Samidare as backup. A fourth group led by Commander Nakayama Shigoroku consisting of 5 subchasers, 3 vedettes and a barge would also depart Buin to help. Ijuin was to be the strike unit, Kanaoka the transport unit and Hara the Guard unit. Ijuin planned to have Kanaoka and Hara standing off Marquana Bay supported by the incoming 4th unit led by Shigoroku. Further support would be given in the form of 8 floatplanes that would try to bomb Potter’s men with 20 zeros providing air cover. 

During the morning of the 6th, Admiral Wilkinson received reports the Japanese might be attempting an evacuation of Choiseul. At that time his 10th echelon was underway transporting the IMAC advance base to Vella Lavella, leaving the only available force Captain Frank Walker with destroyers Selfridge, Chevalier and O’Bannon. Walker was just returning from a run up the slot passing by the Russells on his way home. Wilkinson sent word to Walker to pay specific attention to the coast of Choiseul as he passed around. During that afternoon, Admiral Halsey sent an alert to Wilkinson that the Tokyo Express was definitely about to make a run, but it was not to Choisuel, instead it was to Marquana bay. Wilkinson dispatched 3 destroyers from the 10th echelon, Ralph Talbot, Taylor and LaVallete with Commander Harold Larson to reinforce Walker around Sauka point to try and intercept the Japanese.

Shortly after sending the orders, Walk received further intelligence. At 7:30pm he learnt that an unknown number of destroyers, 3 torpedo boats and 6 subchasers were enroute, expected to be in the area by 10:30 with an embarkation time of 11:30. At 9:02 he was told that possibly 9 destroyers were coming. A few minutes later another report passed on by some B-25’s attacking buin stated they spotted 4 IJN destroyers or possibly Jintsu-class cruisers. Thus pretty uncertain of what was actually out there, Walker’s crews were warned to expect the worse and they would sound General Quarters by 7pm. 40 minutes later the 938th seaplanes began harassing them. At 9:50 Walker announced over the TBS “When we round the corner close the gap and be ready for anything. I want to get the fish off without guns if possible.” Wilkinson’s reinforcements only made it to the rendezvous point by 11:40, leading Walker to have to start the battle alone. Since the days of John Paul Jones, American naval lore had honored and applauded commanders who unleashed bold attacks on superior enemy forces, but in this case Walker would prove to be too rash. 

Walker took his force around the north coast of Vella Lavella that night and began scouting the area finding no sign of the enemy. Meanwhile Ijuins strike force followed by Hara and Kanaoka proceeded to their staging point arrived at 10pm. Minutes later a scout plan reported 4 cruisers and 3 destroyers northeast of Vella Lavella on a western course. The plane most certainly saw the Selfridge, Chevalier and O’Bannon coming up the slot but mistook them as cruisers. Ijuin ordered Konaoka to take his group west towards the Shortlands while he and Hara turned back to meet the enemy. However Hara’s force were a bit further west and having difficulty due to mist causing lack of visibility. at 10:30 the Americans made their first radar contact of the enemy and 5 minutes later lookouts aboard the Kazagumo sighted the Americans to their south. Consequently, Ijuin had just turned to port heading southwest to cross Walker’s bows, but he misjudged the distance and instead opened the range. Walker responded by increasing his forces speed to 30 knots to try and head off the enemy. Upon seeing this, Ijuin changed his course at 10:45 to south-southeast to close the range, then at 10:48 ordered a 45 degree turn south. These maneuvers actually worked to the Americans advantage, and upon seeing he was presenting an easier target, Ijuin ordered another simultaneous turn to port which staggered his ships in line abreast on a course opposite and nearly parallel to Walker with their range rapidly closing. The maneuvering blunder allowed the Americans to pull up to the nearest group of 4 IJN destroyers and launch a half salvo of torpedoes. Most of the torpedoes were fired at the Yagumo which was being mistaken as a possible cruiser. Commander Osako Higashi aboard the Yagumo ordered 8 torpedoes to be launched before the guns began to fire. The Americans opened fire with their guns after the torpedoes turning Yagumo into a burning wreck quickly. Ijuin tried to course correct again going south then west. 

But by this point, Hara had just made it to the battle at 11:01 the Americans saw his forces to their southwest and closed in to engage. This put Hara ahead and parallel to Walker giving the Americans the perfect position to launch another salvo of torpedoes. At the same time one of Yagumo’s torpedoes hit Chevalier detonating her No 2 Gun Magazine, blowing the ship in two. Her brigade and aft section swung across O’Bannon’s path forcing O’Bannon to ram into her starboard engine room. The force of the collision was mitigated by Commander Donald MacDonald who ordered an emergency full speed astern when he saw the explosion on Chevalier. Two minutes later a torpedo, most likely fired from Chevalier, hit Yagumo. At 11:06, one of Hara’s destroyers landed a torpedo hit on the Selfridge, shearing off her bow and wrecking everything from the bridge forward. In just 5 minutes, 104 American sailors were dead and 66 were wounded. Both sides continued the brawl, at 11:17 Ijuin still taking a westward course, ordered torpedoes to be fired at what he thought were cruisers, probably the O’Bannon and Chevalier. He received a claim that one was sunk, so he decided to break off the battle and head for home. Meanwhile Geoerge Peckham aboard the Selfridge believed he had been hit by torpedo boats and wildly ordered men to track where they might be. It was an age old naval case of both sides fighting ghosts ships basically.

Meanwhile Commander Nakayama’s group began to approach Marquana bay from the north and Wilkinsons reinforcements group led by Larson were arriving from the south as well. At 10:55 Larson had received ordered from Walker to execute “William” which was the codename for torpedoes and “dog” was naval gunfire. Larsons group passed Yagumo who was undergoing her death throes and by 11:40 the group was in the battle area. Larson could not make out a contact on enemy ships and by midnight simply headed for Marquana bay, seeing nothing but crippled ships. Chevalier was beyond saving so she was scuttled, Selfridge was able to be repaired by 3:15am and would make a slow but safe journey home. Walker notified COMAIRSOLS they needed air cover as Nakayama’s group passed east of the battle area but did not engage. Japanese barges began to load men as the 938ht floatplane harassed the New Zealanders artillery. Many New Zealanders reported hearing naval gunfire and what sounded like barges scraping against reefs. By 3:10am, Nakayama left for Buin with all 589 men of the Tsuruya unit.

The Americans captured 74 survivors of the Yagumo who were marooned at Biloa, while 27 others would make their way to Buin using motorized whaleboats. Ijuin had lost 179 men dead with 74 captured. On October 8th, Potter’s men determined the Japanese were indeed gone so they began occupying Marquana bay. Thus ended the battle of Vella Lavella.  The 1st battalion, 27th regiment landed at Ringi Cover on southern Kolombangara on October 6th finding 49 abandoned artillery pieces and some scattered Japanese who had been left behind. By October 15th Admiral Hasley declared operation Toenails terminated. Two days prior the Japanese had likewise terminated operation Se-go. Admiral Samejima would be forced to carry the blame for the loss of the central solomons. He went on the record to say this “The relations between the Army and Navy units in this area were extremely harmonious and satisfactory, and the foregoing is due to the character and judgment of Maj-Gen. Sasaki and Rear Admiral Ōta. However, because of my inexperience in commanding land operations, there were times when I failed to dispatch appropriate orders to Maj-Gen. Sasaki in conducting our operations. And the fact that there is evidence that I left the operations up to the arbitrary decisions of Maj-Gen. Sasaki to some degree clearly reveals the folly of placing a Naval Commander like me in charge of land operations involving Army and Navy units.” In the end his forces managed to hold back the enemy for nearly two months and he had pulled off a pretty incredible evacuation.

Operation Toenails was a success for the allies managing to secure 4 new airbases at Munda, Segi, Ondonga and Barakoma. These acquisitions would have a huge impact on future campaigns against Bougainville and Rabaul. Admiral Halsey would receive some criticism for underestimating both the terrain and enemy during operation Toenails. Major General Harmon went on the record to say “Munda is a tough nut –much tougher in terrain, organization of the ground and determination of the Jap than we had thought,.  The Japanese agreed; an intelligence report dated 11 August stated that the “reasons for the slow advance of the enemy in Munda, etc, are due to the courage of our forces and the difficult fighting in the jungle.” The allies learned some important lessons such as the necessity of adequate medial support; the implementation of effective evacuation procedures; close air support for ground troops; the effectiveness of naval gunfire support or lack thereof it; and the 3 most effective weapons against the Japanese; the 155mm gun, tanks and dive bombers. These 3 weapons would be put into effect on Bougainville. The central solomons campaign saw 995 US Army, 192 marine and 500 US navy death with 4407 wounded. The New Zealanders and Fijians received 200 casualties. For the Japanese it was estimated 4000 died with 4500 wounded. Now we need to head over to New Guinea.

General Vasey’s men were preparing for an assault against Dumpu, while being harassed by the infilitration specialists of the Saito Unit. The Saito units had performed infilitrations against Dakisaria and Marawasa. On October 2nd, while the bulk of the 21st and 25th brigades were establishing bridgeheads to cross the Gusap and Tunkaat river. The 2/7th independent company at this time were trying to cross the Ramu into Kaigulin where a Japanese outpost was. The outpost was guarded by the Saito unit, 80 men of the 10th company, 78th regiment supported by the 3rd company. The Saito unit gave them hell, forcing the commandos to cross the Ramu elsewhere trying to hook around their right flank. They managed to pull the flanking maneuver and in the battle killed 6 Japanese. Interestingly Lt R.D Watts decapitated a Japanese using a katana he had acquired in a previous battle, a case of the turntables. I am now realizing when I make this dumb joke many of you might not have watched the office, I must sound even dumber than I am. The following day, Brigadier Dougherty ordered his men to only patrol as he was waiting for Brigadier Eather’s forces to assemble in the Bumbum area. Yes, there is a place called Bumbum, I thought Nuk Nuk would be my favorite New Guinea area, I was wrong. 

On the morning of October 4th, Dougherty ordered the 2/14th towards Wampun and the 2/16th to capture Dumpu. By 2pm, Captain C.L McInnes lead a company of the 2/14th to find Wampun deserted which was expected. However the men had marched all day in the heat, without any water. McInnes company was sent to Karam to search for water. Another company followed McInnes company soon after and a mile or so out they came across a banana plantation. They saw some troops cutting down banana leaves and assumed it was McInnes men, however these were actually Japanese of the Saito Unit. The forward patrol were carelessly advancing towards the banana plantation when bursts of machine gun and rifle fire hit Colonel Honner and Sergeant Pryor. Pyror wounded in his chin and chest tried to drag his commanding officer back, but Honnor had taken a shot to the leg and could only crawl. Honnor began screaming to his men to figure out the position of the enemy and this led Private Bennet to lead a small party to do so. The Japanese continued to fire upon them and Honnor was hit in his hand to add to his misery. Luckily for them the 2/14th sent a rescue party to extricate Honnor. Honnor was moved to safety by 5pm as Colonel O’Day prepared to attack the Japanese at the banana planation. At 6pm O’day led two platoons to rush their position where they killed 11 troops and a Japanese officers, driving the rest to flee into the jungle. The next morning they would also kill a few stragglers, the action cost 7 australian lives of the 2/14th while killing an estimated 26 Japanese and taking a single prisoner.

Meanwhile the 2/16th had successfully crossed the Surinam River without facing any opposition. They sent a platoon ahead led by Lt Scott to check out Dumpu. At 4:40pm he reported back that it seemed Dumpu was still occupied. Major Symington led forward a company to prepare to attack Dumpu, but when they reached its outskirts they could visibly see Japanese fleeing the area. Thus Dougherty’s men grabbed Dumpu without a fight. General Vasey believed 78th regiment had failed to relieve pressure on the retreating 51st division, but unbeknownst to him, General Nakano’s men were already marching through the formidable Saruwaged range. The range had an altitude of 3000 meters where temperatures fell below 10 degrees. Anyone who tried to start a fire from the moss-covered wood would find it unbelievably difficult. Many men reported heating gunpowder from rifles to start fires. A lot of rifles were burnt away because of this. Their rations ran out quickly, leading to starving men turning upon the dead….and even the living. Private Kitamoto Masamich recalled “seeing three soldiers had pinned a trooper to the ground while one of them stabbed him in the heart with his bayonet. I watched shocked as the remaining three soldiers cut slices of the dead trooper’s thigh and began to devour the human flesh. I shouted at them as flies swarmed about their faces… They had become mad with hunger and fatigue.’ Kitamoto covered the corpse and moved on. Cannibalism reared its ugly head often for the Japanese, particularly in some parts of Burma by late 1945. 

Until now the 7th division was enjoying a pretty uninterrupted advance to Dumpu. The Benabena was pretty secure as well, but General Nakai was establishing strong defensive positions along the Kankirei saddle. This would soon turn the campaign in the Ramu valley and Finisterre range into a gritty holding operation. In the meantime, the allies were being directed towards the FInschhafen campaign, with General Herring ordering Vasey to hold the Dumpu-Marawasa area. There he was to establish a new landing strip at Dumpu and to not make any large advances. Only the 2/27th battalion of Lt Colonel John Bishop would be allowed to advance into the Finisterre foothills. Dougherty hoped the 2/27th might reach Kumbarum within the Finisterre foothills and during a torrential rainstorm they overran the area with no opposition. Bishops men patrolled around and found the enemy was occupying the key feature guarding the exists of the Faria and Uria rivers from some mountains northwest of Kumbarum. Under the cover of rain, Lt King took 8 men to scramble up the feature which panicked the Japanese there causing them to flee without a fight. Thus it was named King’s Hill and would become an important tactical position and observation post. Apparently Kings men had come up just when two battalions were changing their troops dispositions, and a platoon guarding King’s Hill had retired before even seeing the allied forces. Regardless a company was sent to the Boganon mountain area, that rose some 41000 feet.

The torrential rain caused a ton of delays for the construction of the new landing strip. In the meantime the 21st brigade patrolled as much as they could. The 2/16th and 2/14th patrolled west of the Mosia river finding no enemy. On the 6th, the 25th brigade sent patrols in all directions north of the Ramu Valley. They found signs of the enemy recently leaving the Boparimpum area; the same at Koram. Just a bit north of Koram, it looked like there was a Japanese outpost on some high ground. Patrols took care near this outpost as it was expected Japanese snipers were there, but when further prodded it seemed abandoned. The 2/2nd independent company patrolled the area of Sepu towards the Waimeriba crossing of the Ramu finding only signs the enemy had recently vacated the area. A small patrol skirmished with the enemy between Saus and Usini. Kesawai would be found unoccupied on the 5th. Overall it was concluded the Japanese had abandoned the Ramu Valley entirely. 

On the 6th, Generals Vasey and Wootten received a signal that the 2/2nd, 2/4th, 2/6th and 2/7th independent companies would become cavalry commando squadrons which did not sit well with the experienced commandos. Since the beginning of 1943, the term “commando” had been increasingly used to describe a member of an independent company. The term was quite alien to the Australian Army, and the tasks undertaken by independent companies since the beginning of the pacific war were not at all like that of what British commandos did. In the short space of two years, the independent companies had built up a proud tradition  and the men regarded the term “independent company” as a much better description of what they did than the terms “cavalry” or “commando” and thus resented the change of title.

The next day, Dougherty’s 2/16th battalion occupied Bebei and the 2/27th battalion cautiously investigated the upper reaches of the Uria and Faria river valleys. When the men went past the Faria river towards some high ground they suddenly came across a party of 8 Japanese. A fight broke out as they killed 3 of the 8 Japanese receiving no casualties themselves. The Japanese looked to be withdrawing and the Australians dug in for the night in a place designated Guy’s Post atop Buff’s Knoll. These prodding actions prompted Nakai to order the 2nd battalion, 78th regiment to launch a counterattack against Buff’s Knoll. An hour after midnight during a particularly rainy night, a Japanese platoon charged up the knoll. The first attack lasted about half and hour before petering out. The Australian company consolidated around Guy’s Post established a defensive perimeter through out the night. However the night attack ultimately failed for the Japanese as they were not familiar with the terrain and the heavy rain made a mess of their advance. On the morning of October 8th, the Japanese tried to push again while the 2/27th consolidated their position in the Faria area. The Japanese barely budged the Australians and on October 9th, Colonel Bishop ordered the company to advance forward astride the main Japanese route going east towards the Kankiryo saddle. The man at Guy’s Post followed them an hour or so behind as they skirmished with Japanese towards Trevors ridge and John’s knoll. They would kill roughly 11 Japanese as they occupied both Trevors ridge and Johns knoll. Yet this is all for today on New Guinea as we are going to travel back to the CBI theater who we have not talked about in some time.

Going way back to 1942, the Japanese empire had been at its zenith forcing the allies to come up with some special operations such as the Chindits. Our old onion necklace wearing friend Brigadier Wingate was running that show, but General Blamey also created his “inter-allied Services Department” known as the ISD. They were a military intelligence unit formed around several British special operations officers who had escaped Singapore before it hell. Inside the ISD later named the Services Reconnaissance Department, a raiding/commando unit was formed called the Z special unit. They were primarily Australian, but also held some British, Dutch, New Zealander, Timorese and Indonesian members. After escaping places like Singapore, and Sumatra, British Captain Ivan Lyon joined the units and became one of their leaders. He devised a plan to attack Japanese shipping in Singapore Harbor.

His plan designated Operation Jaywick, called for traversing to the harbor in a vessel disguised as an Asian fishing boat. Then they were to use folboats or folding canoes to get over to enemy ships and attach limpet mines to them. Lyon was promoted to Major and began rigorous training 17th volunteers at Camp X,  a clifftop overlooking Refuge Bay to the north of Sydney. The men worked for weeks digging, breaking rock and clearing scrub around the campsite and parade ground, which worked as prelude to the long, and progressively longer days they would spent canoeing. There were plenty of route marches across rocky hills which Lyon said “consisted of point-to-point walking or scrambling, compass work, stalking and attacks’. The men were tested on elementary navigation, chart reading, tide tables, visual signaling with semaphore and morse and the use of prismatic compasses on land and sea. They trained using a variety of weapons such as Owen sub machine guns, Brens, Lewis guns, all with the view to shoot down enemy aircraft. The practiced unarmed combat, grenade tossing, limpet mining and gelignite. They also received numerous lectures on ship engines. By early 1943, the 17 men had been reduced to 10. They were then given a captured Japanese coastal fish carrier named the Krait which was powered by a Deutz four cylinder engine, had a beam of 11 feet and a range of 8000 miles with a max speed of 6.5 knots. They modified  the vessel to increase her storage capacity. On August 4th, the Krait departed Cairns en route to the submarine base at Exmouth Gulf on the northwest corner of Australia. On September 2nd, Lyon’s commandos began their long and dangerous voyage sailing through the Lombok strait to Singapore. None of the men knew about the plan prior to the attack nor their destination.  It was on the third day that Lyon gathered the men to disclose the truth. ‘He said, “Righto, do you know where we’re going?”’Some of the men said they believed it was Surabaya in East Java. After Lyon revealed their destination, Moss Berryman recalled ‘They couldn’t believe it when they were told they were going to Singapore “to blow up a few ships”’Lyon could see one or two of the men were stunned at the thought of going so deep inside enemy territory. Jones recalled ‘Nobody expected to be going that far and there was sort of talk about how dangerous it was,’. Lyon reassured the men that wasn’t the case. ‘This is not a dangerous trip, it’s an experience.’ But for anyone who didn’t fancy it, Lyon said he understood and he would ‘drop you off at the first island we come to and if you’re there when we come back we’ll pick you up’. It was a smart psychological play as he knew on one would dare lose face in front of his mates. Lyon stared at their faces and they returned his gaze. No one moved. They were all fully committed.

Their safety depending on maintaining the disguise of a local fishing boat, so the raiders stained their skin brown with dye to appear more Asiatic, I guess its sort of like the prime minister of my country on Halloween. Cramped on the Krait, the commandos reached the Java sea and passed the south west corner or Borneo getting 50 miles off her coast by September 14th. The enemy’s high activity in the area forced Lyon to detour towards Panjang island with the intention of making their way to Durian island. Yet when they approached Durian island they spotted a observation post so they turned back to Panjang which lies approximately 25 miles south of Singapore. 

On september 20th, 6 men on 3 canoes carrying 9 limpet mines each departed the Krait enroute to Singapore harbor. The raiders passed through Bulan and the Batam islands on september 22nd, reaching Donas island the next day. On the 24th Lyon sighted 13 sizable ships in the harbor, so he told the men they would be hitting them that night. Lyon distributed cyanide pills to all the men and told them ‘I leave it up to yourselves to decide what you want to do. But I can tell you now that if you get caught you won’t have a very good time of it. They’re not known for being gentlemen, the Japanese. Don’t delude yourselves in thinking you are tough enough to resist interrogation. You could be tortured enough to give away the whole story. You may not be able to do anything about it. Above all, they had to think of their mates on the Krait. If they fell into enemy hands, the Japanese would want to know how we arrived in Singapore’

The men rowed through the capricious tide, but it soon forced them back towards Dongas, instead they moved to Suber island the next day. On the night of september 26th, Lyon’s raiders departed again, Canoe 1 held Lyon and Huston; Canoe 2 Davidson and falls and Canoe 3 Page and jones. Canoe 2 would hit the north shipping in Keppel Harbor while 1 and 3 would hit examination anchorage and the wharf at Pulau Bukon. Canoe 2 had the strongest men and was given the additional task of returning to Pompong to rendezvous with the Krait 

Canoe 2 steered through an anchored ketch on the edge of the main channel, continuing between the islands of Biakang Mati and Tekukor. They arrived to Keppel Harbor and set their sights on a 6000 ton cargo ship sitting low in the water, indicating she had a full load. The found a second target, also a 6000 ton cargo vessel and a third ship of similar proportions, though the last looked not fully loaded. At 1:15am they attached the last of their 9 limpet mines, 3 per ship and made their escape towards Panjang. 

The other two canoes had a much easier paddle from Subar. The tide was running east to west, allowing them to go with ease to their target. The paddled together until 9:30 when they separated. At Pulau Bukom an older freighter was mined amidship and around the engine rooms. Then they spotted a modern freighter with engines after and 3 sets of goalpost masts and another 6000 ton old freighter. Over in Examination Anchorage nothing suitable was found, so the raiders mined a tanker even though it was probably impossible to sink with mines. All 4 ships were mined, the men ate some chocolate rations and made their escape towards Dongas. The ships combined comprised around 39000 tons between them.

On the way back, the exhausted commandos heard the distant explosions and the chaos that erupted in Singapore. When dawn broke, in Examination anchorage one ship was partially submerged, while two more would sink and 3 were heavily damaged including the tanker Shosei Mary. Canoe 2 and 3 waited until the commotion died down before returning to Panjang, reuniting with everyone aboard the Krait by October 2nd. Their return back to Australia was relatively uneventful, except for one tense incident in the Lombok strait when a IJN minesweeper approached their ship. The commandos remained cool and the minesweeper simply carried on.

 

The Japanese would retaliate for what happened during Operation Jaywick. On October 10th, the Kempeitai, those are military police of the IJA for those of you who dont know, you can sort of picture the Gestapo, but not quite the same. They went to Changi Prison in Singapore and began reading out a list of civilian names. These named men were taken away for interrogation, torture and in many cases execution. Over the course of 6 months, 50 Europeans and Australians suffered a brutal inquisition. They were beaten with knotted ropes, electrically shocked, had nails driven into the feet, the old cigarettes burnt onto their hands, arms and on their genitals ouch. They were waterboarded and in total 16 men would die. But no credible information was taken from any of them. The Japanese were far more brutal to the Malays and Chinese. Countless were tortured, interrogated and many executed with their severed heads put on posts around the city. After it was all said and done the Kempeitai filled a report speculating the raid had been carried out by two chinese and one Malay. They didn’t believe it and their superiors did not either. The 6 months of horror is known as the Double Tenth Massacre.

 

There was another unit formed known as the M special Unit, which was a joint Australian, New Zealand, Dutch and British reconnaissance unit formed as a successor to the Coastwatchers. Their role was to gather intelligence on Japanese shipping and troop movements. To do this, small teams were landed behind enemy lines by sea, air and land. One of their first operations was Locust led by Lt Jack Fryer. A group of 4 men departed Benabena overland on January 21st and advance to Lumi airstrip. They formed a base camp thee and began observing the Japanese. In conjunction to Locust was operation Whiting, which was a team of 5 Dutchmen led by Sergeant Huibert Staverman who also departed Benabena to establish a coast-watching station in the hills above Hollandia, reaching Aitape by mid september. Unfortunately the operation would be a catastrophe as the Dutch were ambushed around Aitape. Sergeant Staverman, Corporal D.J Topman, privates H Pattiwal, M Reharing and radio operator Sergeant Len Siffleet were publicly executed at Eitape beach on October 24th of 1943.

 

Another important development was the Japanese seizure of Macau. Unlike the case of Portuguese held Timor taken in 1942, the Japanese has respected Portuguese neutrality in Macau. However there was a huge influx of Chinese, American and European refugees coming from Guangdong and Hong Kong and this aroused Japanese suspicions. After the fall of Hong Kong, the British had established a clandestine support organization inside Macau trying to gain intelligence on the Japanese in an effort rescue the prisoners from Hong Kong. British army aid group known as BAAG, was under the command of Lt Colonel Lindsay Tasman Ride. They operated out of Hong Kong, Waichow, Guilin, Sanbu, Kaiping, Kunming and other places. They had planned out escape routes from Macau for local Chinese using the route through Shekki or via the sea to a place called To Fuk. Guangzhouwan was another escape route that wealthy Chinese and other nationalities with resources could buy passage through. Another route used a heavily armed motor junk that went to the north west point of Macau, Kong CHung and took them as far as Sam Fau. From there with aid, they could get to Guilin and then Chongqing. 

 

But then a blockade was imposed on the Chinese mainland. Macau’s survival depended upon receiving rice and fuel from places like Vichy controlled Indochina and Guangzhouwan, but after the Japanese occupied them Macau suffered critical food shortages. Macau’s ships were not allowed to be used by Portuguese to carry food and thus were dependent on foreign ships. On the night of August 18th, the British ship Sian, under Portuguese protection was commandeered by a combined fleet of Japanese and pro-Japanese Chinese run ships, which illegally entered Macau’s inner harbor. There was a shootout leading to 20 dead British sailors and the Japanese allegedly discovered that the ship was transporting a shipment of illegal weapons to be sold to the NRA. The next morning Lt General Tanaka Hisakzu of the 23rd army ordered troops across the border who clashed briefly with Macau police forces before Lisbon ordered them to not resist. 

 

Governor Mauricio Teixeira was forced to collaborate with the Japanese who starting in September demanded the installation of Japanese advisors or full blown military occupation. The result was Macau becoming a protectorate. The isolated port city became a center for smuggling and black market activities…which it kinda still is today haha.

 

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The battle for Vella Lavella was over, the Japanese yet again proved themselves experts at the art of evacuation. The battle for Finschhafen was not over by any means and now the allies were cautiously proceeding forward lest they repeat any mistakes learnt in Buna-Gona, Lae and Salamaua. 

 

- 97 - Pacific War - Drive to Finschhafen, September 26 - 3 October, 1943

Last time we spoke about the Huon Gulf offensive. The Japanese until now had not considered their losses at Guadalcanal and Buna-Gona as irretrievable, but with the loss of Salamaua and Lae there was a brutal realization they were going to have to pull back their defensive line. The absolute defense line was established as the entire empire of the rising sun took two steps back. Meanwhile General Douglas MacArthur and the allied war planners decided to revise operation Cartwheel. The enemy was in disarray and this provided an opportunity to keep them off balance and maintain the momentum. They decided to launch an offensive against the Huon Peninsula, to hit places like Finschhafen. The offensive began with another bang as forces landed and advanced to seize immediate objectives to the misery of the retreating Japanese. 

This episode is Drive to Finschhafen 

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Before we leap back over to New Guinea, we first need to talk about some developments in the Solomons. Admirals Kusaka and Samejima were about to launch Operation Se-Go, the evacuation of Kolombangara. Now after the battle of Vella Lavella, Brigadier Potter’s 35th battalion was closing in on the Marquana Bay area by September 26th. Potter sent two New Zealander Platoons as a vanguard. To face them, Captain Tsuruya had organized his meager forces and successfully surrounded the New Zealander Platoons. This began a fight for the New Zealander’s survival that would last until October 2nd. Worried about the fate of his two platoons, Potter ordered Lt Seward with 3 companies to rescue the platoons. Seward described the endeavor as running straight into a hornets nest. They ran straight into some Japanese machine gun positions, which they nicknamed Machine Gully, and it cost them 18 dead and 10 wounded. Tsuruya managed to halt their advance using Machine Gully, which was a dense rainforest concealing his men. On October 2nd, the two platoons were finally rescued. The horrible casualties prompted Potter to halt attacks until every landing craft could bring over the 37th battalion from Tambala bay to hit the other side.

The 37ths movement down the rugged coast would be sluggish, giving the Japanese ample time to prepare for the evacuation of the Tsuruya unit. Meanwhile General Sasaki and Admiral Ota were getting their forces ready for the evacuation. Each unit was responsible for its supply and had to carry enough rations to last until october 5th. All the troops had to carry their weapons and as much ammunition as they could, while medical supplies were divided amongst them. Mountains guns, quick fire guns, heavy machine guns could be disassembled and carried if possible, everything else was to be destroyed. And I mean everything, even street signs were destroyed. Sasaki moved all the wounded to the north shore of Kolombangara who were to be the first loading onto the destroyers. Ota was in charge of all matters related to the embarkation such as communications; locating hiding places for the barges and loading which would take place between September 28-30th. They were expecting to evacuate 7660 men in all.

Operation Se-Go began on the 27th, as General Yoshimura’s barges headed for Kolombangara in separate groups and Admiral Ijuin prepared his force of 11 destroyers to run towards the northern coast the following day. Only one of Yoshimuras groups led by Commander Tanegashima were intercepted as they headed down the slot. 5 destroyers, the USS Claxton, Spence, Dyson, Foote and Charles Ausburne led by Captain Martin Gillan pounced on the force destroying 4 barges, but the rest eventually escaped to Kolombangara by the 28th with the other groups. Ota hid the barges as he awaited Ijuins destroyers. Ijuin’s force were spotted by a PBY due northeast of Green Island, prompting Generals Moore and Twining to launch an air raid. A strike force of radar equipped B-24’s of the 394th bombardment squadron intercepted Ijuin’s destroyers as they were passing Bougainville strait. None of their bombing attempts found a hit luckily for Ijuin. Meanwhile the barges began to depart up the slot towards Choiseul seeing zero opposition. At Tuki point the barges awaited the destroyers before the loading process began. The only major mishap would occur when the commander of the barges carrying 735 men from Jack Harbor to board the Amagiri steered too widely, missed the signal light from the destroyers and began heading for Vella Lavella. By the time they figured out the mistake and returned to the loading area, the destroyers were gone, with only 1950 men aboard. With the 1950 men aboard, Ijuin’s destroyers made their first dash, but would be intercepted again, this time by 27 B-24’s. The strike was thwarted by Zero fighter escorts and bad weather allowing Ijuin to arrive safely at Buka by the 29th.

After this, the Americans were now fully alert to what was going on and responded by bombing Choiseul. At 9:15am on the 29th, Kakasa was attacked by 17 Dauntless, 12 Avengers and 56 fighter escorts. Destroyers Patterson, McCalla, Foote and Ralph Talbot led by Captain Frank R Walker were sent up the slot to hunt barges as well. On september 29th, Tanegashima headed for Choiseul with 11 barges carrying 1100 men. At 10:30 the Americans found them. There was no moon that night, and frequent rain squalls dotted the slot. Upon seeing the Americans, Tanegashima ordered the barges to scatters and Walker detached McCalla to hunt a small group while the rest of his force hit a larger one. Yano, whose battalion was on the barges recalled his barge running at full speeds as shells flew all around them. No barge was sunk or seriously damaged as they made a quick escape.

Thus the first stage of operation Se-Go saw the rescue of over 6000 men, relying on the combination of surprise and gambling to be honest. But 25 barges were lost in the process. For stage 2 Samejima would reinforce the surviving 43 barges and 5 vedettes with 3 torpedo boats and two other armed boats. Yoshimura and Ijuin planned to toss 3 destroyers Kazagumo, Yugumo and Akigumo to be a diversion for the Americans. On the other side, Admiral Halsey ordered Admiral Merill’s task force 39 consisting of Light cruisers Montpelier and Denver; and destroyers Eaton, Waller, Cony, Renshaw, Spence, Claxton, Dyson, Selfridge and Charles Ausburne, to sweep the slot. Commander  Chandler with four destroyers, Pringle, Saufley, Radford and Greyson was in the lead, followed by Merrill with two cruisers and nine destroyers. 

On the night of October 1st, while Yoshimura’s barges were leaving Choiseul en route to Kolombangara. The Americans spotted the decoy destroyers northwest of Choiseul at 9:20 via a VP-54 Black Cat that began tailing the force as it heading in the direction of Vella Lavella. Now Merill had orders to not risk his cruisers unless heavy Japanese units were found, so he turned back and allowed Wilkinson’s destroyers to advance. The American chased the decoy towards Vella Lavella as Yoshimura’s barges went by relatively unmolested, though a small group of barges would be fired upon by US destroyers, losing 2 in the process. On the morning of October 2nd, Ijuin departed Rabaul with 9 destroyers and at Vila, the Yokosuka 7th guns would fire their last rounds before moving towards the coast. That night, Ijuin approached Kolombangara as Tanegashima awaited with 2100 men to be transported onto the destroyers. They managed to load 145 men by 10:35, but then the destroyers were forced to pull back as Americans had been spotted in the slot. Tanegashima nonetheless, headed for Sumbe Head with the rest, 600 men in all. 

Commander Harold O. Larson with three destroyers, Ralph Talbot, Taylor and La Vallette dashed across the slot to hit barges. Largson located the barges and began firing upon them when Ijuin’s destroyers appeared at 10:42. The Americans closed in on the Japanese and fired torpedoes at 11:25 scoring no hits. They then opened fire with their guns targeting the Minazuki. The Japanese scattered, prompting a chase, but it fell into nothing by midnight. In the end the Americans managed to sink 5 of Tanegashima barges. With that the Japanese had successfully completed operation Se-Go rescuing 4000 men in the second stage, for a near total of 10,000 men in all. The Japanese had truly proved themselves capable evacuatee’s if that is a word, with the evacuation of Guadalcanal, Kiska and Kolombangara. That's all for the Solomon’s as now we need to venture back to Green Hell.

Poor General Adachi’s 18th army was not giving a single break. Just a week after the fall of Lae, General MacArthur’s southwest pacific area had launched two new offensives aimed at the Ramu Valley and Finschhafen. Operation Cartwheel had initially scheduled an offensive against the Huon Peninsula to take place 6 weeks after the taking of Lae, but MacArthur pushed this forward due to intelligence indicating the Japanese were in the process of sending heavy reinforcements from Madang to aid Ramu Valley and Finschhafen. The first objectives for the allies were Kaiaput and Dumpu in the Markham and Ramu valleys where airfields could be constructed to help General Kenney extend his arm. Lack of air and naval capability meant the Japanese would be forced to march nearly 200 miles to reach places like Finschhafen with reinforcements, giving MacArthur ample room to hit the port before they could. 

Now in the previous episode we saw Brigadier Windeyer successfully land is forces at Scarlet Beach, with the 2/17th advancing further to secure the Song River area; the 2/15th captured Katika and the 2/13th were advancing southwards towards Heldsbach and Tareko. Just like at Lae, the Japanese were taken completely off guard by the landings, prompting General Adachi to order General Yamada to hit the enemy at the most opportune moment while General Katagiri’s 20th division were quickly dispatched on 20 large barges for a coastal advance. Katagiri’s men reached Sio by barge on September 21st and from there he dispatched his 2nd battalion, 79th regiment with 3 machine gun platoons and an artillery company to the Kalasa-Kelanoa area while the rest would concentrate around the Sio area until september 30th. Yamada ordered his forces to concentrate at the Sattelberg mountains, a important point 1000 meters above sea level which dominated the Finschhafen area. It was hoped holding such a point would allow a launching pad for future counter offensives.

Meanwhile Windeyer ordered the 2/15th battalion to lead an advance towards the Bumi river while the 2/13th consolidated at the Heldsbach plantation Launch Jetty area. Yet Wootten also gave Windeyer that task of securing Sattelberg, so he ordered Lt Main’s company of the 2/17th with an additional platoon for the job. On September 24th, Main signaled “Coy less one pl now approx 3 miles along main track and proceeding to Sattelberg. Patrol P.I.B moving ahead of coy”. Sattelberg was an interesting spot to defend. It was initially a 19th century German mission, about 5 miles inland with a height of 3150 feet. It offered a birds eye few of the coastal area making it a particularly important point. Allied intelligence misjudged how inaccessible it was and there was the belief its occupation was merely a method of guarding one's right flank. Yamada’s men were easily able to slip into Sattelberg via the Tirimoro, Gurunkor and Kunawa, this certainly would not be the same case for the allied forces. On September 22, the 22nd battalion had departed Hopoi. They marched through a swampy terrain towards Wideru without opposition. By 8am on the 23rd, they saw their first signs of the Japanese occupation. They also ran into locals who began reporting to them the Japanese had spent the night at Buiengim. At 1:35pm they reached Bua where leading troops had a small skirmish with a Japanese outpost which quickly withdrew. By 4pm part of the Australian forces seized a steep ridge where the track cut around 250 yards east of Bua. When it began to get dark they began to be fired upon from a mountain gun. The fire was coming from an area near the mouth of the Mongi river.

Meanwhile the 2/15th battalion were advancing along a coastal track with its leading platoon reaching the mouth of the Bumi by midday. The river looked to be fordable, what they didnt know was two mixed companies of the 85th naval garrison had fortified and wired positions on its southern bank. When the Australians began crossing they were fired upon, prompting Lt Shrapnel to order 6 3 inch mortars to be brought up to support the Bumi crossing. The battalion continued their advance along the foothills of the Kreutberg Range. This was the first time any units of the 9th division apart from the 2/24th battalion and some individual companies had done any hill-climbing on New Guinea. It was a very tough initiation. There was no track and zero water, the force had to cut their way for about 800 yards through dense jungle and then go up a slope so steep that any man carrying a heavy load had to have it passed up to him. Several tin hats clattered down the hillside and the stretcher bearers left all but two stretchers going half way up. The unsexy stuff about war, but terrain can be just as much of an enemy to you and your objective than the actual enemy. They reached the crest of the ridge, took a breather and then began advancing south.

The next day the 2/13th began to join them, allowing the 2/15th to move off towards the Bumi. However to their amazement, upon reaching the river at 10am, they found it unoccupied on the southbank. Barbed wire was seen, but no Japanese. Then as they advanced some more they were fired upon, it was a deception. A company led by Captain Snell was ordered to cross the river to create a beachhead on the opposite bank. The men entered the waist deep water further down, seeing one man killed by enemy fire. Bullets were flying around as the Australians were providing cover fire. As the men crossing went further down they found an area not occupied by the enemy and formed a bridgehead. From there more men were able to safely get across. However the position under pouring rain forced the Australians to improvise. They had a supply issue and needed better access, so they cut a track around the foothills to the bridgehead positions. The difficulty was that the rain had really begun to kick in and it was causing enormous delays. Windeyer ordered a jeep track to be established from the coastal track due north of Kamloa to the bridgehead to compensate. A platoon of the 2/3rd pioneers and some men of the 2/17t7, 2/13th and 2/15th were employed to carry supplies along the current path until the track was made to their misery.

 

On September 25th Lt Mair led a patrol of the 2/13th out to deal with some troublesome enemy mortars to the east. At around 9am they found a Japanese outpost 20 feet above them. They were fired upon losing 2 men dead and 4 wounded. The enemy was firing from some bunkers and foxholes with barbed wire coming up from the river. Other patrols were made prodding the area as the 2/3rd field company and the pioneers of the 2/15th finished cutting the new jeep track. When the track was completed, Windeyer ordered the men to not advance south of the Bumi for another two days to allow more supplies to be brought up near the river crossing.

Back over at Scarlet beach, Japanese aircraft were striking them early in the morning as allied aircraft hit airfields on New Britain. At 12:30pm on September 24th, a Japanese airforce of 12 bombs and 20 Zeros hit Australian positions at the north end of the airstrip. Artillery pieces that had been pounding Kakakog and the Salankaua plantation areas were hit hard. 60 or so bombs were dropped leading to 18 gunner casualties and the 2/3rd field company had 14 deaths and 19 wounded. Despite the airstrikes, by September 25th there was something worse to worry about emerging from the west. After the 2/17th began its advance to Sattelberg which Papuan infantryman had reported was unoccupied, it soon became apparent this was false. After passing 800 yards beyond Jivevaneng, the same papuan infantry could visually see the Sattelberg area was anything but unoccupied, it was heavily fortified.

Now the 2/17th were still on the merry way to Sattelberg none the wiser, in fact they reached Jivevaneng and mistook it to be Sattelberg, not realizing they had to cross a place called Coconut Ridge to get to Sattelberg. Windeyer received brand new reports from the Papuans that Sattelberg was heavily fortified while simultaneously the 2/17th vanguard patrols ran into some forward defensive lines around Sattelberg. The 2/17th patrols were hit hard by mortars and grenades forced to pull back quickly. Windeyer decided he was stretched to thin in the area so he ordered everyone to pull back to Jivevaneng. The Japanese now saw the Australian presence on the Sattelberg Road, General Yamada planned an offensive against Heldsbach to cut the enemy off north of Arndt Point. Meanwhile by 2pm, Colonel Grace of the 2/13th was ordered to seize Snell’s Hill a high ground southeast of the bridgehead. By 9am some platoons were patrolling the area, when Lt Webb’s platoon ran 400 yards into a Japanese position sitting on a Spur controlling a track from Tirimoro. Lt Webb reported it in prompting Colonel Grace to call in for support. The men would be facing around 150 men of Yamadas 85th naval garrison.

 

Two companies of the 2/15th took up the job and would begin by literally falling and tumbling 150 yards from their assembly line. They were tripping over vines, bamboo and heavy timber descending down a valley. When they got 450 yards from the slope of Snell’s Hill they were pretty exhausted. However Yamada’s naval troops gave them no time to take breath as they began lobbing grenades down at them. Luckily the grenade shower was rather ineffective. The Australians used cover fire as they could not hope to toss grenades them themselves lest they tumble back down upon their charging men. The Australians charged up the slope bayonets fixed and as they came to its summit, many of the Japanese turned and fled. Sergeant Fink took his men through a kunai patch to try and hit the Japanese rear, managing to clear some machine gun nests in the process. During his sweeping maneuver 10 casualties were inflicted upon the Australians. Finks men drew a lot of the enemy fire, relieving pressure from the others who led a frontal and left wing attack. Over on the left wing Captain Stuarts men charged through some kunai grass overrunning two 13 mm machine gun nests. 40-50 Japanese panicked upon seeing this and ran back to an observation post. Soon the Australian platoons began to consolidate and applied pressure. Stuarts advanced in what he termed “an extended line-desert formation, not in a file according to orthodox jungle tactics”. Three 13mm guns were captured, 7 LMGS, a ton of mortars and rifles and 52 Japanese would be buried on the summit. It was an intense actions seeing potentially 100 casualties inflicted by the 2/15th who in return had 3 deaths and 7 wounded.

 

While the 2/15th had been tackling Snell Hill, the 2/13th tried to cut across the Tirimoro track to another high ground called Starvation Hill. Around 5 minutes after the Snell battle started, some gunfire could be seen coming over from the other high ground. A few platoon of the 2/13th were immediately ordered to check it out. As the men advanced along the Tirimoro track they came across thick vegetation along the slope going up to Starvation Hill. Companies 7 and 8 of the 238th were defending Starvation Hill and they held a great field of fire looking down. The men began to crawl through it going up along the slope. Men were on their hands and knees going through thick bamboo, the progress was slow and noisy because the bamboo would make sharp snapping sounds. The two leading platoons took what cover they could as a storm of fire erupted. Japanese LMG’s were opening up forcing the Australians to try and pull back safely 150 yards and hunker down for the night. 9 men were cut down during the mayhem. 

Over in the north, Yamada ordered the 3rd battalion, 80th regiment to hit Scarlet Beach. Enroute to Scarlet beach was Major Pike’s company of the 2/17th who were guarding the approaches to the beach from Katika. Pike had sent a small patrol out and 2500 yards to the west they ran into patrols of Yamada’s force. At around midday, 30 Japanese attacked a position west of Katika held by Lt McLeod. Two Japanese were killed, including an officer who had a marked map and what looked like an operation order on him. To the south Windeyer received a report of what was going on and ordered Pike to send out a stronger patrol to hit and locate the enemy so their artillery could fire upon them. A platoon went out in the afternoon and after 2000 yards or so found the enemy and ordered the artillery fire in. The platoon was met with heavy fire, leading Sergeant Brightwell to be shot dead as the men pulled back to Katika. Thus Yamada’s plans to hit Scarlet Beach quickly dissolved into back and forth patrol skirmishes in the Sattelberg and Katika areas.

 

The new threat to the west, forced Windeyer to request reinforcements. Reluctantly, General MacArthur and Admirals Barbey and Carpender authorized the sending of reinforcements to an area they had assumed had a small enemy presence. General Herring met with Barbey aboard the Conyngham informing him Finschhafen would required an additional brigade. Barbey declined to transport the extra troops to Finschhafen on the grounds it was against MacArthurs orders. Apparently MacArthur’s planners felt that Finschhafen was going to be a pushover and they had pretty much considered the operation won and down already. Herring then asked Carpender to help transport the additional units, but was amazed to discover that the Americans would not comply unless the matter went first to MacArthur. None the less Carpender planned to transport the units via small craft staging out of Lae when Finschhafen was cleared. Then Windeyers urgent requests for reinforcements came in, indicated things were not won and down and Finschhafen had not fallen. Herring then sent a secret signal to Blamey and MacArthur pleaded for additional help, which finally secured him the 2nd battalion of the 43rd regiment by the end of the month.

Back over at Jivevaneng on the 27th telephone lines to Zag were suddenly cut and one of hte 2/17th’s patrols made contact with the Japanese. The 2/17th at Jivevaneng opened fire with artillery  upon the Sattelberg area and along the main track. Then after dusk a platoon of screaming Japanese apparently screaming Tojo charged the Jivevaneng defensive lines. 6 of them were killed in the attack. Windeyer ordered what became known as the Sattelforce, two companies of the 2/17th led by Lt Main and Lt Pike to take control of the Sattelberg track and the tracks leading back to the beachhead. On the 28th, Sattelforce began probing, but between 3-8pm a company of Japanese made three consecutive attacks against them. All the attacks were coming from the front and left flank, seeing screaming Japanese charging madly upon them. Main’s company was soon running low on ammunition and they feared a dawn attack was approaching. Main estimated the enemy had suffered up to 60 casualties at this point. During the morning of the 29th, Main’s assumption about a dawn attack came true, as they were hit by a Japanese platoon, but after this the Japanese retired. Main’s men found 30 dead Japanese after performing a intense defense in a rather isolated position. The 2/43rd battalion landing at Scarlet beach at 3:30am and their commander Lt Joshua was immediately ordered “you will relieve the troops known as Sattelforce…This relief to be completed as speedily as possible to enable 2/17 battalion to concentrate for operations against Finschhafen”. 13 Hours later they did just that.

On september 27th, Windeyer ordered the 2/13th to exploit the gains made by the 2/15th to capture Kakakog, while the 2/15th would attack the Salankaua Plantation. Back over at Starvation Hill, Mortar Sergeant Chown led a patrol, getting as close as possible to the hill. A telephone wire was carried up and Chowne found himself an observation point at the edge of a bamboo patch, just 20 yards or so near the Japanese. Despite being dangerously close to the enemy, he directed 3 inch mortar fire down upon them. He only had 15 mortar bombs, thus this led him to be so critical with his positioning. Before firing them off he sent word to the other Platoon leaders that an attack could be made. A platoon led by Sergeant McVey advanced to the edge of the bamboo ready to pounce. Chown lined up McVeys men called the mortar fire and they charged up the slope. The Japanese were caught by complete surprise seeing the enemy suddenly on top of them. Many of the Japanese fled at the offset, thus Starvation Hill was captured with pinpoint precision. Unbeknownst to the Australians, the only Japanese atop Starvation were rearguards as the 7th and 8th companies of hte 238th regiment had already withdrawn over to Sattelberg that morning.

The next day, the 2/13th made their way cautiously over to Kakakog. Their objectives were three demolished buildings known as the “triangle” and the remains of the Kakakog hospital designated “the city”. These were found on the west and east ends of Kakakog respectively. D Company led by Lt Cribb and A company led by Lt Cooper crossed over a spur on their way to hit the triangle. Cribb took the left and Cooper the right as they advanced upon the objective. They were met with a heavy bombardment, but the aim was apparently so bad the men joked “we were under more danger from falling coconuts than the gunnery itself”. Their attack only got 300 yards past Snell’s Hill by september 29th. The next day the men continued to advance, and now the enemy’s artillery took a toll upon them causing them to halt. Two other companies led by Lt stuart and Colbin were penetrating east of the Ilebbe Creek without any opposition. They got within 50 yards of the Salankaua Plantation but had to cross a bridge to close the distance. To ford the river was just as dangerous as attempting the bridge leading the companies to launch smaller patrols to prod out options. It quickly became apparent by the late afternoon the element of surprise was lost. Luckily for the frustrated men, the Salvation Army and YMCA were up with the troops. The religious and welfare organizations looked after the mens physical and spiritual comfort. After the war there were few Australian ex-soldiers who would not put a coin in a Salvo’s box when it was passed around the pub or street corner, as it brought back memories of their aid during the fighting. One soldier who fought across the Bumi wrote  “Another army came down to the Bumi—its weapons a coffee urn, its captain a Good Samaritan. Proudly he hoisted his unit's flag… He came not to reproach us for past sins or preach of the men we might have been. It is ideal, practical Christianity; he succoured the wounded and sick, revived the tired and weary; his was a happy little half-way tavern for those that passed.”

 

The next day, the 2/17th were relieved and would advance south, while the 2/13th came up for another assault against Kakakog. At 6:20am Colvin reported back to Windeyer there was going to be delays as the men needed to first take some higher ground. Windeyer back over in Scarlet beach decided he would come over to see it for himself. In the meantime some patrols were poking around the Triangle and to their surprise they saw no sign of the enemy. When Windeyer arrived it was decided the men would attack from the northwest. The 2/13th hit the Triangle while the 2/17th hit Salankaua plantation. On October 1st they were supported by an aerial strike at 11am followed up by artillery. For some reason know one ever found out why, this all began at 10:35am instead. 10 Vultee Vengeances and 8 Bostons bombed and strafed Salankaua plantation and Kakakog, doing little damage, but keeping the Japanese hunkered down. As the aircraft disappeared the infantry had run to their assembly points just in the nick of time to be ready to advance under artillery barrage. When one platoon got 250 yards near the City, grenades and mortar fire occurred. The australians could now see the enemy was hiding in the area and waiting for them to advance. As men forded the Ilebbe creek they were fired upon heavily suffering a few casualties before the men dispersed for cover. Instead of continuing across many changed direction and joined the assault upon the Triangle. The Australians were getting pinned down in every sector, seeing men trying to hide behind anything they could. The situation seemed desperate, then suddenly Lt Crawford took charge of the situation and organized a bayonet fixed direct attack across the Ilebbe. Crawford ordered the men to toss their grenades over the top of two platoons charging over the creek in an attempt to rush the enemy post on the other side. One Private Rolfe stood up at the bank of the creek and began firing his Bren from the hip providing wild cover fire. The men charged over the creek, being fired upon by Japanese snipers from tree tops. Despite their firepower, the Japanese were unable to stop the bayonet charge as the Australians ran them down. Crawford was wounded during the action, but they practically annihilated the entire outpost, bayonetting many Japanese. Due east of them near the Salankaua plantation, the men began to take out the tree top snipers. 12 2 inch mortars helped keep the pressure and momentum going. The Creek area was secured seeing 50 dead Japanese at the cost of 27 Australians. With the Ilebbe Creek cleared out, the pressure increased against the Triangle and City. Artillery was raining down upon them, likewise heavy fire was coming back from Kakakog ridge. By 3pm the Australians found themselves pinned down again. Yet again they had to halt their attack and dig in for the night as they had 10 deaths and 70 wounded, though they estimated that they had killed between 80-100 Japanese atop Kakakog ridge. The casualties would force the Japanese to abandon the Salankaua plantation.

Meanwhile  after advancing to Kasanga, the 22nd battalion was able to seize Timbulum and Logaweng without opposition and were now preparing to cross the Mape River. On October 2nd, the 2/13th would find Kakakog ridge abandoned, but they very cautiously checked every nock and cranny upon it expecting Japanese ambush. A forward patrol went to the triangle and saw signs of an evacuation, numerous dead Japanese and abandoned equipment everywhere. The 2/17th likewise found the mouth of the Bumi unoccupied and easily secured a bridgehead before finding Salanakaua plantation unoccupied as well. With the enemy gone, the 2/15th were set forward towards Simbang and the 2/17th towards Kolem.

With that, Finschhafen had fallen. It was a bitter fight, but by early October it was evident the enemy were yielding the coastal stip to assemble further west at the peak of Sattelberg which dominated the entire area. The 2/17th had already found out the hard way what it was to approach Sattelberg, and now the 2/43rd were trying to rescue one of their companies pinned down at Jivevaneng. Though Finschhafen was theirs, it was by no means secure. Papuan infantry and friendly locals were sending reports the Japanese were entering the wareo-sattelberg area from the north. The cost for this victory had been 73 Australians killed, 285 wounded and 301 sick.

To the west at Kaiapit, the Australians were consolidating their position along the Markham valley and preparing to resume their advance on Ramu. Brigadier Dougherty’s brigade were flown over to Kaiapit to relieve King’s valiant commandos. Meanwhile General Nakai ordered the Saito unit to infiltrate and raid the Australians position. The 80 men of the Saito unit were led by Captain Morisada who organized his men into 4 smaller attack groups. Back on September 23rd, 3 Saito groups carried out their first operation, successfully blowing up the billet of a commanding officer and setting fire to a entire kunai patch that delayed an Australian advance. Meanwhile the bulk of the Nakai detachment withdrew back to the Ramu valley where they established fortifications at the Kankirei Mountains. Kankieri means “summit of joy” and was named so on June of 1943 when troops of the 20th division reached its peak to look down upon Ramu valley, cheering as they did because they had just completed the road from Madang. However by late september the Australians now looked to be approaching said road to Madang.

 

By the 23rd the 2/16th battalion captured Antiragen and the Umi river crossing. The next day was quite a handful for them alongside the 2/6th independent company. Both had patrols probing the Sagerak when they ran into some Japanese rearguard. 2 inch mortars and rifles pushed the rearguard to pull back and soon some patrols were moving on towards Narawapum. Meanwhile a papuan company was patrolling its northern foothills trying to find a fast route for the Australians to take to catch up to the Japanese in the Boana-Wantoat areas. Around midday the 2/16th and 2/6th were crossing the Umi to secure some high ground south of Sagerak. They clashed with around 20 Japanese carrying full packs in the Narawapum area causing them to flee. All of these Japanese forces were from the 1st battalion, 78th regiment, struggling to estalbish decent delaying actions. 

 

General Vasey then appointed a new objective, Dumpu, where he hoped to catch General Nakano’s men whom he assumed were retreating up the Ramu Valley towards Bogadjim. In reality, Nakano’s 51st division were withdrawing through the Saruwaged Range, whose track deteriorated as it went up the upper reaches of the Sanem river. Private Kitamoto who was traveling with the 51st would recall “After we escaped the clutches of the enemy we were confronted by nature. Here the living had to walk across the dead to stay on the track. Using the dead bodies as stepping stones and clinging to the slippery lichen covered rocks, the men made their way up the mountain. Fresh red blood ran from the mouth of the dead when they were stepped on and their glassy eyes stared us in the face. Approaching 4000 meters, the cold bit hard into the light summer uniforms the soldiers wore but the exhausted men could not stop to sleep or they would freeze to death. The screaming voices of the men who slipped from the log bridges to their death in the canyons below, and the wailing cries of the men who could move no more and were asking for help. It was a sense of hell, something quite out of this world.’

 

Under the belief there was a strong enemy presence covering the withdrawal, possibly the full 20th division, Dougherty decided to order the 2/16th back across the Umi river on september 25th. At the same time, Nakai had ordered the bulk of his 78th regiment to take up a position in the Gurumbu-Kankirei area;  for the 1st battalion, 26th field artillery regiment to defend the seashore in the Erima area; and for the 2rd battalion 78th regiment to advance into the Yokopi mountain area to defend Kesawai. Meanwhile the last battalion of the 21st brigade had just arrived to Kaiapit, so Vasey ordered Brigaider Eathers 25th brigade to be the next one flown in. 

General Herring had decided to place the Bena Force under Vasey’s command, which was ordered to cross the Ramu and assault Dumpu and Kesawai. For the next few days, heavy patrolling was conducted at Dumpu, the upper Ramu valley, Kaiapit, Sagerak and eventually past the Umi. Patrols would find no enemy at Kaiapit, nor Sagerak, this prompted Dougherty to believe there were no enemy east of the Umi. On september 28th, Dougherty ordered the 2/16th battalion to recross the river and successfully began occupying Sagerak as the rest of the brigade made their way over after. On the 29th, the 21st brigade were advancing west, taking Wankon Hill and Marawasa facing no opposition. On that same day, some Australian commandos of the Bena Froce led by Captain Dexter were advancing west of Kesawai where they established a new abmush position. The Australians tried to lure the Japanese to the ambush area with 3 men boldly coming over to the Japanese base, drawing their attention. The 3 men ran back to the ambush position and wondered if it worked, and soon 60 Japanese appeared. Their commanding officers were within 30 yards of the ambush are, when the Australians opened fire. The Australians had taken a semi circle position and the effect was like “a reaper’s sycthe”. A larger group of Japanese then rapidly came over once they heard the gunfire and the Australians were soon running low on ammunition. Dexter was wounded, another man was killed, so they began a quick withdraw, racing back for the Ramu in broad daylight. While this was going on Eathers forces were beginning to assemble at Kaiapit. 

On September 30th, Dougherty’s units advance to the Gusap River which divided Markham and Ramu. In the battalions report of the crossing of the Gusap, they described it as such

"It was a complete surprise to most of the battalion to learn that during the day's march—actually just before reaching Arifagan Creek—they had crossed the divide between the Markham and Ramu River basins. The divide was impossible to pinpoint on the ground as the gradients were imperceptible. The only visible indication that a divide had been crossed was that rivers were now flowing in the opposite direction from the Markham drainage basin." It was at this point Vasey realized he might not be facing the full strength of the 20th division as he received a report Wootten was apparently fighting them over at Finschhafen. Upon looking over the matter, Blamey and Herring decided to not heavily commit to Markham and Ramu Valleys, but instead prioritize the battle for Finschhafen. The commanders met at Lae on October 1st, where Herring agreed to allow Vasey to push towards Dumpu, but he would not allow him to remove the whole of two independent companies from the Benabena plateau. Vasey  ordered Dougherty and Eather to concentrate on the Gusap area and for the 2/7th independent company to scout the Bumbum area. God I love new guinea. 

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

The Japanese pulled off another incredible evacuation, similar to that of Guadalcanal and Kiska with operation Se-Go. Over on Green Hell the battle for Finschhafen was turning out not to be a pushover, and it was looking like another major offensive was afoot. 

 

- 96 - Pacific War - Huon Peninsula Offensive, September 19-26, 1943

Last time we spoke about the conclusion to the Lae-Salamaua campaign. Operation postern was unleashed with a bang. The Japanese were taken by complete surprise when the allies landed in the Lae Area. General Nakano frantically withdrew the forces from Salamaua over to Lae having been duped by the allied deception. Despite their fighting withdrawal, the Japanese not only lost Lae to the surprise attack, but ironically lost Salamaua at the same time. It was a race for the allied divisions to see who would seize both objectives. As the allies marched into Salamaua they realized it was so desolated, it probably would not be of use as a forward base, but Lae would prove extremely beneficial. Ultimately Nakano managed to get 8000 or more men out of the mayhem, now marching north for salvation, but the allies were not done yet.

This episode is Huon Peninsula Offensive

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

 

Before we venture back to the boys on Green Hell, there had been some developments in the Solomons. On September 18th, Admiral Wilkinson brought over the first units of General Barrowcloughs 3rd division, the 35th and 37th battalions of the 14th brigade. They were brought over to Les Gill’s plantation located at Joroveto north of Barakoma and they landed without any conflicts. Unbeknownst to them however, Admiral Sakamaki had launched an airstrike of 12 vals and 48 zeros. Luckily the allies tossed an interception in the form of 17 F4U Corsairs, 6 Hellcats and 4 P-40’s which ran into them just over Baga island as Admiral Wilkinsons escorts force of 7 destroyers were making their escape. The air battle spread towards the east where the landing area was, but no shipping was damaged as the allies claimed to have knocked out 15 enemy aircraft at the cost of 3 Corsairs.

Once he got ashore, Barrowclough assumed command of the Northern Landing force and set up his HQ on the eastern coast of Vella Lavella. In response, Wilkinson spread his fighter cover more thinly and scattered his LSTs away from Barakoma’s anti-aircraft guns. On September 25th a large convoy carrying the 30th battalion, 14th brigade and some marines and Seabee units arrived at Ruravai. They began establishing an advance Marine base for an upcoming operation against Bougainville. This prompted Sakamaki to launch another air strike, this time of 8 vals and 40 zeros. Brigadier General James Moore had roughly 20 fighters to cover the convoy, but some of the vals managed to slip past them. At 11:13, 12 Hellcats intercepted the enemy, leading to dogfights with the Zeros, but two minutes later the Vals had come out from hiding in front of the sun. The vals were targeting the IMAC landing site at Ruravai where the 77th seabees had been clearing a beach area. The marines had some 40mm guns already set up when the Vals struck. Two bombs hit LST-167 forcing it vessel to beach itself while the rest of the bombs scattered across the beach killing 32 men and wounding 58. Sakamaki followed this up with another air strike on October 1st consisting of 8 vals and a dozen zeros again against Ruravai. The 1st marine parachute battalion was landing at the time, as Sakamaki’s bombers successfully evaded allied rader and fighter patrols to hit the LSTs. LST-334 took a hit and near miss causing damage but no casualties. LST-448 was hit twice leaving her bursting into flames, killing 52 men with many more wounded. LAST-448 was hit again leading to her sinking while under tow. It was some pretty devastating air strikes, but it was also to be the last as the Japanese were in the midst of evacuating their troops from New Georgia and the 26th air flotilla was withdrawing from Buin.

To the northwest, Fijina commandos ha discovered the Horaniu defense force were now scattered in an area between Tambala Bay and Marquana Bay. Barrowclough decided to order Bridagider Leslie Potter’s 14th brigade to take out the enemy there. Potter planned to take the 35th battalion and his HQ up the western coast to Matu Soroto Bay while the 37th battalion would land at Doveli cover on the northern coast, hoping to trap the Japanese between both forces. On September 21st, Captain Tsuruya Yoshio had just arrived from Buin to take command of the rather disorganized Vella Lavella forces and began concentrating at Marquana Bay establishing a defensive perimeter. Potter’s forces successfully landed at the designated points by september 24th and prepared their advance for the next day.

Meanwhile Admiral Samejima and Kusaka were planning the evacuation of Kolombangara. To help them General Imamura was tossing over Major General Yoshimura Masayoshi’s 2nd shipping detachment alongside 30 barges. Plans were quickly formed back in early september for Yoshimura to carrying out the evacuation in two stages beginning on September 28th and October 20th via the Choiseul route. Admiral Ijuin proposed using the 8th fleet destroyers for both transport and cover. Kusaka approved the plans and granted an additional 6 destroyers for Ijuins task, taken from the combined fleet, while also arranging some air cover from Sakamaki over Choiseul. The operation designated Se-gō, was mostly complete. Yoshimure assumed command over the Barges designated the 17th army sea battle unit, while under command of Samejima. He would have ultimately at his disposal 70 barges. Yoshimura had armed the barges usually with heavy machine guns and trained the crews to expect attacks from American destroyers and PT boats. He also outfitted them with repair tools. One of the largest problems he faced was how to move 70 barges and 9 small naval vedettes to the forward bases while keeping them hidden from enemy aircraft. The NGAF would confirm this problem on September 20th, when 8 Corsairs were patrolling and came across some barges. They managed to destroy 5 out of the 8 they found. Yoshimura recalled “it was an inauspicious start to the operation”. But he carried on none the less. Leaving buin on september 23rd, they arrived at Sumbe Head by the 25th where the 8th fleet sent a detachment of the Kure 7th to establish a base of operations.

Kusaka flew into Vila to meet with General Sasaki and Admiral ota, landing in the midst of exploding shells. To prepare for the withdrawal Sakai had established 3 boarding points along Kolombangara; Jack harbor, Tuki point and Hambare harbor. At the same time he tried to conceal his intentions by increasing patrols and firing off the Yokosuka 7th guns against the enemy. Alongside this he had demolition teams blowing up all the airfield installations, which was mingling with General Barker’s artillery. Construction units were beginning to cut trails to the boarding points. Against them was Admiral Halsey who held intelligence indicated the Japanese were planning to either reinforce or evacuate Kolombangara. Halsey send Admiral Merrills task force 39 to move up the Slot while Admiral Wilkinsons destroyers would swing south up Vella Gulf with the objective of catching the enemy between them. Halsey called it a “mouse trap”. On september 25th however, both the USS Columbia and Clevland reported sighting torpedo wakes, indicating a possible submarine force prompting Halsey to pull back the cruisers before the mousetrap was sprung, leaving only Wilkinsons destroyers to pounce on the evacuating Japanese. But thats all for the solomon’s for now as we are jumping back to Green Hell.

Salamaua and Lae had fallen. General Adachi was now determined to hold the Finisterre range, the Ramu Valley and the Huon Peninsula. He ordered Nakai detachment consisting of the 78th regiment less one company and a battalion of the 26th field artillery regiment led by Major General Nakai Masutaro to take up a position at Kaiapit. Masutaro’s boys were to try and help halt the enemy pursuing General Nakano’s fleeing 51st division. To make matters worse, although the original orders were for the fleeing men to carry their weapons, the Japanese progressively began to abandon their equipment as they fled. Rifle ammunition was the first to go, followed by helmets, then rifles. Kitamoto Masamichi ordered his engineers to gather as many of the abandoned rifles as they could and use their files to erase the chrysanthemum insignia off them. For those of you who don’t know, the chrysanthemum is the symbol of the emperor, so they were going to literally waste time and resources to mitigate what they thought was a disgrace. Men also dropped rice, personal belongings, clothes, whatever they had to in order to survive. The logical thing to do is survive, not take time to file off the symbol of your emperor off the rifles. Major Shintani’s 1st battalion of the 80th regiment apparently carried all their weapons across the Saruwaged, including 4 heavy machine guns. Shintani had told his men “the soldier who abandons his arms will be shot to death”. Shintani actually died during the crossing of the Saruwaged, but his men carried on his orders. Some of you might know already, but I am a Dad Carlin fanboy and he said it quite right in his piece on the pacific war about the Japanese. They did everything to the extreme. You just don’t see the same radical behavior from the other belligerents of WW2. I find we often mock the Japanese naivety about believing their spirit would overcome the material difference, but by hell come high water they tried. They marched north via the Markham valley while General Katagiri’s 20th division was sent to help defend Finschhafen.

The Japanese had to shuffle their strategic plans at this point. Thus far they had not regarded the losses of Guadalcanal and Buna-Gona as irretrievable, always believing a decisive victory could be obtained allowing for their recapture. Now after losing Lae-Salamaua, the central solomons and the Aluetians, a brutal realization had dawned on them. With a new thrust into the central pacific, they now saw their perimeter was overextended and they needed to withdraw it. This created what became known as the absolute zone of national defense also called the absolute defense line. Tokyo drew the new perimeter line from western New Guinea through the Carolines to the Marianas, leaving most of the southeast area on the outpost line. The main goal was to build strong fortifications along the perimeter while General Imamura and Admiral Kusaka held the enemy at bay as long as possible. 

General Imamura kept his 38th division to defend Rabaul and dispatched the 65th independent mixed brigade to Tuluvu. The 65th were ordered to develop a shipping point there and to maintain its airfield. Back on September 5th, Imamura sent Major General Matsuda Iwao to assume command of all the forces at Tuluvu which at that time consisted of the 65th brigade and the 4th shipping detachment, thus together they would be designated the Matsuda detachment. They were going to defend the coasts of western New Britain. Lt general Sakai Yasuchi’s 17th division were dispatched from Shanghai to Rabaul to reinforce New Britain while Lt General Kanda Masatane’s 6th division were sent to Bougainville to defend it at all dost. The 2nd battalion, 238th regiment would defend gasmata and the 51st transport regiment were deployed at Lorengau in the Admiralties.

Now back over with the allies, when Lae was captured with such ease, this caused General Douglas MacArthur’s HQ to revise the Cartwheel schedule. Originally it was planned to hit Finschhafen, the primary Japanese base for barge traffic. This was supposed to occur around 6 weeks after the fall of Lae. But like I said, because of Lae’s quick capture, combined with some intelligence indicating the Japanese were heavily reinforcing Finschhafen and the Ramu Valley, MacArthur decided to order and immediate operation to secure the villages of Kaiaput and Dumpu in the Markham and Ramu valleys and to construct airfields for Kenney. Allied intelligence indicated the number of Japanese defending the immediate area of Finschhafen was roughly 350 men, providing MacArthur and his staff some optimism. It would be later discovered General Adachi had 5000 available men there. On September 17th MacArthur ordered Admiral Brabey to begin amphibious attack plans for Finschhafen to commence as soon as possible. The Markham and Ramu valleys were like a giant corridor some 115 miles long running from southeast and northwest, separating the Huon Peninsula from the rest of New Guinea. From end to end of the river corridor were large mountains rising on the north and south. The valley itself was flat kunai grass land, very suitable for airfields. 

General Vasey’s 7th division were earmarked to advance along the Markham and Ramu valleys as far as Dumpu. Dumpu would provide General Kenney with airfields required to isolate the Huon Peninsula. From there Kenney could hit Japanese supply convoys moving between Madang, Wewak and Hansa Bay. Meanwhile General Wootten’s 9th division were given the task of amphibiously assaulting Finschhafen before exploiting along the coast to Sio and Saidor. Yet before any major operations could be unleashed there was still work to be done at Lae. General Milford’s 5th division was given the task of cleaning up Lae so it could become a major forward base of operations. On September 22nd Milford moved his HQ to Lae. The western boundary between the new Lae Fortress and 7th division would be a line running north and south through Nadzab. The southern boundary would go as far as Nassau bay. Milford had the 15th, 29th and 4th brigade at his disposal. Milfords men immediately set to work clearing the interior approaches to the town of Lae against any possible Japanese counterattack while simultaneously aiding in the pursuit of the fleeing Japanese. The successful evacuation by the Japanese of Salamaua and then Lae had shocked the Australian commanders despite the fact they had been informed as early as May of intense Japanese patrol activities along the interior trails. A young Australian officer had earlier reported that the Japanese were surveying interior trails for a possible retreat across the mountains. On September 8th they acquired a order of evacuation document leaving no doubt how the Japanese were going to withdraw north. Mildfords HQ deduced the line of retreat was going to be from the Melambi river, Boana, Melasapipi, Iloka and Ulap. However this would prove to be deception on the part of General Nakano who changed the direction of the march to a steep trail along the east side of the Atzera range towards Sio. 

Going back to the Quadrant Conference held in Quebec city between August 17th and August 24th, the allies had decided to make some major changes to Operation cartwheel. The main focus was now shifting to the Central Pacific and the Joint chiefs of staff planned to employ the 1st and 2nd marine divisions. For the southwest and south pacific areas this meant the central thrust was going to take a bunch of warships, transport ships and cargo ships. MacArthur was livid at the idea two marine divisions would basically prevent him from his objective of Rabaul. Thus in Quebec, it was decided to neutralize Rabaul rather than capture it. MacArthur also brought up the question of invading the southern philippines, but received no answer. He feared that even if the idea was approved, it might be handed over to Admiral Nimitz. Thus to bypass Rabaul, MacArthur’s forces would seize Kavieng and the Admiralties. MacArthur would also have to neutralize Wewak and liberate the valuable Vogelkop Peninsula along New Guinea’s northern coast. 

Back over in New Guinea, General Nakano’s men were continuing their withdrawal with the Australians in hot pursuit. On September 17th, th 2/14th battalion crossed the Atzera Range to capture Boana. The Japanese 30th independent engineer regiment and 51st engineer regiment were constructing a small bridge across the busu river using jungle wood. General Nakano had rejoined his HQ with the second echelon of men and he had such a rough time marched he had to be carried by four soldiers. On September 18th the 2/24th battalion reached Musom and Gawam. The Japanese defending Markham point had been completely cut off as of september 14th, receiving no supplies from Lae nor any information about the fact Lae and Salamaua had fallen into enemy hands. On the night of september 16th, 100 men of the 2nd battalion 328th regiment evacuated from Markham point, retreating towards to coast trying to get to Salamaua or Finschhafen. On the 18th, Captain Proctors company of the 15ht battalion were at Labu when they saw a group of 30 armed Japanese trying to escape in folding boats across the Labu lagoon. His company fired upon them forcing the Japanese to quickly row away and flee into the jungle. At 5:10am the next day the Japanese returned to attack Proctors company, trying to break out of what had become an encirclement. Three consecutive attacks were made, with the third reaching the edge of Proctors defensive perimeter when the fighting fell into hand to hand combat. The Japanese were driven off after they had 13 deaths, including their commanding officer. The rest of the Japanese would disperse into the jungle or die to future mop up operations.

The next day Boana was taken and now the 2/14th were being held up by a Japanese rearguard on the upper reaches of the Busu. On September 20th, Nakano’s first echelon finally crossed the Busu river and by the 22nd the other 3 echelons did likewise. In pursuit, a platoon of the 2/24th began to hit the Japanese at Kwapsanek, but Wootten’s forces ultimately failed to catch the Japanese rearguard. In the end the Australians prepared to launch a new offensive against the Ramu valley and Finschhafen, the pursuit units were gradually called back allowing Naknao’s men to reach the north coast almost unmolested. General Blamey predicted the remnants of the enemy would need “to escape the hardship of the mountain tracks”. I believe he was quite right on that one.

The men of Colonel Watanabe’s 14th field artillery regiment continued their march going up the range carrying their single mountain gun towards Lumbaip and then Kemen. Kane Yoshihara noted the officers and men “clung on to the rocks with truly formidable spirit”. General Nakano recalled “I was deeply stirred by their sense of responsibility but could not overlook their suffering”. Nakano ordered the last of the regiments guns to be abandoned. He recalled “the gunners with tears in their eyes, bade a formal farewell as they did so”. Colonel Watanabe would survive the trek alongside 280 of his men. There was a saying amongst the Japanese armed forces that “Java is heaven, Burma is Hell, but you never come back alive from New Guinea”. An American soldier once referred to New Guinea as ‘a green hell on earth”. The conditions were so horrible a veteran of the 32nd division went on the record to say “If I owned New Guinea and I owned hell, I would live in hell and rent out New Guinea”. Vasey and Blamey decided the next objective would be Kaiapit as they believed Naknao was retreating through the Markham and Ramy valleys. They earmarked Captain Gordon King’s 2/6th independent company to quickly capture the village before the Japanese could get there. On september 17th, King’s company flew over from Port Moresby landed at Sangan on the western bank of the Leron River. Two platoons from Captain John Chalf’s Papuan infantry battalion company also reached the western bank of the leron that day coming overland from Chivasing. They would act as a screen ahead of King’s men. Kings men began their march for Kaiapit and against them would be Major General Nakai Masutaro who had departed from Bogadjim with the 78th regiment on september 7th. He dispatched the 3rd battalion and Morisada company towards Kaiapit while the bulk of his forces advanced towards Nadzab where they planned to hit its airfield. The Takano Platoon, a reconnaissance unit were the only ones able to reach Kaiapit by September 19th just as the Australians were approaching. King have strict orders to the men that no movement was to be on the track to the village itself as it was believed the enemy would be covering such an approach. Instead the men came through kunai patches, bringing their 2 inch mortars close in to hit the enemy. The mortars began to smash the enemy forward positions sending Japanese fleeing or dying at their posts. The Australians then began to pin down the defenders using grenades and rushed their positions. Japanese treetop snipers unleashed hell, but soon the Australians began firing upon the treelines and village huts where they were hiding. The storming of the village was intense and fast seeing 30 dead Japanese and the rest fleeing. King lost 3 men dead with 7 wounded for the assault. The Australians quickly went to work creating a defensive perimeter placing booby traps everywhere they could. Vasey’s decision to swiftly hit the village had paid off big time. The following morning, 300 men led by Major Yonekura Tsuneo arrived to Kaiapit, under the belief it was still in Japanese hands. Just before dawn of September 20th, the Australian commando’s saw the incoming Japanese column and immediately opened fire upon them. The Japanese erupted into pure chaos as men of all ranks bunched up and milled about in confusion. Some of the men could be heard screaming in Japanese “we are Japanese let us through!”. Others soon realized Kaiapit was in Australian hands. Thousand of rounds were fired back at the Australians, but their positions were well concealed. King watched as the confused enemy did exactly what he taught his men not to do, shooting at shadows, wasting ammunition and firing high “In all that enormous activity of firing, nobody got hit nobody got hurt at all”. The situation came as a shock to King as well, because the sheer volume of return fire indicated it was a considerably large force. Some of  King's men wanted to advance, but he advised caution. Platoon leader Watson waited for King’s signal for when he could advance and King recalled “each second seeming like a minute as the Japanese gathered in the half light. Watson was standing up there, looking back to me waiting”. When King dropped his arm, Watson blew his whistle and his men charged. Lt Bob Scott of section 7 recalled “we killed over a hundred Japanese in the first 100 yards”. Scotts group had cut down Yonekura and his command group in the first wave of Australian fire. Lt Bob Balderstone of section 9 sent his men into the right flank as Lt Jack Elsworthy’s section 9 took up the left flank. The Australians had seized the moment and inflicted hellish pain on the Japanese. Watson’s platoon lost 8 men killed, 14 wounded. King tossed another platoon through the right flank to grab Mission Hill which dominated the battlefield. As the men advanced, they drove off Japanese in their path and would seize the deserted hill. Once it was captured the Australians had a bird’s eye view that allowed them to better direct their forces. Seeing the hill secured, Watson judged the time was ripe to continue the advance so he ordered Balderstone and Elsworthy’s sections forward. Balderstone was hiding behind a coconut palm when a bullet nicked his right arm prompting him to scream out “who did that!”. It was not a serious wound, but he was fired up and he yelled to his men to surge forward. Balderstone personally tackled a Japanese machinegunner afterwards. After clearing some machinegun positions below mission hill, the enemy was becoming surrounded. The casualties had become so severe the Japanese began to rout in disorder towards Antiragen and Narawapum. It was an incredible victory for King, they buried 214 Japanese and believed many more were dying or wounded. General Vasey arrived around midday and walked over the corpse strewn battlefield to Mission hill stating ‘My God, my God, my God,’. The scale of the carnage and size of the force against a single Australian company was incredible. Gordon King was resting a wounded leg on a shady spot atop the hill when Vasey approached him. King struggled to get to his feet and Vasey said ‘No, no, sit down,’ But King stood up to talk nonetheless. Vasey told him to get the first available aircraft out before adding, ‘Gordon, I promise that you’ll never be left out on a limb like this again.’ Vasey then returned to his plane, which headed back down the Markham Valley. Some months later, Vasey told King, ‘We were lucky, we were very lucky.’ King replied, ‘Well, if you’re inferring that what we did was luck, I don’t agree with you, Sir. Because I think we weren’t lucky, we were just bloody good.’ For this victory King had lost 14 men dead, 23 wounded, it was something out of a Rambo film.

Brigadier Dougherty's 21st brigade were beginning to land at Kaiapit on september 21st. Kings victory allowed Vasey to bring a fresh bridge into position to keep the advance going against Markham and Ramu valleys. The Yonekura battalion had nearly been wiped out to a man, thus General Nakai ordered the 1st battalion to rescue the battered force. Most of the Morisada company were unscathed as they did not engage in the battle at Kaiapit, alongside them were some stragglers left behind and around 40 men who managed to escape the carnage. Aided by the rescue battalion they managed to withdrew back towards Marawasa by September 24th. A volunteer unit was formed under Captain Morisada named the Saito unit, which consisted of around 80 men from the 10th company 78th regiment. They would work as a special infiltration unit who would begin raiding operations.

Back over at Lae, Generals, Blamey, Herring and Wootten began to plan their offensive against Finschhafen. Towards midnight on the 17th, Herring arrived to Lae by PT boat for a meeting with Wootten. Wootten had warned Blamey and Herring that he might be required to carry out an attack on Finschhafen at short notice, leading Wooten to order Brigadier Windeyer to look at Finschhafen on the map because it might be of interest to him soon. Before Herrings arrival, plans were already being formed. At 9am of the 18th, Windeyer and his staff attended a 9th division conference at the HQ on the Bunga river. There Herring outlined a plan for the capture of the Finschhafen-Langemak Bay-dreger Harbor area with a quick swoop which would gain control over the eastern coast of the Huon peninsula and thereby Vitiaz strait.

Windeyers 20th brigade would be join General Heavy’s 532nd engineer boat and shore regiment and Admiral Brbey’s landing craft armada to perform an amphibious assault against Scarlet Beach. Scarlet beach was on the southern part of the Song River just due north of Finschhafen where it was believed the Japanese would not be expecting a landing. From there it was possible they would be able to cut off the Japanese supply lines. Wootten and Blamey tossed up an additional brigade, but the available crafts: 4 destroyer transports, 15 LCI’s and 3 LSTs were only capable of lifting a single brigade. In the end the decision was made that after the landings, the 22nd battalion would advance round the south coast of the Huon Peninsula to try and deceive the Japanese as to where the real direction of the threat was coming from.

Windeyer planned to hit the beachhead with two battalions, the 2/17ths on the right and the 2/13th on the left. Once the beachhead was secured, the 2/15th would advance south along the main road towards Finschhafen. Additionally an expedition would be launched from G Beach on the night of September 21sst to also land at Scarlet Beach the following morning. To support the landings a large air armada of both American and Australian planes would protect the convoy during the daylight. General Kenney would be tossing air strikes against Cape Gloucester with Liberators, while the RAAF hit Gasmata with Kittyhawks and Bostons and Mitchells against Finschhafen. All of the key airfields and supply points between Wewak and Finschhafen would get smashed. Barbeys destroyers likewise would bombardment Finschhafen as well.

To meet the boys coming to the beaches was Major General Yamada Eizo commanding the 1st shipping detachment, a naval force based around the 85th naval garrison. Around 1200 men were stationed at Finschhafen, many of them however were barge operators and mechanics. But there were some combat units; Major Shigeru Tashiros 2 battalion, 238th regiment had companies 7 and 8 at Finschhafen with company 5 at Tami islands. Additionally there was the bulk of the 80th regiment coming over from Madang via the coastal road that would arrive just in time to meet the Australian offensive. In the end Yamada’s combat strength would be roughly 4000 men strong.

On September 10th, after the allies landings at Lae and Nadzab, General Katagiri marched the rest of his forces from Madang to Finschhafen in a grueling advance along the coast. The first elements of his 79th regiment assembled at Gali by September 21st. Because of all of this, Madang was left pretty much undefended. The 239th regiment was chosen to reinforce the base, departing Wewak on October 3rd. Over in Finschhafen, Yamada began deploying the bulk of his forces at Logaweng; with 4 companies holding the Mongi river’s mouth and two mixed companies of about 50 engineers and 300 naval personnel holding the Bumi river. To the north, Yamada could only deploy company 9th company of the 80th regiment towards the Song River to secure Sattelberg. Looking at it all on paper it seemed the Australians were set to face little resistance. On the afternoon of September 21st, Barbey’s force of 8 LCM’s and 15 LCV’s departed Lae for Scarlet Beach. 

Windeyer’s landing plan called for two companies of th 2/17th battalion were going to land on the right beach while two companies from the 2/13th would land on the left. While the rest of the brigade landed, the right companies would hit North Hill and the left companies would hit Arndt Point. Barbey’s convoy arrived off Scarlett Beach at 4:45am and the barges began to lower. After an 11 minute bombardment by destroyers Perkins, Drayton, Smith, Lamson and Flusser the barges began to speed over to the shore. However due to the darkness of the night, the whole wave landed a bit further south than intended and as a result the 4 assaulting companies were landed not only on the wrong beaches but also got mixed with other groups. This caused a fit of confusion as a platoon of the 2/13th drew fire from some machine gun nests near the mouth of the Song River. They quickly engaged the enemy with grenades and small arms, gradually silencing the two enemy posts. When the 2/17th battalion began to become organized in the area the platoon moved further south to rejoin its company. This all resulted in a failure to secure Scarlet Beach, forcing the second wave to veer further left and beach near Siki Cove under heavy enemy fire. But the LCI’s of the 2nd and 3rd waves responded to the heavy fire with their 20 mm guns sending the Japanese fleeing. After that Scarlet beach was secured. Funny enough, if it was not for the misstep landing further south, the operation would have seen more casualties amongst the Australians, as the Japanese machine guns proved to be sited in a deadly position to hit Scarlet Beach. As the remaining waves disembarked, Lt Gibb’s platoon of the 2/17th advanced inland and were soon met by some machine gun nests. Within half an hour of combat, the platoon killed 7 Japanese and sent the rest fleeing. Other platoons of the 2/17th began to advance up the Song River fighting only limited skirmishes. The 2/13th meanwhile were sending two companies towards Siki Cove where they had to clear a few pillboxes taking some Japanese prisoners. Windeyers forces then launched an attack against Katika. Makes me think of the show Vikings haha (do a Floki thing). A company led by Lt Pike passed through Katika at 6:45am, heading for some high ground beyond. There Pike’s men ran into some strong resistance. Another platoon led by Lt Birmingham ran into a Japanese position who tossed a ton of well directed grenades their way killing 3 men and wounding 7. Pike’s platoon stormed some huts seeing the Japanese begin a encirclement maneuver against him. Luckily the encirclement was thwarted with the help of another platoon led by Lt Cribb. Companies of the 2/17th and 2/13th were led by Pike and Cribb respectively and both found themselves close against one another. Cribb informed Pike he would launch a bombardment upon the enemy holding some high grounds allowing Pikes men to make a hook maneuver to hit the enemy. Under the cover of 15 3 inch mortars they hit the Japanese, ultimately taking the village at the cost of many men. 

While Scarlet Beaches defensive perimeter was being consolidated, the 2/13th advanced south towards Heldsbac and Tareko as Barbey’s destroyers were attacked by an air strike. 20 bombers, 10 torpedo bombs and 40 fighters had come over from Rabaul to hit the landing beach. Three American fighter squadrons were waiting to intercept them, successfully shooting down 10 bombers and 29 fighters, while losing 3 lightnings. Likewise the destroyers anti aircraft fire managed to take down 9 torpedo bombers, without receiving any significant hits back. Scarlet Beach was now in allied hands. 5300 troops, 180 vehicles, 32 guns and 180 tons of supplies had been landed successfully. The cost amounted to 20 dead australians, 65 wounded and 9 men missing. For the Americans 8 engineers were killed with 42 wounded. Yet again the rapid pace of the allies had caught the Japanese off guard upsetting their plans to reinforce Finschhafen.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

The landing at Scarlet beach was a large success. The Japanese had planned to reinforce Finschhafen with 5000 troops, but now they had been caught completely off guard and would only have a fraction of the troops they wanted to support the area. In New Guinea, when it rains it pours. 

 

- 95 - Pacific War - Fall of Lae-Salamaua, September 12-19, 1943

Last time we spoke about the unleashing of Operation Postern and the continued advance towards Salamaua. The landings at Lae and droppings at Nadzab went pretty uncontested. Red beach and yellow beach were secured with minimal Japanese aerial raids trying to hinder the movement of men and supplies. defensive perimeters were quickly established and units began their drive towards Lae and Nadzab. Meanwhile the offensive against Salamaua raged on while the Japanese commanders received the shocking news of the landings in the Lae area. General Adachi frantically ordered forces to withdraw from the salamaua area to rush over to Lae’s defense. Meanwhile Shoge and Mukai took the little forces they had and prepared to mount a defense to the death to try and hold back the allies from claiming their ultimate prize. But in the end would it not result in the loss of both? 

This episode is Fall of Lae-Salamaua

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

So as we concluded last time, the landings were a success. The Australian 9th Division, transported by five destroyers, landed to the east of Lae on 4 September. Aside from a few air raids from Rabaul it all went unopposed. As Admiral Barbey noted “Unloading of LSTs, each containing 400 men, 35 vehicles and 80 tons of bulk stores was excellent. One LST was unloaded in 1 hour 42 minutes. Unloading of the remainder was completed within 2 hours 15 minutes.”By 10.30 a.m. 7,800 troops and 1,500 tons of stores were ashore. The 503rd parachute infantry regiment dropped at Nadzab pushing small amounts of Japanese forces. And at Salamaua, General Milfords forces held down the bulk of the Japanese troops, who now had to frantically rush over to Lae.

General Milford’s 5th division were applying an enormous amount of pressure upon the Salamaua defenses, trying to tie down the bulk of General Nakano’s forces. Despite the frantic orders to withdraw over to Lae, the Salamaua defenders would continue to offer strong resistance against Milford’s attacks as they still wanted to retain Salamaua. North of the francisco river, the Japanese had considerable artillery to support a defense and continued to fire upon the advancing attackers. In response at 5am on september 5th, Captain Dawsons 2/6th field regiment directed their artillery concentration upon Rough Hill and Arnold’s Crest. A patrol of the 58/59th and 2/7th battalions tried to peak at both and were forced back under heavy fire. During the afternoon, the 12th platoon of Lt Albert Farley’s B company attacked the pimple, a prominent feature near the middle of what was being called E ridge. It was a razorback that approached along the Lokanu ridge. It allowed no flanking maneuvers. The platoon was met with australian grenades, it seems the Japanese had stolen at some point. During the night, a detachment of SNLF marines performed a surprising counterattack. They began with a mortar attack before creeping within 10 meters of the Australian lines. According to Keith Ross, the Japanese did not even have bullets in their gun spouts, believing someone might prematurely fire a shot making the enemy aware of their presence. When they got within 10 meters they began to cock their weapons. Ross recalled ‘When they charged the magazines they made a hell of a racket and we realized they were there.’. The Japanese charged with fixed bayonets and were met by a wall of fire, forcing them to withdrew.

Over on Charlie Hill Companies 1 and 3 of the 66th regiment led by Lt Usui Genkichi were trapped, so they set up ambush positions to try and cut off the supply lines of A and B companies of the 42nd battalion. As a ration train was moving around the western slopes of CHarlie Hill to supply Greer’s B company, the Japanese fired upon them from a newly established position on a ledge. The next day another ration train was hit 100 yards down the ridge to the west. This prompted Davidson to have the ration trains bypass the ambush areas more widely. Usui then ordered his men to light fires that would burn towards the Australian positions. Using wind, Usui hoped to dislodge the Australians. On the 6th, the 12th platoon maneuvered to cut off the Japanese supply line, but at 5pm a kunai fire forced them out. The 10th platoon rushed over to retake the position but likewise was burned out. The following morning another platoon came over but the Japanese were already there digging in. This little fire trick protected the Japanese from being completely cut off. It was a surprising victory for Usui and worked to prevent the allied supplies from getting through, forcing the assault upon Charlie Hill to a halt.

Meanwhile, on September 6th, General Nakano accompanied the 3rd battalion, 102nd regiment with some SNLF marines as they debarked Salamaua aboard 73 barges enroute to Lae. Over at Lae General Shoge and Admiral Fujita were commanding the meager amount of combat forces they had alongside numerous inexperienced non-combatants to try and halt the allied advance. Nakano ordered his forces to commence their withdrawal towards Lae on September 8th. He began by deploying the 1st battalion, 115th regiment at Buang, near the coast north of Malolo to cover the retreat. His forces south of the Francisco river were to pull back across the river while 200 men of the 15th independent engineer regiment would hold the line connecting Yalu and Markham point. Against them, Brigadier Evan’s had established a supply point at G Beach which was on the western mouth of the Burep River. There he had set up the 24th brigade’s HQ and brought up two 25 pounder guns for support. This greatly lessened the supply line to the front. 

Meanwhile, Brigadier Whiteheads men were beginning to reach the east bank of the Busu river and General Woottens 2/24th and 2/28th were advancing towards Busu. When Lt Ed Shattock’s platoon of the 2/24th battalion reached the Busu, Shattock was ordered not to cross it. He recalled ‘The Japs were not in position opposite me; we could have done it,’. In reality his force had reached a point on the Busu that held a extremely fast current. Perhaps his best swimmers may have been able to ford it without clothes or equipment, but it would have been dangerous as hell, especially if the Japanese caught them on the other side. Whitehead was eager to cross it, but knew the danger so he waited to bring bridging equipment over. He also ordered the 2/4th independent company over in Burep to advance west through some thick jungle to take a position east of the Busu. Over in the coastal area, Lt Colonel Colin Norman’s 2/28th battalion reached the Busu in the afternoon. They noticed the 3rd battalion, 102nd regiment were assembling at the Busu river line, along with remnants of the 3rd battalion, 115th regiment led by Major Mukai. The river looked to be swollen from recent heavy rains, thus the Japanese likewise needed to build a bridge to get across.

Back over at Nadzab, the 871st airborne engineers continued their labor, under terrible torrential rain allowing the 2/33rd battalion to arrive by September 9th. This was the same battalion that underwent the terrible accident when a B-24 liberator crashed on take-off after clipping a branch and rammed into 5 troop trucks full of soldiers waiting to debark. Its 4 500 lb bombs exploded tossing 2800 gallons of fuel in all directions killing 59 and wounding 92. Thus the weakened battalion alongside the 2/25th would begin an advance down the Markham valley towards Lae. They were met with the traditional New Guinea welcome, torrential rain, most of Nadzab’s airtrip was so flooded it delayed the arrival of the 2/31st battalion until September 12th, much to General Vasey’s dismay. 

Back over at Charlie Hill, the isolated Japanese were taking advantage of the torrential rain. They began evacuating pill boxes upon the knolls between Charlie Hill and Lewis Knoll. During the night of september 8th the whole of the Charlie-Lewis-Breger hill area would be evacuated. At 9:30am the next day, a mortar barrage began as platoons crossed their start lines on the northern slopes of Charlie hill. 15 minutes later the first platoon managed to occupy the first part of the Japanese perimeter without opposition. The second platoon passed through them and occupied the rest of the perimeter, Charlie Hill was now in Australian hands. Wasting no time, Davidson ordered the B Company now under the command of Captain Ganter to pursue the fleeing Japanese towards Nuk Nuk, which I had to say 3 times before not laughing. God I love New Guinea. At the same time, the 47th battalion also found abandoned pillboxes facing them, so they began a pursuit of the fleeing enemy. Colonel MacKechnies men found the same situation over at Berger Hill. On September 9th the 15th battalion were carrying out a two pronged attack upon the crest of scout ridge. C company came from the Bamboos while D company performed a outflanking maneuver from the enemy’s rear. Both forces had a limited approach area allowing only a platoon front. At 2:40pm the outflanking companies forward platoon reached the crest of Scout ridge finding no opposition. At 3:35 they reached the southwest edge of the Japanese position facing the Bamboo’s and alongside the other companies platoons began an attack. The enemy fired green flares and withdrew upon seeing them leading to only a minor skirmish. 

Over on Lokanu ridge, Lt Turner was leading a platoon assault under artillery and mortar support. They attacked the last Japanese strongpoint on its eastern tip overlooking the sea. The Japanese had hastily evacuated the position fleeing into the jungle below, leaving many dead and abandoned a lot of equipment. Further patrols from the Bamboos completely what was becoming a relieving picture, the Pimple and Knoll on Lokanu ridge were abandoned. After a 10 day initiation in the battle area, Lt Colonel Jack Amies commander of the 15th battalion signaled Milford late on September 9th “the 15th now holds line of Lokanu ridge complete from sea at Lokanu to crest of scout ridge”. The brigadiers met on the 9th with Milford who ordered them to speed up the divisions advance so they could give the enemy no respite to reorganize and occupy new positions. Thus the race to Salamaua was on. Brigadiers Hammer and Monaghan began a competition to see who would reach Salamau first. Hammer would state that Monaghan and come in at the “death knock” and Monaghan replied “that Hammer could relax and leave the battle to the 29th brigade who would clean it up for you”

Meanwhile General Wootten’s men were preparing to cross the Busu. During the morning their patrols had gone across to find suitable crossing points, but finding none. Over at the coast, one patrol reached a large island, named Rooke’s Island as Lt Rooke led the patrol. The island was in the center of the Busu’s mouth, Colonel Norman ordered Captain Leo Lyon’s A company to attempt a crossing. They sent one platoon across via a sandbank at the mouth, while the remainder of the company covered them with fire from Rook’s island. Captain Leo Lyon watched as two leading scouts moved across the sandbar about 50 meters apart with their rifles over their heads. The lead scout got about 80 meters from the far bank when the Japanese began opening fire from near the mouth of the river on the west bank. Both men fall and were washed out to sea, but one was only wounded and fought his way back through the current to the allied side.

Worried by the delays, Wootten ordered his brigadiers to seize some bridgeheads over the Busu. Norman assembled his battalion on the east bank near Rooke’s island and crossed the last channel of the Busu in four extended lines by the late afternoon. After stealthily forded over to Rooke’s island, the 2/28th egan crossing the channel under the cover of 25 pounder fire at 5:30pm. Each company moved to the startline one after another at two minute intervals. It was a very difficult crossing, many were swept off their feet by the fierce current. Many had their weapons snatched from them. As men began to be swept off, they tried grasped for anything on the western bank, like overhanging boughs and kunai. This shocked the Japanese, they had not considered it possible to cross. Most of the Japanese machine guns and grenade launchers were at the mouth point tip and thus when they began scrambling to hit the allies fording the channel it was too late. Norman’s men lost apparently 25% of their weapons crossing and suffered 13 deaths, but they gained Wootten’s desired bridgehead. 

On September 9th, at the height of the battle, Admiral Mori arrived at Lae via the I-174. He relieved Admiral Fujita, who would return to Rabaul on the same submarine. He soon discovered most of the navy’s forces were allocated to support tasks while Nakano directed the IJA forces to man the main defenses of Lae. The 2nd machine gun company of the 238th regiment and the 25th machine cannon company were sent to Munum and Ngasawapum to keep the road open to Boana. 

Back over at Norman’s bridgehead, some Japanese units crept through some kunai grass to surprise attack them using machine gun and mortar fire. But it was all for naught, as Norman’s C company counterattacked with fixed bayonets charging into a waist deep swamp where the Japanese were hiding. B Company came to support them and gradually the Japanese scattered after 63 deaths while the Australians suffered 21 casualties. Feeling more confident, Evans had the 2/43rd battalion hand over their weapons to be ferried across over to the 2/28th. A LCVP was able to make 40 trips taking some 1200 troops and much supplies over to the west bank of the Busu. To the north, Whitehead’s 26th brigade had been delayed 36 hours waiting for some rubber boats and suitable rope to get their men across. The 2/24th battalion began to work with the engineers to get across the Busu at a place where the river separated into 3 channels around 20, 30 and 14 meters wide. Their currents ran around 25 kms per hour with a depth of over 2 meters. With all the rain, it became apparent the crossing was going to be impossible with the materials on hand. None the less when there is a will there is a way. Warrant officer Bill McCallum and two engineers swam the river with signal wire and managed to drag a rope across, securing it to the west bank. However when they began hooking boats to the rope there soon became swamped, ruining the entire ordeal. Further north the 2/4th independent company managed to bridge and cross the Sankwep river which lay on a junction of the Busu. They soon established an ambush position on the east bank of the Busu near the Kunda bridge.

It was at this point General Herring decided to reinforce Wootten with Brigadier Cedric Edgar’s 4th brigade, consisting of the 22nd, 29/46th and 37/52nd battalions. They would take over the beachhead areas after landings were made. They departed Milne Bay in 6 LST’s and 6 LCI’s on September 9th, successfully landing at Red Beach by the night of the 10th. Meanwhile to the north the 2/25th battalion had reached Jensen’s plantation when they were fired upon for the first time. The Australians had taken over 5 days from capturing Nadzab to contact Japanese positions west of Lae and the delay unnerved the Japanese commanders. General Yoshihara would write  ‘The movement of the units which had dropped on Nadzab were very sluggish; if they had attacked with their vast strength, it would have been the hour of death of Lae in a matter of a few hours. It was a piece of good luck in the midst of misfortune’, the Japanese command, although ‘unable to understand the reason’, was given time to bring troops across from Lae and Salamaua to defend the western approaches of Lae.” Thus the Japanese had been given a minor window to retreat some of their forces from Salamaua to Lae.

Back over at Salamaua, the heavy rains continued to mask the Japanese retreat across the francisco river, while simultaneously hindering the Australians from crossing it. Brigadier Monaghan’s men managed to reach scout hill. The 15th battalion began their pursuit of the enemy going north east of scout ridge on the 10th. In their rapid advance they managed to kill a few stragglers and secured some high ground overlooking the mouth of the francisco river. Patrols south west of Nuk Nuk linked up with the 42nd battalion. North of the Francisco, Brigadier Hammer began testing enemy defenses at Rough Hill. Captain Jago’s C company of the 58/59th tossed 3 platoons at Rough Hill, Bob Lanes 7th, Ted Griff’s 8th and Arthur O’Rourkes 9th. Each made up up the hill around 50-100 yards before being fired upon and forced to pull out. After this Lewin’s platoon from the 2/3rd independent company fought its way up Savige Spur were they too faced heavy fire and had to pull out. They gradually managed to capture the Savige Spur, leading to an encirclement of the position. Meanwhile the 2/7th battalion along with 3 other companies of the 58/59th and two independent company platoons moved up Sandy Creek. The Japanese launched a counterattack dislodging units from the outskirts of Rough Hill and Arnolds Crest, preparing for a final withdrawal that was set to begin the following night. 

Thus when the Australians launched their attack the next day they found an abandoned Rough Hill. To the south, C company of the 15th battalion crossed the overflowing francisco river near its mouth to dominate the isthmus. Davidson’s B company crossed the francisco river in the morning and advanced northeast across the Salamaua airfield without opposition quickly captured Logui I. As the Australians entered Salamaua it appeared to them like a shell. The allied bombing campaigns against Salamaua had been devastating. Private Ted Griff would write “The isthmus was lined with bomb craters.” Private Peter Hemery wrote “not a building is left standing – just an occasional heap of scattered wreckage”. Private Jack Glynn wrote ‘Salamaua was a shambles; a building wasn’t left standing, by the look of the place it was very good bombing.’ The bombing had killed an estimated 200-300 Japanese in Salamaua, many were left unburied leaving a terrible nauseating stench in the air. A great quantity of supplies were discarded or destroyed. Two cargo ships laid offshore, and further down the beach were numerous wrecked barges. The aircraft hangers had roughly 40 damaged aircraft and it looked obvious the airfield had not been used since the 9th division had landed.To be blunt, most of the Japanese stationed there were relieved to depart it. In the end it was Monaghan who won the race.

Over to the west, after crossing the river, the 47th battalion advanced unopposed and converged with Hammer’s forces. They soon captured Arnold’s crest, Edwards Spur and launched their first attacks against Kela ridge known as “the hand”. The Japanese had concentrated at Malolo where they were evacuating by barge towards Law on the night of september 11th. To cover them, General Nakano ordered units from the 80th and 238th regiments to defend a last line that ran from the Kela ridge all the way to Malolo. Wootten brought up 14 25 pounders to support the advance. Australian forces now past the Busu began to unleash hell with their artillery. The Japanese command at Lae believed the artillery spelt their doom. Meanwhile the 2/24th battalion had unsuccessfully tried to bridge the busu using some felled logs supported on stone pylons. The men tried to build the bridge placing the felled logs around the large stone pylons and were initially successful when it was just a 20 meter stream. However during the night the river rose and the logs went up with them. The current was so strong the logs that did not rise because they were stuck with the stone just snapped in two. The men had to abandon the attempt. Lt Evans was forced to strip the 2/43rd battalion of their weapons and ferried them over the Busu during the afternoon by rope. Eventually Evans managed to arrange a deal with some American boatmen to lend him an LCVP for a few trips which allowed for his 2/28th fully equipped to get over. Logistics logistics logistics. The 2/28th managed to create a bridgehead with a sigh of relief I imagine.

To the north, the 25 pounders were gradually moving closer to hit Lae more accurately. The 2/25th battalion ran into 200 men of the 15th independent engineer regiment who had the unfortunate task of delaying them. The Japanese defensive positions were strung out back along the road behind Whittakers bridge and strongpoints north of Lae airfield known as Heaths, Edwards and Jacobsens. 30 of them were killed outright as the withdrew past heaths plantation. The 2/33rd battalion and 2/2nd pioneer battalion advanced towards Markham point. C company of the 24th battalion launched and attack, beginning by lobbing 126 mortars and 8 rounds of smoke at a point called River Ambush. As the mortar fire ceased the leading platoons surged forward, but the Japanese defenders advanced past the smoke and quickly repulsed the incoming attackers.

The next day, the 2/31st battalion arrived to the scene and joined the 2/25th battalion to clear Jenyn’s plantation. They encountered some heavy resistance further down the road at a bridge near Whittakers plantation. The 24th battalion made another attempt against markham point on the 12th. Four platoons hit some southern pillboxes, but were repulsed quite quickly. Lt Richards went on the record to say "that a further ground attack without support will not be successful and application has again been made for a synchronized air and artillery attack." Over on the coast the 2/32nd and 2/43rd battalions had just arrived and Evans directed the 2/28th to continue the advance towards Malahang while the 2/43rd would hit New and Old Yanga. Captain Catchloves company patrolled towards New Yanga while Captain Gordon’s company patrolled towards Old Yanga. During the morning both skirmished and dispersed enemy patrols then at 2:30pm it was reported that New Yanga looked abandoned. At 3:35 Catchlove was organizing an assault against the outskirts of New Yanga when suddenly heavy firing came out from the direction of a hut. The Australians were surprised by this but quickly called in some artillery support from the 14 25 pounders brought up from Red Beach alongside mortars. They hit New Yanga with 525 shells as the infantry tried to storm in but they were met with heavy casualties. They attempted a second assault during the afternoon, but again the Japanese held them back.

Back over at the Salamaua area, the Japanese continued their frantic withdrawal as the 5th division began mop up operations. Patrols combed the peninsula finding two naval and two anti aircraft guns, large quantities of unused arms, medical supplies, some wireless transceivers and a portable generator. The Japanese HQ were some well furnished huts, allies found food still on the table, indicating it was a rushed withdrawal. The Japanese had built several camps on the waters edge and inside cave networks. Some patrols found female clothing, lipstick and powder indicating the presence of women, and you can imagine what that was.  The 42nd Battalion would manage to occupy Kela Point; one of Major Warfe’s patrols reached the coast half way between Kela Point and Mission Point; and the 2/7th Battalion would capture the now-abandoned Kidney Hill before continuing forward towards Malolo. The Japanese at Kela ridge continued to fire back upon the enemy performing a bitter fighting withdrawal, until their final evacuation by barge on September 13th. By the 13th the bulk of General Nakono’s 51st division had reached Lae and were now preparing to withdraw even further to the Kiari-Sio area. Nakano had devised two plans to withdraw the Lae garrison; one plan was to go across the Saruwaged Range to the north coast, the other was to go over the foothills of the Finisterre ranges heading west parallel to the Markham valley. Engineering officer Kitamoto Masamichi who knew about both routes was asked to give his opinion and he recalled ‘It was a responsibility too heavy for just a Lieutenant to decide, I thought, but, well aware that Allied aircraft could easily interdict the route through the open kunai of the Markham Valley foothills. The second plan is impossible. The first plan is difficult but there is still some chance of success. I would choose plan one. However, the sacrifice will be great.We should ready our packs as we would retreat over the mountains from 10th to 15th of September,’’ Nakano agreed and issued the withdrawal orders which went out to all units on september 8th. 

Beginning on the 12th, the 7th base force main units consisting of Admiral Mori’s men began their withdrawal. The original plan called for them to cross the Busu river at the kunda bridge, then to travel via Gawan and Bungalumba to the summit of the Saruwaged Range. However the kunda bridge was blocked by Australian commandos, so they would need to find another way across the Busu then the Boana while fighting the enemy back. Engineers of the 51st and 30th engineer regiments were sent first to construct and repair the road to Mount Sarawaget. Colonel Araki commanded the second group coming over from Edwards plantation, consisting of the 51st divisional HQ, the 66th regiment, the 3rd battalion 21st regiment; the 1st battalion, 80th regiment and the bulk of the 14th field artillery regiment. The last group who would act as a rearguard were the 2nd and 3rd battalions of 115th regiment coming from Malahang and Busu, the 15th independent engineer regiment and the 1st battalion of the 11th regiment coming from Whittaker, Heaths, Edwards and Jacobsens plantations. Admiral Mori’s men were ambushed from the start by and american patrol of the 1st battalion, 503rd parachute regiment due east of Nadzab. This forced them to divert into the jungle towards Yalu. Over at the Lae field hospital were patients who were unable to be evacuated via submarine nor was it possible for them to be carried across the mountains, so they volunteered to protect the divisions rears.

Meanwhile Salamaua was now destined to become a large allied base. When General Herring arrived at Milfords HQ on september 14th, he took one look at the insanitary shell of what was Salamaua town, its poor airfield and near by swamp. He immediately wiped it as a base, it was to be discarded to ruin. Some Americans camped nearby it would call it "a filthy, rat-ridden, pestilential hole". Perhaps a lackluster jewel after fighting bitter months for it. The Salamaua campaign was over. The 15th battalion charged up the coast chasing after the Japanese catching some south of the Markham river. The campaign was a brutal one. The 17th brigade reported 135 killed, 354 wounded;  the 15th Brigade reporting 124 killed and 346 wounded; the 162nd Regiment reporting 81 killed and 396 wounded; and the 29th Brigade reporting 76 killed and 155 wounded. Against them, Nakano’s 51st Division suffered an estimated 2200 casualties since the end of July, for a total of over 8000 casualties, including 2722 killed, in the entire campaign. 

Back over at Lae, the evacuation saw standard infantry equipment being carried at 120 round of ammunition, 2 grenades and provisions for 10 days. Infantry had to carry their machine guns, small mortars, while artillery units had to carry their 75mm mountain guns and machine cannon company’s their 20mm guns. With supplies no longer being sent to the Salamaua front, there were provisions available for the withdrawal. General Yoshihara would write later that the generally healthy men of the Lae based naval forces were able to carry enough provisions for 14-15 days, but the IJA units most of whom had been fighting for Salamaua for months, were in extreme exhaustion and only able to carry half the amount. Over to the east the 2/24th battalion on september 13th began constructing a box-girder bridge over the Busu. It was launched after midday under enemy fire. When it nearly got across the gap, it overbalanced and was swept away downstream. Later in the afternoon more box-girders were brought over. A 25 meter single box-girder bridge was assembled using 3 box and 2 hornbeam sections. 100 men picked up the bridge and carried it through water over a meter deep across the first 20 meter channel to a mid river island. However they had no beachhead thus on the far bank only a mortar barrage could keep the enemy at a distance. They began to doubt the crossing would ever be made, so Whitehead on the 13th asked Wootten permission to send 120 men over the Busu at its mouth to advance north to the other side where the 2/24th battalion were. An hour later, Lt Colonel Ainslie of the 2/48th brigade crossed and began advancing north, but the jungle proved difficult and communications were bad.

Further north the 2/4th independent company tried to cross the river, but the Japanese held them back. The men were led by Lt Staples and as they forded the river he was wounded by a Japanese sniper. The remainder of his section were swept off their feat and scattered along the bank of the river. This prompted other men to try and use the kunda bridge. The Japanese employed a trick often used against them, they allowed a bunch to cross the bridge before unleashing their guns. 7 men were cut to ribbons, many other became marooned on the wrong side. In the desperate situation private Jaggar charged and attacked two enemy machine gun nests and a mortar post killing several Japanese and capturing a lot of equipment. Jagger then waited for darkness before swimming back. The platoon that had gotten over lost 7 men with several wounded.

Along the coast the 2/43rd found New Yanga unoccupied while the 2/28th encountered stiff resistance at Malahang. Lt Connor’s platoon were advancing at 11:20am when they ran into the enemy who were entrenched at a track junction 1000 yards east of Malahang anchorage. Connor went ahead with Corporal Torrent to charge 3 foxholes where 6 Japanese including an officer were killed. Connor was killed, so Torrent took command and he ordered an advance at 3:30pm where they found Japanese abandoned positions. The defenders were hitting the men as hard as they could. Artillery commander Lt COlonel Sukenobu Watanabe believed that the artillery troops were of no use ‘if they could not fire a shot on the battlefield’. Thus for his tired and weakened unit, ‘one cannon would be enough but they must also carry some shells’. His men sacrificed carrying sufficient food as he led them up the Saruwaged carrying mountain gun components weighing up to 50 kg’s each. Meanwhile Hiromatsu Sato’s anti-aircraft unit abandoned their guns in the Atzera Range in order to carry additional food. Sato and his men had enough food for 4 days and were told it could take 20 days to reach the northern coast. ‘We were stricken with apprehension, the effect of salt worked wondrously… those of us without salt became weakened… I used my salt sparingly and never drank unboiled water’. 

Back over to the west, Brigadier Eather ordered the 2/25th to put pressure on Whittakers plantation while the 2/33rd moved around south to establish a roadblock at Heath’s plantation. Artillery and mortar fire began the advanced as Major Robertson’s company of the 2/25th captured the bridge at Whittakers while Captain Gow and Captain Butler’s Companies advanced towards heaths plantation. There was a fierce battle but a single platoon managed to overrun the enemy HQ on the northern sector of heaths plantation. Meanwhile two patrols advanced west and southwest converging towards Heaths plantation only to find it abandoned. Thus the 2/33rd occupied Heaths plantation without a fight. 

During the night, the Japanese had evacuated Whittakers and the second echelon of forces had successfully departed Lae to march north to the Butibum rivers and than towards Boana. At 5pm on the 14th, Eather learnt from divisional HQ that one of the documents captured by the 2/25th the previous day indicated the Japanese operation order dated september the 8th. It showcased the evacuation of Lae which was of great excitement for General Vasey when he found out. Now every member of the division sought to race the 9th division to Lae, also hoping to prevent as many of the enemy from escaping as possible. Vasey’s staff concluded the Japanese were already withdrawing up the Busu. Thus Vasey believed that it would not be a good idea to weaken Eather’s assault on what he now realized were stubborn Japanese rearguards, remembering how brutal the Japanese rearguards were in the Papuan campaigns. So he ordered the 25th brigade to push vigorously towards Lae. Eather elected to quickly seize Edwards plantation. On september 14th Eather’s forces drove the Japanese from their positions at Lane’s bridge and continued to pursue them in the direction of Edwards plantation. 

Over to the east, Whiteheads engineers were at last able to create a bridge over the third channel, allowing Captain McNamara’s company of the 2/24th to get across. The Japanese were surprised by this and began to unleash as much fire as they could on the newly established bridgehead. But Whitehead quickly sent another company led by Captain Finlay to support the bridgehead successfully fighting the Japanese off after 4 hours of combat. The rest of the battalion crossed afterwords uncontested, then the 2/23rd and the 2/48th. Along the coast, Evans 24th brigade advanced against harsh Japanese resistance. Evan’s received word the 2/43rd were approaching Wagan from the north so he sent the 2/32nd battalion to hit Wagan from the south. Lt Day was leading a platoon around the right flank when he began getting sniped from tree top Japanese. Day’s platoon suffered heavy casualties and he himself took a shot through his spine. He was dragged away by Warrant officer Dalziel, but Dalziel was shot dead in the process. Day was then killed by a grenade, prompting Sergeant McCallum to take over, who advised the situation was quite warm and required some mortar support. The men backed up to give room for mortars to fire off and at 4:15, 12 3 inches and 10 2 inches began lobbing. This time a few platoons with machine gun crew support made a frontal attack with others hitting flanks. They met heavy fire back at 30 yards or so and suffered 6 more casualties. The Japanese began to waver as the platoons continued their assault and soon it became a full flight towards the village. As the platoons charged, many mopped up the snipers and apparently some fowls who would be destined for the nights dinner. The 2/32nd captured Wagan village by dusk while the 2/28th while the 2/28th advanced towards Malahang anchorage. The men began infiltrating a road behind a Japanese position. At 9;15am they unleashed an attack killing 12 Japanese without any loss and at 12:40pm killed another 14. A company found two abandoned 75 mm dual purpose guns north of the anchorage during the afternoon patrol. A few patrols went further north of the anchorage circling around establishing positions that would seal the anchorages fate. Wootten ordered the 2/24th to recross the river and reinforce the kunda bridge position while Vasey earmarked Brigadier Dougherty’s 21st brigade to advance upon the Boana.

On September 15th, Whitehead was finally able to launch his main offensive, tossing the 2/23rd battalion against Kamkamun and the 2/48th battalion at the Malahang airfield. A bit to the south the 2/32nd were capturing Malahang mission and the 2/43rd were just entering Wagan village. To the west, Eather’s men were facing strong resistance from Japanese rearguards at Edwards plantation. The 2/33rd were performing a frontal assault trying to draw enemy attention while the 2/31st moved around the right flank to secure some high ground behind the Edwards Plantation. Despite their resilience, Edwards plantation was completely surrounded and by the late afternoon the Japanese were forced to make a break for it, heading north over Edwards bridge, thus completely abandoning Lae to its fate. As they fled, 64 Japanese would be cut down by machine gun fire, trying desperately to climb a spur, being pursued by Eather’s men. 

Along the coast, the 2/28th were moving through Malahang anchorage with just a few skirmishes occurring. Both divisions raced to be the first to enter Lae. General Nakano’s 8650 men, including 2500 naval personnel had managed to get out, heading north towards the Busu. Southeast of Yalu, Admiral Mori’s first echelon were intercepted by the 3rd battalion, 503rd parachute regiment. The Paratroopers clashed with a vanguard of 34 men forcing the rest to head northwest across the Atzera Range. 

Despite being closer to Lae, Wootten’s men halted their advance at the Bumbu river by midday on september 16th. Eather’s however considered his advance was not speedy enough, therefore he urged the leading company to hasten. In the words of Captain Butler “Up at daylight and off again. "C" Company leading the Brigade this time. Men are a bit nervous again and went pretty steadily. Sick Japs along track kept holding things up and we expected to run into something at any moment. Then along the track and into the middle of us came a jeep crowded with Brigade HQ. Passed me and up to the leading platoon. The old Brig jumped out and started urging the troops to hurry along. The troops weren't very impressed as they thought the Jap was in front. Finally the Brigadier, armed with a pistol, acted as leading scout, and the troops followed in column of route behind… A brigadier is not an ideal section leader. The whole reason for his action was that he wanted the brigade to be first onto the beach. He managed it O.K. I had to send a patrol down the beach and back so we have that honour—doubtful one—as there were no Japs. Unfortunately we advanced too quickly—due to no opposition—and the Yanks came over and strafed us.” Eather’s men took Jacobsen’s plantation without opposition, then a patrol reached Lae’s Voco Point at 11:30. Not knowing Vasey had won the race, Wootten launched a final attack preceded by an aerial strike and artillery barrage after midday. They actually mistook the 2/25th to be Japanese almost leading to calamity, but Wootten stopped his artillery quickly when it became apparent. Both divisions finally entered Lae, ending the Lae-Salamaua campaign. Operation Postern was a success, though they were unable to prevent the Japanese from evacuating Lae. The overriding failure on the allied side was due to an underestimation of the enemy. There had been an overriding assumption that the Japanese forces at Lae would fight to the death to hold it. Back on September 8th, General MacArthur, cause you know I have to say something don’t you. Well he put out a triumphant communique, claiming they had enveloped 20,000 Japanese. Wootten’s staff estimated there had been around 8240 Japanese at Lae and 6934 at Salamaua. Vasey’s staff thought it was 6420 at Lae and 7041 at Salamaua. In truth Nakano had roughly 11,000 men and the majority got away, over 8000, a considerable feat.  The Japanese had inflicted 150 deaths and 397 wounded on the 9th division and 38 deaths and 104 wounded upon the 7th division. Wootten wrote upon seeing Lae "It was in an indescribably filthy condition and had been very thoroughly wrecked", Vast dumps of stores and discarded weapons littered the area. The airfield had not been used since just before the landing, the hangars were wrecked and about forty damaged planes were mute witnesses to the power of the Allied air force. The typical nauseating stench of an area occupied by the Japanese army pervaded Lae as it had Salamaua six days before. Lae would become a major forward base of operations, as Buna had become earlier. Another stepping stone to Tokyo.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

And thus ends the Salamaua-Lae campaign. The deceptive strategy to pressure Salamaua to entice the enemy to loosen its grip on Lae resulted in both bases being overrun in a dramatic fashion. Now the allies had a major forward base of operations to continue the push north.

 

- 94 - Pacific War - Operation Postern, September 5-12, 1943

Last time we spoke about the mop up operations on New Georgia and the continued drive upon Salamaua and Lae. Munda had fallen, New Georgia was certainly a lost cause, but that did not mean there wasn’t come cleaning up to do. The Americans were stuck mopping up places like Arundel and Baanga seeing fierce Japanese resistance. Sasaki ordered his men to fight as hard as they possibly could while others made their way to evacuation points. Over on Green Hell, the Australian and American forces had just taken Mubo and Lababia ridge, prompting General Nakano to create a last line of defense in front of Salamaua. Now the allies had to cross the francisco river and face multiple hills, ridges and knolls. Forward units forded the francisco river and grabbed a few knolls catching a glimpse finally of Salamaua, but a glimpse was all they were going to get as the Japanese fought tooth and nail to push them back.

This episode is Operation Postern

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

The time has come at last. For months, we have seen the Australian and American forces fight for each hill, ridge and knoll, cross over ravines, rivers, swamps, a green hell of a landscape filled with more horror than just the Japanese. From the Jungles of Way to the rugged mountains of bobdubi and Komiatum, through the endless rain, mud and death. Operation Postern was to finally be unleashed, landings at Lae and Nadzab would commence.

Now back in August, Admiral Barbey and General Wooten were forced to postpone D-day for September 4. For Lae the plan called for two battalions of Brigadir Victor Windeyer’s 20th brigade to land on Red Beach; the 2/15th battalion would hit the eastern flank and the 2/17th to western flank closer to Lae. The 2/13th would hit Yellow beach; the 2/23rd battalion with a company of engineers, a field ambulance, a force of artillery and light anti-aircraft section would join the landing phase; the 26th brigade would follow up the initial landings and move right through the beachhead. The planners were concerned with possible Japanese naval action against their beachheads at night, as this had occurred at Guadalcanal and Milne Bay, so the defense of Red Beach would be coordinated with the 2/2nd machine gun battalion.

Red Beach was selected as it was close to Lae, just a bit due east, but out of range of her large gun batteries. Yellow beach was further east and selected as an additional landing area to protect the eastern flank of the main beachhead that would be at red beach. The allies could not provide continuous air cover thus Brigadier Victor Windeyer’s 20th brigade would have to land and unload quick as all hell. The initial plans called for a time of landing known as “h hour” to be between 3am and 4am in line with Wooten’s request that it occur two hours during moonlight before dawn. They estimated they would need 9-10 hours for the unloading phase, the LST’s would then retract at around 1pm. However, when the landing date was postponed for September 4th, this changed everything. Now there would be no morning moon, thus H hour could not be scheduled until after sunrise to allow time for the allied navy to identify the correct beach on a coast that was covered by a low-lying swampy jungle terrain, there was no prominent landmarks it would be difficult. This delayed the landing until 6:30am, resulting in the loss of around 3 hours of unloading time. Alongside that came the decision to retract the LST’s by 11am as the allied air cover could not be guaranteed after 11am. This the unloading time was now reduced to 4.5 hours, that a hell of a lot less than they needed. It was also expected that the troops would take at least 1 to 1.5 hours to disembark leaving just 3 hours to unload supplies. Again logistics are not sexy, but this is the kind of problems needed to be overcome to win wars.

So Brigadier David Whitehead’s 26th brigade was going to follow up the initial landings, moving straight through the beachhead with the 2/2nd machine gun battalion who were earmarked to guard red beach. Furthermore General Heavy’s brigade would dispatch some amphibian scouts with the 532nd engineer boat and shore regiment to go in on the first wave to establish red and yellow markers for the two beaches. To make things even more confusing, there was this enormous fringing reef along the thousand mile coastline with a few breaks. One break in the reef line near a village called Tauali was going to be marked Green beach as a back up landing area. The one and half mile of good narrow beach was to be Yellow beach 1, and yes there was a yellow beach 2, closer to Silimati.

Admiral Barbey was going to employ every vessel he had; 4 Destroyer transports, the Gilmer, Humphreys, Brooks and Sands; 20 LCI’s, 18 LCT’s and 13 LSTs. From August 20-22nd Barbey had a full-scale landing rehearsal carried out at beaches on the south coast of Normanby island. The men learnt a few things from this experience. The first was that the surfacing of tracks with steel mesh was too slow to allow the vehicles to clear the beach. They decided that more stores would be loaded as bulk cargo and more labor would be provided to clear the landing crafts. Thus on August 29th, the 2/13th battalion was taken to Normanby island on destroyer transports were the men were disembarking from the LCVP’s up to their necks in water. There were major differences as you can imagine for the conditions in Australia vs New Guinea. As Patrick Bourke remarked ‘the country fringing the beach was the worst we had been in. Almost impenetrable jungle grew in waist deep swamps, crisscrossed by much deeper creeks.’

There was also a pre-emptive naval bombardment of Finschhafen as reports began to come in indicating enemy troops and supplies were being moved down the coast from Finschhafen by night. Vice Admiral Carpender ordered Captain Jesse Carter, commander of destroyer squadron 5 to sweep the Huan Gulf by night and hit Finschhafen. One of Carpenders staff noted  ‘It will be worthwhile to prove the Navy is willing to pitch in, even if we get nothing but coconuts,”. On August 22nd, destroyers Perkins, Smith, Conyngham and Mahan departed Milne bay enroute for the Huon Gulf. This was the furthest allied vessels larger than PT boats had ventured along the New Guinea coast since the beginning of the pacific war. Early on August 22rd, they opened fire on Finschhafen, firing 540 rounds of 5 inch shells within 10 minutes before hauling ass out of there. It was the first naval bombardment of Japanese forces in New Guinea. As for the battle for the skies, General Kenney was preparing to launch a series of air raids against Lae to support Operation postern. On the day before the landing, 21 allies bombers would hit Lae Airfield to try and knock out their aerial capabilities.

Now all of that was just for the Lae landing, we got an entire other operation to hit Nadzab, designated as Z-day which because of the postponement was changed to September 5th. 96 C-47’s, 82 carrying the regiments, 5 carrying artillery and 9 for supplies would be employed by Colonel Paul Prentiss’s 54th troop carrier wing to transport Colonel Kenneth Kinsler’s 503rd parachute regiment. Alongside this, Brigadier Eather’s 25th brigade were earmarked to be the first flown in after the initial landings. On August 31st tossed 3 battalion commanders, their operations and communications officers with supplies using a Flying fortress at a very low altitude over the drop zone. They were acting as a sort of reconnaissance and they would uncover vital information to ensure safe location markers for accurate future drops. Hell they even performed meteorological analysis to figure out the wind conditions for jump areas. Meanwhile they keep saying everyday here in montreal its gonna be sunny and its rained for 5 days straight. 

There would be rehearsals for the parachuting forces before September 3rd when the final plan was issued. Kinsler’s 1st battalion led by Major John Britten would hit field B with the task of securing the Nadzab airfield site before establishing a defensive perimeter and beginning work on the airfield. Meanwhile the Australian 2/2nd pioneer battalion led by Lt Colonel J.T Lang would cross the Markham to help construct a new airfield. Alongside this Kinsler’s 2nd battalion led by Lt Colonel George Jones was going to hit field A to capture the Gabsonkek area which would prevent the Japanese from advancing from the north or northwest. Kinsler’s 3rd battalion led by Lt COlonel John Tolson would hit field c to capture Gabmatzung and prevent the Japanese from advancing from the east. Furthermore Prentiss would drop 22 dummy paratroopers in the forests south of Yalu right where Japanese forces occupying Heath’s plantation would be able to see them. It was hoped this deception would delay advances towards Nadzab. By the way I took the time to educate myself a bit more on what is known as Paradummy’s, because honestly until writing this episode I had no idea it was a thing. These were burlap cases filled with straw and plant waste, they kind of look like sackboy to be honest. As you can imagine from ground level looking fairly high up they do look like real paratroopers and they often were dropped alongside real paratroopers to give them a fighting chance against enemy bullets. The more you know. 

After all the planning was done Barbey’s little armada departed Milne Bay on the morning of September 3rd. Their journey was uneventful as they disembarked at Buna for a short break before re-embarking in the afternoon. After this point Heavy’s Morobe base was hit by 9 Rabaul based Betty’s with 27 Zeros for escort which tried to high altitude bomb them, doing little damage. Because of the deceptive campaign against Salamaua, termed the Salamaua magnet, very few IJA forces were left guarding Lae. At Lae were Companies 10 and 11 of the 115th regiment to the right bank of the Markham; Company 6 of the 238th regiment at Markham point; the 2 machine gun company of the 238th regiment were spread between the Bunga river and Bulu River; the 15th independent engineer regiment, 2nd company of the 5th battalion of heavy field artillery, the 25th, 29th and 30th machine cannon companies would all be at Lae proper. Aside from the few IJA troops, Rear Admiral Fujita Ruitaro had the 7th base force, formed around the 5th Yokosuka and 5th Sasebo SNLF and the 82nd naval garrisons anti-aircraft and coastal defense units.

The Japanese were having a hell of a difficult time supplying their forces at Lae. To supply the near 10,000 or so men present within the Lae-Salamaua area each month required, 150 barges carrying 1500 cubic meters of supplies. Only large type barges could manage to get through the Dampier straits rather rough sea, smaller barges were too dangerous for the task. After each passing month, the naval ships used for transports were decreasing and by May the supplies were being carried by 6 submarines, cutting the volume in half the following month. After that supplies began to be carried overland from Wewak and Madang and a new barge route was established through Sio and Finschhafen. Regardless the Japanese were barely able to keep Lae and Salamaua supplied. This saw barely 300 fit men left to guard Lae with 2650 troops, malnourished, sick, wounded or suffering tropical ailments. The Japanese did have some big guns however, 28 75mm, 4 105mm and two 155mm for the coastal defenses, but their ammunition supply was quite limited. The 155mm’s only had 30 shells a piece, while the 105mm had 50. 

By late July, General Adachi decided to place Major General Shoge Ryoichi in command of the defenses at Lae, talk about a shitty promotion haha. Ryoichi’s rd battalion, 238th regiment was sent first to Salamaua, then Company 6th and the 2nd machine gun company of the 238th regiment managed to reach Lae, but by the time things cooked up the rest would be stuck in Finschhafen. Therefore Rear Admiral Mori Kunizo was sent to grab command of the 7th base force in the meantime while Fujita would lead all the IJN and IJA units currently at Lae. By nightfall on September 3rd, the final voyage began. The allied vessels got to the assembly area unhindered and undetected and by 5:50am on the 4th identified the beach markers. The destroyer transports lowered the landing craft carrying the first wave while performing a 6 minute bombardment. The first landing craft hit the beach at 6:30am and at his guard post at the Japanese anti-aircraft positions overlooking the Lae airfield, private Wada Kiichi heard the sound and saw the flashes of a naval bombardment out in the Guon Gulf. He wrote this ‘Suddenly, there was a booming sound from the sea, and in a split second, I sighted red and yellow tracers come flying on a half moon ballistic arc. Where would the huge fleet land?‘Aren’t they, in fact, landing right here in Lae?  ‘If I must die, I will fight with courage and die like an imperial navy man without shame.’

Brigadier Windeyer’s troops began to land at Red and Yellow beach, only meeting 30 members of the 2nd machine gun company of the 238th regiment who they brushed off around the Bulu plantation. General Kenney unleashed air raids against the Japanese airbases. At 7:45am 13 RAAF bombers, 10 Beauforts and 3 A-20 Bostons hit Gasmata; at 9am 24 Liberators hit Lae; at 9:30am 9 Mitchells hit Tuluvu on Cape Gloucester and 3 Bostons returned to hit Gasmata again in the afternoon. As the 22nd squadron War diary noted of the Gasmata raid “the strip is considered unserviceable”. The second wave approached the beach in the larger LCI’s, managing to unload 6 companies without any opposition other than some very annoying reefs near the shore. Thus two waves hit the ground uncontested, but danger did lurk in the skies above. 6 Ki-43 Osca’rs and 3 Ki-51 Sonia’s took off from Lae at 7am and 4 minutes later the Oscars began strafing 7 LCI’s carrying the 2/23rd battalion and its division HQ while the Sonia’s bombed two LCI’s. One of the bombs crashed through the main deck of LCI 339 just forward of its pilot house setting the ship on fire before it began listing to port taking on water. The LCI ran ashore and was abandoned by the crew, 10 of which were wounded. Another bomb narrowly missed LCI 341 exploding near the bottom of the vessel, blowing a large hole amidships on her port side flooding two compartments. The list to port was corrected and the LCI managed to run ashore and would be salvaged later. 9 men were killed with 45 wounded during the attack. 8 Boomerangs and 2 Wirraways came over from Tsili Tsili to aid the next echelons as they began to unload units. The LSTs began clearing the landing area by 11am. The LCT’s took a lot longer to unload than expected, they had arrived at 8am but only cleared the area over the course of 6 hours.

Meanwhile, General Imamura frantically launched a strong air raid towards Law consisting of 12 Betty’s, 8 Val’s and 61 Zero’s. The 81 aircraft strong party departed Rabaul, but was soon discovered by destroyer USS Reid lingering off Cape Cretin at around 1pm. Reid’s report gave enough time for the allies to toss a counter air wave to intercept them consisting of 40 Lightnings and 20 Thunderbolts. A few vals tried to bomb Reid in the meantime, resulting in all misses. The interception saw the loss of 23 Japanese aircraft, mostly Zero’s while only two lightnings were shutdown. However many Japanese aircraft continued towards Morobe where they descended upon the 6th echelons LSTs just off Cape Ward Hunt at around 2pm. These were carrying the Australian 2/4th independent company and the 2/2nd machine gun battalion, just 33 kms east of Morobe heading for Lae. 6 Vals managed to land two bomb hits on LST-473 and the Betty’s one torpedo hit against LST-471. This killed 51, wounded 67 mostly from the 2/4th independent company. The Japanese lost an additional 4 Zeros and 3 betty’s while 15 other aircraft were badly damaged. The remaining LSTs continued on towards Red beach, while some were ordered to divert course to assist the damaged LST’s from the aerial attacks. Destroyer Humphrey’s would grab the wounded and bring them back to Buna. Everything arrived on schedule by 23:00. Thus Admiral Barbey had managed to land 7800 personnel, of which 3780 were combat troops, alongside 3300 tons of supplies.

After the landings, engineers at Red and Yellow beach got to work constructing roads while Windeyer’s combat troops began to extend their perimeter. By nightfall the 2/17th battalion had crossed the Buso river and by 7:30am the 2/7th field company had built a single-girder bridge across it. To defend against further aerial raids upon the beachheads, a battery of the 2/4th light anti-aircraft regiment landed two detachments at Red and yellow beach. By mid afternoon the 2/13th had extended the yellow beach perimeter around 3000 meters inland and 2000 meters east to west. Lt Colonel Colvin’s 2 companies of the 2/13th advanced inland towards the Bulu plantation sending the 30 Japanese who tried to contest them earlier further north towards some hills. Aside from them there were no signs of other enemy, by 2pm patrols of the 2/13th and 2/15th were forded the Suez river between Bulu river and Red beach. Colonel Grace’s 2/15th battalion were given the task of protected the beachhead, while Lt Colonel Simpson’s 2/17th began to advance towards the Buso river at 9am. Two companies of Major broadbent advanced northwest across the Buso going another 4 miles finding no enemy. Two companies of the 2/13th would also advance east along a track going towards Hopoi where opposition was expected. General Wootten wanted to speed up the advance towards Lae to prevent the Japanese from any time to organize a defense east of the Busu river. Wootten gave Brigadier Whiteheads 2/17th battalion the task of passing through the 20th brigade and continued the advance towards Buso river. Over on the other side Admiral Fujita began deploying his forces in a defensive perimeter between the Markham and Busu Rivers, with most of his naval units taking up positions on the right bank of the Busu while Companies 10 and 11 of the 115th regiment, around 127 men were sent to hold Singaua point. General Shoge rushed over as quickly as he could to take command at Lae, while General Nakano sent Major Mukai Masatake to assume command of the frontline actions.

The next day the Australian advance going east and west continued still with no opposition. Simpson’s men went west, advancing through some horrible wet and boggy terrain. To simpsons north was Broadbents men who got lost for a little while fording rivers until they made it to the Singaua plantation. Meanwhile the 2/23rd and 2/24th battalions followed behind them led by Lt Colonel Gillespie and Major McRae. They bivoucked south of Apo where Whitehead placed his HQ. During the morning hours, Brigadier Bernard Evan’s 24th brigade embarked on 20 LCI’s over at Buna and began to land at Red Beach by nightfall. As the Lae operation was moving along full swing, it was now time for Z-day.

A B-24 liberator crashed on take-off after clipping a branch and rammed into 5 troop trucks full of soldiers waiting to debark. Its 4 500 lb bombs exploded tossing 2800 gallons of fuel in all directions killing 59 and wounding 92. It was a horrible disaster and a bad omen. The armada of C-47’s were being escorted by 48 Lightnings, 12 Airacobras and 48 Thunderbolts a very intimidating force. Generals Kenney, Vasey and MacArthur accompanied the armada aboard some flying fortresses. Kenney said to MacArthur “They’re my kids and I want to see them do their stuff”, apparently MacArthur hesitated for a moment before replying “you’re right George We’ll both go. They’re my kids too”. Kenney worried about the consequences of both of them being killed by “some five dollar a month Jap aviator”. MacArthur only worried about becoming airsick and throwing up in front of his colleagues. General Vasey who had witnessed German paratroops in action over Crete back in 1941, watched the drop from above and would write to his wife “I wanted to see paratroops land from the top rather than the bottom as in Crete”. Over 302 aircraft crossed the Owen Stanley range. Heading the armada at 1000 feet were B-25 strafers carrying 8 .50 caliber gun in their noses and 60 frag bombs in their bomb bays. Behind that at about 500 feet were A-20’s ready to lay smoke as frag bombs exploded. At around 2000 feet behind them were 96 C-47’s carrying the paratroops, supplies and artillery. To all their sides were the fights sitting at around 7000 feet. Following this were B-17’s loaded up with 300 lb parachute bombs to be drop ordered by paratroopers. Then even further behind that were B-24’s and more B-17’s who were going to hit Japanese defensive positions at Heath’s plantation and other points between Nadzab and Lae.

Air attacks against the defenses would be followed up with smokescreens. At 10:22am the C-47’s began to drop their paratroopers over their target zones. Each C-47 dropped its men in less than 10 seconds and the whole regiment was unloaded in 4 and a half minutes. The whole of the Nadzab area was landed upon and taken uncontested. Watching it unfold Kenney was impressed going on the record to say “the operation really was a magnificent spectacle. I truly don’t believe that another air force in the world could have put this over as perfectly as the 5th Air Force did.” By 2pm, the 2/2nd Pioneer battalion crossed Markham arriving at Nadzab during the night. The 2/2nd Pioneer battalion began hacking and burning kunai grass off the airstrip to clear it up before successfully extending it from 1500 feet to 3300 feet. This would allow the 871st airborne engineer battalion to land so they could construct two additional airstrips. On September 7th, Vasey’s 7th division began to land at Nadzab, only facing some challenging weather.

C Company of the 24th battalion led by Captain Arthur Duell departed Deep creek on the 4th to attack Markham point acting as a diversion. Lt Fred Child’s 14th platoon performed the initial attack from the southwest followed up by Lt Maurie Yong’s 13th platoon who advanced down a ridge near the river. Two other platoons covered them as they all blasted mortars over the Japanese camp and unleashed 2 vickers guns on Labu island. 100 men of the 6th company, 238th regiment were taken by surprise. They had dug in behind some barbed wire for several months astride a razorback ridge along the Markham river. Their surprise wore off quickly as they unleashed heavy fire killing 12 men and wounding 6. The allies were forced to pull back after killing 18 Japanese. Further to the south, General Nakano was facing some pressure from General Milford’s 5th division. During late August the Japanese had been fighting tooth and nail to hold their last defensive line in front of Salamaua. The Japanese forward positions had been hit by heavy artillery for a long time, but their defenders were hunkering down. Brigadier Monaghan elected to send a company to cross the western slopes of Charlie Hill and occupy a position on its northern portion, thus isolating the Japanese. This was the same strategy that had been employed against Mount Tambu. However Milford instead elected to toss a frontal assault, believing his artillery support would win the day.

Zero hour for the assault was to be 3:20pm, from 11:30am until then artillery smashed the Japanese positions with 2000 shells, 450 mortar bombs and 6000 rounds of machine gun fire. When zero hour hit, D company of the 42nd battalion began their climb. Lt Garland’s 17th platoon led the way, immediately receiving enemy first after the first 100 yards. Two other platoons crossed around to the left and right only getting a few yards further. The approach to Charlie Hill from the west was a very steep thickly clad razorback. Garland’s men had not even seen the enemy and 5 of them were hit. Two hours after the attack had begun, platoon leaders signaled down the slope that no progress could be made, it was simply too steep. Up above there were 4 well camouflaged machine gun nests unleashing havoc. The assault was canceled and the men withdrew.

Over to the west, the 47th battalion launched two attacks against the Kunai spur. Captain Aubrey McWatter’s A company began their attack at dusk on august 28th. Sergeant George Pitt’s 9th platoon took the left as Barnett’s 7th platoon to the right. The assault fell into hand to hand combat quickly, Barnett was twice wounded and his men were forced back. Pitt’s platoon ran into heavy machine gun fire from a well dug in log bunker and were forced back having two deaths and two wounded. On the 30th, Major Idris Leach’s C company made their attack but were forced back by heavy fire. Major Idris Leach and Sergeant Bill Eisenmenger lost their lives in that attack. On that same day, there was a request to increase artillery fire. 200 shells were lobbed upon the enemy the next day, then on september 1st after 5 hours of shelling, two platoons attacked again. They were supported by vickers guns as men scrambled to climb the ridge to its crest. The artillery softened up the enemy somewhat. Platoon leader Lt Ernest Anzac Walters died leading his men in the bloody carnage. They achieved the objective by the late afternoon sending many Japanese fleeing from their positions. Owen guns and grenades broke them. Around 60 dead Japanese were found on the Kunai spur, around 40 of them had been killed by artillery fire, some pillboxes took direct hits. The Kunai Spur was renamed Lewis Knoll after Captain Eric Lewis of B Company.

To the east, after seizing Lokanu ridge, Milford ordered Lt Colonel Jack Amies 15th battalion to head right of the Americans and penetrate the Japanese defensive line at all cost without delay. At first light on the 31st, Lt Doug Matthew’s 18th platoon of D company, reached a junction between Lokanu ridge and a razorback. The Japanese hit Matthew’s men with mortar and machine gun fire. Despite the heavy fire, Matthew and his men crept up 75 yards, but at 12:50pm were met with a shower of grenades from enemies on a crest above them. Matthew decided to wait for reinforcements and artillery support before attacking up Scout ridge. Lt George Matthew’s, brother Lt doug Matthews arrived with the 14th platoon after 1pm and organized a company attack, despite still not having artillery support nor mortars. Lt Doug led the 18th platoon forward, leading to 11 men becoming wounded, Doug likewise received a shot to the leg. George helped his brother get down the ridge and Doug told him before being carried off for care “About six weeks, I think”. George would later recall “I didn’t worry too much about it. I thought on of the family has got out of it”. Lt Doug Matthew died the next day.

The 15th battalion forces kept up the pressure sending C company, but they were repulsed likewise. On September 1st, Colonel Davidson sent B company around the west side of Charlie Hill intending to cut off the Japanese supply lines. Captain Frank Greer’s B Company crossed a creek during the night and advanced 300 meters from the crest of Charlie Hill. They set up an ambush position, unknowingly 30 yards below the enemy perimeter on Charlie Hill. The Japanese tossed multiple counterattacks while A Company managed to establish their own ambush position nearby in some thick undergrowth on the eastern side of Charlie Hill. On September 4th, A Company joined up with B Company to the west, completely sealing off the enemy position.

Meanwhile Captain Yates C company was advancing northwards from Lewis Knoll. Their patrols ran into Japanese losing many men in the process. At 7:15am the next morning they came across a razorback running towards a strongly held enemy position on Twin Smiths. Captain Yates led an attack upon the Twin Smiths, but the enemy fire was too much, forcing him to withdrew. 

After the defeat at Arnold’s Crest, Brigadier Hammer had resorted to harassing actions against the enemy. The 2/7th were hitting Arnold’s Crest while Major Warfe’s 58/59th and 2/3rd independent company were hitting rough hill. Hammer sent Lt Garland’s men from C Platoon to infiltrate the Japanese rear and to carry out a diversionary ambush. On September 3rd, Lt Garland ordered Arnold’s Crest to be shelled, so that the noise would cover his men as they began their infiltration. They departed at 9am, moving along the Buiris Creek between the Japanese positions. They ambushed a supply track at 11am, just when the shelling stopped. Garland recalled ‘My men made their way forward through the jungle canopy like deadly green ghosts. I never heard a sound as they moved forward and adopted their ambush positions.’ Garland positioned his men on the southern side of the track with around ten meters between them, covering more than a thousand meters of track, watching while hiding; a difficult balance. Garland noted ‘You soon learn to look through the jungle, by slightly moving your head from side to side, whilst preserving your concealment.’ After two hours of waiting, Garland’s men killed 8 Japanese in an ambush, after this they pulled out.

Finally, Scout Ridge was devastated with artillery and mortar bombardment, allowing Lt George Matthews men to gain its crest where his brother had died. On September 3rd, detachments of the 5th Sasebo and 2nd Maizuru SNLF marines counterattacked and forced the australians off. While this was occurring, Lt Tom Cavenagh’s A company of the 15th battalion seized the unoccupied Lokanu knoll. They crept up the knoll under artillery support to find freshly dug trenches, weapon-pits and foxholes all recently abandoned. By nightfall the SNLF marines attempted to reoccupy the positions but were forced to dig in on the northern side of Lokanu Knoll. On the night of september 4th, General Adachi learnt of the Lae landings and immediately ordered General Nakano to withdrew from Salamaua and to assemble at Lae by september 20th. Japanese forces were going to withdrew towards Kaiapit or Sio through Salawaket. Adachi sent the main body of the 20th division to defend Finschhafen, resulting in the suspension of the construction of the Madang-Lae road. The Nakai detachment of Major General Nakai Masutaro currently at Bogadjim was ordered to defend Kaiapit and hold back the allied advance to help Nakano’s withdrawal.

Nakano ordered the 5th Sasebo and 2nd Maizuru SNLF to cover the movement by barge of the 3rd battalion 102nd regiment towards Law, departing on september 6th. Meanwhile the 51st division prepared a fighting withdrawal and at Lae, General Shoge and Major Mukai just arrived to grab command of the IJA forces. Shoge’s attitude was considered to be the ideal representative of a commander. He often went a day or two without opening his mouth, he was a fighting man who did not display signs of joy or sorrow, nor pleasure or pain. Holding the enemy back to the east and west, even within close range, he remained cool. He never lost his composure and he was a large influence upon his officers and men. Shoge concentrated the whole strength of the Lae garrison to block the superior allied forces while Mukai personally led platoons and companies to direct the fighting at the frontlines.

Meanwhile on september 6th, Wootten’s men continued their advance. The 2/13th battalion reached the Buhem river and captured the overgrown Hopoi airfield. The 2/23rd battalion moved past the 2/17th arriving to the left bank of the Buiem river. From there they pushed back some Japanese to the Singaua plantation. By the late afternoon the Japanese were being hit from the east and north, forcing them to retreat. Ever since D-day, the Japanese had been tossing air raids against Red Beach, the Aluki track and the amphibian craft plying between the beaches, but they were unable to hinder the movement of men and supplies. At midnight on the 6th, 5 LCV’s and 3 LCMS landed supplies from Red Beach to Apo village alleviating the severe ration and ammunition shortage for the forward troops and shortening supply lines. New plans were formed. On September 7th, the 24th brigade would takeover the costal advance while Whiteheads 26th brigade would advance further inland up the Burep River. The climax for the Lae-Salamaua campaign was nearly at hand.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

Operation Postern finally kicked off and the amphibious invasion seems to be a resounding success. The Japanese were completely bamboozled and now frantically tried to get men in the Salamaua area over to defend Lae, but would they lose both as a result of it? 

- 93 - Pacific War - Mopping up in New Georgia, August 29 - 5 September, 1943

Last time we spoke about the major planning leading to a thrust into the central pacific and General Kenney’s neutralization efforts of the Lae area. Admiral Nimitz and Douglas MacArthur had been battling it out for a long time leading finally to some concrete plans for twin campaigns, one in the Central Pacific and one in the South and Southwest Pacific.  Countless meetings, deals and minds were put to work trying to figure out how to prepare the gradual advance towards the Japanese home islands. To finally make some waves into the central pacific it was to be the Ellice Islands, Gilbert Islands and Nauru as first objectives. Meanwhile in New Guinea the advance upon Salamaua and Lae raged on, but to really break them first air supremacy was required. Kenney unleashed a massive campaign with some innovative new toys completely desolating Wewakes airpower.

This episode is Mopping up in New Georgia

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

New Georgia was falling apart for the Japanese. When Munda was seized it spelled doom. General Sasaki ordered his forces to withdraw to places like Baanga Islands after fighting a series of desperate holding operations against the forces of General Griswold. Again, the seizure of Munda was a colossal undertaking. The Americans had tossed 30,000 troops to overcome 5000 Japanese. The Americans lost 1136 of said troops and the Japanese 1500. The Japanese managed this type of bulwark defenses by building up a network of entrenchment systems around Munda Point. The US air supremacy over New Georgia gave them little advantage because the island was simply too dense in vegetation to properly spot enemy positions. Rear Admiral Turner likewise learnt a valuable lesson, that no matter how many transport boats were tossed into an invasion plan, more would always be needed. These lesson led to some radical rethinking of strategy going forward for future operations, like in the Central pacific.

Admiral Ota used his fleet of barges to move 5 to 8 in a group, every night. Colonel Tomonari’s 13th regiment and Sasaki’s HQ were moved to Vila in an effort to reinforce  what would be the new main Japanese outpost in the Central Pacific. Further north the Americans successfully invaded Vella Lavella, completely bypassing Kolombangara and thus cutting off the enemy’s supply line. In response to this Admiral Samejima established a barge staging base at Horaniu. Samejima then advised Sasaki to simply proceed with the course of action he thought best. Sasaki decided to do what he had been arguing for sometime now, to concentrate all his forces at Kolombangara. However with Zieta in the hands of the Americans, he would have to figure out a clever way to carry out the logistics of such a plan. Thus he split his forces in two, taking up positions at Bairoko and Baanga. Ota was given the task of evacuating the northern forces at Bairoko using his barge fleet, but the men to the south in Baanga were going to perform a fighting withdrawal of both Baanga and Arundel. Luckily for the Japanese, the 27th regiment had bypassed the Yano battalion in Baanga, to advance upon Piru Plantation and Sunday inlet. The forces at Baanga would be facing against the landings of 3 battalions; the 2nd and 3rd battalions, 169th regiment and the 3rd battalion, 172nd regiment led by General Barker. While Barker was getting his men to assembly positions, the Yokosuka 7th’s 12cm guns and two mountains began to fire upon Munda Field. This caused only slight damage with some casualties, but it was a nuisance nonetheless.

On August 16th, Barkers 136th field artillery battalion positions at Munda began counter firing against the Yokosuka guns. This was followed up by aerial attacks by 13 Avengers and 17 Dauntless who performed carpet bombing. For those who don’t know this is the practice of bombing over a large area simultaneously. Imagine hitting a km area of vegetation by spreading your aircraft and timing everything just right, it produces what would look like a carpet of bombs hitting. So when you take a carpet and toss it over your floor, that was kind of the mental image received by this maneuver. The results were devastating. The Yokosuka 7th guns would not fire again. 

Meanwhile the recently landed 2nd battalion, 169th regiment faced the strongest pocket of Japanese as they attempted pushing the defenders further west. The 3rd battalion, 172nd regiment would eventually join in on this attack. When the 2nd battalion was showing signs of slow progress, Barker decided to toss the 172nd in on August 18th. But the fiercest fighting would be seen between the 3rd battalion, 23rd regiment who continued to resist against Barkers 4 battalions as Sasaki’s men were crossing over to Baanga and Arundel island. On August 19th, the 1st battalion finally managed to break through to the southwestern coast, where they came across the now abandoned 12cm guns of the enemy. During that night the 3rd battalion, 23rd regiment had slipped through a swamp making their way north to join their fleeing comrades over to Arundel. By nightfall of the next day all had successfully gone over. The cost of mopping up Baanga as recorded by the 169th was 44 dead, 74 wounded and 300 non-battle casualties, the ever present dangers of tropical island warfare. For the 172nd records, it was 8 dead, 36 wounded and nearly 200 men requiring evacuation from tropical diseases. For the Japanese there was no estimation or rough counts for casualties. Such dire numbers would see General Wing replace Barker as commander of the 43rd division effective August 20th. Now Admiral Halsey also wanted to see Arundel seized as it had become an important position, but the allies did not realize the amount of forces that had been snuck onto the small island.

Meanwhile the 25th division continued their advance north through painfully rough swamp terrain, pursuing a rather elusive enemy. As the regiments advanced, bulldozers of the 65th engineer battalion tried to build jeep trails behind them. However the rain was so bad they became a nasty type of tropical mud and the bulldozers were struggling. Thus the supplies would have to be carried onwards to the front by hand, typically on the men’s backs, or occasionally via air drops. By mid August the 161st regiment would finally reach the rendezvous point at Mount Bao where General Collins planned to have them turn west to secure an artillery position at Mount Tirokiambo. Once the artillery was set up, it could support an assault of Bairoko. Bairoko would be hit from the west by the 3rd battalion, 145th regiment of Colonel Dalton and from the east by the 1st battalion, 27th regiment of COlonel Liversedge. But mother nature is a cruel mistress and she places some impassable swamps, preventing the 140th field artillery battalion from reaching Mount Tirokiambo. On August 21st, the marine defense battalion tractors had to pull the 155mm’s of the 136th Field artillery battalion over the soft road to get onto a position on Zieta Hill. However this took too long and while it was occurring the Japanese had successfully evacuated Bairoko. Admiral Ota’s fleet of barges had been running to Bairoko every night under the cover of darkness and the cover of some guns placed on Kolombangara that fired upon US PT boats trying to harass the barges. American intelligence believed all of this activity was actually reinforcing Bairoko, thus they planned for a daylight raid to hit the barges in their bases. Rendova launched some PT boats, the 15th corps lent some demolition teams of the 117th engineer battalion and the NGAF provided fighter cover. The raid failed and the boats were forced to retreat.  On August 23rd, Dalton and Liversedge’s men entered Bairoko to find a completely deserted base. On that same day, the 27th regiment arrived to the Piru Plantation after slogging through swamps prompting Collins to remark “Crossing that swamp was the toughest physical test I underwent during the war.”

On August 23rd, Samejima sent new orders to Sasaki, instructing him to hold the Gizo-Kolombangara-Arundel line and to wait until a proper evacuation date was set. Sasaki sent the 1st company of Major Kinoshita Seishu to occupy some high ground on the western part of Arundel and the 4th company of 1st lt Ito Saburo at the base of the Stima Peninsula on its northeast coast. On August 25th Ota’s barges were continuing to run nightly runs to Arundel bringing the 6 and 7th companies of Major Yamada Tadaichi over to Vila. By late August most of the other units arrived to Vila, with the Kure 6th SNLF taking the task of defending Kolombangara’s western coast and the 229th regiment were deployed at Mbambare Harbor to protect its eastern coast. In addition, Captain Miyazuki Toshio departed Rabaul with 3 destroyers, the Hamakaze, Shigure and Isokaze to evacuate men at Rekata Bay back on August 22nd. However they were harassed by a PBY around Bougainville and realizing the Americans might toss a naval mission against them, they were forced to abort. 

Another evacuation run was attempted 3 days later, seeing Admiral Ijuin leading light cruiser Sendai and 2 destroyers to escort Captain Toshio's group. The diversion was discover by Australian coastwatchers and soon Toshio was intercepted by 10 PBY’s in the Bougainville strait. The Hamakaze’s forecastle was hit by a bomb that caused 36 casualties again they had to abort. Two days after this light cruiser Sendai the destroyer Sazanami finally broke through to Rakata Bay and managed to grab most of the troops there. To grab the rest of the troops, 6 flying boats and a submarine were sent. Detachments of the Kure 7th SNLF would be landed at Sumbe Head and Sambe Head over on Choisuel, who would work to establish new staging bases for the rest of the troops being brought back to Buin.

Over at Horaniu, the Japanese were constructing a new barge deport. Admiral Wilkinsons 3rd echelon led by Captain Grayson Carter consisting of 2 LSTs and the destroyers Philip and Waller were sent over to Barakoma on August 20th. They were intercepted by enemy planes in the Gizo strait which saw Philip collide into Waller providing some slight damage. The last convoys of the month would manage to unload at Barakoma under excellent weather and good air cover. Altogether Wilkinsons landed 6505 men, 1097 tons of rations, 843 tons of petroleum, 2247 tons of ammunition and 2528 tons of vehicles, By September 27th the field would be fully operational. The Americans also managed to construct an airfield at Ondonga, giving General Wing further support to mop up Arundel. On August the 29th, the 2nd battalion of the 172nd regiment were moving to the east coast while the 1st battalion moved west. Both had to advance over mangroves and hardcoral shorelines, because the interior was far too dense with underbrush. 

Meanwhile over on Vella Lavella, Wilkinsons turned command over to General Griswold on September 3rd. The americans expected no resistance as they planned to occupy the entire island. Admiral Halsey gave the task to Major General Harold Barrowcloughts 3rd New Zealand division who were scheduled to arrive in mid september. But in the meantime, Griswold landed the 1st battalion, 145th regiment at Brakoma to allow Major Delbert Munsons 1st battalion, 35th regiment to advance up the east coast to secure the Kokolope Bay area, where the American wanted to set up a new radar site. Munson’s men made good progress as the reached Lambu Lambu cove by September 4th. From there they dispatched Companies A and C with some Fijian commandos to patrol. The patrols got to the Boko Mission where A company ran suddenly into a strong Japanese patrol. A firefight broke out taking the lives of 12 Japanese. The men examined the bodies and their equipment and sent word back that they were facing recently landed enemy forces. The next morning, the 4th company of the Mikami battalion assaulted A company who were dug in at the Boko Mission. A company managed to fight them off, but had 2 deaths and 2 wounded in the process.

Because of the attacks, General McClure sent forward his 3rd battalion followed up by units of the 64th field artillery battalion. The artillery men took up a position at Ruravai to support the advance. At the same time Munsons men cleared up the Boko Mission area, allowing for supplies to come up to it by boat. Munson then directed his forces to hit the main Japanese defenses at Baka Baka. As the men advanced they faced a steep ridge holding Japanese machine gun nests which greatly hindered their progress. Meanwhile on September 5th, the 2nd battalion, 172nd regiment discover the main enemy positions on Arundel while the 1st battalion was landing at Bustling Point trying to secure a forward artillery position. The 1st battalion would then occupy the tip of Bomboe Peninsula. The Japanese units meanwhile were reporting great success in their efforts and also requested they be allowed to assault the enemy artillery at Piru Plantation. On the last day of August, the 9th defense battalions 155mm’s at Piru Plantation had begun opening fire on Kolombangara. They also dropped some leaflets upon the Japanese at Vila describing the agonizing death their artillery would provide them, cheeky. The leaflets read “ask the survivors from the 229th what it was like on Bakudan Hill”. The next morning Takabayashi told the 3rd battalion  “enemy shelling and firing will be intensified in the future, any rambling activity must be avoided and everyone must always be on the alert.” All of this prompted Sasaki to order a counterattack. 

At around midnight on September 9th, Takabayashi’s 3rd battalion, 13th regiment aided by a platoon of the 6th engineers snuck across the Blackett strait using barges to Sagekarasa island, their orders were to drive the enemy out of northern Arundel. Just a few hours later, Griswold ordered Colonel Sugg’s 27th regiment to Bomboe Village to attack from the west. Sugg’s men began their advance on September 12th, and his 3rd battalion forded the Bomboe Lagoon to seize Sagekarasa Island, effectively cutting off the 13th regiment. The Japanese were taken by surprise and began counterattacking with Takabayashi from the west and Ito from the east, but the Americans held on.

Further south, Sugg’s 2nd battalion ran into the Japanese main position, meeting heavy gun fire. Additionally the 1st battalion, 169th regiment began an occupation of the Fringe Island and the 82nd chemical battalion began deploying their 4.2 inch mortars at Bomboe to prepare a killing field for the Japanese at Safekarasa. From their positions on Fringe Island, the Americans were able to observe and track the Japanese barges with moonlight seeing them depart Vila and approach the landing area. This provided Sugg’s the perfect amount of information to launch a deadly accurate mortar bombardment. The proceeding bombardement took countless lives including the 3rd battalion commander Takabayashi. On the night of September the 15th, Colonel Tomonari brought his HQ across and ten minutes later while he was sitting on a log listening to a company commanders report, he was killed instantly by a mortar shell that landed at his feet. Kinoshita took temporary command of the 13th regiment, 3 days later Colonel Muta Toyoji would become the new 13th regiment commander.

On that same day the Americans attacked the main Japanese position, but were beaten back. Griswold  responded by bringing forward the 1st battalion, 27th regiment from Enogai with 5 marine tanks of the 11th defense battalion the following afternoon. On September the 17th the tanks charged forward with 3 rifle companies lined abreast behind them. Artillery and mortar concentrated upon Kinoshita’s position, shocking the Japanese and forcing them to pull back. However the following day, the Japanese had quickly learnt their lesson and came back with anti-tank guns. They knocked out two tanks before pulling back to the Stima Peninsula. After two more days, the Japanese began evacuating Arundel. During the night, the 3rd battalion evacuated under some heavy mortar and artillery fire while the Yokosuka 7th guns covered them. The following night barges grabbed the 1st battalion troops, bringing the battle of Arundel to a close. For Colonel Muta Toyoji’s 13th regiment, the fight for Arundel was a costly endeavor, they suffered 243 killed, 363 wounded, including many officers. For the Americans it was 31 dead and 225 wounded.

Back on September 10th, McClure's batteries began to arrive at Lambu Lambu and as soon as they were put into position they began firing against the Japanese. You see during one of the fights between the Japanese and Munson’s forces, a dead Japanese officer was found to be carrying a sketch map of the Japanese positions at Horaniu. Captain Jorn Burden translated the Japanese sketch onto their maps and added details from other patrol reports. This gave A and C batteries an incredibly accurate firing grid that proved to be deadly. The concentration of fire was so accurate the Japanese were forced to abandon their positions almost immediately. When troops later came to the area they found the dugouts had suffered direct shell hits with corpses still holding picks and shovels in their hands. The Japanese realized the American gunners knew exactly where they were located so they made a panicked withdrawal to the northwest coast. On September 14th Munson finally unleashed an attack upon Horaniu only to find the dugouts empty. Fijian commandos were sent to pursue the fleeing Japanese as the 1st battalion moved back to Lambu Lambu and the 3rd battalion occupied Horaniu. The New Zealanders would take over the fight for Vella Lavella, but now we need to venture back over to Green Hell.

With the loss of Mubo and Lababia ridge, General Nakano was forced to establish a rough arc of defensive positions in the heavily timbered ground from Bobdubi on the south bank of the Francisco river through Komiatum village to the Tambu Peninsula on the coast. Nakano had risen to the bait of General Blamey who had hoped he would and poured more men into this area in order to defense Salamaua from what he believed to be the actual allied goal. Naknao reinforced the area with the 3rd battalion, 238th regiment and the 3rd battalion, 21st regiment who had been stationed at Lae. The new key position in the Japanese line was Charlie Hill. The new Japanese defensive line ran east along the Yamada Yama known to the allies as Scout ridge to the coast at Lokanu and north over the Francisco river along the ridges of Rough Hill, Arnold’s Crest, Kidney Hill and the coast near Malolo. Charlie Hill held 4 perimeters. Below ground the Japanese constructed an intricate tunnel system to protect them and their supplies from bombardments. The entrance shafts had vine covered ladders that went down 6 meters. Galleries branched off the main tunnel like catacombs with benches cut into the sides for sleeping. Near Charlie Ridge was Davidson Ridge where Nakano deployed some new reinforcements from the 115th regiment.

On August 24th, Nakano told his men “If this line cannot be maintained, the division is to be honorably annihilated.” Meanwhile, Colonel MacKechnie was tossing patrols past Roosevelt ridge. On August 16th I Company, down 2/3rds of its strength, basically down to a single platoon level, crept forward to toss grenades at some Japanese around Scout ridge while Sergeant Warren unleashed mortar cover. The Japanese sought revenge that night and performed a dusk to dawn attack, but grenades and mortars held them back. It was to be the start of two bitter weeks of such small skirmishes, and the Japanese hunkered down in their foxholes guarded Scout Ridge with their lives. On August 18th, K company performed a frontal assault along the ridge, but Japanese barricades and machine gun fire kept them back. 3 Americans were killed, 7 wounded for their efforts, including a courageous medic who ran into the fray. The Japanese positions on Scout ridge were very strong, with lines in depth going back all the way towards Salamaua. Scout ridge provided the defenders with countless defensive positions along its crest with four intersecting ridges behind Roosevelt ridge.

On August 20th, Colonel Davidson ordered his men of the 42nd battalion to capture what he thought were only two knolls to the north of the battalion's positions on Davidson ridge. The smaller knoll was occupied without opposition and the other knoll only had slight opposition. However the next morning, scouts reported there was another feature, they called Bamboo Knoll about 600 yards farther north. Davidson then ordered it captured and it was with little opposition. Crouching in some kunai grass atop that knoll, the scouts could see Salamaua and allied artillery hitting it. They could not see the airstrip because another hill was in the way, that hill was Charlie Hill. Davidson’s intelligence told him they had already seized Charlie hill because their maps were not quite accurate. This caused a lot of headaches for historians going through diaries, trying to piece together the movement of troops. Thought I would try to add some frustrating information on their part. 

Now to intercept the enemy fleeing from Mount Tambu into the area between Komiatum and Davidson ridge, Brigadier Monaghan’s 29th brigade were assembled east of Mount Tambu. Meanwhile Major Warfe was performing an offensive against the junction of Bobdubi, Komiatum and the Bench Cut Track. Warfs A Platoon led by Lt John Lewin had cut off a point at a junction between Bobdubi and Stevens track on August 14th. Warfe planned to toss A and B Platoons against the enemy while the 2/7th battalion’s D company took up a further point on the track. At the same time the 58/59th battalion were going to launch a diversionary attack against Erskine Creek.

On August 17ths, Warfes commandos advanced south under artillery and mortar support attacking the enemy along Buirali creek and Salamaua track. However the enemy proved too intense to overcome, leading the commando platoons to pull back somewhat. Then the 2/7th company came to the right of A platoons position filling a gap in the center of the enemy line. They exploited the gap and advanced towards the western edge of the main Japanese camp. Lewin’s A company kept prodding the enemy lines until 6:30pm when the Japanese made a vicious counterattack causing 5 deaths including Lt Barry and 11 wounded. By dusk the Australian attacking force was thrust like a wedge into the enemy positions with Lewin and A platoon on the left, the 2/7th company in the middle and B company on the right. The following day the Japanese were forced to pull back to the line of the Komiatum track

By August 19th, the Japanese were being hit hard. On their northern lines they had 23 deaths, the commander of the 80th battalion, Major Jinno was dead. The Komiatum track was cut by the 17th brigade at Laver’s knoll. They were withdrawing across the front, most were now taking up positions further east at Charlie Hill and Kunai Spur. Brigadier Hammer’s 58/59th were able to occupy Erskine Creek and C company of the 2/7th seized Orodubi. The following day the 2/7th battalion occupied the junction of Bobdubi and the salamaua track. They captured quite a few forward pill boxes, found the enemy was still holding some in the back so they began raining mortar upon them. At dawn on August 21st patrols found the Komiatum track abandoned, now they could push further on.

On august 21st as a result of the enemy giving so much ground, Hammer ordered the mento ford the Francisco river to put more pressure on Salamaua. Lt Henry Mallett’s 11th platoon of the 2/7th battalion forded the Francisco river near its south end at Bobdubi ridge. They advanced over a razorback spit towards Rough Hill where they ran into Japanese machine gun fire. They were quickly bolstered by another platoon and by 3pm took the position, to gain fire support to allow others to cross the river. During the afternoon a composite platoon led by Lt Owen Edwards advanced further to occupy a dominant hill, which was named Arnold’s Crest after captain Ted Arnold the commander of C company. Like I said if you wanted a mountain, ridge, or hill named after you it seems New Guinea was the place. By August 22nd Hammer’s men were occupying Arnolds Crest giving covering fire to allow more forces to cross the river. Once enough men had crossed they began expanding the perimeter. Then on August 27th 420 Japanese from companies from the 115th and 80th regiments counterattacked Arnold’s Crest, successfully cutting off the allied line of communications to the south. The Australians did not give it up without a fight however, the counter attacked trying to seize the nearby Fisher’s knoll. The Japanese were forced to give up Fishers Knoll but repelled the allied attacks upon the crest itself. Despite still holding Arnold’s Crest the following morning saw the Japanese withdrawing westwards.

Now it seems Hammer got too excited when he ordered his forces to occupy so many forward positons. Hammer signaled his new divisional commander, General Milford “unreliability of 58/59th battalion troops has forced me to withdraw to hold a tighter line Buiris Creek”. Basically he believed he had overextended the 58/59th who were currently surrounded by a company or so of Japanese. The 58/59th were down to less than 30 or so men, carrying many wounded back and sending reports they were running low on ammunition. However on the ground, John Bethune’s B company were holding strong, keeping the situation together. Another company commander named Newman went on the record stating “Hammer had weak companies flung out into the blue where they could not be reinforced or supplies” After all was said and done, upon reflecting on the situation, Hammer would sign off on a recommendation to award John Bethune a military Cross, writing “‘Displaying grit and determination Lt Bethune tenaciously held the area until shortage of amn [ammunition] and supplies forced him to withdraw.’ The situation forced Hammer to tone down the aggression somewhat lest a catastrophe were to occur. He ordered the men to form a defensive line from Rough Hill to Arnold’s Crest, while more forces came to prepare for another offensive.

On August 21st, the Taylor Force had rejoined its regimental force, allowing MacKechnie to launch a new attack in force. On August 27th, A company advanced along a trail going up George Ridge successfully cutting the Japanese supply line. The men dug in, expecting a lot of angry Japanese counter attacks. Captain George of A company wrote this of the experience “‘We began to feel chill in the stomach. Every rush meant firing a few more clips, throwing a few more grenades. As the dark suddenly quietened, our hands counted blindly the few clips left in our belts, the last grenade or two on the parapet – like a thirsty man in the desert checking his last water. For when ammo ran out, they would overwhelm us – waves of many Japs with long bayonets. Home was a long way off indeed, over dark waters to Oregon.’” The fighting fell into hand to hand combat, from foxhole to foxhole. Men fought and died around George who knew the position could not be held. The next day George heard 4 rifle shots signaling permission for his battered unit to withdraw. They fought off 10 consecutive counter attacks before tossing in the towel. 

Not all was lost on the action for George’s men however, so many Japanese were employed for the counter attacks, they had to give up a position they held known as Bald Hill. Other companies of Taylor force seized the hill as the Japanese retreated to positions on Berger hill and Egg knoll. Over to the west, Brigadier Moten’s battered 17th brigade were relieved by Monaghan’s men who took up positions north of Mount Tambu. Davidson’s 42nd battalion occupied Bamboo Knoll after tossing back a ton of Japanese counterattacks. Davidson then tossed some patrols towards Charlie Hill, which would receive its name after Davidson’s given name. The Japanese presence on Charlie Hill was far to strong for smaller units to prod it, so more forces would be brought up. 

Back over to the north, Warfe’s commando’s attempted to overrun the Kunai Spur, a dominant position blocking the way along the Francisco river to Salamaua. On the morning of August 22nd, B Company of the 58/59th crossed the Buirali creek and one of their patrols advanced north to Kunai spit. Three simultaneous attacks were directed on Kunai Spur the following day by Captain Cramps 2/7th company from the north, Sergeant Tom Pot’s 58/59th platoon from the west and Lt Russell Matthews 58/59th platoon from the east. It was a very steep climb, when Matthews men finally go atop the spit they were face to face with a machine gun nest that nearly took them out. On August 25th the 2/7th platoon managed to outflank the enemy position near Buirali Creek which caused them to counter attack. They failed to take the Kunai SPur and were relieved by Lt colonel Ken Montgomery’s 47th battalion on the 26th. At this point Monaghan took command, and his first order of business was going to be an assault against Nakano’s last line in front of Salamaua.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

The allies were cleaning up on New George while continuing their deceptive assault on Salamaua on New Guinea. General Nakano’s men were beginning to feel the wall behind their backs as the allies closed in on Salamaua, but still they did not realize Lae was the actual target. 

- 92 - Pacific War - Into the Central Pacific, August 22-29, 1943

Last time we spoke about the beginning of mop up operations after the fall of Munda, the amphibious invasion of Vella Lavella and the fall of Kiska. New Georgia was a lost cause for the Japanese with the fall of Munda and now all efforts were being made to perform a withdrawal while buying time for forces to be brought over to places like Bougainville. Admiral Halsey ultimately choose to bypass Kolombangara and targeting Vella Lavella, which saw a successful amphibious invasion with a minor naval scuffle during the process. Then the Americans and Canadians invaded Kiska at long last. Although there were numerous reports that the island was abandoned it was decided to go forward with the invasion, at minimum it would be good training for the men. All they found were booby traps and some abandoned dogs as they ushered in the conclusion to the aleutian islands campaign. 

This episode is Into the Central Pacific

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

 

So its been nearly a year since the start of the allied offensive in the Pacific. Way back when the Japanese were trying to recover from the Midway disaster, the Americans had no idea if they could manage a major land victory. For nearly a year, the allied campaigns in New Guinea and the Solomons showcased what both sides were capable of. But the US Navy wanted something else, they wanted a drive through the central pacific. Now to begin a thrust into the central pacific meant performing two parallel Pacific campaigns north and south of the equator. Admiral Nimitz did not yet possess the naval, specifically carrier forces required to wage a central pacific offensive, hell legions of troops required months of amphibious training, is was an enormous feat. Admiral Halsey likewise never ceased calling for reinforcements to carry his fight through the central and northern solomons. 

Ever since the Casablanca Conference, Admirals King and Nimitz had been analyzing the idea of a central thrust in the pacific. They were looking specifically at a thrust in the direction of Truk-Guam and to hit the Marshall Islands. The victory over Guadalcanal had allowed the allies to secure lines of communication and supply to Australia and King presumed Rabaul would fall in 1943. On June 10th King began demanding hard deadlines for a central pacific campaign stating “In order that effective momentum of offensive operations can be attained and maintained, firm timing must be set up for all areas.” The joint chiefs of staff four days later told Nimitz to prepare an invasion of the Marshall Islands with a tentative sailing date of November 15th, 1943. As for the direct thrust, King declared  "establishing a base in the northwestern Marshalls and then proceeding to Truk and the Marianas." To pull this off MacArthur was expected to release the 1st marine division in time to participate in the operation with most of Halsey’s naval and amphibious forces as well. As you can imagine MacArthur was outraged and objected the demands of his Cartwheel campaign to preclude any transfer of troops or ships from his theater to Nimitz. MacArthur wanted covering support from the Pacific Fleet’s new fast carrier task forces to help raid Rabaul, Truk and other Japanese bases on a southern route. Halsey likewise was anxious about withdrawing aircraft from the south pacific area to support operations north of the equator. He warned Nimitz on June 25th that if airpower were diverted from the drive on Rabaul “it would seriously jeopardize our chances of success at what appears to be the most critical stage of the campaign.” Without borrowing forces from the south pacific, Nimitz could not realistically tackle the Marshalls until early 1944 and many members of the planning staff counseled patience. They argued to Nimitz, the new offensive should await the arrival of a large fleet of Essex carriers. By February or March of 1944, they predicted a much expanded 5th fleet could simply steam into the Marshalls and seize 4 or 5 of the largest Japanese bases simultaneously. If the combined fleet came out to fight, such an American force would willingly and confidently give them battle. But King simply wanted action in 1943, he insisted the northern line of attack be opened before the final assault on Rabaul. This would prevent the enemy from concentrating their defenses against either prong of the westward advance. Enemy territory simply had to be taken, somewhere in the central pacific by the end of the year. 

There was a lot of arguing going about. The joint chiefs had clearly intimated that the Philippines were to be approached through the central pacific, but MacArthur concluded that a drive through the Marshalls and Carolines would have to occur without land-based air support, thus it would be slow and extremely costly to naval power and shipping. MacArthur argued the central pacific route was unwise and thought after Rabaul was captured it should be southwest pacific forces advancing along the north coast of New Guinea and onwards to the Philippines. This would require the neutralization of various islands like Palaus and others in the Banda and Arafura seas to protect their flanks. This long range plan that he prepared was designated RENO. 

Now all of this of course was intended to cut Japan off from her vast riches in the Dutch East Indies, the thing keeping her war machine alive. The British also had their own desires who applied much pressure onto their American allies, prompting General Marshall to assure them that a Gilberts-Marshalls-Carolines campaign would be undertaken “with the resources available in the theater”. DuringQuadrant conference, the British chiefs had agreed to back King’s demand for resources in the central Pacific in return for more forces against Nazi Germany. However during the Trident conference in May, which was not concerned so much with the Pacific strategy, the joint chiefs of staff submitted a plan titled “the strategic plan for the defeat of Japan” which called for a large, sustained air offensive against the home islands in preparation for an invasion. For this all to occur, China had to be maintained, and that meant the Americans and British would need to right their way into China finding a good secure port to move materials properly, most likely this would be Hong Kong. In the meantime the Americans, British and Chinese would work together to recapture Burma to try and drive through the strait of Malacca to Hong Kong via a series of amphibious operations. The Americans would also attempt a drive through the Celebes sea to Hong Kong from the central pacific aided by some subsidiary efforts from the south and southwest pacific areas, good luck getting a penny from MacArthur. 

The Central Pacific was the most advantageous and logical route because it was shorter than the southern route, it would require less ships, less troops, less supplies and the bases in the Marshalls, Marianas and Carolines would isolate Japan from her overseas empire. The Japanese would only be able to mount limited air and ground forces on the islands in the central pacific, but nonetheless the American planners were forced to make twin drives along the central and southern axes. It has been argued, President FDR was swayed by Marshall’s insistent demands for a southern push, because MacArthur held considerable political weight and could have been made a republican nominee for presidency in 1944. There were positives to running twin operations of course. For one thing it would prevent the Japanese from being able to guess the time and place of forthcoming advances keeping them off balance. It also allowed for opportunities for mutual support.

Some of the operations would require a behemoth amount of resources, take for example the estimations they ran for the capture of the Bismarck Archipelago which was required to secure the line of communications to Australia and provide access to the Celebes sea. They estimated it would require 7 divisions, 5 of which needed to be amphibious units. If Rabaul fell or was neutralized, perhaps the division numbers would be less. The Marshall operation would require two reinforced amphibious divisions, 4 heavy bombardment and two fighter groups of land based aircraft. On top of that was the naval aspect, they estimated that they needed four battleships, three more auxiliary carriers, twelve cruisers, sixty-three destroyers, twenty-four attack transports, forty-four tank landing ships (LST's), plus landing craft. Garrison forces would include one reinforced division, 10 defense battalions, 545 planes, and 18 motor torpedo boats. For the Carolines, the Combined Chiefs estimated that they would require 3 reinforced amphibious divisions, 2 heavy bomber groups, 10 carriers of the Enterprise and Essex classes, 7 auxiliary carriers, 4 modern battleships, 9 old battleships, 31 cruisers, 108 destroyers, 20 submarines, 45 attack transports, 15 attack cargo ships, 6 LSD's , 3 headquarters ships, and miscellaneous auxiliaries. To garrison the islands would take two reinforced divisions and three defense battalions, plus aircraft. Talk about a shopping list.

By the end of the year it was expected that one Marine and 3 Army divisions would be allocated to the Central Pacific while the South Pacific would gain 2 marines, 5 US Army and 1 New Zealand division and in the southwest pacific 4 US infantry, 1 US airborne, 1 US marine and 11 Australian divisions. So calculated all that, the Joint chiefs estimated 2 more divisions would be needed for the Marshalls, 2 more for the Carolines and 3 more for New Guinea. The strategic plan got the stamp of approval by the combined chiefs of staff on May 22nd. For the planned central pacific offensive, Nimitz decided his first objective would be the Marshall Islands. Their seizure was essential to extend the line of communication to the Celebes sea and to shorten the routes to Australia. From the Marshalls, land-based aircraft could support naval operations against the enemy’s communication lines and there was always the possibility that by hitting the Marshalls, this would lure the combined fleet out for a fight. By July 20th, it was decided that instead of directly hitting the Marshalls, which would be extremely costly requiring a large force, they would instead capture Nauru and the Gilbert Islands as a preliminary springboard to invade the Marshalls. There had been two competing suggestions debated at CINCPAC HQ. Captain Forrest Sherman the chief of staff to Vice admiral John Henry Towers advocated to recapture Wake Islands and employ it as a springboard to invade the Marshalls. Wake was around 500 miles south of the Marshalls. Admiral Spruance favored opening a campaign south and east where the fleet could count on greater land-based air support from rear bases in the south pacific. He was the one advocating to invade the Gilberts, which were 600 miles southeast of the Marshalls. Spruance persuaded Nimitz who persuaded King thus, the Gilberts won the day. Code named Operation Galvanic, was the offensive to simultaneously invade the Ellice Islands, Gilbert Islands and Nauru by November 15th 1943.

For Galvanic, Nimitz would have at his disposal all surface forces of the Pacific Fleet, the air forces of the pacific excluding those in the south and southwest pacific areas, elements of the 7th air force, the 2nd marine division of Major General Julian Smith over in New Zealand currently performing amphibious training, 3 aviation engineer or construction battalions, a port battalion and 3 marine defense battalions. The 7th air force led by Major General Willis Hale had already carried out some reconnaissance and bombing missions against Nauru and the Gilberts back in January, February and April. In spite of some heavy interception they managed to hit the runway on Nauru and a local phosphate plant as well as some installations on Tarawa. The 7th air force were utilizing air bases on Canton and Funafuti which were the only ones in range of the Gilberts. To seize the Ellice islands and build new airfields, Nimitz ordered the 5th and 7th defense battalions and 2nd airdrome battalion accompanied by the 16th naval construction battalion to conduct neutralization and reconnaissance. Nimitz sought to build new airfields at Nukufetau and Nanomea which were around 600 miles south and 350 miles east of Tarawa.

On August the 18th an advance survey party landed at Nanomea determining it to hold no enemy presence thus the first elements of the 7th defense battalion began occupying it 10 days later. On August the 22nd an advance party of the 2nd Airdrome battalion landed at Nukufetau finding no enemy presenced allowing the remainder of the battalion to follow suit 5 days later. Transforming the atolls into air bases was rapid work. By September 7th a 5000 foot airstrip was operational on Nanomea, by the end of the month a full squadron of aircraft were operating from it. Over on Nukufetau work was slower, but its strip would be operation by October 9th. Back on August 11th, the 804th aviation engineer battalion was sent to develop Baker island, a already american held island 480 miles east of the Gilberts. They began their work on September 1st, taking a week to build a strip capable of supporting fighters. All of this gave Nimitz and Hale the bases they needed to prepare Operation Galvanic.

 

Now over in the southwest pacific, Generals MacArthur and Blamey were continuing their planned invasion of Lae codenamed Operation Postern. By early 1943, MacArthur had devised plans that made Blamey the commander of “allied land forces” only in name. As we have seen, the creation of the Alamo Force led by General Krueger was MacArthurs attempt at seizing overall command. This led Blamey to gradually realized his only functions would be that of the commander of Australian military forces. MacArthur would reconstitute the United States Army Forces in the Far East USAFFE, for his command in the Philippines with himself as its commander. Now the original date for operation Postern was August 1st and it was to have two stages: the first was an amphibious assault neat the Lae coast and the second was an air-ground operation against Nadzab airfield to its west, this would prevent the enemy from reinforcing Lae overland. 

 

The Amphibious operation would be carried out by General Vasey’s 7th division, who would depart Milne Bay and move north of Buna to land near Lae utilizing small landing craft. Admiral Barbey estimated it would require 65 LCVPS (landing craft, vehicle personnel or Higgins boats) and LCTs from the 2nd engineer special brigade. To train for the operation the 7th would be sent to trinity beach near Cairns. However continuous outbreaks of malaria led it being believed the unit could not be used without endangering the civilian population. Major General George Wooten’s 9th division not yet exposed to the conditions on Green Hell and malaria free ended up taking the amphibious role. After two weeks of amphibious training with higgins boats. The 9th moved to Milne bay by August 12th and would be followed by General Heavy’s units who would help further train them at Morobe. 

 

Now I had mentioned the second part was an air-ground operation, originally it was to consist of the 2/503rd american parachute battalion to take the airfield. Then the 25th and 21st brigades of the 7th division were to cross the Markham river and assist the parachute battalion to occupy the area. But it would turn out, when they arrived to Markham, the Australians first had to advance through the Bulldog road to reach Wau, and although a ton of work had been done on it the Bulldog road had not reached Markham river yet. At first General Berryman boldly said to General Kenney that he would be him a bottle of whisky that a jeep could simply cover the gap to the road by august the 1st, he lost the bet. Thus it was decided transport aircraft would be required to take the 7th division directly from Port Moresby into the overgrown landing ground at Nadzab. The parachute battalion would not receive any support from Markham. MacArthur decided to instead employ the full 503rd parachute regiment led by COlonel Kenneth Kinsler to hit Nadzab on August 8th.

Now thanks in a large part to cooperation between Generals Vasey, Herring, Whitehead and Kenney the planning for the operation went well. Extensive air and land reconnaissance of the area was the key to success. With all the preparation done, D-day for the 9th division’s amphibious assault was scheduled for September 1st, Z day for the 7th divisions operation against Nadzab would be September 2nd. Like all good operations, a diversion was going to be implemented. General Savige’s forces had been conducting a series of attacks in the Salamaua area for months. The “Salamaua magnet” had successfully convinced General Nakano the allies intended to hit Salamaua. Nakano also believed holding Salamaua would keep Lae safe. General Adachi would go on the record to state, orders given to him and other forces was to hold Salamaua as long as possible, probably until the last man if it came down to it. Adachi knew if Salamaua fell, Lae was pretty much a lost cause. The irony of course was this all led to troops being pulled away from Lae to bolster Salamaua, when Lae was in fact the target. 

Air supremacy over the Huon Gulf was going to be a necessity for Operation Postern to succeed. Generals Berryman and Kenney needed to acquire new airfields that would be used to neutralize Wewak and Madang, two key Japanese air bases. The allies began building airfields at Benabena and Tsili Tsili which could act as advanced fighter bases and refueling points. Benabena already had a functioning airstrip, but Whitehead wanted to develop it further, Kenney was concerned as he knew the Japanese were aware of the site. Kenney wanted to divert the enemy’s attention away from the airfield being built at Tsili Tsili which the Japanese did not know about yet. The Japanese were tossing wave after wave of air raids against Benabena, doing minimal damage. Meanwhile a military road was being constructed from Bogadjim on the northern coast up the valley of Mindjim river to Yaula and Yokopi and it was intended to extend past the Finisterre range into the Ramu Valley. On August 1st the New Guinea force HQ estimated the road would reach Ramu Valley within 8 weeks. THe development of the road and other activity in the Ramu valley was drawing attention from the Japanese, thus the 2/2nd independent company as sent to reinforce the 2/7th at Benabena. As this occurred, the secret construction work at Tsili Tsili raged on using some innovative ideas. The construction workers were using camouflage and careful timing of flights to hide the existence of Tsili Tsili’s airfield, and managing to do this successfully for two months. An enormous amount of air transport and equipment was allocated for the task. The 871st airborne engineers battalion were sent in to hammer the job out and soon 3 dry weather runways were operational by september.

Over on the Japanese side, they were reorganizing their air forces in New Guinea. After receiving alarming reports of enemy airfields being constructed at Mount Hagen and Benabena, knowing full well these would threaten their airfields at Wewak and Madang, it was decided the air strength of New Guinea would be bolstered by the 7th air division of Lt General Sudo Einosuke. From June 19th onwards, aircraft of the 7th division began arriving at Wewak from the Dutch East Indies. The 6th air division had moved its HQ from Rabual to Wewak on July 9th of 1943, 324 aircraft strong. The 7th air division brought another 156 aircraft, alongside this the 4th air army was brought over to Rabaul on August 6th placed under the command of General Imamura’s 8th area army. Additionally to support the defense of Wewak and Madang, General Adachi was planning to toss 3000 soldiers under Lt General Katagiri Shigeru’s 20th division against Benabena while Lt General Mano Goro’s 41st division would occupy Mount Hagen.

Such operations were scheduled to begin in early september. A detachment of the 30th independent engineer regiment of Lt Kitamoto Masamichi were sent over to Kaiapit alongside patrols further into the Ramu valley. They gradually occupied Dumpu and Wesa. But the increasing allied threat to Salamaua and Lae prompted Adachi to postpone the Benabena attack until August 1st and as a result Lae’s airbase was being abandoned. Since early july, Lae was facing a substantial issue maintaining aviation fuel, it had been a point of refueling for aircraft going between Rabaul and other airfields like Madang and Wewak. Alongside this, Lae was within allied medium bomber range, and the threat prompted the Japanese to build 3 new airfields on the northwestern coast of New Guinea at But, Dagua and the Boram Plantation. It was the 20th and 41st divisions who ended up providing most of the labor to construct these airfields.

On August 14th Tsili Tsili saw its first two squadrons of P-39 Airacobras of the 35th fighter group led by Lt Colonel Malcolm Moore. These arrived just in time to meet the beginning enemy attacks. Japanese aircraft had finally spotted the secret airfield during some reconnaissance flights on August 11th. On the morning of August 15th, 7 Ki-48
Lilly’s escorted by 36 Ki-43 Oscars attacked Tsili Tsili. The bombers were intercepted immediately and all were shot down by 26 Airacobras and 3 Lightnings. However the Oscars managed to shoot down two C-47’s of the 21st troop carrier squadron. The other C-47’s scrambled to escape back to Port Moresby by flying at treetop level. The allied fighters then intercepted the Oscars lading to 3 Oscars being downed at the cost of 4 Airacobras. The following day saw another raid, but Thunderbolts and Lightnings intercepted the raiders downing some 15 Oscars. After receiving such a blow, the Japanese commanders at Wewak decided to conserve further air strength. Unbeknownst to them the situation was far more dire than they thought. You see the Japanese commanders did not believe the enemy fighters and medium bombers had the range to hit Wewak. 

To geek out a bit, when such aircraft like Mitchells first arrived in Australia, they were equipped with a lower turret. Now when they began performing operations in New Guinea, it required low altitude flying and thus the turrets became useless, so they were removed and replaced with forward firing guns at the nose. General Kenney’s air depot at Townsville working tireless to modify 172 Mitchells between July and September of 1943. The removal of the large turrets allowed for an additional square shaped 11,500 liter metal fuel tank to be installed, which was suspended by hooks from a bomb shackle. These fuel tanks gave the aircraft an extra two hours flying time, just enough to give them the range to hit Wewak. These tanks were very vulnerable to catching fire during combat or from crash landings so they were made dischargeable. A minor innovation, that made all the difference. On August 1th aerial photographs indicated the Japanese had 8 medium bombers, 31 light bombers, 69 fighters at Wewak and Boram plus 34 medium and 34 light bombs with 23 fighters at Dagua and But. Thus Kenney elected to hit them and he had at his disposal two heavy bomber groups the 43rd and 90th bomb groups with 64 bombers alongside two medium groups, the 3rd attack group and 38th bomb groups with 58 modified mitchells. 

Kenney’s plan was to toss 8 squadrons of heavy bombers for night raids against Wewaks 4 airfields followed up by 5 squadrons of Mitchells. Fighter could refuel at Tsili Tsili to help escort and boy would they, an unprecedented 99 fighter escorts would take part in the raids. On the night of August 16th the first raid occurred seeing 12 B-17 and 38 Liberators take off from Port Moresby, all but two reached Wewak by midnight. For 3 hours Colonels Harry Hawthorne and Aruther Rogers led the 43rd and 90th bombardment groups to pound the 4 airfields causing tremendous damage. Countless aircraft tried to take off the next day at Boram only to fail due to damage. The next morning, two squadrons of Mithcells of Lt COlonel Brian O’Neill’s 38th bomb group left Port Moresby to hit Dagua and But while two squadrons of Colonel Donald Hall’s 3rd attack group would hit Wewak and Boram. They would be employing some new toys, the first parachute retarded fragmentation bombs or also called Parafrags. They had been developed from standard 10 kg fragmentation bombs which were carried in a honeycomb rack in the bomb bay. A small parachute slowed and straightened out the course of the bomb allowing the bomber to get out of the blast range before it exploded. Further work was also going into the development of “daisy-cutter” bombs, which were bombs wrapping with wire to iron rods onto them to produce a ground level fragmentation effect when used with a ground proximity fuse. Nerd stuff. 

 

The 3rd group bombers ended up catching some newly arrived Japanese aircraft perfectly lined up on each side of the runways. The Mitchells strafed them before dropping 786 10 kg paragraph bombs, annihilating 60 aircraft. Meanwhile the 38th group Mitchells faced some issues discharging their auxiliary fuel tanks, leading to only 3 bombers reaching Dagua and none to But. The 3 who reached Dagua strafed and low level bombed it with 105 ten kg parafrags destroying and damaged at least 17 aircraft and intercepting a single Oscar. Not a bad haul at all for just 3 Mitchells. The following day, Kenney tried to repeat the raids, but this time only half of the 49 heavy bombers reached their targets and the bombing was quite inaccurate. However, most of the 62 Mitchell’s reached the target this time, but they would be pounced upon by Japanese fighters and anti-aircraft fire from an enemy that was waiting for them. A flight led by Major Ralph Cheli, commanding the 405th bomb squadron was jumped by nearly a dozen Oscars. Cheli’s plane was badly hit, his right engine and wing catch fire. Yet despite this Cheli led his flight across Dagua airfield before crashing into the ocean. He was captured and sent to Rabaul where he would later be executed. For this brave action Cheli was awarded the Medal of Honor. In the end 15 Oscars were destroyed at the cost of 2 lightnings and 1 mitchell. Two additional raids were conducted on August 20th and 21st.

 

The 5th air force claimed to have destroyed 20 enemy aircraft on the 20th and 70th on the final day, half of which were shot down in air combat by the Lightnings. An estimated 174 Japanese aircraft were put out of action during these attacks, almost 90% of which came from Wewaks total air strength around 200 strong. Even before it had a chance to derail the battle for Lae, the 4th air army had been completely annihilated. Wewak was neutralized, the door was open to smash Lae.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

A ton of planning was raging on and now there was to finally be twin operations to thrust into the central pacific and south pacific. With some new toys, Kenney’s airforces had all but smashed what the Japanese had created to defend Lae. Now the door was wide open for Lae to be assaulted.

- 91 - Pacific War - Fall of Kiska & Battle of Vella Lavella, August 15-22, 1943

Last time we spoke about the Komiatum Offensive in New Guinea. The drive to Lae and Salamaua was raging on New Guinea. Mount Tambu was assaulted and the allies received hellish casualties trying to take it. The legendary Bull Allen saved countless lives during this action, but Mount Tambu simply couldn't be captured. The allies chose to isolate and surround mount Tambu instead. The allies secured took the sugarcane knoll, the timbered knoll and then found a path heading to Komiatum. Nakano ordered his men to hold Komiatum ridge, but their situation became more and more desperate. Allied artillery and aerial bombardment alongside the enveloping maneuvers were taking a toll, the Japanese had suffered 900 casualties since July 23rd. With more men dying minute by minute, Nakano ordered a withdrawal from Komiatum still believing the primary target of the allies was Salamaua.

This episode is the Fall of Kiska & Battle of Vella Lavella 

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

So before venturing back to the frigid northern aleutians, we have a lot of action to talk about in the south Pacific. On August 3rd, General Sasaki was forced to order a withdrawal from Munda. General Griswold sent a message over to Admiral Hasley declaring “Our ground forces today wrested Munda from the Japs and present it to you as sole owner”. Halsey in his typical fashion replied “keep ‘em dying”. Despite the blood, sweat and tears taking Munda, as a whole, operation cartwheel had fallen a month behind schedule. As Griswold noted “the months fighting had not been the Americans’ finest hour in the Solomon islands campaign”. Halsey would add to it “the smoke of charred reputations still makes me cough”. Now just because Munda had fallen did not mean the work was all done, there was to be cleanup operations of course. General Sasaki ordered his forces to retreat northwards, most were enroute to the Kure 6th farm; the 13th regiment and Sasaki’s HQ were going to Bairoko; the 3rd battalion, 23rd regiment and Yokosuka 7th guns were heading to Baanga island. The Americans would be in hot pursuit.

General Griswold divided the cleanup operations, giving the 25th division the task of advancing across New Georgia to seize Bairoko Harbor and the Piru Plantation. General Hodge 's 43rd division was given the task of seizing the islands of Arundel and Baanga. General Collins would deploy the 1st battalion, 27th regiment and Colonel Dalton’s 161st regiment to advance up the Bairoko trail; the rest of Colonel Douglas Sugg’s 27th would advance along the Zieta Trail towards the Piru plantation. General Sasaki learnt on August 6th, the American navy had scored a small but conclusive victory when 6 US destroyers sunk 3 IJN destroyers, the Arashi, Kawakaze and Hagikaze during the Naval battle of Vella Gulf. This of course meant the Japanese reinforcement convoy had failed, thus Sasaki wasted no time ordered a general withdrawal to Kolombangara by the way of Baanga Island. Sasaki needed to give the men more time, so he reinforced the Yano battalion with the 12th company of the 3rd battalion, 23rd regiment who were left to defend the Kure 6th farm. Major Yano Keiji, a veteran of Guadalcanal, selected a rough terrain east and south of Zieta village and the Kure 6th farm to dig in. The Americans would later refer to it as “Zieta Garden”. The garden was to be Yano’s first line of defense across the Zieta river. There was a bit of high ground due north of Zieta Village which would have been easier to defend, but he needed his men to protect the trail running to Lulu Channel and Baanga, his only line of communications. The 3rd battalion, 23rd regiment in the meantime were securing Baanga. General Sasaki radioed his plans to the 8th Fleet, but to his surprise was told to hold onto New Georgia until late September for “future operations”. Sasaki was bewildered by this, but understood Admiral Samejima then commanding the 8th fleet was trying to direct a land battle, and obviously he was not experienced in such things. What Sasaki did not know at the time was Samejima was being instructed by General headquarters to do this. On August 7th, the Army and Navy had agreed to pull out of the Central Solomons and would cooperate to bolster Bougainville’s defenses. A revisión later on August 13th would instruct Koga, Kusaka and Imamura to hold onto as much of New Georgia as possible while Bougainville was being reinforced. Full evacuation of New Georgia was set for late September to early October, but the actual dates were dependent on the Bougainville progress.

On August 8th Sugg’s 2nd battalion advanced through a deep ravine going roughly 2 miles up the trail when his men were met with heavy machine gun fire. The Yano battalion was defending the barge supply route through the Lulu channel as their comrades and supplies made their way to Baanga. On August 9th, the 27th began their assault upon the Kure 6th Farm, employing a envelopment maneuver. The Yano battalion was holding them at bay, but gradually the allied forces were confining the Japanese into a smaller and smaller pocket. Meanwhile the 1st battalion was advancing north along the Munda-Bairoko trail where they joined Colonel Liversedge’s men. On the 10th, Hodge ordered the 169th regiment to hit Baanga and on the 11th patrols from their 3rd battalion had located the Japanese strongpoint on its southwest tip. By nightfall, the American assault of the Kure 6th Farm forced Colonel Yano to withdraw back across the Zieta River to form a new defensive perimeter. His men performed a fighting withdrawal throughout the night seeing many Japanese scream and throw rocks at the Americans. The usual night time activities that kept the allied forces miserable. 

On the 12th the Americans unleashed an artillery bombardment upon the Kure 6th Farm positions not realizing they had already been abandoned. The 89th had fired 2700 rounds, the heaviest concentration of the operation on completely empty positions. The Americans advanced over Yano’s old positions, crossed the river and fell upon Yano’s new defensive perimeter. On that day General Barker assumed command of the 43rd division as General Hodge returned to his command of the Americal Division. Barker began by sending L Company of the 169th regiment to occupy Baanga. L Company were met with unexpectedly heavy Japanese fire suffering 28 casualties before they were forced to pull back. 

 

Meanwhile on August 13th, Sugg’s 3rd battalion with E company managed to launch their main assault against the Yano battalion. They were attempting a envelopment maneuver against Yano’s flanks, but heavy resistance saw Yano’s right flank repel the attack. On the left there was a marshy plain that hindered the American advance forcing them to go too far left and thus failing to apply enough pressure. Although the assault failed, the unexpected left advance saw some gain. A patrol from H company stumbled across a heavily used trail leading to the Lulu channel. They established a roadblock that night allowing ambush efforts to hit the trail. The roadblock convinced Yano he was soon to be cut off, so he immediately prepared a withdrawal to Baanga. 

 

In the meantime, Barker decided to use Vela Cela island as a launching point for an assault against Maanga. On August the 14th, the 3rd battalion, 169th regiment began occupying the small island before using it as a springboard to land at Baanga. However the Americans quickly found themselves surrounded by a mangrove swamp and the Japanese began tossing counter attacks until night fell.  Yano’s forces repelled numerous American attacks from the 3rd battalion throughout the day, afternoon and night. The Japanese threw back one attack led by four marine tanks, which had crossed the river on a bridge engineers built. While doing this his men also began their retreat westwards. H Company met a brief exchange with Yano’s men, but Yano decided not to seriously clash with them and withdrew his battalion to Baanga by the 15th.  The 27th occupied Zieta village, making contact with Schultz 3rd battalion, 148th infantry over on Zieta Hill to the north. After this the 27th would advance upon Piru plantation and Sunday Inlet, too which they also ran into mangrove swamps greatly hindering them. The fight for the Zieta area had cost them 168 casualties, the americans were seeing a continuous flow of fierce counterattacks at Baanga, prompting Barker to decided he would reinforce the beachhead with the 2nd battalion 169th regiment and the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 172nd regiment.

 

At this point General Griswold and Admirals Halsey and Wilkinson were trying to figure out what to do next. Halsey’s original plan after the taking of Munda was to attack Kolombangara, but the recent performance of the Japanese defenders made the Americans quite skittish about performing an amphibious invasion. The battle for Munda point was one of the fiercest defenses the Japanese had put up. More than 30,000 troops had been brought over to face 5000 Japanese defenders within their network of entrenchments. As pointed out by the commander in chief of the US Navy planning memorandum “If we are going to require such overwhelming superiority at every point where we attack the Japanese, it is time for radical change in the estimate of the forces that will be required to defeat the Japanese now in the Southwest and Central Pacific.” Munda Point airfield would become a landmark victory because of the 6000 foot runway it would soon provide, alongside taxiways and its capacity as a base of operations. Halsey would later declare its airfield “to be the finest in the south pacific” and the Seabees would be awarded with a citation for their great efforts. Commander Doane would receive a special mention “by virtue of his planning, leadership, industry, and working ‘round the clock’ to make serviceable the Munda Airfield on August 14th, 1943, a good four days ahead of the original schedule.” The seabees work was a testament not only to their morale and organization, but also the fact they held superior equipment. Admiral Nimitz would go on the record to state “one of the outstanding features of the war in both the North and South Pacific areas has been the ability of US forces to build and use airfields, on a terrain and with a speed which would have been considered fantastically impossible in our pre-war days.” Overall the Georgia campaign would go on the be an essential component in the strangulation of Rabaul, as pointed out by historian Eliot Morison “The Central Solomons ranks with Guadalcanal and Buna-Gona for intensity of human tribulation. We had Munda and we needed it for the next move, toward Rabaul; but we certainly took it the hard way. The strategy and tactics of the New Georgia campaign were among the least successful of any allied campaign in the Pacific”.

 

Allied intelligence indicated Kolombangara had roughly 10,000 Japanese defenders, thus Halsey was inclined to seek an alternative method rather than slugging it out. He thought perhaps they could bypass Kolombangara completely and instead land on Vella Lavella. If they managed to pull that off, it would cut off the Japanese supply line to Kolombangara which was basically surviving on fishing boats and barges based out of Buin. Halsey noted “Kolombangara was 35 miles nearer the Shortlands and Kahili. According to coast-watchers, its garrison numbered not more than 250, and its shoreline would offer at least one airstrip.” A reconnaissance carried out back on July 22nd reported very few enemy troops on the island and that it held a feasible airfield site at Barakoma which also had beaches capable for LST’s to land at. Thus Halsey approved the plan and Griswold formed the Northern Landing Force, placed under the command of Brigadier General Robert McClure. The force consisted of the recently arrived 35th regiment of the 25th division attached to the 25th cavalry reconnaissance troops, all led by Colonel Everett Brown; the 4th defense battalion, the 58th naval construction battalion and the Naval base group. 

To hit Vella Lavella they would require air supremacy and artillery planted upon Piru Plantation and the Enogai-Bairoko area. General Twinnings AirSols had 161 fighters back on July 31st, but by August 18th they would have 129 functioning. Twining had sufficient strength in bombers as the number of light and medium bombers had dropped by less than a dozen, at around 129. For heavy bombers his increased from 48 to 61. It was critical Munda airfields be fully operational by mid august, sothe Seabees of the 73rd and 24th naval construction battalions went to work. Admiral Fitch’s plan for Munda airfield called for a 6000 long foot runway with a minimum 8 inch coral surface and taxiways and revetments ready for over 200 fighters by September 25th. Eventually this would also include 48 heavy bombers. The immediate job was the fighter strip as always, you prepare your defenses against air attacks before you bring in the heavy bombers. He had a week to make the field operational. Commander Doane of the 73rd Seabees had two critical assets. The first was Munda was by far the best airfield site in the Solomons. Beneath one to 3 feet of topsoil was solid coral and there was a plentiful supply of live coral which hardened like concrete, great for the surfacing. Second the 73rd was the best equipped battalion yet to arrive to the solomons with D-7 and D-8 bulldozers, ¾ yard power shovels, 8 yard carryalls and 7 ton rollers. Weather was good and the moon was bright for the week permitting night time work without lights. The immediate threat would have been a 12cm of the Yokosuka 7th SNLF at Baanga, but they never fired upon them. Again, wars are won by logistics and it can't be expressed enough what a colossal amount the Seabees did for the Pacific War. By August 14th, Mulcahy flew over to set up his HQ and the VMF-123 and VMF-124 flew into the base with a R4D carrying their gear and personnel. For the incoming invasion P-40s would be coming from Segi while Corsairs would be launched from Munda. 

Admiral Kusaka had reformed his 1st Base air force thanks to the arrival of his long-sought reinforcements. In mid July reinforcements arrived to the Solomons in the form of the 201st Kokutai Aerial Bomb group and carrier Division 2’s naval bombers from Ryujo. The overall strength of the 1st base air force was now at around 230 aircraft of various types. The land-based bombers would go to Rear Admiral Ueno Keizo’s 25th air flotilla over in Rabaul. They were tasked with night bombing raids against Guadalcanal and New Georgia now. Naval fights and bombers would be merged into the 1st combined air attack force, later reformed into the 26th air flotilla led by Rear Admiral Sakamaki Munetake. There job was to destroy any enemy shipping in New Georgia and to conduct interceptions over the Munda-Buin areas. It was understood the Americans held numerical superiority, but the Japanese were willing to take them on hoping their fighting spirit would prevail.

Meanwhile, back on the night of August 12th, Admiral Wilkinson deployed an advance party of 14 men led by Captain George Kriner to perform a reconnaissance of Vella Lavella. They would be reinforced by Companies E and G of the 103rd regiment when the scouts found 40 Japanese around Biloa and another 100 5 miles north of Barakoma. They had reached the island secretly using 4 PT boats, though Japanese floatplanes would made to bomb one of them. After the successful arrival of the advance party at Barakoma, F Company of the 103rd landed on August 14th to reinforce the beachhead. 

The main invasión force designated Task Force 31 led by Admiral Wilkinson  would consist of 10 destroyers, 5 destroyer transports, 12 LCI’s, 3 LST’s and two subchasers. At 3:05am  the 1st transport group of the force departed consisting of the destroyer transports with 6 escort destroyers were carrying the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 35th regiment. Captain Ryan led the group aboard Nicholas while Wilkinson was aboard Cony. The second transport group made up of the smaller vessels carried the Seabees and support personally following an hour behind with 4 destroyer escorts led by Captain William Cooke. After the force departed Guadalcanal they were to approach the Gizo Strait around midnight, before beginning to unload in the early hours of august 15th, under the cover of fighters. 

However Wilkinson would not be aware his force was spotted by a G3M Betty bomber which reported back to Admiral Samaki who immediately launched a strike force. By 8am, the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 35th regiment had landed. While the 3rd battalion began their unloading process enemy aircraft appeared. 48 Zeros and 6 Vals were intercepted by American fighters. By 9:15 all the troops were landed, now the equipment began to be unloaded. The Japanese launched two waves from Buin, the first appeared at 12:30, made up of 48 Zero’s and 11 Vals. They were intercepted leading to no damage being done to the landing forces. 7 Zeros came in low to strafe the beach but were turned away by fire from 65 automatic weapons aboard the LST’s. LST’s in the past lacked adequate anti aircraft protection, thus 20 20mm guns were borrowed from Guadalcanal and set to use. At 5:30 32 Zero’s and 8 Vals showed up but they too were intercepted. By 6pm the LSTs were beginning to retract. The strikes had amounted to 12 men killed on the beach and 40 wounded, it could have been much worse. The Japanese reported losing 9 Zeros and 8 Vals for the day while the Americans would claim to have lost a total of 5 fighters. Without any real land battle the amphibious invasion of Vella Lavella was a resounding success.

After darkness settled in, Admiral Ueno’s 5th air attack force over in Rabaul launched their final attempt against the American convoys. At 5:30pm, 3 Betty’s that had launched out of Vunakanau were spotting the convoy and reporting their movements. They came across the LCI’s southeast of Gatukai and the LSTs as they were approaching the Gizo strait. 23 Bettys in 3 Chutai’s, one armed with torpedoes the other two with bombs approached. The torpedo armed Betty’s attacked the LCI’s while the bombers went for the LST’s. The American destroyers tossed up a lot of anti aircraft fire as the torpedoes and bombs failed to hit targets. 4 Betty’s would be damaged badly for their efforts. The Japanese reaction to the terrible results was to form an unrealistic plan to wipe out the American invasion by sending a single battalion to the island. When the landings became known, officers of the 8th fleet and 17th army formed a conference. They estimated, with accuracy surprisingly, that the landing force was around a brigade in strength. One officer proposed the idea to send a battalion to counterland. General Imamura’s HQ calmly pointed out that sending a single battalion against a brigade would be like “pouring water on a hot stone”. The men were desperately more needed for the defense of Bougainville.

The Japanese knew they were vastly outnumbered in the Solomons and that the fight for the central solomons was pretty much lost. They believed their only chance to successfully defend the rest of the solomons was to carry out a slow retreat in order to build up forces in Bougainville and Rabaul.  It was decided that two rifle companies of the Miktami battalion and a platoon from the Yokosuka 7th SNLF would be sent to Horaniu on the northeast corner of Vella Lavella. These forces would establish a barge staging base between Kolombangara and the Shortlands. Alongside this Rekata bay would be evacuated and its 7th Kure SNLF would set up a relay base at Choiseul. Imamura nad Kusaka planned to hold Horaniu for as long as possible, trying to establish a new supply route along the west coast of Choiseul. 

For the Horaniu operation, Admiral Ijuins destroyer squadron of Sazanami, Shigure, Hamakaze and Isokaze were going to escort 22 barges, supported by 3 torpedo boats and two subchasers. The small armada departed Rabaul on August 17th, but Ijuin’s destroyers were spotted quickly by an allied search plane 100 miles out of Rabaul. In fact, Wilkinson was anticipating the Japanese heading for Kolombangara or perhaps Barakoma. He sent 4 destroyers, the Nicholas, O’Bannon, Taylor and Chevalier under Captain Thomas Ryan. Ryan had been an ensign in Yokohama during the 1923 Great Kanto earthquake, where he saved the love of one Mrs. Slack from the burning Grand Hotel. This earned him the medal of honor making him 1 of 18 men to receive the medal of honor during the interwar period of 1920-1940. Ryans force departed Tulagi while the other American convoy, the 2nd echelon led by Cooke were landing equipment at Barakoma. By nightfall Ryans squadron were coming up the slot while the enemy convoy was being harassed by 4 Avengers. The Avengers failed to score hits, but the anti aircraft gunfire alerted Ryan, as the Japanese were reversing course heading in his direction.

At 12:29am on August 18th O’Bannon made radar contact and a few minutes later the Americans could see the Japanese ships. At 12:32 the Japanese spotted Ryans force, prompting Ijuin to order a 45 degree turn northwest to try and lure the enemy away from the convoy. As his ruse succeeded there would be a pretty ineffective long range gun and torpedo duel seeing Hamakaze and Isokaze taking slight damage. Meanwhile the Japanese barges were racing to the coast. Ryan believed he had foiled the reinforcement when he engaged the destroyers . But because Chevalier was facing some mechanical failures and could not keep up speed to chase the Japanese destroyers, Ryan decided to turn back to engage the already landed reinforcements at Horaniu. However they managed to escape north too quickly, thus the Horaniu operation was quite a bit of success, with a lot of luck at play. Now we are shifting over to the frigid north waters of the Aleutians.

The fall of Attu and Munda were pivotal moments of the Pacific war that completely changed the course of their respective campaigns. When Munda was taken, the Japanese realized the central solomons were a lost cause and began to move all resources and men they could to Bougainville. When Attu was taken, the Japanese realized the Aleutian islands campaign was a lost cause and decided to evacuate the forces on Kiska. The battle of the pips and miraculous evacuation of Kiska was completed by the end of July. Kiska was pummeled on July 26th and 27th under clear sunny weather. 104 tons of bombs hit Kiska’s installation on the 26th in a large attack consisting of 32 B-24’s, 24 P-38 lightnings and 38 P-40’s. On the 27th it was hit with 22 tons of bombs. On August 1st Lt Bernard O’Donnel conducted the first reconnaissance sweep since the July 27th bombing and observed no Japanese fights, no anti aircraft fire and no ships at harbor. Meanwhile the blockade was being performed by Giffen and Griffen’s task force who bombarded Kiska. Intelligence crews working on aerial photographs of the island and its installations noted a number of odd features. Practically all the buildings around 23 in all appeared destroyed, but with rubble patterns suggesting demolition rather than bombing. The Japanese also appeared to have done no repair work on the craters in the north head runway, which was very odd, it was around the clock kind of work for them. All the garrisons trucks seemed to be parked on the beach in clusters and it seemed they were not moving day to day. Some pilots reported a bit of activity, like narrowly missing flak and some vehicles and ships seen moving below, but Kinkaids HQ noted all these reports were coming from green pilots. Experienced fliers were not reporting such things. Radio traffic had vanished, some wondering if the bombing was so tremendous it destroyed all the radios. Generals Butler and DeWitt believed the Green pilots, but Generals Buckner and Holland Smith were very suspicious, pointing out that the Japanese had already carried out a secret massive evacuation at Guadalcanal. In fact Buckner and Smith kept asking Kinkaid to toss some Alaskan scouts ashore in rubber boats at night prior to an invasion to report if the island was abandoned or not. But Kinkaid had the last say in the matter and declined to do so. Kinkaid’s decision was to go ahead with a full scale invasion of the island. In his words “if the enemy had evacuated the island, the troop landings would be a good training exercises, a super dress rehearsal, excellent for training purposes”. 

On August 12th, Captain George Ruddel, leading a squadron of 4 fighters circled low over the anti aircraft gun positions on Kiska, received no flak so he landed on her North head runway dodging nearly 30 craters. The 3 other fighters followed suit and the pilots performed a tiny expedition for some time. They found no sign of people, just destroyed buildings and abandoned equipment. Nonetheless Ruddels report would not stop Kinkaid, only some scolding for doing something so dangerous. The invasion of Kiska, codenamed operation cottage, was set for August 15th. The invasion force was 30,000 Americans and 5300 Canadians under the overall command of Major General Charles Harrison Corlet. It consisted of Brigadier General Archibald Arnolds 7th division; Buckner’s 4th regiment; Colonel Roy Victor Rickards 87th mountain infantry regiment, the 13th Canadian Brigade known as the Greenlight Force which consisted of the Canadian Fusiliers regiment, the 1st Battalion of Winnipeg Grenadiers, the Rocky Mountain Rangers regiment and Le Regiment de Hull led by Major General George Pearkers; there was also Colonel Robert Fredericks 1st Special Service force consisting of 2500 paratroops of elite American-Canadian commandos. Kiska marked the first time Canadian conscripts were sent to a combat zone in WW2. The men were equipped in Arctic gear, trained mostly at Adak, practicing amphibious landings using LCI’s and LCT’s.

The naval forces were commanded by Admiral Rockwell were more than 100 warships strong, with Admiral Baker leading a group to bombard Kiska with over 60 tons on August 14th. The journey to the abandoned island was pretty uneventful. On August 15th, Admiral Rockwell dispatched the transports to gather off Kiska during a period of light fog. Major General Corlett’s plan was to stage a diversionary landing using a detachment of Alaskan Scout led by Colonel Verbeck to hit Gertrude Cove which was assumed to be heavily fortified. While this occurred an advance force of the 1st, 2nd and provisional battalions of the 1st regiment, 1st special service force would secure the western side of the island, known as Quisling cove. The main force would land at a beach on the north near the Kiska volcano.

Colonel Verbecks scouts and Colonel Robert Fredericks commands were the first to come ashore. They were met by empty machine gun nests as they climbed Lard Hill, Larry Hill and Lawson Hill, interesting names. They investigated caves and ravines only to find destroyed equipment. But perhaps the enemy was simply further up in the hills saving their ammunition to ambush them. During the morning the main force landed on Kiskas northern side whereupon they immediately began climbing some cliffs to reach objectives. In the process each battalion of the 87th mountain regiment captured Robber Hill, Riot Hill and Rose Hill. US Army Lt George Earle recalled this of the unique landscapes of Kiska “At one end was a perfectly shaped steaming volcano, cloudcushioned, well- wrapped […] all around were cliff-walled shores and, when visible, a bright green matting of waist-high tundra scrub and deep lush mosses – a great green sponge of slopes rising to a rocky knife-edge crest nearly eight hundred feet above the shore up in the fog, and zigzagging its ridge-line backbone toward the […] four-thousand foot cone of the volcano”. Lt Earle also noted the incessant rain and fog, Kiska saw roughly 250 days of rain per year on average and held a ton of clouds blotting out sunshine. On the day the allied force landed the island was blanketed with a thick fog. As the allied forces advanced they ran into a variety of booby traps the Japanese had taken a lot of time to leave behind, these included; typical land mines, improvised 155m shells with trigger wires, M-93 mine’s laid upside down wired to blocks of TNT, timed bombs, candle bombs, and the classic grenades with trip wire. There was to be several casualties from booby traps. In the fog as timed bombs or other traps went off, allied forces opened fire towards noises believing the enemy was upon them. There was some friendly fire incidents amongst the Americans and Canadians, but not as much that has been perpetuated by quite a few videos on Youtube mind you. Its actually a myth thats been perpetuated in many books, in fact the main source I have been using for the Aleutian islands campaign is guilty of it sad to say. The friendly fire incidents on Kiska was not a large skirmish between American and Canadian forces that resulted in many deaths or wounded, no that was pretty much summed up to booby traps, a lot of them. If you want to know more about this, I did a podcast interview on my youtube channel, the Pacific War channel with Brad St.Croix, a historian focused on Canadian military history. The episode is titled the Canadian experience during the Pacific War, and Brad had a lot of, going to admit, vented anger about debunking this myth haha. Please go check it out, I have to admit of all my podcast episodes it has not received many views and I am sad at this because there’s a lot of interesting stuff, like how Canada was going to be part of Operation Downfall. Anyways.

The Americans and Canadians suspected the Japanese might be retreating into the interior or hiding in fight pits, so they were tense the entire time, after the stories from Attu who could blame them. The crack of a single rifle fire, would be met with more, but it always died down quickly. Corlett’s forces continued to climb uphill towards Link Hill and Ranger Hill in the direction of the main enemy camp at Kiska harbor. They found all the fortifications they came across abandoned. The second wave of the main force were brought over consisted of the 1st regiment, 1st special service force who landed at Little Kiska Island unopposed. By August 18th Corlett was confident the enemy was not on Kiska, but he continued the search nonetheless, into the caves and ravine, until August 22nd. To quote Ian Toll’s 2nd book of his pacific war trilogy 

“Considering the expenditure of naval ordnance and aerial bombs on an

island that had been vacated by the enemy, and the tremendous investment

of shipping and troops in a bloodless invasion, the Kiska operation had been

slightly farcical. In Pearl Harbor, the news was received in good humor.

Nimitz liked to tell visitors how advance elements of the huge invasion

force, creeping inland with weapons at the ready, were warmly greeted by a

single affable dog that trotted out to beg for food”

Indeed the capture of Kiska which ushered the end to the Aleutians campaign, was kind of a enormous blunder when you consider the amount of resources allocated to it. You always have to consider these resources could have been brought to the south pacific, but hindsight is hindsight. After the battle of Attu, the allies expected an absolute bloodbath on Kiska. For Corlett’s men, the americans suffered 18 deaths, 170 wounded, the Canadians 4 killed and 4 wounded, 130 men also got trench foot. The destroyer Abner Read struck a Japanese mine on August 18th, suffering 70 dead and 47 wounded to bring the total casualties to 313. Generals Buckner and DeWitt sought an invasion of Paramushiro, but the joint chiefs of staff would gradually reject the idea because it was simply seen to be easier to drive through the central or south pacific to Japan. But I would like to point out, if the south and central pacific campaigns did not go well, the idea of hitting the Japanese home islands from the Aleutians could have been a very real thing. Kinkaid, Butler, Eareckson amongst many others would leave the north pacific to deploy in other theaters. It was only really Buckner who remained, DeWitt returned to the west coast, as did the majority of forces.

Wanted a feel good end to this one. So the allied forces on Kiska found more than just booby traps, turns out the Japanese had abandoned a number of dogs on the island, so the allied troops adopted many of them and turned them into unit mascots and pets. Surviving photos of the soldiers and the dogs are abundant and cute.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

The amphibious assault of Vella Lavella was a huge success, though now the battle for the small island was on. The farcical battle of Kiska had ushered in the end of the Aleutian islands campaign, birthing a long persisting myth to this very day of an incredible friendly fire battle. 

- 90 - Pacific War - Komiatum Offensive, August 8-15, 1943

Last time we spoke about the intense battle for Munda. The most important objective of the New Georgia campaign, the seizure of Munda had come at long last. The 43rd, 37th and 25th divisions all performed an envelopment offensive against Munda, but in their way were extremely formidable Japanese fortifications. It was a real slogfest seeing tremendous casualties for both sides of the conflict. However the Americans were able to breakthrough some of the Japanese bunkers, tunnels and pillboxes thanks largely to the use of flamethrowers which were becoming more and more popular on the battlefield of the Pacific. Munda was finally captured and now the Japanese had to withdraw to other areas like Vila to keep the fight alive. On the seas, commander Frederick Moosbrugger unleashed some improved mark 14 torpedoes at the IJN and scored a major victory sending 3 destroyed to their grave and countless sailors and soldiers. 

This episode is the Komiatum Offensive

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

 

So last week we talked exclusively about the New Georgia campaign, so today as you guessed it we are diving back over to New Guinea. You know when it comes to the big and popular aspects of the war, Guadalcanal usually takes the leading role, but campaigns like New Guinea seem to always fall to the wayside as they say. Yet the battle for New Guinea was just as important, it took significant resources away from the Empire of Japan. We are soon to reach the climax of the Lae-Salamaua campaign, things are really starting to heat up.

Now the last time we were over on Green Hell, Brigadier Moten had just ordered the 2/6th battalion to secure Bobdubi ridge, while the 2/5th assault Mount Tambu. By the end of July, the Coane Force was beginning to occupy Tambu Bay. The 3rd battalion, 162nd of Archibald Roosevelt were securing the Boisi area with two of their companies hitting slopes west of Tambu Bay, while the 2nd battalion assembled itself at Tambu Bay. By seizing Tambu Bay, the artillery could now take up a good position to better support the troops. Further north, Brigadier Heathcote Hammer was reorganizing his 15th brigade for a new attack against the Old Vickers position. On July 24th, he held an officers conference at Gwaibolom. Hammer laid out plans to employ the 58/59th battalion against Erskine Creek and Old Vickers. The commander of the 58/59th, Lt Colonel Patrick Starr received the order from Hammer, but also a letter directed at him. In the letter Hammer laid out a ton of criticisms against his unit, some of his officers and by implication Starr himself. The main criticisms were based largely on ineffective ground operations such as the unit lacking adequate knowledge of where their neighboring units were or that of the enemy. But as we know, this unit had not received proper training and it really was a baptism under fire kind of situation. But like they say about swimming, sometimes you gotta be thrown into the pool, and boy were they. Following some rather poorly planned and failed attacks back on June 30th, the 58/59th now adopted a more measure approach against the Old Vickers position. Hammer also helped with his reorganizing efforts. Hammer ordered Company A to head further north, while Major Warfe’s commandos would take over the defenses for Gwaibolom; General Savige was assigned the 2/7th to help reinforce the 15th brigade; the 2/6th were ordered to advance along the Sugarcane Ridge to clear a way forward, but would run into a 100 Japanese strong position north off the ridge. On July 26th, the Australians concentrated their 25 pounders upon the ridge before launching a frontal assault.

Meanwhile Brigadier General Ralph Coane renewed their attack against Roosevelt Ridge on July 27th. Coane ordered the still assembling 2nd battalion, 162nd regiment for the task. 100 men of E company advanced using a creek line parallel to the ridge, going through some thick jungle. They marched single file, hooking back towards a spur that led towards a small knoll on its crest, looking for a way to break the Japanese defenses. But once they reached the crest, they began taking heavy fire and although they established themselves firmly on a shoulder of ground below the ridge, they could advance no further. Meanwhile the 2/6th were lobbing 25 pounders accurately over the Old Vicker’s position, forcing the Japanese to flee to the refugee of their underground shelters. It basically had become a routine of taking a bombardment and awaiting some screaming Australians or Americans afterwards for most of the Japanese defenders by this point. However no assault came.

On July 28th another bombardment was on its way, but this one was directed on the Coconuts area. Starting at 2:45, two 25 pounders from Tambu Bay fired hundreds of rounds alongside some 3 inch mortars in an attempt to thwart the Japanese from sending reinforcement over to the Old Vickers position. During the final 5 minutes of what was a 15 minute bombardment, it turned into a creeping barrage allowing C Company of the 58/59th to advance. The bombardment made a ton of smoke aiding the men. Three platoons attacked the Old vickers position simultaneously. Platoon 7 of Butch Proby charged across some exposed ground at the center of the position; Platoon 13 of Lt Jack Evans attacked the left; while Platoon 15 of Sergeant Vic Hammond attacked from the right. The platoons managed to successfully overrun the Japanese forward bunkers and reached the crest just as the unsuspecting Japanese there were emerging from their dugouts. A heavy firefight broke out, but it was the defenders who began fleeing for their lives towards the Coconuts area. As the men consolidated the Old vickers position they found 17 dead Japanese, but also a large amount of abandoned booty. A 70mm gun with 300 shells, 4 light machine guns, 1 medium machine gun and 28 rifles which the Australians gladly grabbed.

Hammer expected the Japanese to launch a vicious counterattack so he rapidly ordered the 2/7th battalion to send the fresh A Company of Captain Septimus Cramp over to relieve the exhausted C Company. Meanwhile B Company of the 2/6th were assaulting Sugarcane Ridge being supported by 3 inch mortars and 4 Vickers guns from the 2/6th field regiment along the Tambu Bay coast. Coming from Ambush Knoll, Platoon 10 led by Lt Clive Trethewie made a frontal assault, but machine gun fire from atop Sugarcane Ridge halted them quickly. Platoon 12 led by Sergeant Stan White and Platoon 11 of Lt Ted Exton were hooking around the ridge to attack the enemy’s rear. The Japanese defenders had assumed the ridge was too steep in its rear position and were completely taken by surprise by the attack, seeing Extoons Platoon 11 overrun them. The Japanese were forced to flee for their lives. The Japanese attempted a dusk counterattack to reclaim the ridge, but it failed.

On July 28th, with E Company stalled, F company was brought up to help out, taking up a position to E Company’s left. They both tried to assault the ridge together, but gained little ground and were forced to dig in as the Japanese harassed them with counterattacks. The problem really was the Japanese were simply too well dug in. They held a steep narrow crest on the ridge, with the typical camouflaged pillboxes, mutually supporting machine gun nests, an intricate network of underground tunnels, lets call it the “Japanese special” haha, it will be seen quite often going forward into this war. The allied artillery and mortar bombardments could do little to actually hurt the Japanese, but it did cause them to take shelter within their tunnels, then there was the hope the assaulting forces got close enough before the Japanese stormed out again, which feels a lot like battles from WW1.

In the meantime Major Roosevelt’s battalion were working to cut off the Japanese supply routes to the ridge. He dispatched multiple patrols to take up positions along junctions and tracks between Scout ridge, Roosevelt Ridge and Mount Tambu. The men ran into skirmishes with Japanese supply efforts, greatly hindering them. But with the lack of progress by Coane’s force concerned certain commanders like General Savige who began to criticize Coane for a lack of control and discipline over the men. Savige ordered him to push on immediately to capture Roosevelt Ridge, but in response Coane protested that he needed more reinforcements to seize the heavily fortified position. Likewise the lack of progress over at Mount Tambu was also annoying commanders. Taylor Force had just relieved the exhausted 2/5th battalion on the 28th. Several companies consisting of around 400 men from the 1st battalion, 162nd regiment coming over from Nassau Bay took up positions around Mount Tambu. Australian mortar crews and stretcher bearers remaining in the line to support their American comrades with one company of the 2/5th staying behind likewise. Moten planned for a new attack, slated for the 30th, to be followed with attacks against Goodview Junction and Orodubi by the 2/5th and 2/6th respectively. To open up the new attack, 8 105mm guns positioned at Buigap Creek Valley alongside 5 25 pounders position at Tambu Bay opened fire in the morning firing around 200 rounds per gun for an hour and a half.

The Americans began their assault with Platoons 2 and 3 charging the ridge while Platoon 1 awaited in reserve. For 45 minutes the two leading platoons moved 150 meters across the Japanese front’s right shoulder. They managed to knock out 6 out of 8 bunkers on the shoulder before attempting to advance further, but the defenders second tier line three meters higher up opened fire upon them and numerous grenades came rolling down the slope. The fire was too much, with the defenders using their tunnel and trench system to deadly effect taking up numerous positions to fire down on the Americans. The two platoons were halted dead in their tracks as the third platoon was brought up, but it made no difference. A legendary figure emerged from this action.

For those of you from down unda, you probably already know the story, but for those of you who down, Corporal Leslie Bull Allen became a hero this day. Bull Allen was born in 1918, in Ballarant Victoria and when WW2 broke out he volunteered for service with the 2nd Australian imperial force. He served the 2/5th in Palestine where he became a stretcher bearer. He served in Libya and Syria where he received the nickname Bull for getting a reputation to having a cool head under fire. He was a fairly big boy, 5”11, laborer type build and he had a really deep laugh his comrades would remark “you could hear him a mile off! Bull was thus one of the battalion’s most recognisable…and one of its most popular characters”. After facing the Italians, French and Germans, Bull was sent to New Guinea. He had served during the Wau battle where he received a Military medal for carrying out comrades under intense fire, his citation read “Private Allen’s bearing and his untiring efforts in tending the wounded and helping with rations and stores were an inspiration”. On July the 30th when the Americans were storming Mount Tambu and got botched down, Allen was one of the stretcher bearers who came running up and by himself carried 12 American servicemen to safety. There’s a famous photograph of Bull carrying an American soldier over his shoulders who had been knocked unconscious by a mortar, I do recommend googling it. And of course, I am a Sabaton fan and I would be remiss not to mention there is a song dedicated to Bull Allen, worth a listen. I got to sit down with Sabaton at a bar once in Montreal, the first time they came to north america, by the way, just gloating. Bull Allen received the Silver Star for his heroism from the United States. But as much as I’d like to end it there, I would also like to mention the reality of war. Bull put on a straight face and showed no fear as he saved the men, but as early as 1941 he was showing psychological issues. He had been admitted to a hospital in Libya, suffering from anxiety neurosis, again what we call acute combat stress or combat stress reaction. By the time he saved those boys on Mount Tambu his health was being taxed heavily. Towards the end of 1944, Bull would begin lashing out at superior officers and got himself court martialed and demoted to private. His psychological health, alongside a few bouts of malaria took a horrible toll on him creating numerous anxiety ridden episodes seeing him discharged from duty as he was not deemed medically fit. Bull found it difficult in the post war years suffering from post traumatic stress, and during one point he lost the ability to speak for 6 months. He spent his life after the war working as a laborer and then as a theater nurse at the Ballarat Base hospital. Bull became quite a popular fellow around Ballarant and would pass away on May 11th of 1982 from diabetes and other complications. He is a staple on Anzac Day and a famous image of the Australian war effort during the Pacific War. Mount Tambu was not taken that day, though the first line of bunkers were battered. Moten realized frontally attacking such fortifications was suicide, so he elected to cut off Mount Tambu instead. With the Americans failing, the 2/5th and 2/6th planned attacks changed to taking up positions to surround Mount Tambu.

Back on the 29th, Major Warfe took his men to attack what was known as the Timbered knoll held by some Japanese. He sent A Platoon led by John Lewin south along its ridge. They were supported by artillery from Tambu Bay. At 4pm the artillery and mortars started blasting away for 15 minutes. The commandos assaulted the knoll from its northern side, but were quickly pinned down by machine gun fire. Around 10 men advanced along the Bench Cut track east of the Timbered Knoll and attacked it from the south, successfully surprising the defenders, forcing them to flee. Following the capture of the Timbered Knoll, Warfe wanted to press onwards to Orodubi, but Brigadier Hammer ordered his commandos to hold their position as he did not want to open up any gaps along the ridge.

Also on the 29th, General Herring for the first time informed General Savige of the true offensive going on which was against Lae rather than Salamaua, indicating to him that the role of his 3rd division was to hold the enemy down in the Salamaua area. Likewise Moten had devised a new plan to drive the enemy from Mount Tambu. It turned out a patrol from the 2/6th had discovered a route going from Ambush Knoll to the Buirali Creek which would allow forces to cut off the Komiatum track, thus isolating the Mount Tambu and Goodview junction. The 2/6 sent 4 patrols out searching for how to ford the Buirali Creek going up to the Kiamatum ridge, some of which probed Japanese positions. 

To the north, Captain Edwin Griff’s B Company of the 58/59th advanced to Buggert preparing to attack the Coconuts area. On the 30th as they began their attack, they were met with heavy fit around 80 yards south of the South Coconuts. Forced to dig in the Australians spent the night repelling 3 counterattacks with a handful of men receiving some nasty bayonet and knife wounds. By the morning of the 31st Griff was down to 38 effective men and at 7:20am a 4th Japanese counterattack consisting of a hundred or so men overwhelmed his position. Griff was forced to withdraw to a village west of the Old Vickers position. While this was going on, Hammer had sent companies over to cut the Komiatum and Bench tracks using his A company and C Company. Moten reinforced him with A company of the 2/7th in the hopes such actions would press the Japanese to move more units from Lae over the Salamaua area. It was a huge success as by the end of July the Salamaua area counted with more than 8000 troops. However with all of these troops at Salamaua also required the allies to boost up their commitment in the area, thus Brigadier Raymond Monaghan with the 29th brigade were landed at Nassau Bay for the task. They were assigned to reinforce the Coane force which was still struggling against Roosevelt ridge.

Over on the Japanese side, General Adachi decided to reinforce Lae’s defenses. He deployed the 2nd battalion, 80th regiment who would be coming over from Finschhafen, however they would never make it to Lae as by the time they were going to depart they were forced to stay put because the Australians were threatening  the region. Adachi also ordered the Shoge detachment of Major General Shoge Ryoichi to depart Wewak. His force consisted of the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 238th regiment and a battalion of the 41st mountain artillery regiment. Elements of the 238th regiment began leaving Wewak traveling in groups of 3 motor landing crafts every two nights. Each MLC had 50 men and their supplies packed in like sardines. Soon small fishing boats were also carrying 20 men, by late July the 2nd battalion, 238th had all moved from Wewak to Alexishafen. From Alexishafen they traveled again by night and by MLC to Finschhafen and from there finally to Lae. However due to increased attacks and losses upon the MLCS countless men would be left at Finschhafen. Some were ordered to march overland to Lae, but it was a nightmare of a trip.

On August 1st, the 1st battalion, 80th regiment had taken up positions along the side of the Old Vickers position and began firing upon its defenders. They were covered by mortars as they charged up the steep terrain in an enveloping movements towards Grassy Knoll. Captain Edwin Griff’s B company harassed them from the west, and by the following morning the 2/7th battalion were able to push the Japanese back. To the north in the Coconuts, Pimple Knoll and the Sugarcane Knoll more Japanese attacks were occurring, but the defenders held the former Japanese fortifications giving them a distinct edge. By the afternoon the Japanese were sniping men in the Old Vickers and Sugarcane Knoll, trying to cover their assault units. By August 3rd, the Japanese unleashed another assault against the entire perimeter, seeing the fiercest fighting take place in an area in front of the 8th Platoon led by Corporal Alan Naismith. Alan ended up crawling forward with grenades in hand before tossing them down the steep slopes of Old Vickers killing many Japanese. Seeing the battle going nowhere, the Japanese unleashed a banzai charge at night as a last ditch effort to break through, but were ultimately forced to withdraw. Seeing three full days of frontal assaults fail, the Japanese then elected to advance further south along a ridge and dug in between the Old Vickers and Buggert. This threatened to encircle the 2/7th, so Griff’s B Company were ordered to restore the line of communications to Old Vickers.

Griff ordered a concentrated bombardment of 30 mortars before his company stormed the slope the Japanese dug in on. Two platoons quickly broke through towards Sugarcane Knoll and in the process forced the Japanese to withdraw back over to the Coconuts area. Griff then ordered his company to perform mop up operations as some Japanese had stayed in their foxholes. Yet the performance overall for the 58/59th had displeased Hammer who now decided to place them under Major Warfe’s command. They would also be redeployed over to the Gwaibolom area, while the commandos would take over their Old Vickers position. For a few days the 2/7th performed patrols around the Coconuts area to prepare for a final attack against it.

Over at Mount Tambu, on August 4th, Captain Cam Bennett’s B Company and Walters A Company of the 2/5th successfully surprise attacked the defenders atop a small knoll known as Hodge’s Knoll. However they were soon met with heavy counterattacks from three sides dislodging them in the late afternoon. The next day, Moten ordered the 2/6th battalion to advance along the Stephens Track, while its D company led by Captain Harold Laver would take an alternate path towards the Komiatum ridge heading north of Goodview. During the afternoon, a forward patrol of Company D found a route through the jungle to Komiatum village, but the route proved very difficult for the full company to traverse. Alongside this discovery, a patrol from Taylor Force found a small ridge north of Komiatum that was unoccupied named Davidson ridge. By August 6th, Moten and Savige concluded their plan to isolate and reduce Mount Tambu. The 2/6th would secure Komiatum ridge to the northwest; Coane Force would hit Roosevelt and Scout ridge; Lt Colonel Charlie Davidsons 42nd battalion would hit a key ridge to the north, Ie: the one that was to be called Davidson; the 2/5th would hit Goodview junction and the 15th brigade would contain assault the Coconuts area containing the enemy at Tambu knoll and Orodubi.

General Herring liked the plan and urged General Savige to quote "drive Coane on to the capture of Roosevelt Ridge even if the cost is higher than he cares about". Herring also added that he could take Savige’s requests to the higher authorities and upon stating that Savige immediately requested Coane and Major Roosevelt be relieved of their commands. Again a lot of the interpersonal and command issues were due to MacArthurs tampering with Alamo Force. Brigadier Coane was told by Fuller he was a separate command from MacKechnie and Colonel Roosevelt continuously refused to obey orders from MacKechnie stating he was not under Australian command. It took until July 19th, for Herring to clarify things that the Australians were in charge of operations in the Nassau Bay area. Combine this with the lack of progress and it was no surprise people were gunning to sack another. On August 7th the first units of Davidsons 42nd battalion landed at Nassau bay at 2am and Coane requested that Davidson immediately march north. Davidson refused to do so until his men got a hot meal and some sleep angering Coane. Then when Davidson and his men reach Duali he was informed Major Stephen Hodgman was waiting with orders from Moten that it was he who was taking operational command. Coane was only to have command over supply communications and rations. When Davidson reached Tambu Bay on the 8th he met with Coane who was greatly frustrated that he was unable to use Davidsons units to hit Roosevelt ridge. Coane told him “If I can’t do as I want with you, I don’t consider you under my command at all”. It was quite fortunate as MacArthur soon relieved Coane and Roosevelt of their commands. As General Savige would later write “MacArthur asked me for my views on Coane and Roosevelt and I gave them strongly…I had my bags packed but MacArthur supported me”. Thus MacArthur sides with Herring and Savige and as a result Colonel MacKechnie was given back command over the 162nd regiment which was taken away from the 41st division directly under Savige’s command. So much sneaky maneuvering going on by MacArthur’s team. On August the 9th Savige visited Motens HQ, then Hammers, then the 58/59th battalions and finally the 2/6th. He was making a tour of the front lines trying to raise morale for the Australians. The next day, the 42nd battalion finally got into position at Tambu Bay where they received confirmation of their orders to seize Davidson ridge. By the 11th the men were climbing the ridge, facing no opposition and it was fully occupied by the 12th.

Also on the 12th, MacKechnie began his attack against Roosevelt ridge deploying his 2nd battalion on the right flank and the 3rd on the left. The 2nd battalion established a position on the ridge crest rappelling several counterattacks throughout the day. After a 1.5hr artillery barrage of over 2000 rounds the 2nd battalion charged the ridge and successfully breached the Japanese line in three points. Meanwhile the 3rd battalion, 66th regiment were fighting for their lives, but by nightfall two Australian companies were now occupying high knolls around 500 yards apart. The 3rd battalion, 238th regiment had just begun arriving to Salamaua and were quickly redirected to help out the men on Roosevelt ridge. It would all be for naught however as by the 14th, the Australians pushed the Japanese to the eastern end of the ridge. From a Historian who covered the 41st division “At about 13:15 the jungles north, south and west of Roosevelt Ridge shook and shivered to the sustained blast. The mountains and ridges threw the echo back and forth, down and out, and the quiet white-capped sea to the east, ringing the outer third of Roosevelt Ridge, grew dark a s it received the eruption of earth and steel on that stricken shoulder of land. Scores of guns—75-mm howitzers, Aussie 25-pounders, 20-mms, Bofors, light and heavy machine-guns, even small arms—had opened up simultaneously on the enemy-held ridge. A score or more Allied fighters and bombers had swooped low to strafe its dome and tons of bombs released from the B-24s and B-25s fell straight and true, to detonate, shatter, rip and tear and to deliver certain death at that moment on an August afternoon. Those who watched from the beach saw the top fourth of the ridge lift perceptibly into the air and then fall into the waiting sea. In a scant twenty minutes all that remained of the objective was a denuded, redly scarred hill over which infantrymen already were clambering, destroying what remained of a battered and stunned enemy.” By the late afternoon, Roosevelt Ridge was finally firmly in the hands of the allies. MacKechnie could not however advance any further as his lines were already overextended. The Japanese withdrew to the nearby Scout Ridge where the 238th regiment reinforcements also came to defend. 

While this was occurring the 2/7th were advancing upon the Coconuts area. Captain Andrew Rooke led the Bena platoon of Company A alongside Platoon 9 to hit the steep eastern approaches of the South coconuts; Captain Fred Barr’s B company advanced upon the North Coconuts from the west. August the 14th began with a heavy airstrike made up of 22 B-24’s and 7 B-17’s. Starting at 9:30am as told to us by Axel Olsen observing from the Old Vickers “with a noise like the rushing of a great wind’, the bombs passed over the heads of the waiting assault troops. ‘Trees, logs and other rubbish flew through the fall [sic] of dust which now cloaked the target.’ The observers at Old Vickers observed, ‘It seemed that nothing could have lived in the midst of devastation loosed by the planes.” At 10:10 artillery began to bombard the area for an hour and half. As the artillery ceased, 3 inch mortars continued to fire covering the approach of the infantry who were using smoke bombs. As Axel Olsen wrote observing from the Old Vickers  “came a terribly fierce raking with Vickers guns firing through the haze from smoke bombs”. The Australian assault battered the north coconuts position which was guarded by two pillboxes connected to weapon pits using crawl trenches. The area had suffered hard from the bombardments easily allowing the Australians to seize it. However the southern defenses of the south Coconuts found defenders resisting hard in their trenches. The center Coconuts position like the north had nearly been obliterated by the bombing allowing B company to make progress, but soon they were pulling back to the north coconuts position. During the night, allied platoons came across a Japanese communication line going over the Salamua-Bobdubi track, so they cut it to prevent reinforcements. For the next two days, patrols and mortar fire were harassing the south coconuts defenders gradually forcing them to evacuate. By August the 17th the Coconuts and northern end towards Bobdubi were firmly in Australian hands.

With all of these gains in hand, Moten was finally ready to attack Komiatum. On August the 15th,  Captain Edgar’s A Company, Captain Laver’s D Company of the 2/6th battalion took up a position due west of Laver’s Knoll. Yes the future names of these knolls and ridges really does seem to give away what happens in the stories haha. Laver’s Knoll was a key feature of the Komiatum ridge and taking it would allow the allies to apply more pressure upon the enemy. On the morning of the 16th, the 2/5th battalion performed a diversionary attack against Goodview, while A and B Companies advanced up the Komiatum ridge under a creeping barrage. The men were fortunate as the Japanese were forced to flee during the artillery fire, allowing Laver’s knoll to be seized quite easily. The men dug in immediately allowing Lt Les Johnson’s platoon 17 to capture, you guessed it Johnson’s knoll. During WW2 if you really wanted something named after you, all you had to do was travel to Green Hell. Johnson and his men dug in on the knoll and soon Japanese fire was directed at them. Japanese counterattacks were lobbed from their south and west before nightfall, but they managed to hold on. During the night the 42nd battalion began using Vicker guns and mortars from Davidson ridge to help harass the enemy. Around dawn on the 17th, the Japanese unleashed another counter attack against Johnson knoll, this time the enemy got within just meters of the Australian defenders. After dusk even more counterattacks were made seeing 217 deaths, 380 wounded and 301 sick Japanese after all was said and done. The attacks were tossed back and soon Vickers machine guns were brought up to Laver’s Knoll to add to the Japanese misery. Unable to break the allied push onto the Komiatum ridge, the Japanese began to become more and more desperate. Artillery and aerial bombardment on top of enveloping maneuvers by the Australians were taking a heavy toll. The Japanese had suffered over 900 casualties since July 23rd and with more and more men dying by the minute, General Nakano ordered a withdrawal from Komiatum to be carried out on the night of August 19th. Nakano was still under the illusion Salamaua was the main target.

The next day the Taylor Force and 2/5th found Mount Tambu and Goodview suddenly unoccupied and finally seized their objectives. General Savige personally came over to congratulate the men who took Laver’s knoll, but this was to be his last action in command of the 3rd division. Blamey decided to replace  Savige with the commander of the 5th division General Edward Milford. Milford would later find out the reason for Savige’s sacking was because General Herring was greatly annoyed that a supply line to the coast had not been opened, which was desperately needed to relieve supply aircraft for the upcoming attack on Lae. Herring told Milford that Savige had never visited the front line because he was too old, but as I just mentioned this was false, Savage had in fact visited Mubo and Komiatum. Major General Frank Berryman working in Blamey’s HQ, who remained quite close to the man, who often sought out his advice believed General Herring was unjustified in his sacking of Savige. Berryman would point out “ Herring ‘not giving Savige a fair burl… Savige having to fight Herring as well as Japs. Savige had done well and we had misjudged him’.Savige bitterly handed over his command, greatly disappointed he would not get to see the final capture of Salamaua. But he did not depart unrewarded, as he received a Companion of the order of Bath for his services during the campaign with his citation reading;

Maj-Gen. Savige had control of the Battle for Salamaua from 30 Jun. 43 till his relief on 26 Aug. 43. The battle was finally won on 11 Sep. 43—the credit for victory must rest with Maj-Gen. Savige during whose period of command, the back of the enemy's defence was broken. The nature of the country rendered great assistance to the defender, and careful planning alone enabled the defences to be overcome. The supplying of our forward troops was also a terrific problem.

Maj-Gen. Savige triumphed over all these difficulties, his men were kept supplied, they were encouraged to endure the most dreadful hardships, and to overcome great difficulties of terrain. Maj-Gen. Savige's plans were well conceived and he saw them carried through. The success achieved is of the greatest importance to the Allied cause, and Maj-Gen. Savige by his fine leadership has made a very real contribution to the ultimate success of the United nations.

The victories won over the enemy at the battles for Mubo and Komiatum were due to his well conceived plans and energetic execution.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

The battle for Salamaua and Lae was drawing ever closer. The boys down unda had seized control over vital positions forcing the Japanese into more and more desperate defensive measures taking horrifying casualties in the process. 

- 89 - Pacific War - Fall of Munda, August 1-8, 1943

Last time we spoke about the drive to Lae and Salamaua on New Guinea and the mysterious battle of the Pips. The boys on Green Hell were having a hell of a time trying to capture Mount Tambu. The Japanese had made a pillbox nightmare around Mount Tambu and reclaimed Ambush Knoll. Ambush Knoll was once again taken by the allies, by Warfe’s commandos to be exact, but Mount Tambu was proving to be a much tougher nut to crack. Then in the frigid northern waters of the Aluetians, the allies had just successfully retaken Attu, but at a horrifying cost. The heavy cost convinced the allies, Kiska would be a similar bloody affair so they sought some Canadian help for its invasion. Yet before the invasion would occur one of the strangest battle of WW2 happened, the mysterious battle of the pips. The Americans found themselves firing at ghosts. But today we are venturing over to New Georgia.

This episode is the Fall of Munda

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

The New Georgia campaign in many ways was akin to Guadalcanal. The Americans had suddenly invaded the island, landing numerous troops before the Japanese could coordinate a way to thwart them. Once the troops were landed, then the Japanese decided to react, and by react I mean tossing troops of their own on the island to dislodge the Americans. But just like with the Guadalcanal campaign, the war of transportation was not one the IJN could seemingly win against the Americans. By 2nd of July US forces led by the US 43rd Division, held an overwhelming advantage of 15,000 troops compared to 9,000 Japanese, who had landed at Zannana with a view to attacking westwards towards Munda Point. It was a battle that took far longer than the Allies had envisaged. Stubborn Japanese resistance and their ability to infiltrate US lines and cut supplies meant an advance at a snail’s pace, despite their control of the air and sea. Yet while the Americans were chipping away, bit by bit at the outskirts of New Georgia, the real defensive position was of course, Munda. Up until this point Major General Minoru Sasaki had done a great job of delaying the Americans while pulling his forces back to make a stand at Munda. Indeed the Americans had a terrible time fighting the Japanese and mother nature, as Sergeant Antony Coulis described one advance thus “We alternatively crawled up and down greasy ridges. We forded numerous jungle streams and swam three of them. The repeated torture of plunging into icy streams; the chopping away of endless underbrush and foliage; the continuous drizzle of rain; the days without hot food or drink; the mosquitoes tormenting us at night. It was sheer physical torture …”

Sasaki had constructed a barrage of defensive entrenchments around the airport around Munda to halt the US advance. As Admiral Halsey recalled “Rugged as jungle fighting is by now we should have been within reach of our objective, the airfield. Something was wrong.” The now deceased Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s plan to turn the Solomons into a killing machine in order to force the United States to parley for a negotiated peace, seemed to be working. With the battle turning into a stalemate, on 15 July Halsey sent the famously tough Major-General Oscar Griswold, of the 14th Army Corps to New Georgia. Major-General John Hester, who had turned down help from the Marines, was relieved from command of the 43rd Division and replaced by Guadalcanal veteran Major-General John Hodge.

A Landing Craft Tank Captain named Jack Johnson  described the operation as a “screw-up. General Hester was army. I had him aboard one time. He was a little fart. He wore these high lace-up boots and carried a riding crop.” However, a lot of the blame would be placed on Rear-Admiral Turner, the commander of the amphibious forces who had insisted that Hester should retain divisional command as well as overall command of the landing operations.It also did not help that the 43rd “National Guard Division” were untested in battle. Griswold would find them in a state of near psychological collapse, prompting him to request reinforcements from the 37th division.

The 37th division was led by General Beightler who was manning Reincke Ridge while to the south near the beach were the 43rd division under General Hester's command until the 29th and the 25th division of General Lawton Collins. Additionally Marine tanks of the 10th defense battalion from Rendova were arriving to replace recent losses and they would be critically needed to face the nightmarish Japanese pillboxes the Americans would be facing.

In front of the Americans was a complex of camouflaged and mutually supporting pillboxes and fortifications amidst thick jungle. These defenses dominated several high features including Shimizu Hill, Horseshoe Hill, Kelley Hill and Reincke Ridge. They were made out of crushed coral and coconut logs dug several feet into the ground, with just a small portion poking out for their machine gunners and riflemen. It was these types of defenses that had plagued Hesters assaults. Across a frontage of around 3200 yards, Sasaki had established a series of these defenses along a northwestern axis going from the beach to Ilangana. Before the offensive could be kicked off, 161st regiment led by Colonel James Dalton discovered the Japanese held the Bartley ridge due east of Horseshoe hill. Their reconnaissance indicated double-logged pillboxes. Bartley ridge would be the most forward of the defensive positions and thus needed to be seized first. 

To meet the enemy Sasaki ordered Colonel Tomonari’s forces to launch a second counterattack against whatever allied forces showed up on the northern flank and he also requested the recently landed Yano battalion to reinforce the northern flank. However Tomonari’s men had suffered tremendous casualties and he was still trying to rally the scattered men along the rugged highlands. Meanwhile Colonel Yano was only able to send his 7th company to take up a position northwest of the 3rd battalion holding Sankaku hill, because his other men were needed to defend Vila. Because of this Sasaki ordered the depleted 1st battalion, 229th regiment to reinforce the Ilangana line. Colonel Hirata placed the 1st battalion along the line between Sato’s 2nd battalion and Kojima’s 3rd, which would turn out to be a key position.

The offensive kicked off at first light on July 25th. Commander Arleigh Burke took 7 destroyers through the Blanche Channel and bombarded the Lambete plantation for 43 minutes firing more than 4000 5 inch shells. Nearly at the same time, the new commander of AriSols, Brigadier General Than Twining sent 171 bombers and 100 fighters to hit Munda, the largest air strike thus far in the area. As Burke’s destroyers were firing 5 inch shells, B-24’s and B-17’s led the air attack, followed by B-25’s, Dauntless and Avengers. It was described by many eyewitnesses as “the greatest show on earth”. The Japanese were only able to toss back 57 Zeros at 9:40am who were intercepted quickly by a Rendova patrol of 29 fighters who shot down 6 zeros and lost 4 of their own. But from 6:30-7am, the 254 aircraft managed to drop 500,800 lbs of fragmentation and high explosive bombs over the target area, a roughly 1500 by 250 yard strip. The result was enormous clouds of smoke hanging all over Munda, but Japanese casualties were considerably light.

As the bombardment was quieting down, Griswold unleashed the ground forces supported by the 43rd divisions artillery who were firing more than 2150 105mm howitzer shells and 1182 155mm howitzer shells. Colonel Brown's 103rd regiment advanced upon Ilangana point while the 172nd tried to envelop Shimizu Hill, supported by 5 tanks. The 172nd tossed their 2nd and 3rd battalions around the left and right of Shimizu hill, but by 10am, even with the 5 tanks the Japanese pillboxes had halted them in their tracks. 3 of the tanks were disabled because of vapor lock and a ton of time was wasted by infantry trying to extricate them. THe 3rd battalion on the lefthand side, tried to fight through machine gun and mortar fire, but found it impossible. The men tried to move around the pillboxes but found themselves fired upon by other machine gun positions. The 2nd battalion, 103rd regiment attacked in the center of the 43rd divisions zone and managed to progress 300 yards against lighter opposition. bY 10:40am Company E managed to advance 500 yards and by noon reached a beach near Terere. As Company E tried hastily to create a defendable position, the Japanese moved behind them cutting their telephone lines back to the battalion HQ.

Seeing the opening, General Hester tossed in some of his reserves in the form of Ramsey’s 3rd battalion, 169th regiment. They were ordered to charge through the same gap made by 3 Company. But as they marched towards the gap they were met with enfilade fire from the southern part of Shimizu hill and from some pillboxes to the south. The 169th were unable to exploit the gap and now E company was forced to pull back lest they be encircled and annihilated. To the north, Beightler kept his 145th and 148th regiments in reserve until Bartley ridge was neutralized. Dalton sent I Company to contain the Japanese pocket by attacking it frontally while the 1st battalion and rest of the 3rd battalion performed a double envelopment. The 1st battalion went around the left while the 3rd took the right, seeing both driving southward and northward for 200 yards. The 1st battalion led by Lt Colonel Slaftcho Katsarky advanced 700 yards with only light opposition, but over on the other side the 3rd battalion of Lt Colonel David Buchanan were halted at the offset by heavy machine gun fire. By the 2nd of the day the 3rd battalion would establish itself in a containing position north,south and east of Bartley ridge. E Company had to be taken out of reserve and sent into the line on some high ground due north of Bartley ridge to secure the right flank of the 161st zone. The 1st battalion advanced a further 400 yards west of Bartley and took up a position on a small rise northeast of Horseshoe hill.

With the southern advance stalling somewhat, Colonel Stuart Baxter of the 148th was ordered to help the 161st’s efforts at reducing the pocket on Bartley ridge. He performed a limited advance and his 2nd battalion led by Lt Colonel Herbert Radcliffe gained 600 yards without meeting Japanese resistance. Meeting no resistance, the 1st battalion led by Lt Colonel Vernor Hydaker took up the 2nd battalions position as they advanced further, allowing engineers of the 117th engineer battalion to construct a supply trail behind them. 

Despite all of this Griswold was frustrated by the failure of his 43rd division performance. Ultimately Griswold blamed General Hester who he wrote about in his diary that night  “I am afraid Hester is too nice for a battle soldier. He is sick and all done in. Tonight I am requesting his relief from the division.” The next day he ordered the exhausted 172nd to hold their position while the 10rd would advance 800 yards from Ilangana for Terere. To support them the artillery bombarded for over an hour, allowed the 103rd to advance with some tanks in the vanguard. A crucial component of their advance would be the 118th engineer battalion led by 2nd Lt James Olds an acting corps chemical officer, whose men were equipped with flamethrowers who went to work spilling fire over enemy pillboxes. This led to the vegetation over and around them being incarcerated in a matter of seconds and many pillboxes were simply wiped out. 

As I had said a few times in this series, the flamethrower would be one of the most devastating weapons in island hopping warfare. The flamethrower was gradually employed by both assault and mop up operations. However useful as it was, it did hold some disadvantages. The equipment as you can imagine was quite large and heavy, required the operator to get very close to the enemy positions and thus extremely vulnerable. For flamethrower personnel to be able to close the distance required rifle team protection. But what if you could alleviate these vulnerabilities by slapping a big flamethrower to a tank? Generals like Griswold and Harmon at this point began mounting flamethrowers to tanks and although it would not see the limelight at Munda, the Firetank as they would become known would become the most devastating weapon against Japanese defenses. By the midafternoon, Browns 10rd regiment managed to reduce around 74 pillboxes along a 600 yard front, successfully occupying Ilangana and continuing the coastal advance until Kia. While it was a great victory for Hester, it failed to change Griswolds mind about relieving him.

Back over in the north, Beightler ordered another assault of Bartley’s ridge. 6 light marine tanks of the 10th defense battalion led the charge at 9am. Companies L and K advanced in columns behind the tanks, tossing heavy fire from .30 caliber Browning automatic rifles (known as BAR’s for my Call of Duty world at war veterans) and 2 flamethrowers. Unfortunately for the two guys carrying the flamethrowers, they were not properly protected by their rifle teams and were killed quickly. Very much like the learning of how to perform amphibious landings, it would take time to learn how to effectively use flamethrower units. The man managed to overrun a dozen or so pillboxes, but the terrain soon forced Dalton to frantically order men to extricate stuck tanks. During the morning hours a Japanese soldier burst out of the brush and planted a magnetic mine to one of the stuck tanks disabling it. A second tank was hit in its fuel line by gunfire while the remaining tanks managed to pull back and reorganize by 11am. After 5 hours of combat, Buchanan’s 3rd battalion had lost 29 men and only progressed 200 yards and thus was forced to pull back again. 

On the 27th, Beightler committed his 2nd battalion, 145th regiment to reduce the defenders on Horseshoe hill. They managed to occupy a knoll connecting Horseshoe hill called Wing Hill, but heavy fire from Horseshoe hill eventually dislodges them. Meanwhile Colonel Tomonari finally managed to rally his men together for an attack against the 148th northern flank, while Sasaki sent a machine gun detachment, which was actually some anti-aircraft gunners to ambush the 148th engineers causing Colonel Baxter to order Companies A and D to rush over to protect them. Further south, General Hester began tossing some more aggressive actions in combination with artillery and mortar bombardments, gradually pushing the Japanese off high grounds. The 43rd division was slowly advancing yard by yard on the right flank, now reaching within 500 yards of the coast, but the 8 tanks of the 9th defense battalion were demolished in the attacks.

On the 29th, the 1st battalion, 169th regiment had to be brought over from Rendova to take up a position between the 103rd and 172nd regiments. Alongside 4 tanks from the 10th defense battalion and some engineers wielding flamethrowers, Hester now had enough hardened forces to push the Japanese. Because of the continuous fighting, all the American regiments were becoming veterans. Pockets of Japanese that would have once held back an entire american battalion, possibly even a regiment were not being reducing quickly and efficiently. The technique for reducing pillboxes, whether it be from isolating them or overwhelming them was becoming mastered. Broken down this process began with a complete non-combative reconnaissance of the Japanese defenses. This was followed up by a reconnaissance in force, usually by a platoon with extra units who would uncover a portion of the Japanese positions. The assault consisted of  parts: preparing an artillery bombardment usually consisting of mortars, firing off the bombardment, then storming in. The bombardments usually got rid of the brush and foliage improving visibility so the enemy could be targeted and damaged. If done efficiently, the Japanese would flee their pillboxes to take refuge. Flamethrowers and tanks made the process a lot easier for the finishing touch part. Soon the Japanese were being pushed to the crest of Shimizu hill. However while Hester was definitely picking things up better with the 43rd division, Griswold was determined to relieve him of command, feeling the man had exhausted himself. Now Major General John Hodge would take over the 43rd.

Meanwhile to the north, the Beightlers 161st regiment infiltrated abandoned pillboxes on Bartley ridge near its crest. Over on Horseshoe Hill the Japanese were being hit with heavy bombardments while the 2nd battalion reoccupied Wing Hill and Companies G and F crept their way up the crest of the hill. However once near the crest they began to be pinned down by machine gun fire. The 1st battalion was hitting the hill from the southeast meeting heavy fire as well and they managed to reach 15 yards on top of the crest before being halted. By 5:30pm, the 2nd battalion was forced to withdraw to the foot of the hill, but two companies from the 1st battalion dug in on the crest. The americans lost 24 men died with 40 wounded.

On the other side, during the night, Tomonari’s main forces of 400 men arrived ready to attack at dawn. They attempted to move behind the rear of the 148th as Baxter’s troops were advancing to Bibilo Hill. Baxter’s force was spread out quite thinly across 1500 or so yards and they happened to be around 800 yards west of their main regimental ration and ammunition dump. The Japanese from a high ground position began firing down upon them with machine guns, rifles and grenades as forward units stormed the rations and ammunition dump. A ragtag group of service company soldiers rush over to defend the dumb returning fire upon the Japanese. Major Frank Hipp of the 148th took command of the force managing to hold back the Japanese. However as a result of this near catastrophe, Beightler ordered Baxter to withdraw on the 29th. Beightler believed the enemy was coming through a gap between the 148th and 161st greatly worrying him. 

Back over at Horseshoe hill, Companies G and F reached the crest while E company was hitting its northern side, supported by machine gun crews from H company. The fighting for the north side resulted in hand to hand combat seeing E company make some progress. But by nightfall the 2nd battalion again was again withdrawing down the hill. The actions ended disastrously, as the men were hit hard as they withdrew down the hill taking enormous casualties and gaining nothing in the process. On the 30th, Bartley Ridge and Shimizu Hill remained in Japanese hands as Beightler and Hodge were reorganizing their exhausted forces. That morning, Baxter finally began his withdrawal, miserably under heavy rain, with Tomonari’s troops harassing them with ambushes. The ambushes caused Baxter to order the men to dig in around the supply dump and that night saw numerous soldiers dying for water begin to use their helmets as rain catchers. The next day the 148th attempted another break through, but Tomonari’s machine gun crews hammered them back towards the supply dump for another night.

At this point Sasaki received new orders instructing him to keep the supply lines to Kolombanagara secure. He elected to prepare his men to withdraw to a new defensive line that would be anchored at Kokenggolo Hill to the right, running east of Bibilo hill towards the Munda-Bairoko trail, then it would pass north to Hachiman Hill. Yano and his battalion were ordered to come over from Kolombangara to take up a position at Sankaku hill; Hirata’s 229th regiment would hold Kokenggolo Hill and Tomonari would take up a position at Hachiman Hill. These orders came after the Japanese defenders had suffered tremendous losses over days of fighting. In truth the Japanese defensive line was formidable facing the American 14th corps, and indeed the Americans had been held back for a long time. But the Americans brought terrible power, their naval, artillery and aerial bombing was constant and hammered the Japanese. By late July most of the Japanese emplacements near Munda were in shambles. Rifle companies that were typically 170 men strong had shrunken significantly, some down as low as 20 men. The 229th regiment numbered only 1245 effective men. The hospitals could not hope to care for all the sick and wounded as constant shelling rained hell from above. Aside from the sick and wounded, as a major result of the shelling, many men were suffering nervous disorders, to use the old term shell shock, but today we’d call it  Combat Stress Reaction “CSR”. To compensate for the losses, Colonel Hirata simply ordered his men of the 229th to kill 10 americans for every Japanese and to do so to the death. That’s the kind of, I guess what the Japanese at the time would call fighting spirit, something that made the Japanese armed forces during WW2 unique, perhaps rather tragically. 

General Imamura decided to reinforce Vila with the 3rd battalion, 23rd regiment and six companies to buff up the 1th and 229th regiments. This freed up the Yano battalion to take up their new position on the new defensive line. Yet still in the meantime, Japanese were still defending Shimizu and Horseshoe Hill to give the rest of the forces time to withdraw. On the 31st Major Francis Carberry’s 2nd Battalion, 161st charged up Bartley ridge finding no resistance. Then at 4:45pm the 15th field artillery began firing on Horseshoe Hill while the American forces near its crest tried to dislodge the Japanese. Again they were unsuccessful. By the afternoon Japanese were withdrawing from the Ilagana line, covered by fire from Horseshoe hill. During the night Tomonari led his men to withdraw, but a Avenger spotted his force fleeing through a valley overheard and called in an artillery strike. One of the shells hit Tomonari’s HQ killing a lot of his staff and nearly him. Tomonari’s force had to abandon a lot of equipment, but by dawn of August 1st they had managed to assemble at Kokenggolo and Bibilo Hills. His 2nd battalion alongside Hara’s quick fire battalion went into the tunnels of Kokenggolo Hill while the rest of the 1st and 3rd battalions dug in on Bibilo Hill. 

Baxter received a message over radio on the 1st of August from General Beightler “time is precious, you must move, get going haste is essential”. The order was to get every man Baxter had and take Shimizu hill. Baxter rallied Companies A, E, B and G into a skirmish line with bayonets fixed and charged at 850am. By 9:30am the exhausted Americans reached Katsarsky’s position where they handed the weary men fresh water and some hot food. Shimizu hill was theres. Meanwhile the 103rd regiment began their own attack. Hodge sent Companies E, F and G to march upon Lambeti which they did, finding no opposition. The rest of the 43rd found no opposition as they marched across Shimizu Hill, by 3pm they advanced 700 yards. Beightlers men captured Horseshoe Hill without firing a shot and as darkness fell on the 1st of august, Griswold ordered a general advance for the next day. Admiral Wilkinson brought a convoy bearing fresh troops of the 27th regiment to aid Beightlers right flank, but it took them until August the 3rd to get into combat assembly.

In the meantime August the 1st would bring with it a significant increase in artillery bombardment. The 43rd divisions artillery commander, Brigadier General Harold Barker fired 2000 rounds on the 1st, followed by 2000 more on the 2nd, an incredible 7300 rounds on the 3rd and 3600 on the 4th. The Munda area was turned into an inferno. Yano lost the commander and all platoon leaders of the 8th company; 5 officers died atop Bibilo hill; Hara Masao was killed leaving his 1st battalion to be commanded by Sato on August 2nd; the tunnels of Kokenggolo Hill were one of the few safe planes, but a direct hit collapses an entrance to Sato’s tunnel, burying him along with 60 men, requiring an entire day to dig them out. The Japanese were forced to take refuge wherever they could, preventing Sasaki from stabilizing his new defensive line. Captain Sugiura Kaju brought reinforcements from the 7th and 8th combined SNLF to Erventa where he loaded up the 3rd battalion, 23rd regiment to head for the Vella Gulf under the escort of Admiral Nishimuras cruisers Susuya, Chokai, Kumano, Sendai and destroyer Amagiri. However the naval force was intercepted by PT boats near the Blackett strait. The PT boats fired torpedoes at the Japanese destroyers, but none hit a target. Sugiura was able to land the reinforcements around Webster Cove, but the Amagiri rammed PT 109 just forward of her starboard torpedo tube ripping away the starboard aft side of the boat. Two men were killed, and one John F Kennedy, yes the future president was tossed around the cockpit of PT 109. Kennedy got the rest of the men to abandon ship around 11 in all. A few of them had serious burns and they were forced to swim for an islet 3.5 miles away known as Plum Pudding Island. Kennedy was the first to reach the island and he proceeded to help tow others to the island. The island was unoccupied, but a company of Sasebo 6th SNLF were nearby on another islet called Gizo. Seeing Japanese barges moving around, the Americans would make their way east to an island near Ferguson passage called Leorava island. It would not be until the night of August 7th when the coastwatch Lt Reginald Evans found them and helped them reach PT 157. For his courage and leadership Kennedy received the Navy and Marine Corps Medal alongside a purple heart for injuries he suffered. However the medals would pale in comparisons to the story written about the event by John Hersey for the New Yorker and Reader’s digest which would give Kennedy a strong foundation politically. 

Back to the battle, on August 2nd, Griswold’s forces advanced across the entire front and by the late afternoon the 103rd regiment had already reached the outer taxiways of Munda airfield; the 169th were approaching Bibilo Hill; and the 37th division were 700 yards ahead of Horseshoe hill. By the end of the day, the Japanese defensive line was basically Kokenggolo to Bibilo Hill and the Americans were closing in on both. The 103rd and 169th had units around the eastern end of the airfield, many men using wrecked Japanese aircraft as defendable positions. The 145th and 161st were on the eastern ridges of Bibilo hill and the 148th were about to cut the Munda-Bairoko trail. The Yano battalion’s position was taken so quickly, the Americans had failed to notice they had overrun it. Thus Yano withdrew northwards.

On August 3rd, the general advance continued and with more open terrain present, mortars became a lot more effective speeding it up. The 169th were advancing up the eastern end of Kokenggolo Hill; to the north, the 145th were advancing up the eastern ridges of Bibilo Hill the 161st were breaking through on the right and the 148th were now along the Munda-Bairoko trail. The situation was desperate that night so Sasaki was forced to order the men to withdraw yet again, now towards Zieta. Hirata’s 229th regiment was to hold their position until sundown to give everyone time, then act as a rearguard until they could withdraw to Kongo Hill. Sasaki likewise moved his HQ to the Kure 6th Farm at Zieta. The next morning brought further misery upon the Japanese in the form of an airstrike. At 7:20am 25 Dauntless, 24 Avengers and 24 B-25’s bombed Gurasai-Kindu Point, which is just due west of Munda airfield were the Japanese had constructed fortifications and emplaced many anti aircraft guns.

Griswold did not let up seeing perhaps the final push against Munda before him. Hodge’s 43rd division with marine tanks leading the way attacked Kokenggolo Hill. Beightler’s 25th division were striking against the Japanese northern flank, freeing up the 148th and 161st to advance west towards the beach. The defenders at Kokenggolo Hill offered strong resistance as they withdrew towards Kong Hill before the 161st managed to break through to the sea. The fiercest fighting would be found on Bibilo hill, where the 145th were fighting against the dug in 229th regiment. By the end of the day, both the 148th and 161st broke through to the sea north of Kokenggolo hill and the 145th nearly cleared Bibilo hill as the Japanese fled along a trail going to the Kure 6th farm. With Bibilo Hill reduced, the Japanese began abandoning Kong Hill to continue retreating northwards. 

Griswold’s 43rd division tossed mortars, infantry and tanks across Kokenggolo Hill driving away the last of the Japanese from tunnels, bunkers and pillboxes. Their forces soon crossed the western part of the Munda airfield. General Wing grabbed a military telephone and called General Hodge from Bibilo Hill stating “Munda is yours at 2:10 today”. Inturn Griswold radioed the good news over to Admiral Halsey "...Our ground forces today wrested Munda from the Japs and present it to you… as the sole owner…" Halsey then replied with "a custody receipt for Munda… Keep 'em dying." Munda had fallen at long last. The Americans had suffered  4994 casualties since July 2nd, the Japanese had 4683 death with a untold amount of wounded.

With Munda captured, Tomonari was ordered to withdraw to Kolombangara to take command of the Vila defenses while Sasaki would move his HQ to Bairoko then move by barge to Vila as well. The 3rd battalion, 23rd regiment was deployed at Baanga island to cover the Japanese withdrawal using mountain guns. Admiral Ota’s SNLF marines were to defend Arundel island. While these forces made their retreat, Admiral Samejima elected to carry out another reinforcement run. He would transport the Mikami battalion and on August the 6th with Admiral Ijuin carrying two other companies of replacements to Buin, Sugiura was once again sailing for Kolombangara. Sugiura had the destroyers Hagikaze, Kawakaze and Arashi while Ijuin had the destroyer Shigure. Meanwhile Admiral Wilkinson received reports from a PBY that sighted Sugiura’s ships passing by the Buka Passage, so he ordered Commander Frederick Moosbrugger to depart Tulagi and sweep the Vella Gulf. Moosbrugger had the destroyers Stack, Sterret, Lang, Dunlap, Craven and Maury. He sailed south of Rendova to enter the Vella Gulf. He took his time going 15 knots to create as little wake as possible so Japanese floatplanes would not spot him and he was northwest of the coast of Kolombanaga by 11:25pm. Moosbrugger’s plan  was to divide his force into two formations; a torpedo division consisting of Dunlap, Craven and Maury, and a Gun division consisting of Lang Sterett and Stack. The torpedo group would attack first once rader contact was made while the Gun group would cut across the bows of the enemy and open fire as the torpedo’s were expected to hit.

This was to be the first time in the Solomons campaign that the US navy planned to use torpedo’s as its primary weapon. All 6 of Moosbruggers destroyers held SG radar, but much more importantly at this time an advancement had been made to fix the idiotic mark 14 torpedoes. The defective magnetic exploder was fixed and the settings that made them run too deep was fixed. Admiral King was responsible for the first fix while Moosebrugger on his own accord ordered the torpedoes to be set at a minimum running depth of 5 feet. Sugiura knew fell well he most likely did not hold the element of surprise, but he was prepared to fight as he entered the Vella Gulf with his destroyer Hagikaze in the lead. Moosebruggers force was passing through the Gizo strait before turning southeast towards Blackett strait. Then the Americans turned north up the gulf with the torpedo group leading the way during the dark hours when at 11:33 Dunlaps radar made a contact, bearing 19700 yards away.

Moosbrugger immediately changed course to close in and began to line-up his torpedo attacks. For once the Japanese lookouts failed to spot the Americans, most likely due to a lack of moonlight. At 11:41 at a range of around 4500 yards Moosebrugger fired 22 torpedoes and at 11:46 turned his ships 90 degrees as the Gun group made a course to cross Sugiuras T. aT At 11:42 Sugiura’s lookouts spotted the American ships silhouettes and torpedo wakes, but it was too late. At 11:45 7 out of the 22 torpedoes found targets. Two torpedoes hit Hagikaze, 3 hit Arashia and 2 hit Kawakaze. Hagikaze was hit aft her engine room bringing her to a stop; Arashia’s machinery spaces were destroyed and Kawakaze was hit under her bridge detonating her forward magazine sending her ablaze. Shigure would be found later to have been hit by a torpedo which failed to explode. The 3 destroyers were disabled and burning wrecks. The Japanese fired 8 torpedoes in return, none finding a target as they frantically tried to turn northwards to escape. The Gun group opened fire sinking the 3 crippling destroyers in the course of an hour killing 820 of the 940 troops on board. The Japanese would later send 4 large barges to try and rescue survivors with around 310 out of 1520 Japanese sailors and soldiers being rescued including Sugiura. The IJN received a night action defeat which also killed and prevented reinforcements for New Georgia. The American torpedoes would soon strike fear into the IJN.

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Munda has fallen at last, though it came at a terrible price. Now with the airfield in American hands, the battle for New Georgia would come to a swifter end. The US Navy finally got the chance to deliver a torpedo blow to the IJN and a devastating one it was.