The Pacific War - week by week

- 137 - Pacific War - Fall of Saipan, July 2-9,1944

Last time we spoke about operation forager and the Changsha-Hengyang campaign. On Saipan, General Holland Smith's forces advanced with the 4th Marine Division targeting Hill 600 and the 2nd Marine Division capturing Mounts Tipo Pale and Tapotchau. The 27th Division supported these efforts, encountering resistance and challenging terrain. Meanwhile, the 27th Division, under new leadership, made progress despite difficulties. Concurrently, Japanese forces initiated a three-pronged assault in Hunan, capturing significant territory despite supply challenges and heavy rain. On June 11, the 40th Division took control of Yiyang while the 34th Division moved toward Yuelu Mountain. The 68th and 116th bypassed Changsha towards Guanqiao, with the 3rd and 13th facing resistance near Liuyang, which fell on June 14. Xue Yue retreated to Liling as Chinese defenses crumbled. Concurrently, the U.S. initiated Operation Matterhorn, targeting Japan's industrial sites. Despite challenges, the initial bombing runs prompted further strategic bombings, marking a significant phase in the Pacific War.

This episode is the Fall of Saipan

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

 

As we last saw, the Americans had begun their advance into Central Saipan. They achieved significant success on the right with the 4th Marine Division, but faced difficulties breaking through on the left and center. Following the victory in the Philippine Sea, Admiral Turner successfully completed unloading operations, landing approximately 60,000 troops and 75,000 tons of supplies by June 26. To maintain air superiority, Admiral Mitscher conducted raids on the islands of Pagan, Tinian, Guam, Rota, and Iwo Jima, and continued these raids over the next few days, despite ongoing Japanese night air attacks against the American beachhead.

In a strategic effort to keep the Japanese unsettled and unable to prepare for counterattacks, Carrier Task Group One raided Pagan Island on June 23rd. The neighboring islands in the Marianas were also not ignored; almost daily photo reconnaissance missions were conducted over Guam and Tinian to monitor any changes in their situation or positions before the landings. On June 25, Carrier Task Group Three carried out intense bombing raids on Guam and Rota to further incapacitate the airfields and installations there.

The first significant naval raid following the battle, beyond routine operations, was an attempted strike against the Volcano-Bonin group, which escalated into a substantial air battle initiated by the Japanese. At 6:00 on June 24th, Vice Admiral Joseph J. Clark's Task Group 58.1, comprising the Hornet, Yorktown, and Bataan launched a long-range fighter sweep of 48 Hellcats against Iwo Jima, which was intercepted by numerous enemy fighters. In the ensuing battle, four U.S. Hellcats were lost, while Japanese losses were estimated at 68 fighters and bombers. Despite this defeat, the Japanese attempted another attack against Clark's task group with the remnants of their local air force. This attempt ended disastrously for them, as U.S. interceptors shot down an additional 46 aircraft, bringing the day's total to 114. Task Group 58.1, having completed its mission without bombing the airfields, safely returned to Eniwetok without incident.

On the opposing side, after the fall of Mount Tapotchau, General Saito organized a final line of resistance between Tanapag, Radar Hill, and Tarahoho. In a brief resume on the morning of 27th June, Major General Igeta summarized the situation: “The summit of Tapotchau was occupied yesterday evening. Front line units tried to retake it with a night attack, but did not succeed as planned. In Donnay the enemy broke through with a number of tanks, but their advance was slow. Thereafter, no great change in the situation. The defense force, along with the firmest possible defense of its present front line and its activities toward annihilation of the enemy, is at present setting up with a line between Tanapag--Hill 221 (Radar Hill)--Tarahoho as the final line of resistance… Meanwhile, about 50 men of the 118th Infantry are improving their positions on the east side of Hill 343, and one company of the 136th Infantry is improving its position on Hill 268, and about 50 men of the 118 Infantry are digging in on the north side of that hill. The main body of the 9th Expeditionary Force, about 200 men, and about 100 men from the 9th Tank Regiment are consolidating their positions north and east of there in the high ground (Chacha water area).”Although the pre-landing preparations had been largely ineffective, continuous naval bombardment during the battle forced his troops to stay low and defend under intense pressure.

For the June 27 attack, General Smith ordered the three divisions to advance side by side and capture the O-6 Line. On General Schmidt’s front, progress was swift. The 23rd Marines advanced quickly, facing only sporadic rifle fire from the villages of Donnay and Hashigoru, and reached their objective. Meanwhile, the 165th Regiment moved rapidly through the hills but struggled to maintain contact, requiring the deployment of a battalion from the 24th Marines to fill the gap and repel an enemy tank attack. In the center, the 106th Regiment encircled Hell’s Pocket and established a cordon at the north end of Death Valley, although they made little progress against Hill Able. To the left, General Watson’s Marines advanced about 200 yards along Mount Tapotchau's western slopes while the division realigned its lines.

Despite largely ineffective pre-landing preparations, the continuous naval bombardment during the battle forced enemy troops to stay under cover and defend under intense pressure. In General Saito’s words “The practical experiences of the defense forces of Saipan… have to do with the power of the enemy naval bombardment. If there just were no naval gunfire, we feel with determination that we could fight it out with the enemy in a decisive battle.” Underwater mines, which the Japanese had used as land mines, were found along the road and railroad in the vicinity of Donnay. Tanks detoured these mined areas without difficulty, however. A Japanese supply dump, found near Hashigoru, contained new clothing, ammunition, and infantry weapons. Lieutenant Colonel Dillon's 2nd Battalion, moving through the matted vegetation and ragged cliff line along the coast, experienced difficulty keeping abreast of the faster-moving 3d Battalion. Since a detailed search of the gnarled coast line could not be instituted without sacrificing the momentum of the attack, Colonel Jones ordered the 1st Battalion to follow Dillon's unit at 400 yards, mopping up and investigating suspicious areas. By 4:40pm the 23rd Marines had trudged to objective O-6. Both battalions immediately dispatched security-reconnaissance patrols to their front but made no contacts with the enemy. 

The next day, Major-General George Griner arrived to assume command of the 27th Division, immediately reorganizing his units and deploying the reserve 3rd Battalion, 105th Regiment. The 3rd Battalion, 106th Regiment had suffered heavy casualties in its Death Valley fight. By June 28 its effective strength of riflemen numbered approximately 100, and it was reorganized into a single rifle company. Among the 3rd Battalion's casualties on June 28 was the commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Harold I. Mizony, USA, killed in action when two Japanese tanks unexpectedly appeared just forward of his battalion observation post. By chance, the two enemy vehicles had found a lucrative target; commanders of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, together with their company commanders, were gathered to plan the next move. Tightly grouped a short distance behind them were the men of the two battalions, waiting for the orders that would send them into action. Within a matter of moments the enemy tankers reaped an awful harvest, including 12 killed and 61 wounded, and then disappeared unscathed.

On General Watson’s front, Major Hunt's 2nd Battalion continued to fight across the open canefield toward its objective, a low ridge line north of Tipo Pale. Japanese riflemen and machine gunners, secure in their hillside grotto, raked the clearing with grazing fire. Light flame-thrower and medium tanks were available to the 6th Marines, but their use in this instance was limited because of difficult routes of approach to enemy positions, and support had to be delivered from long ranges. This left the task to the infantrymen. As everywhere demonstrated, reduction of cave positions proved a slow, painful job. By late afternoon the situation had improved slightly and the volume of Japanese fire had diminished somewhat, but the 2nd Battalion's unceasing efforts since 6:30 found it still short of the ridge line objective and very tired. A great store of energy had been burned in moving across the murderous field, yet more effort would be required. It appeared that the Japanese were rooted to the pock-marked ridge line. The Tipo Pale strong point, at which Company K, 6th Marines, had been whittling for many days, finally was secured on 28 June, permitting the company to rejoin its battalion. The tenacious Japanese soldiers in this pocket had sold their lives but had exacted from the 6th Marines a high price in time, men and effort.

The 8th Marines encountered tough Japanese resistance and difficult terrain while advancing against four small hills known as the Pimples, achieving minimal progress. Meanwhile, Schmidt, positioned well behind the 27th Division, received orders to maintain current positions. However, the 23rd Regiment conducted patrols beyond its lines up to 500 yards, and the 165th Regiment secured Hill 700 to complete the movement to the O-6 Line. Over the following two days, combat fatigue and the need for the 27th Division to catch up slowed the Marine divisions almost to a halt. Beginning their attack at 11:00 on June 29, the 3rd Battalion, 105th Regiment successfully closed the gap on Griner’s right flank by about 800 yards, eventually linking up with the 24th Marines the next day. On the left, the 106th Regiment encountered heavy resistance but eventually captured Death Valley and Hell’s Pocket, establishing contact with the 8th Marines by June 30. Behind them, the 2nd Battalion, 165th Regiment secured Hill Able and the remaining portion of Purple Heart Ridge. Meanwhile, the Marines and the 165th Regiment conducted patrols, cleared out remaining enemy forces, and fortified their positions. The 6th and 8th Marines also made some limited progress northward, culminating in the capture of Bill’s Pimple.

During the night of June 30, the Japanese commenced their withdrawal towards Saito’s final defensive line in an organized manner despite facing artillery fire. This new defensive line, though shorter, provided an opportunity for Saito to regroup his troops and strengthen their defense. However, failure to hold this position would spell disaster for him and his soldiers. Upon learning of the Japanese retreat, the American forces resumed their offensive on July 1, encountering stubborn resistance from remaining Japanese pockets that needed to be cleared out. The following day, General Smith's forces launched a coordinated attack. On the left flank, Colonel Stuart’s 2nd Marines swiftly advanced through Garapan, Flametree, and Sugarloaf Hills, while the 6th Marines made significant gains after neutralizing an enemy stronghold. The 8th Marines, after securing the Pimples, faced heavy Japanese resistance at Limestone Hill. In the meantime, evacuation of casualties had become a problem: Marines had fallen on the open field, and all attempts to rescue them only resulted in more men being hit. The scheme finally adopted, and the one which brought success, was for a tank to position itself between the casualty and the limestone hill. By following directly behind the tanks, hospital corpsmen could then move safely to the wounded, apply hasty bandages, give them a shot of morphine, and place them on stretchers. Then, carefully coordinating their moves with the tank by talking to the driver through the sound-powered phone on the rear sponson, the stretcher bearers would precede the tank from the site, all the while shielded from Japanese fire. White phosphorous rounds dropped on the hill by the 81mm mortar platoon plus frontal blasts from the chaperoning medium tanks also contributed to the success of this resourceful project. The fact that only small arms fire spattered against the thick hulls of the tanks indicated that the Japanese had no heavier weapons readily available in the limestone hill. By dark, all wounded had been rescued, but the task of seizing the hill still remained.

Only a clever night tank raid, utilizing illuminating shells and flamethrower tanks, could eliminate this stubborn Japanese position. In the center, the 106th Regiment advanced despite sporadic fire, while the 105th Regiment had to overcome the Papako strongpoint to make modest gains. With the arrival of the 27th Division at the O-6 Line, the right units could resume their advance. Consequently, the 165th Regiment encountered minimal opposition, advancing 1700 yards, while the 23rd and 24th Marines made virtually unopposed progress to the intermediate O-6A Line.

On June 3, the general offensive persisted, now targeting the O-7 Line. On the front under Watson's command, the 2nd Marines successfully took control of the remaining portions of Garapan, though they encountered difficulty clearing Mutcho Point on the town's northwestern edge. Duty in the town had little to commend it; battered skeletons of what had once been buildings, and humans, and animals, dotted the area; the choking smell of death hung about like a fog. And everywhere were the pieces of corrugated iron which the Japanese and natives had used as roofing for almost every structure from the hen house to the bank. To step on one of these huge rattling sheets was to inform everyone thereabouts of one's presence. Garapan's trash and garbage dump appearance was further enhanced by odd clothing, shoes, papers, books, and miscellaneous bric-a-brac strewn through the area. Perhaps the only bright point was the copious wells, providing adequate water for the 2nd Marines to bathe away some of the filth on their bodies.

The 6th Marines also advanced, halting 1000 yards from the coast, while the 8th Marines faced minimal resistance and gained approximately 1000 yards. Meanwhile, Schmidt's three regiments advanced side by side and in formation, making swift progress over challenging terrain but were ultimately halted before Hill 721 and 4th of July Hill. Nonetheless, the 24th Marines managed to capture Radar Hill, situated at the center of Saito’s final defensive line.

In the central area, Japanese delaying units hindered the 27th Division's progress towards the coast, with the 106th advancing another 1000 yards and the 165th about 500 yards. During the night of July 3rd the 165th Infantry command post became the scene of violent activity when 27 Japanese advanced into the installation, apparently by mistake. All of the Japanese intruders were killed with no loss to personnel of the 165th. In the morning, when an identification could be made, Colonel Ogawa Yukimatsu, commander of the Japanese 136th Infantry, was discovered among the dead. Piecing the story together, it appears that Ogawa and his headquarters group had been by-passed by U. S. advance and that he was attempting to displace to the northeast when he blundered into the 165th's command post. Detailed instructions pertaining to the establishment of Saito’s final line of defense were found on his body, providing the Americans with valuable intelligence for future operations.

The next morning, Griner’s forces continued their northward advance, successfully securing Flores Point and the surrounding high ground. To the right, despite a disappointing artillery barrage, Schmidt's Marines swiftly captured Hill 721 and 4th of July Hill, with a bold patrol securing Hill 767 to the northeast. On the left flank, while the 2nd Marines cleared Mutcho Point and Tanapag Harbor, the 6th and 8th Marines rapidly pushed to the coast, reaching the O-7 Line.

Watson's involvement in the offensive came to an end, with subsequent shifts in the axis of attack by the 27th Division and the 4th Marine Division towards the northeast. 

Mindful of the significance of the day in American history and pleased with progress at Saipan, General Holland Smith distributed the following message to the landing force on the evening of July 4th: “The Commanding General takes pride on this INDEPENDENCE DAY in sending his best wishes to the fighting men on Saipan. Your unflagging gallantry and devotion to duty have been worthy of the highest praise of our country. It is fitting that on this 4th of July you should be extremely proud of your achievements. Your fight is no less important than that waged by our forefathers who gave us the liberty and freedom we have long enjoyed. Your deeds to maintain these principles will not be forgotten. To all hands a sincere well done. My confidence in your ability is unbounded.” The entire northern part of the island remained to be seized, including the important Marpi Point area; and this demanded a swing of the axis of attack to the northeast. Holland Smith, therefore, split the unconquered portion in half, assigning the left segment to the 27th Division and the right to the 4th Division. To allow sufficient time for the juggling of frontages and zones, the attack hour was delayed until noon of 5 July. Generals Griner and Schmidt, of the 27th and 4th Divisions respectively, were to "conduct such adjustment of their lines or make minor attacks prior to King-hour as they [deemed] necessary to launch a coordinated attack. . . ." The 4th Division's thrust had pushed well into the newly-assigned zone of the 27th Division, so that the previously described reliefs and shifts were necessary. 

The Japanese forces remaining in the upper end of the island were poorly equipped, supplied, and often in poor health, yet they maintained high morale and a readiness to fight to the end. In the final push northward, Griner assumed control of the western front on June 25th. However, the advancement of his 105th and 165th Regiments was hindered by difficult terrain and strong resistance from fortified positions around Harakiri Gulch. On the right flank, the 24th and 25th Marines made successful progress to the O-8A Line after the 23rd Marines secured the intermediate O-7Z Line. Despite concerns of a potential Japanese counterattack during the night, accurate artillery fire dispersed enemy concentrations. The following day, Griner aimed to reach Makunsha by midday, but faced slow progress against obstacles like Harakiri Gulch and along the coastline. Consequently, Smith decided to adjust division boundaries, allowing Schmidt’s Marines to expand northwestward, envelop the 27th Division north of Makunsha, and assume responsibility for the entire front for the sweep to Marpi Point. Under this revised plan, the 27th Division resumed its assault in the afternoon, breaking through a coastal ditch but encountering resistance at the Gulch. Meanwhile, the 23rd Marines, on Schmidt's front, pushed northwest and northeast, with limited progress towards Makunsha. The 24th Marines gained approximately 1800 yards, and the 25th Marines secured Mount Petosukara, where 800 civilians surrendered.

Overnight, attempts to counterattack against Petosukara were swiftly thwarted, but significant action unfolded in the Makunsha region. For the 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines, stationed to protect the regiment's exposed left flank, the action was particularly vicious. Just before dawn the enemy rushed forward, armed with grenades and "idiot sticks," encouraging themselves with loud shouts and screams. Though this thrust failed to penetrate the Marines' lines, some of the enemy fell within five yards of the foremost foxholes. The action report of the 3d Battalion, 24th Marines, estimated the number of enemy killed in this attack at "more than 200."

On July 6, facing the complete breach of his last line of defense and with no options left, Saito realized the futility of the situation. With his forces depleted of essential supplies and under relentless artillery barrage, he issued orders for the remaining troops to execute gyokusai, a final suicidal assault aimed at inflicting maximum damage on the enemy. Several days prior to Saito's final order the assembly of remaining Japanese forces had begun. Some Japanese were out of reach behind U. S. lines, others were hidden in the deep shadows of caves, but all available were mustered. Marpi Point, Paradise Valley and Harakiri Gulch were sites for mobilization and reorganization. Many provisional units were formed in an effort to achieve some degree of tactical unity among the assorted groups and individuals. Weapons and equipment were wanting and some Japanese were armed only with grenades or crudely-fashioned spears. One Japanese staff officer, Major Kiyoshi Yoshida who participated in the battle estimated the total participants at 1,500, many with no weapons. In the light of subsequent events, however, his estimate appears too low. Assuming that he was misinformed on this point, it is not at all surprising; even at the assembly points, U. S. artillery and mortar fire hampered Japanese efforts to organize their troops and an accurate count was impossible. As the conglomerate force moved toward Makunsha, which would serve as a point of departure, it was subjected to persistent, heavy concentrations of artillery fire. This resulted in a limping approach with leaders calling upon every conceivable device to maintain the unity of their commands. Greater silence by the sprawling force would have helped; early in the evening patrols from the 27th Division Reconnaissance Troop had detected unusual activity. This had resulted in the large number of unobserved fire concentrations thrown into the Makunsha vicinity. By nightfall, Generals Saito and Igeta, along with Admiral Nagumo, performed seppuku after a final meal, while Colonel Suzuki Takuji gathered 3000 Japanese fighters, including naval and support personnel, unarmed civilians, and the injured, for a final desperate charge. 

The blow fell at 4:45am. First and hardest struck were the isolated positions held by the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 105th Infantry. The attack on these units hit from front, flank and, after moving through the gap, the rear. Almost as soon as the attack was launched, communications to the rear were cut. It was then simply a matter of two isolated battalions of soldiers fighting for their lives. This they did and did well. Some of the soldiers stacked so many dead Japanese forward of their positions that it was necessary to move to get fields of fire. Major McCarthy, commanding the 2d Battalion, described the onslaught: “It reminded me of one of those old cattle stampede scenes of the movies. The camera is in a hole in the ground and you see the herd coming and then they leap up and over you and are gone. Only the Japs just kept coming and coming. I didn't think they'd ever stop.” The sheer weight of this attack, its ponderous momentum, carried it through the soldiers' lines. In addition, hundreds of Japanese moved past the isolated defense area, using the gap on the right. The fanatical surge then carried to the 3rd Battalion, 105th Infantry, located on the high ground overlooking Harakiri Gulch. Here the soldiers were on better defensive terrain; the Japanese had to climb up to them. The lines held, and the Japanese suffered staggering losses. This portion of the battle did not cease with the coming of daylight on 7th July but continued until midafternoon. Next to feel the impetus of the determined thrust was the 3d Battalion, 10th Marines, in firing positions about 500 yards southwest of Tanapag Village. The Japanese mass that struck this unit was apparently that portion of the banzai force which had moved through the gap between the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 105th Infantry. Hardest hit were Batteries H and Headquarters and Service, in position on the left of the railroad track. Batteries I and G, set up on the right of the track also got into the fight, although they were not as closely engaged as the other two. The only battery that actually fired its howitzers during the melee was H, the others being forced to remain silent by the presence of other artillerymen to their front. During the early phases of the battle, before Battery H was forced to abandon its firing positions, one of its howitzers was turned completely around to engage a Japanese medium tank which had ploughed through to the rear. At a range of less than 50 yards the artillerymen sent 105mm shells crashing into, and destroying, their armored target. Eventually, however, the pressure from Japanese infantrymen was too great; Battery H's outnumbered survivors pulled back. In the frantic confusion and haste of the retreat, they failed to remove the breech blocks or firing locks from the howitzers. The Japanese, oddly enough, neither used nor destroyed the weapons while they had control of the area. Battery I had been attacked at 0455, with Japanese advancing astride the railroad track. The first thrust was repulsed and the Japanese fell back to reorganize. A series of actions, followed this same pattern, continued until 0650, when all of the battery's small-arms ammunition was expended. At this time the battery commander, Captain John M. Allen ordered the firing locks removed from the howitzers and the unit to fall back to the positions of Battery G. Here the two batteries continued the fight until relieved by elements of the 106th Infantry later in the day. Located directly behind Battery H, headquarters and service personnel of the battalion were forced to retire after heavy, close-in fighting. Among the 136 casualties in the battalion was the commanding officer, Major William L. Crouch, who was killed. Japanese killed in the encounter numbered 322. Even as the Japanese surged directly against the 3rd Battalion, brother artillerymen of the 4th Battalion, 10th Marines, in position to the southeast, received pressure from the fringe of the main enemy tide. In defense of its firing positions, the battalion killed about 85 Japanese. Despite the turmoil of the banzai attack, the 4th Battalion responded on the morning of 7 July to an urgent request for support originated by the 23d Marines, fighting down the cliffs above Makunsha. 

By 05:30, they had advanced further, reaching the command post of the 105th Regiment, where Bishop's hastily assembled American forces, aided by artillery, managed to repel the attack. Concurrently, secondary assaults were launched in Paradise Valley and Harakiri Gulch but were promptly quelled by American firepower. By midday, the banzai charge had been effectively halted, and the few surviving Japanese soldiers retreated to Mamushka, engaging in sporadic skirmishes with American troops throughout the day. Despite a counterattack by the 106th Regiment, they were forced to halt just 200 yards short of the Tanapag perimeter, and by midnight, the remaining American survivors were successfully evacuated.

During this engagement, the 105th incurred 406 fatalities and 512 injuries, while Marine artillery units sustained 45 deaths and 82 injuries. On July 8, at 04:30, the remaining Japanese forces launched another attack on the 106th's positions, only to be swiftly repelled. Against the coastal portion of this line the Japanese executed a vigorous thrust during the night of July 7th. Though the strength, organization and planning of this second attack were weak by comparison with the previous effort, the vigor and determination with which it was executed did not vary. Shortly after midnight a report came from the observation post atop Hill 767; Japanese force moving south. Enemy "feeler" patrols probing for weak spots were engaged as early as 3:00am, but the information that they took back to their commanders must not have been encouraging. No holes existed. The attack, launched about 4:30am, struck the 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry, along the beach. Grazing defensive fires swept across the flat beach like a scythe, cutting all in its path. The Japanese never seriously threatened penetration of the lines and those that attempted to swim around the flank were spotted and killed. Shortly after 7:00am the Japanese attack petered out and died. The 106th Infantry estimated that it had slaughtered about 1,000 of the enemy, while at the same time its own losses were practically negligible.

Watson's Marines then assumed control over most Army units and conducted cleanup operations for the ensuing two days. They discovered a total of 4,311 Japanese casualties, including those inflicted earlier by artillery and naval bombardment. Meanwhile, Schmidt's regiments, supported by the 2nd Marines, faced resistance as they advanced northeast and northwest. The NTLF Operation Order for 8 July instructed the 2d Marine Division, less detachments, to "advance in the present 27th Infantry Division zone of action, pass through elements of [that] division on its front line, attack, mop up and destroy enemy elements. . . . Upon passing through the 27th Infantry Division assume operational control 165th Infantry and 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, . . . assume tactical control within the assigned zone of action at 0630 [8 July]." Upon passage of its lines the 27th Division would revert to NTLF reserve. No effective resistance was offered the 2nd Marine Division after it had passed through the 27th Division on the morning of 8 July, although large numbers of poorly armed and totally disorganized enemy were encountered. Some Japanese used the familiar device of hiding in caves and firing from the deep shadows, but the bulk seemed eager to die and made headlong rushes at the Marines. This foolish expenditure simplified the mop-up. The 6th Marines' action report characterized the day's activities as an "attack . . . against a disorganized, swarming mass of Japs . . . waiting for the final death blow. . . ." Adding the hundreds found strewn through its zone to the number that it disposed of, the 6th Marines made a "conservative estimate" for 8 July of 1,500 dead Japanese in its area. On more rugged terrain inland the 8th Marines encountered much the same type of resistance. Here, with more caves to investigate, the sweep was somewhat slower. One wooded pocket encountered, a deep ravine, caused a minor delay. The tactic that previously had worked so well was again employed: one company stayed behind to contain and mop-up while the rest continued the push. The 8th Marines' zone, being inland of the main path of the banzai attack, contained fewer enemy bodies; but, even so, there was conclusive evidence that a terrific battle had taken place.With this final push, Turner declared the island secured, although General Jarman's garrison troops continued mop-up operations for several months. 

Following the declaration that the island was secured, efforts to induce cave-occupants to surrender were intensified. Interpreters, using public address systems, pleaded with people in caves to come out. The device was not only attempted from land but from sea as well. LCI gunboats moved close inshore and broadcast promises of good treatment, for which they were answered with fire from Japanese soldiers in the caves. Even some of Saipan's leading citizens, who had surrendered and received good treatment, talked to those in the caves, urging them to yield. But, for the effort expended, the results were not encouraging. The primary reason for this failure was that the people had been saturated with Japanese propaganda to the effect that the Americans intended to torture and kill them. This had been repeated so often that the people came to believe it. At this time the very zenith of horror occurred. Hundreds of civilians, believing that the end had come, embarked on a ghastly exhibition of self-destruction. Casting their children ahead of them, or embracing them in death, parents flung themselves from the cliffs onto the jagged rocks below. The places they jumped from would become known as "Suicide Cliff" and "Banzai Cliff". Some waded into the surf to drown or employed other gruesome means of destroying themselves. How many civilians died in this orgy of mass hysteria is not known, but it is estimated that around 1000 committed suicide. A commander of a patrol craft (YP) said that the progress of his boat around Marpi Point at this time was slow and tedious because of the hundreds of corpses floating in the water.

On July 13, Colonel Riseley's 3rd Battalion executed the last Marine operation on Saipan, successfully assaulting Maniagassa Island, resulting in 14 Japanese deaths and the capture of 15 others. By the end of the battle, almost the entire Japanese garrison of approximately 28,000 personnel had been eliminated. About 1,700 were taken prisoner, including roughly half who were Korean laborers. Nearly 10,000 Saipan civilians, roughly 40% of the population, perished, with another 14,000 interned. American forces suffered approximately 16,500 casualties, comprising 3,100 fatalities and 13,000 wounded out of a total assault force of 71,000. This casualty rate, exceeding 20%, was comparable to Tarawa and marked the costliest battle for the Americans in the Pacific theater up to that point. That is all for today with Saipan as we now need to head over to New Guinea.

General MacArthur’s next offensive was to be the invasion of Noemfoor Island, codenamed Operation Cyclone. Noemfoor served as a crucial staging ground for Japanese forces destined to reinforce the Biak Detachment, owing mainly to its possession of two vital airfields. Despite being guarded by a modest contingent, primarily consisting of six infantry companies from Colonel Shimizu Suesada’s 219th Regiment, the Japanese presence on the island was scattered, rendering their defense disorganized. Allied estimates of Japanese strength on Noemfoor were too high, for there were not more than 2,000 Japanese on the island. Probably not more than 900 of these could be counted infantry effectives. In addition to the 2,000 Japanese, there were 600-odd Formosan laborers and approximately 500 Javanese slave laborers. The 3d Battalion, 219th Infantry, contained the bulk of the combat troops, but there were also present about 180 men of the 2d Battalion, 219th Infantry, and a like number of the 222d Infantry, 36th Division, troops which had been unable to reach Biak. The Japanese garrison on Noemfoor was commanded by a Colonel Shimizu, who was also the commanding officer of the 219th Infantry. Another unit, commanded by a Major Mori, but apparently under Colonel Shimizu's operational control, seems to have been a provisional organization containing mostly armed service personnel and numbering about 600 men. 

General Krueger, anticipating minimal resistance, tasked Colonel Sandlin’s 158th Regiment with Operation Cyclone, overseen by General Patrick. The assault was to be facilitated by Admiral Fechteler’s Task Force 77, supported by cruisers under Admiral Berkey and aircraft from the 5th and 13th Air Forces, which had been conducting preparatory bombings on Noemfoor and enemy air bases in the Vogelkop Peninsula. Patrick's strategy involved landing on Yellow Beach, where the enemy's defenses were perceived to be strongest, aiming for swift American control over Noemfoor's airfields. In many essentials, the landing plans for Noemfoor were very similar to those used at Biak; but in one major essential the Noemfoor landing plan differed radically from that employed at Biak. At the latter island the HURRICANE Task Force had used a beach which, while within easy marching distance of the principal objectives and the main concentration of enemy troops, was relatively undefended. But at Noemfoor, the landing was to be made in the face of the enemy's strongest defenses, known to be located in the Kamiri Drome area. YELLOW Beach, as the landing area was designated, extended approximately 800 yards along the western end of the airfield, which was situated almost at the high water mark. The reef presented fewer hazards there than elsewhere, since it was somewhat narrower than at most other points along the island's coast. The relative narrowness of the reef at Kamiri would also permit LCIs, LCTs, LCMs and LSTs to approach to within 450 yards of the beach, which was believed to be firm at the airfield. Moreover, landing at YELLOW Beach had the advantage of placing the assault troops immediately on their objective, permitting a rapid seizure of Kamiri Drome before the Japanese could recover from the shock of the naval and air bombardments. Enemy forces on the island would be split, and those stationed at Namber and Kornasoren Dromes would be isolated. To minimize casualties during the assault, the landing plan required the most intense naval bombardment witnessed in the Southwest Pacific Area thus far. Additionally, Krueger kept the 503rd Parachute Regiment on standby at Hollandia for airdrop once a suitable landing zone was secured, with the 34th Regiment stationed at Biak in reserve.

With all preparations finalized by the end of June, Fectheler’s unit set off from Toem at 18:00 on June 30, reaching southeastern Biak around 17:40 the following day. Subsequently, the American forces sailed towards Noemfoor, commencing deployment off Yellow Beach by 05:00 on July 2. Prior to the landings, the island had endured significant bombardment from General Kenney’s aircraft the previous day, with additional air assaults conducted leading up to the arrival of the troops. As the soldiers readied for the shoreline assault, Berkey’s cruisers and Fechteler’s destroyers bombarded Yellow Beach and its surroundings for approximately 50 minutes. Immediately before the landing, air bombardment, like much of the naval gunfire, was directed against the low coral ridges and hills behind Kamiri Drome. It was believed that the most determined enemy opposition would come from positions in these ridges, and to neutralize these possible defenses the 33 B-24's, at approximately H minus 15 minutes, dropped 500-pound bombs along the ridge lines.

The intensity of the Allied air and naval bombardment effectively dispersed most of the Japanese forces from the beach or kept those remaining pinned down. With the cessation of bombing, the initial wave of troop-carrying LVT's approached the outer edge of the reef, supported by rocket fire from LCI gunboats. Encountering no resistance, Sandlin’s 1st and 2nd Battalions disembarked near a coral ledge overlooking Kamiri Drome. The American forces then commenced advancement in the west, east, and south directions to expand the beachhead, facing only minor resistance from caves approximately 500 yards from the eastern end of Kamiri Drome. Simultaneously, Sandlin’s 3rd Battalion landed and swiftly joined mop-up operations at the east end of the airstrip, enabling the 2nd Battalion to turn southward towards the Kamiri River without encountering opposition along the way.

By 4:00, the 158th had successfully secured a rectangular area approximately 3000 yards wide and around 800 yards deep, reaching south to the banks of the Kamiri River. Despite enemy mortar fire, unloading operations had progressed well, with over 7100 men, 500 vehicles, and 2250 tons of supplies successfully brought ashore by evening. American casualties for the day were limited to 3 killed, 19 wounded, and 2 injured, while the Japanese suffered 115 dead and 3 captured. In anticipation of potential Japanese resistance elsewhere, Patrick had requested reinforcements, leading Krueger to order Colonel George Jones’ 503rd Parachute Regiment to advance to Kamiri. On July 3 around 05:15, regimental headquarters and the 1st Battalion began loading onto 38 C-47s at Cyclops Drome, with plans for the other two battalions to drop over the following days. Launching was completed by 07:47, with successful arrival over Noemfoor at 10:00. The leading C-47's paratroopers were on the ground just ten minutes later. 

The planes were to fly over Kamiri Drome in flights of two each, the first plane at a height of 400 feet and the second echeloned slightly to the right rear at 450 feet. Subsequent flights were to follow at a distance of 300 yards. Contrary to plans, the first two C-47s flew over the strip at a height of about 175 feet, and the next eight planes all flew below 400 feet. Dropping from this low altitude caused the paratroopers in the first ten C-47s to suffer many casualties; more casualties resulted because the planes flew over the strip two abreast. The broad formation caused many paratroopers to land off the southern edge of the 100-foot-wide runway in an area where Allied vehicles, bulldozers, supply dumps, and wrecked Japanese aircraft were located. Additional hazards beyond the cleared area were jagged tree stumps, trees partially destroyed by pre-assault air and naval bombardments, and a number of anti-aircraft gun emplacements.  The drop resulted in 72 casualties among the 739 men dropped on July 3, including 31 severe fracture cases, many of whom would not be able to parachute again. Despite these challenges, Jones’s 1st Battalion took control of approximately 2000 yards in the center of the defenses around Kamiri Drome upon arrival, allowing Sandlin’s 2nd and 3rd Battalions to concentrate at the eastern end of the field and expand the perimeter. These battalions then proceeded eastward toward Kornasoren Drome, encountering well-prepared but unmanned defensive positions. Additionally, the 1st Battalion conducted patrols south of the Kamiri River but encountered only a few scattered enemy soldiers. The next day, Jones’ 3rd Battalion initiated their drop on Kamiri Drome. They encountered casualties, with 56 jump injuries among the 685 paratroopers who landed by 10:25. Given the significant injuries from both drops, Krueger and Patrick opted to transport his remaining battalion via water. They would arrive at Noemfoor by July 11. But for now, let's shift focus from Noemfoor to the Wakde-Sarmi area to discuss its final clean-up. 

Following the main conflict's conclusion on June 25, General Sibert directed the 3rd Battalion, 1st Regiment and the 3rd Battalion, 63rd Regiment to clear Lone Tree Hill. By June 30, they successfully secured the area. On the same day, the 1st Battalion, 20th Regiment moved through the defile south of the hill and encountered only a few stragglers. Seeking to fully secure the Maffin Bay staging area, Sibert extended the perimeter to the Woske River on July 1 through the 1st Regiment's efforts. By July 4, elements of the 63rd occupied Hill 225, seizing the crest of Mount Saksin the following day. However, Hill 265, located southwest of Hill 225, presented greater challenges due to Japanese resistance and difficult terrain. Yet by July 9, the 1st Battalions of the 1st and 63rd Regiments secured the hill crest, previously held by elements of the 224th Regiment. With the capture of Hill 265, the last enemy stronghold in the Maffin Bay region fell. Meanwhile, General Tagami abandoned the idea of a decisive battle in the Woske sector, opting instead to withdraw the majority of his 36th Division toward Sarmi and Sawar, with remnants of the 224th Regiment assuming defense of Woske. 

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

The fall of Saipan pierced the Japanese inner defensive perimeter, now the home islands were vulnerable to strategic bombing. The battle claimed nearly 50,000 casualties and at least 8000 civilian deaths. The intense percentage of casualties suffered by the Americans would have a profound effect on future American planning for the Pacific War.

- 136 - Pacific War - The Changsha-Hengyang Campaign, June 25 - July 2, 1944

Last time we spoke about the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. The battle of the philippine sea saw Admiral Ozawa toss numerous aircraft carrier attacks against US Task Force 58. The numerous strikes proved terribly ineffective, seeing most Japanese aircraft shot down and failing to return to their carriers. Ozawa’s forces faced issues with uncorrected compass deviations and poor communication leading to misidentified targets and unsuccessful attacks. The American pilots managed to intercept and shoot down incredible numbers of Japanese aircraft, dealing Ozawa a terrifying defeat. By the end, they had lost three carriers sunk, two carriers damaged, 395 carrier aircraft, about 200 land-based aircraft, two oilers, and four other damaged ships, with around 3,000 Japanese fatalities. The Americans lost 130 aircraft and 76 aviators, with none of their damaged ships rendered out of service. The Battle of the Philippine Sea, the last carrier-versus-carrier battle of the war, stood out because the most conservative and defensive-minded side emerged victorious.

This episode is the the Changsha-Hengyang Campaign

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Today we are first jumping back into the fighting on Saipan, where General Holland Smith’s forces were preparing for the start of the drive into the center of the island. General Holland Smith's strategy involved the 4th Marine Division advancing along the inland road to secure the area southeast of Mount Tapotchau and take Hill 600, which is just north of Magicienne Bay. Meanwhile, the 2nd Marine Division was tasked with capturing Mounts Tipo Pale and Tapotchau, while the 27th Division stood ready to support either Marine division if needed. On the morning of June 22, after a 10-minute artillery barrage, the offensive began.

On General Schmidt’s front, the 24th Marines moved along the shore, facing obstacles in the form of ravines but still reaching the O-4A Line by 13:30. The 25th Marines, advancing in battalions, secured three small ridgelines before being stopped at the fourth, gaining approximately 2000 yards. By noon, as the connection between the two regiments became weak, Schmidt had to send in the reserve 23rd Marines to bridge the gap and push toward Hill 600. Fighting especially troublesome terrain, the 23d Marines made slow progress. Only light enemy resistance from riflemen and machine gunners was encountered, but contact difficulties and time lost trudging up, down, around and through the rugged ground formations, limited the speed of advance. Progress ceased at a point about 200 yards south of objective O-4A, where the unit dug in. To the west, General Watson also made significant advances. The 6th Marines reached the summit of Mount Tipo Pale while the 8th Marines progressed closer to Mount Tapotchau. However, both units encountered obstacles due to enfilading fire from a Japanese stronghold on Tipo Pale, which remained undefeated for two days. Throughout the night, the 27th Division began relieving the worn-out 25th Marines. The 106th Regiment took position against the eastern slopes of Tapotchau, while the 165th faced off against Death Valley. Due to this shift, Holland Smith instructed the 105th Regiment to move north as the division’s reserve, leaving just its 2nd Battalion to clear Nafutan Point. The following morning, the 27th Division's advance was delayed because its regiments struggled to assemble at the line of departure. Meanwhile, Generals Watson and Schmidt had already resumed their offensive, encountering more resistance than the day before.

The 8th Marines initially encountered little resistance as they moved towards Tapotchau, but were stopped when the 106th Regiment had yet to advance. To the left, Colonel Riseley’s 3rd Battalion managed to advance about 400 yards, while the rest of the forces faced the Tipo Pale strongpoint. The 23rd Marines, attacking with battalions in column, Dillon’s 2d Battalion leading, advanced rapidly over rough terrain against machine-gun and rifle fire from Hill 600. Approached from the south. Hill 600 presented an extremely steep slope; and, in the words of the battalion commander, “It was all you could do to climb it, let alone light up it.” The number of Japanese defending the height was not great, but the area was admirably suited for defense and, for about 30 minutes, the fight was close and vicious. Hand grenades passed back and forth as in an overgrown, uncontrolled game of “hot potato.” Despite their struggle against gravity and an obstinate foe, Dillon’s Marines seized the peak and set up a hasty defense against counterattack. From its newly-won position, Dillon’s battalion had an unimpaired view of the whole of Kagman Peninsula. This surge had been executed without benefit of contact with the 27th Division on the left; and, when it was apparent that the latter was still some distance to the rear. General Schmidt ordered the 23d to hold up its advance until Army elements had tied in. Though the peak of the hill was securely in the hands of the 2d Battalion, the battle continued. The hill’s northern slope, cloaked in thick vegetation, was alive with Japanese soldiers. Dillon endeavored to strip them of their concealment by burning the area with flamethrowers, but the efforts were largely unsuccessful. Throughout the remainder of the day and during the night the grenade pitching continued.

In the afternoon, General Ralph Smith’s forces began their assault, with the 106th encountering a strongpoint known as Hell’s Pocket and the 165th being stopped by heavily fortified positions on Purple Heart Ridge. The nature of the terrain facing the 27th Division was to have an unusually vital bearing on the unit’s operations for many days to come. This terrain is well described by the historian attached to the division at Saipan: “The whole mountain [Tapotchau] was stoutly defended by the enemy, but the situation on the two flanks of it was somewhat unusual. On the west side of the peak, the ground sloped sharply to the sea. On the east, Kagman Point side, it dropped in sheer cliffs to a bench or plateau, some six hundred feet below the summit. This plateau, a saddle-shaped piece of land, was some twelve hundred yards across and bordered on the east by a low chain of hills covered with heavy foliage. Beyond them the ground sloped down to Kagman Point on the east or dropped off abruptly to Magicienne Bay on the southeast. The cliffs of Mt. Tapotehau and the chain of hills made a corridor out of the plateau. In the fighting which ensued this corridor was named Death Valley by the men who fought there and the chain of hills came to be known as Purple Heart Ridge.”

At d three divisions of Japanese troops and tanks were massing in front of the 27th Infantry Division. The expected enemy attack materialized at about 6:30, when Japanese tanks struck near the boundary between the 165th and 106th Regiments. The combined efforts of 37mm guns and bazookas in the areas of the 2d Battalion, 165th, and the 3d Battalion, 106th, destroyed five Japanese tanks, but a sixth escaped. This was not enough for the intruders. At about 7:30, in company with infantrymen, five more Japanese tanks struck the right center of the 106th Infantry. The 3d Battalion’s Antitank Platoon and the 1st Platoon of the Regimental Cannon Company accounted for four of the tanks while the fifth, though suffering a hit, broke through the 3d Battalion’s lines. Firing wildly, it sprayed the battalion aid station with machine-gun bullets and set fire to a large ammunition dump nearby. The resultant exploding shells forced the right of the 3d Battalion to withdraw about 100 yards, returning to its original positions after the lire had burned itself out. Holland Smith expressed displeasure over the 27th Division's failure to start its attack on time. He was even more upset when he found out that Colonel Bishop’s 2nd Battalion had not made progress at Nafutan Point. As a result, Major-General Sanderson Jarman had to brief Ralph Smith, who committed to ensuring his regiments advanced on schedule the next day.

On June 24, the 106th and 165th Regiments once again struggled to advance against strong resistance and difficult terrain. An attack toward Nafutan Point in the south also failed, prompting Holland Smith to remove Ralph Smith from command and temporarily appoint Jarman to lead the 27th Division. Colonel Geoffrey O'Connell was assigned to clear Nafutan. In contrast, the 2nd Marines made progress toward Garapan and reached Radio Road on the O-6 Line, where they repelled two strong enemy counterattacks. On the right of the 2nd Marine Division, the 8th Marines continued the fight over nightmarish terrain. As Lieutenant Colonel Hays’ 1sl Battalion moved into the attack, the troublesome pocket, developed on the previous day, came alive again. Matted with undergrowth and trees, the irregular coral limestone formation was favorable for the type of defense the Japanese were employing. Improving the area’s natural assets, they had developed a honeycomb of underground positions. The 1st Battalion, utilizing the most unspectacular of tactics, plodded at its unpleasant task of sealing the caves and killing the occupants. The former chore proved the easier, since in most cases the Japanese had not neglected to plan routes and methods of escape. When the “cavemen" had done as much damage as possible from one position, they would retire to another from which to resume the fight. Shortly after midday, the coordinated efforts of combat engineers armed with flame-throwers, bazookas and demolitions and riflemen showed results; the pocket was eliminated and contact with the 6th Marines again established. By late afternoon the battalion reached the edge of a vast cleared area, desirable from the defense-for-the-night point of view. Since the next satisfactory site was 700 yards farther to the north, the unit halted and dug in. Major Larsen’s 3d Battalion, advancing along the base of a cliff, made good progress, limited only by fairly difficult terrain and the necessity of maintaining contact with flank units. Above the 3d Battalion, along the top of the cliff, moved Lieutenant Colonel Tompkins’ 1st Battalion. 29th Marines. Here the cliff was broken into a rough plateau dotted with smaller plateaus of coral limestone which con tinned rising like irregular stair steps toward Mt Tapotcliau’s crest. The undergrowth in this area was a tangle of fern trees, the roots of which spread out three to eight feet above ground like the ribs of an inverted umbrella, overgrown and interlaced with a strait-jacket of vines. On the battalion’s right flank was a narrow flat ledge covered with grass five feet high and the usual tangle of trees. This ledge, part of the north-south ridge leading to Mt. Tapotchau, was within machine-gun range of the summit. Moving through this intricate snarl was like attempting to swim through a fishermen's net, and Tompkins’ battalion became overextended. At this juncture Colonel Wallace, commanding the 8th Marines, ordered the 2d Battalion to move in behind Tompkins’ right to protect the open flank. As the 8th Marines dug in for the night after an advance of about 700 yards, it again became essential to commit the 37mm Platoon from the Regimental Weapons Company to extend south along the ridge facing the hiatus between the 2nd and 27th Divisions.

Schmidt's division also moved east on Kagman Peninsula, with the 23rd Marines reaching Chacha village and the 24th Marines making rapid coastal gains of around 1200 yards. The next day, while the 2nd Marines held their ground outside Garapan and the 6th Marines tackled the Tipo Pale strongpoint, Colonel Wallace's forces finally attacked Mount Tapotchau. However, the summit was secured by a bold patrol along a ridge line on the right flank, which had to fend off multiple Japanese counterattacks. The 27th Division, under new leadership, resumed its attack, with the 165th taking one-third of Purple Heart Ridge and the 106th making a small entry into Death Valley before withdrawing during the night under enemy pressure. Further south, O'Connell struggled to make headway at Nafutan Point, while on Kagman Peninsula, Schmidt's Marines faced minimal resistance and secured Kagman Hill and the Brown Beaches along the O-6 Line. Additionally, recognizing their desperate situation, Generals Igeta and Saito requested reinforcements from Tinian. 

From Sunharon Harbor on the west coast of Tinian, 11 personnel barges carrying a company of the 1st Battalion, 135th Regiment moved out during darkness of 25-26 June bent upon reinforcing Saipan. Spotted by the destroyer Bancroft and the destroyer escort Elden, the barges were fired upon and dispersed. One was reported sunk, while the remainder scurried back to Tinian Town. Later, at about 2:25am, LCI(G)s 438 and 456 observed several barges moving out of Tanapag Harbor on Saipan’s west coast. Immediately opening fire, the LCI(G)s accounted for one sunk and a second damaged; the remainder returned to Tanapag. Both LCI(G)s received some damage during this repulse, however. The 438 received 12 holes in her hull from one of the barges’ 37mm guns, damaging the fire main, starting batteries and radar. The 456 suffered less, with only slight damage to her winch and refrigerator. The 438 suffered one man killed and two wounded and the 456 two wounded. A report from one of the LCIs that the Japanese barges had unleashed torpedoes during this action was later substantiated by a prisoner of war who stated that there were at least three torpedoes fired at U. S. ships at this time.

The Americans responded by initiating a systematic bombardment of Tinian on June 26.Air and naval gunfire alternated daily, working first in one half and then in the other, while artillery fired on any targets escaping other attention. A target map was maintained, information exchanged and new targets posted. Cruisers Birmingham, Montpelier and Indianapolis, using both air and direct shipboard spot, were assigned to execute the naval gunfire portion of the plan, while planes would be provided by Carrier Support Groups One and Two. Meanwhile, Schmidt’s Marines were clearing the Kagman Peninsula, and the 6th Marines bypassed the Tipo Pale strongpoint and secured the ridge linking it to Tapotchau. 

In the 8th Marines zone the day’s advances were small. On the left the 1st Battalion regulated its progress on that of the 6th Marines. On the right the 2d Battalion’s advance was restrained because of the lack of contact with 27th Division elements. In the 8th Marines’ center, the 3rd Battalion and the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, made only small gains. The attached 2nd Battalion, 25th Marines, remained with the regiment during the greater portion of the day, Company E being used in the lines, while the remainder of the battalion was employed in mopping-up operations. As already noted, the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, could move only as fast as the 6th Marines to its left if it were to retain contact. The cleeply-gashed ground, more than enemy opposition, governed the rate of advance. One unusual enemy tactic employed against the battalion at this time is worthy of note: bundles of picric acid blocks were catapulted upon the Marines by Japanese soldiers located in the craggy rocks along the route. This device showed originality but little else; no casualties were inflicted upon the Marines. Higher on Tapotehau’s western slopes, the 3rd Battalion also fought through difficult terrain. A statement from the 8th Marines’ action report gives an indication of the problems in that zone: “To go from the left flank of 3/8 to the right flank of 3/8 required a two hour and 40 minute march over rough terrain.” At some points the Japanese threw or rolled grenades and demolition charges down upon the Marines as they struggled through the hilly thickets. And as if that were not enough, Japanese positioned above directed plunging machine-gun fire upon the advancing men. The 3d Battalion’s left flank kept pace with the 1st Battalion, but the right flank lagged behind. By nightfall the 3d Battalion’s lines stretched almost north and south along the base of a steep slope. On 25 June the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, less one company, had secured a foothold on the summit of Mt. Tapotchau. It remained on 26 June, then, for Company B to move up the mountain’s western slope and join the battalion. While waiting for this unit, Lieutenant Colonel Tompkins sent a 25-man combat patrol from Company A to seize the northernmost rise of Tapotehau’s crest. This patrol was repulsed after some hard fighting, and it became apparent that this area would have to be thoroughly battered before a successful effort could be made. In the meantime Company B reached the mountain to,. combing the area on the way. From the 2d Battalion position , the Marines observed men of the 2nd Battalion, 106th Infantry, attempting to move up on the division flank. By the close of the day, however, a gap of 600 yards still existed. To protect the exposed flank, the 2nd Battalion bent its lines to the shape of a horseshoe with one company facing north, one east, and one south. To sum up, the most important developments in the 8th Marines’ sector during the day were the straightening of several small bulges in the lines and consolidation of the dominating heights won on 25 June.

The 106th Regiment, under Colonel Albert Stebbins, failed to launch its attack amid confusion. The 165th Regiment bypassed Death Valley and joined the 4th Marine Division. In the south, after heavy bombardment, O'Connell began making progress against Nafutan Point. Life had not been pleasant for the Japanese defenders on Nafutan Point. From seaward, destroyers pounded the rocks and caves unmercifully; from land, a monotonously heavy volume of fire was maintained by 40mm and 90mm anti-aircraft guns, and 81mm and 60mm mortars, as well as fires of the light tank platoon, the self-propelled mount, and small arms of the 2nd Battalion, 105th Regiment. Movement on the point was rendered very difficult, and the shortage of food and water became acute. As a result, on June 26, Captain Sasaki, commanding the 317th Independent Infantry Battalion of the 47th Independent Mixed Brigade, determined to move his battalion from the Nafutan Point trap and join other Japanese forces which he believed to be in the vicinity of Hill 500. This attack, though better planned than the average Japanese effort, achieved very little, and Sasaki’s password “seven lives for one’s country” remained only a slogan.

However, during the night, the trapped Japanese forces managed to break through O’Connell’s defenses. Moving undiscovered through the thinly spread outposts of the 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry, Sasaki’s force headed for Aslito Airfield. The only indication that men of the 2d Battalion had that the enemy was on the move came at about 0200 when “an extremely large group” stumbled into the command post, about 1,500 yards in rear of the front lines. After a lively skirmish, in which the soldiers suffered 24 casualties, the intruders disappeared. The next morning the bodies of 27 Japanese were found in the immediate command post area. At about 0230 Sasaki’s force struck Aslito Airfield. All U. S. personnel in that area were alerted after the enemy succeeded in setting fire to one P-47 and damaging three others. Seabees and engineers quickly rallied to their unexpected mission, cleared the field of Japanese and set up a hasty defense. At 0430 the Commander, Air Defense Command, reported that enemy .50-caliber machine guns and 20mm guns were firing on Aslito Airfield. After causing confusion at the airfield, the force advanced toward Hill 500, where they expected to find Colonel Oka's 47th Independent Mixed Brigade Headquarters . At about 0520 there were two surprises: the first was to Sasaki’s men, who received an unexpected reception from the 25th Marines on Hill 500, and the second surprise was for the 25th Marines, who were not expecting visitors and, in some cases, found the Japanese in their midst before they realized that anything was afoot. Both participants quickly recovered from the shock, however, and a lively small arms and hand grenade battle ensued. At about the same time, the 14th Marines, in artillery firing positions between Hill 500 and Aslito Airfield, was attacked by another portion of Sasaki’s force. The brunt of this assault was borne by the 2nd Battalion led by Lieutenant Colonel Wilson, which held its fire until a precariously late moment, mistaking the advancing Japanese column for a large U. S. Army patrol scheduled to pass through the area at about this time. A savagely-fought, close-in battle ensued, virtually annihilating the attacking force. Total 14th Marines’ casualties in the skirmish were 33 killed and wounded, while 143 Japanese bodies lay sprawled in the regiment’s immediate area. With the coming of daylight, the 25th Marines were assigned the mission of mopping up the stragglers from the abortive enemy effort of the previous night. Total Japanese losses in the fight around Aslito Airfield, at Hill 500, and in the 14th Marines’ area, plus the 27 June mop-up by the 25th Marines, amounted to approximately 500 dead. The participants, some of whom wore United States uniforms and carried M-1 rifles, appeared greatly in need of water and rations. Yet that is all for Saipan for now, as we will be traveling over to China War.

After the success of Operation Kogo, the Japanese planned for General Yokoyama’s 11th Army to initiate a three-pronged assault in Hunan. The 34th, 58th, 68th, and 116th Divisions would head straight for Changsha, while the 3rd, 13th, and 27th Divisions provided coverage on the eastern flank by advancing towards Liling. Meanwhile, the 40th Division, the 17th Independent Mixed Brigade, and the 5th Independent Brigade secured the Dongting Lake region on the western flank. Additionally, the 70th Division in Jiangxi would launch a diversionary attack towards Hunan. On the night of May 27, following heavy artillery bombardment, Yokoyama initiated his offensive. The 34th, 58th, 68th, and 116th Divisions crossed the Xinqiang River swiftly, while the 3rd, 13th, and 27th Divisions moved south towards Liling. Furthermore, the 216th Regiment launched an amphibious operation towards Yingtianzhen and Xiangyin, catching the Chinese defenders off guard. The following day, the 40th Division and the 109th Regiment began their assault southwards, capturing Anxiang, Nan, Tianxingzhou, and the port of Sanxianhu by May 30. Simultaneously, the 5th and 17th Brigades advanced west towards the Songzizhong River to secure the northern shores of Dongting Lake.

In the east, the Japanese forces encountered minimal resistance and advanced almost 100 kilometers, capturing Tongcheng, Nanjiangzhen, Pingjiang, and Changshouzhen by June 1. In the center, the main Japanese divisions breached the 20th Army’s positions at Guanwang and Changlezhen and reached the Guluo River on June 3. With the enemy seemingly in full retreat, Yokoyama’s forces continued southward, hindered only by a sudden downpour, and reached the Laodao River line by June 6, preparing to besiege Changsha. However, heavy rains delayed these preparations, allowing General Xue Yue time to gather his forces around the city. According to a prearranged plan, the 11th Army used the 27th Division to repair the Chongyang-Tongcheng-Pingjiang-Liuyang road and all engineer regiments under the direct command of the Field Engineer commander to repair the Xinqiang-Xinshizhen-Mianhuapo-Changsha road. Continuous rains, however, greatly delayed the road work and turned the roads into a sea of mud. Lines of communication became extremely difficult to maintain and, until the middle of June, the Japanese first-line troops received very few supplies from the rear. In spite of strenuous efforts on the part of the Army to improve these two roads, they eventually had to be abandoned. The situation became critical as all field artillery and motor units became congested on the muddy Yueyang-Changsha road. In the meantime, the 40th Division crossed Dongting Lake to seize Yuanjiang, making contact with elements of the 58th Division at Qiaokou.

On June 11, the 40th Division successfully took control of the Yiyang area, while the 34th Division bypassed the Tamoshan Range and launched an attack towards Yuelu Mountain and Fengshupu. The 68th and 116th Divisions bypassed Changsha and moved forward towards Guanqiao, Changlingxiang, and Yisuhe, and the 3rd and 13th Divisions advanced towards Liuyang, facing significant resistance in the region. Despite this, Liuyang fell on June 14, after which the 13th Division proceeded towards Liling. Finding himself completely surrounded, Xue Yue decided to leave Changsha and retreat towards Liling. In the earlier three battles of Changsha, the Chinese had managed to defend the city and counterattack from the flanks; however, both the western and eastern flanks had now fallen to the Japanese, leaving the defenders with no choice but to withdraw.

Now I want to take a short detour. Since mid-1943, the Americans had been constructing airfields in India, Ceylon, and China to house 16 squadrons of B-29 Superfortress Very-Long-Range heavy bombers under Brigadier-General Kenneth Wolfe's 20th Bomber Command. As part of Operation Matterhorn, these bombers were assigned to target locations in Japan, Manchuria, Korea, Formosa, Indochina, and the Dutch East Indies. A key target was the Japanese steel industry, which relied on a few coke plants situated in Kyushu, Manchuria, and Korea—within reach of the B-29s stationed in Chengdu. Before launching an attack on Japan, Wolfe decided to conduct a test combat mission against the Makkasan railway yard facilities in Bangkok, Thailand. On June 5, at 05:45, Brigadier-General LaVerne Saunders led 98 B-29s on a 2,261-mile round trip from India, marking the longest mission of the war up to that point. 

Each bomber carried a fuel load of 6846 US gallons and 5 short tons of bombs; three groups carried 500-pound general-purpose bombs while the fourth carried M18 incendiary bombs. The XX Bomber Command wanted to test out the new M18 incendiary bombs and the large number of wooden buildings and freight cars and a small oil facility in the area offered good targets. The resulting 134000-pound takeoff weight was too heavy for the temporary field at Charra, so the 444th Bombardment Group had to stage from the other three fields. The attack was launched at 5:45 local time on 5 June 1944 to avoid high ground temperatures that were bad for the R-3350 engines and to allow the whole mission to be conducted in daylight. Wolfe had suggested a night-time raid, but Arnold insisted on daylight precision bombing.

Only 77 bombers reached Bangkok, conducting a chaotic series of bombing runs between 10:52 and 12:32 due to cloud cover. The bomber's aim was to destroy the Memorial Bridge and a major power plant. They missed and instead knocked down tram lines and destroyed a Japanese military hospital as well as the headquarters of the Japanese secret police. No civilian buildings were damaged, a fact that aroused admiration among the Thai authorities. It was only in 1947 that the Thais discovered the American bombers had been aiming at the Memorial Bridge, almost two and-a-half kilometres away. Following the raid, schools and universities were closed in Bangkok and children moved out of the city for their safety.

Upon returning to India, 42 B-29s had to land at alternative airfields due to low fuel, leading to the loss of five bombers and 15 aircrew fatalities. Despite the setbacks, the mission was deemed successful enough for Wolfe to plan a night attack on Japan for June 15. The B-29s began relocating to Chengdu on June 13 to prepare for the strike against the Imperial Iron and Steel Works in Yawata, producing approximately 2,250,000 metric tons of steel annually, or 24% of Japan's steel output.

On June 15 at 16:16, Saunders led 68 B-29s on a 3,182-mile round trip to Yawata. Although some bombers crashed during takeoff, 47 reached the city and attacked for nearly two hours starting at 12:28. Only forty-seven of the sixty-eight B–29s launched hit the target area: one crashed en route, six jettisoned their bombs because of mechanical difficulties, and seven bombed secondary targets or targets of opportunity. Only 15 American aircraft visually aimed their bombs, as Yawata was obscured by darkness and smoke, with 32 others bombing via radar. Two more B-29s targeted Laoyao harbor, while five attacked other nearby targets. In total, 107 tons of bombs were dropped during the raid.

While returning to Chengdu, three additional B-29 bombers were lost in China. In total, seven B-29s and 55 crew members were lost by the Americans, who managed only to inflict minor damage on Yawata. However, this marked the first attack on the Japanese home islands since the Doolittle raid in April 1942, signaling the start of the strategic bombing campaign against Japan. This raid caused panic in Japanese society, prompting Tokyo to pressure Yokoyama to quickly conquer Changsha and then target the B-29 airfields in central China. As a result, on June 16, the 58th Division launched its assault on Changsha, with the 34th Division also attacking Yuelu and Fengshupu. Changsha fell two days later, leading to the collapse of Chinese resistance in the area. By June 22, Liling and Pingxiang were also captured, allowing the Japanese to gain control over the Jiangxi-Zhejiang railway. Upon hearing of the defeat at Changsha, the Allies worried about the role of Kuomintang forces during Operation Ichi-Go. President Roosevelt proposed placing the entire Nationalist Army under General Stilwell, a suggestion that infuriated Chiang Kai-Shek and was quickly rejected, “Due to our errors in Henan and Changsha, the prestige of our nation and our army, including that of the military command, has been questioned. The foreigners haven’t respected neither our combatants nor our commanders. This offense is more intolerable than the Japanese occupation of our homeland by force of arms.” Meanwhile, Yokoyama's next target was Hengyang to the south, where he planned to encircle the city using the 116th and 68th Divisions while the 40th Division secured Xiangxiang to the west. To the east, the 3rd and 13th Divisions would advance beyond You to secure Leiyang, with support from the 27th Division. The 216th Regiment was set to move upstream along the Xiang Jiang to attack Hengyang from the northeast.

Meanwhile, in Henan, General Uchiyama continued his offensive by capturing the Hotsin Airdrome on May 30 and occupying the towns of Lingbao and Wenxiang by June 11. However, the Chinese forces managed to regroup, ambush, and counterattack the Japanese troops, reclaiming the recently lost towns and ultimately forcing the Japanese to retreat from Loyang and other towns by June 15. Nonetheless, the railway remained under Japanese control and was further reinforced with the capture of Runan and Shangcai on June 16.

Back in Hunan, the second phase of Yokoyama's offensive got off to a strong start as the 40th secured Xiangxiang, trapping many retreating Chinese soldiers and compelling them to surrender. Meanwhile, the 68th and 116th moved quickly toward Hengyang, with the 68th occupying Hengyang airfield on June 26 and the 116th reaching the sector northwest of Hengyang the next day. On that day, the 68th also maneuvered around the city, crossing the Xiangjiang River to launch an attack on Hengyang from the southwest.

Both divisions commenced their assault on Hengyang, but the strong Chinese fortifications held by the well-prepared defenders proved impenetrable. The attackers faced a shortage of ammunition and were further challenged by General Chennault's B-25s, P-40s and P-51s, who bombed and strafed the besiegers. As a result, Major-General Fang Xianjue's 10th Army repelled all Japanese assaults by the end of June. The heavy Japanese losses during these attacks, including severe injuries to Lieutenant-General Sakuma Tameto, compelled Yokoyama to suspend the attacks on July 2 until his artillery could support the siege. Yet that will be all for the China front for today as we are now heading over to Biak.

After General Fuller was relieved on June 15th, General Eichelberger assumed command and decided to follow General Doe’s plans for the June 16th attack. The 186th Infantry's unit began attacking eastward along the ridge shortly after 9:00. Company E led, with the 2d Platoon on the ridge, the 3d Platoon in flats 100 yards to the north, and the 1st Platoon 100 yards beyond the 3d. The 2d Platoon quickly found itself in a maze of Japanese positions and was halted by Japanese automatic weapons fire. The 1st Platoon of Company G thereupon moved up on Company E's right and began advancing along the southern slope of the low ridge. Together, the two platoons continued eastward against slackening resistance. They cleared innumerable enemy slit trenches, foxholes, and bunkers, destroyed several machine guns of various calibers, and at 10:50 reached the lines of the 3d Battalion, 162d Infantry. The task of closing the ridge line gap was completed in less than two hours, many of the previous Japanese defenders apparently having withdrawn north into the West Caves the preceding night.

The Americans also moved northeast but encountered heavy resistance from enemy machine-gun and mortar fire. After intense artillery support, the battalion regrouped and attacked again in the afternoon, reaching the western limits of the West Caves positions. However, concerned about a possible counterattack on his left flank, Doe decided to pull his forces back to the low ridge while Haney's 2nd Battalion took over from the 2nd Battalion, 186th Regiment. The 2nd Battalion, 186th Regiment could look back on the day's operations with a good deal of satisfaction. It had closed the gap on the low ridge; it had located the western limits of the enemy's West Caves positions; it had discovered that more Japanese troops were located north of the enemy encampment area both along the main road and on ridges west and northwest of Hill 320; it had eliminated most of the machine-gun nests and rifle pits in the encampment area and many of those on high, forested ground near that bivouac; it had destroyed many Japanese automatic weapons and rifles; and it had killed at least 65 Japanese. The battalion in turn lost 15 men killed and 35 wounded. There had been only local patrolling by the rest of the units in the forward area during the day, for the 1st Battalions of the 162nd and 186th Regiments had been kept in place by American artillery and mortar fire which supported the operations of the 2nd Battalion, 186th Regiment.

On June 17, after identifying the western limits of the West Caves, Doe instructed Newman's 1st Battalion to advance northwest to high ground while Haney's 1st Battalion moved south and southwest towards the West Caves. Facing strong opposition, the 162nd Battalion, supported by tanks, managed to eliminate several pillboxes before being halted around midday. At the same time, the 186th Battalion approached the high ground from the east and joined forces with Haney's Company C, which had just cleared the final major enemy position on the hill. The Americans then continued their westward attack but made only modest progress by nightfall. With the high ground overlooking the West Caves secured, Doe planned to launch a coordinated attack on the strongpoint the following day. However, on June 18, Eichelberger changed his plans due to dissatisfaction with the progress of the operation. Instead, the 162nd and 186th Regiments reorganized for a coordinated attack, with Newman assigned to attack the rear of the West Caves position while the 3rd Battalion, 163rd Regiment gathered near Hill 320 to block enemy reinforcements. 

The main effort was to be made by the 186th Infantry, the 2d and 3d Battalions of which were to attack from the southwest and west while the 1st Battalion struck from the east. The 162d Infantry would hold its positions. An egg-shaped terrain feature on the low ridge 1,000 yards northeast of Borokoe Drome and on the left flank of the 186th Infantry's prospective line of advance was to be seized for flank security and as a line of departure for subsequent attacks north and northeast. On 18 June only local patrolling was undertaken, while the bulk of the troops rested or redeployed in preparation for the attack on the 19th. The egg-shaped feature was secured against no opposition and a few Japanese stragglers along the low ridge in the area were mopped up. The regiment was to advance east from the egg-shaped protrusion of the low ridge with the 2nd Battalion leading, two companies abreast. The 3rd Battalion was to follow the 2nd, and the 1st Battalion would start moving northwestward once the other two had begun moving east. The attack, which was to begin at 6:30 on the 19th, would be supported by the 121st, 167th, 205th, and 947th Field Artillery Battalions, Company D of the 641st Tank Destroyer Battalion, and ten tanks of the 603d Tank Company.

Furthermore, the 34th Regiment was deployed to relieve the 186th west of Mokmer Drome, prepared to take over Borokoe and Sorido Dromes as per Eichelberger's orders. On the morning of June 19, following intense artillery preparation, Eichelberger's offensive began, with Newman's 2nd and 3rd Battalions attacking east and then northwest against light rifle fire and eventually reaching a rugged, heavily-forested coral ridge west of Hill 320 by midday. Around noon, Newman's 1st Battalion started clearing the southern extension of the coral ridge line, successfully advancing through the Japanese encampment area up the road to the 2nd Battalion's position by late afternoon. Facing minimal resistance, the 186th Regiment surrounded the rear of the Japanese in the West Caves, preventing reinforcement or escape. Eichelberger's plans for the next day involved the 186th continuing its operations in the Hill 320 area and the western ridges, while the 162nd attacked the West Caves and the 34th advanced towards the airdromes. On the morning of June 20, Haney's 1st Battalion, supported by two tanks, attacked the West Caves, facing lighter resistance initially but ultimately being halted by heavy Japanese fire. At the same time, Newman's troops extensively patrolled and discovered the Teardrop position, while the 34th Regiment quickly took control of the Borokoe and Sorido Dromes and Sorido village, facing minimal opposition.

During the 1st Battalion, 162nd Regiment again moved up to the West Caves on June 21 and sent patrols out to clear Japanese riflemen from brush and crevices on hillocks north and northwest of the caves. The patrols, actually flamethrower teams supported by riflemen, accomplished their mission without much difficulty while the rest of the battalion, again covered by two tanks from the 603rd Tank Company, surrounded the sump depressions. The infantry and tanks concentrated on the most westerly of three large sinkholes comprising the West Caves. The tanks fired into cave entrances; the infantrymen lobbed hand grenades into holes and crevices within reach; and all Japanese observed were quickly killed by rifle fire. But the battalion was unable to force its way into the main entrance to the underground caverns. Fire into this entrance was also ineffective, for the opening was shielded by stalagmites and stalactites. Engineers poured the contents of five gasoline drums into the cavern through crevices or seepage points found on the surface of the ground. Flamethrowers then ignited the gasoline and the 1st Battalion withdrew to await developments. There were no immediately apparent results and, since it was believed that the West Caves were still strongly held, the battalion did not attempt to send any more men into the entrance. In the late afternoon the unit again pulled back to its bivouac area.

The attacks during the night of June 21-22 had apparently resulted from a decision on the part of Colonel Kuzume to acknowledge defeat. In an impressive ceremony in the West Caves, Colonel Kuzume, surrounded by his staff, burned the colors of the 222nd Regiment and, according to some American reports, disemboweled himself in the tradition of the Samurai. Japanese reports of the Biak action state that Colonel Kuzume did not die then but was killed in action or committed suicide some days later. Whatever the cause and date of his death, on the night of June 21-22 Colonel Kuzume had instructed the forces remaining in the West Caves to withdraw to the north and west. Many of the remaining troops of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 222nd Regiment, who had originally held the low ridge north of Mokmer Drome, had already been killed or had moved north, and most of the Japanese killed by the 186th Regiment during the night of June 21-22 were identified as members of the 221st Regiment, elements of which had been included in the reinforcements sent to Biak after Z Day.

At 4:00 am on June 22, the Japanese launched another attack, relying on stealth, hand grenades, and bayonets. Japanese poured out of the caves and rushed northwest up the road toward the lines of the 186th Infantry, attempting to escape to the west or north. At 2100 Japanese infantry, supported by light machine guns and light mortars, hit the southeast flank of the American regiment. When the Japanese were about fifty yards away, the 186th Infantry's .50-caliber machine guns opened fire and broke up the attack. Undaunted, the Japanese made another break-through attempt about midnight, this time supported only by light mortars. Machine guns, both .50- and .30-caliber, aided by Company G's 60-mm. mortars, forced the enemy to withdraw for a second time.

This final assault was so fierce that the enemy reached the 186th's foxholes, resulting in hand-to-hand combat across the regiment's southern flank. Mortar fire eventually scattered the disorganized enemy, though small groups of Japanese soldiers continued to mount sporadic attacks until dawn. Haney’s 1st Battalion continued to face enemy resistance at the West Caves; however, after dropping two 500-pound TNT charges into one of the cave entrances, the Americans initially reported the caves cleared. This assessment proved premature when another small group of Japanese attempted to breach the 186th Regiment's lines later that night.

 

On the following morning, Haney’s 1st Battalion set up a permanent camp around the various caves and indentations, continuing their search through the area. Although the remaining Japanese troops were trapped in a hopeless situation, they managed to hold their ground. It wasn't until the afternoon of June 25 that any soldiers managed to access the caves, but without making any deep inroads. It wasn't until June 27 that patrols reached the innermost parts of the West Caves. The stench of rotting Japanese bodies was revolting, and the sight nauseating. The entire cave area was strewn with Japanese bodies or parts of bodies. One gruesome area had apparently been used as an aid station and another possibly as a butcher shop for cannibalistically inclined survivors of the carnage since June 18. Three more Japanese were killed in the caves during the day, and large quantities of equipment and documents were found. Because of the advanced stage of decomposition of many of the dead, a complete count of Japanese bodies could not be made, but before overpowering odors drove the patrols out of the caves 125 more or less whole bodies were counted. This was considered a minimum figure, for no estimate could be made of the numbers of Japanese represented by separated arms, legs, or torsos and it was impossible to guess how many Japanese had been sealed in smaller caves or crevices by artillery and mortar fire or by explosions of TNT and Japanese ammunition within the caves.

With the suppression of Japanese cave positions near Mokmer airfield, the strip was finally operational, and P-40s and B-24s started using it from June 22. Between June 22 and 24, the 186th Regiment also took down some Japanese positions northwest of its perimeter. By June 25, Colonel Newman managed to subdue the Teardrop position. Despite lacking supplies and water, some Japanese managed to flee westward, where the 34th Regiment would eventually clean up the area by the end of June. Over at the East Caves from 7 through 10 June the 4.2-inch mortars of the 2d Platoon, Company D, 641st Tank Destroyer Battalion, lobbed over 1,000 shells into the East Caves area. On the 9th and 10th, tanks in LCT's cruising offshore added their fire, and on the latter day the 205th and 947th Field Artillery Battalions swung into action against the East Caves. Bombardments by artillery, mortars, tanks, and destroyers continued from 11-13 June, but the Japanese still managed to deny to the HURRICANE. Task Force the use of the coastal road during much of the period. In between artillery and naval gunfire concentrations, elements of the 3d Battalion, 163d Infantry, probed more deeply into the Japanese positions from the north and northeast and located the north flank of the main enemy defenses. By noon on the 13th, the combination of American fire and infantry action had succeeded in silencing enough of the Japanese fire so that truck convoys could safely use the coastal road without interruptions for the first time. Infantry patrolling and all types of bombardment continued from 14 through 23 June, but the Japanese still occasionally harassed truck convoys along the coastal road. On the 23d or 24th (the records are contradictory) there was undertaken a series of aerial bombardment missions which are among the shortest on record. Fifth Air Force B-25's, based on Mokmer Drome, took off from that field to skip-bomb the East Caves. Although most of the bombs missed the main sump holes, the air missions did cause many explosions and started a number of fires in the East Caves. For a few days, at least, almost all the enemy fire was silenced.

On 27 June Company E, 542d Engineer, Boat and Shore Regiment, started to construct a jetty near Mokmer, and in connection with this mission began working a gravel pit at the base of the ridge northwest of the village. Japanese mortar and rifle fire from the East Caves impeded the latter work and on 29 June 4.2-inch mortars and tanks had to be moved back into the area to shell the caves and protect the engineers. Within three days the mortars fired over 800 rounds into the caves. The engineer company, borrowing bazookas from an infantry unit, sent its own patrols into the caves, and Company I, 163d Infantry, sent patrols back into the area from the north. On 30 June the 205th Field Artillery Battalion sent one gun of Battery C to a position near Mokmer village to place about 800 rounds of smoke and high explosive shells into the caves. Light harassing fire continued, however, and on 3 July elements of Company E, 542d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, moved into the caves under cover of tank fire from the base of the ridge. Some tunnels were sealed shut, twelve Japanese were killed, and two light machine guns were captured. Almost simultaneously, Company E, 163d Infantry, pushed into the caves from Mokmer village. Neither the engineer nor the infantry unit met as much resistance as had been anticipated. Patrolling throughout the caves was continued on the 4th and 5th, and on the latter day a platoon of Company E, 163d Infantry, entered the larger sump holes, where were found many automatic weapons, mortars, rifles, all types of ammunition, food, clothing, cooking utensils, and pioneer equipment. The next day loudspeakers and interpreters were sent into the caves to persuade the few remaining Japanese to surrender. Only ten Japanese, of whom eight were killed, were seen in the area. The Japanese who had lived uninjured through the heavy bombardments since 7 June had evacuated the East Caves. The few Japanese left alive in the East Caves after 6 July were still capable of causing some trouble. On 15 July six souvenir hunters of the Royal Australian Air Force (elements of which were staging through Biak for operations farther west) were killed near the caves. Tanks and infantry were sent into the area to mop up the remaining Japanese and recover the Australian dead. On the 16th and 17th, three badly mutilated bodies of Australian airmen were found and two Japanese machine gun nests were wiped out. On the 20th the infantry and tanks returned to the caves, found the other Australian bodies, and eliminated the last enemy resistance.

Meanwhile, the determined and resourceful defenders of the Ibdi Pocket resisted repeated attacks from the 2nd Battalion, 163rd Regiment and ongoing artillery barrages. By the end of June, the Japanese had been pushed into a 600-yard-square area, with American patrols continuing the cleanup in July. Through the use of bazookas, flamethrowers, tanks, and artillery, the remaining Japanese were gradually confined to an even smaller area until the pocket was cleared on July 28.

The American forces would then mop-up the remainder of the island up to August 20, accounting for a total of 4700 Japanese dead and 220 captured since the start of the battle. Total American casualties were an estimated 400 killed, 2000 wounded, 150 injured in action and 5 missing. Additionally, there were 7234 non-battle casualties due to sickness, many of whom were returned to duty.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

Operation Ichi-Go was continuing its horror show deeper into central China. B-29 Superfortresses are arriving to the scene, first from India and China, but as the Pacific Island hoping campaign makes more and more progress, soon they will be lifting off from airfields much closer to the Japanese home islands.

- 135 - Pacific War - The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot, June 18-25, 1944

Last time we spoke about the Invasion of Saipan, Tinian and Guam. The Japanese mistakenly believed that the Americans were preparing for a decisive battle near New Guinea, not realizing the real target was Saipan. The US assembled a large fleet for Operation Forager, aiming to capture Saipan, Tinian, and Guam, advancing the US strategy to establish strategic airfields to hit  Tokyo. Japanese defenses were ill-prepared, with shortages of ammunition and inadequate inland defenses. The Americans hit Saipan with extensive air and naval bombardments, neutralizing Japanese positions, and faced stiff resistance during landings but ultimately secured a beachhead. The 23rd Marines of Colonel Louis Jones, advanced through Charan Kanoa and secured Mount Fina Susu despite significant losses. Heavy artillery pinned them down at the O-1 Line, leading Jones to reposition his forces. Casualties mounted on both sides as American forces fought to secure the beachhead and push inland.

This episode is the the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Before his death Admiral Yamamoto instilled a sort of mind virus into the Imperial Japanese Navy. To be honest, the virus was a pre war doctrine, laying around ever since perhaps the First-Sino Japanese War of 1894-1895, but Yamamoto certainly focused attention more so upon it. The infamous decisive naval battle. The event that could turn the tide of the war, to bolster Japan’s poker hand for peace negotiations. If Japan could simply knock out a enormous sum if not the entire strength the American Pacific fleet, something extremely unrealistic by this point of the war, but if they could, would America not reconsider settling this all up at the peace table? It had been the strategy of not just the IJN but for the Japanese military as a whole. Japan would never be able to win a war of attrition with the US, but they could make them pay so dearly, perhaps the Americans would just sue for peace. This idea consumed Yamamoto, leading to the disaster at the Battle of Midway. After the Guadalcanal Campaign, Japan lost the initiative, they retreated behind an inner perimeter. Henceforth the IJN scoured over the actions of the American navy, looking for any opportunity to unleash their full might down upon a significant American naval force. So many times the American navy eluded them, but here, with the invasion of Saipan, the IJN felt the decisive naval battle had finally come. 

Admiral Turner and General Smith's American forces had just successfully invaded Saipan, establishing a beachhead with some challenges by June 17. This incited a strong Japanese response, as Admiral Toyoda initiated Operation A-Go, the IJN’s strategy for a decisive battle that could potentially win them the war. Following Admiral Koga’s Plan Z, Toyoda's A-Go involved Admiral Kakuta's land-based aircraft providing early warning and reconnaissance, aiming to neutralize one third of the enemy carriers before Admiral Ozawa’s carriers completed the destruction of the enemy fleet with large-scale daytime air attacks, operating beyond the enemy's aircraft range. Additionally, Toyoda planned a nighttime surface engagement where enemy screening forces would be targeted by massed torpedo attacks. On June 16, at 9:00, the First Mobile Fleet departed the Guimaras and headed to the northeast. At 5:30pm, the Japanese fleet entered the Philippine Sea through the San Bernardino Strait. Admiral Ugaki’s battleships Yamato and Musashi were not with the main body, but were proceeding independently through the Philippine Sea with two heavy cruisers, a light cruiser and five destroyers to join with Ozawa. Once into the Philippine Sea, Ozawa headed southeasterly. At about 5:00 on the 16th, Yamato and Musashi joined with the First Mobile Fleet. The Japanese began to refuel which was not completed until 10:00 on the 17th. 

In response, Admiral Spruance directed Admiral Mitscher’s Task Force 58, strengthened by Admiral Lee’s battleships and Turner’s cruisers and destroyers, to remain positioned west of the Marianas, prepared to counter any IJN attack. On June 16, Mitscher continued strikes against Guam and Tinian. Several Japanese aircraft were destroyed on the ground and in the air, but their airfields remained usable. The following day saw an increase in Japanese air activity. A small strike flown from Truk, five torpedo bombers and one J1N1-S night fighter attacked a transport group east of Saipan at 5:50pm. Three Japanese aircraft were claimed as destroyed, but a torpedo hit the small landing craft LCI-468 that later sank. On June 18th, the Japanese mounted a larger raid, this time from Yap Island. This operation featured 31 Zeros, 17 Judys and two P1Y twin-engined bombers. Combat Air Patrol did not intercept this group before it attacked shipping off the landing beach at Saipan that resulted in damage to an LST. The attack group then encountered the American escort carrier groups and attacked them at dusk. Two escort carriers were nearmissed and Fanshaw Bay was hit by a bomb which penetrated to the hangar deck. The carrier was forced to retire for repairs. As usual, Japanese aviators over-claimed, stating that three or four carriers from Task Force 58 had been hit.Furthermore, Admirals Lockwood and Christie's submarines were tasked with reconnaissance of IJN fleet movements, launching attacks when possible, and rescuing downed aircrews. Since Ozawa’s fleet maintained radio silence and operated beyond the reach of American search planes, the only way to track his movements was through submarines, leaving the Americans mostly uninformed until the battle began.

Unknown to Ozawa and Toyoda, Mitscher's carrier aircraft had already disabled Kakuta's land-based air power in the area, which significantly weakened a major part of A-Go. Additionally, the Americans, who had acquired Plan Z on April 3, were prepared for the critical carrier battle, although they were hesitant to engage in nighttime combat. Meanwhile, on June 18, the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions began their attacks at 10:00 a.m. The 4th Marine Division attacked toward the east coast with three regiments abreast: 25th Marines on the right, 24th Marines in the center, and 23rd Marines on the left. The 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines, remained attached to the 23rd Regiment. Good progress was made by the 24th and 25th Marines, although the former sustained an attack at 10:15 by two Japanese tanks which surged to within 350 yards of the front lines. The situation for a while was alarming: American tanks had departed for rear areas to refuel and rearm so that only bazookas were immediately available for anti-tank defense. Though the 24th Marines’ Weapons Company was immediately alerted, it arrived too late to participate in the fight. The enemy tanks were finally chased by bazookas and artillery, but not before they had sprayed the area, causing 15 casualties with machine-gun and small cannon fire. A portion of the O-3 line was reached by the 24th and 25th Marines during the day, placing the latter along the coast of Magicienne Bay. This healthy gain severed the island's southern portion, including Nafutan Point, from the remainder of the island. To maintain the momentum of the attack and avoid the long delay of a mopping-up process, the 24th Marines by-passed the southern extremity of a heavily defended cliff line running north and south through its zone of action. However, since the direction of attack for the division would soon Swing north through the by-passed area, it was necessary to secure the cliff line. This mission was assigned to the division reserve, 1st Battalion, 25th Marines. This, the unit’s first experience with cleaning cave positions, proved a sIow, unpleasant and dangerous task. Rather than a coordinated move, the task took the form of a series of small, separated actions, each employing groups of four or five men.

At 7:30, the 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines, relieved Haas’ 1st Battalion on the division’s left wing and commenced the move on O-2, which would serve as the line of departure. As will be seen, however, events of the day prevented the regiment from reaching this line. Organizational readjustments within the 23rd Marines included the attachment of the 3rd Battalion’s rifle companies and 81mm mortar platoon to Dillon’s 2nd Battalion and formation of a composite battalion from the 1st Battalion and the 3rd Battalion Headquarters. The latter unit would support the attack of the other two battalions from positions on Mt. Fina Susu. Machine-gun fire stopped the 23rd Marines’ left elements after an advance of 200 to 250 yards. Most of this fire came from a clump of trees to their front, but a definite location of enemy weapons was impossible. Frequent barrages of Japanese mortar fire hampered efforts to spot the enemy, and the attack faltered. At this juncture, Cosgrove’s composite battalion was committed on the left of the 3rd Battalion. 24th Marines, in an attempt to retain the impetus, and the attack again moved forward. But the advance was slow. By 5:15, the 23rd Marines had moved to a line about 400 yards short of O-2. Prior to darkness, 23rd Marines’ patrols were dispatched to the east. On the right, these patrols reached O-2, but on the left machinegun fire denied movement as far as O-2. Colonel Jones, the 23rd Marines’ commander, requested permission from General Schmidt to withdraw to more favorable ground for the night. General Schmidt approved, and the 23rd pulled back to a position about 400 yards east of Lake Susupe, breaking contact with the 2nd Division.

The 23rd Marines emerged from the swamps, the 24th Marines reached the base of Hill 500, and the 25th Marines progressed to Magicienne Bay, effectively dividing the island. General Smith's soldiers also captured the Aslito Airfield, with the 165th and 105th Regiments securing Cape Obiam and the area south of the field. This isolated numerous Japanese forces in the north at Nafutan Point. Concurrently, General Saito was shifting his remaining troops to the Garapan-Mount Tapotchau area, facing relentless artillery, naval, and air attacks that left the Japanese in a dire situation. 

The chief of staff of the 31st Army, General Igeta, drafted a message on the morning of June 18th to the commanding general at Yap Island and the chief of staff in Tokyo. In it he summarized the situation as he saw it and, in the process, revealed how very little he knew of what was taking place. Not that the general was caught in the bog of apathy, nor was he too frightened or lazy to find out what was going on; it was simply impossible for him to penetrate the shroud of obscurity resulting from ruptured communications in the vast area over which the action was taking place. As such, he erroneously reported that the 43rd Division HQ “underwent an enemy attack this morning and the division CO died along with his staff officers.” In another dispatch later in the day, Igeta corrected his error in regard to the division commander’s death, reporting that General Saito was “all right, but that his staff officers were wounded.” He also added that “the secret documents in custody of the 31st Army Headquarters… were completely burned at 1830 of 18 June…” Recognizing the desperate circumstances, Prime Minister Tojo sent a fatalistic message to the garrison, despite reinforcements en route. “Have received your honorable Imperial words. By becoming the bulwark of the Pacific with 10000 deaths; we hope to acquire Imperial favor.”

Reports indicated that Ozawa's mobile fleet was approaching the Marianas and expected to arrive on June 19. When Spruance finally received the spotting report from Cavalla, this prompted a decision that turned out to be the most important of the battle. Assuming that the report from Cavalla was Ozawa’s main force, and assuming it would continue at a speed of 19 knots to the east, Spruance’s staff calculated that the Japanese would still be about 500nm from TF 58 at 5:30 on the 18th. This placed the Japanese well out of range of American searches or strikes. The only way to alter this situation was to steam TF 58 to the southwest toward the contact and plan to locate and engage the Japanese during the afternoon of the 18th. Mitscher advised the aggressive option of steaming to the southwest to close the range on Ozawa’s force. He wanted to launch afternoon strikes to locate and possibly attack Ozawa and even advocated a nighttime surface engagement. While this offered the possibility of opening the battle on terms set by the Americans, there were several problems with it in Spruance’s calculating mind. The first was that TF 58 was not yet concentrated; TGs 58.1 and 58.4 were not due to link up with the other two task groups operating west of Saipan until 1200 on the 18th. If he allowed Mitscher to take off to the west, it would only be with two task groups. Since the Japanese possessed longer-range strike aircraft, this offered Ozawa the chance to attack TF 58 and defeat it piecemeal. As for the prospects of a night engagement, both Spruance and Lee declined that possibility.

 In response, Spruance adopted a cautious approach, instructing Mitscher to gather his carrier groups and redirect them toward Saipan. In a last effort to change Spruance’s mind, Mitscher sent him a message at about 11:30pm and proposed a course change to the west at 1:30am in order to position TF 58 to launch a strike against the Japanese carrier force at 5:00am. At 12:38am on the 19th, Spruance sent a message rejecting the proposal. The die was finally cast for a defensive battle on June 19.Spruance's priority was to safeguard the invasion force rather than eliminate the Japanese fleet.

At 6:00am on the 18th, Japanese search floatplanes from the First Mobile Fleet spotted six carriers from TF 58. In the afternoon, seven aircraft from Carrier Division 1 flying out to 420nm spotted TF 58 after its 1200 rendezvous. The first report was issued at 3:14pm and included detection of an American task group with two carriers. A second aircraft sighted a task group with an “unknown number of carriers” at 4:00 and later issued another report at 1710 which identified two task groups, each with two carriers. These were within strike range, but Ozawa elected not to launch an immediate strike since his pilots were so inexperienced in night flying. Nonetheless, Rear-Admiral Obayashi Sueo of the 3rd Carrier Division boldly ordered the launch of 67 aircraft from the carriers Zuiho, Chitose, and Chiyoda, hoping to surprise the Americans. However, when he learned of Ozawa’s decision, Obayashi reluctantly called off his strike. Ozawa had correctly assessed that the enemy would hold its position near Saipan, allowing him to maintain his own position without fearing an American attack. With this understanding, he changed course southwest to maintain the distance, while Admiral Kurita’s Vanguard Force moved east, and Forces A and B shifted south. At 03:00 on June 19, all three forces turned northeast and increased their speed to 20 knots. Ozawa executed his plan flawlessly, positioning himself to launch significant attacks against the unsuspecting Americans the next morning. His only misstep was breaking radio silence at 20:20 to coordinate the decisive operation with Kakuta, who consistently misrepresented the true condition of his air forces while giving overly optimistic reports of successes by his aviators. As a result, an American station intercepted the transmission and geo-located it accurately. Once the mobile fleet reached strike positions, the Japanese began launching search aircraft, sending 16 floatplanes at 04:45 and another 14 planes about 30 minutes later. Although they lost seven scouts, the Japanese were able to spot the northern elements of Task Force 58 and the picket destroyers deployed ahead by 7:00.

Starting at 05:30, Mitscher's combat air patrol engaged Japanese aircraft from Guam, which were unsuccessful in bombing destroyers. At 6:30am, American radar detected Japanese air activity over Guam and four Hellcats were sent to investigate. At 7:20am, these arrived and found themselves in the middle of many Japanese aircraft taking off. More Hellcats rushed in and, beginning at 8:07am for the next hour, there was constant combat over and near Guam. Up to 33 American fighters were involved, and they claimed 30 fighters and five bombers. The Americans claimed to have destroyed 30 aircraft, successfully hindering Kakuta's support for Ozawa's decisive battle. However, with the return of Japanese floatplanes, Ozawa was preparing to launch his first strike, deploying 69 aircraft: 16 Zero fighters, 45 Zeros with bombs and eight Jills with torpedoes at 08:30 under Obayashi's command. Fortunately for the Americans, radar warnings enabled Mitscher to dispatch every available Hellcat for interception. At 10:23am, launching of every available Hellcat from TF 58 began as the force headed east into the wind. The American carriers cleared their decks and all airborne bombers on search and patrol missions were instructed to clear the area. This allowed the fighters to return as necessary to rearm and refuel. The goal was to keep as many fighters in the air as possible to intercept incoming threats. The Hellcats had reached their interception altitudes of between 17,000 and 23,000ft when at 10:35am they spotted the incoming Japanese aircraft identified as two groups of strike aircraft with escorting Zeros on each flank. The first American fighters on the scene were Hellcats from Essex. Lieutenant Commander C. Brewer of Fighter Squadron 15 VF-15 led them.  The escorting Japanese fighters did not protect the bombers and the bombers scattered making them easy to pick off. Brewer claimed four aircraft, and his wingman claimed another four. In all, VF-15 pilots claimed 20 Japanese aircraft. Joining the Hellcats from Essex were others from Hornet and Bunker Hill as well as from five light carriers for a total of 50 Hellcats. Altogether, some 25 out of the 69 Japanese aircraft in this raid were accounted for by this initial interception. In return, three Hellcats were lost in combat and a Bunker Hill Hellcat was lost when it ditched on its way back to its carrier. The remaining Japanese aircraft continued their approach but were intercepted by Bunker Hill's Hellcats, which claimed another 16. Only around 28 Japanese planes remained and made minor attacks on Admiral Lee's group. Two targeted battleship South Dakota, with one scoring a direct bomb hit at 10:49, though causing minimal damage. Another narrowly missed heavy cruiser Minneapolis, while another almost missed cruiser Wichita. The Japanese reported  losing 42 aircraft:  eight fighters, 32 fighter-bombers, and two torpedo bombers. Most had been destroyed by Hellcats, with anti-aircraft gunnery from TG 58.7 accounting for the rest. Meanwhile, Ozawa launched his main strike at 08:56, composed of the 1st Division's best-trained pilots from three fleet carriers. This was a large strike designated Raid II from the three fleet carriers of Carrier Division 1 with the best-trained aviators in the First Mobile Fleet. The raid consisted of 128 aircraft – 48 Zero fighters, 53 Judy dive-bombers and 27 Jills with torpedoes. Launching began at 08:56 but was disrupted when at 09:09 Taiho came under attack by American submarine Albacore. The submarine fired six torpedoes at the fast-moving carrier. A last-second glitch in the boat’s fire-control computer made it necessary to fire the six torpedoes by eye. One of Taiho’s aircraft saw the torpedoes headed for the ship and dove into one in an effort to save the ship. In spite of this, one of the torpedoes hit the carrier abreast the forward elevator and created a hole which resulted in flooding. The ship’s forward elevator, which was raised for the launch, was knocked out of alignment and fell several feet. Within 30 minutes, the elevator space was planked over by damage-control personnel and the launch continued. In addition to the aircraft lost from Taiho, eight other aircraft developed engine trouble and were forced to return. More trouble soon followed. When the attack group flew over the Vanguard Force deployed about 100nm in front of the main carrier force, it was engaged by the Japanese ships. This fire was effective enough to shoot down two more aircraft and damage another eight that were forced to return. 

This attack and some friendly fire reduced the Japanese force to just 109 aircraft for the largest strike of the day, which was detected by radar. In a swirling action that began at 11:39am, the Hellcats again tore through the Japanese formation. McCampbell claimed three Judys and his wingman two. Other Hellcats joined the fray resulting in about 70 Japanese aircraft being shot down. VF-16 from Lexington claimed 22 Japanese aircraft without a loss; 12 Bunker Hill Hellcats were unable to gain a solid intercept but still claimed five kills, and Hellcats from light carriers Bataan, Monterey and Cabot claimed ten, seven and five, respectively. VF-1 from Yorktown also scored heavily. This still left a number of Japanese aircraft headed for TF 58. Twenty were reported in three groups at 11:45. Most of these made the mistake of attacking the picket destroyers deployed in advance of TG 58.7 or Lee’s battleship force itself. Destroyer Stockham reported being under attack for 20 minutes, but again the ship suffered no damage. Around noon, TG 58.7 came under attack. Two torpedo bombers attacked South Dakota with no success, and two more selected Indiana in the center of TG 58.7’s formation as their target. One crashed into the waterline of the heavily armored ship but caused little damage. Another Jill went after Iowa, but again missed. Alabama was undamaged by two bombs aimed at her. Potentially more serious was a group of six Judy dive-bombers that escaped the Hellcats and proceeded south until running across TG 58.2. Of this group, four selected carrier Wasp for attack. None scored a hit, but one of the bombs detonated overhead which rained down shrapnel that killed one and wounded 12 crewmen. The other two selected TG 58.2’s other fleet carrier, Bunker Hill, for attack at 12:03. They scored two near misses that caused minor fires and other damage, in addition to killing three and wounding 73. Both carriers continued in action. Four of the aircraft were shot down by antiaircraft fire, with the other two landing on Rota and Guam. Finally, six B6N bombers attacked Admiral Reeves’ carriers, but their attacks began at 11:57 and were also ineffective, failing to hit any targets. One missed Enterprise, and another three attacked light carrier Princeton, but all three were destroyed by antiaircraft fire.Thus, Ozawa’s second strike resulted in a significant loss for the Japanese, with 97 of the 128 aircraft not returning to their carriers. His losses totaled 32 fighters, 42 dive-bombers and 23 Jills.

At 5:30, the third group of Japanese scout aircraft took off. This comprised 11 Judys from Shokaku and two Jakes from heavy cruiser Mogami. The aircraft flew 560nm to the east. Two contacts were radioed back to Ozawa. The first, at 9:45, was reported at a position well to the south of TF 58’s actual position. The problem resulted from an uncorrected compass deviation on the search aircraft. This contact was designated “15 Ri” by the Japanese. The second contact, designated “3 Ri”, was reported at 10:00. It was of a task force of three carriers and escorts to the north of TF 58’s actual position, but may have been of TG 58.4.This third Japanese strike designated Raid III by the Americans was mounted by Carrier Division 2. This effort, from Junyo, Hiyo and Ryuho, comprised 47 aircraft including 15 fighters, 25 Zeros with bombs, and seven Jills with torpedoes.

The remaining 20 aircraft saw what they believed to be two battleships but chose to keep searching for carriers. After a failed search, the group eventually attacked the battleships they initially spotted at 12:55 but were intercepted by Hellcats and lost seven aircraft. Nonetheless, the group pressed on and attacked Rear-Admiral William Harrill’s carriers at 13:20. The effort was ineffective with one aircraft dropping a bomb 600 yards from Essex. Ozawa’s third strike had accomplished nothing, but at least 40 of its 47 aircraft survived to return to their carriers.

At 11:00, Ozawa launched his final attack of the day, consisting of 82 aircraft from the carriers Junyo, Hiyo, Ryuho, and Zuikaku of Carrier Division 1. It comprised 30 Zero fighters, ten Zeros with bombs, 27 Vals and nine Judys and six Jills. The planes set off for the new, incorrect southern target and found nothing, causing them to divide into three groups. The largest group of 49 planes headed toward Guam, where the Americans had been periodically discarding their ordnance to neutralize Kakuta’s airfields. 

As Ozawa sent his series of strikes against TF 58, Spruance directed Mitscher to keep a number of Hellcats active over Guam to disrupt any Japanese attempt to mount attacks from there. This reflected Spruance’s fear that the Japanese would use Guam as a base for “shuttle bombing” using aircraft from the 1st Mobile Fleet. Before the first Japanese carrier raid, Hellcats encountered airborne Japanese aircraft over Guam. This action continued throughout the day and periodically intensified when TF 58 dive-bombers and Avengers, ordered to the east to steer clear of the air battle, dumped their ordnance on Guam. Before noon, 15 Yorktown and 17 Hornet Helldivers bombed Orote Field on Guam. Another attack was mounted at 13:30 by Dauntlesses from Lexington and Enterprise, nine Avengers from Enterprise and ten Hellcats for escort. The armor-piercing bombs carried by the dive-bombers did little damage, but the Avengers succeeded in cratering the runway. Other attacks continued throughout the afternoon including Hellcats from Bunker Hill strafing Japanese aircraft on the ground and 11 Helldivers from Essex just before 14:00. The price to keep Guam suppressed during the day was steep – six Hellcats and one Helldiver – but the Base Air Force did not support Ozawa’s main attack.

Back over at the carrier action, Ozawa’s first group approaching Guam were picked up by TF 58 radar at 1449hrs. Before long, 27 Hellcats were on the scene. Among these were 12 from light carrier Cowpens, seven from Essex again led by McCampbell, and eight from Hornet. The Hellcats did great execution, shooting down 30 of the 49 Japanese trying to land on Guam. The remaining 19 planes landed but were damaged on the ground and could no longer fly.Another 15 aircraft headed for Rota but changed course to attack Montgomery’s group when they sighted it en route. Six aircraft approached Wasp unmolested until 2:23 when they were engaged by antiaircraft fire just as they were dropping their bombs. Adept maneuvering by Wasp thwarted the aircraft, identified as Judys. Another group of divebombers appeared and split up; two went after Bunker Hill, and one after Wasp. All missed, and of the nine attackers, only one escaped. The final 18 aircraft of Raid IV, including the eight from Zuikaku and ten Zeros with bombs, were returning to their carriers when they encountered two American scout groups consisting of Hellcats and Avengers some 200nm west of Guam.This encounter cost the Japanese six aircraft, but they did gain a measure of revenge when at 3:30 the same group of returning Japanese aircraft encountered and shot down two Bunker Hill aircraft on a search mission. Despite these efforts, none of the American ships were hit during this fourth attack, while Ozawa suffered a significant loss of 73 aircraft.

The situation worsened when the submarine Cavalla spotted Shokaku recovering aircraft at 11:52 and launched six torpedoes. Three torpedoes hit the carrier's starboard side at 12:22, sparking fires in the hangar and causing the ship to list. Soon, the ship came to a halt and was left behind when Carrier Division 1 moved north. At 1310, the fires on the hangar set off a bomb that set off fumes from the cracked forward fuel tank. Large explosions ensued and it was obvious the carrier was doomed. Shokaku sank at 15:01, resulting in the deaths of 1,272 crew members. The light cruiser Yahagi and destroyers Urakaze, Wakatsuki, and Hatsuzuki rescued Captain Matsubara and 570 men. Additionally, a torpedo hit Taiho, cracking the forward aviation fuel tank and turning the IJN’s newest and most heavily protected carrier into a floating bomb.

At 3:32pm, a massive explosion hit Taiho, lifting her flight deck and causing damage to her hull that led to the ship sinking. Despite Ozawa's initial desire to stay with the carrier, he and his team were eventually evacuated by a destroyer. However, 660 members of Taiho's crew perished as the ship sank. The transfer to the Haguro, added to the confusion for Ozawa was the fact that he and his staff were jammed into inadequate facilities aboard heavy cruiser Haguro after they were forced to depart from Taiho. Communications were grossly inadequate; Ozawa admitted later that he should have turned over command to Kurita until he could have moved to a ship with adequate command and control facilities. After the final strike aircraft returned, the Japanese turned northwest at 18:08, preparing to refuel the following day before continuing their attack. In their four strikes, the Japanese had launched 373 aircraft; of these 243 were lost. Added to these losses were another 50 from Guam, nine when Shokaku went down, and another 13 from Taiho to bring the total to 315. Some 296 Hellcats had been engaged during the day in combat, and only 14 were lost in combat with another six recorded as operational losses. The lack of sufficient training and experience among Japanese aircrews was evident, as seasoned American pilots compared the battle to “an old-time turkey shoot down home.” As a result of the significant losses inflicted on Japanese aircraft by American forces, the aerial portion of the Battle of the Philippine Sea was known as the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. In the war upon the land, after an uneventful night, the 2nd Marine Division conducted patrols as Generals Schmidt and Smith focused on securing the rest of southern Saipan.

Although the 4th Marine Division's assault was postponed due to their need to disperse a sizable Japanese group near Tsutsuran village, the 27th Division pressed forward in the morning with the 165th Regiment swiftly reaching Magicienne Bay. In contrast, the 105th advanced more slowly through challenging terrain, resulting in a gap between the two regiments and requiring the 165th to extend its lines to maintain contact. Further north, Colonel Jones' 23rd Marines succeeded in advancing close to Hill 500 after intense artillery bombardment, but were compelled to withdraw about 400 yards to protect their vulnerable flank. At this stage, Brigadier-General Arthur Harper's Corps artillery had arrived on the island, offering essential reinforcement to the division's artillery units. By the end of the day, Schmidt's division realigned its regiments and shifted north. The most vicious action of the night occurred in the sector occupied by the 2nd Battalion, 24th Marines. Starting at about 3:50am and lasting until daylight, an enemy force of approximately 75 attacked the Marines with grenades and bayonets. In the close-in fighting that ensued, 11 Marines were wounded, but, in the process, the enemy attack was broken. By daylight, many of the attackers were sprawled forward of the Marines’ foxholes, the rest had taken to their heels. Meanwhile, Admiral Mitscher, having retrieved all his aircraft, set a westerly course and increased speed to 23 knots in an attempt to catch up with the enemy. However, on June 20, his usual morning search found no results. The Japanese also maintained radio silence during the day, with no new intelligence obtained by American submarines or PBM flying boats based in Saipan. In the afternoon, a successful search finally established contact, prompting Mitscher to prepare for a bold night strike against an enemy fleet beyond the maximum strike range.

Meanwhile, the plan to refuel the 1st Mobile Fleet on June 20 fell through amid confusion, prompting Ozawa to abandon the attempt after noon. He transferred to the Zuikaku and restored communications, discovering the extent of his aircraft losses. Ozawa’s hope that he could continue strikes was buoyed by reports from Kakuta that some of Ozawa’s aircraft had landed on Guam and the prospects that additional land-based aircraft reinforcements would flow into the area. The only concession he made was to move his next attack until the 21st.

However, at 16:45, Ozawa's reconnaissance revealed he had been spotted, so he decided to retreat northwest at 24 knots. Thirty minutes later, when his scout aircraft located Task Force 58, Ozawa opted to initiate a night attack with seven B5Ns and three radar-equipped B6Ns. Meanwhile, Mitscher launched a full deckload from 11 carriers, including 85 Hellcats, 77 dive-bombers, and 54 Avengers. The First Mobile Fleet was not well positioned to meet the attack. The Van Force with most of the heavy escorts and the best antiaircraft capabilities was not the closest formation to the incoming American strike. Each of Ozawa’s three groups was headed northwesterly with the Van Force to the south, Carrier Division 2 in the center and Zuikaku to the north. Astern of the carrier groups were the two supply groups composed of six oilers with their escorts, making this the closest group to the Americans. After an uneventful flight, the American aircraft found the 1st Mobile Fleet at 18:40, at the edge of their fuel range after nearly 300 miles. Lacking time for a coordinated attack, the American aircraft easily bypassed the 40 fighters and 28 bombers sent to intercept them and individually targeted the enemy carriers. The veteran carrier Zuikaku was defended by 17 fighters and put up a good fight with heavy antiaircraft fire and adept maneuvering. She avoided the four torpedoes aimed at her from the Hornet Avengers and took only a single direct hit by a 500- pound bomb aft of the island. After departing, the Americans reported the big carrier with heavy fires onboard. However, the damage was not as great as it appeared. The single bomb hit penetrated to the upper hanger deck where a fire started among the remaining aircraft. These were not fueled, so after a few tense moments and an order to abandon ship that was quickly rescinded, the fire was extinguished. Six near misses were recorded, but overall damage was light. Zuikaku, the last surviving carrier from the Pearl Harbor attack force, lived to fight again.

Aircraft from Bunker Hill, Monterey, and Cabot attacked the Chiyoda group, which evaded five torpedoes and sustained one bomb hit, surviving to fight another day. The Japanese were organized into three groups, each centered on a light carrier with several escorting battleships or heavy cruisers. The Zuiho and Chitose groups were not attacked, but the Chiyoda group was. The light carrier was the target of over 20 Helldivers and Avengers with bombs, but only a single bomb hit Chiyoda on the flight deck resulting in 20 dead, 30 wounded and two aircraft destroyed. The Avengers from Monterey probably scored the single hit, which caused a fire that was quickly extinguished. Chiyoda successfully dodged five torpedoes from Bunker Hill Avengers and lived to fight another day. Escorting battleship Haruna was hit by a 500-pound bomb that penetrated her stern and flooded the steering compartment. The ship’s speed was reduced, and 15 crewmen were killed and 19 wounded. Cruiser Maya endured a near miss that caused flooding.

The strike group from Lexington, with support from the Avengers from Enterprise, Yorktown, and Belleau Wood, and the bomb-carrying Hellcats from Hornet and Yorktown, attacked Admiral Jojima’s carriers. They inflicted minor damage on Junyo and Ryuho. Most of Lexington’s Dauntless dive-bombers selected Junyo for attention. At 7:04, one or two bombs hit the carrier’s island, and several near misses created minor flooding. Casualties included 53 dead, but overall damage was light. Light carrier Ryuho was attacked by the five Avengers from Enterprise with bombs at 7;10; eight hits were claimed, but only slight damage was caused by near misses. The carrier also survived attacks from Enterprise Dauntlesses, Avengers from Yorktown five with torpedoes and probably Hellcats from Hornet.

Hiyo suffered the most successful attack of the evening. The carrier left the formation to launch two Jills to lay a smoke screen and was caught behind the main body when the American strike arrived. In the opening attack by Dauntlesses from Lexington, one bomb hit the foremast and exploded above the bridge resulting in heavy casualties to bridge personnel. The Japanese reported that another bomb hit the flight deck. However, the group of four Belleau Wood Avengers with torpedoes caused fatal damage. Three conducted an anvil attack, and one torpedo hit the carrier’s starboard engine room. This was followed by a dive-bomb attack from six Enterprise Dauntlesses. The single torpedo hit, the only one scored by Avengers during the entire attack, proved fatal to the largely unprotected carrier. Within minutes, the damage created a list. The ship proceeded for a time on its port engine, but then went dead in the water. Just before sunset, at 1917, there was a large explosion amidships that caused a loss of power. The Japanese were convinced that this was the result of a submarine-launched torpedo, but there were no submarines in the area. A fuel-fed conflagration ensued, causing multiple explosions. The fire was beyond being contained, and the order to abandon ship was given.

Hiyo sank at 20:32, claiming 247 crew members. The final American counterattack came from Wasp’s aircraft, targeting Ozawa’s Supply Group to disrupt the withdrawal of the 1st Mobile Fleet by damaging the oilers. Three oilers were damaged, and two were later scuttled. In this series of uncoordinated attacks, the Americans lost 20 aircraft and destroyed 80 Japanese planes; although the results were underwhelming, with only one carrier sunk, they fared better than Ozawa’s combined strikes the previous day. At 20:45, American aircraft began returning to their carriers. The distance from the targets to TF 58 was between 240 and 300 miles, so fuel exhaustion was a real danger for many pilots. On a dark night, the returning aircraft began to return to their carriers at 8:45. Mitscher decided to ignore the potential Japanese air and submarine threats and ordered his ships to use extra illumination beyond the normal landing lights on each carrier deck to guide his appreciative aviators home. Any pretense of order was quickly lost and soon aircraft were ordered to land on any deck in sight. Almost half of the returning aircraft landed on the wrong carrier. This hectic scene took over two hours to play out. When the final accounting was complete, aircraft losses were expectedly heavy. The Americans would end up losing a total of 100 pilots and 109 crew members. Meanwhile, Admiral Toyoda ordered Ozawa to disengage from the decisive battle and retreat northwest, with the Japanese fleet successfully evading Mitscher’s slow pursuit and reaching Okinawa on the afternoon of June 22.

Once more, the Japanese sought a decisive battle but were decisively defeated. By the end, they had lost three carriers sunk, two carriers damaged, 395 carrier aircraft, about 200 land-based aircraft, two oilers, and four other damaged ships, with around 3,000 Japanese fatalities. In contrast, the Americans lost 130 aircraft and 76 aviators, with none of their damaged ships rendered out of service. The Battle of the Philippine Sea, the last carrier-versus-carrier battle of the war, stood out because the most conservative and defensive-minded side emerged victorious. In terms of scale the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot dwarfed the four carrier battles that preceded it. At the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Battle of Midway, the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, and the Battle of Santa Cruz Islands, the largest carrier engagement involved 7 carriers at Midway; by comparison there were 24 carriers at the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. It was, by a factor of almost 350 percent, the biggest carrier battle in history. Though Mitscher’s Combat Air Patrol was not flawless, the combination of inadequate Japanese aircrew training and American radar-directed fighter interception rendered a significant Japanese strike ineffective. Ozawa conducted an intelligent battle, accurately assessing American intentions to launch carrier air strikes that would have been catastrophic to a carrier task force by 1942 standards. Nevertheless, his tools failed him. Despite Ozawa's skilled fleet handling, he lacked the airpower to inflict serious damage on Task Force 58. Admiral Spruance has faced criticism for his cautious approach, which exposed his carriers to attack without a strong chance of striking back at the enemy. Only the significant difference in skill between American and Japanese aviators and some good luck prevented this strategy from failing. 

Now back over on Saipin, General Watson continued to focus mainly on patrolling, while the 8th Marines worked to secure Hill 500. Colonel Wallace’s 2nd Battalion encountered minimal resistance, enabling them to quickly advance to the O-4 Line. Around 09:00, the 25th Marines moved towards Hill 500, subjecting the Japanese to a severe, thundering beating administered by the 4.5-inch rockets. As the Marines charged up the hill through the thinning smoke, artillery shells walked ahead in sturdy escort. Shortly before noon the hill was seized, and mopping up of the cave network began. Compartments at different levels and angles made it possible for the Japanese occupants to retreat from one cave-room to another, and the cleaning out process was a slow one. The price for Hill 500 was not light. Chambers’ battalion suffered 49 casualties, nine of whom were killed. Counted Japanese dead numbered 44. Upon examination, it was found that Hill 500 had been well organized for defense but that the positions were not strongly manned. As darkness approached, the Marines dug in to defend their newly won possession.

Meanwhile, the 24th Marines also reached the O-4 Line near Tsutsuran, but the 27th Division struggled to push the Japanese forces onto the challenging terrain at Nafutan Point. Additionally, the 106th Regiment arrived on June 20, and Aslito Airfield became operational, putting the security of the Japanese home islands in jeopardy. The following day involved reorganizing, resupplying, mopping-up, and patrolling to prepare for the next day's attack into central Saipan. General Smith's infantry continued their offensive south toward Nafutan Point, making incremental progress through each cave and ravine. 

At 12:15, while engaged in the Nafutan Point attack, the 27th Division received a change of mission and disposition. NTLF Operation Order 9 dictated less one battalion and one light tank platoon, to assemble northwest of Aslito Airfield in NTLF reserve. Control of the division artillery would pass to the 23rd Corps Artillery. The designated infantry battalion was ordered to “operate in the Garrison Area and mop up remaining enemy detachments, maintain anti-sniper patrols within the Garrison Area and along the coast line to protect installations within its zone of action with particular attention to Aslito Airfield.”

At 5:00, after consideration of the NTLForder, Ralph Smith telephoned Holland Smith and urged that a complete regiment be used to clean up Nafutan Point, rather than one battalion. He said that he planned to use the 105th Infantry for the job and that he believed they could finish in a couple of days. Holland Smith agreed to this but specified that one battalion of the 105th must be retained in reserve for possible use elsewhere. For this task, the 2nd Battalion would be selected. This modification was later confirmed in a mailbrief from NTLF which arrived at the 27th Division command post at 8;30, 22 June. Ralph Smith then issued an order to his division, the 105th will hold the present front line facing Nafutan Point, with two battalions on the line and one battalion in regimental reserve. It would relieve elements of 165th now on the front line by . Reorganization of the present front line to be effected not later than 11:00, 22 June and offensive operations against the enemy continued. Reserve battalion will maintain anti-sniper patrols in the vicinity of Aslito Airfield. 

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

The Battle of the Philippines  was the last hurrah of the once proud IJN carrier fleet that had humbled the American two and a half years earlier. Admiral Spruance's strategic patience led to a decisive American victory. Japan's carrier threat, which had driven its early wartime expansion, was annihilated in the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot.

- 134 - Pacific War - Invasion of Saipan, June 11-18, 1944

Last time we spoke about the fall of Mogaung. General Vinegar Joe’s strategy against Myitkyina had turned into a brutal struggle. Stillwells forces were besieging the town while the Chindits battled for Mogaung, diverting Japanese reinforcements in the process. Despite heavy losses, the Chindits captured Naungkyaiktaw with the help of flamethrowers. Gradually Mogaung fell, but the credit was wrongly attributed to the Chinese while it should have gone to the Chindits. Mytikyina withstood endless attacks and at Biak the Americans repelled numerous Japanese assaults. The 2nd battalion, 162nd regiment tossed over to help, but this further complicated supply issues on the plateau. Progress was deeply hampered by water shortages, difficult jungle terrain and supply roads needing repairs. Lastly the battle for Lone Tree Hill saw absolute mayhem and horror, something the Americans and Japanese would never forget.

This episode is the Invasion of Saipan

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

 

The use of US fleet and escort carriers during the landings on Hollandia and Aitape had convinced Admiral Toyoda’s staff that the American naval force could be drawn into decisive naval battle off of New Guinea. On June 1st, however, a reconnaissance flight had discovered a major build up of enemy vessels at Majuro, suggesting that a new invasion was just days away. The Imperial General Staff reeled with shock in response to this, not knowing whether the Allied objective was Biak, Palau or Saipan. Aboard Toyoda's flagship Oyodo in Tokyo Bay, the naval staff debated, and the debate degenerated into argument. The truth was that no one had a “feel” for the American strategy except one lone staff intelligence officer, Commander Nakajima Chikataka. He said it had to be Saipan. But his fellow staff members scoffed at this. Even the Americans did not have such power that they could mount an operation the size of the three-pronged New Guinea strike as just a feint, they argued. They  further argued that an enemy airfield at Biak would allow the Allies to bomb the Philippines and Palau with their long-range B-24 Liberators. And the American carriers were in evidence off New Guinea, unlike at Majuro. Thinking that Nakajima must be seeing things, Toyoda thus decided that Biak had to be the place. The Japanese unleashed Operation KON, diverting an enormous sum of their naval and air resources to bolster Biak in response to the perceived allied advance.

 

However, in actuality, Admiral Spruance was gathering the largest Pacific force yet seen at Pearl Harbor, comprising approximately 535 ships, ranging from battleships to tugs, carrying a total of 127,500 personnel of Lt-General Holland Smith’s 5th Amphibious Corps. 

They were going to hit Saipan, Tinian and Guam. Designated “Operation Forager” it was to be the end game of Admiral Nimitz Central thurst into the Pacific. Taking these would see strategic airfields only 1400 miles away from Tokyo in the hands of the allies. From there the US Army Air Force could begin their long wished bombing campaign against the Japanese home islands. For the Japanese, Saipan in particular was considered a “home island”. Japan had seized Saipan during WW1 from the German Colonial Empire and she heavily invested in “Japanizing” the island. The Japanese government had encouraged southern Japanese and Okinawans to colonize Saipan, introducing Japanese language and culture to the indigenous peoples there. It was more than just another Imperial asset, in many ways Saipan had become a home island.

Part of the new operation would include Admiral Mitscher commanding the Fast Carrier Task Force 58 stationed at the Marshalls, along with Vice-Admiral Charles Lockwood overseeing 19 submarines and Rear-Admiral Ralph Christie leading 9 submarines operating across the Pacific and Southeast Asia. Operation Forager entailed Admiral Turner's Task Force capturing Saipan and Tinian sequentially with the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions, followed by the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade attacking Guam. The 27th Division was reserved for Saipan and the 77th Division for Guam. The outcome on Saipan would determine subsequent operations, with the Southern Landing Forces also held in reserve for the Northern Landing Forces until June 25. Lieutenant-General Holland Smith's strategy for the Saipan invasion involved landing four assault regiments simultaneously on four beaches in the Charan Kanoa area. Following three days of continuous air and naval bombardments, Major-General Thomas Watson's 2nd Marine Division's 6th and 8th Marine Regiments were to land north of Afetna Point on the Red and Green Beaches, while Major-General Harry Schmidt's 4th Marine Division's 23rd and 25th Marine Regiments would land south of Afetna Point on the Blue and Yellow Beaches.

Thomas Watson was then going to seize the Charan Kanoa Airstrip, afterwards he would sing northeast towards Mounts Tipo Pale and Tapotchau while Schmidt secured Charan Kanoa village, the Aslito Airfield and the islands southern end before moving north to take part in clearing the remainder of Saipan. Alongside this, Smith planned to dispatch the reserve 2nd and 24th Marine Regiments of Lt Colonel Walter Stuart and Lt Colonel Guy Tannyhill over to Scarlet and Black Beaches in the north to divert enemy attention. Two innovations would be tried for Forager. The 4th Marine Division had recently and optimistically accepted the proposal to employ amphibian tanks inland. This was a large part due to the unit's experiences on low and level Roi-Namur, during the Kwajalein assault. The 2nd Marine Division on the other hand, having fought on rugged Guadalcanal and experienced the limitations of LVTs during the Tarawa assault, were more pessimistic. General Watson convinced General Smith that he would only allow the amphibian tanks to advance inland far enough to clear the immediate beach area and that only the first troop-carrying LVT wave would follow them to discharge their troops beyond the beach. All subsequent waves would discharge troops on the beach and not proceed beyond the Tractor Control Line. The reason for this pessimism was that the Marines expected the terrain to be rougher than some predicted. They feared control would be lost over troops embarked in LVTs, concentrated groups of men would be exposed to fire, and that more amtracs would be lost to enemy fire inland. They were needed to return to the Transfer Control Line on the reef's lip where support troops boated aboard LCVPs would be picked up and run to shore in the amtracs. Furthermore, LVTs are not designed for cross-country movement. They have comparatively narrow tracks and low ground clearance, making it easy for them to "belly-out" on rough ground, rocks, and stumps. Amphibian tanks are poor substitutes for medium tanks for the same reasons, and in addition they have very thin armor and a high profile.

The Marine divisions commenced training for Saipan in March, conducting a significant rehearsal between May 14 and 20 off Maui. With all arrangements in place, Admiral Turner’s invasion fleet was poised to depart Hawaii by late May. The slower LSTs were scheduled to set sail for Eniwetok on May 25, followed by the troop transports departing Hawaii five days later. Turner’s vessels were slated to gather at Eniwetok on June 6, coinciding with the departure of Admiral Mitscher’s carriers from Majuro for the Marianas. Between June 8 and 10, Turner then embarked from Eniwetok in echelons, experiencing a relatively uneventful voyage towards Saipan. Meanwhile, the Japanese expedited the deployment of 31st Army units to the Central Pacific, successfully positioning most of their line units at designated locations by the end of May. Additionally, certain disparate units of the 31st Army underwent reorganization into seven independent mixed brigades and five independent mixed regiments to enhance chain of command and troop cohesion.

 

This, however, did not allow adequate time to prepare inland defenses in multiple lines, especially in the case of the Marianas. The larger elevated islands within the Marianas offered strategic advantages for establishing multi-layered defenses, creating strongholds on key terrain features, and positioning reserves centrally for potential counterattacks. However, the Japanese were unable to fully exploit these opportunities due to various factors. Insufficient troop deployments occurred until less than two months prior to the US assault, leaving limited time for comprehensive inland defense preparations. Many coastal defense and anti-aircraft guns were discovered still packed and alongside incomplete positions, due to a shortage of construction materials for fortified installations. Consequently, the high ground at the island's center remained unprepared for defense, and several beach defenses were unfinished. There was an overestimation of the natural ruggedness of the terrain to impede American advances. Despite this, some coastal defense guns were strategically placed within earlier reinforced concrete structures. While Saipan and Tinian lacked significant artificial underwater or beach obstacles, mines were sporadically utilized on their shores.

The Japanese also suffered from a lack of anti-aircraft ammunition to counter the enemy air superiority. Over on Saipan, Lieutenant-General Saito Yoshitsugu commanded a significant military presence including the 43rd Division, the 47th Independent Mixed Brigade, the 9th Tank Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the 18th Regiment, and various support units totaling 25,500 personnel. Despite its apparent strength, a convoy carrying reinforcements for the 43rd Division was ambushed by two American submarines between June 4 and 6, resulting in the loss of five transports and nearly decimating the 118th Regiment. Saito, overseeing Saipan as commander of the Northern Marianas Army Group, was joined by Admiral Nagumo's Central Pacific Area Fleet headquarters, bolstering defense with an additional 6,200 naval personnel. Additionally, General Obata, stationed at Saipan's army headquarters, delegated authority to his chief of staff, Major-General Igeta Keiji, as he inspected defenses in Palau during the American landings. Saito organized Saipan's defense into five sectors, anticipating landings on the island's west and northwest coasts, Tanapag Harbor, and the north shore of Magicienne Bay. The Japanese strategy relied on tank-infantry counterattacks launched at night from designated positions to repel enemy landings. However, American bombardment of Saipan commenced before Saito's forces could fully fortify their positions. Large numbers of heavy weapons, ranging from 200mm mortars to 5-inch coastal defense guns and literally dozens of searchlights and antiaircraft guns still remained in naval depots or loaded on railroad cars or still packed in cosmoline near partially excavated gun positions. The high ground in the island's center had received little attention in the defensive preparations; and, indeed, beach defenses themselves were in many cases far from complete. In so far as training in defensive warfare is concerned, Japanese forces displayed a marked deficiency; there was little evidence of organization of the ground, the principal airfield (Aslito) was virtually undefended against ground troops, and their counterattack plans were poorly conceived.

On the afternoon of June 11, Mitscher’s Task Force 58, began a relentless three and a half day heavy bombardment against Saipan, Tinian, Guam, Rota, and Pagan. This onslaught, featuring a 225-plane fighter sweep, caught the Japanese off guard in the Marianas and resulted in the destruction of 150 enemy aircraft, securing air superiority for the rest of the campaign. On June 12th and 13th, 216 carrier bombers hit Guam, Saipan, and Tinian, while Admiral Hoover's B-24s started pounding the southern Marianas airfields. You might be raising your eyebrows, the B-24’s belonged to Task Force 57, under Vice-Admiral John Hoover, which was currently formed by the 5th Air Force over on Cape Gloucester and New Guinea; the 7th Air Force and 4th Marine Aircraft Wing on the Marshall and Gilbert Islands; and the 13th Air Force on the Admiralty Islands. Concurrently, two Japanese convoys were intercepted, leading to the sinking of 16 enemy vessels. The first of these, was a formation of 20 ships, fleeing on a northerly course 125 miles west of Pagan Island. They were attacked on the afternoon of the 12th by planes of Rear Admiral William K. Harrill’s Task Group 58.4. Further  south, 135 miles west of Guam, the other convoy of six ships became the target for a special attack mission sent by Rear Admiral Joseph J. Clark, commanding Task Group 58.1. Between the two attacks 12 cargo ships, three submarine chasers, and one patrol-torpedo boat were sunk. Additionally, on June 13th, Mitscher's fast battleships shelled Saipan, though with limited success. The following day, Turner's fire support ships joined Task Force 58 in bombarding Saipan's beaches and installations, effectively neutralizing most of the Japanese coastal defenses and anti-aircraft positions. Despite some damage inflicted on the destroyer Braine and battleship California, Saito's defenses were not completely destroyed, indicating that the preliminary bombardment was not entirely effective. Meanwhile, underwater demolition teams surveyed the landing beaches, clearing them of mines and obstacles and creating gaps in the reefs for the amphibious approach. Smith's reserves staged a demonstration off Tanapag to divert Japanese attention, while carrier groups were dispatched to prevent enemy aircraft staging through the Bonins, successfully attacking Iwo Jima, Chichi-jima, and Haha-jima.

To deter the Japanese from utilizing the Bonins in the north as a staging area for aircraft, two task groups led by Clark's 58.1 and Harrill's 58.4 set sail from Saipan on June 14th for an offensive. This marked the furthest advance into Empire waters by a carrier striking force at that time. Task Groups 58.1 and 58.4 refueled on June 14th and were then dispatched that night toward Chichi and Iwo Jima. Airstrikes on Japanese airfields in those locations commenced the following afternoon despite challenging weather conditions. Despite facing strong resistance from the Japanese, American fighter sweeps and bombing runs resulted in the destruction of 28 out of 37 Zeros engaged, with an additional seven destroyed on the ground, while only two American aircraft were lost. Adverse weather hampered morning strikes on the 16th, but the afternoon sortie of 54 American aircraft encountered Japanese planes on the runway, claiming 63 destroyed, though this wasn't confirmed by Japanese sources. Only two American aircraft were lost due to anti-aircraft fire and operational issues. Despite airborne opposition and unfavorable flying conditions, the mission achieved its objectives, significantly diminishing the Bonins' effectiveness as an aircraft staging area. After the afternoon raid, the two task groups headed south as per Mitscher's orders to position themselves off Saipan by the 18th. This operation proved successful, as around 100 Japanese aircraft that could have intervened in the impending battle were eliminated.

On the morning of June 15, while the landing craft were lowered and began the complex assembly process, the Americans carried the last air and naval preparations on Saipan. At 8:12am, Turner finally gave the landing signal and the amtracs began to approach their assigned beaches under the cover of the LCI gunboats’ rockets. Enemy fire was light until the LVTs reached the coral reef's lip, at which time artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire increased drastically. Some control craft had drifted slightly to the north and coupled with a stronger than expected current some 2nd Marine Division units landed north of their intended beaches. The UDTs had not experienced this as the sea conditions and tides were different when they went to work the day before. Once over the reef lip some 400yds from shore, the swell made stationkeeping even more problematic. The swell increased through the day, making unloading and transfer difficult as well as capsizing landing craft and LVTs. The 2nd Marine Division had 31 of its 68 amphibian tanks hit or mechanically disabled before reaching the Tractor Control Line ashore. Nonetheless, in 20 minutes, some 8000 assault troops were ashore despite the strong Japanese artillery fire, albeit suffering heavy casualties. On the Red Beaches, Colonel James Riseley’s 2nd and 3rd Battalions encountered stiff resistance from Hill 500 but still managed to secure a shallow beachhead, subsequently repelling a savage counterattack as the reserve 1st Battalion was landing. To the south, as Colonel Clarence Wallace’s 2nd and 3rd Battalions had both come ashore on Green Beach 1, the 2nd would be sent south to seize Afetna Point while the 3rd advanced inland. Afetna Point was important for another reason than just denying the Japanese excellent positions for enfilading the American landing craft. Possession of the point would make Beach Green 3 available for landing of the tanks of both divisions. Because of an open channel off Green 3, LCM’s carrying tanks could proceed directly to the beach without crossing the troublesome reef that fenced all other beaches. Once through the channel the craft could either move straight into Green 3 or fan out to the north or south and put the tanks ashore, wherever it was desired. The same channel could also be used for logistical purposes after tanks were ashore. As a result, the 2nd met strong resistance, progressing slowly and costly against a determined foe while the 1st Battalion was being landed; yet the 3rd managed to push inland against weaker resistance, finally halting about 900 yards from the O-1 Line. In the afternoon, the reserve 1st Battalion, 29th Marines was also landed and employed to fill the gap between Wallace’s battalions. It’s also important to note that the 4th Company, 9th Tank Regiment conducted piecemeal counterattacks on either side of Charan Kanoa with 14 tanks, losing all but three.

Meanwhile, along the Blue Beaches, the 23rd Marines led by Colonel Louis Jones made headway through Charan Kanoa, facing occasional gunfire, and successfully advanced to the O-1 Line. Despite encountering challenging terrain and harassment from Japanese riflemen, their amtracs managed to secure Mount Fina Susu, albeit with significant losses. Upon reaching the O-1 Line, heavy artillery fire pinned down the Americans. Because of the concentrated mortar and artillery fire which had struck his troops throughout the day, the commander of the 23rd Marines, Colonel Jones estimated that the light forces on the O-1 line would be incapable of holding there for the night without being virtually annihilated. In addition, the regimental commander felt that “pulling back would allow our artillery and air to bring fire on the Jap batteries a short distance inland, better contact could be obtained on the right, and the exposed left flank could be better protected.” Dillon’s 2nd Battalion and Cosgrove’s 3rd Battalion were therefore ordered to establish a defense line generally 800 yards west of O-1 for the night. This involved a withdrawal under cover of darkness of the meager forces on O-1.Concerned about the exposed left flank between the 2nd and 4th Divisions, Colonel Jones directed the reserve 1st Battalion to fill the dangerous gap.

Further south, Colonel Merton Batchelder’s 1st Battalion faced fierce resistance from Agingan Point, repelling enemy counterattacks with the aid of air and naval support. Reinforcement from 3rd Battalion units allowed partial clearance of Japanese positions. The 2nd Battalion to the left encountered enemy concentrations but benefited from the heroic actions of the LVTAs, enabling them to advance inland. 

About half the assault Marines of this battalion were carried to a railroad embankment prior to debarkation from LVTs. Until it reached there, the battalion was subjected to frontal small-arms fire from Japanese behind the embankment. There the small arms fire ceased, but mortar and artillery fire continued. From the direction of Nafutan Point came shells which burst overhead, apparently from antiaircraft guns depressed to fire at ground targets. And, as if troubles to the front and flanks were not enough, two enemy mortars began firing on the Marines from positions 500 yards to the rear. Before a request for assistance could be made, friendly planes spotted the mortars, attacked, and silenced them. Much credit for the 2nd Battalion’s success in pushing inland goes to the LVT(A)s of the Army’s 708th Amphibian Tank Battalion, which, according to the Marine battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Hudson, took “more than their share of punishment diverted enemy attention from the amphibious tractors carrying troops ... I shall always re- member the excellent support given to my battalion by the Army LVT(A)’s”. Meanwhile, Marine tanks and artillery, under Turner’s command, were successfully brought ashore, although some tanks and howitzers from the 4th Division were lost to fire and reef obstacles. By late afternoon, the bulk of the reserve 2nd and 24th Marines were landed, with the latter sustaining 400 casualties from accidents and artillery fire.  Lieutenant Colonel Alexander A. Vandergrift,  therefore, deployed his battalion and moved it on foot to an assembly area some 700 yards inland from Yellow 1, near a fork in the rail- road tracks. The men had no more than taken entrenching tools in hand when a barrage of well-directed Japanese artillery fire engulfed them. After the day’s casualties were totalled, it was discovered that the unit had suffered heavily, though it had yet to enter the front line fighting: 25 killed, 72 wounded, 39 missing, mostly those lost on board the overturned LVTs. Other battalions had suffered more heavily, but the real significance of these figures lies in the fact that the 3rd Battalion did not arrive on the beach until 5:27pm. However, by nightfall, only the 25th Marines had reached the O-1 Line, constituting less than one-third of the planned beachhead, with casualties exceeding 2000 during the landings.

After half an hour of the Saipan Invasion, Admiral Toyoda announced Operation A-Go proclaiming "The fate of the Empire rests upon this single battle. Every man is expected to do his utmost." The same Nelsonia words used by Admiral Togo at the legendary battle of Tsushima in 1905. He had created that statement taking Nelson’s signal "England expects that every man will do his duty" at the Battle of Trafalgar. Toyoda planned to destroy the American fleet. Admiral Ugaki’s battleships were to rendezvous with Admiral Ozawa’s carriers in the Philippine Sea to attack the American fleet around Saipan. At 6:35pm on June 15th, the submarine Flying Fish reported that a force of Japanese battleships and at least three carriers had passed through the San Bernardino Strait. The submarines were under orders to report sightings before attempting to attack, so Flying Fish waited until nightfall, then surfaced to radio in its report. The sighting report from the submarine was monitored by the Japanese who knew they had been located. About one hour later, submarine Seahorse also sighted a Japanese force 200nm east-southeast of Surigao Strait. The exact composition of this force was unclear, but was thought to be Yamato and Musashi plus escorts. The submarine was not able to send a signal of its sighting until 4:00am on June 16th. Additionally, throughout the 15th, a growing body of signals intelligence indicated that a major IJN fleet action was underway.

 

Receiving this intelligence on the enemy's intentions, Admiral Spruance made the decision to halt the Guam landings, instructed for unloading at Saipan to continue until June 17th only, and tasked Turner with preparing for an imminent decisive battle. However, that's a podcast for next week. General Saito was on the verge of initiating his counterattack. Throughout the night, there were various probes and minor counterattacks that were swiftly repelled. Nonetheless, the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines faced a major assault at 3am when a Japanese bugler 75 sounded a loud, clear call on the tense night air, and with a waving of flags, loud screams, and a brandishing of swords, the attack was launched. Added to the din were the shouts of the 6th Marines for “flares.” Illumination shells, fired by the three destroyers, Halsey Powell, Coghlan and Monssen of Task Unit 52.17.3 began to burst over the area, clearly revealing the Japanese attackers. Men of Companies F and I opened with accurate, devastating lire. California joined with a tornado of salvos in front of the Marine lines. The Japanese, stripped by the illumination of the advantage afforded by their superior knowledge of the terrain (so helpful in night lighting), dropped before the Marines’ fusillade. As Japanese fell, others replaced them in the determined onslaught. 

At one point in the fighting, it was feared that the enemy had effected a penetration of Company I, along the coastal road. To contain this Japanese prong, Colonel Riseley shifted one company of the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines, company L, into the area. The light of morning, however, revealed that no penetration had been made and that Company B had, in effect, formed a secondary line. By 5:45, the Japanese pressure reached a peak; two Marine 37mm guns near the beach were knocked out and their crews forced back. Although the main positions held, a false report reached the 6th Marines’ command post to the effect that Company F’s lines along the beach had been forced back about 50 yards. This erroneous report, probably fostered by the withdrawal of the two 37mm crews and the infiltration of small enemy groups to the regimental command post, had no basis in fact.

Fortunately, five medium tanks arrived in the nick of time to halt the Japanese advance and thwart their assault. With the dawn of June 16th, the battlefield revealed approximately 700 enemy casualties strewn across the terrain. Meanwhile, as the 6th Marines consolidated their position and the remaining 2nd Marines landed, Colonel Wallace’s 2nd Battalion resumed its offensive against Afetna Point, successfully eliminating enemy resistance and bridging the gap between Marine divisions. Further south, General Schmidt led his three regiments towards Fina Susu Ridge in a coordinated advance. Despite the 23rd Marines encountering formidable enemy opposition in the mountains and marshes, the 25th Marines managed to clear Agingan Point and extend beyond the beachhead, while Colonel Franklin Hart’s 24th Marines in the center made significant progress towards the O-1 line despite facing fierce resistance.

Meanwhile,  Spruance opted to withdraw the unnecessary transports in anticipation of the impending naval confrontation. General Smith made the decision to deploy the reserve 27th Division for landing. Consequently, Major-General Ralph Smith's units, excluding the 106th Regiment, commenced landing operations in the afternoon. However, during the night, Saito initiated his second significant counterattack. The Japanese 136th Infantry (two battalions) and 9th Tank Regiments were to counterattack the center of the 2nd Marine Division sector at 17.00hrs. Yokosuka 1st SNLF was to attack the north flank from the Garapan area and “cooperate with the tanks to annihilate the enemy’s front line and advance towards Oreai (Charan Kanoa) Airfield.” Vice Admiral Nagumo, Commander Central Pacific Fleet and 5th Base Force, was ordered to command the attack personally. The units were still disorganized from the previous night's action and the attack was not launched until 03.30hrs. The objective of the Japanese attack was modest enough: the Saipan radio station, a short 400 yards behind the 6th Marines’ lines. This objective, in itself, represented a revision in Saito’s pre-D-Day policy to “destroy the enemy, during the night, at the water’s edge." Seizure of the radio station area would still leave 500—600 yards distance to the water. This resulted in an estimated 44 tanks and 500 infantry attacking the positions of the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, and 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines. The attack began at about 3:30, and the brunt struck Lieutenant Colonel Jones’ 1st Battalion, 6th Marines,  and to a lesser extent the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines. The tanks advanced in groups of four or five with Japanese soldiers clinging to them. Poor and ineffective tactics reflected the inadequacy of Saito’s order; some tanks cruised about in an aimless fashion, some bogged down in the swampy ground, some made an effort to break through the lines, still others stopped to let off their pugnacious passengers. The Japanese suffered heavy losses, including approximately 24 tanks and 300 men, while inflicting only 97 casualties. By the end of the initial two days, American forces had incurred roughly 3,500 casualties, approximately 20% of the total for the operation. Concurrently, General Obata had instructed the commanders of Guam, Truk, and Tinian to send reinforcements to Saipan via barge, although only two companies managed to land on Rota by June 22nd. On June 17th, the American offensive resumed, yielding significant progress, partly due to artillery support. General Watson expanded the beachhead area nearly twofold, with the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines, and 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines advancing northward to within 1000 yards of Garapan. Meanwhile, Colonel Riseley's remaining units secured the base of Mount Tipo Pale along the O-2 Line, and Colonel Wallace's Marines maneuvered around Lake Susupe to reach the O-1 Line. 

To the south, the 25th Marines led by Colonel Batchelder advanced in a column formation, making headway towards Aslito Airfield by approximately 1500 yards. They managed to secure advantageous high ground along the O-2 Line on the northwest perimeter of the airfield. Simultaneously, Colonel Gerard Kelley’s 165th Regiment also moved towards Aslito, making gains of around 1200 yards despite encountering light resistance. By 2:00pm, the 2nd Battalion had moved to the southwest edge of Aslito Airfield, while the 1st Battalion had become involved in a fight for a dominating ridge line extending from the airfield's southwest corner to the vicinity of Cape Obiam. Infantrymen of the 1st Battalion led by Major James H. Mahoney inched slowly up the steep and open slope, so that, by 5:00pm, a toehold had been gained at the crest. At this point, however, the Japanese launched a counterattack and drove the soldiers back off the hill. Reorganizing and reforming the lines at the base of the ridge, the battalion dug in for the night. Amid heavy artillery bombardment, the 24th Marines reached and secured the O-2 Line, consolidating their position on the ridge. In contrast, progress for the 23rd Marines to the south of Lake Susupe’s swamps was minimal as they faced entrenched enemy forces. With the expansion of the beachhead, additional Corps units landed, including General Smith’s command post, advance parties of the Corps artillery, and Colonel Leonard Bishop’s 105th Regiment. During the night, Saito launched another counterattack, deploying the 1st Battalion of the 18th Regiment to stage a counterlanding on the Marine beachhead. However, the intervention of LCI gunboats and Marine artillery thwarted the attempt, driving the enemy back to Tanapag Harbor. Shifting focus to the Battle of Biak, General Fuller’s forces had previously seized Mokmer but now found themselves encircled by Colonel Kuzume’s formidable positions in the East and West Caves. Despite progress in repairing the airdrome, intense Japanese fire prevented its use until the enemy cave strongholds were neutralized.

In contrast, the Japanese had attempted twice to reinforce Biak but failed both times. However, Operation KON drew the Allied forces away from the island, allowing barges to discreetly bring reinforcements from the southwest to Biak without naval protection. As a result, most of the 2nd Battalion, 221st Regiment was successfully transported to the island by June 12, and General Numata was evacuated during this period. Following this success, the 2nd Battalion, 219th Regiment was loaded onto barges in Sorong and transported to Biak via Noemfoor Island, arriving successfully by June 16. Meanwhile, as Colonel Newman’s 186th Regiment secured its positions on June 8, Fuller decided to send the rest of Colonel Haney’s 162nd Regiment to the recently secured Parai Jetty. With the Ibdi Pocket contained, Haney made significant progress toward Mokmer. The next day, Haney continued his advance, successfully connecting with his 2nd Battalion despite heavy mortar fire. Newman faced multiple night counterattacks and was unable to expand his beachhead. On June 10th the 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry, sent two companies to the point on the low ridge where Company B had been halted the previous afternoon. Despite artillery support, the two units could make little progress and were themselves pinned down about 10:30. Japanese rifle and mortar fire was silenced by the 1st Battalion's 60-mm. mortars, but the Japanese continued to pour machine gun fire from a number of bunkers and pillboxes which proved impervious to bazooka and 75-mm. tank fire. The units withdrew while more artillery fire was placed along the low ridge. On the east flank, enemy fire from the East Caves had died down, and the 2nd Battalion, 162nd Infantry, was able to move on eastward. On that same day, as Admiral Toyoda ordered a third attempt for Operation KON, Admiral Ugaki’s battleships were directed to support Admiral Sakonju’s convoy, assembling at Batjan Island on June 11th. The start of the Marianas bombardment on that day forced Toyoda to suspend the operation and prepare for A-Go, ordering the battleships to rejoin Admiral Ozawa’s command and sending the 23rd Air Flotilla to Palau to reinforce Admiral Kakuta’s 1st Air Fleet.

With two regiments now stationed at Mokmer, Fuller decided to resume his offensive by advancing westward towards Borokoe and northward towards the low ridge. The 163rd Regiment was assigned to hold the Ibdi Pocket and the East Caves. On June 11, the assault battalions began moving to the starting point in front of Menoebaboe. Haney's forces faced strong resistance and only reached the starting point by afternoon. The Americans then crossed the starting line, encountering minimal resistance along the coast but significant opposition on the low ridge. As a result, three battalions reached the 1st Phase Line, while Haney's 3rd Battalion couldn't move beyond the starting line. This forced Newman to pause his advance temporarily until Haney cleared enemy positions on the ridge. On June 12, Haney's 2nd and 3rd Battalions advanced on the low ridge. The 3rd Battalion fought doggedly forward during the afternoon, discovering an ever increasing number of Japanese pillboxes, bunkers, and hasty automatic weapons and rifle emplacements of all kinds, manned by 1st Battalion and 5th Company, 222nd Regiment. Dusk found the unit still some 100 yards short of the line of departure and about 1,300 yards east of the 2nd Battalion. The 1st Battalion, taking no part in the action during the day, moved forward to Mokmer Drome from Parai. Due to heavy Japanese resistance, their progress was slow. The next day, the Americans continued their attacks against enemy positions, but they couldn't close the gap between Haney's 2nd and 3rd Battalions. Fuller concluded that his troops were fatigued and that the Japanese had likely received reinforcements, so he requested an additional infantry regiment. General Krueger planned to send the 34th Regiment from Hollandia, scheduled to arrive on June 18. In response to recent setbacks, General Doe ordered the 1st Battalions of the 162nd and 186th Regiments to support the 3rd Battalion on June 14. These battalions positioned themselves on the terrace above the low ridge, facing the main Japanese strongpoint directly.

In response to the enemy's aggressive action, Colonel Kuzume initiated a tank-infantry counterattack with his remaining forces to push back the enemy battalions, inflicting heavy casualties and disrupting the American advance. Despite this, the Americans managed to regroup and establish a continuous line, while the Japanese sustained significant losses and were unable to execute any further major counterattacks for the rest of the battle. Generals Krueger and MacArthur were unhappy with the progress of operations in Biak, which led them to relieve Fuller of his duties as task force commander. Whether General Fuller's relief as commander of the HURRICANE Task Force was entirely justifiable is a question which cannot be answered categorically. At the time of his relief, the task force had seized Mokmer Drome. Patrols sent westward to Borokoe and Sorido Dromes had found no enemy at those two fields, and General Fuller knew they could be occupied with ease. But he had not sent more troops beyond Mokmer Drome because he believed it more important to secure an overland line of communications to that field and to clear the low ridge so that repair work could continue and at least one strip could be put in service. By June 14th it was only a question of time before the West Caves area and the low ridge would be secured. Indeed, General Eichelberger, who took 3.5 days to acquaint himself with the situation at Biak, drew up new attack plans according to which the 162nd and 186th Infantry Regiments were to be employed in the same area and in much the same manner as General Fuller had been using them. General Eichelberger realized, as had General Fuller, that Borokoe and Sorido Dromes would be no safer than Mokmer Drome as long as the Japanese held the low ridge and West Caves positions. But, in the last analysis, the mission of the HURRICANE Task Force, quick seizure and rehabilitation of the Biak fields, had not been accomplished by mid-June. General Eichelberger then took command of Operation Hurricane on June 15. Although the initial plan was to keep Fuller in charge of the 41st Division, he felt unjustly treated and requested to be relieved of this role as well. Consequently, Doe was promoted to command the 41st Division in Fuller's place.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

The invasion of Saipan was seeing tremendous casualties for both the Japanese and Americans. By the end of the initial two days, American forces had incurred roughly 3,500 casualties, approximately 20% of the total for the operation. This island was not going to be a cake walk by any measure, it would be paid for in blood.

 

- 133 - Pacific War - Fall of Mogaung, June 4-11, 1944

Last time we spoke about landings at Biak. General Fuller unleashed a amphibious assault against Biak that faced countless hurdles. The Hurricane Task force encountered a lot of terrain issues at Humboldt bay, leading to logistical headaches. Despite the disorganization, they shipped off and landed, forming a beachhead. Colonel Kuzume and his men were caught with their pants down, units were scattered all over the place. The first tank battle of the Southwest Pacific occurred, seeing American Shermans absolutely desolate Japanese Type 95’s. General Fuller planned to consolidate his troops at Ibdi and Bosnek while reinforcements arrived, but the Japanese continuously lobbed surprise night attacks to horrible effect. Over in the Burma front, Mutaguchi’s operation continued to unravel as his subordinate officers disregarded his orders and performed their own withdrawals. As Mutaguchi relieved men of command and replaced them, General Slim finally reopened the Imphal-Kohima road spelling doom for the Japanese.

This episode is the Fall of Mogaung

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

As General Vinegar Joe unleashed what he believed to be a masterstroke against Myitkyina, it soon turned out to be an absolute gruesome struggle. As we last saw, General Stilwell’s men had begun a long and difficult siege of Myitkyina. The 22nd and 38th Chinese Divisions were now pinned down by General Tanaka’s battered 18th Division south of Kamaing. To the south Brigadier Calvert’s Chindits began a battle for Mogaung, which forced General Takeda’s 53rd Division to suspend the relief of Myitkyina and rush back to reinforce the town. Though the Mogaung Garrison and the 1st Battalion, 128th Regiment to the north had been effectively destroyed by the Chindit and Chinese attacks, the Japanese had been able to maintain their hold on Mogaung by mid-June. To the east, General Wei’s Y Force had opened a new offensive on Yunnan, gradually pushing Colonel Kurashige’s 148th Regiment to Tengchong but failing to seize Longling against the tenacious resistance of General Matsuyama’s forces. Along the Kamaing-Mogaung front, by late June, Tanaka had been able to assemble most of his depleted command at Lakatkawng, determined to keep the blockade on the Hukawng Valley. His main aim was to clear the Seton roadblock, which had been recently reinforced with General Sun’s 113th Regiment; but once again, his attacks would fail to dislodge the tenacious Chinese defenders. Yet upon receiving orders from the 33rd Army commander to withdraw, General Tanaka reported that the 18th Division could continue to hold in the Kamaing area. This statement, inspired by Colonel Ohgoshi, the chief of staff, proved to be unwarranted optimism. The 18th had staged a desperate resistance in the vicinity of Kamaing for about a month and, for most of the period, had only 80 men for each mile of front. Supplies of ammunition and food were very low with only about 1400 rounds of rifle ammunition per day for the entire Division and 60 rounds per machine gun. The daily ration was about 2.5 ounces of rice per man. On receipt of the Army's message to withdraw, Colonel Ohgoshi had advised the Division commander that further resistance in the area was possible, but had not made it clear that this was his personal belief and did not reflect the opinions of the rest of the Division staff. Within a day or two the commander became aware of the fact that the other staff officers were convinced that further resistance in the Kamaing area was impossible. He therefore forwarded to the 33rd Army a revised report of the Division's actual situation. Upon receipt of the second message, on June 27 the Army directed the Division to retire to the Sahmaw sector. Tanaka believed he needed to stand his ground while the 53rd Division pushed aside the Seton Block and reopened his line of communications. Thus, he elected to continue to resist the attacks from the north while he himself attacked Seton for three more days; but failing to make any progress, he would finally comply with his orders to withdraw to the hills north of Sahmaw in early July. 

While the 4th and 146th Regiments performed covering attacks, the remnants of the 55th and 56th Regiments destroyed their artillery and heavy equipment, and withdrew along an escape trail cut through the forest west of the Seton roadblock. On 2 July the 18th Division began its withdrawal, utilizing an obscure trail that ran directly south from Kamaing. Crossing the mountain range west of Seton, the Division completed its concentration near Sahmaw about 7 July. The Hukawng Operation was then considered concluded, ending a campaign that had been a miserable failure and had cost almost 8,000 casualties. By July 15th, the 18th Division would finally assemble in the Indaw area. Though only 3000 men from the elite 18th Division would survive the Hukawng Valley Campaign, Tanaka had effectively managed to keep intact the blockade to China for another year, something that would have profound repercussions later on in Chinese history.

Further south, the 114th Regiment finally arrived at Gurkhaywa on June 16th, ready to reinforce the Chindits; yet Takeda had also brought most of his troops back to Mogaung, subsequently starting a deadly shelling of the Chindit positions. By when June 15th arrived, the Chinese still had not appeared, and Calvert pulled his troops back towards the bridge. At that moment, remarkable news arrived: The Japanese were abandoning their positions along the river. Calvert was exuberant. This meant he could move out of his bridgehead perhaps capture the town. Certainly, it meant a reduction of the shelling which was claiming at least 15 of his men a day. Yet, when the shelling did not die down and it quickly became apparent that Takeda was merely redeploying his troops along the railway, to get them out of flooding in low-lying areas. Chindit recce teams reported the area from the train station, in the heart of the town to the Mogaung Railway Bridge, further north, was heavily defended with eight bunkers dominating the landscape. Shelling from the village of Naungkyaiktaw, astride the road to Mogaung, set between fields of paddy, was persistent. Naungkyaiktaw had to be captured. Calvert estimated the village was held by a hundred Japanese. Because of this, on June 18th, Calvert ordered his forces to attack the apparent Japanese artillery encampment at Naungkyaiktaw after a heavy air and mortar bombardment. His troops outnumbered them, but unwilling to suffer needless casualties, Calvert directed the American fighter-bombers against the village, which was bombarded on the night of the 17th. Half an hour before dawn on the 18th, the Chindit mortars pummeled the place with 400 rounds for good measure. Calvert then sent in his assault force. Among the attackers was a company of 70 men from King’s Liverpool led by Major Fred Reeman. This was a company that had stayed on with the 77th Brigade after the rest of the battalion had been transferred to the 111th Brigade. They were joined by 12 men of Blaine’s Detachment, once evacuated to India but since returned, this time armed with about a dozen flamethrowers. 

In the darkness, Blaine’s Detachment was told to advance in front of the company of King’s, and to “turn the fucking lights on.” As the detachment began to hurl flames far and wide, the Chindits behind them began cheering. The men had been told that the village had many bunkers, but never saw any at first. The scene soon turned fantastic. They went through the entire village “with twenty or thirty yards of flame shooting out in front.” They soon found the bunkers. The Japanese became crazed with fear especially after the British began yelling “put out the fucking lights,” and turning the flamethrowers their way. Many Japanese fled the bunkers, joined by those outside. They fled through the paddy fields, making for the railway station 400 yards away. Calvert’s machine gunners had been waiting and blazed away, killing at least forty. Meanwhile, the rest of Fusiliers and the Kings walked up the paddy, picking off Japanese hiding or trying to crawl away in the ditches. Calvert, his mobile brigade-major Brash and his orderly Lance-Corporal Young decided to join the mop-up, shooting at Japanese while standing on chairs, as more Fusiliers began clearing the last of the bunkers, hurling grenades into them and blasting the insides with flamethrowers. As twilight set in that day, the most peculiar thing happened. The Fusiliers were cooking an evening meal in their newly-won positions, when a weary, seven-man patrol walked into their billet and began to take off their kit. The Fusiliers who looked up casually, noticed to their horror, that the new men were Japanese. The Japanese, for their part, had not noticed. The Fusiliers lunged for their weapons and opened fire. The Japanese patrol did not survive. In all, Calvert estimated that his troops had killed about 70 Japanese in the capture and holding of Naungkyaiktaw, while suffering 16 killed and 38 wounded. Major Reeman’s King’s company had become reduced to a platoon. 

Calvert was considerably cheered on the evening of the 18th, when the much promised Chinese reinforcements finally arrived, guided over the river in motorized ranger boats by a towering Chindit officer, Captain Andrew. This was the 1st Battalion of the Chinese 114th Regiment led by Major P’ang, which quickly deployed in the positions pointed out by Calvert but left the Chindits a little flummoxed when they proclaimed that they were in no particular hurry to fight as they had been fighting for years. On the following day, another battalion of Chinese arrived under the personal command of the regimental leader, Colonel Li Hung, as did a battery of 75mm pack howitzers  the “6th Battery” under US Major Wayne Cook. The Chinese quickly assumed the defense of Mahaung, prompting an American liaison officer with the Chinese to send a press release that the Chinese had “captured” the village, which embarrassed Li. Cook’s battery was deployed into position at Pinhmi village began operations on the 20th, hurling fire against the Japanese positions as the Chinese infantrymen consolidated their positions. Meantime, elements of the Chinese 113th Infantry, operating five miles north of Mogaung, surrounded a Japanese company, while Cook’s guns hammered them. Fifty Japanese died from first blast alone. The Chinese finished off those who survived.The assault, was so ferocious that all the bunkers were overrun The reinforcements heartened Calvert for his own brigade was now a shell of its former self. The Lancashire Fusiliers and the King’s Liverpool had only 110 men, the South Staffords had 180 and the Gurkha Rifles had 230. He planned a fresh advance, this time aiming for the hamlet of Natgyigon, on Mogaung’s right flank, near the river. This area, Calvert believed, was the “key to Mogaung.” For the time, he chose the early hours of darkness on June 23rd a day which would go down in the annals of the 77th Brigade as the “stuff of legends.” The plan called for a mortar barrage of 1,000 bombs, in addition to shelling from the 75mm guns to cover the advance of the Chindits across the open ground towards Natgyigon. The Gurkhas were to move on the right, with the South Staffords on the left. Blaine’s Detachment and the Lancashire Fusiliers were in reserve. The objective was to capture the entire stretch of ground from the Mogaung Bridge to the train station, the latter of which the Chinese were to secure. Once the area was in Allied hands, the troops were to dig in while the reserve troops mopped up. In addition, Allied aircraft were to bombard the area before the start of the assault, which itself was timed to launch at about 3.10 am. In the dark, section commanders could be heard telling their men: “We attack Mogaung tonight and once we’ve taken it the Brigadier says we are through!” Later, during the attack, Calvert discovered the Chinese infantry had not captured the all-important train station, even as their American liaison officer insisted that they had. Calvert angrily pointed out that no, the Chinese had not, because enemy fire from that direction continued to pick off his men at the railway embankment.

The Gurkhas, moving along a wide right flank along the banks of the Mogaung River, headed for the railway bridge. Approaching the bridge, they came under heavy fire. Captain Allmand, by now suffering from trench foot as were most of the troops, moved forward to silence a machine gun firing on his men. He could barely run because of his affliction but advancing through the mud, he hurled grenades at the Japanese position. A burst of gunfire plunged into him. He fell, badly wounded. One of his Gurkhas, Sergeant. Tilbir Gurung pulled Allmand and another wounded NCO to safety. For this, Gurung was to get a Military Medal. Allmand’s own valor was to be recognized by a Victoria Cross. The South Staffords swept into Mogaung town. Resistance was heavy. Lt Durant of the South Stafford deployed his machineguns to rake Japanese positions with fire. Meantime, the flamethrowers were brought up. As they moved up past Durant’s positions, a shell burst exploded one, setting the man wielding it on fire. The man screamed and somehow shook off the flamethrowing unit from his back. Durant and some of his men rushed forward and rolled him into water in a nearby ditch. The Japanese had dug-in beneath the ruins of a brick house from where they were stubbornly holding the Staffords at bay. The rest of the flamethrowers moved in and sprayed the building. One Japanese, his clothes ablaze, leapt from his positions and tried to make a run for it. A scythe of gunfire cut him down. The rest valiantly held their positions and were burned to cinder. The Staffords, mopping up the, found the Japanese officer. He had shot himself with his revolver.

The Japanese had entrenched themselves at a strategically important building known as the Red House, which was well-protected with machine-gun nests. The advancing Gurkhas consequently ran smack into this killing zone, getting caught in a murderous crossfire and suffering heavy casualties. In response, Calvert threw his reserves into the fray and the Chindits also began to pummel the Japanese positions with mortars and machine-guns, which allowed the infantry to reach the all-important train station. Inflicting some 120 casualties and losing 60 dead and over 100 wounded, the Chindits then successfully captured all their objectives by noon. For the rest of the day, heavy fighting would continue as the Chindits dug in on their gained positions; but during the night, the Japanese would finally pull out, leaving the town to the shattered remnants of the 77th Brigade. Mopping up then continued until June 27, when Mogaung was declared void of Japanese. Though this was the first major town to be recaptured in Burma, Calvert lost over 250 killed and 500 wounded at Mogaung, which was more than any Chindit formation was prepared to take. This was also a bittersweet victory for Calvert because Stilwell would claim that the town had been taken by his Chinese troops, even though the Chindits had done most of the fighting.

Stilwill wrote in his diary on June 27th “Good news from Mogaung, We have it!” Then came a remarkable broadcast from Stilwell’s headquarters via the BBC “The Chinese had captured Mogaung”. There was no mention of the Chindits. Calvert was incensed. Colonel Li was appalled and apologized profusely. “If anyone has taken Mogaung it is your Brigade and we all admire the bravery of your soldiers.” Calvert, his anger against Stilwell unmitigated, sent a message to US headquarters  “Chinese reported taking Mogaung. My Brigade now taking umbrage” this prompted Stilwell’s staff to scour the maps for the location of Umbrage. Meantime, congratulations poured in from Lentaigne, from “Scottie” Scott, from John Masters, and the other brigade commanders. Among the lot, there was one, from Derek Tulloch, which struck Calvert’s heart the most: “Wingate would have been proud of you.” After this defeat, and learning of the concurrent withdrawal of the 18th Division, Takeda’s 53rd Division would withdraw to the Sahmaw River line in early July, where it was also reinforced with the recently-arrived 119th Regiment. 

Meanwhile over at Myitkyina, General Boatner had to order a stop to the attacks after June 18th because of the heavy casualties. For the time being, tunneling would be used to close with the enemy. On June 25th, however, Boatner would have a severe recurrence of malaria that would force him to abandon the frontlines. This led General Stilwell to appoint Brigadier-General Theodore Wessels in command of the Myitkyina Task Force on June 26th. Luckily for Wessels the situation started to improve after the fall of Mogaung, as Chinese troops there could now move up the railroad to connect with Wessels’ forces. This removed the recurrent menace of a Japanese drive from Mogaung, guaranteed reinforcements and the opening of a ground line of communications, and further eliminated one of General Minakami’s two bases from which supplies had trickled into the Japanese perimeter. Despite this, the only gains in the week of June 25th were a few hundred yards taken by the 150th Regiment and the 236th Engineers. Alongside this, Stilwell ordered the 1st Battalion, 42nd Regiment to penetrate through the Japanese positions towards Sitapur on June 28. They would drive deep into the Japanese defense system, leading Stilwell to hope this was the turning point; on receiving Japanese fire, it halted and dug in. Air supply was necessary.In response, Wessels dispatched some Marauder reinforcements. F Company, unaware it had lost its way and under an inexperienced commander, proceeded with a small point almost directly ahead of the marching column. The company commander at the head of the point met a small group of Orientals whom he took to be Chinese and who greeted him affably. The strangers then suggested he and his party lay aside their guns. At this point the commander realized that he had been ambushed and gave the alarm. The Japanese machine guns opened on his trapped column, inflicting heavy casualties. Some of his men made their way back to the Allied lines, but the company was never reconstituted and was broken up and distributed among the rest of Galahad. For his constant gallantry during a stubborn eight-hour rear-guard action, which permitted the survivors to extricate themselves from ambush, Private first class. Anthony Firenze of New Galahad received the Distinguished Service Cross. Wessels then planning to launch a set-piece attack to capture a stretch of the Sumprabum Road. 

Over in the Yunnan front, Colonel Matsui’s 113th Regiment had successfully relieved the pressure from Longling by mid-June. General Matsuyama further ordered him to maintain the offensive while he continued to reorganize his forces. Though Matsui managed to seize the Tiechanghe pass on June 21st, most of his attacks would end up in nothing. In the north, the 20th Army Group launched simultaneous attacks against Qianshuang and Gudong on June 18th. This finally forcing the Japanese to retreat in disorder towards Tengchong by June 22nd. With the fall of Qianshuang, the Japanese had been forced to abandon the upper Shweli valley, and were now moving in some disorder toward Tengchong over three excellent trails. In Qianshuang, they left behind large quantities of ammunition and a few pieces of artillery, suggesting a disorganized withdrawal. 150 dead Japanese were found in Qianshuang itself; more than 300 Chinese gave their lives for the village. South of Qianshuang, the Japanese hastily destroyed their pontoon bridge to slow the Chinese pursuit. On reaching the Qianshuang-Baifen-Gudong line, the 20th Army Group had wrested 4000 square miles from Japanese control in forty days of fighting. The advance had been made over the precipitous ranges of the Kaolikung Mountains in an almost constant rain, a downpour sometimes heavy, sometimes light, rarely abating, and always turning to fog and sleet in the higher altitudes. More than 150 coolie supply porters fell to their deaths from the narrow, slippery trails that snaked precariously over the mountains.

On June 25th General Wei received a personal order from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek to take Teng-chung. A few days later, th 20th Group Army, though delayed by the need to rebuild bridges over each of the swift mountain streams that crossed its advance, had pressed the Japanese rear guards back to the hills that surrounded Teng-chung at a distance of two to three miles from the formidable walled town itself. Meanwhile, the Fourteenth Air Force was trying to soften Teng-chung by daily attacks with bombs and machine-gun fire. The outer defenses of Teng-chung were pillboxes covering every avenue of approach, supported and covered by the 6,500-foot-high, fortified mountain peak of Lai-feng Shan, "The Place Where the Birds Come." Here were 600 or more Japanese with most of the garrison's artillery. Teng-chung itself was girdled by a massive wall of earth that in some places was forty feet high and sixty feet thick at the base, faced throughout with great slabs of stone. Chinese necromancers had carefully laid out the wall in a great square to cut the cardinal points of the compass. Each side had a gate, and each gate now had a Japanese command post, while Japanese machine guns and rifles swept the approaches to the wall, its face, and its parapets. Within the city were about 2,000 Japanese. In all, Colonel Kurashige, who had defended the Kaoli-kung mountains, had about 1,850 Japanese, a heavily reinforced battalion combat team built around the 2nd, 148th regiment. Kurashige's orders were to hold Teng-chung until the Chinese threat to Lung-ling passed

Over at Longling, Matsui saw the arrival of some reinforcements on June 22nd that would allow him to continue his counteroffensive. Making repeated night and day attacks, the Japanese would be able to penetrate the enemy positions on June 24. Matsuyama then directed him to exploit towards Bengmiao and Huangcaobacum; yet a heavy raid by 24 B-25s and the arrival of the 1st Division would manage to halt the Japanese attempt to exploit their success, with Mitsui only securing the area northwest of Bengmiao by July 1st. The next day, Matsuyama then suspended the counteroffensive because of heavy casualties and he could see the enemy were strengthening their positions. In the meantime, Major Kanemitsu’s Lameng Garrison was successfully holding off against a siege by three divisions since June 4th, though the Chinese would only launch unsuccessful attacks in regimental strength during this period; and to the southeast, the Pingda Garrison was also successfully repelling the small enemy attacks against them in spite of being cut off and disease-ridden. That is all for the Burma front today as we now need to head over to the Biak front.

After the arrival of two battalions of the163rd Regiment for reinforcements, General Fuller planed a two-pronged attack against Mokmer Drome, with the 186th Regiment advancing west over the inland plateau while the 162nd Regiment resumed its attack west along the coast. On the morning of June 1, in preparation for the offensive, Colonel Newman’s 3rd Battalion therefore left Bosnek and marched north over the coastal ridge, with the 2nd Battalion also moving from Opiaref to join them. By 11:00, both battalions successfully set up defensive perimeters; yet their preparations would be interrupted abruptly in the afternoon as Colonel Kuzume directed his 1st Battalion to attack the positions held by Company K. These Japanese, who were supported by machine guns and mortars emplaced northwest of the trail crossing, continued attacks until 5:00, when a platoon of Company K, by a flanking movement, forced their withdrawal northward. Company K and two platoons of the Antitank Company remained at the trail crossing for the night. Company I was moved forward to K's left and left rear, and Company L extended K's perimeter east along the main road toward the surveyed drome. Battalion headquarters and Company M stayed near the strip's western end. The 121st Field Artillery Battalion, the Cannon Company, the 2nd Battalion, regimental headquarters, the attached engineers, and the tanks remained near the center of the airfield.

 

Thankfully, the Americans would manage to repel the assaults and would ultimately force a Japanese withdrawal via a bold enveloping maneuver. But the Japanese would return after midnight. The first part of the night passed without incident, but at 3:30 the entire area held by the 3rd Battalion, 186th Infantry, flamed into action. About a company and a half of the 1st Battalion, 222nd Infantry, moved from the south against the semicircular perimeter held by Companies I, K, and L, having outflanked the 3rd Battalion on the west. Simultaneously, other elements of the 1st Battalion attacked from the northwest, attempting to drive a wedge between Companies L and K. Under the support of mortar and machine gun fire from both the northwest and southwest, the encircled Japanese desperately tried to fight their way north. Four hours of confused hand-to-hand fighting, marked by the use of bayonets, machetes, and grenades, ensued. At daylight a count revealed that 86 dead Japanese were within and around the 3rd Battalion's perimeter. The dead included the commander of the 1st Battalion, 222nd Infantry. Losses to the American unit were 3 men killed and 8 wounded. 

After dealing with the threat, Newman resumed the westward advance at 9:00 on June 2nd. The 1st and 3rd Battalions, supported by five tanks and an antitank platoon, were to advance abreast, while the 2nd protected the right flank by patrolling north of the main road. The 121st Field Artillery Battalion was to provide continuous close support and was to displace forward with the infantry. Neither artillery nor air bombardment seems to have been provided for or delivered prior to the attack. However, both the 121st and 146th Field Artillery Battalions were registered on targets north and west of the 186th Infantry. Air support was available from Wakde Island upon call.

The 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry broke camp at its beach defense area at 8:00 on June 2nd and moved north over the ridge to join the rest of the regiment. The 1st Battalion, 222nd Infantry, had made no serious attempt to stop the 186th Infantry's progress westward because the inland plateau was nearly indefensible and because the battalion would have been decimated in battle with the superior strength of the reinforced American regiment. The 1st Battalion was withdrawn from the surveyed drome area, initially in preparation for counterattack against the Bosnek beachhead. While no such counteroffensive was mounted, the withdrawal of the 1st Battalion at least had the advantage of keeping the unit intact. The American advance would thus be opposed by the 10th Company, 222nd Regiment; the 3rd Company, 36th Division Sea Transportation Unit and some other naval and engineer units.  The 1st and 3rd Battalions then advanced with two companies abreast against scattered but determined opposition from elements of the 1st Battalion, 222nd Infantry. Small enemy patrols aimed machine gun and rifle fire at the advancing American units and held their positions until killed or dispersed by tank or artillery fire. Most of the enemy parties were located on the north flank and apparently many of them had been driven westward out of the cave and garden area north of the surveyed drome by fire from the 121st Field Artillery Battalion, which destroyed Biak Detachment headquarters installations in that area. By nightfall the 186th Infantry had killed 96 Japanese and had itself lost 6 men killed and 10 wounded. The unit halted shortly after 1600 and began digging in at a point about 600 yards northeast of the day's objective. The advance had carried the regiment west until it was almost abreast and north of the 162nd Infantry, at the Ibdi Pocket. The latter had attempted to move west along the coast during the day, but it would be unable to dislodge the Japanese from the Ibdi Pocket, ultimately having to attach its 2nd Battalion to the 186th. 

The addition of the 2nd Battalion, 162nd Regiment to the 186th Regiment helped to complicate the supply problems of the troops on the plateau. No water had yet been found inland. Heat and humidity were intense, and thick scrub growth, about 12 feet high, stopped any breezes. Despite the best efforts of Company B, 116th Engineers, the supply road could not be repaired fast enough to keep pace with the advancing infantrymen. Water had to be brought around from Bosnek via Opiaref to the forward units, and there were not enough water trailers nor 5-gallon cans available to supply all the water needed. At night each man received only one canteen of water for the next day, an inadequate amount under the conditions which prevailed inland. The water situation and the necessity for hauling all other supplies north through Opiaref did more to delay the 186th Regiment’s progress westward than did the opposition of the 1st Battalion, 222nd Regiment.

Meanwhile Kuzume’s only support so far had been some air raids carried out by the depleted 23rd Air Flotilla and 7th Air Division. By late May, the 23rd Air Flotilla had only twelve fighters and six medium bombers at Sorong and the 7th Air Division had four large bombers, 20 medium bombers and three fighters. Both units threw what strength they could muster into attacks on the enemy landing force. On May 27th four Army heavy bombers and nine Navy fighters carried out a daylight attack against fierce air opposition, all but four fighters failing to return. Kuzume would need more than that to launch a determined attack that would succeed in pushing the enemy back into the sea. Consequently, on May 29th, General Numata and Admiral Senda had requested the immediate commitment of fleet and air strength into the Biak battle. They both relayed this message “The enemy apparently found the difficulty of rapid occupation of the airfield sector. The enemy will change, in all probability, its policy to occupy the whole island of Biak after the arrival of reinforcements, securing its present positions with landed units for a while. The officers and men on Biak Island are firm in their resolution to crush the enemy. However, our operations are severely restricted by the uncontested superiority of the enemy's feet and air units. The Biak Detachment, which is making every effort in destroying the confronting enemy, request for further support by the army and navy units concerned. We believe that the immediate commitment of our air forces and, if possible, some fleet units would give us a splendid opportunity to turn the tide of battle in the whole Pacific area in our favor.“ This finally convinced Admiral Toyoda to send reinforcements to the island. 

To counter the Allied advance to Biak, the IJN dispatched from one third of its available naval land-based air strength from the Central Pacific to reinforce the 23rd Air Flotilla in western New Guinea. On May 28th 70 carrier-type fighters, 4 reconnaissance bombers, and 16 medium bombers were dispatched to western New Guinea. Another group of planes, comprising 48 fighters, 8 reconnaissance aircraft, and 20 bombers, were sent to western New Guinea and Halmahera from the Carolines on or about May 31st. On 29-30th May the flotilla carried out fresh attacks on the Biak landing force. On May 29th, sixteen medium bombers attacked the enemy fleet in the sea near BIAK Island before daybreak of that day, yet none of them returned. Furthermore, in a daylight attack on the same day, four Zero fighters strafed BIAK Island. None of them returned to the base either. On May 30th, the unit of the Zero fighters of the Navy again fired upon enemy ships in the sea off Mokmer. The damage on the enemy ships was not confirmed. However, the unit reported that they fought four P-38s and four B-25s of the enemy and shot down two B-25s above BIAK Island.

Also as part of Operation KON, a huge task force under Admiral Sakonju, which included the battleship Fuso, four cruisers and eight destroyers, was to transport Major-General Tamada Yoshio’s 2nd Amphibious Brigade towards Biak. Additionally, it was decided to move three infantry companies of the 35th Division from Sorong to Biak by barge. Sakonju’s convoy finally left Davao on the night of June 2nd.

In connection with KON Force's advance, the Japanese had planned heavy air strikes against Biak which were to be carried out by the recently reinforced 23rd Air Flotilla and the few army aircraft which remained at bases within range of Biak. Between 1645 and 1700 on 2 June, from eleven to fifteen Japanese planes bombed Allied positions on Biak, causing a few casualties and some light damage. Seven of these planes were shot down by shore-based anti-aircraft weapons, while guns aboard Seventh Fleet ships lying off Bosnek accounted for at least one more. Later during the same night, a few more enemy planes dropped some bombs harmlessly on and near Owi Island. Still more approached Biak during the night, causing many red alerts but not dropping any bombs. The next night, that of 3-4 June, no Japanese planes attacked Biak, although an unknown number bombed Owi Island without causing any damage or casualties. Again, however, enemy aircraft flew many reconnaissance flights around Biak, causing an almost continuous red alert until the early morning hours of 4 June.

Early on the morning of June 3rd, at a point just east of the Talaud Islands, between Mindanao and Morotai, a 7th Fleet submarine sighted the Transport and 1st Screening Units and was in turn sighted by ships of the latter organization. Alongside this 7th Fleet PB4Y's, operating from Wakde Island, kept the Japanese vessels under surveillance the rest of the day, reporting that the course and speed of the enemy ships could bring them into range of Biak during the evening of June 4th. Their discovery by Allied aircraft so far from Biak apparently had not been anticipated by the Japanese, who later reported that they had not known Allied aircraft were capable of such long-range reconnaissance. Nevertheless, the three KON Force elements steamed on toward Biak, probably hoping that friendly aircraft might drive off the Allied reconnaissance planes and also protect the sea approaches to Biak.

To further muddy the situation, Sakonju received false reports that a strong American carrier group was approaching the waters east of Biak. Admiral Kinkaid had indeed dispatched a special task force to deal with this threat, yet the warships could only arrive off Biak on the night of June 4th and didn’t include any aircraft carrier. Nonetheless, knowing that he had been discovered and unwilling to risk so many ships under these circumstances, Sakonju would have to suspend the reinforcement run and turn back to Davao and Sorong.  

When the Japanese called off KON on June 3rd, the Transport and the 1st and 2nd Screening Units were a little over 500 miles northwest of Biak and about 250 miles east-southeast of the Talaud Islands. At this point, the three forces were reorganized. The Transport Unit, accompanied by the three destroyers of the 1st Screening Unit, changed course for Sorong, while the 2nd Screening Unit and the two heavy cruisers of the 1st turned back toward Davao, which they probably reached late on June 5th. Of the ships moving to Sorong, the Fifth Air Force claimed to have sunk one destroyer and damaged at least two others. The Transport Unit and the 1st Screening Unit's three destroyers arrived safely at Sorong during the evening of June 4th. The Detached Unit, which had been moving toward Biak from Zamboanga on an independent course far to the west of the other three sections of KON Force, had also changed its direction during the night of 3-4 June, and reached Sorong sometime on the 4th. At Sorong the Transport Unit unloaded the 1,700 men of the 2nd Amphibious Brigade. The six destroyers of the Transport and 1st Screening Units then proceeded southwest to Ambon where they refueled. The Transport Unit's one heavy cruiser and one light cruiser sought shelter in Kaboei Bay, Waigeo Island, about 60 miles northwest of Sorong. On 6 June the heavy cruiser Aoba was attacked there by fifteen B-24's of the Fifth Air Force. First reports were that at least two hits were scored on the cruiser, but it was later learned that the ship suffered no damage. Instead, it was able to take part in a second KON Operation.

Back over at Biak, Newman resumed the advance westward on the morning of June 3rd, making painfully slow progress because of the difficult terrain and lack of adequate supply lines. Meeting no opposition, they would finally dig in half a mile from the point at which the main ridge left the coast and turned inland near Mokmer. That day, however, Fuller learnt about the possible enemy naval attack, so he decided to halt any offensive actions for the moment. On June 4th, upon learning that no enemy carriers were in the Biak area, Sakonju was again ordered to prepare to run the American blockade, this time bringing the bulk of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 219th Regiment. There would be two naval groups, the first was the Transport Unit, containing three destroyers which had been part of the first KON Operation Transport Unit. The second section was the Screening Unit, also comprising three destroyers. For the second KON Operation there were two detached units, the 1st had one heavy and one light cruiser while the 2nd Detached Unit included the small craft and patrol boats which had put into Sorong at the end of the first KON. The three destroyers of the Transport Unit were each to embark 200 infantrymen at Sorong. In addition, the destroyers of either or both the Transport and Screening Units were each to tow to Biak one landing barge crammed with troops, probably 30 to 50 men to a barge.

After two quiet nights, meanwhile, Newman decided to send three battalions forward toward the north-south section of the main ridge northwest of Mokmer on June 5th. Warned by the regimental commander that it was important to secure a foothold on the ridge before the Japanese could deny it to the 186th Infantry, the three assault battalions started westward about 8:00 on June 5th. Lack of water again slowed the advance. No water had been received in the forward area since the morning of the 4th, and Colonel Newman had ordered the troops westward against the advice of his staff and battalion commanders. About noon, however, a heavy rain fell. The regimental commander ordered all troops to halt, catch the rain in ponchos, and fill their canteens. "Had it not been for this lucky break, we would undoubtedly have had to halt in midafternoon." As events turned out, no Japanese opposition was encountered, and by 1500 the 3rd Battalion, 186th Infantry, was within 500 yards of the main ridge. Although Newman and General Doe then wanted to secure the dominating terrain north and northwest of the airfield, they would receive direct orders from Fuller to immediately seize Mokmer Drome and a beachhead on the coast directly south of that strip. Throughout the morning of June 6th the 186th Infantry directed most of its efforts to bringing supplies up to the forward units. Almost the entire 2nd Battalion was engaged in hand-carrying supplies to the 3rd Battalion atop the ridge, while the latter unit sent patrols toward Mokmer Drome seeking good routes of approach to that objective. About noon Colonel Newman reported to task force headquarters that no good route had been found and that supplies, especially the ever-needed water, had not been brought forward in sufficient quantities to allow a regimental attack to be launched that day, and he therefore recommended that the attack be postponed until June 7th. General Fuller approved this suggestion. The lack of supplies and water would delay the attack, however, though the 3rd Battalion would be able to move down the west side of the main ridge to take up positions along a line of departure for the next morning's attack.

To support the infantry attack, on June 7th, a thirty-minute artillery concentration began at 7:00 that morning. The 146th, 205th, and 947th Field Artillery Battalions, from positions along the coast to the east, were registered on targets in the airfield area ready to support the advance, but most of the firing was undertaken by the 121st Field Artillery from its location behind the 186th Infantry. While the artillery fired on Mokmer Drome and along the low ridge between that field and the 186th Infantry, Fifth Air Force bombers attacked the Borokoe Drome area and also struck some targets along the low ridge. The airfield was only occupied by the 108th Airfield Construction Unit, which immediately fled the area because of the heavy bombardment. Newman’s 1st and 3rd Battalions advanced south encountering no resistance as they crossed Mokmer Drome and reached the beach. 

When, on 5 June, the 186th Infantry had reached the crest of the main coastal ridge, it had been on the left rear of the Japanese defenses on the low ridge and terraces above Mokmer Drome. Thus, the regiment had been in a favorable position to take these defenses from the rear. But in its move to the airfield, the 186th Infantry had bypassed the Biak Detachment's principal defensive positions. The bypassing had not been intentional. Colonel Newman had instructed both leading battalions to halt on the low ridge, reconnoiter along it in both directions, and report on Japanese defenses before moving on. According to Colonel Newman: "I received a negative report from both battalions, and ordered the movement to the airdrome. Evidently, the right battalion had failed in this patrolling effort."

Instead, the 186th had captured its main objective, but now found itself surrounded by Kuzume’s strongest defenses. The Japanese immediately began to pound the new American perimeter, with an artillery duel soon erupting. By nightfall, it had become impracticable to supply the 186th Regiment over the inland plateau road, which ended on the east side of the main ridge. From that point, all supplies would have to be hand-carried to Mokmer Drome and supply parties would be endangered by Japanese patrols, a few of which moved in behind the 186th as the regiment reached the beach, so the 3rd Battalion, 163rd Regiment would be dispatched to push over the inland plateau and protect the parties. Overwater supply was also attempted, yet as the first boats approached the shore they were greeted by machine gun and rifle fire from Japanese whom the 186th Infantry had not yet cleaned out of caves along the water line in front of Mokmer Drome. The small craft returned the fire, but were finally forced to withdraw. The 186th Infantry, according to Colonel Newman, was "glad to see them withdraw since they had our troops running for cover." At 2:00 another attempt was made to land supplies at Sboeria. The three LCM's managed to put their tanks ashore in the face of continuing Japanese fire, but accompanying LCT's were driven off by Japanese artillery. Two of the LCM's were so damaged by enemy fire that they could not fully retract their ramps and had to proceed the nine and a half miles back to Bosnek in reverse. Plans were made to effect all delivery of supplies and evacuation of casualties at night until the enemy fire on the Sboeria beachhead could be neutralized. The tanks which had been landed lumbered along the shore road fronting Mokmer Drome, destroying several small bunkers along the beach. Then they wheeled toward the low ridge north of the airfield, taking under fire a Japanese 75-mm. mountain gun and a 20-mm. piece which had opposed their landing. These two weapons were silenced. Moving cautiously northwestward from the field along a road which crossed the low ridge, the tanks destroyed two large pillboxes. Alongside this, Fuller sent two companies of Haney’s 3rd Battalion to land on the Parai Jetty in order to outflank the Ibdi Pocket, which the 162nd had been unsuccessfully attempting to dislodge since the start of the month. But June 7th would also see the start of Operation KON’s second attempt. 

After rendezvousing off Misoöl Island that morning, Sakonju instructed his 8 destroyers to proceed to Biak. Air cover was to have been provided by planes of the 23rd Air Flotilla. But the cape area was being patrolled by Allied aircraft on June 8th and, about 1:30, the 23rd Air Flotilla cover of six planes was shot down or driven away by 5th Air Force P-38's. 

Finding the air now free of enemy planes, American B-25's dived to the attack th convoy, reporting the convoy as 2 light cruisers and 4 destroyers. Initially, it was claimed that 1 destroyer was sunk, 2 were left sinking, and the fourth was damaged. A few days later, destruction was reassessed as 4 destroyers sunk and 2 light cruisers chased to the northwest. These claims were exaggerated. One destroyer, the Harusame, was holed by a near miss and sank rapidly, the bulk of its crew being saved. Another destroyer was damaged by a bomb and took some water; two others were slightly damaged by strafing. Neither speed nor navigation was impeded for any of the three. The two light cruisers reported by the Allied planes were, of course, the other two destroyers. These two might have taken some evasive action by heading northwest for a short time, but as soon as the Harusame crew had been rescued and the Allied planes had disappeared, the convoy reformed and continued on toward Biak.

The convoy reformed and continued on toward Biak, undeterred by reports of strong enemy elements in the area. By nightfall, however, it was on a collision course with the cruisers of Admirals Crutchley and Berkey.  At about 6:00 on the 8th, the Transport and Screening Units received a report from a Japanese aircraft that an Allied naval force comprising 1 battleship, 4 cruisers, and 8 destroyers was moving west at high speed from an undesignated point east of Biak. This report was at least partially correct. The Allied task force which had been formed on June 3rd had again assembled on the 8th, having been alerted by reports of the air-sea battle off the Kaap de Goede Hoop. But the Japanese convoy commander apparently took this air reconnaissance report with at least one grain of salt--had not similar information received on June 3rd proved inaccurate? The Transport and Screening Units steamed on, despite the fact that the Kaap de Goede Hoop action had put the force behind schedule. At 11:30 the two enemy groups were approximately forty miles off the north coast of Soepiori Island, ready to turn southeast toward Korim Bay, on the northeast side of Biak. Minutes later a destroyer in the van sighted the Allied task force heading northwest around Biak. The convoy commander quickly realized that he was badly outnumbered and decided that discretion was called for. The Japanese convoy slipping towards the Mapia islands, seeing the allied destroyers failing to pursue them. Yet that is it for Biak for now as we now need to head over to the Wakde-Sarmi front.

 

General Sibert was preparing to resume the westward offensive. By June 14th, the 20th Regiment had relieved the 158th at the Tirfoam River; and although Sibert wanted to complete unloading of his remaining units before sending the 20th to push westward, General Krueger ordered him to start an immediate offensive on June 18th. Now, however, they were up against almost the full strength of General Tagami’s 36th Division. Company B pushed on toward the village at the entrance to the defile between Lone Tree Hill and the eastern nose of Mt. Saksin. This advance was greeted by a hail of fire from Japanese automatic weapons emplaced in the defile--fire reminiscent of the opposition encountered by Company B, 158th Infantry, at the same place more than three weeks earlier. The 20th Infantry's Company B tried to outflank the enemy position to the south but was halted by intense Japanese machine gun fire. Tanks sent forward to aid the infantry were unable to reach the enemy guns because the terrain was impassable to tracked or wheeled vehicles, which could scarcely negotiate the rough road, let alone the thick jungle and rising ground to the south. Late in the afternoon Company A was sent forward to Company B's position, but both units encountered heavy fire and soon lost contact with the rest of the 1st Battalion. The two companies remained for the night in an isolated perimeter near the village and about 400 yards west of the main body. The 3rd Battalion had moved north off the coastal road during the morning, and late in the afternoon it had established a perimeter extending south 200 yards from the beach along the east bank of the Snaky River. The battalion had encountered little opposition during the day, but patrols which had crossed the Snaky before dark reported finding many Japanese defensive positions on the eastern slopes of Lone Tree Hill. A gap which existed between the 1st and 3rd Battalions was partially filled just before nightfall by elements of the 2nd Battalion, which were sent forward late in the afternoon. Casualties during the day were four killed and twenty-eight wounded. The 1st and 3rd Battalions, 1st Infantry, moved across the Tor River in the morning of June 20th and took over the positions in the vicinity of Maffin No. 1 vacated by the 20th Infantry. The 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry, assumed responsibility for the protection of the bridgehead across the Tor. 

The following morning, Sibert then directed his units to patrol extensively in order to locate enemy strong points on and around the hill. Thanks to the information gathered, the 3rd Battalion would attack towards Rocky Point in the afternoon. At the top of Lone Tree Hill was a stretch of rough but generally level ground lying mostly along the western part of the hill. This flat ground, about 700 yards long north to south, was shaped like a crude dumbbell. At its northern end, the level area was about 300 yards wide. It narrowed at the center of the hill to less than 100 yards but broadened again on the south to a width of about 250 yards. There were many coral outcroppings, potholes, and small crevices, while on the north the hill terminated in a very rugged prominence called Rocky Point. This terrain feature, which extended into Maffin Bay from the central mass of Lone Tree Hill, was about 300 yards wide east to west. Its northern face was not as heavily overgrown as the rest of Lone Tree Hill. Although Rocky Point's northeast slope was steep, foot troops could climb that face with more ease than they could approach the top of Lone Tree Hill from most other points. A deep ravine ran southwest into the central mass of Lone Tree Hill from a sandy beach on the east side of Rocky Point. The floor of the ravine varied from 20 to 30 yards in width and its nearly vertical western wall was 40 to 50 feet high. Both sides were honeycombed with natural or man-made tunnels, caverns, and small caves, most of which were connected with each other by underground or deeply defiladed passages. Some caves reached a width of 40 feet, a depth into the hillside of 50 feet, and a height of 20 feet. The ravine terminated on the eastern slope of Lone Tree Hill in a steep grade at the narrow central portion of the hilltop.

At 1:45pm, after a fifteen-minute artillery and 4.2-inch mortar preparation, one company moved across the Snaky River, immediately finding the twenty-foot cliff along the eastern side of the shelf which lay between the Snaky River and the central mass of Lone Tree Hill. The morning patrols had not, apparently, reported the existence of this cliff, and naturally it was not known that Japanese defenses were established along it. Machine gun and rifle fire from the 1st Battalion, 224th Infantry, soon pinned down the 3rd Battalion's leading platoon. The company commander quickly sent part of his unit northward to find the Japanese left flank. Moving around the northeast end of the shelf, this group discovered the beach entrance to the deep ravine between the western side of the shelf and Rocky Point. Progress into or across the ravine was impossible in the face of the intense Japanese small arms fire which greeted the advancing American unit. Company B, 6th Engineers, then in the forward area to cut a road from the mouth of the Snaky River to Rocky Point, was brought up to the ravine to help clean out caves and crevices with flame throwers and demolitions, but could not reach the enemy positions through the continued machine gun, mortar, and rifle fire. Infantry bazooka squads also tried to blast the Japanese out of their caves but failed when their ammunition ran out. Since there was no time to bring additional rockets forward before dark, all elements of the 3rd Battalion and the engineer company were withdrawn to the east bank of the Snaky River for the night. The 20th Infantry was to continue the assault on the morrow with the 3rd Battalion moving against Lone Tree Hill from the northeast, the 2nd Battalion in reserve, and the 1st Battalion remaining in its holding position.

On the morning of June 22, after a heavy air and artillery concentration on Rocky Point, the 3rd Battalion once again attacked northwest with Companies K and I, successfully driving the Japanese back into their caves to reach the top of Lone Tree Hill just south of Rocky Point. Meanwhile, another two companies had attacked southwest to force their way up the southeast slope of the hill; but subjected to heavy machine-gun fire, they would have to withdraw and march north to join Companies K and I. The 2nd Battalion also moved forward and took positions to the south of the 3rd Battalion. Worried about the American gains, Colonel Matsuyama personally led two companies in the afternoon to fall on the 3rd Battalion’s perimeter with suicidal fury. Confused fighting, sometimes hand-to-hand, continued well into the night, with Matsuyama himself getting shot on the thigh. Yet this attack would successfully position the Japanese companies on the rear of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, thus cutting them off from regimental headquarters. Matsuyama also recalled his 2nd Battalion from the Maffin area, so he would employ these reinforcements to attack Sibert’s 2nd Battalion on June 23. At dawn on the 23rd Japanese troops, some of whom were using American weapons and wearing parts of American uniforms, attacked the 2nd Battalion, 20th Infantry, from the deep ravine. The battalion initially held its fire, thinking that the enemy force might be a friendly patrol, and the Japanese were able to advance to within fifteen yards of the battalion lines before being recognized. It was an hour before the results of this error could be corrected--an hour during which both the 2nd Battalion and the Japanese suffered heavy losses. The hour ended with an enemy retreat.

Isolated, the 2nd Battalion then decided to withdraw and march north towards the 3rd Battalion’s perimeter at the top of the hill, getting harassed all the way by Matsuyama’s forces. During the night, the Japanese launched a banzai charge against the perimeter, getting very close to retaking Lone Tree Hill but suffering heavy casualties in the end. Upon learning that his battalions were cut off, meanwhile, Sibert decided to outflank the hill by a shore-to-shore maneuver and then continue the attack from both west and east. Accordingly, Companies K and I of the 1st Regiment boarded ten LVTs on the morning of June 24th and moved to the beach just west of Rocky Point, under the protection of the 6th Reconnaissance Troop. Both companies would land successfully by midday against strong Japanese fire, though they would be rapidly pinned down on the narrow beach. Thankfully, Sibert also landed four tanks two hours later to secure the beachhead. This diversion would allow the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 20th Regiment to begin clearing the Japanese from the many caves and crevices on Rocky Point, the deep ravine east of the point, and the hilltop plateau, further securing the supply route up the hill. 

By nightfall, no enemy counterattack developed, as Tagami had instead decided to withdraw the 224th Regiment to the Hill 255-Mount Saksin line while the 223rd Regiment retreated behind the Woske River. Thus Matsuyama’s resistance in the area weakened and the Americans were finally able to clear Rocky Point. The next day the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 20th Infantry, continued clearing Rocky Point, the deep ravine, the northern part of the hilltop plateau, and the eastern shelf, where a few scattered Japanese still held positions along the twenty-foot-high cliff. Flame throwers, demolition charges, bazookas, and hand grenades all proved successful in eliminating Japanese resistance and sealing or clearing caves and crevices. The task was easier on the 25th, for the Japanese slowly gave up the fight and were killed or sealed off in their caves. Casualties continued to mount, the 2nd Battalion, 20th Infantry, had only about two hundred effectives by the end of the day but many of the losses were not due to Japanese action. Many men were evacuated over the now secured supply route to the top of the hill as they fell from exhaustion or became sick. On the beach west of Rocky Point Companies I and K, 1st Infantry, had little success in expanding their beachhead. The tanks proved useless in the area and were therefore withdrawn to Maffin No. 1. The two infantry companies, pinned down during the morning, kept up a continuous mortar barrage against Japanese positions in the swamp to the south, against the western cliff of Lone Tree Hill, and, when certain such fire would not endanger troops atop the hill, against the northwest corner of Rocky Point. This mortar fire, coupled with the operations on the plateau, began to have the desired effect during the afternoon, and Companies I and K were able to push their defenses beyond the narrow beachhead slightly southward and westward and toward the shore beneath Rocky Point. Once or twice during the afternoon, patrols were able to reach the top of Lone Tree Hill from the northwest corner of the point and established contact with 20th Infantry units. Late in the afternoon Company M, 1st Infantry, operating from the east side of the point, managed to push a patrol around the shore to establish contact with Company K. Though Companies I and K could find little tangible evidence of the results of their operations, they had actually wiped out the 223rd Infantry's defense force in the area just west of Lone Tree Hill. By dusk on the 25th, it had become obvious that the combined efforts of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Infantry, and the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 20th Infantry, had either cleared out the northern half of Lone Tree Hill or had forced the Japanese to withdraw. The latter conclusion was the more nearly correct. The 36th Division decided on 25 June to withdraw the bulk of the Center and Right Sector Forces west of the Woske River and establish new defensive positions, thereby keeping the 223rd Infantry, the bulk of which had not been committed to action in the Lone Tree Hill area, more or less intact. Only the remnants of the 224th Infantry were to remain east of the Woske, and they were to withdraw into rough terrain southwest of Mt. Saksin. At nightfall on the 25th, General Sibert estimated that his three forward battalions had lost approximately 140 men killed and 850 wounded and evacuated, including those who had to be sent back to the rear because of wounds, sickness, heat exhaustion, or psychoneurotic disorders. Known Japanese dead in the northern part of the hill numbered 344, but it could not be estimated how many more had been thrown over the west cliff, sealed in caves, or carried off by withdrawing remnants of the Japanese defense force. According to Japanese sources, the Japanese had lost about 500 men killed and another 300 wounded in the Lone Tree Hill-Hill 225-Mt. Saksin area.

 

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

The Chinese were accredited with the fall of Moguang despite the Chindits taking the lionshare of the fighting. Things were advancing very well for the allies in the new Biak front. As for the battle for Lone Tree Hill, it was a costly one, and not one the Americans or Japanese would soon forget. 

 

- 132 - Pacific War - Landing against Biak, May 28 - June 4, 1944

Last time we spoke about the Siege of Myitkyina. General Vinegar Joe made huge gains in northern Burma. Myitkyina’s airstrip was taken, now the main town was under siege. The Japanese resistance around Kamaing was greatly reduced. However setbacks were also seen, such as the Chindits abandonment of the Blackpool stronghold, prompting Stiwell to toss a new attack at Mogaung. Likewise American officers embedded with the Chinese units were sending reports of how the Chinese were suffering very heavy casualties and utilizing far too much ammunition for their objectives. Regardless, it seemed the Ledo Road to China was going to pan out. Calvert chose a new stronghold location, this time at Lakum, where his Chindits faced heavy resistance. Over on New Guinea, the allies were advancing west of their new beachheads to assault Lone Tree Hill. Soon assaults against Arare and Biak would also be made.

This episode is the Landing against Biak

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

In the last episode, plans were made for an amphibious assault against Biak, yet there were some hiccups. The Hurricane Task Force staged at Humboldt Bay, were facing issues with terrain. Terrain considerations forced most of the task force to assemble on the southern of the two sand spits dividing Humboldt and Jautefa Bays. On this spit the beach had a steep slope which made it impossible for more than a very few LST's to be held against the shore line long enough to load bulk stores. The LST's had to beach on the northern spit, where clearing and salvage after the fires and explosions which had ravaged that beach during the early phases of the Hollandia operation had not been completed. In addition, the northern spit was being used to unload supplies destined to be used at Hollandia, to load supplies being sent to the Tornado Task Force at Wakde-Sarmi, and to unload cargo for the Hurricane Task Force. No road connected the northern and southern sandspits. Consequently, most of the supplies and equipment, as well as many of the troops, had to be transported by water from the southern to the northern loading area. There were only a few LCT's available for this work and only by working twenty-four hours a day, were all the troops and supplies transported to the loading beach in time for departure on the 25th. 

Finally, General Fuller’s task force would depart the bay on the evening of May 25th, covered by Admiral Fectheler’s cruisers and destroyers. Taking the most direct route, the convoy would be able to arrive off Biak on the morning of May 27th. At the time, Biak was held by the Biak Detachment, under Colonel Kuzume Naoyoki. It consisted of the 222nd Regiment; the 19th Guard Unit; and some rear echelon, service, and construction units. There were 10000 IJA personnel, 4000 were combat troops in total and 2000 IJN personnel, 125 were combat troops in total. In view of the intense enemy concentration on the Sorido-Mokmer airfield sector, Colonel Kuzume decided on May 22nd to shift the operational center of gravity of the detachment to the west. The 1st Battalion, 222nd Infantry, was relieved of its mission in the sector east of Opiaref and sent to replace the naval garrison unit in the Bosnek sector. The naval troops were, in turn, shifted westward into the Sorido airfield sector, while the tank company was brought over from Arfak Saba and assembled in the area northwest of Mokmer airfield. Although most of the Japanese efforts had been directed to the construction of airfields, Kuzume had ably managed to build a system of strong cave positions. 

In this amphitheater-like terrain and along the low ridge, both of which were covered with thick growth, the Biak Detachment emplaced many field artillery and antiaircraft weapons. There were also many automatic weapons and a few mortars. All these weapons were located within range of Mokmer Drome and most of them could also fire on Borokoe Drome. The key to Colonel Kuzume's defenses in this area was the West Caves area, located about 50 yards north of the low ridge and about 1200 yards north of the western end of Mokmer Drome. The West Caves were actually three large sumps, or depressions in the ground, which were connected by underground tunnels and caverns. The caves were ringed with pillboxes, bunkers, and foxholes, and an extensive system of coral and log emplacements was built along the spur ridge above Mokmer Drome. Biak naval headquarters was originally located in the West Caves, which could shelter 1000 men, and Colonel Kuzume planned to move Biak Detachment headquarters to the caves for the final defense of the airdromes. As long as the West Caves and the positions along the low ridge were occupied by the Japanese, Allied planes could not safely use the airfields.

Chief of Staff of 2nd Area Army, Lieutenant-General Numata Takazo and Rear-Admiral Senda Sadatoshi, Commander of the 28th Special Base Force, with HQ at Manokwari had come to visit the garrison just as the Allies were preparing to invade, with Numata choosing to stay on the island to direct the battle alongside the resourceful Kuzume. Yet all of the Japanese at Biak were about to be caught with their pants down as many of their troops were scattered about the island. The Biak Detachment would not be in their defensive positions on Z Day but were apparently being held mobile. Detachment headquarters, the 1st Battalion of the 222nd Infantry about half of the 19th Naval Guard Unit, and miscellaneous service organizations were all located in a cave and garden area on the inland plateau about 3,000 yards north-northwest of Bosnek. Outposts at Saba and Opiaref were held by the 1st Company, 222nd Infantry, and a platoon of the 2nd Company was stationed along the main ridge behind Bosnek. The bulk of the 2nd Battalion, the rest of the naval guard unit, and some naval antiaircraft organizations were located at the East Caves. Naval headquarters, various naval service units, and the 6th Company, 222nd Infantry, were at the West Caves. Most of the army service units were at Mokmer Drome or disposed along the low ridge north of that field. The bulk of the 3rd Battalion was posted at the west end of the same airfield. One platoon of the 10th Company was at Sorido, guarding the southern terminus of a trail which led north across the island to Korim Bay. The tanks had not yet moved to Saba but were assembled on the terrace north of the eastern end of Mokmer Drome.

On the morning of May 27, Fechteler carried out his naval fire support as planned and General Kenney’s bombers also launched their air bombardment, receiving little answering fire from the surprised Japanese shore installations. Yet there was a westerly current off Biak that would push the transports over 3000 yards to the west, which would complicate the landings. A rocket-equipped LCI, which began firing on the beaches about H minus 4 minutes, led the first LVT wave toward the shore. The LCI fire, consisting of rockets and fire from automatic weapons, continued until H plus 2 minutes, when it was lifted because it began to endanger the troops who were unloading and pushing inland. The first waves of LVTs then formed rapidly and crossed the line of departure; but because of the westerly current and the smoke and dust raised by the preliminary bombardment, they would end up landing on a mangrove swamp almost 3000 yards west of Green Beach 4. Nevertheless, by 7:30, the 2nd Battalion, 186th Regiment had successfully landed and was pushing beyond the swamps to the main coastal road connecting Bosnek and the airfields. Five minutes later, Companies I and K of Colonel Newman’s 186th Regiment also landed about 700 yards east of the 2nd Battalion. Realizing about the westerly current, Fechteler then started to turn succeeding waves eastward to the proper beaches, with the troops coming ashore in disorder for the next thirty minutes. 

With more than half of his regiment already far west of the proper landing beaches, and knowing that the landing had become disorganized and that the rest of the boat waves were being delayed, Colonel Newman asked the task force commander if the 186th Regiment should continue with its original mission or whether it might be feasible to switch missions with the 162nd Regiment and start moving west toward the airfields. General Fuller, the Task Force commander, ordered the 186th Regiment to continue with its original mission. As events turned out, it might have been better had the regiment continued west, and it is possible that a great deal of time might have been saved if the missions had been switched. In the first place, the maps with which the task force was supplied were so inaccurate that both regiments soon came upon terrain features that threw much planning out of gear. Secondly, most of the 186th Regiment had landed so far west that both it and the 162nd consumed much valuable time getting to their proper locations. Finally, an exchange of missions might have been executed without much difficulty, for, in amphibious training, the 41st Division had learned to switch missions when such mistakes were made.

Luckily, the landings would face no opposition, though the confusion would give Kuzume time to prepare his defense. By 8:00, the rest of Newman’s 3rd Battalion had landed to secure the jetties; and by 10:30, Companies I and K arrived to take their position west of Old Jetty. Entangled with the landed artillery and tanks, the 2nd Battalion would only be able to reach the area east of New Jetty by noon, then sending patrols to the north and east to secure the Bosnek perimeter. The face of the coral ridge behind Bosnek was found to be rough and honeycombed with small caves. Companies F and G, aided by elements of the Support Battery, 542nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, sent patrols along the steep slope and to the top of the ridge to investigate many of the caves, most of which proved to be unoccupied, though three Japanese were killed near caves directly north of New Jetty. The companies moved over the first slope to a second ridge line which was parallel to and about seventy-five yards north of the first. Company G started looking for a trail which was thought to lead over the ridges to the plateau north of Bosnek, but it was Company E which, shortly after noon, found the ill-defined track. A few Japanese from the 2nd Company, 222nd Regiment in a pillbox temporarily prevented the two companies from securing the trail, which was not cleared until 2:00 hours, after the pillbox had been destroyed. During the late afternoon, patrols were sent north of the ridges to the area which the Japanese had surveyed for an airdrome. A few Japanese , most of whom fled upon being sighted, were found at the airdrome site, but there were no signs of large organized enemy groups north, northeast, or east of Bosnek insofar as the 186th Infantry could ascertain.

The only enemy action during this day would be an air attack by four Japanese bombers.  A few enemy planes which flew over Biak around noon fled before anti-aircraft guns from ship or shore could be brought to bear. But all anti-aircraft crews were on the alert to expect further Japanese air action late in the afternoon. Because of the difference in time of sunset at the closest Allied and Japanese bases, Japanese aircraft could remain in the Biak area about half an hour after Allied planes had to leave. The expected attacks developed shortly after 4:00, when four Japanese two-engined bombers, accompanied by three or four fighters, approached the beachhead from the north, flying low over the ridge behind Bosnek and thus escaping radar detection. Some excellent targets were ready for the Japanese. Admiral Fechteler had permitted four LST's to tie up side by side at one of the jetties. Although he knew this move to be tactically unsound, he considered it justified because of the importance of the cargo aboard the LST's and because the jetty provided the only good spot for LST beaching. The Japanese bombing was accurate, but the LST's were lucky. None of the Japanese bombs exploded! Though the Japanese planes also bombed and strafed the beaches, none of the bombs dropped ashore exploded, while the strafing runs killed only one man and wounded two others. All four bombers were shot down by ground or ship-based antiaircraft, and the Japanese fighters were driven off by some Allied fighter planes which had remained late in the area. One Japanese bomber crashed into the water, sideswiping an SC which was standing offshore. Two of the ship's crew were killed and nine wounded. The SC had to be towed away for repairs, and a few other naval vessels suffered minor damage from strafing. There was negligible damage to supplies and equipment ashore. Total Allied losses as a result of the air raid were three killed and fourteen wounded, most of them naval personnel. Unloading also progressed satisfactorily, with 12000 men, 12 medium tanks, 29 artillery pieces, about 500 vehicles, and an estimated 3000 tons of bulk cargo being landed by 5:15.

Meanwhile, Colonel Haney’s 162nd Regiment had begun landing shortly after 9:00 and immediately started moving west along the main coastal road towards Biak’s three airdromes. Moving with speed, the 3rd Battalion passed through Ibdi village at 10:30 and then began to traverse the difficult Parai Defile. At 11:15, the regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon discovered an enemy position on the face of the cliff west of Ibdi, that the 162nd Infantry first learned of the existence of the Parai Defile. At 1:00 the 3rd Battalion, with six tanks of the 603rd Tank Company leading the advance, arrived at the eastern entrance to the defile. There was no large Japanese force stationed along the cliff, but the few Japanese had such a tactical advantage over troops moving along the coastal road that they were able to delay the 162nd Infantry's advance for some time. Meanwhile Company E, which had been attempting to advance along the ridge north of the rest of the regiment, had found that the terrain and thick vegetation made progress along that route next to impossible. Since the company was lagging far behind the rest of the advance and since strong enemy opposition had not yet been encountered either inland or on the coastal route, it withdrew to join the rest of the 2nd Battalion on the beach, and by the time that battalion had reached Parai, Company E was back in place. 

By 3:00, the 3rd Battalion had successfully pushed through the defile and had secured Parai and a large jetty at that village. Progress west of the Parai Defile was without noteworthy incident during the rest of the afternoon, so Haney’s 2nd and 3rd Battalion would be able to dig in at Parai by nightfall. On the other side, Kuzume was surprised by the landings, but he was expecting the enemy to land exactly there, where the extreme narrowness of the beach and the few entrances inland would make deployment difficult. Deciding to seize this momentary advantage, he thus ordered his 1st and 3rd Battalions to carry out an attack all along the Bosnek beachhead during the night. On the 3rd Battalion front, after an unsuccessful raid against two batteries near Ibdi. Then the 3rd Battalion, 222nd Infantry , renewed the attack with grenades and rifle fire, some circling to the north around Battery C and a few others moving against Battery B, located 200 yards to the east. Attacks on Battery C continued until daylight, when the last Japanese withdrew. The action cost Battery C 4 men killed and 8 wounded, while a near-by antiaircraft detachment lost 1 man killed and 1 wounded. Over 15 of the enemy had been killed during the night and an unknown number wounded. The 1st Battalion also raided the beachhead, suffering many casualties as a result. 

On the morning of May 28th, the 162nd then resumed its westward advance, with its 3rd Battalion rapidly proceeding through Mokmer village without opposition. By 9:30, however, the Americans began to face stiff resistance at a road junction nearly 1500 yards west of Mokmer. Supported by artillery, Company K would be able to push to within 200 yards of Mokmer Drome; yet Kuzume would rapidly counterattack them with his 2nd Battalion. Charging repeatedly, the Japanese would eventually force the Americans to pull back by noon, with Lieutenant Yokoyama Hideo dying heroically during these attacks. Emboldened by this success, Kuzume then launched an all out assault from the East Caves area.

On the main ridge north of Mokmer the Japanese had another strongpoint east of the West Caves, which was called by the Japanese the East Caves. Behind Mokmer the ridge rose to a height of 240 feet. It was not so steep a cliff as the Parai Defile barricade, but it could not be climbed without the use of hands. About three quarters of the way to the top was a flat ledge from which two large caverns, similar to those in the West Caves area, could be entered. The Japanese constructed pillboxes on the ridge both below and above the ledge, and in the caverns they emplaced mortars, 20-mm. guns, and heavy machine guns. Observation posts were also set up at the East Caves, from which an unobstructed view of the coast from Parai to the west end of Mokmer Drome could be obtained. The Biak Detachment used the East Caves principally as living quarters, supply dumps, and as a connecting link between the Ibdi Pocket and the West Caves. Continued Japanese occupation of the East Caves would endanger Allied troop and supply movements along the coastal road from Parai to Mokmer Drome. The enemy threw more troops into the battle from the East Caves area until the attackers were coming not only from the west but also from the northwest and north. The Japanese split the 3rd Battalion by driving a wedge along the cliff between the troops on the shore and those on the terrace. Companies L and M were cut off. The 2nd Battalion, attempting to get on the terrace to the north of the 3rd Battalion, was pinned down by Japanese fire from the East Caves and was unable to advance. Company G, on the terrace north of the main road and between the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, was also cut off.

In response to the attacks, Haney ordered the 1st Battalion to move north from Parai onto the main coastal ridge to outflank the enemy positions, but efforts to do so were halted by enemy fire from the East Caves. Two companies patrolled in the broken terrain along the main ridge but were unable to move westward. Most of Company L and the Company M detachment which was also on the coral terrace managed to find a covered route back to the rest of the 3rd Battalion on the shore, but one platoon, initially surrounded, had to fight its way eastward into the lines of the 2nd Battalion, north of Mokmer village. Company G, on the terrace north of the main road and between the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, was also cut off and withdrew to the 2nd Battalion only with difficulty, and after it had suffered many casualties from Japanese fire. During the afternoon the 3rd Battalion stood off two more concerted enemy counterattacks, one at 12:00 and another shortly after 2:00, and suffered more casualties from the enemy mortar and artillery fire. During the latter attack, the Japanese began moving some light tanks forward from the Mokmer Drome area. The 3rd Platoon, 603rd Tank Company, engaged these tanks at a range of 1,200 yards and, with the aid of fire from destroyers lying offshore, drove the enemy tanks back into defilade positions. Three tanks of the 603rd were damaged by Japanese artillery fire and three men of the same organization were wounded during the action. Meanwhile, General Fuller had decided to reinforce the 3rd Battalion, 162nd Infantry. The 1st Platoon, 603rd Tank Company, moved west along the coastal road. At the same time small boats manned by the 542nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment were also sent forward with ammunition and medical supplies, both dangerously low. The small craft moved along the shore out of range of Japanese mortar and artillery fire until opposite the 3rd Battalion's position and then shot inshore at full speed, one by one. Supplies were replenished and the worst casualties evacuated despite continued shelling of the 3rd Battalion's position by the Japanese. The 1st and 2nd Battalions continued their efforts to clear the Japanese from the terrace behind the 3rd but met with little success.

By late afternoon, just as the 3rd Battalion's position was becoming untenable, Fuller gave up plans for further attempts at reinforcement and ordered Haney to withdraw his 3rd Battalion. The withdrawal started slowly because communications difficulties still prevented concentration of supporting fires. However, at 5:00 the regimental commander finally ordered the 3rd Battalion to start moving back along the coastal road. Tanks were to act as point, and rear guard and close-in artillery fire was substituted for a disengaging force. The battalion was to continue eastward until it had passed through the 2nd, which was setting up a new defensive position east of Mokmer village. The men of the 3rd Battalion moved in small parties along the beach and main road, which was intermittently swept by Japanese mortar, machine gun, and rifle fire. Many troops were unable to use the main road, but had to drop down to the beach below the overhanging cliff. Four tanks brought up the rear and protected the north flank. Between 1830 and 1900 all elements of the 3rd Battalion reached safety beyond the 2nd Battalion's lines and began digging in for the night east of the latter unit. Casualties for the day, almost all of them suffered by the 3rd Battalion, were 16 killed and 87 wounded.

Facing strong resistance, he also decided to commit his tank company to the attack. At around 8:00, new waves of Japanese infantry, now supported by four tanks, appeared west and north of the 2nd Battalion, thus beginning the first tank battle of the war in the Southwest Pacific Area. The 2nd Battalion, 162nd Infantry, with the 1st Platoon, 603rd Tank Company, in support, was astride the main coastal road 1,000 yards east of Mokmer. The battalion's left flank was on the beach while its right was against the coastal cliff and less than forty yards inland. Between the beach and the cliff was a coconut grove. The main coastal road crossed the rise of the cliff at a point about 475 yards west of the 2nd Battalion's lines. Shortly after 8:00 the Japanese tanks, followed by an infantry column, advanced down the incline where the main road crossed the cliff and deployed in echelon left formation in the coconut grove. The Japanese vehicles were light tanks, Type 95, weighing about nine tons, carrying a crew of three men, and armed with one 37-mm. cannon and two 7.7-mm. machine guns. They were opposed by two General Sherman M4A1 medium tanks, the heaviest armament on which was the 75-mm.

Each Japanese tank was stopped by one round of 75-mm. armor-piercing ammunition, while the enemy infantry was literally mowed down by the machine guns and mortars of the 2nd Battalion, 162nd Infantry. Armor-piercing 75-mm. shells passed right through the Japanese light tanks, and the Shermans followed with a few rounds of 75-mm. high explosive, which tore holes in the Japanese vehicles and blew loose their turrets. During this action several hits scored on the Shermans by the Japanese 37-mm. guns caused no damage. About thirty minutes after the first attack the Japanese sent in a second wave of three tanks, which used the same route of approach and the same formation in the coconut grove. These three were quickly destroyed by three Shermans. One enemy 37-mm. shell locked the 75-mm. gun of one Sherman in place, but the American tank backed part way into a shell hole to obtain elevation for its weapon and, despite the damage, managed to destroy one of the enemy tanks. The Japanese tanks having been stopped and the leading elements of the second infantry wave killed, the attack disintegrated and the enemy withdrew. For an hour or so the Japanese were quiet, but late in the morning, under the cover of machine gun fire and mortar barrages, they began to circle north of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 162nd Infantry. New infantry attacks began about 12:00. The enemy was unable to dislodge the 162nd Infantry, but his mortar fire caused many casualties within the regimental perimeter and the Japanese managed to cut the coast road east of a large T-jetty at Parai. Company B and the Cannon Company counterattacked the Japanese roadblock behind close-in mortar support and succeeded in dislodging the enemy by fire and movement.

During the afternoon of May 29, the 162nd thus moved back to Parai, where the 2nd Battalion and two companies boarded some amphibious craft back to Bosnek while the rest of the regiment moved overland through the Parai Defile and took up positions at Ibdi The 162nd Infantry's casualties during the day were 16 killed, 96 wounded, and 3 injured. The regiment estimated that it had killed over 500 Japanese during the day. Though Kuzume’s forces had suffered massive casualties, they had heroically managed to stop the enemy advance and would subsequently push troops forward to Parai and into the cliffs along the Parai Defile. They would however also lose most of their armor during these attacks. Only five tanks survived and were withdrawn to the West Caves.

Pending the arrival of reinforcements, General Fuller planned to use his available troops to hold the west flank at Ibdi and expand the beachhead at Bosnek. The 162nd Infantry was to establish a semicircular perimeter beginning on the beach west of Ibdi, reaching north to the main ridge, and returning to the beach at the village. The 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry, would maintain a perimeter around Mandom, where the Hurrican Task Force HQ was located, while the 3rd Battalion moved over the ridge behind Bosnek to set up defenses on the inland plateau. The 2nd Battalion, with part of the 3rd attached, would remain at the Bosnek beachhead. During this period, the 800 well-armed men of the 3rd Battalion, 222nd Infantry in the Ibdi Pocket, made only harassing attacks with small groups against the positions of the 162nd Infantry. On 30th and 31st of May the 162nd Infantry patrolled around the main ridge near Ibdi for a route over which large bodies of troops might move north to the inland plateau in preparation for the second attack westward. During the course of this patrolling, it was discovered that the main ridge from Bosnek to the Parai Defile actually comprised a series of seven sharp coral ridges, the crests of which were 50-75 yards apart and separated by gullies 50-100 feet deep. These separate ridges were honeycombed with small natural caves, potholes, and crevices. There was little soil on most of the coral, yet the area maintained a cover of dense rain forest containing trees 8-20 inches thick and 100-150 feet high. The 162nd Infantry discovered two native trails over the ridges. The most easterly of these, designated "Old Man's Trail," began on the beach road about 1,200 yards west of Mandom. It was a fairly well defined track which swung north over the seven ridges along a comparatively easy route. Another track began 1,200 yards to the west, near Ibdi. Called "Young Man's Trail," the latter followed a very difficult route over the ridges to the inland plateau. Both of these trails ran through the outer defenses of the Ibdi Pocket, into which the Biak Detachment, on 30 May, moved the 3rd Battalion, 222nd Infantry. On 30 and 31 May the 162nd Infantry's patrols along the ridges north of Ibdi and Mandom were harassed by the Japanese in the Ibdi Pocket, which had not yet been recognized as a major enemy strong point. On 30 May the 162nd Infantry located a water hole near the beach terminal of Old Man's Trail. A regimental water point established there was constantly harassed by Japanese rifle fire from the Ibdi Pocket area or by small enemy parties which moved down out of the ridges north of Ibdi and Mandom. The Cannon Company, 162nd Infantry, was therefore assigned the missions of clearing the enemy from the water point area and protecting that important installation from Japanese attacks. Halfway through the Parai Defile, a little over a mile west of the 162nd Infantry's main perimeter, an underground stream ran from the base of the cliff into Soanggarai Bay. At the point where the main road crossed the stream, the 162nd Infantry set up an ambush to prevent Japanese infiltration from the west along the beach. The ambush site was also used as a patrol base from which small parties reconnoitered along the cliffs of the Parai Defile to discover enemy dispositions in the area. Patrolling on 30th and 31st of May cost the 162nd Infantry 6 men killed, 17 wounded, and 4 injured.

On the main coastal ridge between the village of Ibdi and the Parai Defile the Biak Detachment developed another center of resistance which came to be known as the Ibdi Pocket. The terrain in the area was a series of knifelike east-west ridges separated by depressions and crevices up to fifty feet deep. These ridges were connected in places by cross-ridges, and the entire area was covered with thick rain forest and dense jungle undergrowth which had found a foothold in the coral. Pillboxes of coral and logs, hasty emplacements of the same materials, small caves and crevices, and foxholes at the bases of large trees were all utilized by the enemy to defend the area.

Back to the Wakde-Sarmi area, General Patrick was preparing to launch another assault on Lone Tree Hill. On the morning of May 27th at 7:00 two destroyers, firing on Lone Tree Hill and the Maffin Strip area, started scheduled fire support for the day's advance. Artillery and infantry action on this morning was much more closely coordinated than on the previous day. The destroyer fire lasted until 7:45, at which time the field artillery and all the 81-mm. mortars of the 158th Infantry laid concentrations on suspected and known enemy positions in the defile, on Lone Tree Hill, and on Hill 225. After this Colonel Herndon sent his 1st Battalion against the defile between Lone Tree Hill and the eastern nose of Mount Saksin and his 2nd Battalion against Hill 225. At 8:30 Company F, moving around Company E on the south flank, started its attack. Behind close artillery support, apparently controlled by artillery liaison planes for the most part, Company F pushed up a terrain feature initially believed to be Hill 225. It was not discovered until late the next day that F Company was actually on the eastern nose of Mt. Saksin and about 700 yards east of its reported location. Since artillery fire had knocked out two enemy machine gun nests which had been delaying the advance, patrols of Company F were able to reach the top of the eastern ridge. The rest of the company moved up the hill at 10:00; encountering scattered rifle fire from enemy positions to the southwest. Company E, just before noon, arrived atop the same hill on F's right. Company E had orders to secure the southern slopes of the defile between Hill 225 and Lone Tree Hill. Company B, still at the eastern entrance to the defile, was again unable to make any progress and during the morning was held up by machine gun and mortar fire from concealed enemy positions on the southern and southwestern slopes of Lone Tree Hill. No sooner had some of these positions been eliminated by American artillery and mortar fire than Company B was subjected to enemy machine gun and mortar fire originating from the northeast side of Hill 225, the reported location of Companies E and F. Actually, the artillery fire had not been entirely effective, because it had not reached into deep draws or caves in which many of the Japanese weapons were emplaced. Company E, attempting to move down the northern slopes of the eastern ridge to Company B's aid, was soon forced back by enemy rifle fire and infantry counterattacks from the west. At the same time small parties of Japanese, under cover of their own machine guns, started a series of minor counterattacks against Company B. Company F did not become engaged in this action. Instead, the company dug in on the ridge it was holding and sent patrols to the south and west to probe Japanese defenses. It was soon discovered that the combination of rugged terrain and Japanese machine gun and rifle fire limited patrolling to a very small area. North of Company B, Company A patrolled along the west bank of the Snaky River and on the eastern slope of Lone Tree Hill during the morning and early afternoon. About 4:30 the company moved in force up Lone Tree, finding the eastern slope of the hill to be unoccupied. Most of the fire that had harassed the company during the morning had apparently originated on the beach below the northern face of Lone Tree Hill. For the night the unit dug in at the crest of the hill. Again, little ground had been gained, although the eastern nose of Mr. Saksin and Lone Tree Hill had been at least partially occupied. At the same time, Patrick was informed that two battalions of the 163rd Regiment would be shipped to Biak to reinforce Fuller on June 1st, with General Krueger also preparing the 6th Division led by Major General Franklin Silbert  to be dispatched to Wakde to replace the 163rd. Yet before this could occur, Colonel Matsuyama crossed the Tementoe River and launched a surprise night attack against Toem.

During pitch-black night at 8:30, an estimated 100 Japs struck 1st Battalion's area. Divided into small groups, but in two major commands, they carried grappling hooks, knives, grenades, knee-mortars, and rifles. Their grappling hooks had two prongs, like anchors and were attached to long ropes by which they could pull to explode booby traps harmlessly. A knee mortar barrage began the attack. While their mortars drove the men to ground, their grappling hooks caught booby trap wires and exploded attached grenades. They struck from southeast and southwest, two different commands about 150 yards apart. First command shouted wildly and threw grenades. They fired a light machine gun down A Company's street and holed up their tents. But this command's howling rush with grenades was just a feint to cause confusion. The second command, around 35-40,  made the main drive. Easily they broke through 1st Battalion's far-spread perimeter holes. An estimated 25 made the serious penetration. They were trying to reach the Regimental command post to kill the top officers. Some of the staff officers were actually cut off outside their holes in a tent and actually unarmed. Ten Japanese almost reached the command post before they were cut down. Such was the official report, but 163rd men said that they tried to blow up the motor poo, nearly 100 of them. From a slit trench, four blazing M-1s stopped them, from the motor pool chief Staff Sergeant Burton, Staff Sergeant Engbretson, T/4 Switzer, and T/5 Donakowski. They piled up 13 dead Japanese, the last just 20 feet away. On a whistle signal, all Matsuyama's men withdrew.

The wild attack prompted Patrick to not to ship the 163rd towards Biak. The following morning, after another well-timed preliminary artillery bombardment, Herndon once again threw his forces against the Ilier Mountains, yet the result was the same as before. Nonetheless, his troops would be able to cover the amphibious arrival of two tanks to aid in further attacks; but with the situation soon becoming untenable because of strong Japanese counterattacks, all his companies ultimately had to withdraw to the Snaky River line. On May 29th, Krueger finally notified Patrick that the two battalions of the 163rd would have to leave for Biak the next day, so this would force Patrick to cease offensive action and withdraw the 1st Battalion, 158th Regiment back to Arare. Yet further Japanese counterattacks also forced Herndon to withdraw his remaining forces to the Maffin area as well, where he would form a new defensive line. 

Patrick ultimately disagreed with Herndon’s decision to retreat, judging the withdrawal to be unwarranted and would relieve Herndon of his command, replacing him with Colonel Earle Sandlin. Colonel Herndon's fears of attack along his line of communications had been well taken, for the Right Sector Force had begun flanking movements designed to recapture the entire Maffin Bay area. However, the combat engineers quickly proved their versatility by driving off the enemy force with rifle, carbine, and machine gun fire. Five of the engineers were killed. Enemy casualties could not be estimated since the Japanese removed their dead and wounded during the night. The remainder of the night was more quiet, and the next morning the defenses along the Tirfoam were improved. There were a couple of minor attacks during the afternoon and desultory rifle and 70-mm. or 75-mm. artillery fire was directed against all American units still west of the Tor. The 147th Field Artillery Battalion, withdrawing to the east bank of the Tor late in the afternoon, was struck by some of this enemy artillery fire and lost one man killed.

A new defensive line along the Tirfoam was being developed on May 30th as the bulk of the 163rd Regiment would depart for Biak. This left Patrick’s forces spread out over almost twelve miles of coastline, just as Colonel Yoshino was about to launch his night attack. After the difficult river crossing, the 223rd Regiment had spent three days moving into the jungle southwest of Arara, from where they launched a series of simultaneous attacks against some anti-aircraft positions along the beach. 

A 6:05 on June 30th, a guard at B Battery's Position No 6 challenged two men in the jungle across the beach road. Other Japanese were moving west down the road. When they did not answer his challenge, he fired, and hit the ground. Instantly, Japanese machine guns, rifles, mortars, and even grenades hit the B-6 position. The anti-aircraft men killed 10 Japs, but one heavy machine gun jammed. The second gun became overheated and had to cease fire. The Japanese were hard to hit in the dark. They were heavily camouflaged with leaves and nets down to their hips. After one American was killed, the anti-aircraft men left their emplacement and fled 500 yards east on the beach road to Battery A's Position 7. Joined with the men of A-7 - they had already stopped one attack - the B-6 men helped fight about 15-25 Japanese. From 6:40 to 4:30 next day, the Japanese struck intermittently, but rifle and machine guns fire repelled them. About 500 yards west of the B-6 position where the first attack had occurred, Battery A-6 also endured harassment from Japanese mortar, rifle, and machine gun fire. At least twice, the gunners repulsed attacks. A fourth position, Battery B-8, which was 400 yards west of A-6, was assailed about 6:30 also. The anti-aircraft men's .50 multiple heavy machine gun became overheated and jammed. Rifle ammo was running out. Scurrying from the gun-pit, they took cover in the shore brush until the Japanese left at 4:30. All attacks began about the same time, about 8:30, and some men glimpsed a Jap officer with his saber who was giving orders. All Japanese dead had rolls of white gauze in their mouths, and the Japanese officer had completely covered his lower face. The Americans thought that they used these means to prevent them from shouting or screaming when they were wounded. While they attacked the anti-aircraft batteries, Yoshino's men also tried to storm 1st Battalion 158 Infantry protecting Task Force Headquarters and the supply dumps. About 7:00, rifle and machine gun fire began impacting 1st Battalion positions. A captured heavy machine gun fired also. At 10:00 came a furious suicidal attack against B Company - beaten off with rifles, grenades, bayonets, pistols, and even knives. They failed to fire the supply dumps with demolition charges and Molotov cocktails. In the end, the Americans miraculously only lost 12 killed and 10 wounded while inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy. But fearing more enemy attacks, Patrick would decide to reduce the number of separate perimeters along the beach, from 21 to only 8. 

The bulk of the 158th had to withdraw behind the Tor, leaving only its 2nd Battalion west of the river to secure the bridgehead. Facing little resistance, the Japanese recaptured Maffin, though they would be unable to push Sandlin’s troops behind the river. Yoshino and Matsuyama were unable to coordinate their efforts however, allowing the Americans to continue to strengthen their defenses for the next few days, with the Japanese only able to launch nightly raiding attacks that were easily repelled. On June 5, the first units of Major-General Franklin Sibert’s 6th Division then began to arrive, freeing up the 158th to continue with its offensive. 

Sandlin then launched an attack with his 1st and 2nd Battalions supported by tanks crossing the Tor to attack Maffin on June 8, meeting increasingly strong enemy resistance from a line of hastily-repaired bunkers and pillboxes. The tanks were able to reduce the Japanese defenses due to their strong firepower, but not before the Americans had to dig in by nightfall. 

The night passed without incident and early on June 9th patrols began to probe westward toward the Tirfoam. Scouts reported that the Japanese were holding another defense line, including reoccupied bunkers, on a slight rise at the west bank of the river. About 10:00, tank-infantry teams began to destroy the Japanese-held positions along the new line. While tank 75-mm fire was destroying bunkers or forcing the Japanese to seek cover, infantrymen crept forward to toss grenades into bunker gun ports or shoot down Japanese who tried to escape from the area. While these tank-infantry team operations were taking place, the rest of the two infantry battalions rested. Japanese 75-mm. fire, from a weapon emplaced on the beach between the Snaky River and Lone Tree Hill, harassed the 1st Battalion for a while, but this fire was summarily stopped when a 155-mm howitzer of the 218th Field Artillery Battalion scored a direct hit on the enemy piece. By 11:30 the enemy defensive positions had been cleaned out and the 1st and 2nd Battalions resumed the advance westward. Aided by fire from the 147th Field Artillery, which had supplanted the 167th in the close support role, the two infantry units probed cautiously forward, and it was not until 3:30 that both reached the east bank of the Tirfoam. Opposition was scattered, but the American units lost 6 men killed and 6 wounded. It was estimated that 50 of the enemy had been killed and one was captured.

At this point, the 158th would have to stop its advance because they received new orders from Krueger, who planned to employ the regiment for an assault on Noemfoor Island, 300 miles northwest of Sarmi, in late June or early July. As such, advances west of the Tirfoam would be postponed until a second combat team of the 6th Division could arrive in the area to relieve the 158th in mid-June. 

General Sibert assumed command of the Tornado Task Force on June 12th. On 10 and 11th June the 158th Infantry limited its activities to patrolling, consolidating defensive positions, and driving Japanese outposts westward. One outpost, lying southeast of the 2nd Battalion, was manned by about a hundred Japanese and had to be cleared by tank fire and infantry assault. The Japanese, who were members of a 223rd Infantry company assigned to the Right Sector Force, fled toward Mr. Saksin, leaving behind 4 heavy machine guns, 1 light machine gun, 2 70-mm. howitzers, and 1 37-mm. antitank gun. On 14 June the 20th Infantry, 6th Division, relieved the 158th Infantry at the Tirfoam. The 158th recrossed the Tor and went into a defensive perimeter on the west bank of Tementoe Creek. Patrols sent south and east during the next week encountered a few stragglers from the Japanese garrison at Hollandia or from the Matsuyama Force. On the 22nd the entire regimental combat team was relieved of all combat responsibility in the Wakde-Sarmi area and began final preparations for the Noemfoor Island operation. During its operations in the Wakde-Sarmi area the 158th Regimental Combat Team lost 70 men killed, 257 wounded, and 4 missing. The unit took 11 Japanese prisoners and estimated that it killed 920 of the enemy. With their supply line compromised, Yoshino and Matsuyama would also decide to withdraw from their present positions about this time, which would allow the 36th Division to establish better defensive positions in the Ilier Mountains line. Yet that is all for Operation Tornado and Hurricane for now, as we now need to head over to the Imphal-Kohima front.

By June, the situation at Manipur saw General Slim’s 14th Army losing all of their advantages. Despite the extreme odds, with a slim chance of success, General Mutaguchi continued his wild attacks against Imphal. As it was, the two armies had been battling it out in difficult terrain and conditions. There were the steep and often jungle-covered hills, the heat for men not accustomed to it, the risk of tropical diseases like malaria and the leeches – not to mention the weeks and months of both physical and psychological strain from fighting a formidable enemy. The monsoon rains that began later in May only made matters worse. As the days passed by, the low-lying areas in the Imphal Valley would flood because of the downpours, while the streams and small rivers everywhere would become raging torrents. The water level of Loktak Lake would also rise, making it especially uncomfortable for the units of both sides dug in at some of the lakeside villages on the Tiddim Road. Dysentery and diarrhea became an ever-greater concern. Foot rot would start to set in for men in their flooded positions. The slopes in the hills became slippery and that much more treacherous to navigate. The incessant rains would dissolve stretches of ‘fairweather’ roads and ‘jeepable’ tracks into mud and slush everywhere, while triggering landslides in the hills. For the units on higher altitudes like the Shenam Saddle, Point 5846 and the Ukhrul area, the nights would become shockingly cold and damp, adding to their misery. Yet things were undoubtedly harder for the Japanese, who had carried few supplies and didn’t expect to be strung out fighting for so long. 

To the north, General Sato’s 31st Division were withdrawing from Kohima towards Ukhrul, defying Mutaguchi’s orders, with General Miyazaki providing rearguard at Viswema, whileGeneral Grover’s 2nd Division pursued them. Miyazaki’s men held out at Visweman until June 12th, before withdrawing to Maosongsang. Then they held out at Maosongsang until June 16, before retreating to the last holding position at Maram. Over to the south, General Brigg’s 5th Division was engaging Colonel Matsumura’s 60th Regiment, fighting brutally for control over the Imphal-Kohima road. The battered Japanese defenders were fighting tooth and nail to prevent the opening of this vital supply line.  The 9th and 123rd Brigades pushed on, they would only be able to capture the Zebra hill on June 7. The following day, the 3/14th Punjabis made a wide hook and arrived on the road behind Japanese lines by nightfall, where they would repel three heavy counterattacks. This would allow the 123rd to clear the hill positions near Modbung and link up with the Punjabis on June 11th. The 9th Brigade made great progress during these days, pushing on to Satarmaina by June 13th. General Gracey’s 20th Division was also attacking towards the Ukhrul Road during this period, with the 80th Brigade advancing northwards from Kameng up the Iril River Valley on a wide encircling move towards Litan while the 100th Brigade attacked up the road towards Kasom. Though the 80th faced little resistance, the 100th would struggle to progress against the fierce counterattacks of the recently-arrived 67th Regiment. By mid-June, the 51st Regiment was also ordered to abandon its positions and support the 67th on the Ukhrul Road. 

Over in the southwest front, the arrival of reinforcements in the form of the 2nd Battalion, under the command of Colonel Yanagisawa Kanji at the end of May, gave General Tanaka a gleam of hope that he could launch another offensive in early June. On June 6th, four battalions under Colonel Sasahara attacked the 63rd Brigade’s hill positions, applying such great pressure, General Cowan was forced to withdraw his brigade to Bishenpur the following day. On June 7th, Tanaka ordered his recently-arrived reinforcements to clear Ningthoukhong and retake Potsangbam, yet their first coordinated attack would end in failure. The attack was almost single-handedly held by Sergeant Hanson Victor Turner of the 1st West Yorks. Defending his platoon’s position on the perimeter, Turner grabbed some grenades and charged forward, throwing them at the Japanese. He did this five times, going back to gather grenades each time and returning to the attack in the face of Japanese grenade and small-arms fire. He was killed on the sixth occasion while throwing a grenade. For his bravery, Turner was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross. The Japanese eventually captured some ground in North Ningthoukhong, but withdrew after being struck from the air and shelled.

In the meantime, after the Japanese defeat at the Gibraltar Box, the Yamamoto Detachment would continue to harass the British-Indian positions from Nippon and Scraggy Hills in early June. On the evening of June 9, the Japanese put in their last major attack on Scraggy, starting with a heavy artillery bombardment. Artillery concentrations were directed at the Japanese and an airstrike was made on their part of Scraggy and Lynch. The Gurkhas followed up with an advance. Although some ground was recovered, the Japanese maintained their grip on Scraggy’s crest. Having suffered many casualties and feeling that the Gurkhas’ new position was sufficiently strong, General Roberts then decided to halt the counterattacks, thus leaving General Yamamoto in control of Scraggy up until the end of July. Concurrently, as a last hope to break through towards Imphal, Mutaguchi was planning to conduct a desperate offensive on Palel with some reinforcements that would fail to arrive in time. Due to these delays, he would end up sending some of Yamamoto’s exhausted troops to recover Langgol and advance to the hill northeast of Palel. The Japanese managed to get beyond Langgol and attack some positions in the foothills near Palel Airfield, but were soon rebuffed. They finally sent in a commando raid on the airfield in early July, which succeeded in blowing up eight planes.

Over in Ningthoukhong, Tanaka launched another heavy assault on June 12th. Though a salient on the other side was initially captured, a ferocious counterattack would ultimately evict them. This action was performed by units of the 48th Brigade, including reinforcements sent from Potsangbam.  Rifleman Ganju Lama of the 1/7th Gurkha Rifles who earned a Victoria Cross in this action. To the west, Tanaka ordered the newly-arrived 151st Regiment of Colonel Hashimoto Kumakoro to attack the British picquets overlooking the Silchar Track. After a wave of assaults, Water Picquet would fall on June 21; yet the 32nd Brigade would respond immediately with a series of counterattacks that developed into confused fighting as positions were won and lost by both sides. 

On the night of 25 June, no less than a company of Japanese began attacking Mortar Bluff, a picquet position bereft of cover and a short distance away from Water Picquet. It was held by a small garrison of some 40-odd men of the 2/5th Royal Gurkha Rifles who had replaced the 7/10th Baluchis. In pouring rain, the Japanese first bombarded the position with mortars and guns at point-blank range. For the next few hours, the infantry repeatedly attacked the surrounded and dwindling garrison. Subedar Netra Bahadur Thapa defended the besieged position almost through the night, organizing counter-attacks with whatever ammunition and grenades his unit had left. The Japanese finally overran Mortar Bluff the next morning, with Netra Bahadur Thapa fighting to his death. He was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross.

A few hours later, a company of the same unit formed for a counterattack on Mortar Bluff. In the face of heavy fire, Naik Agan Singh Rai led his section in charging a Japanese machine-gun post and killing its crew. It then recaptured Mortar Bluff and neutralized a 37mm gun position and crew. Rai now advanced on a Japanese bunker and killed its occupants, after which his company also recovered Water Picquet. For his actions that day, Rai won the Victoria Cross, the second for the 2/5th Royal Gurkha Rifles the same day. Faced with such counter-attacks and intense artillery fire from Gun Box, the last throw of the Japanese 33rd Division around the Silchar Track ended in failure. This left Hashimoto and Tanaka empty-handed for all the losses they had suffered. Tanaka was forced to withdraw units before they were annihilated. On July 2st the 214th Infantry, with only 400 effectives remaining, completed its withdrawal to the area south of Nouyangtek and the 151st was directed to move back to Laimanai. Having been decimated by sickness and straggling en route to the front, the strength of the entire 151st Infantry Regiment was, at that time, less than 100 men.

Back in the north, Briggs’ units continued to struggle for control of the Satarmaina area. The struggle over the next week centered on the main feature east of the road, the hill named Liver. The 3/9th Jats attacked repeatedly to try to dislodge the Japanese from this feature. One such attempt was made on June 15th, when Hurribombers strafed the hill, followed by heavy artillery concentrations from 25-pdrs, 3.7in  howitzers and 3in  mortars. A Jat company climbed the hill, but had to withdraw some 100 meters from its objective because of heavy machine-gun fire. At the same time, the 1/17th Dogras were sent off on a wide hook left of the road and the 3/14th Punjabis were able to secure the Octopus position by June 20. 

North of them, Grover’s troops would also be able to break through Maram and continue south down the road on June 20, finally meeting the Dogras two days later. Beaten, Miyazaki had nonetheless fulfilled his task and could now withdraw east towards Ukhrul. Sato's rearguard fought determinedly. Often a few men with an artillery piece, grenades and a machine-gun would take up positions on the high ground above tracks, ambushing the British advance guards before melting away to repeat the performance a few km further back or, as was often the case, remaining obstinately in their positions until they were killed. Few were free from disease and fatigue, but surrender played no part in these men's vocabulary; they fought on till overtaken by a British bullet or bayonet or, more often, by starvation and exhaustion. But the 31st Division had literally fought itself to death. Exhausted men lay in pits unable to defend themselves, suicide squads with anti-tank mines tottered towards the advancing Lee Grants and Stuarts to be mown down by accompanying infantry, or obliterated by shellfire

Although the battered 31st Division would manage to survive the Kohima disaster, General Sato would be relieved of his command as he had refused to carry Mutaguchi’s orders numerous times. As a result, Miyazaki was promoted to Lt-General and given temporary command of the division by the end of June. Meanwhile, though his men had resisted like demons, Matsumura now had no choice but to abandon the road and retreat east towards Ukhrul with what remained of his command due to this new threat to the north. On June 21, the Liver position would fall at last. Again, the Japanese positions were bombed and strafed from the air, this time by three squadrons of Hurribombers for half an hour. The 4th and 28th Field Regiments, as well as a troop of the 8th Medium Regiment, fired a concentration on Liver that covered it in dust and smoke. Three companies of the Jats now went in, and yet this attack was also held by the Japanese on and around Liver. They had had enough, however, and by the next morning were found to have withdrawn from the feature. The Jats suffered around 150 casualties that week, including 33 killed. The 15th Division would adopt new defensive positions at Ukhrul to cover the withdrawal of Miyazaki and Matsumura. The main force of the 15th Division then went into defense positions in a line extending generally from Ukhrul through Tongou, Shongphel and Aishan to the 3524 Pass in order to be in position to cover and pick up the Right Assault Unit and the Miyazaki Detachment as they withdrew to the east. In order to hold the new defense positions, all available men, including all those in the rear service units, were thrown into the line. Finally the Imphal-Kohima road was reopened. Slim knew while the battle was not yet over, it had already been won.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

The landings at Biak was another allied success. The first tank battle of the war in the Southwest Pacific Area saw the American Sherman's absolutely devastate Japanese Type-95’s. Within the Burma front, General Slim had finally reopened the Imphal-Kohima road spelling doom for Mutaguchi’s failed offensive.

 

- 131 - Pacific War - Siege of Myitkyina, May 21-28, 1944

Last time we spoke about the battle of Wakde. Operation Tornado, the amphibious assault of Wakde island faced many logistical challenges, but not as much Japanese resistance. The landing at Arare was a large success, seeing the allies secure a beachhead before advancing inland. Through a combination of air, naval and ground attacks, the smaller Japanese force was pushed back. Likewise the islands of Liki and Niroemoar were taken with relative ease as well. Over in the Burma-India theater, the battle for Kohima was gradually seeing the Japanese fail to meet their objectives. Without ammunition or provision supplies flowing to them, the Japanese at Kohima had no hope of holding back the allies. Thus the Japanese were beginning to fall back and now were setting up a defense to stop the allies from entering central Burma. Meanwhile a siege was being erected against Myitkyina.

This episode is the Siege of Myitkyina 

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Last time we saw General Stilwell had managed to seize the Myitkyina airstrip. Now allied forces were gradually securing northern Burma, pushing further towards Mogaung. The Japanese 18th Division were absolutely battered and barely holding on around Kamaing. However when the American-Chinese forces seized Myitkyina’s airstrip, they had failed to quickly attack the main town, which the Japanese were reinforcing heavily. Now they were being attacked from both ends. This prompted General Stilwell to dispatch General Boatner with the task force to try and turn things around. Simultaneously, Stilwell had just received word of the Chindits abandonment of the Blackpool stronghold, outraged by this he ordered them to advance northwards to support the attack on Mogaung.

Three brigades, the 111th, 14th and the 3rd West Africans were to advance north to support Calvert’s 77th Brigade to take Mogaung. The Chindits were incredulous. Nonetheless, Lentaigne, pressed by Stilwell, sought to have his 3rd West Africans, the 14th and 111th Brigades squeeze the Japanese along the western flanks of the Mogaung valley, in which Mogaung occupied the lowest point of an inverted triangle, with the other two points being Kamaing on the top left and Myitkyina on the top right. With any luck, his three brigades could capture Kamaing, which occupied an enviable place on the Mogaung River. The 111th Brigade was to move north-east and operate in the Pahok-Sahmaw area, destroying dumps and blocking enemy movement. Thebattered men of the 111th Brigade struggled to cope with the march north, to the hills east of Lakhren and west of Mogaung. Conditions were appalling on the three-day march to Lakhren village. From there, the best approach to Mogaung would be identified. They were making for a waterlogged, mosquito-infested area north east of the Lake. This area was also alive with Japanese units. They were required to support 77th Brigade’s attack on Mogaung, by pushing from the west as Calvert’s command advanced from the south-east. However, 111th Brigade was spent after Blackpool and many men were forced to return to Lakhren village. There was also a new task for 14th Brigade – the capture of Taungni. With the casualties evacuated, 14th Brigade abandoned the Kyunsalai Pass and headed north towards Mogaung. The steamy swamps continued to take their toll within the ranks of the York and Lancaster columns. Dysentery was rife. Animals collapsed and were shot where they dropped. They reached Mokso on June 25. This much-used rallying point, consisting of four huts, was a sea of mud and detritus, decorated with black clouds of flies. Rations were being consumed rapidly in an area devoid of drop zones. Brigadier Brodie, 14th Brigade’s Commander, responded to the extreme circumstances. His men, despite their dangerously poor condition, were still expected to harass the Japanese along the railway and support 77th Brigade’s assault on Mogaung. He formed his columns into “Light Battle Groups”, free of heavy weapons and the wounded and sick, now lying together in the mud. Meanwhile, some Nigerian units were now struggling on the road to Lakhren along the reailway, as were the York and Lancaster sick – around 300 in all, 200 of whom were dangerously ill.

On May 25th, the same day the Chindits had quit Blackpool, Stilwell ordered the Morris Force to seize Waingmaw, across the river from Myitkyina. Unfortunately, the Japanese had entrenched themselves at the town and enjoyed the luxury of a natural moat after heavy rains flooded the fields on the approaches to the town. Morrisforce was not a proper brigade, having only two columns of troops, to which a third from the 111th Brigade had been added 1,500 troops in total. It had been conceived to harass the Japanese on jungle areas. Now, they were up against fortified positions. The result was a bloodbath. Morrisforce then began to rapidly deplete in strength. By July 14th, it was to consist of exactly three platoons, roughly 120 men.

On May 31st, Boatner then launched his first coordinated attack against Myitkyina seeing the 42nd regiment reach the Waingmaw ferry road. Built up twelve feet above the neighboring paddy fields, the road gave the Japanese a magnificent defensive position, which they exploited cleverly. The Chinese recoiled from this natural fortification but were able to beat off a Japanese counterattack. The 150th Regiment reached the riverbank and drew up in an arc about a sawmill in which the Japanese had a strongpoint. Meanwhile Colonel Hunter’s 2nd battalion reinforced with engineers advanced to Radhapur where they were heavily counterattacked by the 114th Regiment. The next day, the inexperienced 236th Engineer Battalion was sent against Namkwi. The motive behind the 236th's attack was to contain the Japanese in the Namkwi area and introduce the battalion to combat under relatively easy conditions. One company of the 236th did succeed in entering Namkwi but instead of promptly consolidating to meet the inevitable Japanese counterattack fell out for a break. The Japanese counterattacked and drove the unwary engineers right back out of the village. Both the engineers and the 2600 replacements of the Galahad Unit that had recently arrived lacked adequate experience fighting the Japanese and as such suffered badly when fighting against them. Colonel Hunter’s veteran Marauders, however, had suffered ample casualties and thus needed these green replacements in order to continue existing as a fighting force. Boatner tossed a last ditch effort on June 3rd, but his Chinese forces had suffered 320 casualties and their ammunition was running low. While he waited for supplies to build up, he used his green american troops to give them some experience, the Chinese meanwhile tunneled towards the Japanese still suffering heavy casualties. This allowed more Japanese troops to break through and reinforce Myitkyina, with a huge relief force of the 52rd Division soon on its way.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General Matsuyama Yuzo of the depleted 56th Division was facing a deadly offensive of his own on the Yunnan front. After a series of negotiations between Chiang Kai-Shek and the Americans, it had been agreed, General Wei Lihuang’s Y Force would cross the Salween River to attack the Tengchong and Longling areas. This would effectively allow the allies to link the Ledo Road with China, bypassing the heavy Japanese concentration along the Burma Road. Although the Americans had supplied the Y Force with artillery and ammunition, the Chinese had failed to bring the Y Force divisions up to strength, and many questioned their training. Regardless, General Wei planned to have elements of the 20th army group cross the Salween at several points before initiating a full assault against Tengchong once reinforcements had been ferried through. Further south, elements of the 11th Army Group would also cross the Salween to launch attacks on Pingda and Longling. 

On the night of May 11th, the Chinese forces began to cross the Salween River against little Japanese resistance, since Matsuyama had decided not to defend the crossing sites, instead placing his main line of resistance along the ridge line some 10 miles west. The 198th Division was able to assemble in front of the Mamien Pass; the 36th division was successfully ferried through Mengka; the brand new 39th Division managed to secure the Hueijen bridge and the 76th and 88th Divisions were converging on Pingda for the attack. On May 12th, the 198th were making good progress against the Mamien Pass as the 36th had surrounded the Japanese outposts in the eastern end of the Tiantouzhai pass. However Colonel Kurashige Yasuyoshi had his 148th regiment launched two surprise night counterattacks. All that night, the Japanese quietly filtered down from a nearby ridge and assembled near the Chinese position. Attacking at dawn, they surprised the Chinese and almost wiped them out before aid came. When darkness came, the 36th were at their bivouac. That night, the Japanese attacked vigorously, overrunning the division command post and causing the flustered 36th Division to fall back to the Salween. At dawn, the 53rd Army commander, Maj. Gen. Chou Fu-cheng, pushed a regiment across the Salween and restored the situation by attacking the Japanese flank. General Chou was an aggressive and tenacious fighter, whom his Manchurian soldiers had nicknamed Old Board-Back, and who had the reputation of never having yielded an inch to the Japanese. But even Chou could not immediately restore the morale of the 36th Division, which for some weeks took no further part in the Ta-tang-tzu fighting, and the rest of the 53rd Army had to bear the burden of clearing the pass.

In response to this, Lt General Zhou Fucheng of the 53rd Army pushed the 116th and 130th Divisions across the river to resume the advance towards Tiantouzhai. At the Mamien pass, the 592nd and 594th Regiments began clearing out the Japanese strongpoints while the 593rd Regiment moved west over mountain byways to emerge into the Shweli valley by the 16th, securing the western end of the pass and forcing Kurashige’s men to withdraw into the fortified village of Shangzhaigongfang. To the south, the New 39th would be able to secure Hemushu by the 17th. Yet the Japanese under Colonel Matsui Hideji soon recovered from the initial surprise of the Chinese offensive and the 1st battalion, 113th regiment drove the Chinese from Hung-mu-shu. The Japanese exploited their success and pushed the entire New 39th Division back against the Salween.

Further south, the 76th Division met outposts of the 1st battalion, 146th regiment and forced them back to the heights overlooking Ping-ka. Meanwhile the 88th Division from the north was fighting through a series of fortified villages as it headed south to join the 76th Division. By the 16th, thirteen villages were occupied in the area northeast of Ping-ka, but the Japanese, as they withdrew, received reinforcements. Strengthened by the 2nd battalion, 113th regiment, the Japanese did not attack the Chinese who were pursuing them, but moved south and hit the Chinese 228th Regiment south and west of Ping-ka. 

Sensing the imminent danger from the north,  Matsuyama redirected the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 113th Regiment to reinforce Shangzhaigongfang, where Kurashige would continue to resist staunchly. Reports from the American liaison teams were not cheerful. Americans observing the Kaolikung Range actions found that Japanese fire was accurate and economical, and that the enemy's use of camouflage and concealment approached perfection. The Japanese revealed no disposition to surrender though they were heavily outnumbered, often surrounded, and had neither air support nor air supply. On the other hand, the Americans reported that the Chinese endlessly wasted manpower and ammunition in costly frontal attacks. They reported that relations with the Chinese were not always as friendly as had been hoped, and they believed there would have to be better cooperation between Chinese and Americans if the Japanese were to be defeated. The Chinese were described as merely tolerating the Americans' presence and as paying little attention to their advice. The liaison personnel freely admitted their own shortcomings, and by their reports suggested that patience was the most important quality for a liaison officer to cultivate when dealing with the Chinese.

Matsuyama ha spread his forces widely, over a near 60 mile sector, thus he would be unable to perform mobile operations and was gradually shifting to a defense of the Kaolikung mountain range by the 20th. This allowed the 53rd Army to continue their advance and the New 39th to retake Hemushu. By late May, with the 198th Division apparently contained on the north, Kurashige then rushed with the 113th Regiment to reinforce the Tiantouzhai front, where they successfully stopped the 53rd Army on its tracks. Yet on June 1st, the 54th Army, emerged in the Shweli valley from Ta-tang-tzu pass to join the 593rd Regiment from the Ma-mien pass. Next day the Chinese occupied Chieh-tou village and began patrolling the Shweli valley. They took the advice of Y Force officers and donned Burmese clothes. So disguised, they found it easy to enter Japanese-held villages. When taken by surprise, the Japanese were willing to abandon many of their outer defenses. With TNT charges dropped by the 27th Troop Carrier's C-47's when the weather cleared, the 198th Division also blew up the last pillboxes at Chai-kung-tang on June 13th. When the last shots had been fired and the Chinese farmer boys of the 54th Army reported the area secure, there was bewilderment at finding only 75 Japanese bodies in defenses that must have been manned by at least 300 men, and shock and nausea when the Japanese kitchens revealed how the defenders had been able to prolong their stay. Pitiful and ghastly evidence showed that the Japanese had resorted to cannibalism when their rations failed. On June 14th the Japanese further quit Chiao-tou-chieh, leaving many stores to the 2nd Reserve and 36th Divisions. In the end, the Kurashige Detachment would pull back to Watien while the Inose Battalion retreated towards Kutungchieh.

General Wei then ordered the 71st Army to cross the Salween, just below the Huitung Bridge to attack Longling while a containing force attacked the strong Japanese harrison at Lameng. 20,000 troops of the 71st would cross the river by June 5th. At this time the 76th division left a regiment to besiege Pinga while the bulk pushed on to attack Matsuyama’s HQ at Mangshi, while the 9th Division crossed the Salween, cutting off Pingda’s line of communication. On June 4th, the new 28th Division attacked Lameng and forced Major Kanemitsu Keijirous garrison to retreat into the Mount Song fortress where they would hold out for several months. While the New 28th held down Kanemitsu, the 87th Division continued towards Longling, joining up with the 88th on June 8th to begin a siege of the main Japanese position on the Yunnan front. The Japanese still held onto the Burma Road east of Lung-ling, but as of June 7th the 87th Division had covered about two thirds of the distance along the Burma Road from the river to Lung-ling. The Chinese had to deal with small Japanese tanks, which had some moral effect but failed to halt the Chinese advance. Indeed, the latter had been fairly swift, for the Chinese had surprised the Japanese, and had been able to ease their supply problems by the capture of some Japanese rice depots. 

To meet the new crisis, Matsuyama dispatched the 1st battalion, 119th regiment to stop the 2nd army at Xiangdaxiang and then attack Longling from the south. Matsuyama ordered Colonel Matsui Hideji to immediately relieve Longling from the north; and for the Yamazaki Composite Group to keep the Mangshi-Longling road open. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General Song Xilian, had been making some progress against Longling’s two outer heights, the stout defenders would manage to repel the uncoordinated Chinese assaults for about a week. Four days of un-coordinated infantry attacks, with little artillery support, failed to carry the three mountains inside Lung-ling, and there was nothing to show for the heavy drain on the 71st Army's ammunition stocks. This gave more time for Matsuyama’s reinforcements to arrive by June 14th. On the 15th Matsui launched a heavy attack, in coordination with the besieged defenders, successfully defeating the 71st Army and consequently driving the Chinese from the vicinity of Longling. The Japanese had thus been able to drive back 10000 Chinese effectives by an attack with only 1500. 

Repeated attempts by American liaison personnel with the 71st Army to learn how a small Japanese garrison could drive back a Chinese army group only brought embarrassed smiles from Chinese officers. The Chinese finally related on June 25th that the 261st Regiment had bolted, and that the commanding general of the 87th Division had attempted suicide. When fuller details of the fighting around Longling were available, anger and annoyance spread from Y Force to the Generalissimo himself. Y Force personnel considered the Chinese decision to withdraw from Longling inexcusable because the 11th Army Group had sent forward no reinforcements to meet the initial Japanese counterattacks. Of 21 battalions in the Longling vicinity on June 14th, only 9 took part in the fighting. In describing the defensive attitude of the 259th Regiment, as an example of the conduct that had cost the chance of a speedy breakthrough into Burma, one American liaison officer wrote: "From the time that we crossed the river until we reached Longling, the regimental commander continually had his troops in the rear digging emplacements and trenches in the fear that they would have to retreat." Yet that is it for the Yunnan battle for now as we need to head over to the Kamaing area.

General Tanaka’s 18th Division were withdrawing with the 22nd and 38th division in hot pursuit. To the south the Seton Roadblock was being held by 112th Regiment, threatening to thwart Tanaka’s plans. Coming to their aid, General Sun sent his 113th and 114th Regiments to descend upon Lawa, where General Aida began an unauthorized retreat on June 4th. The abandonment of Lawa severely affected the defense of Kamaing, thus General Aida was relieved of command and replaced with Colonel Imaoka Soshiro. Colonel Shoshiro immediately began to dig in at Lagawng. Meanwhile the bulk of the 55th and 56th regiments were holding onto the Nanyaseik area as General Liao’s 65th regiment cut their withdrawal route off on June 1st. While the rest of the 22nd Division were applying pressure from the north, the heavily outnumbered Japanese had no choice but to quickly cut a trail southeast, finally withdrawing on june 7th. Their retreat was chaotic, both regiments lost contact with each other and with their subordinate units as they made separate ways towards Kamaing. It would only be the 3rd battalion, 56th regiment who would arrive at Kamaing by June 10th, most of the others would reach Lakatkawng in late june. While retreating, their artillery units were intercepted by the pursuing Chinese and the artillerymen chose to die with their guns.

While the 22nd Division and 149th Regiment thus pushed towards Kamaing, General Sun had also sent the 113th Regiment to take Zigyun and the 114th Regiment to advance southwards and support the Chindit assault on Mogaung. The Chinese were able to encircle Kamaing from the west, north and east as the 149th Regiment then moving across the fields and into Kamaing to take the settlement on June 16th,  pushing Tanaka’s battle-weary troops to the hills south and west of Kamaing. Meanwhile Brigadier Calbert was able to reach the Mogaung area by the start of June. 12 miles from Mogaung, Calvert’s forward troops began to run into Japanese patrols and snipers. Despite taking losses, the 3/6th Gurkhas led by Colonel Claude Rome, who in his previous incarnation had been overlord of “Broadway,” pushed on, seizing the western heights overlooking Mogaung on May 31. On June 1st, Calvert’s South Staffords linked up with Rome and the Gurkhas at the village of Loihinche. Other elements of the brigade reached the southern foothills of the heights, three miles south of the town, on June 2 and went straight into the fray. That same day, the Lancashire Fusiliers and the South Staffords also attacked Lakum (held by some ordnance troops and a field hospital). The leading force of Fusiliers was soon pinned down by heavy fire, the impasse only broken when a Bren gunner in the leading rifle section went wild, and ran “straight up the hill, firing from the hip and screaming curses at the Japanese.” Softening up the Japanese with airstrikes from Air Commando Mustangs, troops of the 1st Lancashire Fusiliers and 1st South Staffordshires attacked and wrested Lakum village away from Japanese and occupied the summit of the range of hills overlooking the city, to the northwest. 

Calvert decided he would need to build a base akin to White City, where he could collect supplies and build an airstrip to take out the wounded. Calvert fixed his eye on the village of Lakum, occupying a strategic spot on the eastern foothills of the heights overlooking the Mogaung plain. Upon capturing the village, the Chindits would also find substantial ammunition, a field hospital and buildings which had obviously hosted several Japanese headquarters. The country leading up to Lakum, however, was hard stuff. It was in the midst of thick jungle intersected by deep ravines. The path proved difficult to follow as it sometimes wound along a ridge and sometimes went straight up or straight down. The place was a defender’s paradise. “A handful of resolute men could hold successive hill-tops for hours against a large force such as ours overburdened with mules and heavy stores,”.

In response to the new threat, Colonel Okada Hakuji rushed over with some units of his 128th Regiment to protect Mogaung, leaving his 1st Battalion to face the rapidly-approaching 114th Regiment and immediately recalling his 3rd Battalion from Seton. Alongside this General Honda ordered General Takeda to turn back from Myitkyina and instead secure the Moguang-Kameing area. Thus the chance to lift the siege of Myitkyina was lost. By June 3rd, the Chindits had built a new airstrip near the Tapaw Ferry, allowing airdrops of supplies and equipment to spill in. Calvert was now ready to launch his attack. 

Early on June 8th, the 1st South Staffords set off to secure the Pinhmi. The village was defended by elements of 3rd battalion, 128th regiment who were also protecting some ammunition dumps in the area. The Staffords routed the Japanese and destroyed the dumps, clearing the way to the bridge. By now it was afternoon, and they stepped aside to let the 1st Lancashire Fusiliers move on to capture the 150-foot-long bridge. All seemed well until a hail of gunfire shattered the silence, tearing into the Fusiliers. Two companies were pinned down in the ditch while another was in the jungle further down. At about 6 pm, Calvert arrived at the front to confer with Major David Monteith of the attacking company. It was decided that two platoons, under the cover of a mortar barrage would dash across the bridge and secure the other bank. Calvert’s mind went to the 4.2” mortars. He intended to use them to deadly effect now. Two platoons of Fusiliers moved in on the bridge, with one platoon attempting to move along the ditch, only to struggle against the thick, waist-high grass, as the second slipped off the road into the jungle. The mortars, about 60 yards behind them, began firing, slowly at first, but then as fast as the men could drop bombs into the tubes. The men, with fixed bayonets, charged across the bridge. The Japanese waited until the British were halfway across before opening fire. Tracers filled that little space, bullets tearing into flesh. The Chindits toppled left and right. Some crawled in their bellies, trying to get just far enough to throw their grenades upon the enemy positions. By 6.15, it was all over, the retreat was called. Calvert summoned US airstrikes. Mustangs swooped in, bombing and machine-gunning the enemy emplacements, but one Mustang mistakenly bombed a group of Fusiliers unloading mules.

Because of the unexpected opposition, Calvert would instead direct his forces to ford the Wettauk Chaung and take Mahaung and Ywathitgale, which successfully fell on June 9. The following morning, a Gurkha company attacked towards Kyaingyi and the railway to create the impression that the main attack would come from this direction while the bulk of the 3/6th Gurkhas made a wide right flank advance to attack the bridge from the rear. At dawn on the 10th, Shaw’s Gurkhas moved forward, waist deep in marsh water and mud. The bridge assault party was under the command of Captain Michael Allmand, a one-time cavalryman commissioned into the Indian Army in 1942 after escaping from Singapore. Allmand moved his men forward warily. The approaches to the bridge were narrow with the road up on a high embankment with swampy, tree-heavy low-ground flanking both sides. Coming in from the marsh, the Gurkhas set upon the bunkers at the bridge with grenades and small-arms fire, but the Japanese held their ground. At 10 am, they tried again, shooting and hurling grenades from amid waist-deep mud of the Wettauk. Allmand, who was close to shore charged. Throwing grenades to scatter the enemy, he closed in to kill three with his kukri. Rallied by his heroism, the Gurkhas rushed the remaining defenders, capturing the bridge. About 35 Japanese were killed at the bridge and the Gurkhas captured one medium machinegun and two light machineguns. In return, Chindit casualties in the encirclement and capture of the Pinhmi Bridge came to about 130 killed and wounded. By mid-afternoon, Calvert had deployed two battalions up on the Mogaung-Pinhmi Road, while a third occupied the bridge area. Conquering the brigade saw the Chindits suffer 130 casualties, while Okada’s troops had also suffered heavy casualties, yet they had successfully delayed the Chindit advance for four days, which allowed Takeda to bring the bulk of his forces back into Mogaung.

Knowing full well that the Japanese had been able to reinforce Mogaung, Calvert decided to wait for the arrival of the Chinese troops that Stilwell had sent to reinforce him; but in the meantime, he launched a successful attack against the courthouse on June 11, followed by a failed advance towards the river. To secure his right flank, Calvert had decided to send a company of South Staffords under a new replacement officer, Major “Archie” Wavell Jr, son of the venerable Viceroy, to secure the area between the road and the Mogaung River. The Staffords made good headway, but near the river, they came under heavy fire from entrenched Japanese. Wavell was hit in the wrist, the bullet almost taking the hand off; and he was then pulled out of the line and walked back to the field hospital near Gurkha village, clutching onto his hand, which was now hanging on by a sinew. That night, the surgeons at Gurkha Village were to remove the hand entirely. Wavell Jr’s war was over. In the end, the Staffords also had to pull back towards the road after the loss of their commanding officer. By June 15th,  the Chinese had still not appeared, thus the Chindits ultimately had to withdraw to Pinhmi. 

Back over at Myitkyina artillery was arriving by air. Two batteries plus one platoon of 75-mm. howitzers; two 105-mm., and two 155-mm. howitzers, were landed. All except two pieces with GALAHAD were kept under headquarters control. During the siege they fired 600 tons of ammunition, very rarely with massed fire. Boatner renewed his offensive on June 13th, sending almost all his forces to attack the town from all directions. The American-Chinese forces would struggle to make much progress against General Minakami’s defenses. Utilizing a system of night attack and daylight defense, heavy casualties were consequently inflicted on the enemy and large supplies of weapons and ammunition were captured and used in the defense of the city. On June 12th the Japanese hit a platoon of K Company, New GALAHAD, so hard that the company broke and re-formed on the L Company line. The portion of the Japanese thrust that hit the perimeter next to the river made most of the men "take off," but two stayed in place and repelled the Japanese with an automatic rifle and a machine gun. To the west of this little break the Japanese worked their way in close but were stopped by grenades and small arms fire.

As a result of the attacks, however, the 3rd Galahad Battalion had cut the Maingna ferry road and reached the Irrawaddy north of Myitkyina by June 17th, with the 150th and 88th Regiments also gaining up to 200 yards. The allies needed to capture the Myitkyina-Mogaung-Sumprabum road junction; but for such few gains, Boatner had lost many men and thus had to stop his attacks on June 18th. Stilwell ordered the end of all infantry attacks. Boatner replied that he would stop attacking Japanese positions until ". . . our troops are steadied and a favorable opportunity presents itself." There was reason for the troops to need steadying. A and B companies, 209th Engineers, were cut off from their main body by infiltrating Japanese. Trying to close in on them, Company C and Headquarters and Service Companies were in turn halted by Japanese. The condition of A and B Companies became critical during June 14th, for they had only one meal with them. Two of their men managed to work their way back to the block on the Sumprabum Road with news of their plight, but enemy small arms fire prevented airdrops. The isolated companies finally made their way back in small groups to the rest of the battalion over 15 and 16 June. The 3rd Battalion of GALAHAD reported trouble in effecting reorganization and enforcing orders. The Americans were not alone in their problems. Two companies of the Chinese 2/42nd which had made a small penetration into the Japanese lines on 14 June were wiped out by counterattack that night. These setbacks emphasized the nature of the Myitkyina fighting. The Allies held a ring of battalion and regimental strongpoints enclosing a similar Japanese system. Though the Allied strongpoints were close enough for the troops in one to sortie to the aid of another should that be needed, they were not so close that interlocking fire could be put down to close the gaps. Consequently, there was plenty of room for maneuver and ambush, and the inexperienced engineers and New GALAHAD troops often suffered at the hands of General Minakami's veterans. On the other hand, the Myitkyina Garrison did not emerge entirely unscathed, as they too suffered heavily, losing approximately 1000 men during the month of June alone. But that is all for today with the CBI theater as we now need to head over to New Guinea to start the Battle of Lone Tree Hill.

After the fall of Wakde, General Tagami had sent Colonel Yoshino Naoyasu’s 223rd Regiment to cross the Tor River inland to attack Arare while Colonel Matsuyama Soemon’s 224th Regiment attacked the Toem area from the other side. In the meantime, General Doe’s 163rd Regiment patrolled across Tementoe Creek and the Tor River, encountering heavy Japanese resistance at Maffin but successfully repelling some enemy counterattacks. While the 163rd strengthened its defenses on the Tor and at Arare, Doe would also see the arrival of Colonel Prugh Herndon’s 158th Regiment on May 21. General Krueger’s plan was to use this regiment in a vigorous overland drive toward Sarmi, aimed at throwing the enemy into the defensive and therefore securing the Wakde area. This decision was based upon scanty and incomplete information concerning Japanese strength and dispositions. The Japanese had no intention of abandoning Sarmi and the two airstrips between the town and the Tor without a desperate struggle. 

The Americans were also finalizing their plans for an operation against Biak, codenamed Hurricane. General Fuller’s plan was to land the 186th Regiment in the Bosnek area at 7:45 on May 27th to secure the Green Beaches and its two jetties. Once the two jetties were secured, LCI's bearing the 162nd Infantry, supporting troops, and the task force reserve were to move inshore and unload. LST's were also to move to the jetties when the beach area surrounding them had been cleared by the 186th Infantry. LCM's bearing artillery, tanks, and engineering equipment were to move to the beaches as soon as channels through the coral were found or made, or to the jetties in waves following the 186th Infantry's assault companies. As soon as it reorganized ashore, the 162nd Infantry was to advance rapidly west along the coast from Bosnek to seize the three airdromes. This drive was to be supported by eight tanks of the 603rd Tank Company and the 146th Field Artillery Battalion. The fields were to be repaired quickly to accommodate one fighter group and then expanded to receive an additional fighter group, a heavy bomber group, a reconnaissance group, a night fighter squadron, and one photo reconnaissance squadron. Mokmer Drome was to be the first field developed. Brigadier-General Edwin Patrick would also replace Doe in command of the Tornado Task Force, as the latter would resume its duties as assistant commander of the 41st Division.

Admiral Fechteler’s Task Force 77 was to provide naval support and cover the assault shipping. Naval fire support was to begin at H minus 45 minutes, 6:30. From that time until H Hour, cruisers and destroyers were to expend 400 rounds of 8-inch, 1,000 rounds of 6-inch, 3,740 rounds of 5-inch, and 1,000 rounds of 4.7-inch ammunition on targets in the airfield area west of the landing beaches. After H Hour the cruisers were to continue intermittent fire on the airfields, bombard targets of opportunity, and respond to calls for support from the forces ashore. Because there were many known or suspected Japanese gun emplacements along the south shore of Biak, counterbattery fire was to take precedence over all other types of fire. Bombardment of the landing beaches was also to begin at H minus 45 minutes. Five destroyers were to bombard the beaches and adjacent areas until H minus 30 minutes, when they were to move westward to join the cruisers firing on the airfield area. Then four other destroyers were to continue beach bombardment until H minus 3 minutes. Total ammunition allowance for beach bombardment was 4,900 rounds of 5-inch and 4.7-inch shells, while 40-mm. and 20-mm. ammunition was to be expended at the discretion of individual ship commanders. Rocket and automatic weapons fire from three rocket-equipped LCI's and two SC's was to provide close support for the assault waves. This fire was to begin at H minus 5 minutes and was to last until H Hour or until the initial wave was safely ashore.

Meanwhile General Kenney would toss 52 B-24’s to bomb the beaches just before the landings. Additionally, medium bombers and fighters from 5th Air Force would cover the force from the air; and from May 17th onwards, the bombings on Biak’s airfields would increase sharply in violence to soften up its defenses. As elsewhere along the absolute defense zone perimeter, primary emphasis was laid upon the construction of airfields. Between December 1943 and the enemy invasion of Hollandia in April 1944, two of three projected fields on southern Biak were completed and put into operational use by planes of the Navy's 23rd Air Flotilla. Their usefulness ended almost immediately, however, when the enemy's vastly superior air forces began operating from Hollandia bases. As in the Wakde-Sarmi sector, the concentration of effort on airfield construction until the Hollandia invasion resulted in dangerously delaying the preparation of ground defenses against enemy amphibious attack. In the five weeks which elapsed between the Hollandia and Biak invasions, the Biak garrison forces, under able leadership and by dint of desperate effort, succeeded in organizing a system of strong cave positions, which proved highly effective after the enemy landing. However, time, equipment and manpower were so short that defensive preparations could not entirely be completed. Some 15-cm naval guns, brought to Biak immediately after the Hollandia invasion to strengthen the coast defenses, were still unmounted when the island was attacked.

On May 23rd, the 158th advanced west from the Tor River Bridgehead. The advance of Company L met increasingly strong resistance. Japanese defenses were centered around three small, brush-bordered lakes near the beach about 1,800 yards west of the Tor. The rest of the 3rd Battalion, 158th Infantry, across the Tor before 1130, quickly moved forward to assist Company L, which had been pinned down along the main coastal track west of the lakes by Japanese machine gun and rifle fire. Company K pushed up to the left flank of Company L, while Company I moved toward L's rear. With the aid of mortar fire from the 81-mm. weapons of Company M, Companies K and L were able to push gradually forward during the afternoon, advancing on a front about 400 yards wide. Finding that the attack was not progressing as rapidly as he had expected, Colonel Herndon ordered his 1st Battalion across the Tor. The 1st Battalion did not start moving until 1400 and could not get far enough forward to join the attack before dark. Tanks would probably have been of great help to the 3rd Battalion, but by the time the mediums of the 1st Platoon, 603rd Tank Company, moved across the Tor, the forward infantry troops had already halted for the night. In the end, Companies L and K would dig in for the night across the main coastal track about 400 yards east of Maffin.

 The following morning, after an ineffective mortar and artillery bombardment, Herndon resumed the attack. Despite the lack of extended artillery support, Companies K and L moved out as planned at 7:30. Company L, on the right, advanced along the beach encountering only scattered rifle fire but Company K, on the main road, had hardly started when Japanese machine gun and rifle fire from concealed positions in a wooded area on the left front halted its advance. Unable to gain any ground, Company K called for tank support. Two tanks, together with a flamethrower detachment from Company B of the 27th Engineers, arrived at Company K's lines about 1000. With the flamethrowers and tanks blasting the way, the infantrymen overran the Japanese defenses, killing ten of the enemy and capturing two machine guns. The remainder of the Japanese force, probably originally some forty men strong, disappeared into the jungle south of the road, whence scattered rifle fire continued to harass Company K. Company L reached the outskirts of Maffin No. 1 about 1400. The movement had been slow, not as a result of Japanese opposition but because the battalion commander did not believe it prudent for Company L to advance far beyond Company K. Despite the return of two companies, most of Colonel Kato’s engineers would have to withdraw behind the Tirfoam River against such heavy firepower. Captain Saito’s reconnaissance unit, meanwhile, retreated to the jungles south of Maffin alongside one engineer company, which was under Kato himself. 

Over the Tirfoam River, however, the Americans were again stopped by the tenacious engineers, which again forced Herndon to request tank support. As the tanks moved into position elements of the Right Sector Force, comprising Captain Saito's men of the 1st Battalion, 224th Infantry and an engineer company, charged out of the jungle. The Japanese were under Colonel Kato, Right Sector Force commander, who was killed as he personally led a small detachment against the American tanks. The enemy was quickly thrown back with heavy losses by the combined fire of the four tanks and Company L's riflemen and machine gunners. However, under cover of their infantry attack, the Japanese had dragged a 37-mm. anti-tank gun forward out of the jungle. As the enemy infantrymen withdrew to the southwest after the death of Colonel Kato, the anti-tank gun opened fire. It was soon destroyed and its crew killed, but not before three of the American tanks had been so damaged that they had to be withdrawn for repairs.

Facing such heavy resistance, Herndon then sent his 1st Battalion to carry out a deep envelopment to the south across the Tirfoam, yet these troops would similarly be unable to break through by nightfall. After killing 28 men and wounded 75 others, Kato’s force allowed Tagami to dispatch the 2nd Battalion, 223rd Regiment to reinforce the Ilier Mountains line. On the morning of May 25, Major Matsuoka Yasake also arrived there with an infantry company to assume command of the remainder of Kato’s forces. Meanwnhile Yoshino had crossed the Tor River, 3 days behind schedule and to the east, Matsyuama was assembling on the right bank of the Tementoe River. Herndon relieved his 1st Battalion with the 3rd and then pushed west with the 2nd Battalion following behind them. The next objective for the 158th was Long Tree Hill.

Lone Tree Hill, known to the Japanese as Mt. Ilier,  had been named for a single tree which was depicted on its crest by the map then employed by the Americans. Actually, the hill's coral mass was covered with dense rainforest and jungle undergrowth. Lone Tree Hill was about 175 feet high, 1200 yards long north to south, and 1100 yards wide east to west. The north side dropped steeply to a rocky shore on Maffin Bay. The hill's eastern slope was fronted by a short, violently twisting stream which was promptly dubbed the "Snaky River" by the 158th Regiment. The main road curved away from the beach to pass south of the Snaky River and Lone Tree Hill through a narrow defile. The southern side of this defile was formed by two noses of Mt. Saksin , a terrain feature about 100 feet higher than Lone Tree Hill. The more westerly of these noses was named "Hill 225", known to the Japanese as Mt. Sento after its height in feet. No name was given to the eastern ridge line, which pointed toward Lone Tree Hill from the southeast. There was a small native village at the eastern entrance to the defile and another at the pass's western outlet. Mt. Saksin was a name given to an indefinitely outlined hill mass which forms the northern extremity of the Irier Mountains, extending inland from the coast at Lone Tree Hill. The name Saksin was specifically applied to a prominent peak about 2,000 yards due south of Lone Tree. On or about May 23rd General Tagami had moved his headquarters into the Mt. Saksin area, apparently on the southwest side of the central peak. 

Herndon forces continued the advance through the abandoned enemy positions, albeit without tank support, for they could not cross the fragile Tirfoam bridge. In the afternoon, the Americans were finally halted below the southernmost bend of the Snaky River, subjected to heavy machine-gun fire and an intermittent artillery bombardment. General Patrick, who had succeeded to the command of the TORNADO Task Force during the morning, was informed of the opposition encountered by the 1st Battalion. He ordered the advance stopped for the night and instructed the 158th Infantry to remain well east of the Snaky River so that American artillery could register on the native village and the defile without endangering the forward troops. Harassed by a few artillery shells, which by now had been recognized as originating from Japanese 70-mm. or 75-mm. weapons, the 1st Battalion pulled back about 500 yards east of the Snaky. A perimeter was set up with the battalion's left resting on the road and its right on the beach. The 2nd Battalion established a series of company perimeters back along the road to the east. Casualties for the day had been 22 men killed and 26 wounded, almost all in the 1st Battalion, while about 50 Japanese had been killed. When the attack orders for the day had been issued, it had been hoped that the 1st Battalion could reach the top of Lone Tree Hill before nightfall. Since the unexpectedly strong enemy opposition had prevented the realization of this hope, plans were made to continue the advance westward on the 26th. The ultimate objective was the east bank of the Woske River, 2,000 yards west of Lone Tree Hill, and the intermediate objective was the native village at the eastern entrance to the defile. The advance was to be preceded by naval shelling of the northern slopes of Lone Tree Hill from 6:30 to 7:00. A fifteen-minute artillery preparation was also to precede the advance, and the infantry was to start moving at 8:45.

The next morning, naval fire started ten minutes late. Two destroyers lying offshore shelled the northern slopes of Lone Tree Hill and the Maffin Bay area, firing on known or suspected enemy defensive positions and assembly points. After a twenty-minute bombardment the two support vessels withdrew. Artillery fire did not begin until 8:30. The time lag gave the Japanese ample opportunity to prepare for the infantry attack which had been heralded by the destroyer fire. The artillery, aiming its shells into the defile and against the eastern slopes of Lone Tree Hill, ceased firing about 8:45. A few moments later the 1st Battalion, 158th Infantry, Company B again leading, started moving westward. The infantry's line of departure was nearly 1,000 yards east of the village at the southeast foot of Lone Tree Hill, and the advance had to be slow because the road ran through heavily jungled terrain. The enemy therefore had sufficient time to reoccupy positions in the defile and on Lone Tree Hill which might have been vacated during the American artillery barrage. The value of both the naval and artillery bombardment had been lost.

Herndon’s 1st Battalion moved once again against Lone Tree Hill. Company B moved forward to the point at which it had been held up the previous afternoon and was again stopped--this time by fire from the southeastern corner of Lone Tree Hill. Company D's heavy machine guns were brought up to spray a densely wooded area in front of the point rifle platoon. The fire dispersed the Japanese riflemen, and Company B moved forward again. Less than 100 yards of ground had been gained when the company again encountered machine gun and mortar fire originating in the native village. Company A, initially off the road to the right rear of Company B, turned north to the mouth of the Snaky River. One platoon crossed at the river mouth at 1030 but was quickly forced back to the east bank by Japanese machine gun fire from the rocky beach below the north face of Lone Tree Hill. Artillery support was called for, supplied, and proved successful in stopping the enemy fire, and about 1:50 all Company A crossed the Snaky. Orders were to move down the west side of that stream to establish contact with Company B and to send one platoon up the eastern slope of Lone Tree Hill to probe enemy positions. Other efforts were meanwhile being made to scatter the Japanese opposing Company B. Company E moved up to the left flank of Company B and on the south side of the main road. The combined efforts of the two rifle companies proved insufficient to dislodge the Japanese from their positions at the eastern entrance to the defile, and the enemy fire forced the American units to seek cover. Company F was therefore ordered to pass through B's left flank and proceed to Hill 225 to take the Japanese positions from the rear. Company F's attack could not be started before dark and Company A, moving up the west side of the Snaky, was unable to relieve much of the pressure on Company B. Finally, Company A was forced for a second time to withdraw to the east bank of the river as a result of enemy fire from Lone Tree Hill. Tanks would have been of great help to Company B, but the bridge over the Tirfoam could not bear their weight, and the road west of the stream was in such disrepair that tanks probably could not have negotiated it.

Only Company A would manage to cross the Snaky River through much effort, yet it would be unable to relieve the pressure from Company B’s front and would have to retreat by the end of the day. To prevent further casualties from being inflicted by Japanese patrols, which were expected to roam around the flanks of the forward elements during the night, a semicircular perimeter was ultimately established. Although Herndon’s attacks on May 26th had been completely unsuccessful, the 158th Regiment had located and probed some of the principal Japanese defenses in the area and could now be ready to launch a more effective assault. 

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

General Vinegar Joe was experiencing some major setbacks, but it looked like Myitkyina was as good as his. However the American officers' reports of how difficult the going was for the Chinese was quite disheartening. Over in New Guinea, the allies were yet again faced with a great obstacle, now in the form of One Tree Hill.

Pacific War Special - 53 days on starvation island: ft John Bruning

John R. Bruning is the author or collaborating writer  of over 22 books such as the national bestseller Indestructible, Outlaw Platoon written with Sean Parnell, Shadow of the Sword with Jeremiah Workman, How to Break a Terrorist with Matthew Alexander, House to House with David Bellavia, The Devil's Sandbox, and Ghost: Confessions of a Counterterrorism Agent with Fred Burton.

The interview is about his upcoming book  “53 days on starvation island: the world war II battle that saved marine corps Aviation”.

It is the pivotal true story of the first 53 days of the standoff between Imperial Japanese and a handful of Marine aviators defending the Americans dug in at Guadalcanal.

- 130 - Pacific War - Battle of Wakde, May 14-21, 1944

Last time we spoke about the Japanese defeats at Imphal and Kohima. General Mutaguchi’s Operation U-Go was gradually falling apart. General Yamauchi faced defeat afte defeat and was forced to dig in around Sendgmai and Kanglatongbi. The allies then began tossing large counteroffensives while Mutaguchi was forced to change targets for Bishenpur, only to be repelled again. The allies' anvil-hammer strategy proved very effective, the Japanese lost their momentum and now the allies were seizing it. The battle for Kohima was fierce, seeing the Japanese struggle to seize key features upon it. Despite many victories in Kohima, it did not seem like the Japanese would be able to seize the entire area. Within the China theater, Operation Kogo saw the Japanese push into Luoyang, earning enormous victories over the Chinese forces. Out in the Pacific, the British eastern fleet launched a successful airstrike against Surabaya, gaining valuable experience despite minimal Japanese response.

This episode is the Battle of Wakde

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

 

A new mission was afoot, Operation Tornado, the amphibious assault of Wakde Island. The nucleus of the force that would hit Wakde was to be General Doe’s 163rd regiment of the 41st division. The war planners devoted a lot of time to the selection of a landing beach for Tornado. However the island was too small and her beaches were too limited to permit the landing of a reinforced regiment. Furthermore a landing on Wake would most likely be met by hidden Japanese artillery on the mainland. Thus to stop such a thing from occurring they would have to perform a landing against the mainland to eliminate artillery positions. 

It was decided that a landing at Toem, on the mainland directly opposite Wakde, would not be sensible. There the landing craft and cargo ships would be subjected to small-caliber fire from Wakde. In such restricted waters the enemy could place enfilade fire on the ships, but in more open waters to the west naval fire support ships and amphibious vessels would have freedom of movement and could maneuver to neutralize both Wakde and the Toem area while the TORNADO Task Force moved ashore and set up its artillery. After consideration of all these factors, it was finally decided that the initial beachhead would be at Arare, a native settlement on the coast about three miles west of Toem and four and one-half miles southwest of Wakde Island. Additionally, the Allied Air Forces desired that radar warning stations be established in the Wakde area. For this purpose, Liki and Niroemoar Islands, about fifteen miles off Sarmi, were to be seized.

As such the Tornado Task Force was going to begin landing on the mainland opposite of Wakde island at Arare on May 17th. The next day the 1st Battalion, 163rd Infantry would assault Wakde island, covered not only by the task force artillery but also by the Provisional Groupment on Insoemanai and by naval fire support ships. After all of that, on the 19th, Liki and Niroemoar islands would be captured where radar stations would be constructed. Furthermore, in reserve would be the 128th and 158th Regiments, ready to reinforce Doe’s troops if needed. 

Admiral Fechteler’s Task Force 77 was going to take charge of the operations against Wakde and Biak, with Captain Noble’s Eastern Attack Group providing fire support for Operation Tornado. Captain Noble divided his fire support ships into three groups: Fire Support Group A two heavy cruisers and four destroyers, Fire Support Group B three light cruisers and six destroyers, and Fire Support Group C, ten destroyers. These ships would  begin firing on assigned targets at H minus 45 minutes and would continue bombardment until H minus 3. The bulk of the D Day fire was to be aimed at Sawar and Maffin Dromes, west of the landing beach. No resistance was expected at the beach and a light bombardment to be directed on it was purely precautionary. Some fire support ships were assigned counterbattery missions and others were to aim their shells at Wakde and Insoemanai Islands. Other ships assigned to participate in the landing phase were 3 submarine chasers, 2 destroyer-escorts, 4 minesweepers, 2 rocket-equipped submarine chasers, and 3 rocket-equipped LCIs. Rocket fire was to begin at H minus 3 minutes and was to be directed principally against the beachhead area. At H minus 1, all fire on the beach was to cease and the landing craft were to make their final dash to the shore. After the landing, the fire support ships were to shift bombardment to targets on the beach flanks and were to be prepared to deliver call fire upon request from the troops ashore. The landing on Insoemanai was to be supported by two LCI”G”s and two destroyers. Throughout the night of 17-18 May, cruisers and destroyers were to bombard Wakde and on the morning of the 18th they and the rocket-equipped vessels were to support the assault on that island. On the 19th a few destroyers were to support the landings on Liki and Niroemoar Islands.

Admiral Crutchley’s cruisers would shell the mainland around Sarmi and Sawar, while Admiral Berkey’s cruisers would hit Wakde Island. On top of that, General Kenney’s 5th Air Force would hit the Wakde-Sarmi area alongside other targets along New Guinea’s northern coast. Special attention was given to enemy fields east of the Vogelkop Peninsula and on Biak Island. Japanese waterborne supply and reinforcement movements in the Geelvink Bay area were to be stopped insofar as weather, time, and the availability of aircraft permitted it. Insofar as range, weather, and time permitted, Australian bombers, aided by a Dutch squadron of B-25s, were to neutralize enemy air bases on the Arafura Sea islands and on other islands of the Indies southwest of the Vogelkop. On D minus 1 Fifth Air Force bombers were to attempt detonation of possible land mines on the mainland beach and subsurfaces mines in the waters surrounding Wakde. On the morning of D Day there was to be additional bombing west of the landing area, but there was to be no bombing or strafing of the beach immediately before the assault. Fighters were to be on air alert, weather permitting, over the Wakde area from first light to dusk on D Day. During part of the day A-20s would also be on alert over the area and were to strike Wakde. Such daily cover was to continue until aircraft could use the Wakde strip.

To face this onslaught was a signal IJA company, the Japanese 9th Company of the 224th Infantry Regiment, reinforced with a mountain artillery platoon and a few mortar and both light and heavy machine-gun squads from other 224th Regiment units. The strength of this combat force was about 280 men. They would be assisted by the IJN’s 91st Guard Unit of about 150 men and a battery of the 53rd Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, most of whose weapons had long since been demolished by the air attacks. Alongside miscellaneous airdrome engineers and other service personnel, both Army and Navy over on Insoemoear Island, this brought the total of Japanese strength on the island to nearly 800 troops. This was all the result of General Tagami’s decision to concentrate the bulk of his division in the Maffin Bay-Sawar sector, leaving the coastal stretch east of the Tor River and opposite of Wakde pretty much unguarded.

A series of untoward circumstances emerged which hampered the loading process. LSTs on which the Task Force units at Aitape were to be loaded were some eight hours late reaching the staging point. When these vessels finally reached Aitape, adverse surf conditions and congestion on the shore prevented their beaching until late in the afternoon of May 13th, and loading was delayed another twelve hours. There was also some trouble about units scheduled to take part in the Wakde operation. The Shore Battalion, 533rd EBSR, an important element of the Task Force, did not arrive at Aitape until the afternoon of May 12th. The battalion and its equipment could not be unloaded from the ships which had brought it to BLUE Beach from eastern New Guinea and be reloaded on LSTs of the Wakde convoy in time for the departure of the task force from Aitape, scheduled for no later than midnight on May 14th. In view of these logistic difficulties, General Doe was therefore forced to drive his troops to the limit of their endurance in order to get the loading finished on time. He solved the problem of the Shore Battalion, 533rd EBSR by substituting for that unit the Shore Battalion, 593rd EBSR, which was already stationed at Aitape.

Finally at 1am on the 15th, Noble’s ships departed Aitape, stopping at Hollandia to load the remainder of the task force, before assembling off Arare and Wakde by dawn of the 17th. The fire support ships successfully bombarded the Japanese targets against little resistance while as Troops aboard the assault ships arose early, ate the breakfast quickly, and by 5:30 began loading on their assigned landing craft. The sea remained calm and the rain gave way to the sun shortly after dawn. Men of the 3d Battalion, 163d Infantry, transferred from the APA's which had brought them from Aitape to the eight LCVP's of the first wave. The beach was clearly visible and its limits had been marked by colored smoke grenades dropped by cruiser-based seaplanes of the fire support units. Meeting zero opposition, the first American troops would hit the shore at 7:15, with succeeding waves rapidly arriving behind them. The 3rd Battalion then fanned out along the shore and quickly secured the Arare beachhead area, just as the remaining units were being brought to shore. Upon landing, Doe’s 2nd Battalion passed through the 3rd and immediately moved eastward towards Tementoe Creek, successfully securing Toem against no opposition by 9:30. 

There, the 1st Battalion assembled for the assault on Wakde while Company E was transported from the mainland to Insoemanai Island, where the Americans would successfully establish a Provisional Groupment of heavy weapons to support the next day’s assault. Within a few hours after the mainland beachhead had been secured, the Tornado Task Force was ready to execute the second phase of the D Day plan, the capture of Insoemanai Island, a little over 3,500 yards offshore. At about 10:45, under cover of fire from two destroyers and two rocket-equipped LCIs, a platoon of Company E, 163rd Infantry, was transported from the mainland to Insoemanai. There was no opposition to this maneuver and the islet proved to be unoccupied. Four LCMs, an LCVP, and two LCSs immediately took the rest of the company and the Provisional Groupment of heavy weapons to Insoemanai. The landing of the force was rendered difficult only by the fact that a coral fringing reef made it necessary for the troops to wade ashore from about seventy-five yards out. The mortars and machine guns of the Provisional Groupment were quickly set up and began firing on Wakde. The Japanese at Wakde responding to their first bombardments with machine-gun and mortar fire, which was the only noticeable resistance of this day. At the same time, elements of the 3rd Battalion had moved west to the Tor River, successfully reaching it during the afternoon. Thus, by the end of the day, the Americans had landed a total of 7000 men and had successfully secured a firm beachhead between the Tementoe and Tor Rivers at the cost of only 2 killed and 11 wounded. 

Once he received news of the landings, General Tagami ordered all his forces to prepare a counterattack to try and destroy the allied beachhead. He also ordered the Matsuyama Detachment, who were advancing towards Hollandia, to turn back to Toem as quickly as possible so they could launch and attack against the enemy from the east. Yet before the Japanese could begin their advances, General Doe’s amphibious assault began. Shore-based artillery, the Provisional Groupment on Insoemanai, and some of the naval fire support ships unleashed harassing fire on Wakde throughout the night. 36 A-20s of General Kenney’s Fifth Air Force bombed and strafed the Japanese defenses beginning at 7:15am on the 15th. Naval bombardment lasted until 8:57 when the gunfire was aimed at the proposed landing beach on the southern shore of Wakde, and was then to be lifted to the northern side of the island. The 191st Field Artillery Group fired for twenty-three minutes on Wakde, and this bombardment was supplemented by 20-mm. and 40-mm. weapons aboard naval support vessels upon completion of the latters' fire from heavier weapons. The Provisional Groupment on Insoemanai joined in. In addition, rocket-equipped LCIs threw 850 4.5-inch rockets on the island. Noble’s warships expending a total of 400 rounds of 6-inch and 1950 rounds of 5-inch ammunition against Wakde's defenses. 

The Japanese had constructed many defensive positions on Wakde. There were about a hundred bunkers of various sizes and constructions. Some were made of coconut logs and dirt, others utilized cement in sacks, and a few contained concrete or lumps of coarse coral. There were many foxholes and slit trenches, and the Japanese had improved some of the bomb craters to make defensive positions. There were at least two well-constructed concrete air raid shelters and the Japanese were prepared to use the few coral caves on the eastern shore for both defense and storage. Many of the defensive positions were well camouflaged, and some were dug deep into the ground to present a low silhouette. Coconut trees toppled by pre-assault bombardments added more natural camouflage and protection to the enemy's defensive positions. The majority of the many bunkers were mutually supporting, but, on the other hand, some had been built with no apparent relationship to others. Some of the bunkers, most of the field and anti-aircraft gun positions, the airstrip, and many buildings had been severely damaged or destroyed by carrier-based aircraft during their attacks on the Wakde-Sarmi area in support of the Hollandia operation.

By 9am, the first wave of LCVPS were surging forward under Japanese rifle and machine gun fire at around 300 yards range. They hit the beaches at Wakde at 9:10am. For the next 15 minutes, three rifle companies and two Sherman tanks landed against increasing fire from Japanese machine-guns and rifles in hidden positions on the flanks of the beachhead. Despite the resistance, the beachhead was quickly organized and the Americans soon began to expand the perimeter in all directions. The two tanks, with Companies B and F, started moving west to widen the initial hold. Company C struck north toward the airstrip and Company A pushed to the southeast along the small peninsula to destroy a troublesome machine gun nest on the little knoll. After destroying an enemy bunker, Company A cleared the eastern peninsula by 10:45 while Companies B and F, after meeting initial heavy resistance on the west flank, found that most opposition collapsed once the ruins of prewar plantation houses had been cleared by hand grenades and rifle fire. The two companies thereupon left the beach and swung north toward the airfield.

Company C then encountered strong resistance in its drive up the center of the island, laboriously clearing a group of bunkers by 10:15 but then calling for tank support to destroy a second group in front of the airfield. At the same time, Companies B and F swung north towards the airfield, reaching its southern edge at 10:30 and then pushing eastwards. Just before 11:30  the tanks joined the infantry unit, which had now pushed halfway from the beach to the airstrip. With this added strength Company C reduced each bunker in a series of separate actions which included 75-mm. fire from the tanks, lobbing hand grenades into the bunkers' fire ports, and killing with rifle fire all Japanese who showed themselves. With Company B's aid and the continued support of the two tanks, Company C was able to push on to the airstrip. In the northeast corner of the island the Japanese forces maintained a fierce defense, and Companies B, C, and F were subjected to considerable small arms, machine gun, and mortar fire originating from positions at the eastern end of the airstrip. Movement eastward along the south side of the strip was slow, even though Companies B and F had been reinforced by Company D's heavy machine guns, which had arrived on Wakde from Insoemanai late in the morning.

In the meantime, Company A was sent to aid in the mop up of the plantation houses, before turning northwest to clear the western end of Wakde. Company A pushed along the beach road and down a dispersal lane running off the southwest side of the strip. About 1245 the advance was held up by three Japanese bunkers on the right flank. Tank 75-mm. fire, delivered from as close as 20 yards, soon eliminated the Japanese defenders. Small groups of Japanese, originally hiding in foxholes behind the three pillboxes, attempted to assault the tanks with hand grenades and bayonets. Company A's automatic riflemen quickly dispersed or killed these men, and the unit pushed on around the west end of the airstrip. Little opposition was encountered in this movement and the company reached the north shore of Wakde Island about 1:30pm. Major Wing of the 1st battalion, decided to await the arrival of two more tanks from the mainland and the redisposition of Company D's weapons before attacking what promised to be the strongest Japanese defenses on Wakde. The two additional tanks were to be used wherever opposition proved heaviest, while the heavy weapons of Company D were to be equally divided between Companies B and F.

Meanwhile Company C attempted to advance across the strip in support of Company A, but their movement would be delayed due to the ferocious enemy resistance. At 3:45, Company A finally restarted the drive eastwards while Companies B and F kept pushing along the airfield. Company A rapidly moved forward from the western end of the strip, passed through Company C at the halfway point, and pushed cautiously eastward. Movement after passing Company C was slowed by increasingly heavy machine gun and mortar fire from the northeast section of the island. At 6:00, when Major Wing ordered his men to dig in for the night, Company A had not quite reached the northeastern corner of the airfield. Meanwhile, south of the strip Company B had scarcely started its attack when fire from hidden Japanese machine guns held up the advance. Company F was immediately pulled out of its reserve role and committed to action on B's right flank. Two tanks were moved forward to Company B's front at the same time. Despite their best efforts and even with the tank support, Companies B and F were unable to progress more than 300 yards east of the lines of departure. Major Wing decided that since dusk was approaching it would be useless to continue the attack. The two companies were therefore halted and instructed to take up night defensive positions.

Company A had set up its night perimeter about 100 yards short of the northeast corner of the airdrome. Company B was on the south side of the strip about 450 yards from the eastern end, and Company F was on B's right. Company C was pulled back to the southern side of the field and extended Company F's line to the southeast beach at the base of the small peninsula. The battalion command post was about 400 yards behind the lines of Company F. There was no connection across the strip between Companies A and B. The former was in a dangerously exposed position. However, Japanese fire against the company perimeter ceased before dark, and the Japanese did not attack.

The night was fairly uneventful except at around 2:30 am on the 19th a small group of Japanese attacked a command post, defended by elements of Company D, and a half-hour fire fight raged in the darkness. Twelve Japanese were killed while three Americans, all of D Company, were wounded. This night battle did not delay the next day's attack which started, after an artillery and mortar preparation of one hour's duration, at 9:15am. Company C was the first unit under way on the 19th. Two tanks were assigned to the 3rd Platoon and one to the 2nd. The 3rd Platoon was on the left, the 2nd on the right, and the 1st and Weapons Platoons were in support. The 3rd Platoon pushed eastward up a slight rise, harassed by light rifle fire from the front and left flank. Once on top of the rise the platoon met heavy Japanese fire from behind fallen coconut trees and from a number of bunkers, bomb craters, and demolished buildings to the east. The 75-mm. guns of the tanks methodically destroyed each enemy position, and the few enemy that escaped from the bunkers were cut down by 3rd Platoon riflemen. The 2nd Platoon, followed by the rest of C Company, moved on toward the eastern beaches, and was slowed only by heavy brush near the shore. Upon turning north at the beach the company found that the Japanese had converted a number of small coral caves into minor strong points. These were slowly cleared by riflemen, tank fire, and flame throwers as the company pushed on.

Meanwhile, Company B, moving east along the south edge of the airstrip, had also encountered many Japanese defensive positions. Progress was at a snail's pace. Company F, in reserve during the early part of the drive, was thrown into the fight on B's right flank about 11:30 and two tanks were sent from Company C's front to support Company B. The latter, with its zone of responsibility now nearly halved, was able to concentrate its forces for more effective operations. A rifle platoon was assigned to each tank and the remaining rifle platoon was in support. Some Japanese were found hidden in wrecks of aircraft, some of which covered bunkers, and others were in foxholes in heavy brush. This brush was difficult for soldiers afoot to penetrate but the tanks, spraying every likely hiding place with machine gun fire, rapidly broke paths through it. The advance, even with the tank support, was slow, because it was necessary to comb every square foot of ground for Japanese riflemen. It was not until 1400 that Company B reached the southeast corner of the strip. On B's right, Company F and one tank encountered similar opposition but managed to keep abreast of Companies B and C.

During the late afternoon, Companies C and F turned north, while Company A advanced northeast to join up with Company B. At this point the eastern end of the field had been cleared out, the Japanese resistance began to collapse as remaining defenders formed a small triangle perimeter by 6pm. Meanwhile Liki and Niroemoar were captured by Companies E and I on the 19th. The two companies had been transported to the objectives by two APD's and two LCT's, protected by DD's. The islands proved to be unoccupied by the Japanese and the Fifth Air Force radar detachments were immediately set up. The only casualty was the native chieftain of Liki, who was wounded by the pre assault naval bombardment. Detachments of the 163d Infantry were left on both islands to protect the radar installations.

The morning of the 20th, suddenly opened up with a banzai charge performed by 37 Japanese, who had slipped through Company C's lines during the night against engineer units at the beachhead. The attack began at7:30, leaving36 dead and 1 wounded Japanese, the latter was taken prisoner. At 9:00 Companies A, C, and F started patrolling in the northeast pocket. A few Japanese were killed, others were buried by demolition charges in coral caves along the northeast shore, and many committed suicide. During the afternoon Major Wing's men moved back to the mainland and turned over control of Wakde Island to the Allied Air Forces. The 836th Engineer Aviation Battalion began repairing the western end of the Wakde airdrome, with the strip being declared operational on May 21st. The first planes landed on the island that afternoon, two days ahead of schedule. Within a few more days the Wakde strip was sufficiently repaired and enlarged to furnish the needed base from which bombers could support the Biak operation on May 27 and Admiral Nimitz’ advance to the Marianas in mid-June. The final count of Japanese casualties on Wakde was 759 killed and 4 captured, with an additional 50 being killed on the mainland. In turn, the Americans only lost 43 killed and 139 wounded. That is all for today on this front as we now need to cross over to the India-Burma front.

Last time, we saw the forces of General Stopford managed to retake Kohima Ridge in mid May, tossing General Sato’s 31st Division onto the defense. Stopford reorganized his forces for a final push. The 5th brigade led by Brigadier Michael West prepared to launch  coordinated set-piece attacks against the remaining Japanese positions atop Naga Hill. An attack was made by the Cameron Highlanders on Hunter's Hill on the night of May 15th, but it was hurled back. After this bulldozers were sent to cut a track up Naga Hill to allow tanks to support an infantry assault. On the 19th, Brigadier West launched another attack, but this time terrible weather hindered them, allowing the Worcesters to only seize 9 bunkers before being halted by enemy fire, coming from a group of bunkers on the reverse slope. After this, General Messervy of the 7th division was given responsibility for taking Naga Hill. On May 23rd, he brought with him Brigadier Loftus-Tottenham’s 33rd brigade. This switch allowed General Grover to concentrate the remainder of his tired division for an attack on the Japanese positions on Aradura Spur. On the other side, Sato was exhorting his men to “You will fight to the death. When you are killed you will fight on with your spirit.” Yet Sato knew full well he lacked the ammunition and provisions necesary to hold Kohima, he would have to withdraw in short order. 

Two sets of attacks were unleashed upon the Japanse, first on Japanese defences around Point 5120, known also as Church Knoll and Hunter's Hill by Messervy's 7th Indian Division on the left of the battlefield, and then of Aradura Spur by Grover's 2nd Division on the right. The 4/15th Punjab suffered a bloody reverse in these assaults, losing 18 officers and 443 casualties for not a single metre of ground in return. No combination of attacks from the air, artillery strikes, tanks, flame-throwers, infantry or mortars could dislodge Sato's men. On the Aradura Spur, Grover ordered simultaneous assaults to take place on 27th and 28th of May. On the right the Royal Scots and Norfolks were to attack the north-east end of Aradura Spur, while 6th Brigade were to take the south-west, where their objectives were named 'Matthew', 'Mark', 'Luke' and 'John'. When launched, however, 6th Brigade's attack on the 28th failed miserably. The weather was poor, the terrain atrocious and the morale of the exhausted 2nd Division the lowest it had been since its arrival. The attack by the Norfolks and the Royal Scots on the north-west spur met the same fate as the luckless 6th Brigade. The Norfolks were now down to 14 officers and 366 men, many exhausted and ill and, despite the remarkable leadership of Lt. Col. Robert Scott and above-average morale, the Japanese positions looked typically impervious to anything other than a direct tank round into each bunker, which of course was not possible in the steep, jungle-matted hillsides. Along with the intantry attacks, Naga Hill was heavily attacked by Hurricane bombers during the 24th and 25th, but the Japanese remained firmly entrenched and resolutely immovable. 

The only major result of these attacks would be more casualties and a further drop in morale for the British-Indian troops. Sato's was alianted from the HQ of 15th Army, but had no doubt that it was Mutaguchi's abject failure to send supplies through the mountains that had forced him to undertake the kind of passive defense in which his division was now engaged. On May 29th, Sato thus reported that his position was hopeless, and that he reserved the right to act on his own initiative and withdraw when he felt that it was necessary to do so, in order to save what remained of his battered division from inevitable destruction. Later that day he signaled Mutaguchi: “We have fought for two months with the utmost courage, and have reached the limits of human fortitude. Our swords are broken and our arrows spent. Shedding bitter tears, I now leave Kohima.” Apoplectic with rage and astonished at his subordinate's blatant disobedience, Mutaguchi ordered Sato to stay where he was. Sato ignored him and on receipt of Mutaguchi's threat to court-martial him, replied defiantly: “Do as you please. I will bring you down with me.” The angry exchange continued, with Sato the following day sending a final angry message to Mutaguchi in which he declared: “The tactical ability of the 15th Army staff lies below that of cadets.” Sato then ordered his staff to close down the radio sets, in a final act of defiance.

During the back and forth screamfest, Sato had requested Mutaguchi permis him to withdraw to a position that would allowed the 31st division to finally receive supplies, Mutaguchi simply refused and demanded he hold on another 10 days. Sato could simply not keep letting his men down, he made plans to withdraw for May 31st. The Miyazaki detachment was given the task of covering the retreat for the 31st division. On May 27th, the 4/1st Gurkhas under the newly appointed 27-year-old Lieutenant-Colonel Derek Horsford, managed to capture the Gun Spur at the extreme eastern edge of Naga Hill via a night infiltration that took the Japanese entirely by surprise. This further allowed tanks to approach the Japanese positions and, by June 1st, an attack by the Queen's discovered that the Japanese were withdrawing. Grover then thrusted his troops from the newly captured Naga Hill south-east across a valley to cut off General Miyazuki’s rearguard and the 124th regiment around the Aradura Spur from the road to Imphal just behind it. Recognizing the inevitable, Miyazaki then had to withdraw from Aradura on the night of June 4, planning to conduct further delaying actions at Viswema in protection of Sato’s withdrawal. Yet that is it for the battle of Kohima as we now need to travel north to see how General Vinegar Joe’s offensive is going.

Last time we saw General Merrill’s Marauders take the Myitkyina airstrip and prepare for a siege of Myitkyina. The Chinese forces of Generals Sun and Liao were pushing the 18th division towards the Kamaing area. As for the Chindits, Major Master’s 111th Brigade contuined to repel numerous Japanese attacks against the Blackpool Stronghold, without the assistance of his floater Brigades. The Japanese artillery continued to take a killing toll on the camp with their near continuous fire. They had been reinforced with even heavier 155mm guns, which together with enemy mortars positions on a ridge 1,000 yards ahead, began to pummel them. Meanwhile allied aircraft were unable to supply them adequately because of the monsoons, and General Takeda’s 53rd Division was furiously approaching to crush them. On May 16th Japanese troops penetrated the defenses and a counter-attack failed to eject them. Now many positions within the perimeter came under persistent sniper fire. Shelling that evening heralded another attack. It was beaten back, leaving 50 Japanese dead. This was followed by a night attack involving two companies. This was repulsed, the enemy losing another 70 men. Master’s estimated his Brigade had killed about 800 Japanese, they had also suffered 200 casualties during the last few days. Luckily for them, however, the impending threat to Myitkyina and Kamaing, forced General Honda to redirect the 3rd Battalion, 114th Regiment to reinforce the Myitkyina garrison while the 2nd Battalion, 146th Regiment continued north to reinforce General Tanaka. 

At this point Masters wanted to withdraw deeper into the jungle, from where they could ambush the advancing Japanese and set up a new stronghold with the help of 14th Brigade and West Africans, who were probing the jungle ridges east of them. He signaled Lentaigne asking for permission to abandon the block at his discretion. But Lentaigne’s authority had become reduced. He was forced to take the message to Stilwell, who having been thwarted at Myitkyina, had allowed the Hyde to his Jekyll to emerge. In scathing language, he called the British “a bunch of lily-livered Limey popinjays.” Lentaigne then let his Irish temper get the better of him, and a fierce argument erupted at Stilwell’s headquarters. Then on May 22nd, General Takeda’s 53rd Division reached the stronghold. They unleashed an all-out assault, the Cameronians of 90th Column, who held the southern perimeter, were being forced back, inch by inch, as the Chindit artillery engaged the Japanese assaulters over open sights. Soon the airstrip was in enemy hands, prompting the Bofors 40mm AA gunners to lower their quadruple barrels and blaze away at the enemy troops. The pyrotechnics took on a fantastic quality as night fell. At dawn on the 23rd, the Japanese withdrew to just beyond the airstrip, as 10 Japanese fighters swept in to strafe and bomb the British. Their attack proved almost leisurely compared to the artillery and infantry strikes. When the fighters departed, the Japanese artillery and machineguns resumed.

Masters called for a supply drop of ammunition as the previous night’s expenditure had been massive, but necessary. Eight RAF Dakotas appeared that afternoon, in light rain, low, just over the hills, twisting and turning over the forested peaks. Nearing Blackpool, they straightened out and flew level. Doors opened, parachutes streamed and crates of supplies came from the sky. A storm of fire erupted from the Japanese positions. The heavy AA guns joined in, the boom-boom-booms of their heavy fire becoming rhythmic in the distance. The wing of a Dakota vanished and plane fell like a twirling leaf, crashing into the jungle across from the “Deep.” Two other planes in their haste to evade fire nearly crossed streams; their payloads hurled far and wide, most of falling into Japanese hands. In all, four Dakotas were shot down. The defenders only managed to get a half an aircraft’s load of ammunition. Despite this the Chindits continued to resist the furious Japanese assaults; but before dawn on May 24th, the Japanese would finally overrun a hillock known as the Pimple, held by Harper’s 3/9th Gurkhas. Harper mounted an immediate counterattack. Harper’s Gurkhas struggled to dislodge the Japanese from the “pimple,” but failed. The defenders threw machine-gun fire and hurled mortar bombs towards the hillock with little apparent effect. The failed counterattack would only see the Japanese secure the Silly Point positions and advance rapidly east and south as the defenses progressively collapsed before them. 

By May 25, Masters was forced to withdraw while his forces still had enough ammunition to defend themselves. There were 90 men that could not walk without help and another 30-40 that could not walk at all. A doctor summoned Masters to a group of 40-50 disheveled men, many wounded, but still standing, carrying stretchers from the Main Dressing Station. They were now on the evacuation path, now largely devoid of fighting troops. None of the walking wounded would look Masters in the eye. The stretchers and litters were also full of men with horrific wounds; 19 in all. To Masters’ distress, the doctor said there were another 30 such cases ahead who could be saved if they were evacuated. He had given the 19 here full doses of morphine and said, under the thundering noise of the rain, that the men had no chance. It dawned on Masters that the doctor was suggesting that these men be put out of their misery. Master’s said “Very well. I don’t want them to see any Japanese,” The dotor cried “Do you think I want to do it?” But Masters was already seeking a way out. “Get the stretcher bearers on at once” he snapped. As he went back up the ridge towards what was left of the camp, he heard the carbine shots going off one by one along the line of casualties. He pressed his hands on his ears to blot out the sound, but couldn’t.

Masters and his subordinate commanders decided to withdraw in stages, with the forward line of defenders leapfrogging over a second line of the defenders covering them from a defensive position, known as a layback. This second line, were in turn, then to be covered by the troops now behind them, allowing them to leapfrog to the next covering position, a formula which could be repeated for as long as possible, and as long as the ground permitted it. The Chindits would have to begin a long and difficult hill climb away from Blackpool,  towards the rallying point of Mokso Sakan. Luckily for them, Takeda decided not to pursue them, as he had been redirected to reinforce Myitkyina instead. The victory was very costly, however, as the 128th Regiment lost about 400 men; but at last the Mogaung-Indaw route had been reopened after a three month’s blockade. On May 29th, the survivors of the 111th Brigade would finally reach Mokso Sakan, bringing with them 2000 men whom required immediate hospitalization. In the end, the Blackpool Stronghold, desired by Lentaigne and Stilwell, had been a costly endeavor for the Chindits.

Meanwhile, over with the 22nd Division, a failed envelopment maneuver by Task Force Purple, consisting of elements of the 149th regiment and former Galahad evacess, prompting Liao on the 19th to send the 65th regiment to aid the 64th regiments right flank and cut a trail south towards the Mogaung valley. The chinese hastily advanced to Chishidu, pushing the Japanese 1st company, 56th regiment over to Nanyaseik. Further east, Tanaka’s right flank in the Mogaung valley was beginning to crumble against the 38th divisions offensive. This prompted Tanaka to reinforce the 1st battalion, 55th regiment with the 146 regiment. Tanaka ordered Major General Aida Shunji, commander of the 18th infantry group to block the Chinese advance in the mountainous region north of Kamaing. Despite this, General Sun had sent his 114th regiment hooking west behind the Japanese strongpoints, soon they would link up with the 113th to clear the Japanese from West Wala, Maran and Sharaw. Simultaneously, the 112th regiment managed to secure Warang on the 20th. Thus despite all his efforts, Tanaka’s right flank was going to collapse.

At this point, the 18th Division’s daily ration of staple food was only 100 grams of rice the regular quantity being 860 grams and there was no supply of auxiliary rations. Moreover, as the supply of ammunition was cut off, the use of ammunition was limited to only four rounds per day and, as there was no gasoline, vehicles could not be used. Cases of malaria and malnutrition occurred successively and the number of men to one company dropped to about 30. As an extreme case, there was even a company of about 15 men led by a sergeant. About this time, the officers of the 18th Division also learned that there was no chance of the Japanese counter offensive in the Hukawng Valley on which so many hopes had been staked, for the U operation was failing "miserably." Their morale began to sag, and in Tanaka's later opinion this realization marked the "turning point" for his division. 

In order to deliver a killing blow, Sun elected to dispatch the 112th regiment wide around the Japanse eastern flank to cut the Kamain Road south of Seton, while the 114th regiment advanced down the Kumon Range towards Tumbonghka and Mogaung. The 112th managed to slip past the Aida Detachment whom were holding a position at the village of Lawa and would emerge out of the jungle in the rear of Tanaka’s lines on the 25th. The Chinese crossed the Mogaung river by the 26th and captured a supply center at Seton. The Chinese captured 35 Japanese trucks, a jeep, a sedan, 8 warehouses of food and ammunition, 100 horses, 4 pieces of artillery, a workshop, and a motor pool. They then set up a roadblock, prompting Tanaka to strip his divisional HQ and other servicable units to get a force together to hit the 112th as quickly as possible. At the same time Tanaka ordered the 4th regiment to hit the roadblock from the north while the recently arrived 2nd battalion, 146th regiment would hit them from the south. Tanaka also ordered his engineers to cut a secret escape route running from the Noidaw Bum to the Bumrawng Bum via Noidawyang.

Takeda’s 53rd division had just reached Mogaung as they dispatched a depleted 3rd battalion, 128th regiment towards Seton to relive Myitkyina. Seeing the enemy positions emerge at Chishidu and Seton, Tanaka finally decided to withdraw his division to the Kamaing area on the 28th, while his engineers vigerously were constructing fortifications. The Aida detachment would secure Lawa on the right flank, while the 55th and 56th regiments concentrated in the vicinity of Nanyaseik to cover the withdrawal of rear echlon units to Kamaing. Over at the Seton roadblock, the 112th regiment repeled relentless Japanese attacks, throuhg flood weather. 

Meanwhile, Myitkyina was seeing its first two days of siege. The 150th regiment were halted by heavy enemy fire at the railroad yards, suffering 671 casualties on May 20th. K Force took the suburban village of Charpate, north-northwest of Myitkyina, and the 88th Regiment extended its lines south to the railway tracks, which in this area run northwest before turning south to Mogaung. Unfortunately, K Force did not occupy a small height which dominated Charpate. M Force took the little settlement of Namkwi without opposition, in order to shield the Allies against any Japanese attempt to relieve Myitkyina by an attack from Mogaung. General Merrill's forces were now so placed that Japanese reinforcements could reach Myitkyina only from across the Irrawaddy River to the east or along the Myitkyina-Mankrin or Myltkyina-Radhapur roads from the north. The Allied troops were disposed in a semicircle covering all approaches from the northwest, west, southwest, and south. So far, enemy activity was slight in this area. Even at the airfield the continual sniping did not prevent the planes from landing with an ever increasing amount of supplies. If General Merrill retained these positions, he could make a coordinated attack on Myitkyina. For this purpose he was forming a Myitkyina Task Force, which involved reshuffling of all the units under his command. H and K Forces were dissolved; the Marauder battalions were once more combined under Colonel Hunter; and the Chinese regiments operated as separate units.The opportunity to swiftly overrung Myitkyina emerged, as many troops under Major General Minakami Genzo were rushing through enemy gaps during the night to reinforce the battered 114th regiment. On May 30th, Minakami took command over the 3000 man garrison and ordered Myitkyina be held for atleast 3 months to keep the allies from advancing south into central Burma.

On the allied side, Merrill suffered a heart attack and had to be evacuated. Colonel John McCammon assumed commander of the Myitkyina Task Force. McCammon immediately ordered Colonel Hunter’s 3rd battalion to seize the auxiliary airstrip north of Myitkyina, but the Marauders would be halted by stiff Japanese defenses. Gaps were numerous through which the Japanese could work their way into Myitkyina, and Minakami set up a regular ferry service across the Irrawaddy by which supplies and individual replacements could be brought in. The terrain was excellent for defense. The roads lay high above the surrounding rice paddies, and each was therefore an earthwall making a first-rate obstacle. Clumps of trees were all about, and there were plenty of houses on the outskirts of town which the Japanese used to advantage. The northern part of the Japanese perimeter was well shielded by a crescent-shaped depression which the monsoon rains quickly turned into a swamp. In effect, the Allies and the Japanese were committed to position warfare. Though the operation was called a siege, the Japanese received a steady trickle of supplies and replacements until Mogaung fell. Colonel Hunter and his men would be forced to withdraw back to Charpate the following day.

At 10pm on the night of May 23rd a battalion of Japanese launched an attack on Charpate from the rise northeast of the town. Beach's force had been depleted by sickness, and some of his men were out on patrol. The Japanese attack penetrated the 3rd Battalion's position early in the action. From the south 75-mm artillery supported the battalion's defense. The Marauders, fighting stubbornly, repelled the attack, but they suffered severe casualties. On the morning of May 24th at 9:335, the 3rd Battalion had to face still another attack. The fight was going badly when Hunter ordered Beach to break contact with the enemy and move to the railroad, 22 miles to the south. The Japanese occupied Charpate and held it in force as soon as the 3rd Battalion withdrew. McCammon had also ordered the 88th and 89th regiments to attack Myitkyina, but the Chinese barely advanced that day. Two days later the Japanese, supported by mortar fire, attacked Namkwi heavily, and the 2nd Battalion pulled back to a ridge about halfway to Myitkyina. The Japanese then occupied Namkwi and fortified it strongly. They had now taken over two of the towns on the main approaches to Myitkyina. Depressed by these defeats, McCammon was relieved of his command and Stilwell replaced him with General Boatner on May 30. Stilwell was becoming desperate, resorting to sending reinforcements of any kind, with two engineer battalions and a group of replacements and evacuees of Galahad arriving between May 26 and June 1. 

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The landings against Wakde, while perhaps a bit overkill, saw the allies yet again showcase the prowess in amphibious assaults. Over in the Burma-India theater, the battle for Kohima was gradually becoming an allied victory and Vinegar Joe’s first big foray against Myitkyina was painful but looked promising.

- 129 - Pacific War - The Japanese Defeat at Imphal and Kohima , May 7-14, 1944

Last time we spoke about the remarkable success of Operation Reckless and Persecution.  Colonel Oliver Newman led the drive towards Hollandia's airfields, encountering scattered opposition and discovering large undefended Japanese supply dumps. General MacArthur was forced to postpone future plans until May 21st. Meanwhile, Allied submarine interceptions disrupted IJN troop movements, and Task Force 58's airstrikes neutralized Truk. Within Burma, General Stilwell's offensive faced challenges from Japanese resistance and heavy monsoon rains. Despite setbacks, the 22nd Division aimed to capture Inkangahtawng while Chinese forces engaged the enemy along various fronts. Chindits continued Operation Thursday, facing logistical hurdles and Japanese attacks. Colonel Kinnison's Marauders encountered strong resistance near Tingkrukawng, while Colonel Hunter's force successfully surprised the Japanese at Myitkyina. 

This episode is the Japanese Defeat at Imphal and Kohima

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

We are jumping right back into the heat of General Mutaguchi’s insane Operation U-Go. Poor General Yamauchi after suffering a devastating defeat at Nungshigum, was now facing allied tanks he simply had no answer for. Yamauchi ordered his men to dig in around Sendgmai and Kanglatongbi, basically so they would at least be hung around the Kohima-Imphal road. The allies answer to this was 6000 sorties, dropping 1000 bombs in the sector. It was a tremendous amount of damage, but the Japanese did benefit from bunkers. Yamauchi’s 15th Division due north of Imphal were now being contained successfully, allowing General Briggs and Roberts to initiate their own counter offensives by the end of April. Simultaneously the 33rd Division was struggling to advance upon Bishenpur and the Shenam Saddle; over at Kohima, General Sato’s 31st Division was reluctantly falling onto the defensive as the looming threat of a full British-Indian counteroffensive was dawning upon them.

Imphal was still facing a grave threat from the Japanese along the Tiddim Road. Mutaguchi was personally directing the 33rd Divisions actions around Bishenpur at this time. Mutaguchi planned a three-pronged attack, one prong along the Tiddim Road, another down south from the Silchar Track by the 215th Regiment and a lastly from the north by the 214th Regiment. For the assault the 33rd Division received reinforcements in the form of the 14th Tank Regiment; the 2nd Battalion, 18th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment; and the 1st Anti-Tank Battalion from the Yamamoto Detachment. In late May they would also be receiving the 151st regiment and the 14th Tank regiment, amongst other units. This of course meant other units like the Yamamoto Detachment were being deprived of men, thus they in turn would be reinforced. The Yamamoto Detachment received the 2nd battalion, 51st regiment who were previously engaged with the Chindits at Indaw. They would arrive at Kampang after the fall of Crete West. Now in preparation for Mutaguchis renewed offensive the IJA would be tossing aircraft against the Gun Box in Bsihenpur. The Japanese Army Air Force made four air raids on the Gun Box position in Bishenpur in the first ten days of May. There was good reason for this, for at Gun Box the 32nd Indian Brigade had concentrated its artillery support. This included four 3.7in. howitzers, eight 25-pdrs, six 6-pdrs and three A/A guns. From here the guns were able to support the infantry’s actions both on and around the Silchar Track, as well as the villages on the Tiddim Road such as Potsangbam. The Japanese heavy field artillery was at Khoirentak. The 215th regiment meanwhile performed some preliminary attacks against the positions at Ngarangial. Attacks began in early May against positions between Wireless Hill and Ngarangial, with two battalions attacking from the north and one from the south. The enemy, in strong positions, withstood a series of attacks which continued until the middle of May. While Mutaguchi waited for reinforcements to arrive so he could renew his southern offensive, Generals Yamamoto and Gracey were slugging it out for control over Crete West.

The extremely exhausted 3rd battalion, 213 Regiment finally made a break through against the Lynch Pimple on the 8th,  forcing the 80th Brigade to evacuate Crete West two days later. On the night of the 10th, Yamamoto launched his first attacks against Scraggy Hill, which was extensively shelled, followed by a massive infantry assault: in classic style, wave upon wave of Japanese soldiers crashed on Scraggy, overwhelming its forward defenses. A point was finally reached in the night when the British battalion commander on Scraggy felt that the hill would fall unless supporting artillery fire was directed on his own positions. This was called in and the Japanese advance finally halted on the morning of 11th. But parts of Scraggy were now under the control of Yamamoto Force, which dug in. General Scoones reacted by relieving the exhausted 20th Division with the fresher 23rd Division of General Roberts. The new arrivals were shocked to see the conditions on the forward positions of the Shenam Saddle. Scraggy stood out. The Japanese were on part of the hill, while the rest of it was under British control. Trenches and bunkers covered the feature; in places, mere meters separated the two sides’ front trenches. Bits of body parts of soldiers lay everywhere and a terrible stench covered the hillside.

Now Cowan was planning a counter to Mutaguchis incoming offensive. He planned for an anvil and hammer maneuver; the hammer would be the 63rd Indian Brigade recently relieved from Sekmai in the first week of May by the 89th Indian Brigade. They would push down from Bishenpur towards Potsangbam, Ningthoukhong and even further south while the 48th Brigade established a roadblock on the Tiddim Road around Torbung, deep behind enemy lines. Cowan hoped to crush the 33rd Division along the road between his hammer and anvil while also cutting off the incoming Japanese reinforcements. Thus Brigadier Ronald Cameron’s 48th Brigade stealthily advanced south along the eastern shore of Lake Loktak, crossed the Manipur River at Shuganu. It was a long grueling march. Simultaneously, Brigadier Guy Burton’s 63rd Brigade advanced south against Potsangbam on the 10th. In their frustrated push southwards on the Tiddim Road, Burton’s men had to deal first with the determined Japanese defense of Potsangbam. Burton took over on the 9th from Mackenzie’s 32nd Indian Brigade, which had gained a foothold in the village the day before and was now to give its full attention to the Silchar Track. The 63rd Indian Brigade put in a first attack on Potsangbam on 10th. This involved two Gurkha battalions, each supported by a troop of tanks from the 3rd Carabiniers. The area they targeted was the main part of the village east of the Tiddim Road. The initial full frontal attacks failed to make much progress.

Burton then changed tack against the Japanese, who had withdrawn to their main defenses south of the Potsangbam turel. He called for a heavy artillery bombardment from the same direction as before in the northern half of Potsangbam to make it appear that he was repeating the previous line of attack. Except this time he instructed one of his battalions to pass secretly behind the other and make for the area to the immediate east of the road. The move worked and the road through the village and its immediate vicinity were captured by the 15th. The Tiddim Road through Potsangbam was now open, although the Japanese still held on in parts of the village. But it had all taken much longer than expected. While the anvil at Torbung was about to be put in place, the hammer had only inched forward. After a long and difficult march, the brigade arrived near Torbung in mid-May. The roadblock was set up on 17th where three nullahs crossed the road near Milestone 33. To the east were several low-lying hills where brigade headquarters was established, centered on one called Point 3404. The sluggish Khuga River flowed between the hills and the road. In the Torbung sector, the Americas surprised Lt. Colonel Matsuki of the 33rd Supply Regiment, who was given the mission of reopening the line of communications using whatever troops were available in the immediate area. A composite company from the 33rd Supply Regiment, which had been deployed in the Mountainous area west of Churachandpur, held Hill 4358 against several enemy attacks. On the night of 17th, approximately 100 men of the 33rd Supply Regiment were gathered from rear elements to make the first attack on the roadblock. The attacking group was mounted on trucks and the leaders miscalculating the location of the enemy position drove squarely up to the roadblock and the entire attacking unit was virtually annihilated.

Mutaguchi reacted furiously to this by unleashing artillery fire upon Point 3404 and the roadblock from the surrounding hills. Cameron’s guns responded with retaliatory fire. Simultaneously Mutaguchi tossed his 1st battalion, 67th regiment against the Torbung roadblock, but Cameron’s men held on inflicting tremendous casualties against the Japanese. Meanwhile Burton unleashed an attack against the hills immediately west of the road in the hopes of cutting off the supply line of the 214th and 215th Regiments. The 63rd rigade set off on 18th; the next day it had captured the villages of Tokpa Khul and Kha Aimol, and near them Three Pimple Hill and OP Hill respectively. This directly threatened the 33rd Divisions HQ at Laimanai. Mutaguchi reacted by abandoning the assaults from the west and south, and redirected the 215th Regiment to deal with Burton’s 63rd division. All three of Sasahara’s battalions were thrown into the counterattack, the first of which went in on the 20th. Another major assault was made two days later; both were driven off. The Japanese lost over 110 men. But they persisted and put in further attacks over the next week, frustrating any further movement southwards for the 63rd Indian Brigade. The Japanese failed to clear Burton’s position, their relentless attacks would completely pin down the 63rd Brigade, thus preventing any further movement southwards. 

Now at this point the 32nd Brigade had managed to recapture Wireless Hill, prompting Mutaguchi to abandon Potsangbam by the 24th. The 4th Independent Engineer Regiment and 2nd battalion, 213th Regiment fell back to Ningthoukhong. Mutaguchi then tossed another battalion to help out in the attack against Burton’s 63rd division. Without further support of the hammer, Cameron’s anvil force had to repel a coordinated tank-infantry attack on the 21st and again on the 23rd. The 2nd Battalion, 154th Infantry Regiment and a composite company from the 14th Tank Regiment attacked on the 21st and again on the 23rd but were not only unsuccessful in dislodging the enemy, but also suffered extremely heavy losses. Two tanks were destroyed during these attacks. Though the anvil held firm, Burton’s failed attempts to continue the push south would ultimately force Cameron to abandon the roadblock and head back. 

On May 24th, the 48th Brigade was fighting through Bishenpur heading up the road finally linking up with the other brigade around Potsangbam. Thus the Torbung roadblock was an enormous success for Cowan, his men had inflicted 500 casualties and disrupted Mutaguchi’s plan completely. Now Mutaguchi chose to go ahead with only part of his original plan, the attack from the north that would be carried out by Colonel Sakuma Takayoshi’s 214th regiment. To oversee the Bishenpur offensive,  Major-General Tanaka Nobuo was appointed in command of the 33rd Division. Leaving Bungte on the night of the 19th, Sakuma’s 1st battalion advanced south to attack Bishenpur from the north, while the 2nd battalion moved north from Wainen and attacked Hill 2926. Yet as they tried to storm Point 2926, they were beaten off by a platoon of the 7/10th Baluchs. Failing to take the peak, they captured the southern part of the feature and parts of the adjacent Maibam village. The 1st battalion proceeded with their assault against Bishenpur targeting the area at the northern end of the village, near the junction between the Tiddim Road and the Silchar Track. This is also the area where the Gun Box was. Once they had managed to infiltrate the road junction area, however, the Japanese were repeatedly counter-attacked in the next few days, British tanks firing on their positions at close range. Without any anti-tank guns and the British tanks firing on their positions at close range, they were ultimately wiped out. 

Back over with the 2nd Battalion, they had successfully captured Maibam village and Hill 2926, very close to Cowan’s headquarters, so the British would have to direct several reinforcements to lay siege on these enemy positions. Early on the 26th, Sakuma directed a composite company to launch a last charge on Bishenpur from the north, but this attack would also end in failure. Cowan then directed the brigade-strength Woodforce to evict the Japanese from Hill 2926.  Woodforce consisted of the 50th Indian Parachute Brigade’s HQ, commanded by Brigadier Woods and was a composite force of tanks, artillery, sappers and infantry. Taking over the front on the 26th, Woodforce mounted robust counter-attacks over the next two days, finally overcoming all opposition and recapturing the hill and Maibam by the 29th. With most of the 33rd Division fighting to reopen the Tiddim road at Torbung, Sakuma’s 214th Regiment was left to extricate itself as best it could. But the fall of the Torbung roadblock on the 24th also allowed Mutaguchi’s reinforcements to finally reinforce Ningthoukong in preparation for an attack on Potsangbam. 

At this point, the balance of power had shifted very definitely to the allies. Sakuma’s early success at Hill 2926 was the closest any Japanese would get to Imphal from the south. Meanwhile General Yamamoto’s attacks against the Shenam Saddle resumed on the 20th, with his men rushing the crest of Scraggy in waves throwing gelignite bombs and grenades, but ultimately getting pushed back each time. Meanwhile the 2nd battalion, 51st regiment and 1st battalion, 60th regiment began an attack against Gibraltar, a very steep hill along the saddle. Their initial attacks were repelled easily, but on the night of the 23rd they managed to gain a foothold on Gibraltar's crest and this in effect cut off the 37th Indian brigade at Malta and Scraggy. With the Fourteenth Army units on Malta and Scraggy cut off, the fate of the entire Shenam Saddle now hung in the balance, but the very next day the hill was recovered by a counter-attack led by the 5/6th Rajputana Rifles and 3/10th Gurkha Rifles. Gibraltar would be the farthest the Japanese would be able to advance on the Shenam Saddle and the closest they came to breaking through; and from then on, a stalemate developed with neither side making any important moves. After the Japanese had been evicted from Gibraltar on the 24th, they did not follow up with another major attempt to push through the Shenam Saddle for a fortnight. But there was never really a quiet moment on these heights. Sniper fire was ever-present, as was the booming of artillery guns. The situation was the worst on Scraggy, where both sides continued to maintain their respective positions. The British and Indian units here would be fired on from Nippon Hill, besides being subjected to rifle fire, mortaring and grenade attacks from Scraggy itself.

To the north, General Brigg’s resumed his counteroffensive against Molvom, tossing his 9th Brigade into a series of attacks against the Japanese held Hump. The infantry put in several attacks against the Hump, suffering increasing casualties. The men of the 3/14th Punjabis attacked Hump at least half a dozen times that month. Despite it all, the Japanese were still found in their bunkers at the end of May. Sited on the reverse slopes of Hump, their bunkers were difficult to target by guns firing from the other side. Even when they were hit, they were so solidly built that they suffered little damage. The defenders of Hump would wait until the 3/14th Punjabis neared the crest; they would then let loose a barrage of machine-gun fire and grenade attacks. Attack after attack had to be called off in the face of such furious resistance. Though heavy artillery and mortar fire and repeated air strikes were called in on it, the tenacious Japanese defenders would successfully repel all British-Indian attacks throughout early May. 

On the other side, realizing the vital need for artillery support, General Yamauchi decided to bring to the front the field guns that had been left east of the Chindwin River. He also was reinforced with the 2nd Battalion, 67th Regiment, which would seize Lamu on May 10th, securing the rear of the 15th Division. On the 15th, thanks to the timely arrival of the 89th and 123rd Brigades, Briggs was able to renew his assaults in front of Sekmai with greater intensity, finally clearing Kanglatongbi and the hills to the immediate east six days later. 

Colonel Matsumura responded by creating new defensive positions around Modbung. As the month came to a close, Briggs decided to concentrate both his division’s brigades on the Imphal–Kohima Road. The 9th Indian Brigade was to be brought on to the road, swapping places with the 89th Indian Brigade, which would move to the Iril River Valley. The opening of the Imphal–Kohima Road was a far greater priority than clearing the Mapao– Molvom Range. The Japanese defenders of the latter would be left where they had hung on for weeks. In any case, the opening of the road was likely to encourage them much more to leave than any direct attacks on their positions. 

On May 15th Yamauchi was relieved of his command. Yamauchi had really drawn the short end of the straw. As he admitted at the time, his men simply had no answer to the British tanks. His men had thrown themselves into the jungle as lightly as possible in order to strike Imphal quickly, so they did not have effective anti-tank weapons. Ymauchi’s division was always the Japanese weak spot, but they valiantly had refused to lift their roadblock at Kanglatongbi. As a last desperate throw, Yamauchi had ordered the use of poison gas. Yamauchi was also a man who understood how strong the allies were, especially America. Unlike the xenophobic and ignorant Tojo and Mutaguchi, Yamauchi had spent time in the USA and this led him to be quite pessimistic. Regardless, without anti-tank weapons it was quite hopeless. Yamauchi was carried from the battlefield on a litter and would later die in a hospital in Maymyo.

Back over at Kohima, Generals Stopford and Grover were continuing their counteroffensive. Brigadiers 4th Brigade were occupying Oaks Hill when on May 1st, they began to descend during  The Royal Scots stopped their advance and reoccupied Oaks Hill, the brigade artillery back in Jotsoma was on standby to pound any Japanese positions the Norfolks, who were pressing on down the ridge, encountered. The Japanese, alert now to the dangerous presence of enemy troops above them, moved up against Oaks Hill and fought hard to expel the Royal Scots during that first night, with no success. The morning that followed a night of screaming, fear-inducing attacks found the jungle undergrowth littered with Japanese bodies. It was usual practice for the Japanese to take away their dead and wounded, but on this occasion there were too few Japanese survivors for the task. As the Royal Scots repelled numerous enemy counterattacks, the Norfolks were continuing their descent towards the GPT ridge. On May 4th, the Norfolks found themselves in a good position to assault the crests of the ridge. They stormed up catching the Japanese by surprise, managing to seize numerous bunkers.

At the same time, the 161st Brigade was able to seize the area southeast of Two Tree Hill, but the Japanese had a complex bunker system there preventing them from linking Jotsoma with Pulebadze. The bunker complex on GPT Ridge was much more substantial than the British had expected, with literally dozens of small, carefully sited bunkers littering the entire area with interlocking arcs of fire, while the entire position was also covered by Japanese machine guns further to the east on the Aradura Spur. No sooner would one be discovered and attacked, than another would open up against the attackers from somewhere else. Until the entirety of GPT Ridge was cleared, Goschen's brigade could not enjoy the shortcut through to Jotsoma via Two Tree Hill; the road to Imphal remained in Japanese hands and their machine guns continued to spray fire on 6th Brigade's exposed right flank. Within the center the 6th Brigade was attacking Kuki Piquet and FSD Hill. While the attack against Kuki Piquet was not seeing much progress, they did gain a toehold atop FSD Hill. Further north, the 5th Brigade were able to bypass the 138th regiments position on Merema Ridge. They managed to secure a small part of Naga Village by the end of the day. Being close in proximity to General Sato’s HQ, the response from the Japanese was a series of fierce counterattacks. THe 33rd battalion, 14th regiment stormed the Cameron Highlanders who did not have time to consolidate their success by digging in, and heavy Japanese mortar fire at daylight forced the Jocks back to the western edge of the hill. Here Hawkins had them dig to secure the ground that had been seized and the Worcesters, who had protected the flanks of the night advance, were called up to help build a defensive position able to resist counterattack. The rain was by now constant. Everyone was drenched to the skin. The next morning the Japanese Air Force made one of their occasional forays into the deep valley that flowed out of the Kohima Ridge westward, but to limited effect. 

Meanwhile Brigadier Frederick Loftus-Tottenham’s newly arrived 33rd Brigade was in the process of reinforcing the exhausted 6th Brigade at Kohima Ridge, with preparations being made for a renewed general counteroffensive. Meanwhile, over on Pulebadze on the 6th, B Company of the Norfolks, commanded by Captain Jack Randle, was ordered to seize the remaining part of the bunker position at the bottom of GPT Ridge, while the 4/lst Gurkhas of , assisting the breakthrough in the center against Kohima Ridge and Jail Hill, were to attack the lower, western slopes of GPT Ridge. In these attacks the Norfolks were to seize the remaining Japanese bunkers but at high cost, in which Capt. Randle was awarded the posthumous VC. 

The Norfolks remained in the positions they had seized and, after a night of heavy rain, a further attempt to attack the remaining Japanese positions was made at first light on the morning of 7 May by the 4/lst Gurkhas and the Royal Scots. It was important that this operation was successful, as at 10.30am an attempt was to be made by the 1st Queen's - part of 33rd Indian Brigade, who had arrived at Kohima exhausted and malaria-ridden from Arakan the day before - on Jail Hill. If the machine-gun nests on GPT Ridge could be wiped out before the Queen's attacked they would enjoy a much higher chance of success. The only result of this failed assault would be the death of Brigadier Goschen, shot by snipers. 

The Queen's, aware that 4th Brigade had not managed to secure GPT Ridge, nevertheless went in against Jail Hill as planned and were slaughtered. In retrospect the attack was premature, but Stopford continued to demand speed to remove the Japanese stranglehold on Kohima in order to relieve beleaguered Imphal. There was a belief in some higher quarters - held in particular by those whose only experience of the terrain came from reading a map in the comfort of a headquarters tent in the rear - that 2nd Division's offensive lacked pace. These accusations were preposterous to the hard-pressed men on the ground. It was impossible for commanders and staff officers in the rear who could not see the ground to understand how a small piece of jungle-topped hillside could absorb the best part of a brigade; how a small group of well-sited bunkers could hold up an advance until every single one - together with every single occupant - had been systematically destroyed; how only medium artillery could penetrate the roof of a Japanese trench; how only direct and short-range sniping by Lee/Grant tanks was guaranteed to defeat a Japanese bunker; how the desperate terrain, incessant rain and humidity led even the fittest men to tire quickly and what an extraordinarily determined opponent they faced. With few exceptions, the Japanese gave in only when they were dead. Every conscious man who could lift a weapon fought until he collapsed.  Due to these defeats, the British-Indian morale plummeted, even though Sato’s men were also facing a serious supply problem that was further weakening them with each passing day. 

Nevertheless, the Japanese continued a brave defense under heavy artillery, mortar and aerial bombardment. Sato's defensive technique, while it was not going to enable him to break through Kohima by dint of offensive action, was designed to do the next best thing: to draw the enemy onto defences of great complexity and depth and to break them there, both physically and morally. In so doing his troops had to withstand the sort of conditions few other soldiers in history could have survived. They did so, and very nearly succeeded in persuading Stopford that battering through Kohima was an impossible task. Between the 4th and the 'Black 7th', for instance, the 38 3.7in. mountain guns dug in around Jotsoma fired over 3,000 rounds, the 48 25-pdrs fired over 7,000 rounds and the big 5.5in. guns of the medium artillery fired more than 1,500 shells at the Japanese positions, not to mention the almost continuous salvoes from the 3in. mortars of the infantry battalions and the constant strafing and bombing by Hurricanes and Vengeance dive-bombers.

For the next few days, General Stopford’s brigades were slowly reducing the Japanese defenses. British progress, though slow, remained sure, even though it seemed to the troops on the ground as if this battle would go on for ever. 4th Brigade cleared GPT Ridge on 11 May, by which time further costly attacks by the British 6th and 33rd Indian Brigades had finally forced the Japanese to relinquish their hold on Pimple, FSD and Jail hills, the latter of which was captured by the Queen's and C Company, 4/lst Gurkha Rifles. The tide was slowly - and painfully - beginning to turn. On the days that followed, the positions seized on 11 and 12 May were carefully consolidated, the remaining Japanese being exterminated one by one, sniper by sniper and gun by gun. The Berkshires cleared FSD Hill on 12 May, discovering that the Japanese had honeycombed the hill with tunnels, creating an elaborate underground fortress that included a battalion headquarters, repair shop, ammunition storage dump and hospital. Those Japanese bunkers on the western edge of the ridge that remained out of reach of the British artillery could now be engaged directly and at pointblank range by the Lee/Grants, trundling up the road that divides DIS and Jail hills. They did so to the cheers of the British and Indian infantry, who found themselves hugging the ground as the 75mm smashed the enemy foxholes only metres from them, the ground shaking and the shockwave of the blast sucking out their breath and showering them with dirt and debris.

The capture of the southern part of Kohima Ridge a full 37 days after the arrival of Sato’s units would force the Japanese to retreat to a secondary defensive line north of Aradura. On the 15th, patrols of the 5th Brigade advanced down from Naga Hill, securing Treasury Hill before meeting up with the exhausted victors of Kohima Ridge who were advancing along the Imphal road. Yet that is all for the India front, as we now need to jump back over to check out what is going on with Operation Ichi-Go.

After the fall of Xuchang, General Uchiyama dispatched some units south to attack Luohe, while the bulk of his 12th Army advanced north to capture Luoyang and hopefully annihilate General Enbo’s 31st Army Group. On May 2nd, General Uchiyama dispatched the 110th Division against Dengfeng, the 62nd Division against Yuzhou and the bulk of his 37th Division, 3rd armored division and 4th cavalry Brigade against Jia and Ruzhou. On 2nd, the 4th Cavalry Brigade defeated the enemy force in the sector southwest of Yingchiaochen and, on the 4th, advanced to the sector northwest of Linju. The 3rd Armored Division routed the retreating enemy heading west and, on the 4th, mopped up the enemy in the vicinity of Linju. Also on the 4th, the 37th Division arrived at Linju. On the same day, the 7th Independent Mixed Brigade occupied Hsiangcheng. on the 3rd the 62nd defeated the 29th Army at Yuzhou while the 3rd Armored Division and the 4th Cavalry Brigade pursued the retreating Chinese towards Ruzhou. On the 4th, Uchiyama’s main forces were able to capture Ruzhou and the 110th Division managed to dislodge the 13th Army’s position east of Dengfeng. After this Uchiyama’s main forces enveloped the area, annihilating the 13th and 29th Armies at Dengfeng while the 62nd and 110th Divisions made a frontal assault of the city. Alongside this the 7th Independent Mixed Brigade attacked the enemy near Likouzhen.

Yet before Uchiyama’s men could complete the envelopment, General Enbo’s men pulled out towards Tangjiezhen and Changshuixiang around midnight on the 5th. On the 7th, the 37th Division and 7th Brigade managed to envelop Tangjiezhen, and with air support inflicted heavy casualties on the outflanked defenders. Simultaneously, the 27th Division captured Luohe and Suipin. General Yokoyama had dispatched the 11th Independent Brigade to aid Uchiyamas men from the south, facing little resistance as they captured Queshan and Zhumadian before linking up with the 27th Division on the 11th. 

On the other side, General Jiang Dingwen’s 1st War Area Army was regrouping the bulk of its forces along the Luoyang-Yiyang line. General Okamura Ysuji ordered the 12th Army to advance upon Luoyang while Lt General Yoshimoto Teiichi’s 1st Army crossed the Yellow River to try and cut off the Chinese retreat at Xin’An and Xiashichiang. Having defeated the enemy in the sector southwest of Dengfeng, the 12th Army continued to keep the enemy in the Loyang area under strict observation while, at the same time, it ordered the 110th Division to pursue the enemy toward Iyang, the 62nd Division to pursue them toward Pingteng, the main force of the 3rd Armored Division toward Iyang and Hsinan and the 4th Cavalry Brigade to the western sector of Pingteng. Okamura dispatched his reserve 63rd Division led by Lt General Nozoe Masanori to try and break through at Sishuizhen so they could join the attack upon Luoyang. They were successful and in the process, defeated the 177th Division and managed to reach the northeastern sector of Luoyang by the 12th. With assistance from the 59th Brigade coming from the west, Nozoe captured Xin’an by the 14th. The 62nd Division and the 4th Cavalry Brigade captured Pingdengxiang on the 13th and part of the 110th Division captured Yiyang on the 14th. Most of the 110th Division, however, moved to Lungmenchieh below Luoyang. The 3rd Armored Division also reached the area southwest of Lungmenchieh at this point. The 37th Division, meanwhile, was directed to move towards Sunghsien. These actions effectively enveloped Luoyang as Uchiyama had his 110th Division advance through the Luohe River Valley; Yoshimoto’s men advance to Sanmenxia which would fall by the 18th. The 37th Division captured Song alongside the aidromes at Luoning and Lushi by the 20th. But the main effort would be made by the 63rd Division assisted by elements o the 110th Division who launched the assault against Luoyang, being defended by the 36th Army Group. On the 19th, the 63rd Division initiated its attack against enemy positions on the outskirts of Loyang, however, the enemy positions were so strong that the battle situation did not progress as planned. As a result of this the North China Area Army ordered the 12th Army to place the main force of the 3rd Armored Division and 4th Cavalry Brigade together with part of the 110th Division under the command of the 63rd Division commander. At the same time, the 63rd Division was ordered to defend the railway east of Mienchih. At 1pm on the 23rd, the 12th Army dispatched the 63rd Division to attack Luoyang Castle from the north and northeastern fronts of Luoyang to the northeastern corner of the castle while the 3rd Armored Division was to attack the castle from the western front toward the northwestern corner of the castle. The Army also directed the Cavalry Brigade to capture and destroy the enemy which it was expected would flee to the south at the line of the Lo Ho. On the 24th, the Army-called on the enemy in Luoyang to surrender but they refused. At 1pm, therefore, the Army opened its attack and, on the 25th, completely occupied the castle.

During this battle, Lieutenant-General Li Jiayu would heroically die covering the retreat of the remaining troops of his battered 36th Army Group. With the fall of Luoyang and the near destruction of the 1st War Area, Operation Kogo ended in a resounding success for the Japanese, thus securing the South Beijing-Hankou railway. The Japanese estimated over 32000 Chinese casualties and some 7800 troops captured. In turn, they claimed to have lost only 2000 casualties. Interestingly, Operation Kogo also saw the Henan peasants attack the Kuomintang forces in revenge for the Yellow River flood of 1938 and the Henan Famine of 1942. As told to us by General Jiang Dingwen "During the campaign, the unexpected phenomenon was that the people of the mountains in western Henan attacked our troops, taking guns, bullets, and explosives, and even high-powered mortars and radio equipment... They surrounded our troops and killed our officers. We heard this pretty often. The heads of the villages and baojia (village mutual-responsibility groups) just ran away. At the same time, they took away our stored grain, leaving their houses and fields empty, which meant that our officers and soldiers had no food for many days… Actually this is truly painful for me to say: in the end the damages we suffered from the attacks by the people were more serious than the losses from battles with the enemy." In the end, the peasants would be able to disarm over 50000 troops, picking their weapons to defend themselves from the Japanese, but also causing much damage to the Nationalist defense. For their role in this disaster, Generals Dingwen and Enbo would be relieved from their commands, with General Chen Cheng later taking over the 1st War Area in July to oversee its recovery. Meanwhile, the Japanese would continue to prepare for Operation Togo, the Hunan offensive. Yet to finish off this episode we also need to mention some progress in the future plans to invade Wakde.

Admiral King had requested support from the British Eastern Fleet. At this time the Eastern Fleet was organized into three forces for Operation Transom, the invasion of Japanese occupied Surabaya. Force 65 consisted of Battleships Queen Elizabeth, Valiant, Renown, the French battleship Richelieu, two cruisers and eight destroyers, under the direct command of Admiral Somerville; Force 66 consisted of aircraft carriers Illustrious, Saratoga, two cruisers and six destroyers, under the command of Rear-Admiral Clement Moody aboard Illustrious. Force 67 was the replenishment group and comprised six tankers, a water distilling ship and the cruisers London and Suffolk. Somerville commanded the entire fleet from Queen Elizabeth. The warships were drawn from six navies, the capital ships being accompanied by three American destroyers, four British cruisers and three destroyers, four Australian destroyers, a Dutch cruiser and destroyer and a New Zealand cruiser. The Australian light cruiser HMAS Adelaide also sailed from Fremantle in Western Australia to protect the tankers while they were at Exmouth Gulf; this allowed their two escorting cruisers to augment Force 66 during the attack. Two squadrons of Supermarine Spitfire fighters were transferred from No. 1 Wing RAAF at Darwin to Exmouth Gulf to protect the Eastern Fleet while it refueled and Australian and American maritime patrol aircraft were assigned to operate offshore. Each carrier had an air group made up of units from their parent navies. Illustrious embarked two squadrons equipped with 14 Vought F4U Corsair fighters each and two squadrons with nine Avengers. Saratoga's air group comprised a squadron with 26 Grumman F6F Hellcat fighters, a squadron with 24 Douglas SBD Dauntless dive bombers and a squadron operating 18 Avenger torpedo bombers, as well as a single Hellcat allocated to the Air Group Leader.

As for Surabaya, its defenses against air attack at the time of Operation Transom included a few anti-aircraft guns, whose crews were inadequately trained. Radar stations and a network of observer posts were also sited to detect minelaying aircraft. The Japanese forces stationed in the city included the Imperial Japanese Army's 28th Independent Mixed Brigade and the headquarters of the Imperial Japanese Navy's 2nd Southern Expeditionary Fleet under Vice-Admiral Mikawa Gunichi. Because of the distance to be covered from Ceylon and the Royal Navy's lack of experience in underway replenishment, the final plans for the operation involved the Eastern Fleet refueling at Exmouth Gulf in Western Australia before striking Surabaya. Force 67 was the first element of the Eastern Fleet to sail, departing on April 30th. Forces 65 and 66 sailed on May 6th. The Allied ships proceeded to Exmouth Gulf on a course that kept them at least 600 miles from Japanese airfields to avoid being detected or attacked. The carriers air wings practiced the attack they would conduct on Surabaya three times during the voyage. The warships arrived at Exmouth Gulf on 14 and 15th ofMay. The Eastern Fleet departed Exmouth Gulf on the afternoon of the 15th and proceeded north. It arrived at the flying off point at 6:30 am local time on the 17th without being detected by the Japanese. One British and seven American submarines also took up positions near Surabaya, the southern entrance to the Strait of Malacca and the Bali, Lombok and Sunda Straits to support the Eastern Fleet. The submarines were positioned to rescue Allied aircrew that were forced down, attack ships that tried to escape from Surabaya and intercept any Japanese warships that attempted to attack the Allied fleet.

Operation Transom opened up with 76 aircraft launched from Illustrious and Saratoga. The aircraft launched by the carriers were organized into two strike forces. Force A was made up of nine Avengers from Illustrious, twelve Dauntless dive bombers and an escort of eight Corsairs. Force A's Avengers were to bomb the Braat Engineering Works and the Dauntlesses the oil refinery. Force B was to attack shipping and dock facilities in Surabaya's port. It comprised twenty-one Avengers and six Dauntlesses escorted by eight Corsairs and twelve Hellcats. The commander of Saratoga's air group, Commander Joseph C. Clifton, led both carriers' air wings during the attack. All of the aircraft were launched and formed up with the rest of their force by 7:20 am. Two British Avengers crashed during takeoff, their crews being rescued.

The attack on Surabaya commenced at 8:30 am. The Japanese had not detected the aircraft as they approached, and were taken by surprise. The two forces made a well-synchronized attack, Force A approaching Wonokromo from the south and Force B attacking the port from the north. No Japanese fighter aircraft were encountered, and the anti-aircraft guns were largely ineffective. One of Saratoga's Avengers was shot down, and both members of its crew became prisoners of war. The two forces claimed to have damaged 10 ships, demolished the Wonokromo oil refinery and the Braat Engineering Works, destroyed 16 aircraft and leveled several buildings. Saratoga and her three escorting American destroyers detached from the Eastern Fleet shortly before sunset on the 18th, and proceeded to Fremantle. The remainder of the Eastern Fleet reached Exmouth Gulf the next morning, and sailed for Ceylon before sunset after refueling again. Adelaide and one of the Australian destroyers that had been attached to the Eastern Fleet left Exmouth Gulf bound for Fremantle after the tanker group departed on 19 May. The Eastern Fleet arrived back at Ceylon on the 27th. Saratoga reached Bremerton, Washington, on June 10th and after a refit re-joined the Pacific Fleet in September 1944. Though the Japanese would not really divert any forces from western New Guinea in response to the raid and despite the fact that the Japanese claim that not much damage had been inflicted on their shipping or shore facilities, with only one vessel confirmed sunk, Operation Transom would provide Somerville’s Eastern Fleet important experience of carrier strike operations and exposure to superior American carrier tactics. 

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The Allies were gradually countering Operation U-Go as the intense battles at Kohima Ridge and Pulebadze saw British-Indian forces slowly gaining ground amid heavy casualties. Meanwhile, Operation Ichi-Go saw major Japanese successes in China. Lastly Operation Transom saw British-Dutch-American successful carrier strikes against Surabaya, yielding experience despite limited damage.