The Pacific War - week by week

- 128 - Pacific War - Drive for Myitkyina , April 30 - May 7, 1944

Last time we spoke about Operation Reckless, Operation Persecution and the Japanese retreat in New Britain. General Douglas MacArthur unleashed his two amphibious assaults, opening up the Western New Guinea Campaign. Both Operation Reckless and Persecution achieved complete surprise upon the Japanese. Múltiple Japanese units already performing withdrawals were caught into a chaotic new flight when the allies landed and began seizing key territory such as Hollandia and Aitape. The Japanese commanders fell into disarray leaving some to seize command and order further withdrawals in the face of hopeless battles. Yet again, forces already used to retreating through rough terrain without adequate provisions, were hitting the jungle track. Morale was all but collapsing in New Guinea. Over on New Britain matters were similar as the Japanese continued to retreat under heavy pressure from American patrols. Competent commanders would lose their lives beside their men in another hopeless battle. 

This episode is the Drive for Myitkyina

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Operation Reckless and Persecution were tremendous successes. There was very little opposition for the men advancing upon Hollandia, the Japanese simply did not even attempt to defend their well developed defenses there. The drive towards Hollandia’s airfields was led by the 1st Battalion, 186th regiment. From Leimok Hill to Brinkman’s Plantation, they did encounter opposition, but it was scattered and uncoordinated. Colonel Oliver Newman was very cautious, he believed thousands of Japanese were still around the airfields. Just before they came across the airfields, they found large, undefended Japanese supply dumps. This would be one of many Japanese supply dumps captured through the following days, as General Eichelberger recalled “There were more than six hundred supply dumps. There were clothing dumps as high as houses. There were ammunition dumps everywhere. There were pyramids of canned goods and tarpaulin-covered hills of rice which looked like Ohio haystacks. There were saki and beer. There were tons and tons of quinine and other medical supplies, which, as a result of our landing, never reached the Japanese troops at the front. I believe Hollandia was the richest prize—supply wise—taken during the Pacific War”. These types of discoveries indicated the Japanese were extremely desperate.

By May 4th, Major General William Gill’s 32nd Division had just arrived at Aitape to relieve the 163rd regiment, who were earmarked to take part in the next amphibious assault. The terrain, alongside the weather was dreadful at Hollandia, making it impossible to provide the needed airfields suitable for heavy bombers without some legendary engineer work. General MacArthur considered it necessary to seize and develop new heavy bomber airfields in the Wakde-Sarmi-Biak region in order to neutralize enemy bases in the western Caroline. To be honest given the track records of these amphibious assaults in causing absolute mayhem for Japanese commanders, forcing them to keep on running, it was a great idea to keep the pace up. With the knowledge General Tagami’s 36th Division was still in the region and that the enemy might still seek to reinforce that said area before the allies could land there, MacArthur initially planned to send the full 41st Division against Wakde-Sarmi on May 15th, once the Hollandia fields were ready to support the amphibious assault. However supply congestion at Hollandia’s beaches was thwarting such designs.

Admiral Barbey proposed that D Day be postponed until May 21 and gave two reasons for the postponement. First, tides would be higher in the Wakde area on the 21st than on the 15th. Second, postponement would allow orderly and complete preparations to be made. Congestion was severe at the Hollandia beaches, where the bulk of the 41st Division was to stage. Lack of lighterage and beach space, combined with an inadequate road net, hampered unloading of equipment, supplies, and troops which were pouring into the Hollandia area. The arrival of such supplies and units, some of which had to be reloaded for Wakde-Sarmi, seriously interfered with mounting the 41st Division. As such, General Krueger decided that the operation could be started no earlier than the 16th but that unless important strategic considerations dictated otherwise, the 21st would be much preferable. Additionally, a number of engineer and air force organizations were scheduled to arrive at Hollandia on the 12th, either for employment there or to be staged for Wakde-Sarmi. The shipping bringing these units to Hollandia was needed to support the Wakde phase of the new operation, which could not begin until the vessels were reloaded. As beach congestion at Hollandia remained a major problem, this reloading could not be accomplished quickly. It was therefore proposed that the Wakde landings be postponed at least another day to the 17th.

Although MacArthur initially approved the proposed delay, new aerial photography of the coastal area from Sarmi eastward to Wakde indicated the ground conditions of the region were not suited for heavy bomber airstrips. Thus MacArthur decided that the Sarmi portion of the operation should be axed and instead they would focus on Wakde Island slated for D-day May 17th. 10 days after the capture of Wakde, or as soon as the airfields were repaired, the allies would next hit Biak, where more suitable airstrip sites were known to exist. General Doe thus prepared the Wakde Landings, Codenamed Operation Tornado while General Fuller’s remaining regiments were expected to seize the airdrome areas on Biak.

Over on the other side, General Anami planned to send the 36th division over to perform an immediate counterattack against Hollandia, but was denied. General Adachi over to the east had more freedom to act. The 18th Army had found itself cut off from all provisions and supplies, thus deprived of every possibility of rejoining the 2nd Area Army west of Hollandia, for the crucial defense of Western New Guinea. Because of this Adachi reasoned the best move for his 55,000 troops was to perform some quick actions before their strength was sapped out. Thus on April 26th, Adachi ordered the 20th, 41st and 51st Divisions to prepare a counterattack against the enemy beachhead at Aitape. Adachi hoped such a bold action against his enemy’s rear might force a major diversion of the enemy eastwards, in turn hampering their drive against Western New Guinea. 

Now back in mid-February the Japanese were adjusting their forces in the Central Pacific. They had established the 31st Army in Saipan, formed around the 52nd and 29th Division, led by Lt General Obata Hideyoshi. The bulk of the 52nd division, led by Lt General Mugikura Shunzaburo had landed in Truk mid-February, Lt General Takashina Takesi’s 29th Division meanwhile were still in the progress of traveling to the Marianas, escorted by the destroyers Kishinami, Asashimo and Okinami. The bulk of the division departed Busan on February 24; but the convoy would be torpedoed some 200 km south of Okidaitōjima by the submarine Trout on February 28. The 18th Regiment, led by Colonel Monma Kentaro suffered 1657 deaths, including its commanding officer, and 570 wounded. Because of this the 18th regiment was landed at Saipan to recover; 50th regiment was diverted to land at Tinian under the command of Colonel Ogata Keiji and the 38th regiment was sent to Guam on March 4th.

Allied submarine interceptions of these troop movements was no mere coincidence. The submarine activities were frequently guided by 'Magic' intelligence relating to ship movements which was collected by intercepting and decrypting encoded radio transmissions. The IJN routinely broadcast the location and intended route of convoys under its protection, and decrypting these messages allowed Allied naval commanders to alert submarines in the vicinity of convoys. The submarine commanders were free to plan their interception and attack where conditions were most favorable. The IJN's faulty anti-submarine doctrine also contributed to Japan's shipping losses. The Navy had placed a low priority on protecting merchant shipping from submarine attack before and during the early years of the war and convoys were not routinely assembled until 1943. Vast swathes of Japanese shipping was being sunk in early 1944. There were two large reasons for this. Number 1) obviously the IJN was greatly diminished and thus allied submarines were operating further into enemy territory. Number 2) fixing the torpedo issue, yes those pesky Mark 14s/15s were now hitting hard and providing enormous results.

In response to this emerging crisis, the Japanese established the Grand Escort Fleet Headquarters, under the overall command of Admiral Oikawa Koshiro, to coordinate convoys and implement a standard doctrine. The first order of business was to increase the average size of Japanese convoys from 5 ships to "large" convoys of 10 to 20 ship in order to assign more escort ships to protect against enemy submarine activity. To further reinforce the Central Pacific, the Japanese also created nine expeditionary units from the forces of the 1st and 7th Kwantung and 8th Korean Armies. They also decided to assign the 14th and 43rd Divisions of Lieutenant-Generals Inoue Sadae and Saito Yoshitsugu to General Obata’s command, designated Truk Sector Group. To support them, the IJN decided to combine the 4th Fleet and the 14th Air Fleet on March 4th to form the Central Pacific Area Fleet, under Admiral Nagumo. Between March-April, the 31st Army was assigned the priority for shipping, so Nagumo would send a total of eleven large convoys collectively known as the Matsu Fleet to bring said reinforcements to the Central Pacific. Though the deadly American submarines would hunt relentlessly to prevent these reinforcements, they would only be able to sink the light cruiser Tatsuta, the destroyer Asanagi, six transports and one submarine chaser, so the Matsu Fleet was considered as largely successful. 

By mid-April the success of the Matsu Fleet allowed the IJN to allocate more shipping to the 2nd Area Army. Thus the Take-Ichi convoy was formed to carry the 32nd division of Lieutenant-General Ishii Yoshio and the bulk of the 35th division to Western New Guinea. The large convoy consisting of 15 transports was escorted by an unusually strong force under Admiral Kajioka consisting of minelayer Shirataka; destroyers Asakaze, Shiratsuyu, Fujinami and Kuri; Mikura-class escort ship Kurahashi; Type D escort ships No. 20 and No. 22; gunboats Ataka and Uji; minesweepers No. 22 and No. 101; and submarine chasers No. 37, No. 38 and Tama Maru No. 7. They departed Shanghai on April 17th enroute for Manila.

Unbeknownst to the Japanese allied code breakers were decrypting their radio signals and managed to figure out the convoys departure and arrival points. The Submarine Jack was given the coordinates and intercepted Kajioak’s convoy around nightfall of April 26th. Jack fired 19 torpedoes from long range, managing to sink the 5425-ton freighter SS Yoshida Maru No. 1, which was carrying the entire 210th Regiment of the 32nd Division. 3000 soldiers and their commander Colonel Koike Yasumasa all drowned with the ship. Its moments like these I always find myself taking a step back. Thousands of men fighting on all these islands in the Pacific, absolute carnage in places like New Guinea, Guadalcanal, later on Peleliu….one submarine and woosh, a regiment gone. The allied submarine campaign during the Pacific War, did a lion's share of work, horrifying work. War is a horrible thing. 

The remaining convoy ships continued to Manila, arriving there on April 29th. Upon reaching Manila, however, Lieutenant-General Ishii Yoshio learned that his 32nd Division was reassigned to the 2nd Army to further reinforce western New Guinea, so a new convoy of eight transports would resume the journey to New Guinea on May 1st, carrying the bulk of the 32nd and 35th Divisions. You can bet after hearing what happened to the 210th regiment on the Yoshida Maru, these men were dreading to sail again. They had every reason to feel that dread, as the American intelligence operators figured out the convoys departure and arrival information again. They pinpointed the convoys route, speed, daily noon positions, everything. This time the submarine Gurnard intercepted Kajioka’s convoy in the Celebes Sea on May 6. Gurnard's captain, Commander Herb Andrew  submerged his boat and made a cautious approach to avoid detection by aircraft. He reached a firing position 4 hours later and fired 6 torpedoes at 2 transports. Only 1 of these torpedoes struck its mark, and a 2nd salvo missed its intended targets but hit another transport. Andrews then turned his boat and fired further torpedoes from Gurnard's stern torpedo tubes which hit a 3rd transport. One of the Japanese destroyers then counterattacked Gurnard and forced Andrews to break off his attack. The destroyer was traveling at too great a speed for its detection gear to function, however, and did not damage the submarine, despite dropping approximately 100 depth charges. Two hours later, Gurnard rose to periscope depth and found that a major effort to rescue troops and equipment from the torpedoed transports was under way. That night, the submarine also torpedoed one of the crippled transports which was still afloat. In the end, its attack successfully sank transports Aden Maru (5,825 tons) and Taijima Maru (6,995 tons) as well as the cargo ship Tenshinzan Maru (6,886 tons).

Although the Japanese rescue effort was relatively successful, 1290 troops were killed, The 4th Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment was completely destroyed and much of their equipment was lost. 

 Due to these heavy losses, the Take-Ichi convoy finally docked at Halmahera on May 9th, where the remnants of the 32nd and 35th Divisions were ultimately unloaded. General Ikeda’s 35th division, including the 219th regiment from Palau were shipped over to Sorong, with the 219th left to guard the St.Andrew Strait Islands. General Ishii’s 32nd division, was retained at Halmahera to garrison the island. The terrible loss of the Take-Ichi convoy forced the Japanese leadership to acknowledge it was no longer possible to reinforce Western New Guinea, thus General Anami would have to fight with what he had on hand. Alongisde this, IJA General HQ decided to pull back the perimeter of the absolute defense zone in the southern area to a line extending from Sorong to Halmahera, with units at Geelvink Bay, Biak and Manokwari ordered to hold out as long as possible to delay the enemy advance. Anami did not like the orders one bit, as he belived the forward line should be aggressively defended to secure the valuable land holding air bases between Palau and Western New Guinea. What Anami was not aware of, was that the IJN combined fleet were preparing for the famed decisive naval battle in the area. This was part of Admiral Toyoda’s Operation A-Go. Under the plans elaborated by the Combined Fleet, the First Mobile Fleet, and the First Air Fleet were assigned the principal roles in the projected battle. The former assembled its surface strength at Tawitawi in the Sulu Archipelago on May 16th, while the land-based units of the First Air Fleet continued to be widely deployed in the Marianas and Carolines to take advantage of any tactical opportunity that might arise. Tawitawi was chosen as the main staging point for the First Mobile Fleet because of its proximity to both the refueling facilities of Balikpapan and the sea area which the Navy High Command expected to be the scene of the decisive battle.  It was also safely beyond the range of enemy land-based air power and afforded greater security against Allied intelligence than other anchorages in the Philippines.

Orders are orders, thus Anami ordered General Teshima to hold onto Geelvink Bay at all costs while also contuining to secure the Sarmi area as a lifeline for the 18th Army who were being cut off from east of Hollandia. While Admiral Ozawa’s 1st Mobile Fleet assembled its at Tawi Tawi for Operation A-Go and Admiral Kakuta’s 1st Air Fleet deployed its land-based units in the Marianas and Carolines, Admirals King, Nimitz and Spruance had also been planning their invasion of the Marianas, aiming to secure Saipan, Tinian and Guam as advance air and naval bases to allow striking of the Philippines, Formosa and Okinawa. After the landings at Hollandia and Aitape, Admiral Mitscher’s Task Force 58 realized there was very little opposition and he still had plenty of strength to continue operating. Thus Nimitz decided to carry out a preventive strike against Truk, to ensure that the Japanese would not be able to build up their air power before the Marianas invasion scheduled for June. 

Intelligence reports indicated that the Japanese had been rebuilding their strength at Truk. Indeed Truk’s air garrison had grown enough to be a concern again. By late March, 30 flyable Zero fighters had been pieced together from aircraft destroyed during the February raids. Additionally, aircraft were being withdrawn from bypassed bases in the Marshalls and sent to Truk. By April, the Japanese had 104 flyable aircraft at Truk: 6 G4M twin-engine bombers, 12 D4Y1s dive bombers/reconnaissance bombers, 13 B5N or B6N torpedo bombers, 55 Zero fighters, 10 J1N1 night fighters, and 8 floatplanes used for observation and reconnaissance. Moen No. 1 airfield housed the G4Ms and 20 Zero, while Eten had the rest of the Zeros and all the night fighters. The single-engine bombers, the D4Y1s, B5Ns, and B6Ns, were all at Param, with the floatplanes at Dublon. There were another 63 unserviceable aircraft scattered throughout Truk’s airfields.

Admiral Spruance’s 5th fleet would also conduct a bombardment of the Satawa and Ponape islands. On its return from Hollandia, Task Force 58 traveled to Truk, arriving shortly before dawn on April 30th and immediately tossed a fighter sweep consisting of 84 Hellcats. 5 Nakajima bombers from Param were aloft doing a dawn sweep, something that had become routine since February. Truk’s radar detected the inbound US aircraft when they were 30 minutes out, shortly before the scout’s interrupted radio report. The warning gave the Japanese ample time to launch air cover. Before the US fighters arrived, Moen No. 1 had scrambled 20 Zeros, Eten another 29, and Param its remaining eight Nakajima bombers. Yet the 57 Japanese aircraft were brushed aside, nearly 25 Zeros were shot down at the cost of 2 Hellcats. Just like we saw in February, Task Force 58 began staggering air strikes throughout the day. The carriers launched full deckloads seeing fighters, dive bombers and torpedo bombers continously over Truk for the entire day. Task Force 58 performed 2,200 bomber sorties, 467 of which were flown by fighters carrying bombs. In all, US Navy aircraft dropped 748 tons of bombs during the two-day operation. The Hino Maru No. 2, a 1,500-ton cargo ship and auxiliary gunboat, was hit and heavily damaged by a bomb by an Avenger from USS Cabot during the attack’s first day. It sank four days later on May 4. The Sapporo Maru, a 600-ton auxiliary provision stores ship, was bombed on April 30 and sank north of Fefan. The 300-ton auxiliary minelayer Minsei Maru and 20 other craft were also destroyed in the harbor during the two days of raids. While a small haul when compared to February’s results, these losses further reduced the number of vessels remaining in Truk Atoll. This increased the difficulty of moving supplies and personnel between the different islands in the lagoon, further decreasing Truk’s usefulness as an outpost. Additionally, the Japanese submarine I-174 was detected 20 miles south of the atoll on May 1. Aircraft from the light carrier Monterey teamed up with the destroyers MacDonough and Stephen Potter to sink the submarine. Whether the submarine was fleeing Truk or heading back to it after a patrol is not known. Its loss contributed to the decision to abandon Truk as a submarine base later in 1944. The Japanese losing 23 auxiliary vessels and one submarine, but this time the American bombers also targeted Truk’s shore facilities, giving special attention to the airfields on Moen and Eten, the Dublon naval headquarters and oil storage tanks, and Fefen’s docks warehouses and ammo dumps. 

On the morning of May 1st, the Japanese attempted several straggling strikes against the American carriers, but none managed to cause any damage. The largest attack against the US fleet contained 8 bombers, D4Y1 dive bombers, and Nakajima torpedo bombers which survived the first day’s attack. They found Task Group 58.2 and Task Group 58.3 at 8:15am, making a series of attacks against aircraft carriers in both groups. Met by heavy antiaircraft fire, they were shot down, most before they could drop their torpedoes or bombs. Only one came close enough to drop a bomb, which fell near the Lexington but caused no damage. Task Force 58 contuined to pound Truk throughout the day before finally retiring towards Majuro during the night. Based on interpretation of post-strike aerial photography, US intelligence estimated 40 percent of the buildings on Dublon, 80 percent of those on Eten, 75 percent of those at Moen, 20 percent of the buildings on Fefan, 15 percent of those on Param, and 80 percent at Ulalu were destroyed during the airstrikes of April 30 and May 1. Roughly 423 buildings and six hangars were destroyed, 44 others were damaged, 59 Japanese aircraft were shot down, a further 60 were destroyed on the ground, 36 were left damaged, and only 12 were still flyable. All of this cost Mitscher 35 aircraft, with another 33 damaged. Furthermore, half the airmen shot down were rescued by planes or by submarines. 

Thus the threat posed by Truk was yet again neutralized. After this, Admiral Montgomery’s carrier group Task Force 58 was given orders to hit Minami Torishima and Wake Island for mid May. Leaving Majuro on May 15th, Montgomery assemled his forces about 420 miles southeast of Marcus Island on the17th. On the 19th, light carrier San Jacinto hunted for enemy picket boats north and west of Minami Torishima. At 7:28am a Avenger of VT-9 and a Hellcat of VF-9 found and attacked an enemy trawler 475 miles north of Marcus Island. They dropped their bombs and strafed it with machine gun fire. No direct bomb hits were obtained but the target was well covered with machine gun fire. The Japanese trawler was left dead in the water and down by the stern, with a 1/4 miles oil slick and debris behind it. No personnel were visible on the boat. Meanwhile fleet carriers Wasp and Essex launched a predawn fighter sweep. A flight of 4 night fighters launched at 5am from the Wasp on an intruder mission over Marcus Island, but the Essex had to cancel its flight of night fighters. At 11:15, another air attack commenced. Aircraft dove through antiaircraft bursts with bomb blasts occuring all over the island. At one time the entire island was completely smothered by smoke and dust, but the Anti-aircraft fire contuined undiminished. After the planes left, explosions and fires continued on Marcus Island for some time. They managed to inflict a moderate amount of damage to buildings, shot down one G4M and sunktwo small boats; ut the defenders’ anti-aircraft fire was ferocious, successfully shooting down 4 American planes and damaging another 69. On May 21st, San Jacinto rejoined the group and also reported sinking one sampan. Montgomery’s carriers then launched a series of composite carrier strikes against Wake on May 23, further damaging many installations there and sinking a slugger and three barges, at the cost of only one plane. But that is all for carrier actions today as we now need to jump oer to the Burma front.

General Stilwell was contuining his offensive, with the 22nd division advancing south towards Inkangahtawng. General Lioa’s 65th Regiment plus the 3rd Battalion, 66th regiment were advancing down the Kamaing road when they ran into Japanese resistance north and west of Inkangahtawng. The 64th regiment was kept behind to guard the Japanese flank until May 3rd, while the rest of the 22nd Division awaited better weather to perform a coordinated attack against the town. But this was Burma, and Burma is going to Burma. There was an outbreak of monsoons that quickly prevented the effective use of tanks and made supply movement over the Ledo Road a nightmare. By June about one inch of rain fell daily. Though supply convoys could still move from Ledo to Shingbwiyang, the combat trail from Shingbwiyang south was very difficult. The road was graded to Tingkawk Sakan known also as mile post 164 and metaled almost to Mile Post 138. However, rainfall had blocked the road over the flats north of Tingkawk Sakan. At the end of June the situation was unchanged. The Japanese stand at Kamaing and the heavy rains immobilized the survey party and the road trace. As the flood waters rose in the valley, they effectively barred armor from moving south to Mogaung or Myitkyina.

Thus on May 3rd, the 64th avaned east across the Kamaing Road to try and cut the trail 500 yards south of the Hwelon Hka. The next day presented clearer skies, so the Chinese troops initiated their attack. Once Inkangahtawn fell, the 22nd Division would hold the area for several weeks while the first elements of Lt General Pen Yukun’s 50th Division arrived to the front to reinforce them. To the east, General Sun’s 114th regiment were engaging General Tanaka’s 55th regiment along the Lahkraw Hka. To break the stalemate along the Lahkraw Hka, the Chinese 114th Regiment had to clear away the Japanese observation posts in the hills. The 1st battalion, 114th on the regiment's east flank cut around the flank of the 55th Regiment on April 28th, while the 2nd battalion, 114th pushed the same Japanese unit back a few hundred yards. This bending process continued during the next two days, and the 114th Regiment was well south of the enveloped Japanese flank and within half a mile of Wala. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 114th then began moving straight south, leaving behind them pockets of determined Japanese who held up the 3rd battalion, 114th. The Chinese managed to envelope the Japanese, pushing them all the way to Wala. The 113th Regiment also came back into line at the end of April to put frontal pressure on the Japanese positions along the Lahkraw Hka and Tigrawm Hka while the 112th Regiment held its salient without attempting to move. Though the Japanese managed to stabilize their lines on the creeks east and west of Wala, a company of the 114th would cross the Nawngmi Hka on May 6th, thus starting the advance southwards again. Two days later, the 114th's advance became general, while on the east, at Stilwell's order, the 112th began to gather its companies to take Warong. 

On the 9th, the 114th Regiment finally took East Wala and Hlagyi and subsequently linked with the 112th Regiment pushing south towards Warong. The 114th's penetration, driving deeper into the Japanese lines, began to approach the 112th's outposts just north of Manpin. By the 12th the 114th and 112th Regiments were able to maintain communications, with very few Japanese between them. The 114th's penetration further weakened the position of the Japanese facing the 113th Regiment, which in turn began to roll up slowly from east to west as its 1st and 2nd Battalions pressed on to Wala and Maran. Between the 28-30th, Merrills End Run Force began the long grueling advance upon Ritpong. K Force moved out on 28 April; H Force, on 30 April. The so-called trail over the pass was more nearly a route used by the Kachins; in some places there was no path. Twenty pack animals slipped and fell off the narrow, muddy way. It was a grueling march for men who had already marched 500 miles and fought several battles, most of the time on K ration. Before End Rrun Force reached Ritpong, it had only one contact with the Japanese. A few of the enemy were flushed from cover by the 1/88th, but it was feared the Japanese held Ritpong in strength. On May 5th, the Japanese 2nd Battalion, 114th Infantry Regiment made contact with the K Force at Ritpong, 16 miles northwest of Nsopsup, and a four day battle ensued. The Battalion was forced to withdraw to Tingkrukawng, about eight miles to the southeast. There, after several skirmishes, contact with the enemy was lost for a period of five days. On the 5th, when the leading elements of K Force were a mile from Ritpong, Colonel Kinnison began an envelopment to hit the village from north and south. The 3rd Battalion managed to cut its way through the woods and place itself across the southern approaches to Ritpong on the 6th. Meanwhile, the 89th Regiment tried to take Ritpong from the north but failed. Next day an American reinforced company attacked Ritpong from the south but was stalled by a machine gun nest. Merrills Marauders would block the trail to the south, while the 80th Regiment contuined to hit their enemy positions. As the Chinese captured Ritpong on the 9th, M Force had had one skirmish with Japanese, routed them, and begun to cut its own paths. The march was fatiguing in the extreme; fully half the animals died of exhaustion or fell into the gorges. The men were farther harassed by fevers and dysentery, but they were only two days behind H and K Forces

To the south, General Lentaigne’s Chindits were contuining Operation Thursday. Yet under the overall direction of Stilwell, the Chindits were no longer a “special force”, now they were line infantry tasked with the traditional role of advancing and seizing well defended objectives, for which they did not have the training nor equipment to do effectively. Brigadiers Brodie and Ricketts men covered the general Chindit movement heading north. The plan called for closure of Aberdeen, Broadway and White City before the Monsoon broke. It was now the turn of 14 Brigade to play a major role. The new Block near Hopin would cut the road and rail link to the town of Mogaung. Meanwhile Major Masters’ 111th Brigade began to establish the Blackpool Stronghold on May 5. The site was occupied on the night of May 5/6, and Masters spent the entirety of the following day setting up defenses. What he should have done was immediately attack the Japanese-held village of Namkwin just ahead of his positions. Instead, he busied himself with preparing the stronghold. It was a critical mistake, and says much about the lack of enterprise from the brigade. Blackpool Block was finally established on May 7th, with the King’s Own’s 46 Column the first to arrive at the site. They came under fire as they dug in. For the next 5 nights they would be attacked by a railway unit based out of Pinbaw.

The railway unit was using 105mm guns firing from up the valley, while troops from Pinbaw attacked for the next five nights, held at bay by the rifles and machine guns of the King’s own Rifles, and the mortars, which Masters had gathered from the battalions and wielded as single battery of eight. Despite the strong defense, in one section of the northern line nicknamed the “Deep”  which was the tip of the “boar’s nose,” the Japanese were as close as 10 to 20 yards from the wire. Enemy snipers took shots at anything that moved while the King’s own snipers and Bren gunners occupied hidden places among the shattered trees, firing whenever they saw the target, after which a cry would resound amid the quiet that followed: “got him!” The Japanese brought up a single 75mm artillery piece from Pinbaw, with which they shelled the camp, blasting the airstrip with impunity and setting the gliders and Dakotas on fire, until May 13 when Masters came into possession of three airlifted 25-pdr guns, allowing him to hit back. Overhead Cochran’s Air Commandos mounted sortie after sortie against the Japanese positions but it was clear they could not maintain the ante. The dark clouds of the monsoon were gathering in strength.

After the successful establishment of Blackpool, Brigadier Calvert’s 77th brigade began advancing north towards Mogaung on the 8th. The night night, White City was abandoned as Brigadiers Broddie and Ricketts marched north to defend Blackpool. On May 11th, Lt General Takeda launched an attack against White City, but was surprised to find it abandoned. It then advanced to the then-abandoned Broadway and onwards to the Namkwin area, where the Blackpool stronghold was located. Having rushed through empty Broadway and White City, the 53rd Division thus tore into the zone in strength. Takeda Kaoru’s 53rd Division began pursuing Broddie and Ricketts forces. For the next few days Master’s troops continued to repel increasingly stronger and stronger Japanese attacks. Masters quote “Where in the name of God were the floater brigades? White City had been evacuated 13 days earlier and 14th Brigade was supposed to come straight up here. My brigade had marched 140 route miles in 14 days to establish this block. Surely those bloody nitwits could cover 120 route miles in 13 days? Where the hell were they? Where were the West Africans?… 20 bloody battalions, 40 flaming columns of Chindit bullshit sat on their arses and drank eat and wondered how we were getting on.” In mid-May, the 3rd Battalion, 114th Regiment and 2nd Battalion, 146th Regiment tried to break through towards Kamaing and Myitkyina to reinforce Tanaka’s spent defenders and would join in on the attacks against Blackpool. The 2nd Battalion, 2nd Field Artillery Regiment would also support their attacks. The Japanese continued their efforts to quickly crush Blackpool Block. A Company-strength attack on May 14 was backed by artillery support. It was repulsed, the Japanese losing 60 killed. They returned the following morning, when another 50 were killed. Air strikes were called in to further punish the enemy. Then the monsoon took hold and air support and supply became more difficult – Lalaghat and Hailakandi were fair weather fields. The Japanese also retaliated through a single heavy mortar, firing 60lb bombs, note in comparison, Chindit’s standard 81mm mortar fired a 10lb bombs.

Delayed by the outbreak of the monsoons on May 15, the brigades of Brodie and Ricketts had managed to secure the vital Kyunsalai Pass, but they failed to get close enough to provide significant support for the stronghold. At the same time, the flooding of the Namyin river would leave Calvert’s 77th Brigade unable to aid Masters in the defense of Blackpool; and Morris Force, which had successfully cut the Myitkyina road, was too far to the east to come into the stronghold’s assistance. The monsoons had also hampered the airdrop of supplies, so the Chindits would have to make their five days’ rations last up to 14 days. Meanwhile, proceeding from Ritpong, K Force feinted towards the Japanese supply point at Nsopzup in order to attract the Japanese attention while H Force advanced directly to Myitkyina. 

On the 12th, Colonel Henry Kinnison’s Marauders engaged the 2nd Battalion, 114th Regiment, near Tingkrukawng. The Japanese at Tingkrukawng were strong enough to pin both of K force’s combat teams to the ground and then to halt the Chinese when they were committed. Attempts to envelop the Japanese failed. Since H Force was proceeding unmolested, Merrill told Kinnison to withdraw. K Force then picked up H's trail and followed it to Myitkyina. While K Force was fighting at Tingkrukawng, H Force kept on to a river just south of the village of Namkwi on the Mogaung-Myitkyina railroad and about two miles from the principal Myitkyina airstrip that lay almost due west of Myitkyina itself. Despite the several brushes with the Japanese, Kachin informants were sure that the Myitkyina garrison was not on the alert. To ensure surprise, before Colonel Hunter and his force bivouacked for the night of the 16th they rounded up the local Burmans and kept them under careful watch.

Kinnison would reach Hkumchet by the 17th, where the Colonel had to be evacuated because he had contracted a deadly mite typhus, dying shortly after with shocking speed. In all, 149 men contracted this little-known scourge. While M Force was about to reach Arang, H Force began an attack of Pamati and the Myitkyina airstrip on the 17th. The 150th Regiment was ordered to take the airstrip, while GALAHAD personnel took the Irrawaddy ferry terminal at Pamati. The other airstrip, north of the town, was left alone for the present. The attack went like a service school demonstration, for though the Japanese knew Myitkyina was in danger, the actual assault was a complete surprise. Colonel Maruyama, the Japanese commander, had two understrength battalions of the 114th Regiment in the town of Myitkyina and in its little suburb of Sitapur. There were 100 more men of the 15th Airfield Battalion on the north and south airstrips, 318 men from labor and service units on various details in Myitkyina, and 320 patients in a military hospital. Perhaps 700 able-bodied Japanese were present when the battle began. They took the Japanese by complete surprise and subsequently securing both positions. 

As soon as Hunter considered his hold on the major airstrip secure, he sent the prearranged code signal, “Merchant of Venice”, which meant the process of supply and reinforcement could begin. Consequently, some reinforcements began to be flown into the airstrip, though to the disappointment of General Merrill most of these were engineers and anti-aircraft instead of the needed infantry.  Back at his HQ, Stilwell was exultant. The brilliant seizure of the Myitkyina airstrip was the height of his career and the grand climax of the North Burma Campaign, as his forces had driven 500 miles into Burma and won engagements against seven Japanese regiments in the last six months. Stilwell’s triumph also came right on time, as American planners in Washington were beginning to adopt the British position suggesting an end to offensive action in north Burma. Stilwell's bold stroke at Myitkyina would instead see the Americans issue a directive encouraging Admiral Mountbatten’s command to exploit the opening of the Ledo Road and to secure enough of north Burma to protect the Allied hold on China’s lifeline.  

After the capture of the airstrip, Hunter immediately sent two battalions of the 150th Regiment to take Myitkyina. One battalion of the Chinese 89th Regiment, which had arrived from Ledo, would defend the air strip while two battalions of the 150th Regiment attacked Myitkyina. The other battalion of the 150th Regiment would be in reserve at the strip. They would encounter the 114th Regiment HQ and its 1st Battalion. As early as 1700 on 17 May Colonel Maruyama had also brought the 3rd Company, 148th Regiment, 56th Division, in across the Irrawaddy to reinforce Myitkyina. Following the wrong road, however, they went to Sitapur instead, where they were ambushed by the Japanese. On encountering Japanese rifle fire, they lost direction completely and engaged in fighting among themselves. Furthermore, some Marauders would continue toward Zigyun to secure the ferry crossing south of the city. On May 18, as more Chinese battalions were flown to reinforce the Chindits, the 150th again moved against Myitkyina; but repeating the mishap of the day before, the Chinese became confused, fought among themselves, and ultimately drove themselves right back out of the town. Nonetheless, the Siege of Myitkyina had just begun.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

The invasion of Hollandia and Aitape was such quick successes it allowed the Americans to bombard further islands. The Take-Ichi convoy improved the transportation of troops, but it also came at a horrifying cost. The loss of such shipping was yet again the paint on the wall for the Empire of Japan. Despite this the IJN was fully committed to forcing a decisive naval victory. 

- 127 - Pacific War - Invasion of Western New Guinea, April 23-30, 1944

Last time we spoke about the beginning of Operation Ichi-Go, the war in the Burma front and the war in New Guinea. Hundreds of thousands of IJA troops stormed countless areas in China. Chiang Kai-Shek was caught somewhat with his pants down, his best men were in Burma, there was little his defenders could do against such raw power. Xuchang fell and soon the Japanese were marching upon Luoyang. Over in Burma the British, Indian, American and Chinese alliance was continuing to both attack and defend. In the north Stilwell led the offensive, while Slim led the defensive in the south. The Chindits fought like lions to defend White City, but ultimately would give up strongholds to seek out new ones. Over in New Guinea the Japanese continued their frantic retreat under heavy pressure from the Australians. As bad as the situation was, the Japanese were in for another nasty surprise in Green Hell.

This episode is the invasion of Western New Guinea

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Last week we saw the effective conclusion of the Eastern New Guinea Campaign. It was a colossal campaign beginning with the Australian defense along the Kokoda Track, then the blood battle of Buna-Gona, the drive upon Lae-Salamaua, the march north upon the Huon Peninsula and Finisterres, and after taking Madang it was finally over. Yet while the book was closing upon Eastern New Guinea, the book on Western New Guinea was just about to be opened. 

The pace of the offensive against the Japanese in New Guinea accelerated greatly in the first half of 1944. This was primarily because General MacArthur feared unless he made quick progress he would lose the reins over where the allies would drive upon the Japanese home islands. MacArthur of course sought to advance upon the Philippines, while the Joint Chiefs favored the Navy’s central thrust more so. Despite MacArthur’s continuous war against his colleagues and superiors and his continuous complaining he lacked support, he had been provided the means to carry out numerous amphibious assaults that could lead to his ultimate goal. MacArthur’s operations against New Britain, Saidor, Los Negros and Manus clearly indicated allied superiority over the Japanese in terms of men, ships and airpower. By April of 1944, MacArthur had nearly 750,000 men under his command. His major components were 6 US infantry divisions, one cavalry division, 3 separate regiment combat teams and 3 special brigades. The Australians were gradually being relegated into a secondary role, but could still provide 5 additional divisions and enough separate brigades to form another 2 divisions. General Kenney’s air force had grown so large, they could now mount 200 aircraft raids against a variety of targets with little fear of Japanese retaliation. What MacArthur needed was more and more forward airfields so he could hurl fighters and bombers deeper into the Japanese inner perimeter. In a lot of respects, the Japanese position in New Guinea was all but hopeless. Although they still had more than 350,000 troops in the Southwest Pacific area, many were isolated with little chance of receiving reinforcements or supplies. There was also an enormous amount of confusion amongst the various commands, made difficult by enormous distance and the lack of effective naval power. Overall command of Japanese forces as far as Wewak was technically under Lt General Fusataro Tshima, whose HQ was at Manokwari on the Vogelkop Peninsula. It was Tshima who ordered General Adachi to withdraw his 18th Army over to the Hollandia area. Fortunately for MacArthur, Adachi procrastinated heavily, believing a landing would be made at Hansa Bay. All of the heavy bombing by the 5th air force against the coast near Wewak supported his beliefs.

Not too long ago we spoke about Operations Reckless and Persecution, the invasion of Hollandia and Aitape. Admiral Barbey had already departed the staging points and rendezvous northwest of Manus Island by April 20th. The large convoys sailed west from the Admiralty Islands until dusk, whence they turned southwest towards Hollandia. Admiral Mitscher’s Task Force 58 was providing escort while also launching strikes against Wakde, Sarmi and Sentani airfields on April 21st. Over the next three days the carrier aircraft neutralized the remaining airpower in the Wakde-Sarmi area. Early on the 22nd, the two task forces separated, with the Persecution Task Force heading southeast towards Aitape and the rest, designated Reckless Task Force, proceeded to a point 20 miles offshore between Humboldt and Tanahmerah Bay. Now the allied troops were ready to hit the beaches, but awaiting them was a large concentration of Japanese…however it was mostly a concentration of Japanese personnel rather than combat troops.

While initial attention was focussed on the Geelvink Bay area, the 2nd Area Army command was also concerned over the weak condition of the defenses of Hollandia, which lay just east of the 140th meridian in the 8th Area Army zone of responsibility. An order to dispatch an element of the 36th Division to that sector was issued but was quickly revoked on the ground that it would weaken the defenses of Geelvink Bay without appreciably strengthening Hollandia. A large section of the New Guinea coast between Wewak and Sarmi thus remained practically undefended. General Anami promptly dispatched a staff mission to 8th Area Army headquarters at Rabaul to press for reinforcement of the Hollandia area, and a similar recommendation was communicated to Imperial General Headquarters during December. Two battalions of the 6th South Seas Detachment, temporarily stationed on Palau, were dispatched by the High Command. This force arrived in Hollandia on March 4, but numbered only 240 men, since approximately 1000 men, including the detachment commander, had been lost en route to submarine attacks. No other action was taken, however, since both 8th Area Army and 18th Army, after the loss of Finschhafen, were more immediately concerned with checking further enemy penetration of the Dampier Strait region.

Thus roughly 10,000 IJA and 1000 IJN personnel were at Hollandia, most support units led by Major-General Kitazono Toyozo and aviation units from General Inada’s 6th air division. When Tsihima ordered Adachi over to the Hollandia area and he procrastinated, this prompted the leader of the 2nd Area Army, General Korechika Anami over at Davao to become concerned. Anami sent his chief of staff over to Wewak to convince Adachi to pull out, but when Adachi finally began withdrawing, he only had two regiment on the trail by the time of the American landings against Hollandia and Aitape. Major General Toyozo Kitazono only arrived in the area 10 days before the invasion and for an unexplained reason never officially took command. This is why Tshima’s appointed air officers, Inada ended up being thrown the command. Inada only really had 500 effective combat troops, mostly from the 6th South Seas Detachment. These units belonged to General Anami Korechika’s 2nd Area Army, which had been transferred recently from Manchuria to oversee the defense of the eastern Dutch East Indies and western New Guinea, and for the projected and later canceled invasion of northern Australia. Random note, I recently made a Youtube short mocking that canceled australian invasion on my youtube channel, it was a wild idea. Thus Anami’s command was now formally around the 2nd, 18th and 19th armies.

Lt General Kitano Kenzo’s 19th Army had been garrisoning Timor, the Lesser Sunda Islands, Sumbawa, the Banda Sea Islands and some key points in Northwestern New Guinea with their HQ located at Ambon. Lt General Tshima Fusutaro’s 2nd Army as I had mentioned was assigned overall defense of Western New Guinea, with Lt General Tagami Hachiro’s 36th Division landing at Sarmi and Biak in early March and Lt General Ikeda Shunkichi’s 35th Division preparing to come to Manokwari. The 14th Division originally part of the 2nd Army was diverted to defender Palau. Furthermore, to further support  the 2nd Area Army was Vice-Admiral Endo Yoshikazu’s 9th Fleet, three southern expeditionary fleets, and the 7th Air Division of Lt General Sudo Einosuke. At Hollandia, the headquarters of Admiral Endo and Generals Kitazono and Inada had arrived at the same time by mid April. Though General Adachi had placed Kitazono in formal command of all units there, the transport commander had no time, as to develop a comprehensive defense plan for Hollandia, thus as I previously mentioned, command really fell onto Inada and Endo. The Japanese would be woefully unprepared for what was to come. 

Over at Aitape, meanwhile, there were only a handful of replacements from the 20th Division, along with some naval and support personnel, so the situation looked even wrose for the 1000-man garrison. Preceding the amphibious assaults, Admiral Crutchley’s surface fleet was going shell the Tanahmerah Bay area while Admiral Mitscher’s carrier planes bombed the waters off the Tanahmerah beaches to explode possible mines, also finishing off the Hollandia airstrips and the remaining aircraft there. 

Crutchley’s warships picked up their landmarks through the mist as best they could, and at 6sm the roar of 8-inch guns from the heavy cruisers HMAS Australia and HMAS Shropshire shattered the silence of the steaming tropical morning. To this din was added the sharper crack of 5-inch and 4.7-inch weapons from American and Australian destroyers. The fire continued until 6:45, by which time 600 rounds of 8-inch and 1,500 rounds of 5-inch and 4.7-inch ammunition had been expended. As for the aerial strikes, despite the unfavorable weather, Task Force 58 managed to maintain planes on air alert over the Hollandia area since dawn. No enemy aircraft flew up from the Hollandia fields, and the few apparently operational planes sighted on those strips were strafed. In general there were no indications that Japanese defenses or defenders existed in the Tanahmerah Bay area. Task Force 58's scheduled bombing and strafing missions for that region were therefore canceled.

Meeting little opposition, LCVP’s carrying the first wave of the 19th and 21st Regiment approached Red Beach 2. As the leading wave of LCVP's, approached RED Beach 2, which was obscured by smoke from the naval bombardment, a rocket barrage was laid on the landing area by one Seventh Fleet LCI and two landing craft,, of the 542nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment. Machine guns mounted aboard the leading LCVP's kept up a steady fire against the beach. There was no answer from the Japanese, and the only opposition to the landing was scattered small arms and light automatic weapons fire from points far on the flanks of the beach and from a small island in Tanahmerah Bay. This fire was so quickly silenced by supporting destroyers that the assault waves suffered no casualties before reaching shore.

Thus tactical surprise was achieved in Tanahmerah Bay, as the Japanese had only a few lookouts in the sector. General Irving’s 24th Division successfully landed and the 3rd Battalion, 19th Infantry, quickly secured the northern portion of the beachhead and immediately dispatched patrols east and north to probe suspected enemy positions. The 1st Battalion, following the 3rd ashore, went into an assembly area to act as local reserve and to make ready to aid in unloading supplies at the water's edge if that proved necessary. The 2nd Battalion, 21st Infantry, took the southern half of Red Beach 2 with similar ease. The 3rd Battalion of that regiment quickly followed the 2nd ashore and sent Company I south to look for the trail expected to connect with Red Beach 1 at Dépapré.

Simultaneously, LVT’s carrying Lt Colonel Thomas Cliffords 1st battalion, 21st Regiment crossed coral barrier reefs on their way to Red Beach 1. Cliffords men landed completely unopposed and would spend an hour trying to locate the road leading to Lake Sentani and her airfields. Clifford left A Company at the beach while the rest trekked it over the  Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail at 8:37am, still encountering no enemy opposition whatsoever.Moving through fire lanes down which no bullets flew and past pillboxes in early stages of construction, the battalion column reached the village of Mariboe at 1047 hours. Only a few scattered enemy rifle shots had been encountered during this march and the village was secured without opposition. Over three miles by trail inland from Dépapré, Mariboe was the 24th Division's first inland objective. It was evident from scattered Japanese equipment in and around Mariboe that the Japanese had recently evacuated the village not long before the 1st Battalion's arrival. Colonel Clifford  halted his men. Since radio communication with the division command post on Red Beach 2 had been lost, he sent messengers back over the tortuous trail to report progress to General Irving. At the same time patrols were sent toward Kantomé, nearly two miles southeast of Mariboe. They reported few signs of enemy activity along the trail beyond Mariboe. Colonel Clifford apparently did not wait to re-establish contact with higher headquarters but, acting on his patrols' reports, ordered the battalion to push on. Encountering little opposition along the main trail, the unit reached Kantomé about noon.

When Irving arrived to Red Beach 2 at 9;30am, he found a major logistical problem had formed at his main beachhead. Behind the narrow beach, a wide, impassable swamp was discover, it covered most of the area that the men had planned to use for the bivouac and supply dump area. Thus supplies soon began to pile up on the beach. This was an especially serious circumstance, for the landing plans had called for moving almost all troops and supplies overland from Red Beach 2 to the road inland. Construction of a road between the two beaches was soon found impracticable and when, after a day and a half of hard work, engineers had succeeded in driving a few yards of road into the hills south toward Red Beach 1, the project was discontinued. The small completed stretch did serve some useful purpose. On D-Day two batteries of 105-mm. howitzers were dragged along the road as far as possible to a cramped position on a little ridge immediately south of Red Beach 2. From this site the howitzers could deliver some fire support for troops advancing inland from Red Beach 1, but the direction of this fire was limited by a number of hills nearby. The same stretch of road also provided dispersal space for a few of the many vehicles which had been unloaded at Red Beach 2 on D-Day. Additionally, a limited dispersal area, rendered inaccessible by a small stream and by an arm of the swamp, was discovered at the northern edge of the beach, and ultimately the 542nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment constructed a road into this space. Artillery, ashore within an hour after the initial landing, was emplaced there to deliver fire on inland targets. But the fill used to build this road stopped the flow of the little stream which had drained the swamp into Tanahmerah Bay. To prevent a rise in the swamp's water level, a drainage canal was cut directly through the center of the beach. This procedure speeded the outward flow of swamp water, lowered the water level a little, and created a small additional dry area behind the beach, but it did not provide sufficient dry land for dispersal of all the troops and supplies scheduled to land on Red Beach 2. Eventually Irvings men found some dry flat dispersal areas behind the beach, allowing the supply shuttles to continue their work uncongested.

Colonel Cliffords battalion would make the main thrust for the division while the remainder of Colonel Charles Lyman’s 21st Regiment moved over to Red Beach 1. Colonel Clifford possessed little or no knowledge of the situation to the rear other than the difficulties presented by terrain. Ahead, 10,000 Japanese were thought to be concentrated around the airfields. Jangkena was on flat, swampy ground and was not an easily defensible position. Should the 1st Battalion push on to Dazai, also on flat ground, Japanese troops might outflank the unit, cut its line of communications to Dépapré, and destroy it at leisure. If the Japanese bypassed the battalion they could cut off the advance of the rest of the 21st Infantry at any one of the many defiles over the first two or three miles of the trail inland from Dépapré. Colonel Clifford therefore decided to pull his men back to Kantomé for the night, leaving only outposts along the trail east of that village. Kantomé was located near the foot of the Takari Hills, which he thought would present a serious obstacle to any Japanese flanking maneuvers. It was a fortunate decision, as around midnight elements of the 22nd Airfield Battalion had advanced overland around his 1st battalions outposts, striking at their left flank.

Meanwhile, General Heavey’s landing craft carrying the leading waves of the 162nd and 186th Regiments, supported by rocket fire and by Rear-Admiral Russell Berkey’s cruisers, likewise met no Japanese resistance as they landed General Fuller’s troops on the White Beaches. Company A of Colonel Harold Haney’s 162nd Regiment rapidly secured Cape Pie while Company I of Colonel Oliver Newman’s 186th Regiment secured Cape Tjeweri. With Jautefa Bay in hand, Newman’s 3rd Battalion was then landed on White Beach 4 in preparation for an advance towards Leimok Hill and Pim. The first objective, Leimok Hill, lay 1,800 yards northwest of Pim. Part of the battalion secured the hill by 1000, and other elements advanced southward toward Pim. That village and its usable jetty were secured, against light opposition, by 1645, while Suikerbrood Hill, on Jautefa Bay south of Pim, was cleared by 1800. The danger that enemy troops atop dominating heights near Pim might make White Beach 4 untenable was over. The 3rd Battalion then established a night perimeter at Pim, extending its defenses along a trail leading west from that village to the point at which the Pim-Hollandia track joined the main road inland to Lake Sentani, thus securing the roadhead from which movements to inland objectives had to begin.

Over at White Beach 1, Haney’s 3rd Battalion advanced quickly to take Pancake Hill at around 8am, only meeting sporadic rifle fire. After taking the hill, they began pushing up the shores of Humboldt Bay, encountering no resistance as they advanced upon Jarremoh Hill. It seemed clear to the Americans, the Japanese had been taken by complete surprise, not expecting an amphibious assault against Hollandia so quickly, so they had pulled back to the Sentani Lake Airfield sector. Now further south, Haney’s 2nd Battalion were advancing to a track that connected Hollandia with Pim, trying to make contact with the 3rd Battalion over at Jarremoh Hill. Meanwhile Newman’s 1st Batallion was advancing upon Leimok Hill. Though the men wanted to keep pushing towards Hollandia during the late afternoon, Fuller decided to dig in for the night while warships and artillery softened up the city.

When General Anami over at his HQ in Manado heard of the invasion he immediately ordered the 23rd Air Flotilla of Rear-Admiral Ito Yoshiaki to toss whatever he could against the allied surface ships and force along the beaches. He also ordered the 18th army to break through Aitape to rush over and help the Hollandia garrison and for General Tshima to dispatch a regiment force as well to Hollandia. Thus General Tagami got his 224th regiment together for the advance to Hollandia, expecting to get there for early May, while General Nakai’s 20th Division continued to close in on Aitape. Anami also wanted to send the main part of the 36th Division to perform a counterattack in Hollandia’s direction as he thought it vitally important to delay the enemy as much as possible so a better defense of Western New Guinea could be organized. Yet General Terauchi Hisaichi of the Southern Army declined his request to do so on the basis a counteroffensive would simply denude the already weakened defenses of Western New Guinea.

Meanwhile General Doe’s Persecution Task Force was carrying out their landing against Aitape. The landings would be preceded by naval gunfire from Captain Albert Noble’s Destroyer force, aerial bombardment from escort carriers of Rear Admiral Ralph Davisons Task Force 78 and from General Kenney’s air force. Meeting zero resistance and under the cover of a rocket barrage, the LCPR’s landed the men of Colonel Francis Mason's 163rd Regiment by 6:45. Despite the lack of resistance, an immense amount of smoke and poor visibility prevented the troops from landing at Beach Blue, and instead they came ashore at Wapil. Just like at Hollandia, they had achieved tactical surprise at Aitape as the Japanese fled in a panic under naval gunfire. Mason’s got his 2nd Battalion to swing west and quickly seize the Waitanan Creek while the 1st battalion was being landed. Then the 2nd Battalion formed a defensive position at the Pro Mission while the 3rd Battalion sent patrols east to establish an outpost near the mouth of the Nigia River. Back over at the beaches, General Doe landed some Australian engineers who began repairing the Tadji Fighter airstrip. The No. 62 Works Wing, Royal Australian Air Force, had come ashore at Blue Beach during the morning and had been able to start work on Tadji Fighter Strip at 1:00pm. Repairs continued throughout the night under floodlights, the lack of Japanese opposition and the urgency of the task prompting General Doe to push the work. Although it had been hoped that the strip would be ready for use on D+1, terrain conditions were such that necessary repairs were not completed on schedule. Thus it was 9:00 on April 24th before the Australian engineers, who had worked without break for almost forty-eight hours, could announce that the airstrip was ready. At 4:30pm, 25 P-40s of No. 78 Wing, RAAF, landed on the field, and the balance of the wing arrived the next day. The ground on which the fighter strip was located was so poorly drained that it was not until April 28th, after steel matting had been placed on the field, that it could be used continuously. The works wing then moved to Tadji Bomber Strip to aid the 872nd and 875th Engineer Aviation Battalions. The latter two units passed to the operational control of Wing Commander William A. C. Dale of the RAAF, who, besides commanding the works wing, was Persecution Task Force Engineer. Extensive repairs were necessary at the bomber strip and that field was not ready for use by fighter and transport planes until May 27th and for bombers until early July.

While the engineers worked, Colonel Merle Howe’s 127th Regiment also landed, while Mason’s man expanded the perimeter further west, securing the incomplete Tadji west airstrip and the mouth of the Raihu River by the end of the day. Simultaneously, Colonel Cliffords men continued their advance from Kantomé to Sabron, whereupon, Fuller finally decided to launch his assault on Hollandia, with Colonel Haney’s 2nd and 3rd Battalions rapidly moving down the ridge to seize the abandoned town by 11:15am. To the south, Colonel Newman had his 1st Battalion pursue the fleeing enemy, and in the process rapidly secured Brinkman's Plantation and then repelled a very uncoordinated Japanese counterattackby the 6th South Seas Detachment and General Kitazono’s 42nd independent motor car battalion. At 8:00am on the23rd the 1st Battalion left its night positions on Leimok Hill and started out over the main track, passing through the 3rd Battalion. The movement was supported by the 205th and 218th Field Artillery Battalions, set up near Cape Pie, and by aircraft from the carriers of Task Force 58. By 9am the 1st Battalion had reached Brinkman's Plantation, about 2,200 yards by trail southwest of Pim. So far, there had been no opposition. Now Companies A and C parted from the main body to patrol northwest up the Borgonjie River. Proceeding to a fork about 2,000 yards upstream, the two companies repulsed a series of unco-ordinated attacks which were launched against the right flank of the 186th Infantry during the afternoon by a Japanese force estimated at 150. The two companies remained at the stream-branching during the night of 23-24 of April, and on the latter day they moved overland southwest to rejoin the main force on the Pim-Lake Sentani trail.

Meanwhile General Inada’s aviation personnel already at the Sentani airfield alongside those currently retreating there were cut off from their ration and ammunition supplies which happened to be stored near the coast. Facing the hopeless situation of having to conduct a proper defense of the airfields with less than a week’s worth of rations, little small arms and machine gun ammunition, no artillery at all and with two different enemy forces converging upon them, General Inada seized full command and led the weak garrison to retreat towards Genjem. Their rear guard was proved by General Kitazono’s troops. During that same afternoon, two platoons of Cliffords Company B, leading the advance from Sabron, safely crossed a small stream but soon found themselves in the middle of a well-concealed Japanese ambush on the east bank. Rifle and heavy machine gun fire made the stream's steep banks untenable, and the forward platoons hurriedly withdrew to the west, leaving four dead men behind. In response to this, Irvings artillery and Admiral Mitscher’s carrier aircraft began to bomb and strafe the area, but Cliffords B Company was nonetheless unable to break through.

An artillery duel emerged during the night keeping the men of the 1st Battalion wide awake. They were also being supplies with great difficulty via hand-carry over the Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail. Fortunately the 24th Division's plans for the Hollandia operation had taken into consideration many of the potential logistic problems that might be encountered in the Tanahmerah Bay area. The division G-4 Section had made a detailed study which had shown that a full infantry regiment could be supplied by hand-carry from Red Beach 2 over the Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail inland as far as Jangkena. When no road connecting Red Beach 2 with Red Beach 1 had been found, the division moved the main supply point to Dépapré, from which the advance inland would be supported. With this change in plans, the G-4 Section undertook new computations and calculated that the hand-carry distance could be extended to Dazai. This conclusion was based on the assumption that adverse weather conditions would not make the Dépapré-Lake Sentani road nearly impassable. On 23 April heavy rains started to turn the road into a quagmire through which struggling men could scarcely carry their own equipment and food, to say nothing of extra supplies for the leading battalion. By evening on that day logistic support of the 21st Regiment had therefore become a major problem. There was no question but that the regiment would have to be supported by hand-carry, for it was estimated that at least two weeks' hard work by engineers would be required before the road from Dépapré as far as Mariboe could be made passable even for jeeps. But the 1st Battalion had already advanced east of Dazai, beyond which point, according to the G-4 estimates, support by hand-carry would be next to impossible.

Because of the logistical issues, General Eichelberger decided to make the Humboldt Bay area the principal task force landing site, allowing the 41st division to drive further inland. On the 24th, Newman’s 3rd Battalion passed through the 1st and seized the Koejaboe area, only stopping there until the 2nd battalion came over to reinforce the continued advance. During this action however, most of the Japanese continued their retreat towards Genjem unmolested. Over in the west, Irving ordered Clifford to consolidate his forward positions around Sabron and Dazai as he now realized the continued rapid advance inland was no long possible as a result of their hand-carry logistics scheme and the weather was taking quite a turn for the worse hampering air drops.

Back over at Aitape, Mason’s troops crossed the Raihu and by midday the 2nd Battalion secured the town. However General Doe was dissatisfied with the pace of the westward advance, and he therefore suggested to Alamo Force that the 163rd's commander, Mason be relieved. This step was approved by General Krueger, although the regimental commander remained in control of his unit until 9 May, only two days before the 163rd Infantry began loading for another operation. For the next few days, the 163rd patrolled further inland and would fall into a heavy engagement at Kamti on the 29th. At the Kapoam villages, about twelve miles up the Raihu, elements of the 3rd Battalion encountered the only signs of organized Japanese resistance found in the Aitape area to 4 May. At one of these villages, Kamti, some outpost troops of the 3rd Battalion were surrounded by an estimated 200 Japanese who made a number of harassing attacks on 28 and 29th. These skirmishes cost the battalion 3 men killed and 2 wounded, while it was estimated that the Japanese lost about 90 killed. On the 25th, Colonel Lymann’s two forward battalion resumed their march, heading through some dense jungle being met by sporadic enemy small arm fire. They eventually dug in around the vicinity of Julianadorp. Meanwhile Colonel Newman had his 3rd battalion advancing west along the main road to Nefaar while some LVT’s transported his 1st battalion over Lake Sentani to a point on the western shore of Nefaar. Neither force faced much opposition and together would perform some patrolling of the Cyclops Drome during the afternoon.

Back over at Aitape, Colonel Howe’s 127th Regiment finished their occupation of Tumleo, Seleo and the Ali Islands and now were beginning to send patrols east towards Afua. On the 26th, Colonel Newman had his 1st Battalion seize the Cyclops Drome while his 2nd Battalion took some LVTS to capture the Sentani Drome. Shortly after midday both Battalions rapidly secured the airdromes under light enemy resistance. Despite a serious supply situation, Lyman’s 1st and 3rd Battalion resumed the advance, only encountering one enemy bunker at Ebeli Plantation. It had been impossible to drop supplies from the air on April 25 and even hand-carrying had been stopped late in the afternoon by heavy rains which had flooded many small streams. Parts of the Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail were now knee deep in water. The two forward battalions were low on ammunition, and they would have to go on half-rations if the supply situation were not quickly improved. But General Irving was again optimistic about the weather, believing that air supply would be successful on the 26th. Furthermore, he had received information which indicated that the Japanese were evacuating the airfield area. For these reasons he considered that a continuation of the advance would not be unduly hazardous. In ordering the advance, the division commander was knowingly pushing his men far beyond the limit at which they could be supplied by hand-carry. If the airdrop should again fail or if track conditions should not improve, one of the two forward battalions would probably have to be echeloned back along the trail to augment the carrying parties, and the advance would probably have to be halted. Should enemy opposition prove stubborn, the forward battalions might have to withdraw, perhaps as far as Dazai, to replenish their meager supplies of rations and ammunition. General Irving was taking a calculated risk which assumed the success of the airdrop and an absence of determined Japanese opposition. By the afternoon of the 26th, the Hollandia Drome was secured after a successful airdrop at Dazai. After this the objectives of Reckless had been achieved.

Mop up operation would continue up until June 6th, as Fuller’s 41st Division cleared out Cape Soedja and the Cyclops Mountain. They would end up flushing out Japanese on Hill 1000 and Irving’s 24th Division sent out patrols west towards Marneda, Demta Bay and Gemjem. By 6 June the they had all killed 405 Japanese and had taken 64 prisoners in the Genjem-Demta region. Many more Japanese were found dead of starvation or disease along the trails in the same area. During the same time period, Eichelberger’s task force would develop Hollandia into a major base from which future operations would be support. In the end casualties for Operation Reckless amounted to 124 deaths, 1057 wounded and 28 missing for the Americans. The Japanese suffered 3300 deaths, 661 captured. On April 30th, 7220 Japanese from Hollandia’s garrison would assemble at Genjem where General Inada began a gradual withdrawal in 11 echelons towards Sarmi. By May 7th, all echelons departed Genjem for a very long march through some of the worst terrain in New Guinea. Two-thirds of the garrison reached the Tor River by June. It’s estimated 93% of their strength would succumb to the deadly jungles, lack of provisions and rampant cases of malaria. Meanwhile to secure the Tadji airstrips against Japanese attacks from the direction of Wewak, Colonel Howe sent Company C by boat to Nyaparake on April 28th where they set up outposts further inland around Charov and Jalup. By May 4th, further patrolling by the 127th regiment had discovered no trace of organized enemy units, thus Operation Persecution was successfully completed. During the operation 525 Japanese were killed, 25 were captured while the Americans suffered 19 deaths and 40 wounded. That is all for the New Guinea front as we are now traveling over to New Britain.

After the Battle of Talasea and the area was secured, Colonel Smith reached the conclusion that the enemy was withdrawing as rapidly as possible to Cape Hoskins. He decided to send patrols to Numundo Plantation. A reconnaissance patrol on March 10th found enemy positions at Bola and Santa Monica Plantation evacuated, but came upon entrenched enemy at Garilli. On 11th Captain Andrew Haldane's Company K left Bitokara with orders to proceed to Numundo on a three-day patrol, a time estimate that was to prove too optimistic. Company K reached Garilli to find it empty of the enemy, but just north of Patanga encountered Japanese small-arms, automatic-weapons and mortar fire. For four days the Marine patrol made slow progress, fighting an enemy who made a stand in the heavy vegetation approximately every 200 yards and then withdrew effectively before the advance guard flankers could close in. On the evening of the 16th the company entered Kilu where the Japanese made their final stand. While the two forces battled, a Marine landing craft appeared offshore and as it approached the beach the enemy diverted what apparently was a 75mm field gun from the ground action to the "naval force". In the boat was Lieutenant Colonel Deakin who had obtained permission from Colonel Smith to transport a section of 81mm mortars to Captain Haldane's assistance. Although the Japanese bracketed the craft, they failed to hit it and the weapons were landed without casualties. Shortly after the heavy mortars began lobbing shells toward the enemy, the Japanese broke contact and the Marines reached Numundo 48 hours later without finding the Terunuma Detachment again. The 1st Battalion also set up an ambush at Garu which was productive of enemy dead and prisoners for awhile. Company I replaced Company K at Numundo and in turn was replaced on 25 March by the 2nd Battalion. Inasmuch as the enemy continued to straggle eastward singly and in small groups with little or no communications, patrols were kept busy returning over and over again to the same villages and plantations in hopes of catching unwary Japanese. Such hopes frequently paid off. On the 30th the 2nd Battalion moved southeast from Numundo to San Remo Plantation, described by one Marine as "a very pleasant place." From that point patrols probed westward to the Kulu River and eastward into the Cape Hoskins area as far as Buluma. Overall the patrols saw 3 men killed with 8 wounded while accounting for 151 Japanese killed and 68 taken prisoner.

Meanwhile, Matsuda, Komori and Terunuma;s Detachments all were performing withdrawals. Komori dispatched his force to the rendezvous point in successive echelons. He himself left Didmop with the rear guard, back on February 28th, reaching Augitni via Vakan on March 1st. The following morning he started his hospital patients along the evacuation route and sent a detail of 250 men to Bulawatni to help transport provisions. Yet the Marines at Iboki were becoming increasingly troublesome, though quite unaware that they faced anything more than starving stragglers. When Company A, 1st Marines entered Talawaga on the 5th, Colonel Sato felt the hot breath of pursuit on his neck and moved to the trail fork where he assumed command of the combined force. The next morning the Komori Group resumed its withdrawal in a northwesterly direction along the right prong of the trail fork, while Sato prepared to follow with his command on the 7th. At this point the ways of these two officers parted, and thenceforth each pursued his individual course toward the destiny that awaited him. On the 6th the Komori Group, with Major Tobuse's 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry in the lead, covered 16 km’s on the trail running northeast from the fork toward the coast to reach what the Japanese called the "North Road." After the first day on the trail, Komori's progress becomes difficult to follow, owing to his use of place names occurring in no other reports or maps. It was slow and difficult at best, because of rain and mud, and the necessity for wide detours to find fords through deep streams and safe passages through or around extensive swamps. His immediate force numbered about 200, and on March 8th he recorded the Tobuse Battalion a half-day's march ahead. He sighted occasional enemy reconnaissance planes, and on the 12th U.S. landing craft fired upon his men as they attempted to cross the Kuhu River, obliging them to take to the jungle and swamps. The broad Via River stopped his force on the 14th. When improvised rafts refused to float, the major and 15 others swam across. The rest, through weakness or timidity, declined to follow this excellent example, and it took two days and a wide detour inland to get the whole group to the right bank. Then, on the 17th, provisions ran out. Thus the weakening men came by painful stages to Kometto (Eleanora Bay) and the welcome coconuts of Linga Linga Plantation on the 21st. But the wide Kapuluk River posed a formidable obstacle to further progress. They tried first to swim the Kapuluk near its mouth, but 18 men of the 2nd Company were swept away and 12 of them drowned, only the captain reaching the far bank safely. A patrol far upstream failed to find any fording point, so the troops spent the rest of the day building rafts. These managed to stay afloat, but broke apart so frequently that another two days were required for the passage. Then came the real heartbreaker on the 24th: they reached Kou only to find the provisioning post evacuated. On the 25th an officer patrol encountered a U.S. patrol, and once more the group had to detour. On the 26th Komori hired a native to guide him to Numundo Plantation, at the eastern base of the Willaumez Peninsula. But evidently the man had a change of heart, for the major recorded next day that, lacking a guide, "we advanced using a compass." They now entered a region of extensive swamps, intersected by another major obstacle: the two-pronged Kulu river. The column got across this stream on the 27th, but lost five more men in the swift current. The survivors emerged from the swamps on the 29th and followed the river southward. On the 31st Komori made his final diary entry, eloquent in its stark simplicity: "We are very tired and without food." Apparently at this point malaria laid the major low. Ordering his men to continue toward Cape Hoskins, he took refuge in a native village, accompanied only by his executive officer, his orderly and a corporal attached to his headquarters. For lack of further diary entries, obscurity shrouds the last week of his life.

Most of the Japanese forces reached Malalia by the end of March, but Marine patrols were becoming increasingly troublesome. On the 11th, elements of the 1st Marines landed at Linga Linga, patrolling further inland. Company E landed at the Kulu River mouth at the base of Willaumez Peninsula. There the Marines encountered 4 enemy stragglers, killing three and taking one prisoner. Then they moved westward to Kandoka, where they were joined by two platoons of Company F, brought over by boat. There they established a roadblock, just in time to catch Sato’s rear echelon. Second Lieutenant Richard B. Watkins was in command of the trail block. At 9am Watkins led his group inland from the village over some faint trails which he hoped the Japanese main body might be using. The Marines had proceeded about a mile and a half and were about to cross a stream in a sparsely wooded area when they sighted two Japanese standing with slung rifles, apparently resting. Watkins had about decided to dispose of these when they moved off in a northeasterly direction, followed almost immediately by a large body of their compatriots. Lying where the Japanese could easily have spotted them, the Marines counted the 73 enemy soldiers and noted the equipment cited above. Conspicuous among them was a tall, burly officer being carried on a litter. The Japanese were cutting fresh trail through the jungle, and fortunately were too intent on their work to discover the patrol. They made excruciatingly slow progress, however, and Watkins did not dare to move until the last man had disappeared. He then returned with all speed to Kandoka, sending a runner ahead with his report. At the village he met Major Brush who had come over from Yaluiai with one squad on what he had intended as merely a routine inspection. He promptly radioed his command post to send a rifle platoon and a 60mm mortar section to the scene and ordered Watkins to hold the trail block with one rifle squad, one machine-gun squad and two mortar squads while he himself set off with the rest of the troops available in an effort to overtake the Japanese from the rear. Before his own departure that morning, Watkins had sent a six-man patrol under Sergeant Frank Chliek to an inland village some two miles south of Kandoka, right where the Japanese appeared to be heading. The lieutenant promptly dispatched a native messenger there with a warning; then, when firing broke out in that direction, he surmised, correctly, that Chliek had become engaged and took the remaining rifle squad and hurried to his assistance. He arrived to find the sergeant and his men crouched on high ground by the east-west trail with dead Japanese all around them. The volume of fire was intense, the pattern not at all clear. As it turned out, Chliek had stumbled upon the column somewhere near its head and, taking advantage of his superior position, immediately opened fire. Major Brush's force, which had been closing rapidly, was on the opposite side of the valley at this time; hence, at sound of the first shots, had hastened to the scene and struck the Japanese column's other flank. In order to avoid becoming involved in a fire fight with that group, Watkins ordered Chliek's patrol back to Kandoka and followed with his own squad at a slower pace. Brush caught up with him shortly, whereat a counting of heads showed that, miraculously, the Marines had not sustained a single casualty. Here is the aftermath as Watkins recalls it: “On the following morning I took a 20 man patrol through the battle area. We counted 55 dead including 3 officers. It was quite easy to believe that perhaps 20 more died in scattered positions throughout the dense underbrush. The dead were all within a 100 yard stretch of trail. We encountered 2 more Japanese who had evidently just come upon the scene who were sitting side by side staring dazedly at the destruction and did not even turn their heads when we approached.” The burly officer previously observed on a litter proved to be Colonel Sato. Evidently Sergeant Chliek's patrol had struck the enemy column at precisely the point where he was being carried, for the colonel had only had time to leap to his feet and draw his sword to fight back before the Marines' fire riddled him. Seeing their leader fall, those Japanese farther forward took off in mad flight, while those behind were cut off by the converging of the two patrols. Thus perished one of the few Japanese to deserve much credit for the performance of the 65th Brigade on New Britain. Although the rear echelon attacked by the two patrols comprised less than half of Sato's total force, the group, as such, ceased to exist with the death of the leader who alone had held it together. Units split into components, these into smaller parties, straggling eastward over a variety of trails, often hacking their own way by compass azimuth. 

Throughout April, the 17th Division continued their retreat towards Rabaul, managed to repel multiple marine patrol attacks around Cape Hoskins. General Sakai’s survivors finally got to Rabaul between April 16th and May 15th, erecting the last bulwark of defense for the South Pacific. On April 6th, the journey of another Japanese commander came to an end. The body of the already deceased Major Komori was captured at the San Remo Plantation by the 2nd Battalion, 5th marines. They came upon the outpost, suddenly face to face with a group of four bedraggled Japanese. It was one of those abrupt encounters that allow little time for reflection or deliberation. The flurry of fire that followed killed three of the enemy and wounded the fourth, who promptly surrendered. Komori had apparently died of malaria along the way. 

For the 5th Marines, too, was nearing its journey's end, so far as New Britain was concerned. With promotion of the regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Buse took over on an acting basis, and General Smith returned to Cape Gloucester to relieve General Shepherd as Assistant Division Commander. Units attached to the regiment followed, and representatives of the Army's 185th Infantry arrived to inspect positions preparatory to replacing the 5th, just as other 40th Infantry Division elements were doing in the Cape Gloucester area with a view toward relieving the entire 1st Marine Division. Last clash of the campaign occurred onthe 22nd of April, when a 2/5 patrol intercepted a party of Japanese, killing 20, including two officers, and suffering the regiment's last fatality on New Britain. Three days later the whole 185th RCT moved into Talasea and San Remo, and at 1530 command of the area formally passed to the Army. LCM's carrying the 1st and 3rd Battalions back to Borgen Bay cleared Talasea at 1630, followed by those carrying 2/5 from San Remo at 2000. The movement was reported complete at 1930 on the 26th, and men of the 5th learned that the 1st Marines had departed this island of evil memory the previous day and that they would follow as ships became available. Soon they would be relieved by Major-General Isaac Rapp Brush’s 40th Division, which took responsibility for Cape Gloucester, Arawe and Talasea by the end of April. 

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

Thus Operation Reckless and Persecution were both successful. Now MacArthur had a strong foothold in Western New Guinea seeing the Japanese continued their frantic retreat wherever allied forces seemed to pop up. Over in New Britain, the Japanese were losing formidable commanders as they too were on the retreat, things were simply disastrous for the empire of the rising sun. 

- 126 - Pacific War - Operation Ichi-Go Unleashed , April 16-23, 1944

Last time we spoke about the defense of India. General Mutaguchi’s megalomaniac dream of invading India was tossed into motion. Battles were raging over countless features and against formidable allied boxes such as the Lion Box. Yet Mutaguchi had relied far too heavily on seizing the allied supply depots while promising his subordinate commanders they would have ample supplies for their tasks. Those like General Sato became so angry with their superior they pretty much were acting insubordinate. The effort to take Kohima fully and thrust into India was falling apart battle by battle. Meanwhile within China, General Chennault's 14th air force was causing major problems for the Japanese, forcing them into action. Operation Ichi-Go was formed, a colossal offensive to neutralize airfields and perhaps end the China Problem once and for all. Meanwhile the Royal Navy received some breathing room in the mediterranean sea and were now moving into the Pacific Theater.

This episode is Operation Ichi-Go Unleashed

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

The Imperial Japanese Army, largely because of the losses incurred by the Imperial Japanese Navy and logistical constraints, was virtually powerless to stop the allied advance in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. Imperial HQ predicted further losses in early 1944 and General Douglas MacArthur was expecting to sweep up the northern New Guinea coast so he could retake the Philippines. New Guinea was thus seen as a holding operation to delay the allied advance. With its shorter supply line, the Philippines was now being regarded as a good location to block MacArthur’s advance towards the home islands. Everyone of course was still waiting for the decisive naval battle. But back on the mainland, the IJA were not dependent on the IJN, their logistical constraints were not the same at all. Hence suddenly in 1944, the IJA decided to unleash incredibly large and bold offensives in Burma, Northern India and of course in China. 

On New Years day of 1944, Chiang Kai-Shek cabled President FDR warning him that the strategy they and Stalin had agreed on at the Tehran Conference in November of 1943, fully emphasizing the European Front was leaving China open to a major attack. “Before long Japan will launch an all-out offensive against China.” Yet western intelligence disagreed with Chiang Kai-Shek’s sentiment. While General Stilwell was completely focused on recapturing Burma, Chiang Kai-Sheks fears were about to be proven correct. In April of 1944, Operation Ichi-Go was launched. It was the largest military operation in Japanese history, it was also a last ditch effort to finally solve the so-called China Problem. It was obvious to the IJA, the IJN were losing the maritime war in the Pacific, thus they were determined to toss the dice in China. If they were successful, overland supply lines from Burma to Korea could be secured. In addition it would be a hell of a bargaining chip when negotiating with the Americans. If they could finally end Chiang Kai-Shek’s Kuomintang government, America would be facing the extremely formidable task of having to invade and reconquer China. Of course the immediate war aims were to knock out General Chennault’s air force some he would not be able to bomb Formosa or the home islands. Emperor Hirohito recalled in his Dokuhaku Roku, post-war testament “One shred of hope remained—to bash them at Yunnan in conjunction with operations in Burma. If we did that we could deal a telling blow to Britain and America …” 

By early April General Hata had amassed 62,000 men, 52,000 Japanese and 10,000 collaborationist units alongside 800 tanks, 1550 artillery pieces, 250 aircraft, 15550 motorized vehicles and 100000 horses. This would turn into 150,000 troops, and believe it or not that was the advance guard of a campaign that would eventually involve 500,000 troops. They would be supplied with enough ammunition for two years. The IJA air force amassed 200 bombers with enough fuel for 8 months to support them. Over the next 9 months, battles would be fought over 3 regions, Henan in central China to the east of Nanjing; Hunan and Guangxi in south China east of Hong Kong and Guangdong province and south of the Yangtze River. While Ichi-Go was unleashed, Chiang Kai-Sheks crack troops, the Y-Force based out of Yunan province, alongside Merrill’s marauders were busy fighting alongside Stilwell in northern Burma.

In spite of the efforts to keep Ichi-Go secret, during early 1944, the Chinese began fortifying their defenses and redeployed troops on a large scale to strengthen their frontlines. Chiang Kai-Shek knew something was coming, but his commanders believed a large-scale Japanese offensive in China was impossible by this point of the war. The Japanese began carrying out a heavy bombardment campaign, targeting Henyang, Guilin, Chongqing and against the heavy concentration of Chinese troops advancing in the Yangtze river area. The aerial attacks greatly hampered the KMT’s logistical lines. The Chinese reacted by unleashing their frontline artillery, destroying the Bawangcheng bridge on March 25th. The Japanese hastily went to work repairing the bridge as Lt General Uchiyama Eitaro’s 12th army would need to cross as pertaining to Operation Kogo. Kogo was the first phase of the battle aimed at opening the Pinghan Railway that ran from Beijing to northern Wuhan. South of Beijing is the Yellow River, that runs southwest to east. Uchiyama’s plan was initially to cross the Yellow River and secure the Zhengzhou area before driving south towards the Luohe area, where the Japanese would ultimately prepare for a drive towards Luoyang. 

On the night of April 17th, the main part of the 37th division crossed the Yellow River and advanced towards Zhongmu. The Japanese rapidly penetrated the defenders positions, taking them by surprise. Three KM’s in front of Zhongmu, they waited for the 7th independent Mixed Brigade to follow up behind them. The 7th Independent Mixed Brigade had crossed the Yellow River at the same time as the 37th Division, attacking the flank of the enemy facing the crossing point of the main body of the Brigade. Shortly after dawn the main body of the Brigade began crossing the river at a point near the left flank of the 37th Division. On the 19th, part of the 37th Division attacked Zhangzhou, completely routing the Chinese defenders while the bulk of the Division advanced towards Lihezhen. 

Meanwhile the 110th Division advanced upon Bawangcheng with the 62nd Division and 9th Independent Brigade following behind them. The 62nd Division was accompanied by the 3rd Armored Division and 4th Cavalry Brigade, setting out for Luohe with their tank support. The 110th División continued their advance towards Micunzhen, capturing the town by the 24th. On that same day the 9th Independent Brigade seized Sishuizhen, but would be unable to break through the 177th Division’s defenses. After a breakthrough was made at Zhengzhou, the 3rd armored division and 4th cavalry Brigades tanks advanced past the infantry to puncture the Chinese formations, forcing a quick rout. Meanwhile the 62nd Division, 37th Division and 7th Brigade reached the east-west line of Lihezhen and prepared for an assault on Xuchang. The Chinese simply were unable to respond to this. Chiang Kai-Shek and his commanders assumed this was a punitive expedition and that the Japanese would sooner or later turn back as they had always done in the past. As such, only the 15th and 29th Armies were sent to reinforce Xuchang to contain the Japanese offensive. Yet on the other hand, Uchiyama had also decided to divert his tanks and cavalry northwest, preparing for the future attack on Luoyang.

On the 30th, Uchiyama’s forces began attacking Xuchang, shattering the Chinese defenses at extreme speed and fully occupying the city by May 1st. The 62nd Division encountered the 15th and 29th Armies at Yingqiaozhen, battering them so heavily, the Chinese were unable to reinforce the vital railway. Two infantry battalions and one field artillery battalion of the 37th Division and the 27th Division departed Xuchang to continue marching south in order to re-open the Beijing-Hankou railway. The North China Area Army estimated that Tang Enbo would assemble his main force near Yehhsien, planning to advance to Yencheng and then wheel to the northwest in order to capture this force. However, the main force of the 31st Army Group of General Tang Enbo turned its advance to the north. The Area Army, therefore, changed its plan and decided to turn toward Loyang directly after the capture of xuchang, rather than to wait until Yencheng was captured. Yet we will have to wait until next week to find out what happens to General Tang Enbo’s forces as we are now traveling over to Burma. Don’t worry Operation Ichi-Go is just starting.

After the capture of Walawbum in early March, General Stilwell ordered Merrill’s Marauders to perform a wide envelopment, to cut the Kamaing Road behind General Tanaka’s 18th Division while the 22nd Division with tank support drove down the Kamaing Road from the north. Two Marauder battalions led by Lt Colonel Charles Hunter set out on March 12th, reaching Janpan 4 days later. Once there they received new orders from Stilwell to head south through the hills along the Warong trail, then make their way to Kamaian to block the road at Inkangahtawng. Meanwhile Merrills 1st battalion and their Chinese allies were facing strong enemy resistance. From bivouac areas in the hills northeast of Shaduzup, on the Kamaing Road, the 1st Battalion of the 5307th, followed by the 113th Regiment, moved out on the morning of 13 March to put the northern clamp across the Kamaing Road just south of the Jambu Bum, in the vicinity of Shaduzup. I & R Platoons followed some fresh footprints into an enemy bivouac and stirred up a hornet's nest of Japanese. There was brisk skirmishing, and though the Americans managed to cross the Numpyek Hka just beyond, the Japanese had been alerted and proceeded to delay them expertly. Lieutenant-Colonel William Osborne, commander of the 1st Battalion, decided to cut a fresh trail around the Japanese. This was painfully slow business, and waiting for an airdrop took another day. On 22 March, when Colonel Hunter to the south was one day's march from his goal, aggressive patrolling by Red Combat Team revealed that the Japanese had blocked every trail in the area through which Osborne had to pass, so again Osborne elected to make his own trail, this time over ground so rough that the mules had to be unloaded. The maneuver succeeded, and no Japanese were seen on 23 or 24 March. Osborne's march would have been greatly aided had he known Tilly's Kachin Rangers were in the same general area. By March 22nd they reached Hpouchye.

Additionally the 22nd Division and Colonel Browns tanks had been halling it through the Jambu Bum, making slow progress against heavy enemy resistance because of a lack of tank-infantry coordination. It was difficult to coordinate infantry and tank action, because the tankers found it hard to distinguish their countrymen from the Japanese. A few such cases of mistaken identity and the 22nd's men were understandably reluctant to get too close to the tanks. I remember a circumstance in WW1, when the IJA were laying siege to the German concession of Tsingtao. There was a small British force sent to aid the Japanese and so much friendly firing occurred, the IJA forced the Brits to wear their greatcoats to distinguish them from the Germans. So you know, it happens. By March 20th, Stilwell’s forces crossed the ridge, reaching Hkawnglaw Hka, but yet again the lack of tank-infantry coordination led them to pull back. Once over the Jambu Bum, the 22nd found the road down to be mined and blocked with fallen trees. Two days were lost in clearing the road, and then three battalions made a frontal attack, guiding on the road. Next day they tried a co-ordinated tank-infantry attack and the leading tank platoon reached the Hkawnglaw Hka about four miles south of Jambu Bum, destroying a few machine guns and taking four antitank pieces. But the infantry would not follow the tanks and dug in two miles short of the stream. The tanks patrolled till dark, then fell back to their own lines.

Over in the east, Hunter’s men departed Janpan and reached Inkangahtawng on March 23rd, setting up two road blocks. Hunter sent out patrols and quickly discovered Kamaing was wide open, yet the delay of Stilwell’s others units would force General Merril to deny any attempts to attack south. Tanaka’s reaction to the roads blocks were pretty intense. Beginning on he 24th, vigorous Japanese counterattack followed on another. The Morita Unit, about two companies strong were a hastily assembled force drawn from a battalion gun platoon, an engineer company, a medical company, and division headquarters; they were given two 75-mm. guns, placed under command of the 18th Division's senior adjutant, and rushed south to Inkangahtawng. Tanaka also ordered the 2nd battalion, 114th Regiment over at Kamaing to attack north along the Kumon Range. The attacks were so intense, Hunter’s men were forced to pull back to the Manpin Area by March 24th.

Meanwhile, Merrill’s 1st Battalion advanced to Chengun Hka, placing them really close to Tanaka’s headquarters at Shaduzup. To the north, the 64th and 66th Regiments managed to link up, but the relentless Chinese assaults continued to fail against the tenacious defenders costing the attackers many tanks and lives. It was the 2nd battalion, 66th's turn to lead on 21 March. Again the tanks got well ahead of the infantry. A combination of ambush and counterattack by the Japanese cost five tanks, and then the Japanese came on up the road, almost overrunning the battalion headquarters, which was saved by the courage of two engineer platoons that had been clearing the road. That night the 1st battalion, 64th, which had been making the enveloping move, came in from the east and cut the Kamaing Road, right in the segment held by the Japanese. A tank attack on the 23rd found Japanese antitank guns just south of a small stream north of the Hkawnglaw Hka that prevented the tanks from outflanking the position. The guns knocked out the three lead tanks in quick succession, blocking the road. After heavy fighting at the stream crossing, the tanks finally had to withdraw, leaving the derelicts. In the afternoon the two flanking battalions made their way up the road and joined the 66th. Unfortunately, the meeting of the 64th and 66th Regiments did not signal the end of Japanese resistance. Japanese and Chinese positions on the road were thoroughly intermingled, making movement in the immediate area extremely hazardous. An attempt to break the deadlock with the tanks failed when the device chosen to identify the Chinese infantry backfired. Both the Chinese and the Japanese waved white cloths at the tanks. The armor moved blithely on into a nest of Japanese antitank men, who destroyed five tanks with magnetic mines, effectively blocking the road. General Liao, the 22nd Division's commander, now cut a bypass road for the tanks around his west right flank. A tank platoon tried it, could not cross a ravine improperly prepared for tank crossing, came under artillery fire, and had to be withdrawn. General Liao then committed his 65th Regiment to the main attack, applying immense  pressure, prompting Tanaka to order his frontline regiments to withdraw 10 kilometers. 

On March 28th, Merrill’s 1st Battalion established themselves along the Nam Kawng Chaung on the Japanese rear, from where they would be able to attack Tanaka’s headquarters. Surprised, the Japanese chose to bypass the roadblock and evacuated their position via a track to the west. This resulted in Japanese resistance softening up, allowing the 65th Regiment to secure Shaduzup by March 29. At the same time, Hunter’s encircled Marauders were fiercely resisting the enemy attacks at Nhpum Ga, with his 3rd Battalion subsequently taking up positions at the Hsamshingyang airstrip to the north. The men were extremely fatigued, facing constant marches, dysentery, malaria and malnutrition. They fought on for 5 days under constant attack, successfully pushing back the relentless Japanese assaults.

On its hilltop the garrison, though suffering no shortage of food or ammunition, aside from the monotony of diet which was itself a hardship, suffered from an acute shortage of water. There were no plaster casts for the wounded, and they took their sulfadiazine dry. The pack animals could not be protected from the Japanese fire. When dead, their carcasses could not be buried, and the stench and the carrion flies added more miseries to the battle. Sergeant Matsumoto, who had played an important part at Walawbum, was a pillar of strength to the garrison, constantly scouting between the lines, overhearing Japanese conversations, and informing Colonel McGee accordingly. On one occasion, when Matsumoto learned of plans to surprise a small salient at dawn, the Americans drew back their lines, booby-trapping the abandoned foxholes. Punctually the Japanese attacked, straight into the massed fire of the waiting Americans. Throwing themselves into the foxholes for cover, they set off the booby traps. Matsumoto completed the debacle by screaming "Charge!" in Japanese, causing a supporting platoon to throw itself on the American guns.

An ailing General Merrill would be evacuated to Ledo, leaving Colonel Hunter to assume formal command of the Galahad Unit. He then sent his 3rd Battalion to counterattack, unsuccessfully attempting to clear the trail as the Japanese repelled all his assaults. Finally on April 4th, Hunter got a breakthrough. The Japanese were believed to be moving ever more troops up the Tanai and it was believed that the 1st Battalion, which had been ordered to aid, would not arrive for four more days at least. Hunter's reaction was to attack on the 4th with everyone but the sick and the mule skinners, with his large patrols called in and Kachins used to replace them. A fake fight, using carbines, which sounded like the Arisaka rifle, was staged to deceive the Japanese, and the air support made three passes at them. The first two were genuine, the last a feint which made the Japanese take cover, only to come out and find the American infantry on them. Hunter's force gained that day and came within 1,000 yards of the besieged. About this same time Capt. John B. George and a small party, sent north by Hunter to find the Chinese regiment which Hunter understood would support him in this area, met the 1st battalion, 112th regiment at Tanaiyang, about eight miles northeast. After an interval, presumably used to obtain permission to do so, its commander moved toward Hsamshingyang. His first element arrived at the airfield on 4 April and was used to guard a trail junction. Despite this increasing pressure the Japanese made a very heavy attack on the Nhpum Ga garrison, actually reaching the foxholes at one point, and being driven out by two soldiers using hand grenades.

Over the next few days, the Marauders were reinforced by the 112th regiment and Merrill’s 1st battalion, allowing Hunters men to crawl closer and closer to Nhpum Ga. By Easter Sunday,  the Japanese vanished, leaving cooking fires and equipment. There was no pursuit, as Stilwell wanted no movement beyond Nhpum Ga as they were facing large supply issues at this time. The battalion of the 114th made its way to Myitkyina, where General Tanaka, anxious about the town, added it to the garrison. The 1st Battalion, 55th Regiment, however, withdrew towards the vicinity of Warong. The Marauders had suffered 59 deaths and 314 wounded during the Inkangahtawn roadblock engagement and the siege of Nhpum Ga. The Galahad Unit and 114th regiment suffered so heavily from exhaustion, the men would be very weakened for future engagements. 

Further to the south, Stilwell was concerned about the recently offensives aimed at Imphal and Kohima, but he was relieved somewhat, when at the Jorhat conference of April 3, attended by Slim, Lentaigne, Stilwell and Mountbatten, he was told the situation was under control and for him to continue his northern offensive. During the conference, Slim also notified the others he had decided to divert the Chindits 14th and 111th Brigades, further south to help out his 4th Corps. However Brigadiers Fergusson and Calvert argued strongly against it, not wanting to get tangled up in the battle for Imphal. Calvert instead wanted to preserve White City and Broadway whilst Fergusson wanted another attempt at Indaw. The Chindits were still formally under the command of Stilwell in May and he wanted them to hold firm at Indaw to prevent the flow of Japanese reinforcements going north. It was estimated the Chindists could endure roughly 90 days of this action and would need to pull out my mid-June. This estimation did not sit well with Stilwell. General Lentaigne wanted to abandon the strongholds around Indaw and move north closer to Stilwell’s forces. Therefore, Calvert’s brigade would be prepared to open the drive to the town of Mogaung by attacking Mohnyin. Before this could occur, General Hayashi would initiated a general attack against White City on the night of April 6. 

The attack began with a three hour artillery bombardment, then the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 4th Regiment; and 3rd battalion, 114th Regiment stormed Calvert’s defenses. When the shelling died away, Hayashi’s three infantry battalions attempting to punch a hole along the southeast perimeter of the stronghold, defended by the Lancashire Fusiliers, Gurkhas, and other West Africans of the 6th Nigerian Regiment. Secure behind a row of machine guns with a line of mortars behind them, the defenders opened fire. Bullets and projectiles whipped through the air, the bright flashes of tracers lending an ethereal air to the proceedings. Rounds poured into the attacking Japanese who began to suffer heavy casualties. Determined bands of Japanese brought up Bangalore torpedoes to destroy the wire, but all malfunctioned. The battle went on for most of the night.

The Chindits fought like lions throughout the night and managed to toss back numerous enemy attacks. Then to their dismay 27 IJA medium bombers appeared,  blowing holes in the wire. The Bofors engaged them, shot down six and claimed six probables. Desperate efforts were made to repair the defenses before the next attack came in. White City received over 100,000 yards of barbed wire and 600 50ft coils of Dannert wire. The wire was 20 yards thick in places and festooned with mines and booby-traps. Dakotas continued to pour reinforcements into White City. The transport planes were relegated to flights during dawn and dusk times, but they kept coming, concentrating reinforcements at White City. Fresh companies of troops materialized to take up station, until in the words of Lt. Norman Durant of the South Staffords, the place was a “complete babel, for it contained  British troops, West Africans, Chinese, Burmans, a New Zealand RAF officer, Indians, and an American Neisei who acted as interpreter, or better said interrogator of prisoners. Large groups of West Africans from the 7th and 12th Nigerians landed, filling out the columns and battalions already at White City. As the planes continued to bring in reinforcements, Calvert managed to muster roughly seven battalions in and around “White City” against Hayashi. 

Over the next few nights, Calvert’s defenders continued to repel Hayashi’s attacks, until he was finally relieved by Brigadier Abdy Rickett’s 3rd West African Brigade on April 10th. This allowed Calvert to lead a strike force against Hayashi’s HQ at Mawlu from the south. While the Japanese continued their onslaught of White City, Calvert’s strike force advanced to Thayaung, before effortlessly seizing Sepein on the 13th. Then the 7th Nigerians fell upon Mawlu, prompting the HQ staff to flee south in a rout. With Mawlu now in their hands, the Nigerians soon found themselves under heavy fire, pinned down for the next four hours under relentless Japanese firing and dive-bombing by Japanese aircraft that put in a surprise appearance. Soon, the Gurkhas at Sepein also reported that they were under fire from the main Japanese positions at the edge of the village, hidden under mounds of flowering lantana scrubs. The sight was inordinately beautiful and lethal, concealing hordes of Japanese infantry, whose gunfire twinkled through the red, yellow, purple and green of the scrub. Three Gurkha ground attacks failed to dislodge the defenders and the men were becoming dispirited. Calvert decided to withdraw. As dusk settled at Mawlu, Vaughn began to pull his troops out of Mawlu and under the cover of a mortar barrage, taking with him a large collection of vital documents and an even larger trove of Japanese ceremonial swords and military equipment, which would serve as presents for Air Commando and RAF aircrews at White City.

While this was going on, Brigadier Brodies 14th Brigade were advancing to the Wuntho-Indaw railway where they managed to successfully attack the main bridge close to the Bonchaung Station,  interdicting the 15th Division’s lines of communication. To the northeast, Morris Force captured Myothit on April 9 and then continued to set up ambushes on the Bhamo-Lashio Road. Back at White City, Calvert decided to try and get behind the enemy from the flanks and hit them from the rear, pinning them against the stronghold’s wire. On the night of April 16, the Nigerians prepared an ambush on the Mawlu-Henu road, subsequently killing 42 Japanese. 

Yet realizing his strike force had trapped 2000 Japanese, Calvert ordered his men to infiltrate forward while the West Africans at White City launched an attack. This was met by a vicious and chaotic Japanese response as Hayashi’s men tried to break free. During these actions its estimated the Japanese suffered 700 casualties while Calvert suffered 70 men dead with 150 wounded. The last Japanese attack against White City occurred on April 17th. After this Calvert felt he could hold White City indefinitely, but Lentaigne was concerned with the looming monsoon season, so he ordered White City and Broadway to be abandoned on May 3rd in favor of a new stronghold codenamed Blackpool. The site chosen for Blackpool originally codenamed “Clydeside” was a stretch of hilly ground by the railway, near the village of Namkwin, some 32 km southwest of Mogaung. There was water and suitable places to build an airstrip and deploy the 25-pdr artillery guns when they got them. Beyond a large tract of paddy was a hill, which the troops christened “Blackpool Hill” which curved like the sharp-spined back of a wild boar, with the head down, fore-arms and legs extended sideways. The Blackpool position effectively blocked the railway and main road at Hopin, drawing closer to Stilwells forces.

The 11th Brigade had already been dispatched to the north to establish Blackpool. The now rested 16th Brigade managed to capture the Indaw West airfield by April 27th, facing no opposition. Ferguson noted, “This second approach to Indaw was an anti-climax, and for two reasons. First, just before we went in we were told that even if we captured the airfield of Indaw West, no troops, no divisions would be available from India for flying in: all hands and the cook, it seemed, were tied up in the great battle for Manipur. We were to capture the field for two or three days and then to abandon it…. Secondly, it was early apparent that the birds had flown. The Queen’s got right on to the airfield without a shot being fired.” Lentaigne also decided to abandon the Aberdeen stronghold, evacuating Ferguson’s men along with other units. 

Meanwhile, by the end of April, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had also decided that capture of Myitkyina was of vital importance to increase the Hump tonnage. This of course was heavily influenced by the new opportunity for land-based bombers in Chinese airfields to bomb Formosa, the Ryukyu islands, the philippines and the eastern Chinese coast. Now to capture the Moguang-Myitkyina area, Stilwell would receive the Ramgarh-trained 30th Division,the 50th and 14th Divisions, all of which were airlifted over the Hump in April. Stilwell’s plan was to drive down the Mogaung valley on Kamaing with such vigor as to persuade General Tanaka that this was the principal effort. The final directive on the 23rd, was for the 22nd Division to attack, rather than hold, and to swing the 64th and 65th Regiments around General Tanaka's left flank, while the 66th Regiment fought down the road. Once again the 112th was told to block off Kamaing from the south. The orders directed the "22nd and 38th to be in Pakhren and Lawa areas by April 27.  As Stillwell would remark in his diary “Now I've shot my wad,". Meanwhile the Marauder-Chinese force, now codenamed End Run would sneak east over the Kumon Range to attack Myitkyina directly.

Tanaka’s mission at this point was to hold Kamaing with all his strength until the rainy season while the 53rd Division, led by Lieutenant-General Kono Etsujiro moved to reinforce him. Elements of the 53rd Division began to sprinkle into the Indaw Area, but the Japanese HQ for northern Burma, from the newly activated 33rd Army led by Lt General Honda Masaki could not decide to commit them towards either Kamaiang or Myitkyina. Thus Tanaka’s hopes for a counterattack were lost. Tanaka received two understrength regiments, the 146th and 4th in April and May, both of whom had suffered terrible losses against the Chindits the previous month. By mid-April General Sun’s 38th Division was assembling in front of Tingring with the 114th regiment locked down in a fight with Tanaka’s 55th regiment. After a visit to the Sun’s command post on April 11th, Stilwell wrote in his diary: "At least it looks like a start! The piled-up inertia is terrible. . . ." On the next day the 114th Regiment relieved the 113th on the line of three villages all named Tingring. This move placed the 114th and 112th in line, the 112th to the east forming with its lines a small salient about Nhpum Ga. The 114th Regiment was operating in rugged terrain which was almost as much an obstacle as the delaying positions directly about Kamaing defended so skillfully by the Japanese. On at least one occasion the 114th lost its way and had to be located by aerial reconnaissance. The battle raged so heavily, it forced the 55th regiment to pull back, while the 114th regiment fought a Japanese rearguard from Hill 1725. By April 20th, they finally secured Tingring and quickly began a march south. On April 23, Stilwell ordered Liao to commence the drive south from Warazup, with the 22nd Division trying to make their way along Tanaka’s extreme left flank. The Chinese forces were advancing slowly however, very apprehensive because Chiang Kai-Shek had ordered Generals Sun and Liao to be as cautious as possible. And that is all for today on the Burma front as we now need to jump over to New Guinea. 

The last time we were talking about New Guinea, General Shoge’s 239th regiment at Madang were getting ready to cover the continued Japanese retreat to Hansa and Wewak. On the other side, General Vasey’s men were in hot pursuit. To the east, the 58th/59th battalion and Shoge’s 3rd Battalion were patrolling extensively in the Bonggu-Melamu area, playing a sort of game of hide and seek. Several patrols just missed one another in the Wenga, Barum, Damun, Rereo and Redu areas. There were also several clashes. For instance, on March 26, reports from local natives and police boys indicated that the Japanese were again approaching Barum, which had become the main trouble area, from the direction of Damun just to the north. Both sides engaged one another with fire, particularly mortar bombs, but the brush was a cursory one with neither side gaining any advantage. Exchange of fire and a few sporadic attacks by the Japanese continued for about five hours from 5 p.m. While Corporal Tremellen, in the leading section, was moving among his weapon-pits, with a Bren gun in his left hand and two magazines in his right, he was attacked but, not being able to bring his Bren into action, he bashed the Japanese over the head with the Bren magazines. This Japanese thus had the distinction of probably being the only one to be killed by the Bren magazine rather than what was inside it. This would all last until April 11th, when the Japanese had finally withdrawn back to Madang.

To the west, the 57/60th Battalion departed from Kwato on April 5 to rapidly secure Aiyau. From there they immediately sending patrols towards the Bogadjim Plantation. At this point, however, General Morshead had finally decided that it was time for Vasey’s 7th Division to get some rest, so General Boase’s 11th Division would assume responsibility for all units in the Ramu Valley and the Finisterres on April 8. Over at Atherton, General Herring had also retired in February, so General Savige had been appointed to command his 1st Corps. When recommending Savige's appointment Blarney had written to the Minister for the Army: “Two officers have been considered for this vacancy, Major-General S. G. Savige and Major-General G. A. Vasey. Both have been very successful in command in New Guinea operations, and I have some difficulty in determining the recommendations to be submitted, since each is capable and very worthy of advancement to higher responsibilities. Having regard to their respective careers, however, I recommend that Major-General S. G. Savige be appointed.” The significance of Blameys final sentence is a matter for speculation. It could hardly refer to past careers since Vasey's experience in command was wider than that of Berryman, a contemporary who had recently become a corps commander, and no less than Savige's. Alongside this Blamey also decided to do a changeover of corps HQ, seeing Savige take over 2nd Corps in the New Guinea front

On April 10, the 57/60th then managed to break through the Japanese bridge positions to the high ground beyond at Bau-ak while patrols reconnoitered Bwai on the Gori River. The attack on the 10th on the enemy position at Bridge 6—two step heavily-timbered spurs running down from each side of the Ioworo River and making a defile was described by Hammer as "a textbook operation and in actual fact it developed perfectly " . One platoon advanced down the road to "fix" the enemy positions while the remainder of the company encircled the enemy position to come in from the high ground to the north . In the first encounter the leading platoon lost two men killed and two wounded. While it engaged the enemy with fire the rest of the company with Lieutenant Jackson's platoon in the lead clambered into position and , later in the day, clashed with the enemy in a garden area on one of the spurs. For a while the Japanese held on, but the pressure of the Australians and the accurate fire from Private Hillberg's Bren in an exposed position in the enemy's rear forced them to withdraw . Towards dusk an Australian patrol moved down a track towards the road where a small Japanese band was found to be still resisting with machine-gun fire . The Australians did not attack for they were sure that the enemy would disappear during the night. As expected there were no signs of the Japanese next morning at Bridge 6 only bloody bandages and bloodstains on the tracks to remind the Australians of yesterday's fight. McCall occupied the area and sent patrols forward to Bau-ak, the last high ground overlooking Bogadjim. Two days later, Brigadier Hammer sent strong patrols forward to Bogadjim and Erima, which found no enemy resistance in front and managed to secure both important hubs by April 15. At this point, while the 18th Brigade began to be evacuated back to Australia, Brigadier Hammer decided to withdraw the 58th/59th Battalion and the 2/2nd Commando Squadron, as the 57/60th would be the only one to continue the advance to Madang. 

 

On April 17, however, General MacArthur instructed Savige that a brigade from General Ramsay’s 5th Division should relieve the 32nd Division at Saidor in preparation for the Hollandia-Aitape operation’s, so the 8th Brigade and portions of the 30th Battalion would be flown to Saidor five days later. Thus the 300 odd troops were carried over to Bogadjim as Savige ordered the 15th BRigade to rest up and for the 30th battalion to take Madang.  Hammer was anxious to get there first, so he had immediately dispatched patrols to Amele and Madang on April 20th. Shoge was able to fully evacuate Madang and join his comrades as they fled for Hansa. Amele was secured by the 24th, but the Australians would find it very difficult to cross the Gogol River afterwards. After this the 30th battalion and Hammer’s patrols landed at Ort and resumed their advance. Both units cleared the Japanese from the Huon Peninsula, before entering an abandoned Madang. During the Australian advance an enemy mountain gun fired a dozen shells, and there was a sudden burst of machine-gun fire and a couple of grenade explosions from somewhere in the Wagol area. The machine-gun fire did not appear to be directed at the Australians and the shells from the gun landed out to sea. In all probability this was the final defiant gesture by the rearguard of the 18th Army as it left its great base of Madang which had been in Japanese hands since 1942. Madang had been heavily hit by Allied air attacks and possibly some demolitions had been carried out by the retreating Japanese. The airfield was cratered and temporarily unserviceable; the harbor was littered with wrecks, but although the two wharves were damaged they could be repaired and Liberty ships could enter the harbor. The Australian advance through the Markham, Ramu and Faria Valleys was a tremendous ordeal. The 7th division suffered between September 18, 1943 and April 8, 1944 204 killed and 464 wounded while it was estimated the Japanese suffered 800 killed, 400 wounded and 800 died from disease. The occupation of Madang ended the Huon Peninsula and Ramu Valley campaigns. 

Meanwhile, the remainder of the 5th Division assembled at the Madang-Bogadjim area, fanning out patrols to the west and sending small detachment of the 30th Battalion to land on small islands off the coast, preparing a future advance against Alexishafen. Shoge’s detachment rejoined its parent division, the the 41st Division over at the Hansa area, allowing General Katagiri’s 20th Division to continue their advance to Wewak. The 51st Division who had already arrived at Wewak got to watch the allied airshow as Hansa and Wewak we bombed without mercy, seeing countless barges destroyed. This would hamper Katagiri’s efforts to cross the Ramu and Sepik Rivers. Meanwhile General Nakai came across an alternative route in late April known as the Wangan-Garun–Uru-Kluk-Bien-Marienburg-Kaup route. This allowed the 20th Division to resume their march to Wewak. On April the 29th a barge carrying Katagiri was intercepted by a PT boat. General Katagiri was killed in the engagement, leaving Nakai to assume formal command of the Division. After May 1, the 41st Division then began to follow Nakai’s route across the river, with all Japanese units leaving Hansa by May 15th and finally arriving at Wewak at the end of May after a 20-day movement. 

Meanwhile General Adachi’s plan for the coming weeks of April was for the 20th Division to immediately head towards Aitape, while the 51st Division would reinforce Hollandia once the 41st Division had reached Wewak. As such, a force was created around the 66th regiment led by Major-General Kawakubo. They were dispatched on April 19th, but would fail to arrive on time and would have to turn back to defend Wewak. Additionally, Adachi personally sent a part of his units under direct command to reinforce Hollandia. 

Now after the neutralization of Hollandia and the Palaus, General Teramoto’s remaining air units would have to move over to Manado and Genjem on April 15th, leaving only 25 serviceable aircraft from Major-General Inada Masazumi’s 6th Air Division at Hollandia. After April 3rd, although plagued by bad weather, the 5th Air Force virtually owned the air over Hollandia. There would be only one resurgence of air opposition, on April 11th. The Japanese 14th Air Brigade staged a small fighter force to Wewak which, despite the loss of a Tony to the 8th Fighter Squadron, shot down three P-47s of the 311th Fighter Squadron, a new organization that had lately arrived from the United States and had only begun operations at Saidor on April 7. The enemy force perhaps had withdrawn to Hollandia by the next day, because some twenty enemy fighters pounced on a straggling B-24 there and shot it down. Aerial gunners of the 403rd Bombardment Squadron claimed destruction of one of the interceptors, and the 80th Fighter Squadron claimed eight others destroyed. In this action, Captain Richard I. Bong scored his twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh aerial victories, thus topping the score of twenty-six victories established by Rickenbacker in World War I. Promoted the same day to major, Bong was taken out of combat and returned to the United States on temporary duty at the suggestion of General Arnold, who feared adverse reaction among younger pilots if Bong were to be lost in combat after establishing such a record.

Three were also small night attacks, combining 5th Air Force Liberators with Navy PB4Y's and Catalinas, made against Wakde Island during the early morning hours of 6, 13, and 16 April. These attacks seem to have been more profitable than similar missions against the Sentani airfields, probably because Wakde was only a small island easily identified by radar and so jammed with military objectives that a hit anywhere would be damaging. A captured Japanese diary recorded that the 6 April raid killed eleven men, destroyed a barracks, cratered the runway in five places, and destroyed or severely damaged ten planes. A daylight attack against Wakde by seven squadrons of Liberators was scheduled for 6 April, but weather forced its cancellation.

The 24th and 41st Divisions were also carrying out their last rehearsals for Operation Reckless. Allied ground and amphibious forces had been engaged in final preparations and training for the coming assault and, on 8, 9, and 10 April, had undertaken last rehearsals. The 24th Division's rehearsal at Taupota Bay, on the coast of New Guinea south of Goodenough Island, was incomplete. Little unloading was attempted, and the area selected did not permit the employment of naval gunfire support. The 41st Division had a more satisfactory rehearsal, with realistic unloading and naval fire, near Lae, New Guinea. The Final loading began on April 10th, with the LCIs leaving their loading points six days later in order to allow the troops aboard to disembark at the Admiralty Islands for a day of exercising, resting, and eating. Ships carrying the Persecution Task Force, meanwhile, moved out of the Finschhafen area on April 18 and on the same day rendezvoused with the vessels bearing the 41st Division towards the Admiralties. All convoys under Admiral Barbey then moved north around the eastern side of the Admiralties and, at 7:00 on April 20th, the various troops assembled at a rendezvous point northwest of Manus Island. Thus, all seemed ready for the beginning of another amphibious assault. 

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The Imperial Japanese Army tossed a final hail mary attempt to improve the war situation with the grand Ichi-Go offensive. If they could manage to seize their objectives, this would perhaps give them a better hand at the negotiating table. Because the allies certainly would not be keen on having to liberate most of China, it was a very bold strategy.

- 125 - Pacific War - Defense of India , April 9-16, 1944

Last time we spoke about the battle for Kohima and the mop up of the Admiralty islands. The battle for Kohima led to battles raging over the Kohima Ridge. At one point only 2500 allied defenders were facing nearly 15,000 Japanese. Numerous features fell to the Japanese top Kohima ridge. The Japanese were taking heavy casualties while pushing the defenders close to Kohima. A decisive moment presented itself, the Japanese had an open shot against Dimapur. However, mostly because of animosity towards General Mutaguchi the chance to deliver a kill blow was lost. If Dimapur had been taken, it may have changed the entire Burma War. Over in the Admiralty Islands, Los Negros and Manus were finally all mopped up and now the allies had forward airfields to further smash the inner Japanese perimeter. General MacArthurs triumphant return to the Philippines was on its way.

This episode is the Defense of India

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Last we spoke, General Mutaguchi had initiated a grand offensive against Kohima. General Slim, knew the seizure of Kohima would be attempted only in conjunction with the seizure of the much more important target, Dimapur. It was at Dimapur where an enormous allied supply dump lied over the Ledo-Imphal line, it was the hub for which all allied activity in the region revolved. If Dimapur fell, the province of Manipur would be impossible to defend and the Brahmaputra valley would be interdicted thus cutting off all overland supply to China. To everyone's shock the Japanese instead invested an entire division to attack Kohima. Slim thought this was a enormous blunder on the part of General Sato Kotoku, going as far as to ask the RAF not to bomb the Generals HQ as “it never struck him that he could inflict terrible damage on us without taking Kohima at all”. In truth it was not really Sato at fault, it was more so upon his superior General Kawabe Mazakazu who did not trust nor like Mutaguchi and rightly suspected the man’s megalomaniac plan to invade India.

Thus Mutaguchi’s Operation U-Go, the intended invasion of India saw the 33rd and 15th divisions closing in on Imphal by the end of March as the 31st Division attacked Kohima. General Cowan’s 17th Division was able to effectively retreat to Imphal by April 4th, with the 49th Brigade acting as rearguard. Meanwhile General Yanagida had just replenished ammunition and provisions after the battle at Tonzang and now ordered the 214th and 215th Regiments to resume their advance. Colonel Sasahara Masahiko’s 215th regiment departed Singgel on March 27th and crossed the India-Burma border by April 3rd. They advanced to Churachandpur by the 7th as the 214th followed closely behind them.

Meanwhile, the Right Assault Unit, the Yamamoto unit had been in hot pursuit of General Gracey’s 20th division since the start of April, and the 3rd battalion, 213th regiment of the Mitsui Unit had just captured the town Chamol. Additionally the 1st battalion, 60th regiment attempted, but failed to break through Laiching Hill in late March. Afterwords the unit was ordered to turn back and attempt a development of Gravey’s left flank by Moving through Lamlong and then Kampang in early April. To the north, General Yamauchi’s Divisional Headquarters advanced to Kasom on March 28. Yamauchi ordered two companies of the 1st Battalion, 67th Infantry to attack and occupy Kameng, which presented an easy approach route to Imphal. The 123rd Indian Brigade, 5th Indian Division had closed the gap with barbed wire and set up defensive positions in the hills to the immediate north and south of the road. The attack was made on the night of April 3 against the positions held by the 1/17th Dogras of the 123rd Indian Brigade on a hill off the Ukhrul Road, south of the village of Kameng, but failed to achieve its objective. They were then furiously counter-attacked by the guns of the 28th Field Regiment and by the Dogras themselves. A troop of tanks each of the 3rd Carabiniers and 7th Cavalry were also positioned on either side of the hill and fired on what were easy targets. By the next morning, almost 100 Japanese bodies were found; the few survivors had withdrawn. It is believed that the ultimate objective of this attack had been the fair-weather Kangla Airfield farther south. It was now felt the 15th Division’s strength was spreed too thinly, thus the Japanese believed their detachments holding along the Imphal-Ukhrul road were badly in need of reinforcement. As such, Yamauchi ordered the 60th and 51st regiments to get into closer contact and by the 4th of April they were moving into positions north of Imphal.

On that same day, Colonel Matsumura started moving down the road to seize the supply depot known as the 221 Advance Ordnance Depot, the largest in the Imphal Area justnorth of Kanglatongbi. As Japanese pressure on the road increased, its men and some of the most valuable supplies, including ammunition and explosives, were moved into a defensive area at Kanglatongbi known as Lion Box. The 2nd battalion managed to take Hill 3813 by April 6th, the 3rd battalion was less fortunate facing the Lion Box. The Lion Box had very few fighting troops among the several thousand men within its perimeter. The box was defended against mounting Japanese assaults from 4 to 7 April, while the evacuation of the supplies to Imphal continued apace. Its defense was assisted by units of the 9th Indian Brigade and tanks of the 3rd Carabiniers, who would travel up from Sekmai in the south during the day. On the 5th while the 9th Indian BRigade and tanks of the 3rd Carabiniers were patrolling forward to help out the Lion Box, Cowan’s 63rd Brigade arrived to Sekmai to reinforce the northern defenses, and this in turn allowed the 9th Brigade to take up a position to defend Nungshigum.

On the 6th, Colonel Omoto’s 3rd battalion attacked Nungshigum’s northern Hill, known as Hill 3833, successfully overrunning the hastily developed Indian defenses there, while the 1st battalion marched upon Hill 4057. There was a heroic counter attack by a platoon led by 18 year old Jemadar Abdul Hafiz serving as Naib Subedar, Junior Commissioned Officer in the 9th Jat Regiment, British Indian Army. His platoon managed to recover Hill 3833 by the end of the day. Jemadar Abdul Hafiz was tasked with recovering it with two sections of his platoon. He fearlessly led the way and recovered the feature in the face of a hail of machine-gun fire and grenade attacks, killing several Japanese in the process. Injured by now, Hafiz continued the attack, fought to his death and was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross. The hill became known as Runaway Hill because of the way the Japanese had fled from Hafiz’s brave actions.

April the 7th saw a follow-up charge with Omoto’s 3rd battalion re-seizing the hills around Nungshigum. In the four days that followed, Nungshigum exchanged hands a couple of times: the 3/9th Jats recovered it, only to lose it again to the Japanese of the 3/51st Battalion by 11 April who dug in well on the northern and southern bumps around Nungshigum. Meanwhile Matsumura was continuing to exert heavy pressure upon the Lion Box, finally forcing the battle weary defenders to evacuate the box as the position became impossible to defend. The valiant efforts of the Lion Box defenders had earned the British-Indian troops valuable time to evacuate a large amount of critical supplies back to Imphal, preventing their use to the Japanese. Do remember Mutaguchi literally planned the entire offensive on the basis their logistical supply line was simply seizing the allies supply depots. That is what we call a bold strategy. Matsumura’s troops had suffered heavy casualties in their efforts against the Lion Box. Now he ordered the 60th regiment east to reassemble around the villages of Tingsat, Molvom and their surrounding heights by April 8th. They would be reinforced by the honda raiding units coming from the north.

On the 9th, Omoto’s 1st battalion assaulted Hill 4057 taking it from elements of the 123rd Indian Brigade, as the 3rd battalion secured Nungshigum. This breakthrough posed an unacceptable threat to the British, leaving the 4th Corps HQ, the Imphal Main and Kangla airfield vulnerable to further Japanese attacks. This prompted General Brigg’s to get forces together to evict the Japanese from their recently gained heights. Brigg’s was reinforced with the 254th Indian Tank Brigades armor for the job. An unrelenting artillery and aerial bombardment began against the 51st regiment, greatly reducing the strength of Omoto’s companies. Suffering such horrific losses, Omoto was forced to retreat over to the eastern side of the Iril River. At around dusk on the 12th, Omoto’s 3rd battalion withdrew from Nungshigum to take up better positions in the hills north of Hill 4057. From this position the 3rd battalion was able to cover the 1st battalion's withdrawal from Hill 4057 during the night. 

Simultaneously, Briggs launched his main counteroffensive, tossing two companies of the 1/17th Dogras and B Squadron of the 3rd Carabiniers. That morning, the infantry and tanks began climbing up via two spurs on the south-eastern side of Nungshigum. On each spur was a troop of M3 Lee-Grant tanks, together with a company of Dogras. The division’s artillery, together with another troop of tanks, had been placed to the east and west of Nungshigum on the plain. As the infantry and armor climbed, the Vengeance dive-bombers and Hurricanes bombed and strafed the peaks. Soon thereafter, the 88 pieces of artillery and tanks on the plain plastered the same area. The two groups of infantry and tanks joined up at the peak named Pyramid and proceeded in a single file up a narrow ridge towards the Japanese on Southern Bump. As they approached the Japanese defenses, fierce fighting erupted. The tanks were sprayed with machine-gun and rifle fire, and grenades were thrown at them. But there was only so much the Japanese could do. The use of armor on Nungshigum, which rose over 1,000ft above the valley floor, was a masterstroke. The Japanese had never expected to encounter tanks and they had nothing to counter them effectively. The British had to pay a high price, too. All of the British tank officers were killed and the infantry officers wounded later that day. The former had been shot as they stuck their heads out of their tanks’ turrets to guide them safely on the narrow and steep ridgeline. It was finally left to the VCO of the Dogras, Subadar Ranbir Singh, and Squadron Sergeant-Major Craddock of the 3rd Carabiniers to complete the battle. They rose to the occasion; the tanks finally destroyed the main bunkers and the infantry charged at and killed any survivors. There were casualties on both sides, but Japanese losses were especially heavy, leaving 250 bodies. This was the closest the Japanese would come to Imphal as a large, organized force in 1944. Yamauchi’s 15th Division would never be able to pose such an urgent threat from the north again. 

On April 13th, the Honda unit and 2nd battalion, 60th infantry launched an unsuccessful attack against Sengmai. In another attack on the 18th, the 2nd battalion gained a foothold in the enemy positions on the eastern hill of Sengmai, but would be forced off it quickly losing 150 men. The failure to breach the defenders at Sengmai marked a turning point in the operation, forcing the Right Assault Unit onto the defensive. Meanwhile Omoto’s withdrawal had opened a gap between his units and Matsumura’s, leaving Matsumura isolated around the Imphal-Kohima road and the Mapao-Molvom range. This also left Matsumura’s supply lines increasingly vulnerable to attacks by Brigg’s 5th Division. General Scoones ordered the 23rd Indian Division to push back on the Ukhrul Road to regain control over the area, while Briggs cleared the Japanese out of the Imphal-Kohima and Mapao-Molvom Range. For this Major-General Ouvry Roberts dispatched the 37th Brigade up the Ukhrul Road while the 1st Brigade made a wide flanking maneuver to the right to swing north in an attempt to capture Yamauchi’s HQ.

A composite unite of the 51st regiment known as the Suzuta unit formed out of two companies and Suzuta’s HQ managed to resist the Indian attacks at Yaingangpokpi. Their mission was to hold the pass near Hill 3524 and they were met by numerous enemy counterattacking groups. The Suzuta Unit was faced with a serious crisis when it was attacked by a strong enemy tank force on 18 April. Meanwhile back on the 15th, the sudden appearance of the 1st Brigade at Hill 5515.. With his headquarters threatened by this new enemy maneuver, Yamauchi decided to move 15th Division headquarters and the Suzuta Unit to the rear of the Right and Center Assault Units. This move was complicated in that it entailed the evacuation of large numbers of casualties, among whom was General Yamanouchi himself. Upon arriving in the vicinity of Nungga intense enemy activity was encountered. It was found impossible to move west, to the desired destination and the headquarters was forced to move toward Lungshong via Ukhrul. The Suzuta Unit troops reverted to their parent organizations. The command post of the Division was finally established at a point about three miles southwest of Lungshong on 29 April.

By april 22nd, Robert’s Brigades made contact over the Ukhrul Road near Litan and began hunting down Yamauchi’s HQ. They searched for it around Shongphel to the north. They converged on the spot, only to find Yamauchi was not there. To the east the 9th Brigade attacked the Mapao-Molvom Range on the 23rd, making some initial gains at Mapao. Their field guns with Hurricane bombers smashed Mapao, allowing the Jats and Punjabis to fight their way up and capture it in two days. But farther north, the heights around Molvom were better defended and the Japanese defied attempts to infiltrate these positions. The brigade soon got bogged down. Further east the 123rd Brigade advanced up the Iril River Valley facing some of Omoto’s retreating men and would reach Sengmai by mid-may.

The Japanese at this point were also preparing to continue their offensive further south. General Yanagida received reports on the progress of the 15th Division and that Kohima had already fallen. So he decided to bypass the expected resistance in the Moirang vicinity and advance directly upon Imphal. This prompted Colonel Sasagara to send his 2nd battalions of the 215th and 213th regiment to attack the Torbung positions on the 9th. They managed to successfully outflank the 49th brigade and exerted so much pressure in the area, the 49th brigade were forced to withdraw over the next few days. With the Japanese in hot pursuit, Cowan dispatched the 32nd Indian Brigade to defend the Tiddim Road with Brigadier David MacKenzie shifting his main position further back to Bishenpur. The Bishenpur village was well located: it was where the hills touched the Tiddim Road to its west; to the east lay the upper reaches of the Loktak Lake. Bishenpur was considered the best place to position a defense of the southwestern approach to Imphal. It was also important because from here a track wriggled west over the mountains to Silchar in Assam. Besides the Imphal–Kohima Road, the Bishenpur–Silchar Track was the only other navigable route back out to the rest of India. Unsurprisingly then, it was also of interest to the Japanese.

On April 12th the Japanese attacked Potsangbam, but the 2nd battalion, 213th regiment was held up by heavy artillery and aerial bombardment from Bishenpur. The Japanese forayed into the villages of Kwa Siphai and Khoijuman to the northeast, but they were rebuffed. To counter them, aerial bombardments were called in on Potsangbam and the next large village, Ningthoukhong. Strategic Air Force Liberators pattern-bombed the two villages with 1,000lb bombs. The British sent tanks, together with infantry units, across the paddy fields towards Potsangbam, but their advance was held up by fierce opposition. Unlike at Nungshigum, the Japanese here were armed with anti-tank guns. Evicting them would require that much more effort. The 4th Independent Engineer Regiment was brought up to reinforce the 2nd Battalion, 213th Infantry at Potsangbam about 20 April, but it would be unable to break through nonetheless. To the west Sasahara’s men tried to break through Kokadan on the 14th. They made repeated attacks for over a month, but would be unable to penetrate Mackenzie’s defenses.

The 214th regiment tossed three attacks against Hill 5846 from their position on Ingourok by April 24th. Hand-to-hand fighting ensued as each side sought to gain possession of these hills. The British had brought up a troop of Lee-Grant tanks of the 150th Regiment Royal Armoured Corps from Bishenpur and these were pressed into battle, firing in close support of the infantry. By 26 April, Point 5846 and Wooded Ridge were under their firm control, while the Japanese had Wireless Hill. Meanwhile the 2nd battalion reinforced the 214th regiment to skirt around Hill 5846 from the west, going just due north of the track. This endeavor ultimately failed in the end, and the men would have to turn back by the end of the month. Due to his failures and disagreements, General Mutaguchi consequently lost faith in Yanagida, who was ignored from this point onwards while his chief-of-staff, Colonel Tanaka Tetsujiro, effectively commanded the 33rd Division. 

Meanwhile over on the hill of the Shenam Saddle, the battle for Nippon Hill had been raging since early April. Gracey’s initial piecemeal attempts to retake the feature only saw his men fail. On the other side, the Yamamoto Detachment launched a general attack from Chamol on the 8th, trying to make a breakthrough to Nippon Hill, to relieve the outnumbered 11th company, 213th regiment. While the Japanese were held up by crossfire from Tengnoupal, the 80th Brigade sent three companies of the 1st Devon’s to recapture Nippon Hill on the 11th. Following heavy artillery and aerial bombardment, the British troops stormed the hill with a fierce lobing of grenades and machine gun fire, seizing the feature by the end of the day. Nonetheless the Japanese, General Yamamoto kept committing troops to continuous attacks over the next few days. What was witnessed on Nippon Hill was to be repeated on many occasions around Imphal. Japanese defensive positions would be subjected to intense bombardments, which it was hard to imagine anyone surviving. And yet, time and again, the Japanese would emerge out of the targeted positions and counter-attack. In fact, Nippon Hill was one such place where, even days after it had been recaptured by the British, a lone Japanese soldier would emerge from the rubble and attack. This after being buried for hours, or even days, usually without recourse to food or water. This behavior was a measure of the extraordinary capabilities of the Japanese, as defenders in particular, and of their dedication to their cause in general. It was also a testament to the strength of their defenses. On features like Nippon Hill, the Japanese had shown themselves to be adept at digging an extensive, deep network of underground tunnels and holes within their positions. These allowed them to withstand bombardments, while the small openings allowed for a sustained fire to be kept up on anyone who approached.

After a week of fighting, the 3rd Battalion, 213th Regiment finally recaptured Nippon Hill on April 16, and this time it was to stay with the Japanese until the end of July. The hill would allow the Japanese to observe allied movements over the Shenam Saddle and the road below, so accurate firing from well-sited guns on this hill and the adjacent ridge would cause many casualties among the defenders. Yamamoto ramped up his efforts trying to break through towards Imphal. With additional tank and artillery support the 3rd battalion, 213th regiment managed to overrun Crete East on the 22nd as the 80th Brigade evacuated to the isolated Cyprus. Pressing onwards, Yamamoto attacked Crete West, tossing multiple attacks at the feature over the next two weeks. Despite the ferocity of the invaders, the defenders would manage to hold on until the end of April.

Meanwhile the 1st battalion, 60th regiment was unable to break through Hill 5240 near Kampang, so on the 20th they were redirected to hit the northern sector of Palel. The battalion had suffered 300 casualties, unable to pose much of a threat any longer to Gracey’s men. To their left was the 1st INA Division’s 2nd Gandhi Brigade,  deployed on the left flank of Yamamoto Force and an initial group that had rushed through the hills towards Palel. They were targeting the airfield from the south in coordination with the Japanese closing in via Langgol from the east. They clashed with Indian and Gurkha defenders at Purum Chumban on May 2nd. There are differing accounts of what happened during the battle of Purum Chumbang. One has the INA group reaching very close to the airfield, while another has it reach some 8km short of it. What is common to both, however, is the reaction of the Fourteenth Army units (Indian and Gurkha) to the INA’s effort. A parley between the two is supposed to have taken place at some point, where the latter tried to convince their brethren on the British side not to fight. This being rejected, the INA attacked and was repulsed. At least 50 INA men were killed in the retaliatory response. It has been argued that these attacks by their fellow Indians affected INA morale. They had not expected to be considered traitors by their former comrades of the Indian Army. Several hundred INA men deserted before the end of the battle, although the majority of the force remained in the hills around the Tamu–Palel Road, wracked by disease and hunger.

In the meantime, the Kohima Garrison received relief on their ridge positions, now General Grover was formulating a plan to recapture lost territory in the Kohima area and to annhilate the 31st division. His plan was to hold Zubza and Periphema in the rear while Brigadier John Shapland’s 6th Brigade would launch an attack against the Japanese center and gradually push them towards the southern and southwestern flanks of the Kohima Ridge. Brigadier Victor Hawkins 5th Brigade would would perform a flanking maneuver to the north while Brigadier William Goshcens 4th Brigade did the same in the south. On April 18, Hawkins thus dispatched his first units across the deep Zubza nullah to the Merema Ridge to cut the Kohima-Merema-Bokajan road, with the rest of the brigade following in an excruciating march and finally assembling at the Merema Ridge by April 27. 

Further to the north, in parallel with the 2nd Divisions advance, Brigadier Perowne’s men have been performing an extremely difficult march into the Naga Hills. Their task was to prevent the Japanese from escaping the Brahmaputra Valley, taking a track leading from Merema to Bokajan. For weeks the Chindit Brigade had conducted an effective operation, ambushing Japanese supply routes, denying them territory, encouraging local Naga resistance efforts and causing general havoc. General Mutaguchi and ordered Sato to send his 124th Infantry Regiment to support the struggling 15th Division in the south.  Sato decided to occupy Garrison Hill prior to complying with Mutaguchi’s directive, immediately sending the 1st Battalion, 138th Regiment to support the attacks of the 58th Regiment. The assault failed on the 23rd and this further convinced Sato he would be unable to hold Kohima if he sent the reinforcements Mutaguchi requested. His decision was also heavily influenced by his increasing anger at his superior as Mutaguchi was completely failing to supply his men. He had been promised at least 250 tons of resupplies would arrive by April 8, Sato testily demanded food and ammunition. In fact, very few supplies ever reached the 31st Division from Burma, the men having to survive on what they had brought with them, what they could beg or steal from Naga villages, or what 'Churchill Rations' they could capture from British stockpiles. Sato's fury at the lack of promised supplies reaching Kohima was fuelled by his belief that the 31st Division was being let down by Mutaguchi's abject failure to break into Imphal. In response to Mutaguchi's demand that he send troops to assist in the Imphal battle, on April 20 Sato sent the first of a number of increasingly tetchy signals to the army commander: 'We captured Kohima in three weeks as promised. How about Imphal?' Mutaguchi replied: 'Probable date for capture of Imphal April 29', which was the Emperor's birthday. Sato plainly did not believe him. On April 30, Sato signaled again: '31st Division at the limit of its endurance. When are you going to destroy Imphal?' To this he received no reply. 

The relationship between Sato and Mutaguchi had never been good, but now it was really bad. Over the next two weeks, the battles on Kohima Ridge were not seeing results. Repeated attacks were made against Garrison Hill as Shapland’s men tossed desperate attacks at the extreme northern edge of the ridge allowing for a troop of Lee/Grant tanks to lumber up the western end of Naga Hill in order to provide armored support for the 5th Brigade. The plan to get tanks onto the back of Naga Hill by driving through the Japanese positions overlooking the TCP finally succeeded on April 27, the Lee/Grants trundling along the track, wary of mines, but taking the Japanese entirely by surprise at this stroke of legerdemain. Peppered on all sides futilely by bullets, they joined 5th Brigade on Naga Hill, albeit at the cost of 28 Dorset dead, who had kept intense pressure on the TCP end of the Kohima Ridge to distract the Japanese during the operation. In the fighting for control of the tennis court no means of overcoming Japanese bunkers could be discovered using infantry alone, and attempts were made to bulldoze a path up to the remains of the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow to allow a Lee/Grant tank to move onto the tennis court and engage the bunkers directly with its 75mm gun. Unhappily the first effort failed when the Lee/Grant went into reverse, pulling the bulldozer to which it was attached back down the steep slope in a heap of crashing, twisted metal. Four days later a similar attempt with a Stuart Light tank of the 45th Indian Light Cavalry also failed, as the Japanese had brought up a 3.7in. anti-tank gun that put the tank out of action, fortunately with no loss to the crew.By the 27th, the tanks made a break through to the Naga Hill. The Japanese suffered terrible casualties causing them to suspend operations against Garrison Hill. The 31st división was not fully adopting a defensive stance.

Meanwhile, Goschen’s men had set out on a long march to cut the Imphal Road below the Aradura Spur on the night of April 25. They were advancing through some of the worst terrain of the entire region, it was deep, nearly vertical jungle-covered gullies falling between  Mount Pulebadze and the face of Mount Japfu.  The 4th Brigade would reach the valley between Pulebadze and Japfu in three days. One there, General Stopford ordered Goschen to climb over Pulebadze Ridge then come down into Kohima to hit the Japanese position on the GPT ridge, which were giving serious problems to Shaplands men. The brigade accordingly turned left, climbing up and over the Pulebadze Ridge and beginning the slow descent through the jungle down onto the Kohima side. A prominent pimple above the GPT Ridge known as Oaks Hill, sitting at 6,000ft, was occupied by the Norfolks and the 143rd Company on 1 May, the presence of British troops 1,500ft above the Japanese positions becoming known to them for the first time. But that is all for today for India, as there is something else cooking up in the CBI theater.

Since early 1943, the United States had steadily increased its air force in China. By the beginning of 1944 there were more than 500 US planes in this area, whereas, in spite of the organization of the 5th Air Army,the Japanese Air Force had less than half this number of planes in China. Furthermore, with the war situation rapidly growing worse in the Pacific, the Japanese Air Force in China could not hope for any replenishment. Enemy planes not only interfered with Japanese ground operations, but also harassed the lines of communication and attacked the occupied areas. General Chennault's 14th Air Force had been causing such problems, the Japanese were forced to act. The catalyst for their future action was because of a raid against Formosa carried out by 14 B-25s, 8 P-38s and 8 P-51s on November 25, 1943, which caught the Japanese by surprise as the Chinese-American aircraft strafed and dropped bombs over Shinchiku airfield, successfully destroying its installations along with 42 planes on the ground at the cost of three fighters lost. 

This prompted the Japanese commanders to target strategic points along the Hunan-Guangxi, Guangzhou-Hankou and Southern Beijing-Hankou Railways. Thus the infamous Operation Ichi-Go was born. Ichi-Go’s primary targets were Guilin and Liuzhou’s airfields where the US was developing bases for B-29’s to launch strikes against the Japanese home islands. If you are interested in a in-depth talk about this by the way, over on the Pacific War Channel on Youtube or Spotify, I did an interview with Dave from the Coldwar about the bombing of Japan and we talked about this very subject. Pretty neat episode I recommend it! Now in general the main objectives were to link railways in Beijing and Hankou in northern China to the southern Chinese coast at Guangzhou. This would spare shipping and avoid the pesky American submarine force who were now ruining havoc; it was also to take out airfields in Sichuan and Guangxi to thwart further US bombing of Formosa and the Japanese home islands. This also in turn would open a land route to Indochina and hopefully would destroy enough NRA units to collapse Chiang Kai-Sheks government, finally solving the China Problem.

Ichi-Go would start in late April with an offensive  by the 12th Army of Lt General Kita Seiichi, later replaced by Lt General Uchiyama Eitaro. This was codenamed Operation Kogo, tasked with capturing the areas along the South Beijing-Hankou railway, centered around Zhengzhou and Luoyang, and destroying the main strength of the 1st War Area. Then, early in June, the 11th Army of General Yokoyama would launch Operation Togo, with the objective of capturing Changsha and Hengyang and destroying the main force of the 6th and 9th War Areas. Following the conclusion of the first phase, late in July, the 11th Army would be assisted by the 23rd Army of Lt General Tanaka Hisaichi and the Indochina Garrison Army of Lt General Viscount Machiiji Kazumoto would capture Guilin and Liuzhou and the destruction of the 4th War Area. 

Finally, the third phase of Operation Togo would see the 23rd Army capture the strategic areas along the south Canton-Hankou railway, centered around Nanning, by destroying the 7th War Area in September while the 11th Army continued the advance south towards Suichwan Arfield to link with the Indochina forces. For the entire operation, the 5th Air Army of Lt General Shimoyama Takuma would support the offensives from the skies, tasked with annihilating the American-Chinese air force and attaining air supremacy over China. The logistics of Operation Ichi-Go constituted was one of the most notable examples of the IJA’s offensive preparations. Between some of the measures taken was the emplacement of dozens of anti-air batteries throughout the Yangtze River to limit the Chinese-American air activity against troop concentrations at its southern channel; the transfer of dozens of thousands of troops by railway without interference from Chinese guerrillas because security at the railway lines was increased; the monthly river transport of 40000 tons of supplies; the secret storage of 600 pontoons; and the constructions of hideouts for a munitions arsenal that should last for two years and of hundreds of deposits that harbored 50 million liters of gasoline that should last for eight months: 40 million for land vehicles and 10 million for planes.By early April General Hata had amassed 62,000 men, 52,000 Japanese and 10,000 collaborationist units alongside 800 tanks, 1550 artillery pieces, 250 aircraft, 15550 motorized vehicles and 100000 horses. 

Meanwhile the British Eastern Fleet had been receiving more naval resources due to the successes in the Mediterranean and Northern Europe and could now carry out more aggressive actions in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Agreement had been reached, after objections from Admiral Ernest King, but new procedures would need to be learnt by naval crews and Fleet Air Arm aircrew. To this end, Operation Diplomat, a training exercise, took place in late March 1944. The objective was for the fleet to rendezvous with a group of tankers, escorted by the Dutch cruiser HNLMS Tromp and practice refueling at sea procedures. The ships then rendezvoused with USN Task Group 58.5 built around aircraft carrier USS Saratoga and three destroyers.

To further support the coming Hollandia and Aitape landings, Admiral King requested that, during April, the Eastern Fleet should engage Japanese forces in their area and hold them there to reduce the opposition that could be encountered by the Americans at Western New Guinea. In response, Admiral Somerville launched Operation Cockpit on April 16, an air attack against Sabang off Sumatra. The fleet sailed from Trincomalee on 16 April, and two days later the Gambia and Ceylon were detached from Force 69 to strengthen the anti-aircraft defense of the carrier force. On the morning of April 19, 17 Barracudas and 13 Corsairs from the carrier Illustrious and 29 Dauntless and Avenger bombers and 24 Hellcats from Saratoga took off towards Sumatra and subsequently caught the Japanese completely by surprise, finding no opposition there. Thirty Japanese aircraft were destroyed on the airfield and a direct hit by a 1000-pound bomb set a large oil tank on fire. The power-station, barracks and wireless station were badly damaged. The submarine HMS Tactician reported large fires in the dockyard burning fiercely hours after the fleet had left the area. The raid was a clear success, with Somerville later saying that the Japanese "had been caught with their kimonos up". 

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The invaders it seems bit off more than they could chew when they attacked India. General Mutaguchi was facing a determined enemy and very pissed off and somewhat insubordinate colleagues. Operation Ichi-Go was being prepared and the Royal Navy was sending forces into the Indian and Pacific Oceans adding to the IJN’s misery.

- 124 - Pacific War - Battle of Kohima, April 2 - 9, 1944

Last time we spoke about General Douglas MacArthur's operations against western New Guinea  Operation Desecrate One, and the death of Admiral Koga. MacArthur unleashed hell from the skies above against Hollandia and other key target in the Western parts of New Guinea. Accompanying this was Operation Desecrate One, a carrier raid against Palau followed by strikes on Yap and Woleai in the eastern Carolines, in order to prevent the Japanese from reinforcing Western New Guinea. Lastly the commander in chief of the IJN, Admiral Koga, like his predecessor, met his end at the hands of an aircraft crash. But the Japanese had not just lost their commander in chief, they also lost the Z Plan to the allies. The Z Plan documents were taken by Filipino guerillas and found their way to Nimitz who would put them to good use in the future battle of the Philippine sea.

This episode is the Battle of Kohima

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

We are back in the exciting Burma Front to start off this podcast. The Japanese attack against Imphal was being directed by the ambitious and to be frank, quite insane General Mutaguchi Renya. Mutaguchi sought to seize Imphal by a combination of guile, dislocation and surprise. Mutaguchi needed to destroy the British-Indian army at Imphal while also cutting off their rear escape at Kohima. Operation U-Go, was not Go-ing very well, yet I made a pun. The Indian troops were digging their heels in, providing much more resistance than expected. Added to this the Chindits unleashed Operation Thursday, delivering a dangerous thrust into the Japanese flank.

Now last we left off, the Japanese 33rd and 15th divisions were launching their first attacks against Imphal, while General Sato’s 31st division advanced northwest upon Kohima. Sato’s intentions were to cut off the British-Indian defenders  by taking Kohima and seizing the vast depots and stores of Dimapur. To defend Kohima and Dimapur, General Slim had given the task to Major-General Robert, whose HQ was at Dimapur. Robert had the Kohima Garrison at his disposal,  roughly 2500-strong men led by Colonel Hugh Richards since March 22nd,  built around the 1st Assam Regiment. The 1st Assam Regiment was led by Lt Colonel William Felix “Bruno” Brown, and they had orders to “fight to the last man” at the Jessami-Kharasom position. Now relief was going to be provided by Lt General Montagu Stopford whose 33rd corps, formed around the 5th and 7th indian divisions and British 2nd division arrived in early april. Stopford planned to concentrate his men at Jorhat, about 105km north-east of Dimapur, where they could be ready to launch a counterstroke against Dimapur. A single brigade would be dispatched as soon as it arrived to defend the Nichugard Pass, about 13km south-east of Kohima on the road to Dimapur. They would support the 161st Brigade already at Dimapur and the 23rd Long Range Penetration Brigade of Brigadier Lancelot Perowne was going to reinforce Kohima by April 12th. Lancelot’s group would disrupt and cut the Japanese lines of communication back to the Chindwin.

Meanwhile, General Yamauchi’s 15th division and General Sato’s 33rd division were on their way towards the Imphal-Kohima road. South of them was the Honda Raiding Unit, built around the 3rd Battalion of the 67th Infantry Regiment. Their job was to cut off the road at the Kangpokpi Mission in the Ukhrul area. Luckily for Honda and his men, they were able to dodge the catastrophic battle at Sangshak. His unit would reach the road by the 28th, blowing up a bridge near Kangpokpi. There were other units performing similar roles, such as Colonel Matsumura Hiroshi’s 60th regiment who were given the task of cutting off the road at Satarmaina. After the Battle of Sangshak, the Hiroshi’s Unit advanced through Lamu, Tongou, Shongphel, Nungga and Angam cutting the Imphal-Kohima Road at Satarmaina by April 3rd. There was also Colonel Omoto Kisaso’s 51st regiment, who advanced against Hill 4950 by March 31st encountering little to no resistance. After this they advanced further and took Hill 4192 on April 1st. 

Up in the north, the 3rd battalion, 138th regiment had advanced through Layshi without much opposition while the bulk of the division approached Jessami. On the 26th, Colonel Torikai Tsuneo’s 138th regiment crashed into defensive positions held by the 1st Assam Regiment who held their enemy at bay for 5 days. General Slim watched over the developments at Sangshak and Jessami with great interest. Then a unit captured Japanese order from Sangshak confirmed his worst fears. “Within a week of the start of the Japanese offensive, it became clear that the situation in the Kohima area was likely to be even more dangerous than that at Imphal. Not only were the enemy columns closing in on Kohima at much greater speed than I had expected, but they were obviously in much greater strength.” Slim had expected a strike against Kohima by a Japanese regiment, but the entire 31st Division was on its way. “We were  not prepared for so heavy a thrust. Kohima with its rather scratch garrison and, what was worse, Dimapur with no garrison at all, were in deadly peril.” Luckily, the rapid arrival of the 161st Brigade at Dimapur and the dispatch of the 33rd Corps to reinforce Kohima could give him a fighting chance. 

Both locations received attacks on the 26th, and over the next five days both units held their own. But they had lost communications with Kohima, and recall orders could not be issued. A American colonel flew a Piper Cub to airdrop orders, which Brown finally received on the 31st. Brown pulled back April 1st, but Lt Young never got the message. On his own ordered his men out. “I shall be the last man,” he declared, and with difficulty got his company moving toward Kohima. No one ever saw Young alive again, nor was his body identified. The 1st battalion, 58th regiment had also been dispatched from Ukhrul on the 24th and would cut the Imphal-Kohima road at Tuphema by March 30th. 

After the disastrous battle at Sangshak, General Miyazaki ordered a battalion to head over to Pulomi, while the 3rd battalion, 58th regiment advanced to Kohima via Chakhabama and the rest of his unit advanced to Kohima using the road. Sato planned to launch a two-pronged assault against Kohima, with Colonel Fukunaga Ten’s 58th regiment from the south while the 138th regiment swung around Naga village to cut off the Dimapur road. This saw a race to feed units into Dimapur before the Japanese arrived. The first units of Major General Grover 2nd division arrived in piecemeal to Dimapur between April 1st and 11th. They came by small-gauge steam train arriving at Dimapur in a panic. The undefended base area expecting attack at any moment and riven with rumors of the impending arrival of the Japanese. Stopfords men were still several days away by the end of March, prompting Slim to order Brigadier Dermot Warren’s 161st brigade to rush over to Kohima. By April 3rd, Stopford established his HQ at Jorhat, where he made a disastrous blunder.

Stopford at this point was still under the belief the Japanese main objective was Dimapur. He had some false intelligence indicating Japanese units were at any moment in the process of outflanking Kohima. With this knowledge he ordered 161st to evacuate Kohima immediately. For the units currently at Kohima, they could not believe the order. Warren, Colonel Hugh Richards and the civilian Deputy Commissioner, Charles Pawsey - were aghast at, and vehemently protested the decision. When told that the Japanese were outflanking Kohima to the north Pawsey scoffed, retorting that if true, 'my Nagas would have told me'. Major General Ranking, believing that Stopford was making a mistake, went over the head of his new superior officer and called Slim directly by telephone to petition him to leave Warren at Kohima. General Slim, perhaps unwilling to overrule Stopford, and in any case as convinced as Stopford that Dimapur was the Japanese objective, confirmed Stopford's original order. Warren's 161st Brigade, which had been in the process of organizing the desperately needed defense of the ridge, left Kohima virtually undefended only one day before Japanese attacks began. Had Warren's men been allowed to remain where they were the trauma of the siege that followed would have been much reduced and the stranglehold that Sato was able to maintain on the vital road to Imphal for two long months would have been significantly weaker than it turned out to be.

Thus reluctantly, Warren pulled his men back towards Nichugard Pass, leaving only Colonel Richards with the original garrison. Meanwhile Sato’s unit were rapidly advancing through the mountainous terrain of the Naga Hills. Japanese and INA reconnaissance patrols were able to help the unit forage for food on the go, adding to their speed. Perhaps they took some time to eat turtle eggs like Wingate advised. Sorry just had to bring up that weird one, been stuck on my mind. On the morning of April 4th, the 58th regiment began assaulting the southern edge of Kohima at GPT ridge while Miyazaki’s other units were advancing through the hills and valleys leading into Kohima from the east. Colonel Hugh Richard alerted Stopford of the Japanese assault, who immediately realized his grave error. Stopford desperately sent Warren’s men back over to Kohima. Yet only 446 men of the 4th Royal West Kents would manage to get to Kohima in time to help her garrison. They dug in on Kohima Ridge, which is really a series of hills running north-south along the road to Imphal. Gently sloping saddles connect each feature. Since development as a supply base a year earlier, some of its various hills had become known by their function. From south to north, they were GPT “General Purpose Transport” Ridge, Jail Hill, DIS “Detail Issue Store”, FSD “Field Supply Depot”, Kuki Picquet, and Garrison Hill. A northwest extension of Garrison Hill housed a hospital and became known as IGH “Indian General Hospital” Spur. Thick woods, interspersed with the town’s and base’s structures, covered most of these hills. Garrison Hill was terraced and landscaped, and included the home, complete with clubhouse and tennis court of the deputy commissioner for the area, Charles Pawsey. The Imphal-Dimapur Road skirted the ridge to the east before turning west past Garrison Hill. Treasury Hill and a Naga Village settlement overlooked the ridge from the northeast; those heights also extended north to the hamlet of Merema. Southward loomed the imposing Pulebadze Mountain, whereas three miles to the west rose a knoll topped by the village of Jotsoma. Kohima Ridge thus was overlooked by surrounding heights: Pulebadze to the south, Jotsoma to the west, and the Naga Village/Merema to the east and northeast.

The same night they dug in on the ride, Sato had just launched attacks against Garrison Hill. The remainder of the brigade were not able to get in and would remain on Jotsoma ridge to the west, where Warren had emplaced his mountain guns to support the defenders. On April the 5th, the action kicked up with Fukunaga’s 58th regiment attacking from the south while a vanguard overcame the Shere Regiment’s sentries on the Naga Hill to the north, successfully securing a place for their artillery at Naga village. 4 mountain guns would support Miyazaki’s attack, also allowing the Japanese to seize the GPT ridge. In a surprise raid, elements of the 3rd battalion, 58th regiment were able to grab the old town part of Kohima and Treasury Hill. As a result of this, Miyazaki wrongly assumed the enemy had simply withdrawn from Kohima, so he ordered his men to begin an advance upon Cheswema. This in turn gave the defenders some time to reinforce their lines. Japanese pressure on the perimeter increased on the morning of April 6, with repeated attacks by the 58th Regiment on Jail Hill. Heavy artillery and mortar fire quickly denuded trees of their foliage, snapping branches and scattering jagged splinters to accompany the whine and hiss of exploding shrapnel. By 11am the surviving defenders were forced off Jail Hill and down into the steep valley through which ran the road, and then up into the relative safety of the trees on DIS Hill, where Major Shaw's C Company were desperately digging in. The Japanese attack was relentless and, although they secured Jail Hill dominating the south-eastern edge of the Kohima Ridge, they suffered extensive casualties, including Captain Nagaya, the commander of 3rd battalion, 58th Regiment, who was killed. Major Donald Easten was also ordered to retake Jail Hill with D Company, 4th Royal West Kents, but by now the Japanese had already dug deeply into the hillside and could not be ejected without considerable expenditure of life. Easten took his company and dug them in around FSD Hill. 

Since Jail Hill dominated the southern edge of the ridge defensive lines, the disappearing tree cover quickly became a problem for the defenders who were becoming more and more visible to the enemy. It got some bad, the defenders were soon forced to only move positions at night. A company of the 4/7th Rajputs were able to reinforce Kohima by the end of the night, yet overall now 2500 defenders were surrounded by over 15,000 Japanese. The lost of GPT and Jail Hill also meant the defenders had lost access to water, excluding a small spring on Garrison Hill. Richards was forced to limit the men to a single pint of water per day. On the night of the 6th, a company of the 2nd Battalion, 58th Regiment launched a frontal attack against DIS Hill screaming wildly. The fire from the awaiting Royal West Kents scythed into the attackers, as did bombs from Sergeant Victor King's mortars, landing within meters of the West Kent positions. Miyazaki kept sending more and more men, until some infiltrated the defenders positions ending in a confused hand to hand combat brawl. By dawn on the 7th, a counterattack from FSD Hill would be broken by the ferocious Japanese machine-gun and artillery fire. Sergeant-Major Haines led a spirited attack against these positions, dashing 37 meters  up the hill with a mixed group of West Kents and Gurkhas, bayonets fixed and lobbing grenades amongst the bashas. Those Japanese who ran were cut down by waiting Bren guns; those who stayed put were burned alive as the thin structures caught fire. The bakery, whose large brick ovens in peacetime produced several thousand loaves of bread each day, was more impervious to these tactics, but combat engineers destroyed the doors with the help of large quantities of gun cotton. Instead of merely blowing in the doors the ensuing explosion destroyed the entire building, only the brick ovens inside withstanding the blast. Escaping Japanese were brought down by rifle fire. Unusually, two Japanese soldiers were taken prisoner, and although one died later of his wounds, the other provided details about the strength and dispositions of the attacking forces. Captain Shiro Sato, Nagaya's successor in charge of 3rd, 58th Regiment, was killed. Over 60 Japanese were killed in this struggle alone, leading the men to mutter among themselves that this was a worse ordeal than Sangshak.

One of the problems now encountered by the men of C and D Companies of the Royal West Kents was the fact that hundreds of bodies lay littered across the position, some of friends but mostly of Japanese, attracting clouds of slow-moving bluebottles that feasted on the carpet of corpses covering the ground. Attempts were made to remove bodies where it was possible, but snipers and the sheer number meant that it was not possible to dispose of them all. As the days went by the effects of artillery bombardment dispersed some of the remains, with the result that DIS Hill became an unpleasant place to defend at best, and injurious to health at worst. The West Kents attempted to burn the bodies at night, but this had a poor effect on morale as the appalling smell of burning flesh drifted across the position. Where they could, the Japanese cremated their dead. 

Realizing his enemy was strongly entrenched, Miyazaki now decided to order his 3rd battalion to turn back. Meanwhile the bulk of Torikai’s forces were just reaching the battlefront, so Miyazaki ordered his 1st battalion to reinforce their attack. Sato was under the belief they would be capturing the ridge at any moment, so he ordered Torikai to cut off the Kohima-Dimapur road, within the vicinity of Zubza. Sato also dispatched the reserved 124th regiment to Cheswema to get ready for an operation in the north. Torikai’s 2nd battalion advanced into the Dzuzu valley, and their 6th company occupied Zubza, effectively cutting off Warren’s base at Jotsoma. During that night the Japanese launched both real and 'jitter' attacks against the southern perimeter. During the next morning it was discovered, Japanese soldiers had infiltrated back onto DIS Hill during the confusion of the night, placing soldiers and a machine gun in a bunker on the top of the hill. Despite the Japanese machine guns posted on top of the hill, a hero would emerge to knock them out. A fearless 29-year-old Lance-Corporal John Harman demonstrated the type of behavior that was to lead within days to the award of a Victoria Cross, and his death. Realizing that the Japanese machine gun could cause untold damage if unchecked he crawled alone up the hill, standing up at the last minute to charge the Japanese-held bunker. Miraculously the enemy fire tore into the empty air above his head, and Harman reached the bunker door, coolly extracted the pin from a grenade, released the firing lever, counted to three, on a four-second fuse and lobbed it inside. The occupants were killed instantly and Harman returned triumphant with the captured machine gun down the hill to the cheers of his comrades.

The Japanese would launch attacks through the day, gradually pushing the defenders up the hills towards Kohima. General Mutaguchi then personally ordered Sato to continue past Kohima and seize Dimapur. Now Sato and Mutaguchi did not get along well, but he reluctantly obeyed the command, sending his 3rd battalion, 138t regiment along the Merema track to Bokajan. Yet all of a sudden General Kawabe, countermanded the order and instead ordered Sato’s battalion to rapidly be recalled. This was one of those famed “what if” moments. What if Sato had turned a Nelsonian blind eye to the counter order, or if he had delayed its official receipt for another 24 hours? Sato was apparently happy to obey Kawabe and withdraw to Kohima partly because his deep-seated animosity toward Mutaguchi led him to assume the army commander's demands were motivated solely by visions of military glory. Sato's hatred of Mutaguchi blinded him to the strategic possibilities offered by continuing his offensive through to Dimapur, and lost for the Japanese a crucial opportunity for victory in 1944. The failure to secure Dimapur while the British were in a state of confusion at the speed and scale of Mutaguchi's march on Delhi was indeed, as General Slim recognized, one of the great missed opportunities of the Burma war. It led directly to the failure of the Kohima thrust, and contributed to the collapse of the entire Operation. It was the consequence of Sato's lack of strategic imagination, framed by Kawabe's rejection of what he regarded as an attempt by Mutaguchi to secure for himself undying glory. What he and Sato for that matter  failed entirely to see was that Mutaguchi was right. The capture of Dimapur might have been the decisive strategic movement of the campaign leading to a dramatic worsting of the British reminiscent of Malaya and Burma in 1942. Despite the megalomania and terrible planning on Mutaguchi’s part for even initiating Operation U-GO, to not try and make it work was even more criminal. 

On the morning of the 9th, the Japanese once again managed to infiltrate the DIS Hill and again corporal Harman lept into action and mounted a solo attack to remove the threat. Covered by two Bren guns firing from his left and his right, Harman dashed up the hill. Frantically the Japanese returned fire but in their excitement fired wide. Harman reached the trench and, standing 4 meters to its front and firing his Lee Enfield from the hip, shot four Japanese dead, before jumping into the trench and bayoneting the fifth. He then stood up, triumphantly holding the captured enemy machine gun above his head, before throwing it to the ground. The cheers of his comrades reverberated around the hill. Harman then nonchalantly began to walk back down the slope. Unfortunately he had forgotten that with the denuded foliage he was in full view of the Japanese positions on Jail Hill. Unheeding of the shouted cries of his comrades to run, he leisurely made his way back down to his weapon pit, only to be struck by a burst of machine-gun fire in his back just as he reached safety. Donald Easten ran out into the Japanese fire, and dragged Harman into a trench. Within a few minutes, however, this extraordinarily brave man was dead.  

On that day, Warren dispatched the 1/1st Punjabs to break through towards Kohima, but they ran into a number of log-covered bunkers at Piquet Hill, held by the 6th Company, 138th Regiment. The Japanese fired upon them causing 25 casualties by the day's end. Upon the ridge the killing continued. Large numbers of fiercely brave Japanese from the 58th Regiment were killed by the remorseless chatter of the British Bren guns, as during the night three successive assaults were made on C and D Companies of the Royal West Kents, the Japanese being denied success by the interlocking fire of eight Bren guns, whose red-hot barrels had to be changed repeatedly. Casualties on both sides were high, the Japanese attempting to gain access to the hill from the road by use of ladders, seemingly unperturbed by their losses. On the northern side of Garrison Hill the 138th Regiment again launched attacks against A Company. The attack was held, Bren guns, bayonets and grenades in the darkness bloodily halting Japanese ambitions. Victor King's mortars fired in support, the bombs landing with superb accuracy in front of Maj. Tom Kenyon's positions. It had seemed for a while that sheer weight of numbers would overwhelm the much-reduced A Company, but the reliable Brens, considerable reserves of grenades, the accuracy of King's mortars and the determined courage of the Royal West Kents denied the penetration so desperately desired by the Japanese.  

Low on ammunition and suffering heavy casualties, the decision was made to abandon DIS and FSD Hill’s on the night of the 10th. To make matters worse the monsoon rains had come early, and heavy, driving rain on 10th, together with the effects of battle and of sleep deprivation, had pushed men to the edge of exhaustion. Tea was rationed to half a mug per man. Fortunately, the rain somewhat made up for the acute lack of water within the perimeter, men lying back in their weapon pits and trenches to allow the rain to fall directly into parched, open mouths. It was found that a trickle of water was available from a pipe leading onto the road behind the ADS, behind the Japanese positions. Dangerous nightly journeys were made, through hundreds of wounded lying in the open, down the slope to the road, to fill hundreds of water bottles.

The exhausted men made their way off the hills under Japanese sniper and mortar fire. On the 11th, A company over at Garrison Hill were still managing to hold strong against numerous assaults over the tennis court. During the night they were relieved by B company. Meanwhile Grover had finally assembled his 2nd division at Dimapur and dispatched the Cameron Highlanders and 2nd battalion, Durham light infantry with Lee-Grant tank support to open a road back up to Warren’s HQ. The next day, while B company was repelling more assault, the 1st battalion, 58th regiment advanced upon Jotsoma from Pulomi, but could not penetrate through the defensive line. At the same time, the 3rd Battalion, 138th Regiment advanced to Khabvuma, though and was likewise unable to break through towards the Kohima-Dimapur Road. On the 13th, which would become known to the besieged British garrison as “black thirteenth”, B company continued to resist suicidal Japanese assaults across the tennis court, Japanese artillery managed to kill many men atop the IGH Spur.

Casualties were mounting, the Royal West Kents had lost a total of 150 men by this point. 3 Dakotas had tried air supplying, but they accidentally dropped atop the Japanese position on Kohima Ridge. Over at FDS Hill, the situation was quite desperate as the Japanese were squeezing the British from the ridge and to prevent them from using the supplies raining from the sky. Captain Mitchell of the Rajputs was killed on the morning of 12th, and furious counterattacks against the Japanese who had infiltrated amongst C and D Companies of the Royal West Kents failed to remove the intruders; A Company, after their short rest on Kuki, now moved to support C and D Companies. That night the Japanese attempted to rush FSD Hill. The defenders were ordered to wait until they could see the whites of the Japanese eyes before opening fire. During a lull in the fighting Private Peacock from A Company dropped off, exhausted with fatigue. When he came round he discovered that he was sharing his trench with a Japanese officer who had assumed that Peacock was dead. Unable to find his rifle Peacock leapt at the officer and strangled him after a fierce struggle with his bare hands. Then, to make sure, he ran him through with the man's own sword

By the 14th, the Assam Rifles relieved B company over at Garrison Hill, where Richards commemorated his remaining men for the bulwark defense. “By your efforts you have prevented the Japanese from attaining this objective. All attempts to overrun the garrison have been frustrated by your determination and devotion to duty…”. Meanwhile a patrol of the 4/7th Rajputs had advanced up the western valley. The patrol had the unfortunate result of raising some expectations of relief on the ridge. To the fighting men still desperately resisting every Japanese encroachment this made little difference to their lives. Instead, life and death continued their seemingly arbitrary, parallel journeys. The shattered hillside was now almost bare of foliage, the remaining trees standing forlornly, others leaning drunkenly where shells had smashed the trunk or branches. The ground was a churned morass of mud, which the defenders shared with rotting corpses, excrement and the inevitable detritus of war: scattered equipment, discarded helmets, broken weapons and unexploded shells. Yet the troops all knew that they had achieved a remarkable feat of endurance, and resistance. On the 15th the 1/1st Punjabs had finally broken through Piquet Hill and reopened the road to the garrisons perimeter. By the 16th, the 5th Brigade linked up with Warren’s troops for the first time.The Japanese did not let up at all. On the 17th, they finally seized FSD Hill and stormed Kuki Piquet, overcoming some depleted defenders with their sheer weight of numbers. It seemed the exhausted Kohima Garrison were doomed, now crammed into a small area. Then B Company, 1/1st Punjab with Lee-Grant tanks arrived on the 18th, just in time to give the boys a fighting chance. Under heavy Japanese sniper and artillery fire, Warren and Grover’s men advanced towards the besieged ridge positions. The 1st battalion, Royal Berkshire regiment made it to Kohima on the 20th to relieve Richards spent garrison.

 On 19 April, the day before the first of the relieving troops made their way onto the position, Hurribombers strafed the Japanese positions, Dakotas dropped ammunition, water and food accurately on the ridge and the 25-pdrs of the 2nd Division pounded away relentlessly, firing from Zubza. The relief took place in the nick of time. The men of the 1st Battalion, Royal Berkshire Regiment, could not believe their eyes or noses as they climbed up onto Summerhouse Hill on the morning of April 20. Warned by anxious defenders to keep their heads down, many gagged at the repulsive smell of death and excrement that hung like a repressive fog over the position, weighing the hill down with the stench of horror. As Japanese bullets and shells continued to fall the weary veterans of the siege made their way down the gulleys adjacent to the IGH spur, strewn with Japanese corpses, to waiting trucks, guarded by the Lee/Grants. The fresh relief troops on the road were astonished by what they saw when the red-eyed, unshaven survivors made their way quietly out of the trees, but were in no doubt that they were witnessing the end of the first phase of one of the grimmest struggles of the entire war.  The Indian troops called out 'Shabash, Royal West Kents!' in warm acknowledgement of what all the defenders of the Kohima Ridge had achieved, congratulating the tired, bearded scarecrows even as shells fell among the convoy, injuring some of the wounded again and killing some, even as they were being lifted into the trucks. As the trucks crawled down the pitted road towards Jotsoma, and then Zubza, before making their slow way down through the green mountains into hot, steamy Dimapur, the exhausted survivors had long collapsed into deep, delicious sleep. Their ordeal was over.

After 16 days of brutal siege, 278 men had been killed or wounded in a small stand, but one that would prove decisive for the CBI theater. Yet that is all for today on the Burma front as we now need to hope over to the Admiralties. The campaign for the Admiralty islands was coming to an end, now General Swift’s division just had to mop up the islands of Los Negros and Manus. Over on Los Negros, the 5th Cavalry at Papitalai had been pushing west towards the Papitalai Mission since March the 14th. They were still encountering heavy resistance, requiring support from heavy artillery and aerial bombardment. 

At 7:30am on the 15th, Troop A advanced after artillery and mortar concentrations, towards their third objective without any resistance. Troop A dug in there and Troop B sent out patrols 200 yards to the front. Yet still no opposition was encountered. Difficulties of supplying the troops over an extended supply line which consisted of 1 and a half miles of narrow, rutted, and slippery trail prevented further advance. Troop C, aided by a section furnished by the 82d Field Artillery Battalion, took 5 hours for a round trip. The 1st Squadron's last objective was the largest knob, Hill 260, on which it was now estimated were 100 well-entrenched Japanese. By the 17th, sufficient supplies had been brought up to enable Troop C, which had relieved Troop A, to push on toward this knob. After the usual artillery and mortar preparation, Troop C, protected in the rear by Troop B which was dug in on the third objective, advanced to within 50 yards of the hill crest before being stopped by machine-gun and rifle fire. Squadron commander Lt. Col. Charles E. Brady then dispatched Troop B north to envelop the enemy from his left flank. Although Troop B had to cut its way laboriously and noisily through the jungle, the envelopment was highly successful. The Japanese put up little resistance and both troops moved onto the hill and secured it by 1:10pm. About 40 or 50 dead Japanese were counted, although the total, which was impossible to determine in the jungle, was undoubtedly much higher. The 1st Squadron's losses in the day's attack were four killed and seven wounded. 

Meanwhile, patrols from the 12th cavalry had been going around inland in the region southwest of Papitalai Mission and Lombrum. They found more resistance than anticipated. After failing to connect the perimeters, Troops A and B were landed at Chaporowan Point on the 16th where more patrols advanced along the coast, also finding some resistance. Over on the Rossum Road, Troop F of the 7th cavalry were seeing their fare share of resistance at a position 800 yards down the road. Though the cavalrymen were able to push through to the northern edge of Old Rossum, the Japanese fought so hard, Troop F was forced to withdraw. Because of this action, the position was bombed on the 21st before a full assault was launched by the 1st Squadron, 7th cavalry. This time the cavalrymen were able to secure the northern edge of Old Rossum with the support of artillery and tanks. On the 23rd, the squadron pressed their attack, gradually edging through Old Rossum. To gain 1000 yards here the Americans suffered 68 casualties, then on the 24th they yet again had to withdraw undering increasingly heavy Japanese fire. Finally on the 25th, the 1st Squadron, 8th cavalry relieved the battered men. After a heavy artillery and aerial bombardment, the Japanese defenders were finally broken. That day saw the 8th cavalry suffered 7 dead, 29 wounded, for the Japanese it was close to 100. Overall the 2nd Brigade had suffered 36 deaths, 128 wounded in the week of fighting over the Rossum area, they estimated they had killed 200 Japanese. The 2nd Brigade would patrol inland for the next two months, penetrating deep jungles, swamps and high mountains. In the end they would count a total of 586 dead Japanese on Manus.

Meanwhile General Chase ordered a brigade to complete the occupation of Los Negros on March 21st. The 1st Squadron, 5th cavalry and 2nd Squadron, 12th cavalry attacked southwest towards some highground, due west of Hill 260. Troop C of the 12th cavalry advanced towards Juarez Village, supported by Troop B who performed an encircling maneuver against the retreating enemy. The 2nd Squadron, 5th cavalry would manage to clear the southern portion of Los Negros with an assault against Palapi Hill. All of Chase’s units were successful in their assaults, though they faced tough resistance. For the following days, the Japanese would fight back against the invaders and by the 25th, over 500 of them paid the price with their lives. Since February 19th, 1917 Japanese had died on Los Negros, while the 1st Brigade had suffered 143 killed and 408 wounded.

There were also mop up operations against the outlying islands with the 1st Squadron, 7th cavalry landing on Pityilu island on the 30th; the 1st Squadron, 12th cavalry assaulted Koruniat and Ndrilo islands on the 1st of april and the 2nd Squadron, 12th cavalry attacked Rambutyo on the 3rd. The 7th cavalry faced heavy resistance from a 60 man garrison on Pityilu, the 12th cavalry found no Japanese on Koruniat and Ndrilo and only a handful of Japanese were found on Rambutyo. On the 9th of april, the 1st Squadron, 12th cavalry landed on Pak island and with that the liberation of the Admiralty islands was complete. In total, General Krueger reported 326 killed, 1189 wounded and 4 missing while also counting a total of 3280 Japanese killed and 75 captured.  General Krueger would go on to partially explain the heavy enemy losses in the Admiralties operation were due to, "Our troops were gaining superiority on the ground against an enemy whose tactical knowledge envisioned only the offensive." Allied tactics of guaranteeing naval, air, and artillery superiority to the troops in each operation were making the heavy proportion of Japanese casualties an expected result in the Pacific. In the Admiralties invasion, fire from destroyers kept the enemy under cover during the landing and the artillery gave the troopers an enormous advantage against an enemy who possessed only two 75-mm mountain guns and one 70-mm howitzer. Bad weather had greatly restricted air operations during the first week after the invasion, and the weather probably accounted in part for the weakness of enemy air defense throughout the campaign; but the constant pounding of Japanese air bases within range of the Admiralties was a more important factor. General MacArthur's decision to send a limited number of men and ships to take an enemy stronghold far in advance of Allied-held territory, and within striking distance of enemy planes, had proved worth the risks involved. At a small cost, the neutralization of Rabaul and Kavieng was completed; and from the new base in the Admiralties, Allied air and naval forces could now launch surprise attacks on the Dutch New Guinea coast and could threaten essential enemy sea lanes within a 1500-mile radius including the Marianas, the east coast of Mindanao, and the southern limits of the Celebes Sea. 

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

Fate had rolled her dice yet again, and the Japanese had lost another decisive moment whereupon they could have perhaps changed the entire war in the India-Burma front. Likewise General Douglas MacArthur gambled by attacking the Admiralty Islands, but it would pay off heavily. It seems the allies were winning with every hand dealt to them.

- 123 - Pacific War - The Bombing of Hollandia and Palau , March 26 - April 2, 1944

Last time we spoke about Operation Thursday and the ferocious counteroffensive on Bougainville. The Chindits embarked on their second great raid, this time better equipped, better trained and more numerous than ever. With a literal armada of beasts of burden they marched through Burma, forded the Chindwin and began attacking and establishing strongholds. This was all done in coordination with Slim and Stilwell’s forces, trying to break the Japanese and gradually seize back lost territory. Wingate had his work cut out for him as the Chindits were providing real results, yet unfortunately he would not have long to see them. Wingate was killed in a B-25 crash and it felt like the personality of the Chindits left with him. Over on Bougainville the Japanese tossed as much as they could to try and break through the Americans perimeter to hit the airfield, but it was all for naught. 

This episode is the Bombing of Hollandia and Palau 

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Operation Brewer saw General MacArthur tossing cavalrymen against the eastern side of Los Negros. General Swift’s 1st Cavalry Division successfully landed on Los Negros and managed to secure Seedler Harbor quickly. After this, General Chase’s 1st Brigade was given the task of mopping up the island. By march 11th daily patrols had determined that the entire area from the Mokerang Peninsula to Southeast Point and as far west as Porlaka was generally free of the enemy. The 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry pushed its perimeter at Momote west and south to the water barriers of Lemondrol Creek and Ihon Lagoon. The 12th Cavalry beachhead at Salami continuously patrolled into the interior and encountered so few Japanese that it was clear the enemy lacked sufficient numbers to harass the troops on the peninsula. West of Lemondrol Creek  was a completely different story. While the troops holding the beachheads from Lombrum to Papitalai waited for supply channels to be established, they probed to locate the center of enemy resistance. The 12th Cavalry was responsible for the beachheads at Papitalai Mission and Lombrum. The 2nd Squadron had captured Papitalai Mission and on the 11th the 1st Squadron took over Lombrum Point, relieving the 7th Cavalry so they could attack Manus Island. The 5th Cavalry held the Papitalai perimeter with Troop F. When that regiment extended its control over the area east of Lemondrol and Porharmenemen Creeks on the 11th, the 2nd Squadron moved into the Porlaka area while the 1st Squadron on the left flank was concentrated near Southeast Point. It was planned that the 12th Cavalry would do most of its fighting in the northern sector moving inland from the coastal positions to cut oil the Japanese hammered at by the 5th Cavalry as it pushed west on both sides of Lemondrol Creek. Since the 8th, every Troop F patrol from Papitalai had run into enemy resistance in the hilly country to the west. Although small patrols of squad size or slightly larger were held up day after day by resistance about 800 yards west of Papitalai, these first encounters did not reveal the full strength of the enemy pocket. When an attack by a platoon of Troop E, reinforced by two tanks, two bazookas, and flamethrowers, was repulsed on the 11th, the strength of the enemy strongpoint became clearer. The enemy was well dug in along the ridge, marked by a series of knobs, running west from Papitalai. The highest point, Hill 260, about 2,500 yards from Papitalai, not to be mistaken for Hill 260 on Bougainville by the way, this was probably the center of the enemies defense. However, on two knobs east of 260, well-defended outposts prevented any movement farther into the interior. The position 800 yards from Papitalai which had repulsed Troop E was defended by a platoon with knee mortars and at least 3 machine guns. The total enemy strength facing the 5th Cavalry was estimated at 150 to 200 Japanese. 

Now that was the ongoings of Los Negros, but Brigadier General Verne Mudge’s 2nd Brigade was now preparing to invade Manus island. American intelligence was unsure of the disposition of the enemy on Manus. A rough estimate was that 2700 Japanese were concentrated there and would most likely make a stand at Lorengau. The Americans expected the Japanese would put up a last losing fight. But because of the lack of knowledge of their numbers and disposition on the largest island of the Admiralties, this would require careful planning for the invasion. Fighting into the interior where the mountain range would provide defensive positions and through the swampy forests covering the rest of the island would not be easy. There were only 4 roads winding about the island and converging at Lorengau would be suitable for moving vehicles, and long stretches of these red-clay roads would be impassable in rainy weather. Surrounding jungle and swamps would confine any large-scale movement to the roads. Therefore, the plan was to pin the enemy to the coast where it was hoped he had concentrated his main strength.

Mudge planned to land Troops A and C of the 8th cavalry regiment at the Yellow beaches of Lugos Mission. When the 8th Cavalry had secured a beachhead, including the Lugos Mission itself, each squadron would advance east, the 1st Squadron along the coast using the Number Three Road, and the 2nd along an inland road known as the Number One Road, to execute a wide sweep toward Lorengau. If a sizeable garrison was concentrated at fortified Lorengau, the inland arm of this attack would prevent the enemy from escaping along the only road leading west to the mountain areas. Prior to the assault, 3 patrols had been sent to Bear Point on Manus and on the islands of Butjo Luo and Hauwei. Mudge planned to deploy artillery at these places to aid in his assault. Bear Point was found to have no enemy, but unfortunately it was not a suitable place for artillery placement. The northern island of Butjo Luo was an excellent site for artillery and was found to be unoccupied. Hauwei would turn out to be another story. The American  patrol moved out from Salami on an LCV and a PT boat, landing without opposition on the western end of the island. Major Carter S. Vaden of the 99th Field Artillery Battalion, threw two grenades into a well camouflaged bunker about 10 yards from the beach and the party progressed inland. Immediately after the grenade explosions, a mortar shell landed on the beach in the rear of the party. From three sides, machine-gun, rifle, and mortar fire opened up. Fortunately, the grenades had evidently sprung a planned ambush prematurely and the party was not cut off from the rear. Using their submachine guns, the men of the patrol were able to hold back the enemy. They were aided by some supporting fire from the PT Boat and the .30-caliber machine gun of the LCV. After 2 and a half hours they managed to withdraw to the water's edge. The PT boat had returned to its tender after the commanding officer was wounded, and the coxswain of the LCV shouted and motioned for the cavalrymen to get on board, but only five of them reached the boat, as the others were engaged with the enemy on shore. The LCV had troubles of its own; enemy mortar and machine-gun fire found its range and wounded all on board except two. Then the LCV grounded on submerged coral and sank 200 yards offshore after receiving a direct hit from a mortar. The wounded men, put into lifejackets, floated about in the water. When the remaining members of the patrol on shore were wading out toward the LCV, 6 Japanese attempted to set up a machine gun on the beach. The men cut them down with their submachine guns. Still under fire, the cavalrymen swam out to the survivors of the LCV, making a group of 18 men out in the water. Failing to attract the notice of the destroyers nearby, the tired men had to stay in the water for 3 hours until a PT boat picked them up. At the same time a destroyer closed in to the island to draw hostile fire and bombard enemy positions on the western end. Hauwei was going to need extra help to be secured.

The 2nd Squadron, 7th cavalry departed from Lombrum Point on the 11th and landed on Butjo Luo. The next day, Destroyer gunfire and rockets as well as 105-mm concentrations from the 61st Field Artillery Battalion at Mokerang point battered Hauwei. Then Kittyhawks of the 77th Pursuit Squadron at Momote airfield bombed and strafed the Hauwei. After all of this, the 2nd Squadron landed on Hauwei meeting slight resistance at the beach. They advanced 300 yards further inland where they became pinned down by heavy rifle, machine gun and mortar fire. The Japanese were firing upon them from some bunkers, prompting the 2nd Squadron to dig in and allow the artillery teams to hit them throughout the night. During the night the 61st Field Artillery Battalion from the north end of Mokerang Plantation fired 1,000 rounds to harass the enemy. This fire was directed so accurately and carefully that it was brought down on the enemy within 100 yards of the cavalrymen's positions without any casualties to our troops, and helped minimize enemy activity during the night. 

At 10am on the 13th, with the support of a medium tank, the cavalrymen stormed the bunkers along the edges of the island. The Japanese put up a valiant fight, but they lacked anti-tank weaponry. By 12pm, the 2nd Squadron successfully mopped up the enemy, suffering 8 deaths and 46 wounded. They estimated they had killed 43 Japanese who were all naval personnel. Having secured the two islands, now one artillery battalion set up at Butjo Luo and two others upon Hauwei. The next day at 7:00am the 3 artillery battalions opened fire upon the Lorengau Township area. This target was chosen to divert the enemy's attention from the landing beaches around Lugos Mission. Meanwhile 4 destroyers bombarded Lorengau with their 5-inch guns. Then 18 B-25’s from  Nadzab bombed and strafed the Lugos Mission and the beach areas until H - 5 minutes. Between 9:07 and 9:25, they dropped 81 500-pound bombs, strafed with more than 44,000 rounds of machine-gun fire, and cleared the target just as the troops were coming ashore.  

The 8th cavalry departed Salami, heading for the Yellow Beaches covered by 3 rocket boats. The wave of buffaloes drew up to the beaches, and it appeared that they were going to make it without opposition until an enemy machine gun opened up from east of the landing beaches. Immediately the buffaloes responded with their own machine-gun fire, and two PT boats closed in to support. With 100 rounds from a flak boat added to this fire the machine gun was silenced. Two waves of landing craft followed the buffaloes to the shore in rapid succession and the narrow beaches, backed either by jungle or a high bluff, were soon congested with assault troops. On the eastern beach, Troop A began a vigorous drive toward Lugos Mission and the Number Three Road leading to the Lorengau airdrome. Captain Raymond J. Jennings, led the troops to storm the bluff where Lugos Mission was located and overran the mission before the few Japanese who had survived the bombardment could put up effective opposition. The men worked their way into the mission compound and cleared out the area with grenades. Troop A was soon on its way along Number Three Road leaving behind it, some 20 dead SNLF, without the loss of a single cavalryman. Meanwhile Troop C advanced west 800 yards to a ridge where they stopped and dug in, having accomplished their mission of establishing a defensive perimeter to protect the landing of successive elements.

Other waves of the 1st and 2nd Squadrons began landing ashore as the 7th cavalry took up the beachhead. The 2nd squadron advanced over some ridges towards the Number One Road, while Troop A reduced enemy bunkers progressing roughly a mile from the beach. By 11:20am, they came across 3 mutually-supporting bunkers that halted their advance. It took Troop B’s support alongside artillery and aerial bombardment to destroy the bunkers to they could advance. Meanwhile the 1st Squadron emerged out of the jungle into a clearing at 5pm, where they occupied a ridge overlooking the southern edge of the airdrome, where they would dig in. The 2nd Squadron reached Number One Road, where they ran into 3 bunkers. The following morning with tank support the squadron overran the bunkers and advanced northeast towards Lorengau. The cavalrymen would destroy 7 bunkers during their trek, before halting 100 yards before Lorengau.

To the north, Troop A was clearing a coconut grove north of the airstrip, from which Japanese snipers were harassing them throughout the night. Troop C advanced along the southern edge near the airstip where they came across another pack of bunkers. Since the snipers north of the strip had been cleared out by noon, an attack could be made in the open. Troop B, supported by light tanks on their left advanced down the strip, followed by Troop D and the squadron HQ. Troop A advanced across the strip and then east along the north edge. By 1:00pm Troop C managed to destroy two bunkers using grenades, forcing the Japanese inhabitants to flee out into the open where they were cut down. Troop C then was about to dash across the airstrip when they suddenly became pinned down by friendly fire from Troop B who were trying to disengage the enemy before them. The 1st squadron suffered 9 deaths and 19 wounded during the action. Mudge then ordered them to relieve Troop C, who were holding some high ground south of the airstrip. 

On the morning of the 17th after extensive naval and artillery bombardment, Mudge launched a coordinated attack with the 2nd Squadron advancing south of the airstrip and the 1st Squadron assaulting the bunkers that had held up the 8th cavalry’s advance. The bombardments had nearly annihilated the bunkers, allowing the 1st squadron to face only slight resistance. They soon attacked a secondary Japanese position further east upon a ridge. This position was also met with artillery and mortar fire and would fall by 11:30am. After this the cavalrymen were able to obliterate the remaining pillboxes and advance across the pulverized airstrip.

Meanwhile the 2nd Squadron of the 7th and 8th cavalry regiments linked up along the Number One Road near Lorengau. The 8th Cavalry had encountered little resistance on the road, destroying whatever bunkers were encountered with the aid of fire from medium tanks. The light tank accompanying the squadron had a track blown off by the first Japanese anti tank mine encountered in the operation. By 1pm, all the front-line troops around the airstrip to Number one Road linked up forming a general advance. By this point the backbone of the enemies resistance had been broken, leaving little to resistance them. For the next 1,500 yards to the river, it took them  2 hours because the Japanese had hurriedly put in large quantities of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. They had been emplaced, however, with no prepared plan, and many were poorly camouflaged or left lying completely on the surface. The Japanese had also dug holes and refilled them without emplacing any mines. As the cavalrymen slowly made their way to the river, they suffered a few casualties from the mines.

The 7th cavalry reached the Lorengau River by 3pm, from there they dispatched a reconnaissance platoon who quickly came under fire from bunkers atop some hills overlooking Lorengau. Lorengau was sheltered in a valley surrounded by jungle-covered hills rising to 400 feet. The Japanese believed an attack would come from the sea, thus many of their defenses were sited to cover the shoreline. The offshore approaches and the three roads entering the settlement from the east, south, and north were also covered by defensive positions. From the position held by the 2nd Brigade, the only approach to the town was over a sandbar at the mouth of the Lorengau River, a slow-moving stream 20 yards wide and 10 to 20 feet deep, except at the sandbar. The beach area, which the troops would then have to cross, was heavily protected. Naval demolition mines, containing 20 pounds of black powder and detonated by a master switch located in a control bunker up the hillside, covered the beach. About 100 yards inland from the beach a series of rifle pits and gun emplacements were constructed on the side of a dike which paralleled the shore. On the hills surrounding the harbor, beach, and town about a dozen heavy bunkers were used to reinforce the fires of beach defenses and to add depth to the position. As usual these bunkers were carefully camouflaged, although the concentration of naval and artillery fire as well as repeated bombings had disclosed the location of several. Mudge ordered the men to dig in for the night on the west bank of the river and establish a perimeter defense against some expected counterattacks that would not develop in the end. The next morning, after a mortar and artillery bombardment, the 2nd Squadron, 8th Cavalry advanced down from its ridge positions to the mouth of the broad river, with its Reconnaissance Platoon leading. Upon fording the river, the cavalrymen only faced a handful of machine-guns. Facing almost no opposition, the squadron was thus able to secure Lorengau, counting 87 dead Japanese in the remains of the town. 

Colonel Ezaki seemed to have disappeared during the battle over Papitalai leaving his men leaderless. The Japanese naval troops in desperation began retreating towards Rossum, with American patrols hot on their trail. There would be a furious fight down the Rossum Road. 1st Lt. James M. Concannon captured an enemy map of the area during his patrol to which he exclaimed, "Well, here goes Concannon to get himself a Purple Heart!" Lt. Concannon's platoon had been ordered to go along Number Two Road which went to Rossum and from there to Kelaua Harbor, through the heart of the Japanese defenses indicated on the captured map. Hardly had the platoon crossed the outpost line still held by Troop E along Number Two Road when it came under fire from a pair of bunkers sited to cover the track. Lieutenant Concannon and one of his men were wounded. The platoon sergeant assumed command and attempted to flank the position. When the attempt was not successful, the sergeant decided to withdraw and report, as his mission was one of reconnaissance. Upon receiving the information that the enemy was in position not 200 yards from the outpost line, Colonel Bradley directed Major Shore to send Troop A back up the track to neutralize the enemy position. The troop was reinforced with machine guns and two 37-mm antitank guns. 

Troop A of the 8th cavalry were ordered to deal with the newly discovered enemy bunkers. Corporal Peter J. Armstrong and Armando V. Valencia set their heavy machine-gun in position at a range of 30 yards from one of the bunkers. Having disclosed his position by laying a continuous burst of fire on the bunker, Corporal Armstrong was wounded by sniper fire. Armstrong continued firing until a grenade knocked him unconscious. Although the gun had been hit in several places and was leaking a steady stream from its water jacket, Corporal Valencia took over and continued firing at the bunker slits until the machine-gun froze; then he fired with his submachine-gun until it was knocked out of his hands by an enemy bullet. In the meantime the mortars had obtained four direct hits on the bunkers, and the anti-tank guns had made two. Corporals Armstrong and Valencia were later awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, and for its action during the day Troop A was given a unit citation. 

After taking out the stubborn position, Troop A advanced along the road under heavy sniper fire, until they were relieved by Troop C. Troop C immediately was met with a heavy Japanese counterattack shortly after nightfall. The counterattack was launched by 8 Japanese using rifle grenades and small arms. Considering the size of the attacking force, the casualties of the troop were heavy: 2 killed and 10 wounded. All the Japanese were killed, largely due to a quick adjustment by the forward observer of the 61st Field Artillery Battalion followed by four volleys fired for effect. By this point the Americans had achieved all their objectives for the Admiralty Islands campaign, the only thing left to do was mop up the islands. The remaining IJA troops were now withdrawing across the Loniu Passage over to Manus. The 8th cavalry were soon given the task of clearing the eastern end of Manus, while the 7th cavalry would clear out the Rossum Road. Yet that is all for this campaign as we are now heading over to New Guinea.

General MacArthur was planning his new Western New Guinea offensive. After the directives given on March 12th, Admiral Nimitz had been instructed to provide support for his Hollandia operation. The Japanese began their occupation of Hollandia  early in April of 1942 but paid little attention to the region for a year. Then  Allied air reconnaissance disclosed that the enemy was constructing airfields on the Lake Sentani Plain. This development progressed slowly until late 1943, by which time successive reverses in the air and on the ground in eastern New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago, together with increasing shipping losses in the same region, began to demonstrate to the Japanese the vulnerability of their air and supply bases east of Hollandia. In late 1943 and early 1944, the Japanese  built 3 airfields on the Lake Sentani Plain and started a fourth at Tami, on the seacoast east of Humboldt Bay. In addition, because of shipping losses east of Hollandia, the Japanese began to develop Humboldt Bay into a major supply base and transshipment point. Large ships would unload at Hollandia, whence cargo would be carried by barge to points southeast along the coast of New Guinea as far as Wewak over 215 miles away. Much of the cargo of the large ships remained at Hollandia to build up the base there.

Admiral Nimitz decided to dispatch two fast carrier groups of Admiral Mitscher’s Task Force 58 to conduct fighter sweeps against Hollandia and the Wakde-Sarmi area in order to keep their airfields neutralized. MacArthur south for the carries to support the troops for 8 days after the landings. But Nimitz believed this would put the carriers in risk, because the Japanese would be able to launch aircraft from all over the Dutch East Indies or even the Philippines. It was decided Task Force 58 would remain in the Hollandia region for only 3 days after the landings were made. As a result MacArthur opted to supplement using land-based aircraft against Hollandia. To obtain this he would need to capture an airfield in Northern New Guinea, just east of the main objective. He chose an Aitape, it was a lightly guarded area and already partially developed by the Japanese, such as the incomplete airfields around the Tadji Plantation. Once the men landed ashore at Aitape, allied forces could provide flank protection for Haollandia against any westward actions by the Japanese 18th Army. For the assault against Aitape, MacArthur planned to use the 8 escort carriers of Task Force 78 under the command of Rear Admiral Ralph E. Daviso.

Now for the amphibious assault, Admiral Kinkaid gave the job to Admiral Barbey’s task force 77 who were divided into 3 attack groups. They would bring over General Eichelberger’s 1st corp who would perform the Hollandia operation, codenamed Operation Reckless. I think it is a pretty suitable name for a MacArthur operation. For the Hollandia part of the operation, the 19th and 21st regiments of Major General Frederick Irving's 24th division would land at Tanahmerah Bay; the 162nd and 186th regiments of General Fuller’s 41st division would land at Humboldt Bay. For the operation against Aitape, codenamed Persecution, the 163rd regiment of the 41st division led by General Doe would perform the initial landings. To soften up the enemy, General Kenny’s air forces began bombing Wewak and Hansa in mid March, then in early April they began neutralizing the airfields to try and deceive General Adachi into believing they were the next allied target.

Additionally, MacArthur asked Admiral Spruance to perform a carrier raid against the Palau Islands, codenamed Operation Desecrate One, followed by strikes on Yap and Woleai in the eastern Carolines, in order to prevent the Japanese from reinforcing Western New Guinea. Admiral Mitscher’s carriers departed Majuro on the 22nd of March and made their way around the Carolines, trying to sneak past Truk undetected. Despite their best efforts, Japanese search planes from Truk managed to spot them on their 3rd day at sea. This prompted Admiral Spruance to advance the day of the raid from April 1st to March 30th. Meanwhile after sighting the allied naval forces, Admiral Koga ordered an evacuation of Palau, seeing a large number of warships and merchant shipping flee the area for Tawi-Tawi. The US submarines Gar, Blackfish, Tang and Archerfish were stationed to operate against the withdrawing ships and as plane guards. On the 23rd, Tunny sank the Japanese submarine I-42 and damaged the 14,850-ton tanker Iro. To the north of Palau, during an attack on the 26th, Tullibee was hit and sunk by her own circling torpedo. Bashaw torpedoed a 4,317-ton freighter escorted by the destroyers Minazuki and Yuzuki. On the 29th, the super battleship Musashi departed Palau under cover of darkness to avoid an expected air raid, and encountered Tunny, which fired six torpedoes at the battleship; five of them missed, but the sixth blew a hole 5.8 meters in diameter near the bow, flooding her with 3000 tonnes of water. The torpedo hit killed 7 crewmen and wounded another 11. After temporary repairs, Musashi sailed for Japan later that night and arrived at Kure Naval Arsenal on April 3. 

On the 30th, Task Force 58 reached its assembly point 90 miles south of the Palau Islands. The Task Force was met with a Japanese air strike consisting of mostly Betty’s and Oscars who were easily swept aside. Then fast carriers Enterprise, Bunker Hill, Hornet, Yorktown and Lexington launched their first air strikes against Palaus. For the next day and a half, the Americans flew hundreds of sorties over these islands, striking the airfields and shooting down all planes they could find. The attacks saw 40 Japanese ships at Palau and Angaur sunk, another 4 were badly damaged. 93 aerial victories would be won over Palau and Avengers from Lexington, Bunker Hill and Hornet laid extensive mines around the channels and approaches to Palau. This was the first tactical aerial mining of the Pacific War performed by carrier aircraft. In response, Admiral Koga asked for help from neighboring islands. He received 9 B6N torpedo bombers from Yap who attempted a night attack against Task Force 58 on the 31st. Unfortunately for the Japanese, 4 Hellcats from Cabot managed to intercept them, successfully shooting all of them down.

Koga certainly had a lot on his plate. Due to the recent attacks against Truk and now Palau, Koga decided to transfer his HQ from the Musashi to Davao on March 31st. Most of his senior staff and cryptographers boarded 3 H8K flying boats enroute to Mindanao from Palau. All 3 of the flying boats ran straight into a typhoon just off of Cebu, two of them got lost. These flying boats were carrying Admiral Koga and Vice Admiral Fukudome Shigeru, his chief of staff. Koga’s plan would end up crashing enroute to Davao, killing all aboard. Thus another commander in chief of the IJN forces had met his end to a plane crash. The other plane carrying Fukudome crashed off the coast of Cebu. Fukudome had a harrowing experience, but escaped the aircraft and began swimming to the island. To make matters even worse, while swimming Fukudome was grabbed by Filipino guerillas who brought him over to Lt Colonel James Cushing. Cushing was a former engineer in the Philippines who helped organize a resistance movement. Now captured Fukudome was certainly a large prize, yet a even bigger one came on April 3rd. A Filipino shopkeeper named Pedro Gantuangoko spotted a box floating offshore on the 3rd and picked it up in his fishing boat. The box contained a red leather briefcase carrying the Z plan. Fukudome had assumed the box sank with the aircraft, but in a twist of fate it did not.

Now while this was going on, Lt Colonel Seiiti Ohnisi had dispatched troops to search for survivors of the aircraft crash and for the box containing the Z plan. Ohnisi hundreds of Filipino villagers interrogated, tortured and killed, entire Filipino villages were burnt to the ground. Eventually Ohnisi cornered Cushing and they struck a deal. On April 10th, with Japanese forces on Cebu hot on the heels of the guerillas, the American commander, Lt-Colonel Cushing, arranged to return Fukudome and the other prisoners to the Japanese in return for a cessation of the massacre of Filipino civilians. Three days later, the Filipinos who had found the box containing Plan Z and the code book when it washed ashore, turned them over to Cushing. The codebook was recognized for what it was when the guerillas discovered the Japanese were offering a 50000 peso reward for its return. On April 27, Cushing arranged for the items to be picked up by the submarine Crevalle. Traveling mostly on the surface for speed, and diving only when needed, the submarine survived depth charging twice, finally arriving at Darwin on May 19. From there, the documents were flown to Brisbane later that day. Allied codebreakers looked forward with anticipation to the arrival of the codebook, since they had been stymied by changes to the IJN code since the summer of 1942 and had not “read the enemy’s mail” in any detail since the week before the Battle of Midway. The documents outlined the new strategy for the defense of the inner perimeter islands around Japan with the intention of drawing the US fleet in for a decisive showdown. The documents were sent to Admiral Nimitz and would prove extremely valuable during the Battle of the Philippines Sea. The documents were so vital, the Americans performed a covert operation sending them back to the Philippines by submarine and placed near the wreckage of the flying boat by American divers. It was one of the greatest intelligence coups of WW2. Thus Admiral Koga was dead, the Z plan fell into allied hands and the IJN was now leaderless. Koga’s death would not be announced until May and he was replaced by Admiral Toyoda Soemu. Koga was promoted to Marshal Admiral posthumously and granted a state funeral. According to pilot Nagatsuka Ryuji: “The death of Admiral Koga, successor to Admiral Yamamoto, had been another shock for the Japanese nation. These distressing circumstances had forced the naval and military Chiefs of Staff to resign. They had been replaced by General Tojo and Admiral Shimada.” 

Now back to the invasion, on April 1st Rear-Admiral John Reeves’ carriers launched  airstrikes against Yap and Ulithi, with the three task groups then attacking Woleai. \25 American aircraft were lost, with 26 out of 44 aircrews rescued thanks to submarine Harder. Meanwhile, the fleet’s Hellcats win 111 aerial victories and destroy 46 grounded aircraft on the three atolls. With this, Task Force 58 successfully removed Palau as a threat to the Hollandia-Aitape operation. Alongside this South and Southwest Pacific land-based aircraft from bases in eastern New Guinea and the Admiralties, bombed islands in the eastern Carolines and undertook many long reconnaissance missions. Meanwhile Kenney’s air forces were busy neutralizing enemy air bases in Western New Guinea and the eastern islands of the Dutch East Indies. Most of the strategic support missions flown to western New Guinea were undertaken by US 5th Air Force while the Royal Australian Air Forces Command took responsibility for the majority of the strikes against the islands in the eastern Dutch East Indies. The operations were intensified roughly 6 weeks before the landings at Hollandia and Aitape. 

 

On March 30th, Kenney shifted the weight of his attacks from the Wewak area to Hollandia, where the Japanese 6th Air Division had recently retreated from Wewak and received strong reinforcements. The airforces also performed a full aerial reconnaissance taking photos of Hollandia’s 3 airdromes on March. Added to this were radio intercepts and intelligence ereports, allowing the allies to estimate the Japanese had around 351 aircraft there. With this information at hand, Kenney launched Liberators armed with small 20 pound fragmentation bombs to perform a concentrated bombing against the enemy airfield. Since the Allies hoped to rehabilitate the Hollandia strips as quickly as possible, hits on the runways with heavy ordnance would be avoided. Fighter cover would be provided by long-range P-38's, which would escort the bombers over the target, and by shorter-range P-47's, which would meet the bombers near Aitape, beat off pursuing fighters, and shepherd them home. Medium and light bombers would continue attacks on the airfields at Wewak to prevent their use by Japanese fighters. The Liberators with their P-38 and P-47 escorts would smash the anti-aircraft defenses while the medium and light bombers would drench the area with bombs.

On March 30th, 7 B-24’s hit Hollandia dispersals as 75 Liberators of the 43rd bombardment group and 59 P-38s of the 80th, 431st and 432nd Fighter Squadrons swept over Hollandia’s airstrips and dropped nearly 6000 bombs. To make matters worse for the Japanese, they suffered from insufficient radar warning, many of their aircraft would be on the ground refueling after some morning patrols. The 5th Air Force found countless enemy aircraft parked wing tip to wing tip along the runways, a lethargic anti-aircraft reaction. 25 or more fighters made "eager" passes against the 65th Bombardment Squadron, whose gunners claimed two destroyed. The 80th Fighter Squadron engaged a reported 35 to 40 hostile fighters, destroying 7 of them. The 431st Fighter Squadron claimed one Tony damaged, but the 432d encountered no enemy fighters. Japanese interception seemed badly disorganized. The planes milled about with little evident formation, and most of the pilots appeared to have little desire for a fight. Over 100 aircraft were destroyed as the Japanese were caught completely unprepared.

Japanese prisoners-of-war and captured documents later revealed that the reason the bombing operation was so successful was because the Japanese high command erroneously transported too many airplanes to Hollandia from the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies but did not transport more pilots and maintenance crews with the airplanes. There was no way for them to build appropriate defensive shelters to protect all 400 aircraft and also there were not enough trained pilots who could fly all of those airplanes at the same time so many perfectly operational aircraft were left sitting there with no aircrew to maintain them. The morale at Hollandia airbase was very low during the bombing operation, with many Japanese soldiers and airmen hiding in bunkers instead of manning anti-aircraft artillery and getting airplanes into the air. Most of these Hollandia soldiers and airmen were rear-echelon and not combat-oriented at all because most of the combat-trained divisions from the 18th Army were recently sent further east towards Wewak in anticipation of amphibious landings that would never come thanks to the deception and feints carried out by General Kenney. The P-38s then withdrew to Nadzab as soon as the bombers cleared their targets; and the P-47s, meeting the Liberators near Aitape, convoyed them home without incident. So successful was this first raid that one squadron reported that “Hollandia had really been Wewaked”.

The next day, Kenney launched a nearly identical mission, with 7 Liberators and 52 P-38s bombing the dispersal at Hollandia, Cyclops and Sentani airdromes. 153 tons of 100 pound demos, frags and incendiary bombs were dropped. The Japanese anti-aircraft fire was more accurate this time around and 56 Japanese fighters gave the allies a fight. However the pilots were inexperienced and unaggressive. The Americans estimated 14 aircraft were shot down while they suffered the loss of one P-38. After the air strike, the total number of destroyed aircraft on the ground reached 199. At this point the Japanese scrambled to withdraw their remaining serviceable aircraft out of Hollandia.

On April 3, Kenney sent his heaviest air attack to date. 66 B-24s escorted by 21 P-38s dropped 492 1000-pound bombs on anti-aircraft defenses. An estimated 30 Japanese Tonys and Oscars attempted without success to break up the bomb runs, and B-24 gunners claimed 2 fighters destroyed, while the 21 escorting P-38's of the 80th Squadron claimed downing ten. Then, 96 A-20s escorted by 17 P-38s strafed and dropped 100-pound para-demolition bombs over grounded aircraft, stores, and other targets of opportunity. The 432nd Squadron, covering the A-20's with 17 P-38's, encountered about 20 Japanese fighters and claimed 12 definitely destroyed, against the loss of one P-38. Finally, 76 B-25s escorted by 36 P-38s swept the strips at noon, scattering parafrags and parademos and strafing everything in sight. Only 3 Japanese fighters were encountered in this last attack, which were all shot down. After the end of the raid, Hollandia was so badly mauled that it could no longer be considered a major air installation. A Japanese seaman after hearing of the Allied mission of April 3rd against Hollandia, although seemingly confused as to imperial folklore, correctly assessed the Allied victory: "Yesterday, the anniversary of the birthday of Emperor Meiji, we received from the enemy, greetings, which amount to the annihilation of our Army Air Force in New Guinea." After April 3rd, the 5th Air Force virtually owned the air over Hollandia.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

The Admiralty Islands campaign was coming to a swift close, seeing MacArthur secure the valuable islands like Los Negros and Manus. MacArthurs new campaign to hit Western New Guinea and the Dutch East Indies, certainly began with a bang as General Kenney’s air forces had basically claimed air supremacy, the Japanese were in full panic mode. 

- 122 - Pacific War - Operation Thursday, March 19-26, 1944

Last time we spoke about the beginning of the Japanese counteroffensive on Bougainville, action on the Burma front and New Guinea. General Hyakutake was under immense pressure to dislodge the Americal force from Bougainville. He unleashed a grand counter offensive trying to break the American defensive lines. Both the Japanese and Americans began suffering heavy casualties, yet neither side wavered in its resolve. Over in the Burma front, the Galahad unit, aka Merrills marauders joined their British, American and Chinese allies in pushing the Japanese back. There were some issues involving friendly fire, but overall the allies were making gains in a theater where the Japanese had dominated for years. Over in New Guinea, the Japanese were continuing to retreat to Madang. Things were going so terribly, units were now being deployed to defend the western part of New Guinea. Japan was simply not winning the war of attrition. 

This episode is the Operation Thursday

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Things have really been heating up on the Burma front. General Mutaguchi basically tricked his own superiors into allowing him to invade India under the guise of Operations HA-GO and U-GO. This saw Japanese units advancing towards Imphal and Kohima. On the other side General Stilwell’s forces were advancing upon Myitkyina in the north, as General Slim’s 15th corp were clashing with the Japanese in the Arakan region. Americans, British, Indians, Chinese were all performing operations to halt Japanese attacks and push further into Burma, but on top of all of that, we now need to talk about our favorite child born from the onion eating madman Wingate, the Chindits. 

All the way back in early February, Operation Thursday was in development. The operation was basically an extended version of the first Chindit raid, this time in two waves, with 3 brigades making long marches across the Chindwin. The first wave would go into the enemy territory, then 2-3 months later the second wave would come in to reinforce them. There were large issues with the operation, namely a lack of aircraft. Aircraft were being used for the Arakan campaign and flying supplies over the Hump. Chiang Kai-shek would not part with any aircraft set to go over the Hump and not even Mountbatten had the authority to touch the issue. Regardless Thursday would be authorized and its goals were as follows; to assist Stilwell’s advance; to create favorable conditions for the Y-Force to gord the Salween and to inflict maximum damage to the Japanese in northern Burma. Their principles targets were the Shwebo-Myitkyina railway and the Myitkyina-Bhamo-Indaw road. There would be 4 strongholds to be designated, Piccadilly, Chowringhee, Broadway and Templecombe, the last one later renamed Aberdeen. The US 900th airborne engineer company would clear strips suitable for Dakotas to land.

On February 4th Wingate and Stratemeyer, commander of the Eastern Air command issued the essential guidelines for Thursday, stressing this raid would require the wounded being flown out from the strongholds rather than to be abandoned as was the case with the first expedition. Stratemeyer added orders to bomb the stronghold areas prior to their establishment, though Wingate had instead favored diversionary bombings of Rangoon, Mandalay and Bangkok. 

On February 5th of 1944, Fergussons 16th brigade kicked off first from Ledo and onlookers would remark they looked more like a mule train than a commando force. There were elephants, 250 bullocks, 547 horses and 31314 mules assigned to the operation. Fergusson’s 4000 men took 500 mules, fully laden along with them. They avoided Japanese forces by traversing exceptionally difficult terrain. It would be a full month before all Brigade Battalions crossed the Chindwin river. The main target was Indaw, although two Columns were tasked to attack the town of Lonkin, in the Kachin Hills and 20 miles west of Kamaing. Two gliders, loaded with folding boats, outboard engines, and gasoline, were towed by air to the Chindwin River and softly set down on a sandbar. Not only were the necessities delivered to Fergusson, but also for reuse the pair of C-4As were plucked from the scene by a C-47. Wingate traveled with Fergusson and his men for the first the start of the grueling ascent up the Paktai. They faced mud slides, torrential rain, the usual Burma experiences. It would take them all of February to reach the Chindwin, after that it was another 200 miles to their target of Indaw. Wingate departed after the first few days, but would come back over by aircraft to observe the crossing of the Chindwin. Fergusson had been critical of Wingate in January, describing him as a liar, but he continued to believe in the man. “Wingate was sometimes wrong in small things but never in big.’

When Wingate met Fergusson he showed up with an entourage of war correspondents, trying to publicize the Chindits activities. He began talking to them of a new fad he came across, turtle eggs which he declared provided singular nourishment. Like so many of Wingate’s eccentric ideas, no one favored it. Turtles’ eggs were found to be no more appetizing than those of any other reptile, and in fact many of the Chindits experienced stomach pains and other digestive problems after eating them. Then Fergusson had to tell Wingate they could not possibly reach Indaw earlier than March 20th. The expectation had been March 5th, thus Wingate was pissed.

At the same time, the 1st air commando had performed aerial reconnaissance over the 3 selected locations suitable for bringing gliders, Broadway, Piccadilly and Chowringhee. Yet Wingate had issued strict orders banning any further overflights fearing it would give up their intentions to the Japanese. Despite the warning, Colonel Cochram dispatched a B-25 on March 5th to perform a final look over the sites, giving last minute reports that Broadway and Chowinghee were clear, but it looked like teak logs were sprawled over the Piccadilly site. Since the Piccadilly site seemed unsuitable, Brigadier Calvert persuaded Wingate to send the Gliders into Broadway. On the night of March 5th, the gliders carrying the second wave were flown in. The pathfinder gliders, first to touch down, set out flare pots to facilitate succeeding waves of gliders. However, the field proved far less accessible than expected. For many years, the local people had logged teak and during the wet season, slid the huge logs across the ground down to a river. Over time the technique gouged deep ruts that elephant grass covered, making the trenches invisible to aerial photographs or reconnaissance. Co-commander of the 1st air commando group John Richardson Alison recalled "They formed perfect glider traps, and there was no way to avoid them. The gliders arrived overhead in large numbers, and when a glider starts down there is no way to stop it. As each one hit the trenches the landing gears would come off and the gliders would go in a heap. We tried to arrange the lights to spread the gliders all over the field to avoid collisions, but this was impossible. They were coming in too fast to change directions, and glider after glider piled into each other while landing.” The next day the gliders landed successfully on Chowringhee and the airstrip was completed by nightfall. Meanwhile transports began to bring Calverts 77th brigade, followed by Brigadiers Lentaigne’s 111th brigade. By the 11th, the fly in was complete, now 9250 Chindits were landed on Broadway and Chowringhee.

The Chindits then began their advance east to hit the Lashio-Bahmo-Myitkyina motor supply line. Trekking from Chowringhee, Morris Force Columns headed north-east, to cut the Bhamo-Myitkyina road, as 111 Brigade’s British Battalions marched south from Broadway to link up with other elements flown into Chowringhee. Their job was to stop Indaw being reinforced from the south. Thus, 111th Brigade set up ambushes and roadblocks south of Indaw although part of the brigade which landed at Chowringhee was delayed in crossing the Irrawaddy River, before moving west to Pinlebu. Broadway was held with a garrison that included field artillery, anti-aircraft guns and some six Spitfires that would successfully repel a Ki-43 attack on March 13. 

Meanwhile Calvert’s columns advanced over the railway towards Henu, where they would establish the White City stronghold, roughly 20 miles north of Indaw. Columns were directed to demolish bridges and railroads around the Kadu, Mawhun and Pinwe stations. It was a long and gruesome march over some very tough terrain. For example, it took Column 45, bringing up the Brigade’s rear, nine days to cover the first 35 miles, to Hkalak Ga. They set out again on February 22nd. By this time, the men were tiring of K-rations, which gave calories but no bulk. Smoking was confined to lunch and evening bivouacs. The Leicesters were in the lead and reached the Chindwin on February 29th. Meanwhile, 45 Recce’s columns, still in the rear, reached the Chindwin during the afternoon of Saturday March 4. It had taken them 21 days to cover some of the wildest, toughest country on earth.

After successfully crossing the Chindwin, on March 12th Fergusson received orders to seize Indaw’s airfield, destroy supply dumps in the area and establish a new Stronghold, to be known as Aberdeen. The Brigade continued south, moving parallel to and west of the railway. Meanwhile Calvert’s 5 columns to 5 days to reach Henu. The South Staffords were the first to arrive and the Japanese reacted before they could dig in – they would have to fight for the Block. were on the alert to resist their incursion. In the afternoon of 16th, Calvert launched a bayonet charge up Pagoda Hill, with the Chindits soon engaging the Japanese engineers, who were charging down, in a vicious hand-to-hand combat. Eventually, with the assistance of the 1st Air Commando’s close support, the Japanese were successfully pushed off the hill and the White City stronghold was established. For the loss of 23 dead and 64 wounded, Calvert’s Chindits had killed 42 Japanese and had effectively cut the line of communications supporting the 18th Division far to the north. In the ensuing days, the stronghold would be developed into a fortress, with some airstrips becoming operational by March 21st.

The time chosen to drop the Chindits near the 18th Division’s line of communications was most embarrassing to General Tanaka. On January 10, Headquarters, 15th Army, had suspended movement of supplies to the 18th Division in order to accumulate stocks for the projected attack on Imphal. Shipment was to resume as soon as the Imphal operation was underway. Then the Chindits cut the rail line, and just when the supply movement was to have resumed, the 18th Division had to start living on what was at hand in north Burma. It was aided by the 56th Division, which shipped about ninety tons of vital supplies to Myitkyina via Bhamo, but Tanaka's supply position was fundamentally compromised by the Chindits fighting along the railway to north Burma.

On the 18th Calvert’s force took a large night drop, including wire and entrenching tools. They slaved away to turn the Block into a fortress. The parachutes festooned across the forest canopy gave the Block its popular name – White City – soon a maze of slit trenches and bunkers roofed with heavy timbers. White City, with its commanding position, became a powerful concentration of force, with Calvert’s three Battalions steadily reinforced. The Block grew a heavily wired perimeter and a garrison strong enough to raise a substantial force for mobile action. Calvert regarded White City as “ideally situated around a series of hills about 30ft to 50ft high, with numerous small valleys in between, with water at the north and south. I brought the village of Henu into our defended area, so that we would have a good field of fire across the paddy to the south. I also brought into the perimeter what we called ‘OP Hill’, a feature slightly higher than our own little hills, to give us good observation. Our perimeter was now about 1,000 yards long, mostly along the railway, and 800 yards deep.” Calvert now had 2,000 men inside the Block, with mobile “floater” columns operating to north and south, together with a sizeable force protecting Broadway. He called in air strikes to punish a Japanese force at nearby Mawlu.

Meanwhile the 15th Army's staff were beginning to panic. Many of the officers were beginning to see the paint on the wall and were calling for the Imphal offensive to be abandoned. General Mutaguchi refused to give up and instead directed some troops to thwart the Chindits. To do this a reserve battalion was taken from the 15th, 18th, 33rd and 56th divisions and redirected to Indaw while Colonel Yanagisawa Hiroshi’s 67th regiment moved over to Napin. Major General Hayashi Yoshihide’s 24th independent mixed brigade was ordered to advance north along with some units of the 2nd division who would open a new HQ at Indaw by March 25th. Further behind the lines, the 53rd division led by Lieutenant-General Kono Etsujiro were directed to rush north to engage the enemy as fast as possible. All of this was still a diversion from the main effort against Imphal and it basically helped Stilwell’s operations. To aid the war effort the IJA air force were also stepping up their game. On march 18th, a KI-43 raid managed to destroy some Spitfires grounded at broadway. William 'Babe' Whitamore and Alan M Peart managed to get airborne, with both shooting down one 'Oscar' each. Whitamore was shot down and killed but Peart survived for over half an hour, holding off over 20 enemy fighters. The remaining Spitfires were destroyed on the ground for the loss of another pilot, Lt Coulter. Peart flew back to Kangla the same day in his damaged Spitfire and reported the action. 

The following day, Fergusson’s footsore columns finally neared Manhton village and prepared to establish the Aberdeen Stronghold. After an appalling final leg of their terrible march into Burma, with progress reduced at some points to 100 yards per hour, the 16th Brigade elements finally reached Aberdeen clearing, some 60 miles west of Broadway Stronghold. The Aberdeen clearing was at Manhton, just east of the Meza River and 25 miles from the railway supplying the Japanese 18th Division, fighting Stilwell’s Chinese troops, and the 56th Division, opposing the Yunnan Chinese. Aberdeen took in three villages: Manhton, Kalat and Naunghmi. Aberdeen’s site had a lot of advantages. It was only two days’ march from Indaw and 14 miles from the Indaw-Banmauk road. The dominant feature was a hill at the northern end, where the permanent garrison would be quartered. There were, however, some drawbacks – mainly the fact that, as Fergusson himself acknowledged, it was “highly accessible” to the enemy. The 16th brigade were exhausted and needed rest, the planned attack against Indaw would have to be delayed.

To the south, on the 21st the Japanese launched a major night attack against White City. The battle was ferocious, Calvert’s Chindits managed to successfully repel numerous attacks for over 8 hours until the Japanese finally pulled back. The Japanese suffered an estimated 300 deaths, the Chindits also suffered heavy losses. In the White City perimeter, men took solace from the companionship of the animals sharing their hardships. A pony gave birth to a foal during a Japanese attack and murderous mortar barrage. The foal was named “Minnie” after a nearby mortar post. In another attack, Minnie was kicked in the eye by a panic-stricken mule. They fought to save the eye and Brigadier Mike Calvert ordered regular reports of Minnie’s progress to be circulated to all forward positions. When recovered, Minnie took to “doing the rounds” of the mortar positions, on the scrounge for tea – which she drank from a pint pot. Minnie survived White City and further battles and went on to enjoy a distinguished military career as the Lancashire Fusiliers’ mascot. Minnie got out to India, traveled to Britain and subsequently joined the Regiment on a tour of duty in Egypt.

On the 23rd, leading elements of Brigadier Thomas Brodies 14th brigade began to arrive to Aberdeen with the task of blocking the Indaw-Banmauk road.  At the same time, the 111th Brigade’s columns were ordered to stop Japanese movements along the Pinlebu-Pinbon. The advance on Indaw may have been compromised inadvertently by the movements of 111 Brigade. One of its British Battalions, the Cameronian’s, moved in a wide sweep west of Indaw, crossed the Banmauk road on the 22nd, with orders to cut the Indaw-Homalu road. They bumped into a Japanese patrol at night and their two wounded were flown out by light aircraft the next day. The men became hardened to the realities of jungle warfare against the Japanese, who fought to the death. Some columns were luckier than others regarding their supply drops. The King’s Own columns had a reputation for being unlucky. During the 21-23, three successive attempts to re-supply them failed. Already, the columns were heavily reliant on food purchased in villages. 

Wingate then visited Bernard Fergusson at Aberdeen. Fergusson wanted to rest 16 Brigade after its exhausting march in but Wingate told him to press on to Indaw before it could be reinforced. Unfortunately, however, the Japanese had already accomplished this. The 16th brigade departed Aberdeen on the 24th, heading south to Auktaw, drawing closer to the heavily-reinforced Indaw. Between them were strongpoints at Thetkegyin village. This part of the country was quite dry and the Japanese controlled all the water sources, thus the Chindits would be forced to fight to drink. Despite successfully blocking the Indaw-Banmauk road, most of Fergussons columns would get sucked into heavy fighting around Thetkegyin on the 26th. Only the 2nd Leicester’s columns 17 and 71 made it to Indaw, holding a toehold grimly until they were ordered to pull back. After 5 intense days of fighting, Fergusson ordered his men to withdraw and regroup at Aberdeen. 

Back on the 24th, Wingate flew down to Broadway and White City on a morale-boosting mission to 77 Brigade. After a side trip to Aberdeen, he flew back to Broadway and then on to Imphal. This would be the last time Calvert ever saw him. Wingate flew back to Imphal, landing at 6:23pm before taking off again at 8pm for Hailakandi airfield. Half an hour later the B-25 crashed into the Naga hills due west of Imphal near the village of Thilon. Cochran dispatched a special force to search for the crash and they found it the next day. Everyone inside the B-25 had died instantly. Investigators believed the crash could have occurred from freak weather, engine failure or pilot error. But since it was Wingate, there was an air of reluctance to accept it was just an accident. An official investigation concluded it had been the result of engine failure and that the pilot unsuccessfully tried to return to Imphal. Yet other theories emerged and were tested out. Sabotage was the first, but it was ruled out because the B-25 had been closely guarded at all times and nobody knew Wingates intentions or flight plans. Thunderstorms and turbulence were cited as plausible, but all pilots in the area confirmed no thunderstorms.  General Slim opted for extreme turbulence, even though the pilots’ testimony also ruled that out. ‘The wreckage was eventually found on the reverse side of a ridge, so that it was unlikely that the aircraft had flown into the hill. The most probable explanation is that it had suddenly entered one of those local storms of extreme turbulence so frequent in the area. These were difficult to avoid at night, and once in them an aeroplane might be flung out of control, or even have its wings torn off.’ Another theory had it that the B-25’s cluster bombs had broke loose from the bay’s rolled into the fuselage and detonated.

Given, well how Wingate was, many in the Indian army rejoiced at his death, some quoted Shakepears Macbeth ‘Nothing in his life became him like the leaving it.’ Mountbatten wrote to his wife Edwina ‘I cannot tell you how much I am going to miss Wingate. Not only had we become close personal friends but he was such a fire-eater, and it was such a help to me having a man with a burning desire to fight. He was a pain in the neck to the generals over him, but I loved his wild enthusiasm and it will be difficult for me to try to inculcate it from above.’ General Slim had this to write on Wingate “With him, contact had too often been collision, for few could meet so stark a character without being violently attracted or repelled. To most he was either prophet or adventurer. Very few could regard him dispassionately; nor did he care to be so regarded. I once likened him to Peter the Hermit preaching his Crusade. I am sure that many of the knights and princes that Peter so fierily exhorted did not like him very  much – but they went crusading all the same. The trouble was, I think, that Wingate regarded himself as a prophet, and that always leads to a single-centredness that verges on fanaticism, with all his faults. Yet had he not done so, his leadership could not have been so dynamic, nor his personal magnetism so striking.” And so went Wingate, probably one of the most colorful characters of the Pacific War.

In light of Wingates death, General Slim promoted Lentaigne to Major-General and appointed him the new commander of the 3rd Division. Slim, had loose operational control over Special Force, selected Brigadier Lentaigne to be Wingate's replacement after conferring with Brigadier Derek Tulloch, Wingate's Chief of Staff. Lentaigne was judged to be the most balanced and experienced commander in the force; he had been an instructor at the Staff College at Quetta, had led a Gurkha battalion with distinction during the grueling retreat from Burma in 1942 and had commanded a Chindit brigade in the field. As an officer of Gurkha troops, he had a similar outlook and background to Slim. The other Chindit brigade commanders were unknown quantities, mostly without staff qualifications, some of whom had never even commanded a battalion-sized unit in combat before 1944, and Wingate's staff officers lacked the necessary combat experience. The force's second-in-command, Major General George Symes, was bypassed by Slim and formally protested and asked to be relieved. In selecting Lentaigne, Slim did not take into account the tensions between those Chindit commanders and staff who were closely associated with Wingate, and Lentaigne, who had a classical "line" officer's background and had been critical of Wingate's methods and techniques.

The loss of Wingate caused significant damage to the Chindits, it was as if they lost their persona. The month following Wingate’s death, the 14th, 16th and 111th Brigades appeared to lack direction. They stayed around Indaw, ambushing the Japanese but with no major objective. As Slim, noted, "The immediate sense of loss that struck like a blow, even those who had differed most from him—and I was not one of these- was a measure of the impact he had made. He had stirred up everyone with whom he had come in contact. "

At Broadway, for instance, after days of aerial attack, the 2nd Battalion, 146th Regiment stormed across the airstrip on March 27th and attacked its lightly defended western perimeter. Thankfully, the attack was repulsed, partly due to superior numbers. Three days of hard fighting at Broadway then ended with counterattacks and concentrated airstrikes finally dislodging the enemy. Though the Japanese regrouped, they were again pushed back by counterattacks supported by airstrikes in the end. Meanwhile, White City’s defenses were strengthened. The Dakota brought over four 25 pounders, six Bofors anti-aircraft guns and four two-pounder anti-tank guns. This would allow Calvert to attack Mawlu on the 27th. As a result, the village was successfully taken and burnt out with flamethrowers, with the Chindits then reducing the remaining Japanese strongpoints. By the end of March, however, several major changes were made at the highest level. Much of the air support was diverted to the critical battles of Imphal and Kohima, where troops were cut off and could only be resupplied by air. The 23rd Brigade, yet to fly in, was also dispatched to Kohima. Finally, the Chindits were formally subordinated to General Stilwell, who ordered them to abandon their dispersed operations around Indaw and concentrate on interdicting the supply lines to the Japanese forces opposing his troops. In early April, while the 3rd West African Brigade and the remainder of Brodie’s 14th Brigade were being brought in to Aberdeen, Lentaigne ordered the 111th Brigade led by Major John Masters to advance north and build the new Blackpool stronghold, which would block the railway and main road at Hopin. To Calvert’s disgust, he was ordered to abandon White City and Broadway and move north to support the new stronghold, as Lentaigne insisted that the Chindit brigades were too far apart to support each other. But that is all for today in the Burma front as we now need to head over to Bougainville.

The counterattack on Bougainville shifted on March 15th. General Kanda noticed Iwasa and Muda’s Units were struggling to break through in their areas, so he changed the point of attack for the Magata Unit. He withdrew the bulk of the forces from Hills 700 and 260, sending them westward in preparation for a final attempt to break through towards the Piva airfields. The reserve 6th cavalry regiment was sent to reinforce Mugata’s rear while the 2nd battalion, 4th South Seas Garrison was brought forward to try and contain the Americans at the Saua river mouth. Thus, there was a five-day break in the major action while the Japanese transferred the 13th and 23rd Regiments to reinforce what was left of Colonel Mugata's 45th Regiment. At this time the Japanese maintained patrols, which sometimes got into firefights with American patrols. A number of Japanese were taken prisoner during these patrol actions. From time to time the Japanese would lob mortar shells into the 129th's sector. During this lull in the fighting, the tired American riflemen and engineers were busy strengthening the defenses. Pillboxes were rebuilt, tactical wire reestablished, illuminating devices installed, communications improved, and the many Japanese dead buried. Information gained from prisoners and reconnaissance led General Beightler to conclude that the Japanese would launch a major assault on March 23rd. It was estimated that General Kanda had approximately 4850 men at his disposal to renew the attack on the 129th's front.

Meanwhile the American artillery was smashing the South Knob who were now only being defended by a screening force. On the 18th, General McCulloch launched a final combined assault against the Knob. Companies A and B of the 132nd regiment performed a enveloping maneuver and enjoyed some initial success until they came upon heavy fire from Japanese bunkers. At 2:10pm the next day the attack resumed, this time successfully destroying several pillboxes, but the Americans were halted short of the crest.

On the 20th, Company B was reinforced with a platoon from A and they circled the south end of the Knob, reaching the base of the trail going east. There they discovered the Japanese could pour down just as much fire, seeing another failed attack. Because of this failure it was decided to leave the reduction of Hill 260 to artillery and mortars. On the 23rd, the Iwasa and Muda units had completed their movement, now 4850 troops were concentrated on the northern sector ready to perform a major assault. Having been forewarned by the captured documents, the American forces were expecting the attack. The Americans unleashed a heavy artillery bombardment against Magata’s assault forces as they were forming up, disrupting their initial advance and causing massive casualties. Late in the evening, Kanda launched his own assault, with General Iwara’s 2nd battalion, 23rd regiment and 2nd battalion, 13th regiment through Cox Creek followed by Muda’s men. Advancing under darkness, the Japanese surprised the Americans and managed to knock out 3 pillboxes under heavy fire. The area of attack was so narrow, artillery and air strikes could not be performed safely, so General Beightler ordered the 148th regiment to respond with a combined tank-infantry assault. With the support of Sherman’s the Americans stormed the Japanese positions at 7:25am successfully reoccupying must of their lost territory within only 20 minutes. The Japanese tossed further attacked but were being gradually pushed from the narrow area by noon. 

During the afternoon, General Kreber’s corp and divisional artillery began concentrating their fire on a very narrow sector where the bulk of the surviving Japanese were dug in. An infantryman of the 129th recalled: “All these big guns opened fire into this area about 500 yards in front of us, and I remember what they called a million dollar barrage and it's something you never forget–the big guns shooting over your head. It was very frightening because you wondered whether one of these shells would not go far enough. It was all jungle out in front of us and when they got done it was all cleared out. They had knocked everything down. A lot of Japs were killed by this… I can remember the day after the big attack the bulldozers came in and dug these huge trenches and we had to go out and take the Japanese and drag them into these. Because of the warm weather they began to smell pretty bad. Many, many killed!” It was the heaviest artillery concentration seen as of yet during the Pacific War. It completely disrupted the Magata unit, causing tremendous casualties. The 2nd Battalion, 45th Regiment were completely disorganized; the 1st and 3rd Battalions were reduced to 20 men; the 1st Battalion, 81st Regiment were reduced to 40 men; and the 3rd Battalion, 53rd Regiment were down to 100 men. The massive losses forced the Japanese to withdraw.

General Hyakutake now realized his counteroffensive was a failure and forced to call it off.  The Japanese were in full retreat by the 28th. The Magata force, with an estimated strength of over fifteen hundred men, utilized the Numa Numa Trail and withdrew toward the northern part of Bougainville. The remnants of the Iwasa and Muda forces, covered by reinforcements from the 4th South Seas Garrison unit and the 6th Cavalry Regiment, moved quickly along a number of trails to the relative safety of southern Bougainville. The units of the 17th Infantry Group returned to northern Bougainville and rejoined its parent unit. On the 28th, the 182nd regiment found the South Knob abandoned and finally secured Hill 260. The three-week battle for the rather insignificant knoll had cost the Americans 98 deaths and 581 wounded, counting 560 dead Japanese on the knob. Total casualties for the final Japanese counteroffensive on Bougainville would be 263 American dead and over 2489 Japanese bodies counted. In reality, Hyakutake’s 17th Army lost a total of 3000 killed and 4000 wounded in their March operations, including 2398 killed and 3060 wounded from the 6th Division. General Beightler expressed the feelings of many in stating that the beating administered to the 6th Division was a partial repayment for its role in the rape of Nanking in 1937. Although the Japanese would plan another concentrated assault on Allied positions later down the line, they would never again launch a major attack. For all practical purposes, the battle for the Solomons was now over. Now we need to jump over to the Southwest Pacific. 

As a result of the Admiralty Islands being invaded a month ahead of schedule. Yet General MacArthur kept his gaze on the development in the Central Pacific. He needed to pick up the pace if he wanted to win the race, so he planned to carry out the invasion of Kavieng, bypassing the Hansa Bay area with a direct jump to Holland before the end of April. General Sutherland gave the Joint Chiefs an outline calling for the Southwest Pacific forces to move into the Hollandia area with two divisions on April 15, supported by the Pacific Fleet. Air, naval, and logistic bases would be established at Hollandia to support subsequent Southwest Pacific advances northwest to the Geelvink Bay region of Dutch New Guinea. The Southwest Pacific forces would then move to Geelvink Bay about June. In the middle of the next month, according to General Sutherland's presentation, three Southwest Pacific divisions would be sent against the Arafura Sea islands, southwest of Dutch New Guinea. There, air bases would be established from which to cover later advances to the Vogelkop Peninsula and Halmahera, both scheduled for mid-September, when Central Pacific forces might be ready to move to the Palaus. If the Marianas were bypassed, however, the Palaus might then be invaded as early as mid-July. Land-based aircraft of the Southwest Pacific Area could support a July invasion of the Palaus from air bases in the Hollandia and Geelvink Bay regions. If air bases on the Vogelkop, Halmahera, and the Arafura Sea islands proved inadequate to provide left flank protection for the move into the Philippines, then airdrome sites on Ambon Island might also be seized in September or October. The entry into the Philippines would be effected at southeastern Mindanao on 15 November 1944.

Yet for all of this, MacArthur needed something he did not have, the Pacific Fleet’s aircraft carriers. After concluding the Marshall islands campaign, Admiral Nimitz argued that the next move would be to bypass Truk and invade the southern Marianas and the Palaus islands to further neutralize the Carolines. To seize the Philippines a good fleet base would be required in the western Pacific. Nimitz proposed seizing Ulithi atoll, around midway between the Marianas and Palaus. Nimitz also argued the case for Woleai in the Carolines, 400 miles south of the Marianas. By early March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff thus met at the Washington Planning Conferences with Nimitz and Lieutenant-General Richard Sutherland, to hear about their plans and discuss what the best course of action would be. In the end, on March 12th, they issued a new directive for operations in 1944. 

The Joint Chiefs ordered MacArthur to cancel his Kavieng operation and instead to complete the neutralization of Rabaul and Kavieng with minimum forces necessary. The Southwest Pacific's forces were to jump from eastern New Guinea to Hollandia on April 15, thus bypassing Wewak and Hansa Bay, with the mission to develop an air center from which heavy bombers could start striking the Palaus and Japanese air bases in western New Guinea and Halmahera. Once Hollandia was secured, MacArthur was to conduct operations northwest along the northern New Guinea coast in preparation for the invasion of the Palaus and Mindanao.  The target date for the Southwest Pacific's landing on Mindanao in the Philippines was set for November 15. Admiral Nimitz, in turn, was ordered to cancel his Truk operation and to speed the aerial neutralization of Truk, Woleai, and other Japanese bases in the central and eastern Carolines. He was also directed to conduct heavy carrier strikes against the Marianas, the Carolines and the Palaus, and to provide carrier support and amphibious means for the Southwest Pacific's landings in the Hollandia area. The Marianas would be occupied by Central Pacific forces beginning in mid June and Palaus by mid September. The Joint Chiefs, were looking to extend Allied control over the eastern approaches to the Philippines and Formosa and to secure air and naval bases from which to support operations against Mindanao, Formosa, and the China coast.

The invasion of the Admiralty and Green Islands led the Americans to seize full control over the South Pacific. This allowed the US Navy to begin sending destroyers to harass the Japanese at Rabaul and Kavieng. Admiral Halsey at Guadalcanal assembled an invasion force to hit Kavieng. When he heard about the decision to cancel the Kavieng invasion, he searched for another task for the boys he got together. He decided to capture the Emirau island, lying halfway between Kavieng and the Admiralties, thinking it could be the last link to strangle Rabaul. For what would be the last operation of Cartwheel, Admiral Wilkinson put Commodore Reifsneider in command of the amphibious operation and assigned Lieutenant-Colonel Alan Shapley’s 4th Marines to carry out the landing. As a preliminary, Admiral Griffin’s Task Force 36, formed around four battleships and two escort carriers, also bombarded Kavieng and its nearby airfields on March 20th. The bombardment gave Rear-Admiral Tamura Ryukichi the impression that the expected invasion by Allied forces was imminent and he gave the order to kill all the European prisoners in Kavieng. At least 25 of them were executed in the Kavieng Wharf Massacre, which later led to six of the perpetrators being sentenced for war crimes in 1947. Sentenced to death by hanging, Tamura was executed at Stanley Prison on March 16, 1948.

Meanwhile Reifsneider’s convoy  departed Guadalcanal in two echelons, successfully reached the unoccupied Emirau Island at 6:05am. The Marines of the two assault battalions, the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 4th Marines, traveled on nine high speed transports while the remainder of the force were on the dock landing ships, Epping Forest, Gunston Hall and Lindenwald, and the attack transport Callaway. One LSD carried the 66 LVTs for crossing Emirau's fringing reef, one carried three LCTs, two of them loaded with tanks, and the third carried three LCTs with radar sets and anti-aircraft guns. The LVTs were launched, and the assault troops transferred to the amphibious tractors using the APDs' boats, supplemented by those from Callaway while F4U Corsairs of VMF-218 flew overhead to make a last-minute check of the island for any signs of the Japanese. The assault waves touched down on schedule. The reserve 3rd Battalion's boats grounded on the reef soon afterwards, and its marines waded ashore through knee deep water. The only problem encountered was with launching the LCTs carrying the tanks. The LSD's flooding mechanism failed and the LCTs had to be dragged out by a fleet tug. While the detachment sent to occupy Elomusao Island was approaching the beach, some supposed opposition caused the amphibious tractors and then a destroyer to open fire, and a man was wounded by a shell fragment. After all of this…well the Marines were told by the natives the Japanese had left Emirau two months before and only a small detachment remained on Mussau Island. Thus 3727 troops and 844 tons of cargo were ashore by nightfall, when the ships sailed; and within a month, some 18,000 men and 44,000 tons of supplies had been landed and it had become a motor torpedo base that could keep watch on the north coast of New Ireland. 

As for the Japanese Admiral Koga was planning to carry out a desperate program of reorganization, including the creation of the Mobile Fleet. Admiral Ozawa’s 1st Mobile Fleet was formed by the 2nd and 3rd Fleets; consisting of most of the IJN’s warships. This would leave the combined fleet as a mere administrative organization. Land-based forces in the Central Pacific were expanded, their main base was at Tinian; Saipan was fortified and it became the new fleet HQ. Fuel shortages and loss of tankers to submarine attacks had become so severe, Admiral Ozawa’s new command would have to remain within the Singapore zone. They would operate close to the Dutch East Indies oilfield and within Japanese waters for training.

Koga also prepared a new defensive plan, with the inner perimeter now extending from the Kuriles to the Nanpo Islands,  then the Marianas and the Carolines to the west end of New Guinea. He also drew up plans for the formation of a 3rd Aircraft Carrier Fleet, in three divisions, each composed of three carriers. It looked very impressive on paper, but the reality was that the 3rd division actually consisted of two converted tankers the Zuiho and Chitose and the converted naval auxiliary ship Chiyoda. Furthermore, the carriers lacked any experienced pilots, with most of them having been lost around Rabaul and in the Solomons and Marshalls. Thus, new pilots for the three carrier divisions would have to be trained. Finally, he developed Plan Z, a strike against the American fleet the moment it entered the Philippine Sea.  For this decisive battle, that in his eyes could allow the Japanese to win an “honorable peace”, Koga wanted to be prepared to use 500 planes on the carriers and another 500 on the islands, so he needed to increase the Japanese air force by about 50%, something that would be hard to achieve. 

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

And with that the South Pacific was liberated from the Japanese Empire. Operation Cartwheel was effectively done. The allies were squeezing the Japanese empire back to the home islands and honestly it was a good time to negotiate a peace on the side of the Japanese. But they would not do so, always on the search for the famed decisive victory. 

- 121 - Pacific War - Bougainville Counteroffensive, March 12-19, 1944

Last time we spoke about Operation HA-GO, U-GO and some action brewing up on New Britain and Bougainville. Mutaguchi basically tricked his superiors at Tokyo into allowing him to attempt an invasion of India. Operations HA-GO and U-GO were simultaneously unleashed, the only problem was the allies were very ready to meet them. General Slim’s men captured documents indicating the true nature of the operations and he acted accordingly. The new box defense systems were employed as the allies lured the Japanese into major traps thwarting their designs against Imphal. The Japanese were fighting tenaciously, but time and supplies would not be on their side. Over on New Britain the allies advanced and managed to seize Talasea. Meanwhile on Bougainville the Japanese were preparing a large counteroffensive, attempting to breach the American defensive perimeter. The operation had just kicked off last episode and today we will continue the story.

This episode is the Bougainville Counteroffensive 

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

The Marines departed Bougainville and were relieved by the Americal Division by the end of January 1944. Sporadic fighting emerged and through it Major General Griswold obtained intelligence indicating the Japanese would launch a major counter attack, most likely slated for early March. At the time Lt General Hyakutake was under extreme pressure to reduce the bombing against Rabaul. Rabaul as we know was smashed daily, suffering heavy losses. Admiral Koga had responded by taking away air units from Truk, but all this achieved was even more losses. Rabaul was neutralized, and Truk became vulnerable. The Americans had pummeled both so much, they were able to unleash a dramatic thrust into the central pacific aimed at the Gilberts, Marshalls and later the Carolines. Now it seems Hyakutake had been operating under some very bad intelligence, indicating to him the Americans were defending their perimeter with just a single division around the airfield. With the objective of destroying said airfield, Hyakutake did not know the actual number of defenders and would not enjoy movement by sea. The Americans had full control of the sea lanes, thus any IJN destroyers trying to move troops would run a risky gauntlet. By the first quarter of 1944, Rabaul had tossed meager attacks against the Americans, for example on January 23rd two bombers scored a direct hit over the living quarters of Brigadier General John Hodge and his senior staff officers. 

What Hyakutake had to work with was 4300 men of the 45th regiment led by Colonel Isashi Magata. These men were considered the crack troops on Bougainville and they included artillery, mortar and engineering battalions. They were further supported by 4125 men of the 23rd regiment led by Major General Shun Iwara and 1350 men of the 13th regiment led by Colonel Toyo Horei Muda. All three units would be led by Major General Masatane Kanda. The 3 units made an arduous trek through the jungles to reach their jump off points by the evening of March 7th. Hyakutake then sent them a resounding message “time has come to manifest our knighthood with the pure brilliance of the sword. It is our duty to erase the mortification of our brothers at Guadalcanal. Attack! Assault! Destroy everything! Cut, slash, and mow them down. May the color of the red emblem of our arms be deepened with the blood of American rascals.” Major General Kanda also added his own message  “The cry of our victory at Torokina Bay shall resound to the shores of our beloved Nippon. We are invincible.” All of these troops received a large morale boost from such message, but on top of that there was something else incentivising them all. They had adequate food to last them until April 1st, they literally needed to overrun the Americans to steal their provisions. Such was the reality of the Japanese island hopping campaigns.

Hyakutakes forces proved themselves far from invincible. Their artillery bombarded on the morning of the 8th, targeting the airfield at Piva Yoke. Their bombardment destroyed a bomber, 3 fighters, killed a single man, and forced a temporary evacuation of aircraft to New Georgia. It was now exactly the greatest of results. Artilleryman Stan Coleman vividly described the Japanese artillery attack “All of a sudden we heard a very different kind of ‘whoosh.’ It was made by a shell at the end of its flight, not the beginning. It was ‘incoming mail.’ All hell broke loose. In the rear some fuel dumps went up. Every American artillery piece in the perimeter went into action.” The American artillery counter-attack proved far more effective. The Japanese artillery units were forced to move positions constantly and then they were met by a new type of weapon.  As Coleman recalled “Four blue Marine Corsairs came in with rockets. Rockets were a new ground-support weapon and I had never seen them … The rockets in flight made a fearful display. There was a tremendous concussion when they struck their target.”

That same night the Iwasa Unit attacked Hill 700 during a heavy downpour. Yet by 2:30am the first attacks were beaten off. It seems the experience persuaded the Japanese not to attempt another night attack on March 9th. Instead, they used occasional machine gun and mortar fire to disrupt the fitful sleep of the Americans. Then at 6:45am on the 10th, Iwasa launched another attack in coordination with Colonel Muda’s assault against Hill 260. Iwasa’s men clambered up the steep 70 degree slopes screaming maniacally. They would shout confused threats in English. A prolific slaughter occurred against one group of Japanese soldiers who seized out a pillbox and set up a machine gun post on the saddle of the hill. It was dearly bought. General Griswold had brought up more reinforcements for the 145th that same morning. Engineers put together a bangalore torpedo 72 feet long by connecting sticks of dynamite like a long pipe. The object was to climb the hill and then snake the charge down the opposite side into one of the pillboxes. Unfortunately the Japanese spotted them and fired a knee mortar, hitting the torpedo and killing the engineers. Another ruse was attempted shortly after noon with the object of getting the Japanese on the saddle to surrender. A public address system was set up with speakers aimed at Hill 700, and one of the division's Japanese interpreters spoke to the defenders. He informed them of the odds against their success and told them that they could not be reinforced. If they surrendered, it would be considered honorable. To die needlessly was foolish. For the short time he spoke all was quiet, but seconds after he had finished the Japanese directed a mortar barrage on the section of the hill from whence he was broadcasting. The day ended in victory for the riflemen of the 37th Division. At 11:15 an air strike by 26 planes and continuous artillery fire had devastated the Japanese. The day’s assault cost the lives of some 500 or more Japanese soldiers. 

Meanwhile further south, the 1st battalion, 13th regiment was knocked out by heavy artillery fire. Colonel Muda sent his 3rd battalion, 13th regiment to attack the southern positions of the 182nd regiment around Hill 260. Hill 260, a twin-peaked rise close to the west bank of the Torokina River approximately four miles north of its mouth, was covered with heavy vegetation. The hill itself measured only 850 yards along its north-south axis and at its widest a mere 450 yards, and it was shaped roughly like an hourglass, with the highest elevations to the north and south connected by a narrow saddle. The eastern slope of the hill was precipitous, steepest along the South Knob, where it was almost perpendicular. The South Knob, which was considered the most important part of Hill 260, had been occupied by men of 2nd battalion, 182th regiment since early January, and vigorous patrolling had also been carried on regularly along the saddle and on the unoccupied North Knob. The hill was about half a mile east of the 182nd's main line of resistance. Between Hill 260 and the main line of the Americal was a small stream named Eagle Creek, which provided a natural defensive barrier. There was but a single trail leading from the main perimeter to South Knob. A small bridge over the creek could take vehicular traffic. The last hundred yards to the top of South Knob was a steep stairway cut into the sides of the hill. Possession of this portion of the hill was important for both sides. The Americans had built a platform near the top of a 150-foot banyan tree from which forward observers could see any enemy-activity along the Torokina River or along the highlands to the northeast. Conversely, if the Japanese could seize the hill they could have good observation of the American-held Hills 608 and 309 and the area behind them.

Under the cover of intense machine-gun and mortar fire, the Japanese managed to climb the steep slope of the South Knob and then burst in among the outnumbered Americans. The position was held by a reinforced platoon of Company G of the 182nd and a forward observer team of the 246th Field Artillery Battalion. The Americans were rapidly wiped out and dispersed as Muda’s men established a defensive perimeter over the crest of South Knob. Hearing the dire news, General Griswold ordered General Hodge to hold Hill 260 at all costs, an order that surprised many of the Americal's staff since they had not expected to try to hold the hill in the face of a concerted Japanese attack.

Companies E and F immediately advanced to occupy the North Knob and then attempted an encircling maneuver to counterattack the newly-established Japanese perimeter. Company E at 8:45 attacked South Knob from the southwest while Company F moved south. The company began its attack at 10:45 but halted after the troops had advanced a few yards into the cleared zone. The men took whatever cover was available and waited for flame throwers before trying to advance farther. At approximately 2:45 the commander, Lieutenant Colonel Dexter Lowry, ordered the attack resumed; Company E split and attempted an envelopment. The northern prong of the envelopment was halted but the infantrymen of the southern prong, using grenades and flame throwers, managed to gain a lodgment within earshot of the men of Company G who were still holding out in the pillbox. 

Meanwhile, the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 145th Regiment had been reorganized and launched a counterattack against Hill 700 at 5:00. The Japanese unleashed intense mortar and artillery ied, but gradually were dislodge from the crest of the hill, leaving just 4 pillboxes remaining under their control. After the reestablishment of the original resistance line, Iwasa prepared his men to storm Pat’s Nose during the night. The Japanese had lost heavily during these attacks, which also cost the 145th three dead and 121 wounded. During the night, after a failed bayonet charge, the Japanese would reinforce their position on Hill 260. They then struck at Company E early in the morning of March 11th and although this attack was beaten off, the American situation in the lodgment had become desperate. Thus, after another Japanese flanking attack, the defenders would have to pull back towards North Knob.  Company G was sent to relieve the beleaguered Company E but was halted by yet another Japanese flanking attack on Company E. General Hodge, fearful of reducing his main defense line, felt that he could send no more reserves to the hill and therefore decided to break off the action and pull Company G and what was left of Company E off South Knob. They retired, unimpeded by the Japanese, behind Eagle Creek. There they joined Company B and then proceeded to cut a new trail up to the crest of North Knob.

At daybreak on 11 March, Iwasa launched another attack against the promontory called ‘Pat’s Nose,’ some 150 yards to the west of ‘Hill 700.’ Flanking 37 mm guns cut the Japanese charge to shreds. Iwasa’s rear echelons kept advancing over the dead bodies of those who had been leading the charge and eventually managed to break through the barbed wire, though they too were ultimately destroyed. After an hour of suicidal attack Iwasa’s troops receded leaving some 84 dead behind them. The 37th Division's historian described this attack: "Brandishing their prized sabers, screeching 'Chusuto' (Damn them!), the Jap officers climbed up the slope and rushed forward in an admirable display of blind courage. The men screamed in reply 'Yaruzo' (Let's do it!) and then 'Yarimosu' (We will do it!). As they closed with the American doughboys, the leaders cried' San nen Kire!' (Cut a thousand men!).

General Beightler, concerned over the inability of the 145th to reduce the Japanese positions on Hill 700, decided to send the 2nd Battalion, 148th Regiment to finally wipe out the enemy opposition. After a heavy mortar and artillery bombardment, two platoons of Company E advanced east from Pat's Nose trying to flank the saddle while a third attacked west from Hill 700. Thirteen men were killed before the momentum of the attack waned and the battalion dug in on the ground it had gained. Meanwhile, Companies F and B, now under the command of Brigadier-General William McCulloch, began a  two-pronged attempt to drive the Japanese off South Knob. Supported by flamethrowers units from the 132nd, men of Company B got across the saddle and onto the knob, but were ultimately pulled because of the enemy’s numerical superiority.

Meanwhile, Colonel Magata Isashi’s 45th Regiment had limited its actions to heavy patrol activity while the Iwasa Unit was attacking Hill 700. The terrain fronting the 129th Regiment, which was holding the center of the 37th Division line, was much more favorable for the Japanese than that encountered by either the Iwasa or Muda forces. The land was relatively flat, although cut by many gullies. The 129th's line, defended by two battalions, extended over two miles, curving slightly from just east of the Numa Numa Trail southwest to the right flank of the 148th Regiment. The Japanese had easy access to the 37th's lines, first via the Numa Numa Trail and then following the lowlands and gullies adjacent to the creeks. Colonel John Frederick, the regimental commander of the 129th, had recognized the potential vulnerability of this position and had organized a defense in depth during the two months prior to the attack. The position was anchored by a large number of mutually supporting earthen and log pillboxes and protected by a double apron of barbed wire, in front of which antipersonnel mines had been laid. Machine-guns had been sited to provide interlocking fire and additional barbed wire had been placed to channel potential attackers into the main machine-gun fire lanes. The 129th's cannon company of 75-mm pack howitzers, and its mortar sections had been augmented by 37-mm and 40-mm anti-tank guns, which could fire canisters in flat-trajectory direct fire. Thus although Colonel Magata's men did not have to climb up steep cliffs to get at the American positions, they would find the 129th's defenses near impregnable to relatively lightly supported infantry attacks, no matter how fanatically delivered. While patrolling, some documents were taken from dead Japanese bodies detailing Magata’s plan, so Colonel John Frederick’s 129th Regiment was expecting his thrust.

On the 11th, the contact between Japanese and American patrols increased, as did the amount of incoming mortar fire, so the American supporting artillery was directed to fire intermittently into the areas where the Japanese were located.Colonel Frederick at 4:00pm ordered all his outposts back into the main perimeter and division artillery fired a ten-minute concentration along the 2nd Battalion front. At dusk, a heavy firefight then broke out as the Japanese opened up with machine-guns and mortars on Company G's area. During the exchange of fire, which lasted until 7:20pm, men in the pillboxes did not fire their machine guns, since they did not want to reveal their positions. The firing died down to only a few exchanges during the night, generally directed at Japanese infiltrators, who were attempting to cut through the barbed wire. Finally, at dawn on the 12th, Magata sent his 1st and 3rd battalions in column to strike Company G. Although the attacking Japanese suffered very heavy casualties from machine-gun fire, they penetrated the first line of defense by sheer weight of numbers. Moving up the streambed running into the sector, they captured one pillbox after another until they held a total of seven.

Frederick then sent his reserve 1st Battalion to support Company G, while also launching a counterattack that managed to contain the enemy expansion and that also retook two pillboxes by late afternoon. Meanwhile, Companies E and F of the 148th were converging against Iwasa’s remaining strongpoints. Using grenades, rifles, and flamethrowers, they finally reduced the pillboxes one by one, leaving the Japanese in possession of only one pillbox by 1:00pm. An historian of the 145th Regiment described the fight for this last strongpoint: “On the second day, the last held enemy pillbox was subjected to everything an infantryman has at his command. Hand grenades by the dozen were thrown at the emplacement. Still there was responding fire. Flamethrowers scorched the hidden Nip into silence. The searching parties entered the charred remains of the emplacement only to hear the click of a Japanese grenade being detonated. In the far corner they made out the dim outline of a Jap, eyes bloodshot, mouth bleeding, face seared, clothing burned. His clenched fist held a grenade. Even as the men dove for cover outside the pillbox, the Jap threw the grenade at them as in a dying gesture.” Despite a heroic resistance, this was cleared in the afternoon at last, thus completely restoring the original 145th’s line. 

While this was going on, after a heavy artillery bombardment, McCulloch sent Companies B and F once again to storm the South Knob. Company B in a column of platoons with six flamethrowers attempted to storm the height from the northwest. The leading platoon was halted by machine gun fire from pillboxes dug in on the west slope. Once these were spotted a concentration of mortar and machine gun fire was directed against these Japanese positions, enabling the following platoon to reach the top of the knob. There, it was pinned down by heavy fire from machine guns sited east of the observation post banyan tree. American mortar fire, together with the work of the flamethrower operators, who were covered by BAR men of the 3rd Platoon, soon negated these positions. Although it appeared that the South Knob would soon be in American hands, ammunition for the attacking platoons was running low, there had been numerous casualties, there were no more reserves, and it was already late in the day. 

Despite this, Hodge sent Company A of the 132nd Regiment to reinforce the gained position. Company A of the 132nd tried to scale the height from the southwest to join Company B of the 182nd on the crest. A burst of machine gun fire killed the company commander, however, and disorganized the attack so much that under the best of conditions the men could not reach the top before dark. Hodge then reluctantly recalled his forces and, sensing the futility of further attacks, he requested permission to pull off South Knob. Yet Griswold refused the request and a new attack was ordered for the next day using two companies of the 1st Battalion, 132nd Regiment. After another heavy artillery bombardment, Company A attacked southward along the narrow saddle while Company B attacked up the southwest slope. Surprisingly, the two companies of the 182nd that had led the attack the day before had not been kept in immediate reserve but had been pulled back within the perimeter. Therefore there were no reserve troops available to help exploit the minor gains made during the afternoon. As night fell, Major Raymond Daehler, the battalion commander, reluctantly pulled his men off the knob and retreated to safer ground.

Despite repeated attacks from 12 -16th, Magata had made no headway and finally withdrew his forces. After Iwasa's retreat, the men of the 145th had the dubious honor of policing the slopes of Hill 700 and burying the corpses left behind. In an area roughly 50 yards square, corpses that could be identified were counted. This count included only those within the barbed wire lines in front of the pillboxes. As one observer noted, the carnage was a sight to turn even the most cast-iron stomach: “Enemy dead were strewn in piles of mutilated bodies, so badly dismembered in most cases that a physical count was impossible. Here and there was a leg or an arm or a blown-off hand, all to show for the vanished and vanquished enemy. At one point, Japanese bodies formed a human stairway over the barbed wire. Five enemy were piled one on top of the other, as each had successively approached the location to use a predecessor as a barricade and then fall on top of him as he in turn was killed. Farther out from the perimeter, where a little stream wound its way parallel to it, Japs killed by the concussion of thousands of mortar shells lay with their heads, ostrich fashion, stuck under the least protection they could find”. What was left of Iwasa’s shattered command to the relative safety of the Blue Ridge, Approximately two miles east of the American perimeter. During the day, as the Japanese were retreating, American planes dropped 123 tons of bombs on the intermediate areas, and destroyers off shore lobbed their five-inch shells into the high ground to the north and east of the perimeter.

Further east, Magata launched a night attack at 4:00am, managing to gain another pillbox, so Griswold would decide to reinforce Frederick with a tank platoon. General Griswold agreed to send the 1st Platoon of Company C, tank battalion, forward, with the stipulation that they be used only to augment the infantry as they took back the lost pillboxes. 4 tanks supported a midmorning assault, which successfully retook two pillboxes. Another tank-infantry attack began at 1:15pm but was halted since the tanks were low on fuel and ammunition. They were replaced by tanks of another platoon, which assisted the infantry of the 129th in destroying all the other pillboxes held by the Japanese and in restoring the front line roughly to the positions held before the Japanese attack of the previous day. Alongside this, Griswold ordered the reconnaissance troop forward to occupy the right sector of the threatened area, with the 131st Engineer Regiment taking over the extreme left. General Hodge requested to be reinforced with tanks; but as they could not cross Eagle Creek, McCulloch and him reluctantly decided to cease any further attempt to drive the Japanese off South Knob. He thought that the three-day action against the Muda Unit had obviously so weakened it that it no longer posed a danger to the perimeter proper. Thus, it could be contained and continually harassed by combat patrols and neutralization fire. 

On the 14th, the fighting fell into just intermittent small-arms and mortar fire from the Japanese as Colonel Magata shifted some of his troops to more favorable positions and as he brought his reserve 2nd Battalion, 45th Regiment and 2nd Battalion, 13th Regiment to reinforce further attacks. Magata also received the 1st Battalion, 81st Regiment and the 3rd Battalion, 53rd Regiment from the north, tossing them into his new reserve. At 4:00am on 15th, the Japanese launched a heavy local attack against the right of Company F. By dawn, they had captured one pillbox and penetrated approximately 100 yards into the perimeter, where they were ultimately checked. A coordinated counterattack by Companies F and C in conjunction with a 36-plane strike against the Japanese positions, managed to retake the pillbox. Further tank-infantry attacks finally drove the entrenched Japanese out of the salient and successfully restored the line. Losses for the day were 10 dead and 53 wounded, while 190 Japanese were counted dead. The Japanese then repeated the attack the next morning at 4:00am on the high ground east of Cox Creek with a larger force of elements from three battalions. They penetrated approximately 75 yards before their momentum was halted. Then, Company B, supported by a platoon of tanks, counterattacked and restored the original line by midmorning. Finally, shortly after noon, the tanks moved beyond the wire and shelled the draws and ravines in front of Company F until their ammunition was exhausted. Once again the Japanese had paid heavily for no gain. 194 dead were counted and 1 prisoner taken, while the Americans only lost 2 dead and 63 wounded. Though the counter offensive is nowhere near done, that is all for this week as we now have to jump over to the CBI theater.

General Merrill’s Marauders had been given the task of cutting the Japanese supply line over the Kamaing road. At Merrill’s disposal were the three battalions of GALAHAD, each in turn broken down into two combat teams. The teams bore the code names Red and White for the 1st Battalion; Blue and Green for the 2nd Battalion and Khaki and Orange for the 3rd Battalion. Each team included a rifle company, heavy weapons platoon, pioneer and demolition platoon, reconnaissance platoon, and medical detachment, with a combined strength of sixteen officers and 456 enlisted men. The marauders had been recruited from units in the south-west pacific and from Trinidad in the Caribbean. Many of the volunteers were notably seen as pure psychopaths. Their training in India was quite painful, a lot so for the military police nearby. 10 percent of the Marauders went AWOL, many of them amused themselves by shooting at catte, chickens and other birds, apparently even at the feet of locals to make them dance. One incident apparently had some of them aboard a train to Ledo firing out of the windows. They were seen as arrogant, psychopathic, gung-ho and they had many colorful catchphrases such as ‘My pack is on my back, my gun is oiled and loaded, and as I walk in the shadow of death I fear no sonofabitch.’ 

The baptism of the Marauders did not impress their commander who was obsessed with speed and efficiency. The Galahad unit had departed on February 24th and on receiving orders to move to his forward assembly area, Merrill sent his three intelligence and reconnaissance (I & R) platoons to check trails as far as the Tawang Hka, the first of the three considerable streams that crossed the line of march. At 6:00am on the 24th, the 5307th moved out, screened by the I & R platoons. Next day two of them clashed with Japanese patrols and the point of one platoon, Pvt. Robert W. Landis of Youngstown, Ohio, was killed. Luckily radio communication between the 2nd Battalion, 56th Regiment and the 18th Division’s headquarters broke down at this time, so General Tanaka was unaware that a semi-detached American unit was operating off to his flank. 

Stilwell fretted at the time it took them to cross the 130 miles over the Naga range to the battlefront. Part of the problem was that 5307th Composite was mule-based and had to bring 700 animals with them but none of them knew anything about muleteering. Whatever misgivings Stilwell had when he saw his reinforcements, he kept them to himself and addressed them simply and quietly, explaining that their new mission was to hit Walawbum. On the afternoon of the 28th, Merill received the new orders, calling for cutting the road on either side of Walawbum, the 2nd Battalion led by Colonel McGee to the west, the 3rd Battalion led by Colonel Beach to the south, and the 1st Battalion led by Colonel Osborne to patrol along the Nambyu Hka north of the Kamaing Road. Positions near Walawbum would be held until the 38th Division relieved the 5307th.

Unfortunately the freak rains already experienced by Stilwell and his men continued, so that the Marauders’ eight-day, 60-mile trek to Walawbum turned into something of a nightmare. On March 2nd, the Marauders crossed the Tanai Hka and arrived at their assembly area. With the last elements at hand, General Stillwell initiated his offensive. On the 3rd, Colonel Brown’s tankers, with the support of a battalion from the 65th regiment advanced against Maingkwan. Facing light opposition, they managed to advance 5000 yards northeast of Maingkwan by 3pm when they were halted by heavy Japanese fire. Meanwhile, Merrill’s marauders were clashing with Japanese at various places throughout the day. The 3rd Battalion had a sharp fight at Lagang Ga, killing 30 Japanese and seized the area needed for the building of a drop field. One of the battalion's two combat teams, Khaki, stayed at Lagang Ga to build and protect the dropping zone. Orange Combat Team kept on to the high ground east of Walawbum and dug in, its heavy weapons commanding the Kamaing Road. This saw them securing high ground east of Walawbum. The 22d Division, was also moving ahead, and so far was in step with the tanks and GALAHAD. On  the 3rd, the 64th Regiment was near Ngam Ga, east of the Kamaing Road. The 66th to the west was in contact with the third regiment, the 65th, as it emerged from the Taro Plain.

Tanaka’s intelligence indicated the Americans were at Walawbum. The Chinese 22nd and 38th divisions were advancing slowly, so he believed his rearguard could hold them back so he could take the bulk of his strength to attack the americans. On the 3rd, the 55th and 56th regiment began retreating in order to launch an enveloping maneuver against Merrill's marauders. The next day, Brown found the enemy gone and his men were able to advance 3 miles southeast, getting his tanks in line with Maingkwan. Over at Walawbum, Merrills 3rd battalion were resisting against ferocious attacks from the Japanese. The drop field at Lagang Ga was attacked at dawn on the 4th but the garrison held. Orange Combat Team opened the battle in its sector with mortar fire on Walawbum, drawing mortar and 75-mm. fire in return from the 56th Infantry Regiment, which had been Tanaka's left flank, as it assembled for attack. When it moved, the 56th tried to cross the river and work around the Americans' flanks, where it met booby traps and ambushes thoughtfully prepared for just such a contingency. Some Japanese did cross to the east, but this failed to affect the course of the action, and 75 dead Japanese were counted, as against one American dead and seven wounded. These latter were evacuated by air the same evening. The 2nd battalion managed to get across the Kamaing road west of Wesu Ga where they established a roadblock.

Finding out about the roadblock, Tanaka dispatched his forces to clear them out. On the 5th the Japanese appeared to be forming for an attack, but mortar fire seemed to be successful in breaking up such attempts. To the south, Allied aircraft could be seen bombing and machine-gunning what Orange Combat Team took to be Japanese reinforcements. One indication that the Japanese were increasing their strength in the immediate area lay in their being able to force Orange Combat Team's I & R Platoon back across the river about noon. Simultaneously, the 66th regiment liberated the abandoned Maingkwan and began advancing south over the Kamaing road. Brown's reconnaissance had found a good trail running south from Tsamat Ga, and on the morning of the 5th the tanks moved out through the jungle. After the engineers had prepared a small stream for crossing, the tanks broke into a freshly evacuated Japanese bivouac area. Jungle vines looping across the trail from either side, and connecting masses of vegetation and trees, made effective obstacles as they slowed down the tanks by catching their turrets; not until late afternoon did the armor break out on the trail running east and west between Maingkwan and Wesu Ga. Almost immediately the tanks encountered what seemed to be a company of Japanese defending a small but marshy stream. The stream did not seem fordable, so Brown attacked by fire alone. Unknown to him, his tanks were firing on Tanaka's division headquarters, and now lay squarely between the 18th's headquarters and its 56th Regiment.

This understandably threw Tanaka’s plan into chaos, as his forces who were unsuccessfully attacking Merrills marauders were becoming encircled. Tanaka decided to swing his force around the American roadblock, using a Japanese built trail that the Americans did not know about.The bypass road over which the 18th was to withdraw had been built by the Japanese engineers some days before and quote “The Engineer Regiment commander, Colonel Fukayama, had considered the possibility of reversals in our position and, in order to facilitate the withdrawal of the division, he had previously cleared a secret jungle trail about 20 kilometers long leading from the vicinity of Lalawng Ga to Jambu Hkintang on his own initiative. This trail was used in the withdrawal of the main body of the division.”

By nightfall, Merrill’s 2nd battalion had pulled out to Wesu Ga and were trying to link up with the 3rd battalion south of Walawbum. On the 6th after heavy artillery bombardment, at 5:15pm an estimated two companies of Japanese in line of skirmishers, with heavy supporting fire, crossed the river. The American mortars continued their work; the automatic weapons held back until the Japanese were within fifty yards. Two heavy machine guns, which had a clear field of fire along the river bank, were especially effective. The Japanese failed, leaving many dead on the open ground east of the river and on the river banks. Orange Combat Team found its ammunition low, and so sent a request for more to Khaki Combat Team, which was about one hundred yards downstream. This was however just a diversionary attack, as most of the 18th division were escaping unmolested.

Meanwhile elements of the 113th regiment were beginning to arrive to Lagang Ga and unfortunately an incident of friendly fire would occur. The remainder of the 38th Division and an American patrol met near Walawbum on March 7th. The recognition signal had been arranged as three bursts of three rounds each. This necessarily meant there would be firing when the Chinese and Americans met. When the tops of the American helmets, which looked not unlike the Japanese pot helmet when their brims were invisible, appeared through and over the brush, there was a brief exchange of fire in which three Chinese were wounded before identity was established. Such is the nature of coordinating multiple nations' armies during actions. General Sun and Merrill’s marauders made a withdrawal beginning on the 7th in order to circle south and cut the Kamaing road again, this time even further south than before. Brown in the meantime had advanced to Ninghku Ga where he secured support from a battalion of the 64th regiment and launched a coordinated tank-infantry attack against Kumnyen.

At around 3pm, the tanks and infantry assembled across the Kamaing road in two places, establishing a roadblock while the tanks moved out aggressively along the road to east and west. On the 8th, Brown’s tanks then moved along the Kamaing Road and onto a trail that showed signs of heavy traffic. This allowed them to discover Tanaka’s evacuation route, finally occupying Walawbum by the end of the day. Brown later recalled, "swarming with people from the 64th Infantry and the 113th Infantry who, to the tankers' great disgust, disputed the latter's claim to have taken Walawbum”. Though the 18th division had managed to escape Stilwells traps, the American-Chinese forces had still scored a well-earned victory. The road to Myitkyina was not open. 

The cost for this first series of victories in the North Burma Campaign were 802 Chinese dead and 1479 wounded, plus 530 undifferentiated casualties from the fall of 1943 to March 18, 1944. But the temporary American-Chinese collaboration did not presage a wider Sino-American synergy, and the Marauders found operating with their allies a major problem. One issue was that of disease: the Americans caught dysentery in large numbers and attributed this to the insanitary habits of the Chinese, especially their refusal to boil their water, or to wash their hands after using the latrines. The American K-rations also proved unsatisfactory and unsuitable for jungle warfare, as the Chindits soon discovered. Yet that is all for burma as we now have to jump over to New Guinea.

The advance and pursuit upon Madang resumed on March 12th as the 2/12th Battalion found Ward's Village unoccupied while the 57th/60th Battalion secured the abandoned Saipa 2. The 57th/60th Battalion advanced swiftly by night and finally concentrated at Yokopi two days later. On the 16th, Brigadier Hammer then received a rather ambiguous order. Chilton had redefined the division's role "in the light of the present situation". While the 18th Brigade was to watch the 15th Brigade's immediate left flank from the high ground between the lower Evapia and Mene Rivers, and the commando troop at Faita the far left flank, the 15th Brigade would garrison Kankiryo Saddle, keep contact with the enemy along the Bogadjim Road and patrol along the Kabenau River towards Astrolabe Bay to join the Americans. Finally, the 15th Brigade would "provide a firm base for patrolling, by employing at the discretion of the commander, a force not exceeding one battalion forward of Kankiryo up to and inclusive of Yokopi". The order was ambiguous as far as the local commanders were concerned, and managed to overcome the ban placed by higher authority on any advance across the Finisterres to the coast: Hammer could not go beyond Yokopi but, at the same time, he was to maintain contact with the enemy along the Bogadjim Road—and they were already farther back than Yokopi.

At this point Hammer decided that the supply route from the Saddle to the 57th/60th had to be developed. While the battalion patrolled and the enemy positions were bombarded, Saipa, Yokopi and Daumoina were built into staging areas. In the meantime, patrols from the 2/2nd Commando Squadron were harrying the Japanese from the left flank, successfully establishing a new patrol base at Jappa by March 17th. From there, the Commandos patrolled towards Aminik, Oromuge and Mataloi, which they finally found abandoned. Further east, the 58th/59th Battalion patrolled from the Nangapo and Yangalum areas towards Arawum and Kul 2 as they searched for the Americans at the Kabenau and Kambara Rivers. An accidental meeting had already taken place between the patrols of the two Allies. An American reconnaissance patrol was being towed in a rubber boat by a PT boat with the object of landing at Male and seeing if the Japanese were at Bogadjim. Off Garagassi Point, the tow rope broke and the Americans rowed to shore in their rubber boat which they deflated and hid in the bush near Melamu. Moving inland for about a mile they turned west and nearing the Kaliko Track met Lieutenant Norrie's patrol of the 58th/59th Battalion and accompanied the Australians to Barum, where the Americans were given supplies and a guide; moving via Wenga, they reached Jamjam on the 18th and found no signs of the enemy. On this day at noon about 30 Japanese with three machine-guns and a mortar attacked Norrie's position at Barum. The situation would have been serious had it not been for Sergeant Matheson and his two men who had remained behind at Kaliko and managed to bear the first brunt of the attack and warn those at Barum. The Americans moved on the 20th to Yangalum and next day set out for Kul 2, along almost exactly the same route as that taken by Brewster, who had departed on March 20. Brewster reached Kul 2 on March 21, where he joined the Americans from Saidor and remained with them until the 26th. In this period he went to Saidor where he met General Gill, giving him information about the area east of the Kabenau River and learning of the American intentions and dispositions. Brewster then returned to Yangalum having carried out an important and lengthy linking patrol—35 miles each way.

On the other side, General Adachi ordered his 51st division to continue withdrawing towards Wewak and for the 20th division towards Hansa. There he sought for them to reorganize and receive around 5000 replacements from Palau each. By the 9th, both divisions had reached Bogia and the 20th division had established a new defense of the Hansa area. By mid March the 51st reached Wewak and would be able to assemble at Hansa. On March 20th, the bulk of the 41st division was ordered to withdraw towards Hansa as well. As a result of the invasion of the Admiralty Islands, the 18th army and 4th air army were now cut off from Rabaul. Thus they were reassigned to the 2nd Area Army under the command of General Anami Korechika with his HQ at Ambon. They would be responsible for the defense of the eastern part of the Dutch East Indies and the western portion of New Guinea. General Teramoto would also have to move his command from Wewak to Hollandia. 

Back at Yokopi, Hammer anticipated that the constant patrolling and bombardment had forced the Japanese to withdraw from their positions. On March 28th, patrols of the 57th/60th moved past Daumoina and effectively found the enemy gone. The reality, however, was that General Nakai and Colonel Matsumoto had been ordered to pull back and follow its parent unit towards Hansa. The remainder of the 41st Division were following suit over the next few days. Only a 5000-men detachment, deemed the Madang detachment formed around the 239th Regiment, under the command of General Shoge, was left behind to hold Madang and cover the Japanese withdrawal. Hammer ordered the 57th/60th to move forward with speed towards Yaula, yet the Australians would be stopped at the Kofebi River on March 30. In response, a company would be sent in an enveloping maneuver across the river, successfully getting through to Mabelebu although they would be unable to draw away the defenders. During the night, the surrounded company would then have to resist a number of enemy counterattacks, though these weren’t really counterattacks but the Japanese trying to retreat towards Madang. The following day, with the enemy gone, the Australian patrols would rapidly set out north towards Yaula. Meanwhile, the 2/2nd Squadron’s patrols, after securing Mataloi 1, were also advancing towards Yaula with speed. Finally, the commandos would successfully enter Yaula on April 4, with the 57th/60th’s vanguard arriving soon after and then occupying Kwato by nightfall. 

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

The Bougainville counteroffensive proved the Japanese could still unleash brutal offensives and meet some success. However the level of success was not going to win the war let alone the fight over Bougainville. Within Burma the mixed national armies of the allies were finding some difficult working together, but they were gradually pushing the Japanese back.

 

- 120 - Pacific War - The battle of Imphal, March 5-12, 1944

Last time we spoke about the invasion of the Admiralty Islands and some action on New Britain and Bougainville. The last steps of operation Cartwheel would see the Bismarck-Solomon area sealed off with the capture of the admiralty islands. MacArthur was yet again trying to seize the initiative and force a drive upon the Philippines. A diversionary landing was made against Momote and Los Negros would cost 116 lives, 434 wounded by March 8th. On New Britain, General Rupertus began new amphibious assaults and other actions to cut off the retreat for the Japanese defenders. Then on Bougainville, under immense pressure from his superiors, General Hyakutake prepared to launch his main counterattack, codenamed Operation TA. He assembled 15,000 men who would hit the American defensive perimeter to dislodge the enemy from the island. Was this idea even feasible, or would it all end in a terrific disaster?

This episode is the battle of Imphal

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

The war was not going well for the Japanese in 1944. They were on the cusp of being dislodged from the south pacific. Rabaul and Truk were effectively neutralized and the Americans were making enormous strides in the central pacific, seen in the Gilberts and Marshall campaigns. Even in Burma, a war front the Japanese had basically been winning every battle flawlessly, was now suffering defeats. The first defeats were found in the Hukawng Valley and Arakan region. In the face of these terrible defeats, the Japanese General Mutaguchi argued he had the answer. 

Mutaguchi, a victor over the Singapore campaign, had wargamed the possibility of invading India and won support of some of his superiors in Tokyo. His reasoning had been to brush past the British in Assam, to storm the gateway into the subcontinent, where hopefully the Indians would rise up to greet the Japanese as liberators. With Subhas Chandra Bose and his Indian National Army, the Japanese could rally the Indians to turn against the British. The collapse of India would be a killing blow against Britain's influence in Asia. Initially it was also believed, such a move would allow the Japanese to link up with the Axis forces in Persia. Such fantastical ideas were farfetched even for 1942 standards, but in 1944 these were laughable. Stalingrad and Kursk had effectively turned the Eastern Front completely around, the Germans were fighting for their survival. Yet this all did not dissuade Mutaguchi. 

Lt General Hanaya Tadashi was placed in charge of the Arakan region. Hanaya was tasked with deceiving the British into believing the counter attack in Arakan was an attempt to invade India, thus dragging units out of Imphal. The Operation was codenamed HA-GO, an intended feint, to mask another operation, U-GO to invade Imphal. To pull it off the assault in Arakan was made to be massive. Slim was forced to meet the enemy fiercely in Arakan, he had no choice but to pull his reserves out of Imphal. The Japanese were delivered a nasty surprise with the Admin Box tactic. For over 18 days the battle raged around the Admin Box, but the Japanese could not make a dent. The Japanese forces had expected once the British saw their lines of communications cut and were outflanked they would panic and flee. It was after all what had been occurring for years in Burma. The Japanese hoped to annihilate the 15th corp, but instead the British dug their heels in. Once again victory disease sprang its head force, the arrogant and overly confident Japanese, bit off more than they could chew. It was as if they were facing a brand new opponent. The Admin Box was hit by infantry and aerial attacks, the casualties were terrific, but the Admin Box never wavered. The Japanese had planned for a lighting battle, traveling light and seizing supplies on the go, but the British did not roll over. The Japanese began to run out of supplies, starvation loomed over the invaders. Casualties on both sides increased sharply, and Slim predicted the Japanese would not allow for defeat and instead would redouble their efforts. By February 13th, Slim was confident victory was in their hands as the 26th Indian division began to arrive to deliver a hammer blow with the Admin Box as the anvil. The Japanese fought desperately, but by the 24th they were withdrawing leaving 5000 dead. After defeating the Japanese Slim unleashed his own operation into the Arakan and while doing so his men captured some Japanese documents showcasing operation HA-GO in full. Slim now knew the Japanese were feinting him to draw resources away from Imphal

Now Mutaguchi had sold Operation U-GO to his superiors in Tokyo as a pre-emptive strike to disable 14th Army, but in reality it was always to invade India. He also wanted to press the attack farther and take Dimapur, a major supply base through which ran the railway line to Ledo. Taking Dimapur would deal a major blow to the Allies and could potentially open the door to further operations deeper into India. Once they had broken through, the INA would rally local support, enabling them to extend the fight to the British in Assam, Bengal and beyond. For his Operation U-Go, Mutaguchi thought he could outsmart the British in terms of how he would approach Imphal. His plan called for the 33rd Division of Lt General Yanagida Motoso to begin an advance on March 8th attacking from the south. It was presumed the British would expect this and rush reinforcement when attacked. Meanwhile he planned to send the 15th division under Lt General Yamauchi Masafumi a week later to ford the Chindwin River and advance on Imphal from the north. Even further north the entire 31st division of Lt General Sato Kotoku would also ford the Chindwin between Homalin and Tamanthi, advancing northwest to block the main British supply route in the hills at Kohima. 

To pull all of this off, Mutaguchi needed to ensure his forces captured Imphal before the monsoon rains made the jungle tracks impassable. He did not have much in terms of supplies to give to his 3 divisions. By 1943, the supply route into Rangoon by sea through the Bay of Bengal had become too dangerous because of attacks by Allied submarines, so the supplies had to rely on the railway being constructed by forced labor and POWs from Thailand. Mutaguchi was well aware of these issues. He knew, however, from personal experience in Malaya and Singapore, that taking logistical risks against the British could bring great rewards. This was because the British, who were usually immeasurably better supplied than the Japanese, frequently left behind large quantities of what the latter referred to as Chachiru kyuyo 'Churchill Rations' in their haste to flee the advancing Japanese. Accordingly, the capture of British supply dumps around Imphal formed a key assumption in his planning. The essence of Mutaguchi's plan was speed - totsusbin ‘swift onslaught' - for if these vast depots were not seized as a matter of priority, the whole offensive would literally run out of fuel. He thought it would take no more than three weeks for his forces to fall on the British supply dumps. Without the capture of these supplies success could not be guaranteed, but it seemed increasingly inconceivable to Mutaguchi that a decisive, overwhelming attack against Imphal would not bring with it rapid and substantial rewards. At no time was he concerned that he might not capture the vast British depots needed to fuel his advance. Imphal needed to be taken by April 10th or it would all be a disaster

General Slim planned for his 14th Army to make a stand at Imphal, taking the hit on the chin as they say, before pushing the enemy back. He needed to draw the Japanese in the Imphal Valley, in a tight circle so he could launch an effective counteroffensive. Lt General Geoffrey Scoones 4th corps would deploy the 20th Indian division led by Major General Douglas Gracey around Tamu and the 17th Indian Light Division of Major General David Punch Cowan around Tiddim. Both divisions had been aggressively carrying out patrols in the valley and along the banks of the Chindwin River. The 23rd Indian Division of Major General Ouvry Roberts was held in reserve at Imphal, with his 49th brigade in the Ukhrul area to the northeast. 

Once Mutaguchi’s offensive kicked off, Slim planned for his two southern divisions to withdraw up the Tamu-Palel and Tiddim roads to go on the defensive around the Imphal Valley. The two divisions would have a short and more secure line of communications and supply behind them as they forced the Japanese to extend them self over the mountains. To counter losing the overland supply line from Kohima, Slim planned to use air supply to maintain his men during the long siege. Slim also expected Mutaguchi to send a single regiment to seize the defenseless Kohima, not an entire division that was further tasked with pouring down into the Brahmaputra valley. That last part would put his entire plan in jeopardy.

On March 8th, Operation U-Go was kicked off with Lt General Yanagida Motoso’s 33rd division beginning their advance in 4 columns. The left column was the 215th regiment led by Colonel Sasahara Masahiko who advanced south of Tiddim before swinging north towards the village of Singgel. They would come across the large supply deport between the milestones 109 and 110 around the Tiddim road. The central column consisted of the 214th regiment led by Colonel Sakuma Takayoshi, advancing up the Kabaw Valley to assault Tonzang. Following this column up was the Fort White Garrison unit led by Colonel Yagi Shigeru. Both columns would cut off the route of withdrawal of Major General David Cowan’s 17th division and annihilate it. Lastly the right column consisting of the Yamamoto Force led by Major General Yamamoto Tsunoru. They would be advancing north up the Kabaw valley to assault Major General Douglas Gracey’s 20th Division on the Tamu-Palel Road. There had been early reports from scouts that groups of Japanese soldiers were advancing west of the Tiddim road. This only sounded off the alarm bells for the 14th corps on March 12th, after a verified sighting report was made stating a large group of Japanese were just a few kilometers off the road at Milestone 109. 

Consequently, Scoones ordered Cowan to withdraw, so the 17th would begin to move from Tiddim on March 14, after laying mines and booby traps. But it was too late, as the Japanese had already cut the Tiddim Road earlier that morning, so Cowan would have to fight its way out to Imphal. That day, Yamamoto Force had also started attacking Gracey’s southern front-line positions, with a particular tank-on-tank battle developing between a troop of M3 Lee/Grant tanks of the 3rd Carabiniers and some six light tanks of the 14th Tank Regiment. The latter were trounced in the end, with four tanks destroyed and two captured. Meanwhile on the 15th, Lt General Yamauchi Masafumi’s 15th division began fording the Chindwin river at Thaungdut and Sittaung and would descend upon Imphal from the north. Lt General Sato Kotoku’s 31st division also forded the river further north at Homalin, Kawya nad Tamanthi and were rapidly advancing towards Kohima and Ukhrul. 

Just as Mutaguchi had guessed, Scoones ordered his 37th and 49th brigades to advance to the Tiddim road to help Cowan’s men. Cowan had sent his 63rd indian brigade to attack the 214th regiment at Tonang and Tiutum. Thai left Imphal and Ukhrul with little protection, so Scoones decided to dispatch the newly arrived 50th indian parachute brigade of Brigadier Maxwell Hope-Thomson to defend Ukhrul, but he did not expect them to find a real fight. Ukhrul would only have the lightest of garrisons and no real defenses. Forces in the area comprised two battalions of the newly raised and part-trained 50th Indian Parachute Brigade whose young and professional commander, 31-year-old Brigadier Maxwell 'Tim' Hope-Thomson had persuaded the powers that be in New Delhi to allow him to complete the training of his brigade in territory close to the enemy. At the start of March the brigade HQ and one battalion had arrived in Imphal, and began the leisurely process of shaking itself out in the safety of the hills north-east of the town. To the brigade was added the 4/5th Mahrattas under Lieutenant-Colonel Trim. Sent into the jungle almost to fend for themselves, it was not expected that they would have to fight, let alone be on the receiving end of an entire Japanese divisional attack. They had little equipment, no barbed wire and little or no experience or knowledge of the territory.

On March 16th, Scoones ordered Gracey to withdraw, so the 20th Division could begin a controlled withdrawal up the Tamu-Palel Road, gradually moving into three defensive boxes.  The first was to be at Moreh, held by the 32nd Indian Brigade; the second in the Khongkhang–Sibong area, held by the 80th Indian Brigade; and the third was to be on the Shenam Saddle, held by the 100th Indian Brigade. Luckily for the allies, Yamamoto had dispatch two of his battalions in a useless wide flanking maneuver towards Mombi and the Tamu-Palel road. Thus Yamamoto would lack sufficient troops to launch a full attack against the retreating allied forces. Meanwhile Hawker Hurricanes and heavy artillery bombarded as the 63rd launched a direct assault against Tuitum saddle, managing to break through to the Manipur River, leaving a rearguard at the bridge. During the following days, the rearguard would repel a series of intense assaults upon the saddle by the 214th regiment and Yanagida’s Fort White column. At the same time the 37th brigade was fighting against the bulk of the 215th regiment around milestone 100. The fighting became very confused as the Japanese units became sandwiched between the allied units who in turn were surrounded by other Japanese units.

On March 18th, the 3rd battalion ,215th regiment managed to capture the supply depot between Milestones 109 and 110 facing minor resistance. Then they were forced to repel a number of counter attacks by the 48th Indian brigade. On the 19th, Hope-Thomson received some panicked reports that his battalions were seeing heavy columns of Japanese advancing on their undefended camp at Sheldon’s Corner. It was the 31st infantry of Major General Miyazaki Shigesaburo from the 58th regiment. Hope-Thomson made a last minute call to assemble his dispersed forces at the deserted Naga Village of Sangshak. His brigade, when concentrated, consisted of 1850 men. However, as the troops dug in they discovered to their discomfort that they were atop an ancient volcano, and the rock was impervious to their picks. All they could dig were shallow trenches, which provided ineffective protection from Japanese artillery. Like all Naga villages that at Sangshak was perched on a hill, and had no water; anything the men required had to be brought up from the valley floor, through the rapidly tightening Japanese encirclement. Its unknown why Miyazaki diverted his men to hit Sangshak rather than continue towards Kohima. By nightfall of the 22nd, the Japanese infantry overwhelmed Indian defenses without performed a detailed reconnaissance and lacking artillery support. This would prove to be a fatal mistake. 400 Gurkhas of the 153rd parachute battalion began mowing down wave after wave of Japanese troops using machine gun fire. The Japanese 8th Company of 58th lost 90 out of 120 men in the space of just 15 minutes. Suffering tremendous casualties, seeing entire companies decimated, Miyazaki decided to regroup and began tossing numerous frantic efforts to break up the defenders positions.Under heavy mountain artillery fire and unable to be supplied by air, Hope-Thomson’s troops grimly held a position that was not even ringed by barbed wire until March 26, when they finally received Scoones’ order to pull out. 

The Parachute brigade was being virtually destroyed in four battles at Sangshak, suffering 652 casualties. Yet in turn Miyazaki was served nearly 1000 casualties and his advance upon Kohima was held up for a week, severely delaying Sato’s plans. Further to the south, Yamauchi’s 60th regiment was also facing stubborn defenses at Sangshak. They actually had been waiting for the battle of Sangshak to conclude and only jumped in on the last day’s assault. This prevented one of Yamauchi’s columns from arriving in time north of Imphal, giving Scoones and Slim an extra few days to prepare Imphal’s defenses. Meanwhile on March 23rd, the 48th brigade used their heavy guns and mortars to hit the Japanese positions and managed to force the 215th regiment to pull away from the valuable supply depot. To secure the depot however, they still needed to clear the road from the north. Gurkha’s were sent in waves against the strongly defended Japanese bunkers, while the 37th brigade and Hawker Hurricanes hit the main defensive positions of the 215th regiment. At this point, General Yanagida, who had always felt that Allied capabilities were being underestimated, determined that his forces would not be able to hold on much longer and thus ordered them to pull back. Yanagida had received a signal from Colonel Sasahara about the critical situation his regiment was in. Sasahara, in turn, had been reacting to a signal from one of his battalion commanders, Major Sueki. Faced with rapidly depleting ammunition, mounting casualties and attacks on his position near Milestone 109, Sueki had signaled that he would not be able to hold on much longer. He indicated that he would destroy his codes and radio and fight to the end. Sasahara is said to have communicated this and the regiment’s resolve to fight to the end to Yanagida. There is some mystery around this signal, some accounts suggesting the division commander received only the latter half of the message. Either way, Yanagida had had enough. All his reservations about the Imphal offensive came to the fore. He ordered the 215th Regiment to pull out and sent a signal to Mutaguchi about his decision. In this he noted the strength of their opponent, questioned the rationale of the operation and remarked on the impossibility of meeting the deadline. He is supposed to have gone so far as to suggest the suspension of the Imphal offensive. This all greatly pissed off Mutaguchi whose divisional commanders for the majority disagreed with his U-GO plan, and Motoso Yanagida openly derided him as an "imbecile". Irregardless, Mutaguchi sought to remove Yanagida from his command. Their relationship would not improve as more setbacks were on the way.

With the Japanese dislodged, the 37th Brigade managed to reopen the Tiddim Road and the 48th Brigade finally secured the entire depot area around Milestone 109. Whatever supplies that could be recovered and transported back to Imphal were grabbed, while as many as possible that could be of potential value to the Japanese were destroyed. On the 26th, the 63rd Brigade’s rearguard also withdrew, blowing up the Manipur River bridge behind them. Two days later, the 37th made first contact with Cowan’s units near Milestone 102 and the 17th Division finally began their retreat towards Imphal. Their only obstacle would be a roadblock established by the 2nd Battalion, 213th Regiment around Khuadam. But that would be cleared out quite easily by Cowan’s men who were able to reach Imphal by April 4th.

In the meantime, Scoones had asked Gracey to send back one of his 100th indian brigade into the reserve on the 25th, leaving him with only two brigades to fend off the Japanese attacks. The next day, the 11th company, 213th regiment of the Yamamoto Force managed to advance past the main defenses at Moreh, defended by the 32nd indian brigade and captured Nippon Hill. Though they were not under heavy enemy pressure, the 32nd Indian Brigade finally withdrew from Moreh on April 1. It had set the dump on fire; by some estimates at least a million pounds’ worth of supplies that had not yet been evacuated were destroyed. They arrived at the Shenam Saddle a few days later to join the 80th Indian Brigade in a fierce battle for Nippon Hill. Meanwhile, Slim had foreseen that reinforcements would be needed at Imphal and Kohima and had already requested them with great urgency. 

Slim was granted  30 Dakotas to fly the 5th Division from Arakan back on the 18th. By the 27th, the 9th and 123rd Indian Brigades had arrived at Imphal and the 161st Indian Brigade was being flown to Dimapur to reinforce Kohima. In addition, Slim was promised the 2nd British Division and the 23rd Long Range Penetration Brigade, should it be necessary. General Giffard also decided that once the airlift of the 5th Division was complete, the 7th Division would then be airlifted to Manipur. Yet that is all for the India-Burma front as we need to move over to New Britain.

On March 5th, Colonel Smith's 5th marines began loading for an overnight run to the Willaumez Peninsula, departing Iboki by nightfall. The following morning the small convoy assembled off Volupai, waiting for air support to soften up their landing area, but they never showed up. Apparently having reason to believe that the Marines would attempt to land at Beach Red, the defenders constructed an intricate communications net between Talasea and Volupai, placed some mines on the beach, constructed defenses of a sort, sighted in 90mm mortars–and then inexplicably did not attempt to defend the beach as they could have done very well under the circumstances. Realizing the longer they waited the better the enemy could prepare, Smith ordered the first assault wave to hit the beaches at 8:25. LCM-tank gunboats raked the beach with machine-gun fire, as Smith’s 1st Battalion successfully landed meeting enemy sniper and mortar fire. Some sniper fire was observed and 90mm mortar shells began splashing in the water, but Companies A and B drove on shoreward and within 10 minutes after crossing the line of departure about 500 Marines had landed. The two assault companies then pushed forward to establish a beachhead line through which the 2nd Battalion could pass and continue the attack in the direction of Bitokara Mission. Company A accomplished this with relatively little difficulty on the right, but on the left there existed a virtually impassable swamp, running north and south and extending to the edge of the Volupai track. As a result, Company B had to pass through a slot between Little Mt. Worri and the swamp in order to accomplish its mission, encountering and eliminating an enemy pocket of resistance before establishing its lines 200 yards inland. Meanwhile the reinforced platoon patrol that had gone after the bunker on Little Mt. Worri had run into difficulty. The retreating enemy joined other of their fellows and hastily manned defensive positions which had been prepared in the Volupai coconut grove. The platoon accounted for about a dozen of the Emperor's troops, losing one Marine killed and another wounded in the process. Finding he could not advance against the Japanese all-around defensive positions, the patrol leader requested assistance but was instructed to hold what he had until the 2nd Battalion arrived on the scene.

As the advancing elements pushed their way through the coconut trees, rear echelon personnel on Beach Red suffered heavier casualties than the assault units. All during the day the Japanese lobbed 90mm mortar shells onto the beach, shells landing capriciously and inevitably taking their toll in the crowded, constricted area. Among the early victims was Lieutenant Commander Richard M. Forsythe, regimental surgeon, who continued working with the wounded until he was evacuated. The heaviest casualties that day were recorded in the 11th Marines and among medical company personnel. Both groups had to remain on the beach, there being no other place to go. On top of that, coral reefs were delaying the LCM’s from fully landing the 3nd battalion until the early afternoon. Once Company E came ashore, the advance guard rapidly moved forward and began moving through the 1st Battalion's lines astride the Volupai Plantation track at 11:00. 

The Marines were brought to an abrupt halt 200 yards farther on where the Japanese had dug positions commanding the narrow trail. As Company E attempted to attack outside the plantation track, a medium tank commanded by Lieutenant John M. Scarborough moved up the trail to the company's assistance and knocked out a heavy machine-gun position. But suddenly two Japanese, one on each side of the trail and each armed with a magnetic mine, leaped out of the brush. The defending Marine infantry killed one before he could reach the tank, but the other succeeded in affixing the mine to the port side of the turret. The blast that followed killed the Japanese and the Marine who was trying to stop him, as well as jamming the turret so that it could not be operated and stunning the tank crew within. Simultaneously the rear of the turret was pierced by a missile, presumably an anti-tank grenade, which made a hole about three quarters of an inch in diameter.

Supported by two more tanks and mortars, Company E finally began moving towards the coconut grove with increasing momentum during the afternoon, at the same time capturing a detailed map of Japanese positions in the Talasea-Bitokara-Waru area. As night approached, elements of the 2nd Battalion set up an all-around defense within the coconut grove while the 1st Battalion manned the beachhead. By the end of the first day, the Marines had penetrated approximately 2000 yards inland from the beach and killed 35 Japanese while suffering 13 killed and 71 wounded, most of them to the deadly mortar fire.  More than half of these were incurred on the beach, and the figures for the day represented more than half the total casualties the combat team would suffer between March 6th and its departure on April 25th. 9 of the fatalities and 29 of the wounded were in the 11th Marines alone. 

At 2:00am on March 7th, a handful of Japanese attempted to infiltrate the lines of Company E, but the attack was so easily repelled that Smith considered that this wasn’t even a counterattack. Actually, realizing that his forces were heavily outnumbered, General Sakai had ordered the defenders to leave a rearguard of about 100 men and withdraw at once towards Bola. During the morning, the 2nd Battalion advanced through the abandoned enemy positions without facing any opposition until they were stopped on Mt. Schleuther’s northwest slope at 11:45. It became evident that the Japanese were attempting to turn the battalion's right flank. Luckily, Company F rushed forward and managed to extend the threatened flank and seize the high ground. At 3:00pm, the reserve 3rd Battalion was also landed at Volupai, thus relieving the 1st Battalion at the beachhead. The next morning, after a mortar barrage, the 2nd battalion soon discovered the Japanese had retreated past Bitokara. The Marines quickly captured Bitokara by 1:40pm. The Marines then dispatched scouts towards Mt. Schleuther and Talasea. The Mt. Schleuther scouting group reported that the Japanese were well dug in on a nearby peak, and at 3:00 a task force consisting of Company E and reinforcing elements began the ascent. A request for artillery fire on Scheuther brought several rounds dangerously close to the 2nd battalion, 5th Marines CP, and the battalion's 81mm mortars promptly took over the support missions. As the task force approached the enemy positions, however, it ran into concentrated fire from machine-guns and small arms, backed up by a 90mm mortar and a 75mm field piece. The Marines fought back for an hour and sustained 18 casualties before they were ordered withdrawn to the mission. The second scouting party had returned from Talasea, meanwhile, to report no indications of the enemy. 

 

As no enemy presence was found on the latter, Company F advanced to the airdrome and in less than an hour reported it secured.

Meanwhile the 1st Battalion advanced to Liapo and then began to push over rough terrain towards Waru, finally digging in for the night just a bit short of its objective. After some artillery and mortar dueling during the night, Companies G, B and C launched a coordinated assault at 8:00am on the 9th. Once again, they found abandoned positions, successfully clearing the Waru area by 1:00pm. Also a patrol was landed on Garua Island at 11:47, reporting it deserted as well.  By the afternoon, Smith moved his command post to Bitokara and informed the division that Talasea was secure and that his forces would now concentrate on mopping up and patrolling the Willaumez Peninsula. The 4 day campaign had cost the Marines 17 killed and 114 wounded, while estimating they had killed 150 Japanese. But now we need to jump over to Bougainville.

The Japanese had begun earlier in the year to improve some trails, particularly the net leading from the Mosigetta-Mawaraka area. A rough road had been completed through the jungle to the jump-off positions for the infantry. Nevertheless, the movement of over fifteen thousand troops with all their equipment proved to be a major task that would have dampened the spirits of all but the most ardent warriors. Artillery units had a particularly difficult time pulling their heavy guns through the jungle to get them into position to support the attack. Their task was made even more difficult by the daily downpour that flooded the streams, washing away many of the makeshift bridges and making some trails veritable seas of mud. American intelligence by mid-February was aware of the large-scale movement toward the perimeter and Allied planes repeatedly attacked the trails. Despite all these difficulties, the Japanese soldiers displaying their tenacity and ability to overcome the most difficult obstacles, brought up the supplies and eventually had all the guns in place for the attack.

All of this was done to support a major counteroffensive scheduled to begin on March 8th. On the 7th, the Iwasa unit has assembled behind Hill 1111; the Magata Unit behind Mount Nampei; the Muda Unit at Peko village on the East-West Trail, and the 17th Army Artillery Group, commanded by Colonel Saito Harumasa in place near Hill 600. Facing them, were the men of the 37th and Americal Divisions, who were on full alert in their foxholes and bunkers, waiting for the great Japanese counterattack. On the 8th General Hyakutake’s counterattack began with a heavy albeit uncoordinated artillery bombardment. The Japanese artillery concentrated its fire on Piva Yoke instead of the forward areas of the perimeter, which would be the main initial point of attack. The artillery fire was delivered spasmodically and with poor coordination despite the high vantage points from which the Japanese surveyed the central segment of the American positions.

The Japanese artillery did little damage. American corps and division artillery countered immediately, the 37th Division guns firing on the suspected hills to the northeast and the Americal howitzers concentrating on those to the east. The 6th Field Artillery Battalion and the 129th Infantry's cannon company were so situated that they could fire directly at the gun flashes. All other guns were directed by forward observers or spotter planes. Destroyers in Empress Augusta Bay also fired counterbattery missions. By midmorning marine dive and torpedo bombers were flying neutralization missions against Hills 250 and 600. Then in the afternoon 56 SBDs and 36 TBFs, guided by artillery smokeshells, struck the main concentrations on and around hill 1111. This all massively delayed the Japanese main assault. Only the 23rd Regiment would manage to assemble in place for the attack on Hill 700 by nightfall. Under drenching rainfall, the Japanese thus attacked the hill with some companies, yet their first assault was easily repelled by the experienced defenders. 

At 2:30General Iwasa launched his main assault, sending his 2nd and 3rd battalions, 23rd division against the saddle. Despite the heavy fire from the 145th Regiment, the Japanese stormed the hill en masse, screaming and screaming threats in English and even singing American songs, presumably in attempts to unnerve the defenders of the hill. According to the historian of the 145th  "The enemy stormed the hill, clawing his way up the steep slope, yelling like a maniac, suicidally putting everything he had into a frontal attack designed to take the highest point on the hill. ... The 145th Infantry, defending the ridge, were somewhat taken aback by an enemy so unreasoning as to crawl up the 70-degree slope on all fours, rifles slung over their backs." Suffering severe losses, Iwasa’s 2nd Battalion managed to blast their way through the protective wire and knock out one of the pillboxes. Through this gap, the Japanese moved onto the saddle and began to attack adjacent strongpoints, securing a penetration of the 145th's line 70 yards wide and 50 yards deep. Behind them, however, an effective artillery response would break up the attack of Iwasa’s 3rd Battalion; yet the 2nd Battalion would continue to expand this perimeter until, by 12:00, they had captured seven pillboxes and had brought up machine-guns and mortars with which they could put McClelland Road, the only lateral supply road for the 145th, under direct fire.

Supply of the forward troops became very difficult, since the three-quarter-ton trucks and half-tracks could not use the road. All supplies had to be hand carried. Evacuation of the wounded also became difficult and dangerous. Japanese machine guns on the crest of the hill were able to cover the ridge with accurate and deadly grazing fire. They had placed other machine guns in trees on the spur of the hill about a hundred yards to the rear of the ground-emplaced weapons, which could sweep the entire front. With the exception of a few scattered trees and shallow trenches, there was little cover for troops of the 145th who moved up the steep slopes attempting to retake the lost positions. All during the day the Japanese were also extending the trenches repairing the old pillboxes, and building new ones.

In response to this breakthrough, General Beightler sent the 1st Battalion, 145th Regiment to counterattack. By noon, the Americans were attacking the newly-gained Japanese positions, successfully retaking five of the lost pillboxes against heavy fire and establishing a new line just south of the crest by nightfall. The first attempt to recapture Hill 700 was launched at noon on the 9th. Company C moved northward against the saddle in a direct frontal assault while two platoons of Company F attacked the saddle from the flanks. Company C was halted by devastating fire two-thirds of the way to its objective, and the men were forced to dig in and hold what they had gained. Meanwhile the riflemen of Company F had retaken five of the lost pillboxes, and the line, now reinforced, was solidly established by nightfall just south of the crest. Beightler had ordered two tanks forward late in the afternoon to take enemy targets under direct fire, particularly those that menaced McClelland Road, but the terrain proved too steep for them to be used effectively. Thankfully, Iwasa’s breakthrough had been contained, with the 145th losing 23 killed and 128 wounded against an estimated 500 enemy dead. 

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

Mutaguchi’s insane Operation U-Go was not going the way he thought it would. General Slim was outsmarting his enemy and it seems the allies were going to make further gains in Burma. Meanwhile things were heating up on Bougainville as Iwasa continued his grand offensive. 

- 119 - Pacific War - The invasion of the Admiralty Islands, February 27 - March 5, 1944

Last time we spoke about the invasion of Eniwetok and the end of Operation HA-GO in the Burma front. While Operation Hailstone was going on, the invasion of Eniwetok was greatly sped up as the Americans were simply too fast at conquering the Marshall islands. Codenamed operation Catchpole, Eniwetok was hit with the same kind of overwhelming force applied to Kwajalein and other islands. Aerial, naval and land base artillery smashed the defenders into submission before forces were landed. The Japanese launched so daring night time infiltration attacks, but were hopeless to stop the American seizure of the island. Within the Burma front the Japanese invaders were shocked at the performance of the newly improved Indian Army. Operation HA-GO was an utter disaster and worse it had weakened the Japanese to the point now the allies were going on the attack. 

This episode is the invasion of the Admiralty Islands

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

The war for the South Pacific is reaching its climax. The allies are securing western New Britain, the Solomons and the Huon Peninsula. The Japanese are simply overwhelmed. The Japanese air forces have been utterly annihilated, their warships are being drained of fuel, are worn down by the war and are seemingly no longer ready for that decisive naval battle envisioned by Isoroku Yamamoto. The men are battle-weary, food is becoming more scarce, malnourishment is spreading. All those strung out at the furthest islands are basically being left to die. To end the misery for those in the South Pacific, the capture of the Admiralty Islands was one of the last steps in Operation Cartwheel and would seal off the Bismarck-Solomons area from supply and reinforcement, denying their use to the Japanese for effective air and naval operations, and left garrisons totaling over 100000 troops in isolated impotence

In the South Pacific, the Admiralty Islands, that of Manus and Los Negros stood at the northeastern exist of the Bismarck Sea. They commanded the important strategic point some 600 miles from Rabaul, 820 miles from Truk and 1370 miles from Mindanao Island. The joint chiefs believed Seeadler Harbor had the potential to become a major naval anchorage for the Pacific Fleet and perhaps the springboard for the invasion of the Philippines. Back on April 7th, 1942 a Japanese destroyer and a merchant ship had landed invading forces at Lorengau, driving off the hundred or so Europeans who had been living there. At that time the only airstrip was at Lorengau, the administrative center for the group of islands. Apparently the Admiralties were not considered significant in the offensive phase of the Japanese conquest of the South Pacific area, for it was not until February 1943, that construction forces started to build a 5000-foot airstrip at Momote Plantation on Los Negros and to put the 3000-foot Lorengau airfield into operational use. After October 1943, the Momote field and the smaller Lorengau strip served as ferrying stops on the replacement routes to Wewak, Hollandia, and Rabaul, until Allied air attacks destroyed the effectiveness of the Admiralties' base. Seeadler Harbor was also being used for surface craft and possibly for seaplanes. 

In late 1943, General MacArthur had assigned General Krueger’s Alamo Force at that time based in Finschhafen to plan the seizure of the Seeadler Harbor area, with the aim of establishing an airdrome and light naval facilities for the support of subsequent operations along the north coast of New Guinea.  On February 13th however, MacArthur ordered Krueger to seize all of the Admiralty islands and to build air bases at Lorengau and Momote. This was to be Operation Brewer, beginning on April 1st. However one of Lt General Kenney’s spotter planes noticed there was no sign of life on the Admiralty Islands and this prompted MacArthur to move up the time table, to the end of February. It would be quite a mistake. MacArthur’s chief of intelligence, Colonel Willoughby, was convinced Kenney’s intelligence was incorrect and information from ULTRA intercepts seemed to support his claims. It seemed Kenney had been fooled. The Japanese appeared to be absent on the islands, because Colonel Yoshio Ezaki had ordered his men not to move during the day, so as to conceal their work constructing two new airstrips and to conserve anti-aircraft ammunition. In spite of Kenney’s arguments that the Japanese looked vulnerable, MacArthur’s staff officers were not at all happy at the idea of taking such a high level risk assaulting them. Even Kenney would note “we had already outrun the capabilities of our supply system.” Ignoring the limitations, MacArthur was determined to take the islands, but would later reminisce “I felt that the situation presented an ideal opportunity for a coup de main which, if successful, could advance the Allied timetable in the Pacific by several months and save thousands of Allied lives.”

This of course is MacArthur we are talking about and the capture of the Admiralty Islands would advance his timetable to retake the Philippines, so for him it was a no brainer. There was also the on going race. MacArthur was obviously taking notice of Admiral Nimitz’s thrust into the Central Pacific, and what a thrust it was. The Gilberts and Marshalls were falling in extremely surprising speed. MacArthur, fully aware of the risks of forwarding Operation Brewer, nevertheless did so and would cover his tracks by describing the invasion as “a reconnaissance in force” The misgivings of this decision would be apparent when a covert reconnaissance mission led by Lt J.R McGowan and 5 other men of the 158th infantry reported on February 27th that the island were “lousy with Japs”, but by that point it was too late to pull back.

For the operation, Krueger would assign Major-General Innis Swift’s 1st Cavalry Division, which was training intensively in the Oro Bay area. Although the 1st Cavalry Division was dismounted for operations in the Pacific, it retained its organization as a cavalry unit with two brigades, each made up of two reinforced regiments. In addition to supporting units, each regiment comprised two squadrons of three rille troops and a heavy weapons troop. Air offensives against Rabaul and Wewak continued throughout February, seeing an enormous reduction in the Japanese ability for air action. On the 22nd and 23rd, Captain Burke’s Destroyer Squadron 23, consisting of Destroyers Charles Ausburne, Stanly, Converse, Spence and Dyson made a daring sweep in the Admiralty island area. They managed to sink the 3800 ton Japanese tug Nagaura due east of Lorengau. 3 of his destroyers then sailed south of New Hanover where they sank a IJN minelayer and a cargo ship before turning around the coast of New Ireland. They encountered no shipping there, so they fired 1500 five-inch shells into Duke of York Island in order to damage the airfield under construction. Meanwhile the other 2 destroyers sailed north of New Hanover and bombarded the enemy base at Kavieng.

At this point MacArthur realized the Japanese could not mount any significant air or naval support to defend the admiralties. He also believed Los Negros islands was lightly held and that they was a “coup de main” opportunity. As someone who speaks french as a second language, I gotta say its so weird how we anglophones use these random french phrases for things haha. Thus MacArthur decided to change his plans somewhat. In place of the scheduled assault set for April 1st, he now was tossing the “reconnaissance in force” I mentioned early against the Momote airstrip on Hyane Harbor and that it should be carried out no later than February 29th. The force performing this was to be known as the Brewer Reconnaissance Force; it consisted of 3 rifle troops and the heavy weapons troop of the 2nd Squadron, 5th Cavalry Regiment: 800 men with their complement of light and heavy machine guns, rocket launchers, and mortars. With them was a platoon from Battery B, 99th Field Artillery Battalion, carrying two 75-mm pack howitzers, four 50-caliber machine guns, and small arms. The 673rd Antiaircraft Machine Gun Battery, a unit of some 80 men, was equipped with twelve 50-caliber machine guns as well as individual weapons. Air and naval liaison officers and a shore fire control party were scheduled to land with the attacking force; Headquarters Troop, 1st Cavalry Brigade, would furnish a reconnaissance and a communications platoon. Arrangements had also been made for a detachment from the Australian New Guinea Administration Unit, usually called ANGAU; this group was to assist chiefly in gathering intelligence, patrolling, recruiting, and dealing with the native population as their villages were liberated. 

If these men found Momote to be adequately defended, then they would establish a perimeter and await reinforcements, thus the reconnaissance turns into an invasion.With just 5 days to plan, General Kenney’s 5th air force was given the task of bombing the objective area and northern Ireland. Meanwhile Admiral Barbey’s destroyers were going to perform a heavy bombardment to cover the approach and landings. A patrol from the Alamo Scouts landed on the southeastern coast of Los Negros from a Catalina flying boat on the night of February 27th. They performed a reconnaissance, quickly discovering Colonel Ezaki Yoshio’s forces were present. Yoshio’s HQ was at Papitalai, the bulk of troops at Lorengau with garrison units were on Rambutyo, Peli, Pak, and Pityilu Islands and at the inland village of Kawaliap. One battalion was also at Papitalai covering HQ. The 2nd Battalion, 1st Independent Mixed Regiment at Salami and 1st Battalion, 229th Regiment at Hyane Harbor with its main elements south of Momote. It was obvious the enemy was still present in force. The Scouts discovered a large bivouac area on the southeast part of Los Negros and reported that the region between the Momote air strip and the south coast was as I mentioned earlier "lousy with Japs." This further allowed Admiral Barbey to make more specific bombardment plans.

Three fire support areas had been established for the attack group, consisting of nine destroyers and the three destroyer-transports which were carrying the reconnaissance force. These areas covered the entire seaward side of Los Negros from the south coast to the northern end of Salami Plantation. In the final plans the attack group would bring the weight of its firepower against targets around Hyane Harbor and to the north. Additional fire to cover the southern part of the island would be furnished by another task group of two cruisers and four destroyers, which would meet the convoy at Cape Cretin. It was decided to split this latter group, giving one cruiser and two destroyers responsibility for the Japanese bivouac area, southwest of the Momote strip, which the Alamo Scouts had located. The other cruiser and two destroyers would fire on targets in the Lorengau-Seeadler Harbor region. In the 15-minute bombardment, scheduled from H-35 to H-20, 5-inch naval guns were each to expend approximately 350 rounds. Under the air force plan, two groups of heavy bombers would attack ground targets on Los Negros from H-28 to H-20. Two minutes later, four groups of medium bombers were to bomb and strafe the landing area until the first wave was ashore. Following H Hour a squadron of medium bombers and six smoke planes were to be on air alert for further missions. 

The Japanese did not anticipate a landing would be made at Momote, thus only a few elements of the 1st battalion, 229th regiment were there while the bulk of their forces were concentrated at the beaches of Seeadler Harbor and on the other side of the island. Now despite the Alamo scouts best efforts, there was quite a lot of unknown variables. In light of that the landings would be done simplistically. 3 waves of 12 LCPRS would carry the troops to White Beach, lying near Jamandilai Point. From there the reconnaissance force led by Brigadier-General William Chase would advance and hold Momote airstrip. If this proved too difficult, the men would be loaded back up and return to Oro Bay. Now in the event of a successful landing, the remainder of the 5th cavalry regiment would come over 2 days later and the rest of the cavalry division, the main body of the Brewer force, would follow the reconnaissance and support forces as soon as shipping could be made available.

On February 27, the 2nd Squadron, 5th Cavalry led by Lt. Colonel William E. Lobit loaded up at Oro Bay, and the following morning departed aboard 3 APDs and nine destroyers under the command of Rear-Admiral William Fechteler. They would rendezvous with Admiral Kinkaid’s light cruisers at 13:26, around Cape Cretin, with General MacArthur onboard, and finally would arrive at a point about 10 miles south of Los Negros at 6:00 on February 29. While the troops climbed aboard their LCPRs, Fechteler’s destroyers opened fire on their assigned targets. Unfortunately, when the LCPRs reached the line of departure, about 3700 yards from the beaches, the defenders responded with heavy machine-gun and battery fire.At H-28 minutes enemy machine-gun fire opened on the boats, whom began maneuvering radically as they could. Machine-gun fire was also directed against the destroyers and the Phoenix group to the south. Heavier shore batteries opened up; flashes could be seen from d gun near Southeast Point on the island, and what appeared to be 3- or 4-inch shells landed in the vicinity of the Flusser and the Mahan. In response the Phoenix and Mahan fired upon the batteries and 9 B-25’s strafed and bombed the area. Their participation was limited by a heavy overcast and a low ceiling. Of the 40 B-24s scheduled to arrive during the naval bombardment, only 3 appeared before their appointed time to bomb the target area at H-47 minutes. The planned missions of four groups of B-25s fared little better, only nine appearing and these later than scheduled. No communications had been established with the B-25s nor could any of the planes be seen from the flagship, so the plan was called off for stopping naval gunfire at H-20 minutes to permit low-level bombing and strafing. The naval bombardment was continued for another 15 minutes. The order to cease fire was given at H-5 minutes and, although no aircraft were visible, starshells were fired as the attack signal for any strafers that might be in the vicinity.

The first wave of LCPRs reached the shore at 8:17, meeting slight enemy fire. Troop G led by 1st-Lieutenant Marvin Henshaw rushed beyond the narrow beach to the edge of a coconut plantation, taking cover under fallen trees and kunai grass. Here they laid prone, forming a rough half-circle with a 50-yard radius. They saw scattered groups of the enemy fleeing inland, some as far away as the other side of the air strip. Lieutenant Henshaw killed one with a long distance shot, and members of his platoon killed another. Not one of the soldiers who landed in the first wave was a casualty. As the bombardment lifted, the defenders gradually came out of their dugouts and began subjecting the returning boats to cross-fire. As the second wave approached, the enemy fire became so heavy, the LCPR’s were forced to turn back so the Mahan, Flusser and Drayton could further bombard them. At 08:23, the second wave finally landed, moving swiftly past the troops of the first wave to a point 100 yards inland. 22 minutes later, the third wave landed, rapidly fanning south and establishing a line 300 yards inland by 09:00. Meeting slight opposition, the cavalrymen managed to secure the Momote airstrip by 9:50 and completely unloaded by 12:50.

4 of the LCPRs had been left out of action during the landings, so the reconnaissance force could not be evacuated. From the positions held by the first waves, the troops then gradually moved forward to cover the whole dispersal area of the airdrome, sending patrols beyond the airdrome which identified evidence of concerning recent Japanese activity. As patrols sent out beyond the airdrome began to report back, the commanders could decide the next move. One patrol had scouted 1,000 yards west to Porlaka without contact, and another almost as far north as the skidway before meeting any enemy, there was plenty of evidence that the Japanese had recently been in the vicinity in some strength. One patrol that went about a mile south found the hastily vacated quarters of a high-ranking officer, as well as a bivouac area, and fired at a fleeing Japanese officer. Another found three big kitchens and a warehouse of food. Although the Japanese in the area had offered negligible resistance, our command expected a change in the near future. Captured documents revealed that 200 antiaircraft personnel had been encamped nearby. 

Given this information, General Chase decided to pull back to a perimeter due east of the airstrip and had the cavalrymen dig in for the night. During the afternoon the reconnaissance force organized its defenses, which presented many difficulties. A good foxhole required back-breaking efforts, because the soil was heavy with coral. Since there was no barbed wire to put around the beachhead, men and weapons had to be spaced closely and every man available used for the perimeter defense. The 40 field artillery officers and men were assigned sectors for close-in defense, because their two pack howitzers could not cover the critical space in front of the defense line from such a shallow depth as the perimeter allowed. They took over these sectors after the howitzers had blasted away for a while at the Japanese known to be in the skidway area. For heavy weapons support, the twelve 50-caliber machine guns of the antiaircraft unit were moved into positions along the front line. Signalmen strung the perimeter with wire to make the necessary hook-ups for officers in the chain of command, and removed the radio sets for communication with Sixth Army Headquarters from an advanced position to a more sheltered bomb crater. Outposts were stationed beyond the strip on the far edges of the dispersal area. Meanwhile, MacArthur came ashore during the afternoon and decorated the first man to land, Lieutenant Henshaw, with a Distinguished Service Cross. He decided to stay, ordering Chase to hold his position until the follow-up force arrived. MacArthur then returned to the Phoenix, which got underway shortly afterwards at 5:29 for Cape Sudest, taking with it all the ships except two destroyers. 

On the Japanese side, Colonel Ezaki immediately ordered the 1st Battalion, 229th Regiment to attack the beachhead during the night and annihilate the enemy or die trying. Suspicions that the Momote landing was a diversion, however, would prevent him from sending the rest of his troops to assist. Colonel Ezaki issued the following orders to the infantry battalion defending the Hyane Harbor sector: “Tonight the battalion under Captain Baba will annihilate the enemy who have landed. This is not a delaying action. Be resolute to sacrifice your life for the Emperor and commit suicide in case capture is imminent. We must carry out our mission with the present strength and annihilate the enemy on the spot. I am highly indignant about the enemy's arrogant attitude. Remember to kill or capture all ranking enemy officers for our intelligence purposes…”

As ordered, 200 men with 3 mortars; 2 platoons of the 229th Infantry and 1 platoon of crept up to the Americans during the night. Yet by the time they reached the American line, their movement was no longer coordinated and they could only achieve some minor infiltrations. Groups of 7 to 15 Japanese edging in, flinging grenades at the weapons that fired. The only way the Japanese could be seen was by the light of grenade explosions or when the attackers got close enough so that a cavalryman crouched in a fox hole could see them silhouetted against the sky. Many of the Japanese were cut down by machine-gun and rifle fire, but some got through and succeeded in cutting all telephone lines. Although infiltrations occurred on all edges of the perimeter, the attack was heaviest near the shore on the southern side. Here some Japanese reached the shore in the rear of the main defense line by swimming in from the sea with life preservers. The vegetation bordering the beach provided protection for these infiltrators. One group found an opening in the left flank of Troop E, holding the south sector, next to the field artillery unit that held along the shore. The enemy penetrated Troop E's defense line, entirely isolating the 3d Platoon. Without communication with its troop, the unit had to fight it out alone against very heavy attacks.

Come daylight, the majority of the Japanese survivors had disappeared back into the jungle, leaving 66 dead against 7 Americans killed and 15 wounded. However, those who had infiltrated and reoccupied some of their former pillboxes and fortifications in the perimeter had to be cleared out by the tired cavalrymen. 

During the afternoon, patrols were also sent west and north to check how much strength the enemy had and the perimeter was further contracted and tightened. At 5:00, 2 companies of the 229th regiment made another coordinated effort against the perimeter, yet its intensity was lowered by the death of the battalion commander. The afternoon was free from enemy activity except for a patrol which was discovered inside the perimeter at about 4:00. The patrol's mission was evidently to kill or capture the American commanding officer. It was led by Captain Baba, the commander of the battalion who made the major attack on the preceding night. Although operating in broad daylight, the patrol came close to succeeding. The Americans were confident that the morning's mop-up had taken care of all the enemy within the perimeter. Secondary growth was thick in the area and the Japanese were unnoticed until they were within 35 yards of the task force command post. Once the group was sighted, a considerable amount of fire was placed on it. The Japanese lay concealed in the undergrowth and a single sniper pecked away with his rifle in the direction of the CP. Not knowing the size of the party, Major Chiaramonte set out with four men "to get the sniper." The task force commander and his executive officer directed the movement of the group either right or left according to movements in the underbrush, and the soldiers and Major Chiaramonte opened up whenever they detected any movements. As Major Chiaramonte and his party finally entered the area on which they had been firing, they heard a click followed by grenade explosions. Three of the Japanese had committed suicide. Another rolled over on his back and used his sword to commit hara-kiri. Fifteen dead officers and sergeants were counted, including Captain Baba. Thus, the attackers were kept beyond the perimeter until nightfall, when the attack finally stopped. 

On March 2, after clearing Jamandilai Point by 10:45, 6 LSTs landed the 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry plus artillery and Seabees. While the troops landed, Captain Emile Dechaineux’s and will be honest very curious how Americans would pronounce that one, like i’ve said before there is no rhyme or reason as to how Americans pronounce french last names haha, well Dechaineux’s destroyers bombarded Hauwei Island and Hyane Harbor. With reinforcements in hand, General Chase launched a new attack to extend his perimeter. At 2:15 B-25's, P- 38's, and P-47's bombed and strafed the area. The western half of the airfield and the dispersal area were softened up for the ground attack, and the skidway and Hyane coast beyond were also targets. Bombs were also dropped on the strip of land forming the northern arm of the harbor. After this at 3:00 the two cavalry squadrons advanced across the airstrip, rapidly taking the entire aerodrome against light opposition and finally digging along a new perimeter. 

To block possible enemy landings from across Hyane Harbor, two anti-aircraft batteries and E Company of the 592nd Boat and Shore Regiment defended the shore. Seabees formed an inner defense line to the west and northwest of the brigade. Six rough trenches were dug out by a bulldozer and ten men stationed in each. The remainder of the 40th Construction Battalion elements remained in their trench on the right flank, which was now a secondary line behind the troopers. The critical north and northwest sectors were the 2nd Squadron's responsibility. They prepared their positions with careful attention to interlocking bands of machine-gun fire, while the 1st Squadron dug in on the left flank. The first night in the enlarged beachhead passed by without a crisis. An attack came at 9:00pm, but it was not as severe as expected. The chief enemy effort was to push machine-gun parties and infiltration groups through the 2nd Squadron's sector, and in particular through that held by Troop G. Communication lines were cut, radio equipment was slightly damaged, and a few Japanese penetrated as far as the field artillery positions. The artillery, prepared for interdiction fire, was not called on. 

The following morning, a systematic search for enemy troops within the position was started and all Japanese within the perimeter were killed while the Seabees began work on the airstrip. At the same time, Krueger arranged with Barbey to expedite the movement of the rest of the cavalry division. The 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment was to arrive on March 4; the remaining units of the 1st Brigade would arrive by March 6; and the 2nd Brigade was to arrive on March 9. At this point Colonel Ezaki realized his situation was desperate, his 1st battalion, 229th regiment was being obliterated. He moved his HQ from Papitalai to Papitalai Mission and began concentrating his garrison units at Lorengau. He also ordered the 2nd battalion ,1st independent regiment at Salami to perform an assault from the north, coordinating with the 229th regiment. Their advance was slowed by constant naval and land artillery fire, but they got into position by the night of March 3rd. The Americans expected the attack, as prior, an enemy officer patrol had attempted to land on the shore of Hyane Harbor. The platoon leader of the shore company guarding the beach there allowed the boat to come in to land, then opened fire, killing all members of the patrol. Among the valuable documents discovered on the bodies was one which gave the information that a strong attack would be launched that night. 

With this knowledge, the Americans fortified their front line defenses. Since infiltration was still the greatest danger for a small force holding a large perimeter in jungle and darkness, the front line positions were of prime importance. To offer as little space as possible for infiltration, each troop in the line would use all three of its rifle platoons. Automatic weapons covering front-line positions were basic in the fire plans; each of these weapons, in turn, was protected by two, three, or four dugouts on both flanks and rear manned by two or three riflemen. The approaches to these positions were strewn with mines, and trip signals were made of empty "C"-ration cans with lumps of coral inside for clappers, and hung on lengths of wire strung taut ten inches off the ground. In organizing defenses, good use was made of Japanese revetments, built to protect their airplanes in the dispersal bays on the airstrip. These revetments were steep banks of earth reaching some 15 feet high; usually a large one was at the end of a bay with two smaller embankments flanking it to form a pattern which, from the air, looked like cleats on the sole of a football shoe. Near the crest of some of these mounds, on the reverse slopes, cavalrymen dug foxholes. Two 30-caliber water-cooled machine guns were then placed on the flat ground alongside the bunker and mounted to fire across the front of the position. 

All the 81-mm mortars were massed near the center of the perimeter, while all the 60-mm mortars were moved close to the front line. The water-cooled 50-caliber machine guns of the antiaircraft were returned to their units, except for those on the northern end of the air strip. This side of the perimeter faced the skidway, whence the chief attack was expected. Patrols had met the greatest opposition when working in this direction and toward Porlaka; enemy barges and troop concentrations had also been sighted on the northwestern shore of Hyane Harbor.  Nearby naval units would also coordinate by firing upon any Japanese concentration discovered. At 9pm the Japanese began their attack as a single Japanese bomber dropped 8 bombs. 

As soon as the plane had departed, two yellow flares went up from the vicinity of Podaka, and a tracer, apparently 20-mm, was fired almost vertically from a position in front of the Troop B sector to the southwest. Almost immediately an attack supported by mortar fire was launched there as well as against the position held by Troops F and G to the northwest. The attack against the 1st Squadron on the southwest was relatively light, the enemy strength here being estimated later at two reinforced platoons. Since the 1st Squadron's sector was covered by a heavy growth of secondary jungle forest, infiltration was a great danger. The sited positions of our automatic weapons were of little value in the darkness, so the cavalrymen picked up the guns and fired them from the hip. The Japanese moved automatic weapons forward apparently with no other plan of action than to set them up in the open in front of our lines, depending on darkness to conceal their positions. The excited talking of the crews gave their positions away and they became easy targets for the defending riflemen. The attackers were blanketed by mortar fire accurately placed 20 to 50 yards in front of the perimeter. Nevertheless, many of the enemy did infiltrate, some as far as the south end of the air strip where they hid in heavy brush or climbed trees to begin sniper operations at dawn. Because of the relative weakness of the attacking force, there was never any real danger that the 1st Squadron's positions would be overrun.  

The attack upon the 2nd Squadron's position on the northwest was a greater threat, with over a battalion, as later estimated, advancing on this sector from the direction of Pori aka and the skidway against the whole of Troop G's position and the right flank of Troop F. Apparently the enemy's intention was to drive our troops from their perimeter and occupy the north end of the air strip. The attacks against the sector held by Troops E and F were limited to infiltrations toward mortar positions and command posts. The rear installations were covered hy enemy mortar fire and machinegun fire while Japanese with grenades closed in on them and overran the positions. The Seabees, holding their secondary defense line behind the cavalry on the north side of the perimeter, also felt the effects of the furious attacks. Cavalrymen whose guns were knocked out, or who had run out of ammunition, carne back to the Seabees' trenches. When a weak place developed toward the left side of the Seabees' positions, their extra ammunition was at the other end of their line. First the men passed the ammunition to the front line by throwing the boxes from hole to hole, but when that seemed too slow they got out of their holes and ran with it, holding it low. 

The Japanese advanced relentlessly, talking and singing though damaged and hampered by antipersonnel mines and booby traps, until they were cut down by the fierce machine-gun fire of the cavalrymen. Yet more and more kept coming behind them, marching over the bodies of the first. The Americans hunkered down in their holes and fired upon anything that moved,  continuing to inflict heavy casualties. The Japanese attempted a number of tricks and were occasionally successful. Somehow they learnt the names of platoon leaders. On one occasion a Japanese yelled, "Retreat, Thorne, the whole regiment's falling back to another line." This caused the mortar platoon commanded by 1st Lt. William D. Thorne to leave their positions. Not only did the platoon suffer three casualties, but it was unable to direct its mortar fire during the rest of the night. Another trick was to have individuals move about in front of the perimeter to draw the fire of machine guns. Then two or three snipers would fire tracers at any weapon that disclosed itself, enabling a mortar to open up on the position. Several cases of wiretapping of a 90-mm anti-aircraft battery took place between 10:30 and midnight, the wire-tapper claiming to be, on one occasion, a certain officer commanding a platoon, and on another, a sergeant. He reported in each case the disruption of our plans and the success of the enemy. Since his voice was not recognized, his messages were not heeded. However, a later message, although believed false, made the 211th Coast Artillery (AA) Battalion change its CP. At 11:30 a single enemy plane with landing lights on made several runs at a low altitude dropping flares. In spite of orders to hold their fire, the anti-aircraft battery opened up on the fourth run and drove the plane to the north, where it dropped bombs on Japanese positions. 

Japanese using knives and grenades managed to get themselves into Troop G's defenses. A ferocious counterattack by the cavalrymen would shortly regain the positions just in time to face another strong frontal attack, in which more Japanese were cut down in front of the 2nd Squadron. By daylight, the infantry attacks were finally over, with the cavalrymen counting over 750 Japanese dead as they established a new outpost line on March 4. Against them, the Americans lost 61 killed and 244 wounded, 9 of the dead and 38 of the wounded were Seabees. That same day was met with another heavy bombardment of the Japanese positions, then the 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry landed against slight enemy resistance. The defensive perimeter was strengthened again and the damage of the previous night was repaired.

Colonel Ezaki now believed that his troops had successfully pierced the American first line of defense and thus ordered to continue the attack that night; but upon learning the truth and how many casualties he had suffered, he decided to cancel the attack and ordered a general withdrawal towards Lorengau, leaving some units to hold Papitalai and delay the American advance. 600  men had been lost in the skidway area and in the attacks upon the perimeter. The remaining 200, with an additional 100 stragglers from other disorganized units, were ordered to retreat through Salami Beach and across Papitalai Harbor to Papitalai Mission. Natives on Mokerang Peninsula later told the Angau Party that the Japanese retreat developed into a rout. They were panic-stricken; some did not even wait to take paddles for the native canoes that they had appropriated for their escape to Papitalai Mission. Not more than 80 Japanese, frantic from fear and exhaustion, arrived at the mission to bolster the force already there.

By the 5th, General Swift arrived to the secured  beachhead in the Admiralties, and with the arrival of the 12th Cavalry Regiment the following day, he was now ready to launch an offensive west towards Seeadler Harbor, the Lorengau airdrome and north against Salami Plantation. The same day, to clear the way for the 2nd Brigade’s landing at Red Beach, General Swift ordered the 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry to move across the skidway to a point about 500 yards north. Despite a thorough artillery support, the advance did not go smoothly, with the Japanese immediately launching a strong attack from both Porlaka and the native skidway. Luckily the few Japanese who penetrated the position were killed, around 25 of them and the attack was broken up by mortar and artillery fire. At 4:30, the squadron finally began their offensive, moving with difficulty across a mined area and only gaining about 500 yards by nightfall. 

The next morning, the squadron advanced, with the 12th Cavalry soon joining them. Despite the occasional pillboxes and the congested trail, the cavalrymen made ample progress towards the beaches of Seeadler Harbor and closed in on Salami by 4:30. To further secure the harbor, General Swift planned to clear the enemy presence at the Mokerang Peninsula, Papitalai Mission and Lombrum Point. That day, the 5th Cavalry had already begun the work of clearing the southern shore of Seeadler Harbor by pushing patrols west from the airstrip. Finding much more enemy corpses that opposition, Troop F would be able to establish a bridgehead at Porlaka. At 12:00 on the 7th, after an artillery bombardment, a reconnaissance patrol consisting of 40 volunteers from Troop B, led by Capt. William C. Cornelius advanced across Lemondrol Creek and successfully landed on Papitalai against an estimated 50 Japanese defenders. Captain Cornelius, leading the first wave, was reported to have single-handedly killed four of the enemy with rifle fire and grenades while operating 50 yards in advance of the troops. Yet severely wounded, he would die the next day; for his courage and leadership he was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.  The Japanese quickly withdrew. Simultaneously after a heavy air and artillery bombardment, the 2nd Squadron, 12th Cavalry departed Salami and advanced across Seeadler Harbor to land on Papitalai Mission, meeting heavy resistance. 

By nightfall, Troop G had secured a beachhead, though it would have to break up three determined counterattacks during the night. This ultimately forced the Japanese to pull out from their beach defenses at Papitalai Mission and retreat towards Lorengau, allowing the cavalrymen to secure the beachhead the following morning. By 12:00 on the 8th, supplies for the 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry's attack on Lombrum Plantation also began arriving at Red Beach over the difficult road from Momote. Equipping the 12th Cavalry and the 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry, at Salami with enough supplies to carry on their overwater attacks was a difficult and hazardous operation. The single road from Momote to Salami was impassable for most vehicles during the days when the supplies were most urgently needed. Buffaloes got through by going overwater part of the way, but the rest of the essential supplies had to be dropped from airplanes or sent in LCMs from Momote around Mokerang Peninsula. The sending of LCMs into Seeadler Harbor was an operation which was possible only after continued naval efforts from D-Day on. Magnetic mines, dropped by American planes in May 1943, were presumably still in the harbor and had to be removed. To make entry into the harbor safe for their forces, destroyers also had to neutralize the Japanese harbor defense guns, which had already proved effective. The destroyers and minesweepers worked to accomplish these missions, but even by 7 March, when six LCMs loaded with supplies were to make their way around the point, it was not certain that enemy resistance on the islands guarding the harbor had completely disintegrated. 

LCMs then successfully landed TROOP E, F and G on Lombrum two hours later against sporadic fire. The Americans extended their perimeter by 5:00, successfully completing the task of securing Seeadler Harbor while other units of the 12th Cavalry secured the Mokerang Peninsula to cover the north flank of the 2nd Brigade's landing. On the 9th, the 2nd Brigade successfully landed at Salami while destroyers pounded the main Japanese positions at Lorengau. This ended the first phase of Operation Brewer. The Americans had suffered a total of 116 killed and 434 wounded during their occupation of Los Negros while counting 1288 enemy dead by March 8. Their next objective would be Lorengau airdrome on Manus Island, but that it for the Admiralties as we now need to travel over to New Britain.

Over on New Britain, General Rupertus was planning to invade the Willaumez Peninsula in order to cut off the Japanese retreat line there and take the Talasea airdrome. He assigned the 5th marines under Colonel Oliver Smith for the task. They were going land at a point about midway on the west coast of the Willaumez Peninsula north of Volupai, labeled Beach Red. The chosen zone of operations was about as good as the Marines could have found. It presented them with a short, comparatively flat route to their objective which might make possible utilization of tanks. A dirt track approximately four miles long connected Beach Red with Bitokara, and although it was not designed for motor transport, the Marines could hope. Beach Red contained about as much depth as Beaches Yellow 1 and Yellow 2 in the Gloucester landings, but was more confined on its flanks. Its 350 yards of sand nestled between a cliff on the right and a swamp on the left. The cliff constituted the northwestern slope of Little Mt. Worri, a mass rising 1360 feet above the beach and enfolding the native villages of Liapo to the south and Volupai on the west. Overlooking this smaller mountain from the south was Big Mt. Worri, higher by 300 feet and with a more encompassing base. Included in its ridge line was Mt. Schleuther, on the peninsula's eastern coast which dominated Bitokara, Talasea and the Waru villages from an altitude of 1130 feet. Volupai Plantation was 400 yards inland from Beach Red, containing a collection of small buildings and groves of coconut palms and cacao trees. Volupai track, linking Beach Red with Bitokara, skirted the northern bases of the several mountains. The country, except for the plantations and villages, was typical of New Britain: overgrown jungle and underbrush.

Sea and air control in the New Britain area had passed so completely into Allied hands that it was decided to transport the assault forces from Iboki to Volupai in a convoy of 38 LCMs, 17 LCVPs and 5 LCTs, with only 5 PT boats as escorts. Furthermore, on March 3rd, an amphibious patrol landed on Cape Bastian and managed to contact friendly natives in order to learn that the enemy had a weak presence in the area. This was the reinforced 7th Company, 54th Regiment, which had been sent by General Sakai to defend Talasea while the bulk of the Matsuda and Komori Detachments retreated towards Malalia. Sakai was planning to engage the enemy in a decisive battle with the entire force of the 17th Division; but on February 23, General Imamura had ordered him to withdraw towards Rabaul. Thus Sakai assigned the 17th Provisional Battalion to secure Toriu; the 2nd Battalion, 53rd Regiment to hold Ulamona; the 39th Anti-Aircraft Battalion to remain at Malalia; the 17th Engineer Regiment to facilitate the crossing of the Kapuira River; and the 17th Transport Regiment to establish supply depots at Ubai, Butiolo and Sulu. He also ordered the bulk of the 54th Regiment to leave some naval units at Gasmata and begin to retreat towards Amio and then Ubai, where barges were to finally evacuate the detachment.

Over in Bougainville, General Griswold’s 14th Corps had just taken over the protection of the Cape Torokina base. As such, nearly 62000 men were stationed in the area, defenses were consolidated, and an impressive artillery complement under Brigadier-General Leo Kreber was directed to cover the perimeter. During this period of consolidation, the most important actions were the establishment of an important Fijian outpost at Ibu village. One of the most effective units operating under corps command was the 1st Battalion of the Fiji Infantry Regiment. This battalion, consisting of 777 enlisted men and 34 officers, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel J.B.K. Taylor of the New Zealand Army, whom arrived at Bougainville in late December. Taylor was wounded the first night ashore and was replaced as commander by Major Gregory Upton, who was in charge of the battalion during its long-range patrols in late December and January. The Fijian troops were well trained, proud of their uniforms and ability to march, and according to reports, loved to sing a wide variety of Fijian songs as well as the more modern American tunes. Almost immediately after their arrival, plans were under way to use their unique abilities as jungle fighters to establish a combat outpost far to the east of the mountain range, most of which was controlled by the Japanese. The managed to gain valuable information on Japanese movements before withdrawing in late February, and a successful expansion of the perimeter east of the mouth of the Torokina River. But the first real test of the Corps in Bougainville was approaching. 

Under immense pressure from his superiors, General Hyakutake had been preparing to launch his main counterattack, codenamed Operation TA, since early January. He assembled over 15000 men from his total strength of nearly 40000 to take part in the operation. General Kanda the 6th Division commander was given command of the force and his mission was simple. 3 task forces, named after their commanders; the Iwasa unit of Major General Iwasa Shun consisting of the 23rd Infantry Regiment, the 2nd Battalion of the 13th Regiment, attached engineering troops, and two batteries of light field artillery and a mortar battalion–in all, approximately 4,150 men; the Magata Unit, commanded by Colonel Magata Isashi, consisting of most of the 45th Infantry Regiment (less 2nd Battalion), with artillery, mortar battalions, and engineers attached–a total of approximately 4,300 men; The smallest of the forces, the Muda Unit, commanded by Colonel Muda Toyohorei , consisted of the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 13th Regiment and an engineering company–a total of 1,350 men.  These 3 units would  attack strongpoints in the American perimeter. Thus, the Iwasa Unit was to strike towards Hill 700 on the right flank of the 37th Division line and then drive directly toward the two Piva airfields, which Hyakutake planned to capture by March 10; the Magata Unit was to take the low ground west of Hill 700 and then drive south to capture the Torokina airstrip by March 17; and the Muda Unit was to seize Hills 260 and 309 in the Americal sector and then capture the strategically-important Hill 608 by March 10. Bougainville was about to see some major action.

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Despite the admiralty islands certainly holding significant enemy units, General MacArthur went ahead with his reconnaissance in force and turned it into a full blown invasion. Yet again MacArthur proved, he was willing to do whatever necessary to make sure the drive of the Pacific pointed in the direction of the Philippines.