- 98 - Pacific War - Naval Battle of Vella Lavella, October 3 - 10, 1943

Last time we spoke about operation Se-Go and the continued drive on Finschhafen. The evacuation of Kolombangara, designated operation Se-Go showcased how the Japanese were becoming experts at large scale evacuations. Nearly 10,000 men were safely evacuated from Kolombangara at the cost of some barges. Then in New Guinea, the Allies became aware the taking of Finschhafen was not going to be a cake walk. In fact Wootten sent word to the other commanders that he believed he was facing the full 20th division at Finschhafen. The other commanders were sending their men through the Ramu and Markham valleys finding rearguards everywhere they looked. Rivers and ridges were being taken at a quick pace and Finschhafen was technically seized, but certainly not secured. Now the allies would have to attack the stronghold of Sattelberg. And Today we are going to see some action upon land and sea.

This episode is the naval battle of Vella Lavella

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

The Japanese had accomplished another astounding evacuation, managing to pull out nearly 10,000 men from the marooned and isolated Kolombangara. They managed this with limited craft and boldly under the nose of the enemy who enjoyed superiority over land, air and sea. Yet as you can imagine this certainly showcases how the tide of the war in the south pacific had decisively turned. Japanese naval operations were becoming increasingly concerned with evacuating troops as their positions grew hopeless. The campaign for the central solomons was falling apart for Japan, the invasion of Bougainville was imminent. However because of the evacuation of Kolombangara, one of its results would be the establishment of a staging base for barges and landing craft over at Horaniu, the northeast shore of Vella Lavella. 

Now in  last episode we spoke about the actions of the Tsuruya unit who were busy delaying Brigadier Potter’s New Zealander forces. The Japanese had their backs against the wall at Marquana Bay, holding by just a threat. They had little food or ammunition left with no possibility of re-supply or reinforcements. Despite insufficient resources, Admiral Samejima was determined to rescue the doomed Tsuruya unit. Samejima managed to convince Admiral Kusaka to carry out yet another evacuation, this time of Vella Lavella, slated for the night of October 6th. Before dawn on the 6th, Admiral Ijuin departed Rabaul with 9 destroyers divided into three groups. The first group led by Admiral Ijuin consisted of the Akigumo, Isokaze, Kazagumo and Yugumo. The 2nd group led by Captain Kanaoka Kunizo was aboard Fumizuki accompanied by Yunagi and Matsukaze and a transport unit of 6 barges, 30 folding boats and the transport Usaka Maru. The third group was led by Captain Hara Tameichi aboard the Shigure with Samidare as backup. A fourth group led by Commander Nakayama Shigoroku consisting of 5 subchasers, 3 vedettes and a barge would also depart Buin to help. Ijuin was to be the strike unit, Kanaoka the transport unit and Hara the Guard unit. Ijuin planned to have Kanaoka and Hara standing off Marquana Bay supported by the incoming 4th unit led by Shigoroku. Further support would be given in the form of 8 floatplanes that would try to bomb Potter’s men with 20 zeros providing air cover. 

During the morning of the 6th, Admiral Wilkinson received reports the Japanese might be attempting an evacuation of Choiseul. At that time his 10th echelon was underway transporting the IMAC advance base to Vella Lavella, leaving the only available force Captain Frank Walker with destroyers Selfridge, Chevalier and O’Bannon. Walker was just returning from a run up the slot passing by the Russells on his way home. Wilkinson sent word to Walker to pay specific attention to the coast of Choiseul as he passed around. During that afternoon, Admiral Halsey sent an alert to Wilkinson that the Tokyo Express was definitely about to make a run, but it was not to Choisuel, instead it was to Marquana bay. Wilkinson dispatched 3 destroyers from the 10th echelon, Ralph Talbot, Taylor and LaVallete with Commander Harold Larson to reinforce Walker around Sauka point to try and intercept the Japanese.

Shortly after sending the orders, Walk received further intelligence. At 7:30pm he learnt that an unknown number of destroyers, 3 torpedo boats and 6 subchasers were enroute, expected to be in the area by 10:30 with an embarkation time of 11:30. At 9:02 he was told that possibly 9 destroyers were coming. A few minutes later another report passed on by some B-25’s attacking buin stated they spotted 4 IJN destroyers or possibly Jintsu-class cruisers. Thus pretty uncertain of what was actually out there, Walker’s crews were warned to expect the worse and they would sound General Quarters by 7pm. 40 minutes later the 938th seaplanes began harassing them. At 9:50 Walker announced over the TBS “When we round the corner close the gap and be ready for anything. I want to get the fish off without guns if possible.” Wilkinson’s reinforcements only made it to the rendezvous point by 11:40, leading Walker to have to start the battle alone. Since the days of John Paul Jones, American naval lore had honored and applauded commanders who unleashed bold attacks on superior enemy forces, but in this case Walker would prove to be too rash. 

Walker took his force around the north coast of Vella Lavella that night and began scouting the area finding no sign of the enemy. Meanwhile Ijuins strike force followed by Hara and Kanaoka proceeded to their staging point arrived at 10pm. Minutes later a scout plan reported 4 cruisers and 3 destroyers northeast of Vella Lavella on a western course. The plane most certainly saw the Selfridge, Chevalier and O’Bannon coming up the slot but mistook them as cruisers. Ijuin ordered Konaoka to take his group west towards the Shortlands while he and Hara turned back to meet the enemy. However Hara’s force were a bit further west and having difficulty due to mist causing lack of visibility. at 10:30 the Americans made their first radar contact of the enemy and 5 minutes later lookouts aboard the Kazagumo sighted the Americans to their south. Consequently, Ijuin had just turned to port heading southwest to cross Walker’s bows, but he misjudged the distance and instead opened the range. Walker responded by increasing his forces speed to 30 knots to try and head off the enemy. Upon seeing this, Ijuin changed his course at 10:45 to south-southeast to close the range, then at 10:48 ordered a 45 degree turn south. These maneuvers actually worked to the Americans advantage, and upon seeing he was presenting an easier target, Ijuin ordered another simultaneous turn to port which staggered his ships in line abreast on a course opposite and nearly parallel to Walker with their range rapidly closing. The maneuvering blunder allowed the Americans to pull up to the nearest group of 4 IJN destroyers and launch a half salvo of torpedoes. Most of the torpedoes were fired at the Yagumo which was being mistaken as a possible cruiser. Commander Osako Higashi aboard the Yagumo ordered 8 torpedoes to be launched before the guns began to fire. The Americans opened fire with their guns after the torpedoes turning Yagumo into a burning wreck quickly. Ijuin tried to course correct again going south then west. 

But by this point, Hara had just made it to the battle at 11:01 the Americans saw his forces to their southwest and closed in to engage. This put Hara ahead and parallel to Walker giving the Americans the perfect position to launch another salvo of torpedoes. At the same time one of Yagumo’s torpedoes hit Chevalier detonating her No 2 Gun Magazine, blowing the ship in two. Her brigade and aft section swung across O’Bannon’s path forcing O’Bannon to ram into her starboard engine room. The force of the collision was mitigated by Commander Donald MacDonald who ordered an emergency full speed astern when he saw the explosion on Chevalier. Two minutes later a torpedo, most likely fired from Chevalier, hit Yagumo. At 11:06, one of Hara’s destroyers landed a torpedo hit on the Selfridge, shearing off her bow and wrecking everything from the bridge forward. In just 5 minutes, 104 American sailors were dead and 66 were wounded. Both sides continued the brawl, at 11:17 Ijuin still taking a westward course, ordered torpedoes to be fired at what he thought were cruisers, probably the O’Bannon and Chevalier. He received a claim that one was sunk, so he decided to break off the battle and head for home. Meanwhile Geoerge Peckham aboard the Selfridge believed he had been hit by torpedo boats and wildly ordered men to track where they might be. It was an age old naval case of both sides fighting ghosts ships basically.

Meanwhile Commander Nakayama’s group began to approach Marquana bay from the north and Wilkinsons reinforcements group led by Larson were arriving from the south as well. At 10:55 Larson had received ordered from Walker to execute “William” which was the codename for torpedoes and “dog” was naval gunfire. Larsons group passed Yagumo who was undergoing her death throes and by 11:40 the group was in the battle area. Larson could not make out a contact on enemy ships and by midnight simply headed for Marquana bay, seeing nothing but crippled ships. Chevalier was beyond saving so she was scuttled, Selfridge was able to be repaired by 3:15am and would make a slow but safe journey home. Walker notified COMAIRSOLS they needed air cover as Nakayama’s group passed east of the battle area but did not engage. Japanese barges began to load men as the 938ht floatplane harassed the New Zealanders artillery. Many New Zealanders reported hearing naval gunfire and what sounded like barges scraping against reefs. By 3:10am, Nakayama left for Buin with all 589 men of the Tsuruya unit.

The Americans captured 74 survivors of the Yagumo who were marooned at Biloa, while 27 others would make their way to Buin using motorized whaleboats. Ijuin had lost 179 men dead with 74 captured. On October 8th, Potter’s men determined the Japanese were indeed gone so they began occupying Marquana bay. Thus ended the battle of Vella Lavella.  The 1st battalion, 27th regiment landed at Ringi Cover on southern Kolombangara on October 6th finding 49 abandoned artillery pieces and some scattered Japanese who had been left behind. By October 15th Admiral Hasley declared operation Toenails terminated. Two days prior the Japanese had likewise terminated operation Se-go. Admiral Samejima would be forced to carry the blame for the loss of the central solomons. He went on the record to say this “The relations between the Army and Navy units in this area were extremely harmonious and satisfactory, and the foregoing is due to the character and judgment of Maj-Gen. Sasaki and Rear Admiral Ōta. However, because of my inexperience in commanding land operations, there were times when I failed to dispatch appropriate orders to Maj-Gen. Sasaki in conducting our operations. And the fact that there is evidence that I left the operations up to the arbitrary decisions of Maj-Gen. Sasaki to some degree clearly reveals the folly of placing a Naval Commander like me in charge of land operations involving Army and Navy units.” In the end his forces managed to hold back the enemy for nearly two months and he had pulled off a pretty incredible evacuation.

Operation Toenails was a success for the allies managing to secure 4 new airbases at Munda, Segi, Ondonga and Barakoma. These acquisitions would have a huge impact on future campaigns against Bougainville and Rabaul. Admiral Halsey would receive some criticism for underestimating both the terrain and enemy during operation Toenails. Major General Harmon went on the record to say “Munda is a tough nut –much tougher in terrain, organization of the ground and determination of the Jap than we had thought,.  The Japanese agreed; an intelligence report dated 11 August stated that the “reasons for the slow advance of the enemy in Munda, etc, are due to the courage of our forces and the difficult fighting in the jungle.” The allies learned some important lessons such as the necessity of adequate medial support; the implementation of effective evacuation procedures; close air support for ground troops; the effectiveness of naval gunfire support or lack thereof it; and the 3 most effective weapons against the Japanese; the 155mm gun, tanks and dive bombers. These 3 weapons would be put into effect on Bougainville. The central solomons campaign saw 995 US Army, 192 marine and 500 US navy death with 4407 wounded. The New Zealanders and Fijians received 200 casualties. For the Japanese it was estimated 4000 died with 4500 wounded. Now we need to head over to New Guinea.

General Vasey’s men were preparing for an assault against Dumpu, while being harassed by the infilitration specialists of the Saito Unit. The Saito units had performed infilitrations against Dakisaria and Marawasa. On October 2nd, while the bulk of the 21st and 25th brigades were establishing bridgeheads to cross the Gusap and Tunkaat river. The 2/7th independent company at this time were trying to cross the Ramu into Kaigulin where a Japanese outpost was. The outpost was guarded by the Saito unit, 80 men of the 10th company, 78th regiment supported by the 3rd company. The Saito unit gave them hell, forcing the commandos to cross the Ramu elsewhere trying to hook around their right flank. They managed to pull the flanking maneuver and in the battle killed 6 Japanese. Interestingly Lt R.D Watts decapitated a Japanese using a katana he had acquired in a previous battle, a case of the turntables. I am now realizing when I make this dumb joke many of you might not have watched the office, I must sound even dumber than I am. The following day, Brigadier Dougherty ordered his men to only patrol as he was waiting for Brigadier Eather’s forces to assemble in the Bumbum area. Yes, there is a place called Bumbum, I thought Nuk Nuk would be my favorite New Guinea area, I was wrong. 

On the morning of October 4th, Dougherty ordered the 2/14th towards Wampun and the 2/16th to capture Dumpu. By 2pm, Captain C.L McInnes lead a company of the 2/14th to find Wampun deserted which was expected. However the men had marched all day in the heat, without any water. McInnes company was sent to Karam to search for water. Another company followed McInnes company soon after and a mile or so out they came across a banana plantation. They saw some troops cutting down banana leaves and assumed it was McInnes men, however these were actually Japanese of the Saito Unit. The forward patrol were carelessly advancing towards the banana plantation when bursts of machine gun and rifle fire hit Colonel Honner and Sergeant Pryor. Pyror wounded in his chin and chest tried to drag his commanding officer back, but Honnor had taken a shot to the leg and could only crawl. Honnor began screaming to his men to figure out the position of the enemy and this led Private Bennet to lead a small party to do so. The Japanese continued to fire upon them and Honnor was hit in his hand to add to his misery. Luckily for them the 2/14th sent a rescue party to extricate Honnor. Honnor was moved to safety by 5pm as Colonel O’Day prepared to attack the Japanese at the banana planation. At 6pm O’day led two platoons to rush their position where they killed 11 troops and a Japanese officers, driving the rest to flee into the jungle. The next morning they would also kill a few stragglers, the action cost 7 australian lives of the 2/14th while killing an estimated 26 Japanese and taking a single prisoner.

Meanwhile the 2/16th had successfully crossed the Surinam River without facing any opposition. They sent a platoon ahead led by Lt Scott to check out Dumpu. At 4:40pm he reported back that it seemed Dumpu was still occupied. Major Symington led forward a company to prepare to attack Dumpu, but when they reached its outskirts they could visibly see Japanese fleeing the area. Thus Dougherty’s men grabbed Dumpu without a fight. General Vasey believed 78th regiment had failed to relieve pressure on the retreating 51st division, but unbeknownst to him, General Nakano’s men were already marching through the formidable Saruwaged range. The range had an altitude of 3000 meters where temperatures fell below 10 degrees. Anyone who tried to start a fire from the moss-covered wood would find it unbelievably difficult. Many men reported heating gunpowder from rifles to start fires. A lot of rifles were burnt away because of this. Their rations ran out quickly, leading to starving men turning upon the dead….and even the living. Private Kitamoto Masamich recalled “seeing three soldiers had pinned a trooper to the ground while one of them stabbed him in the heart with his bayonet. I watched shocked as the remaining three soldiers cut slices of the dead trooper’s thigh and began to devour the human flesh. I shouted at them as flies swarmed about their faces… They had become mad with hunger and fatigue.’ Kitamoto covered the corpse and moved on. Cannibalism reared its ugly head often for the Japanese, particularly in some parts of Burma by late 1945. 

Until now the 7th division was enjoying a pretty uninterrupted advance to Dumpu. The Benabena was pretty secure as well, but General Nakai was establishing strong defensive positions along the Kankirei saddle. This would soon turn the campaign in the Ramu valley and Finisterre range into a gritty holding operation. In the meantime, the allies were being directed towards the FInschhafen campaign, with General Herring ordering Vasey to hold the Dumpu-Marawasa area. There he was to establish a new landing strip at Dumpu and to not make any large advances. Only the 2/27th battalion of Lt Colonel John Bishop would be allowed to advance into the Finisterre foothills. Dougherty hoped the 2/27th might reach Kumbarum within the Finisterre foothills and during a torrential rainstorm they overran the area with no opposition. Bishops men patrolled around and found the enemy was occupying the key feature guarding the exists of the Faria and Uria rivers from some mountains northwest of Kumbarum. Under the cover of rain, Lt King took 8 men to scramble up the feature which panicked the Japanese there causing them to flee without a fight. Thus it was named King’s Hill and would become an important tactical position and observation post. Apparently Kings men had come up just when two battalions were changing their troops dispositions, and a platoon guarding King’s Hill had retired before even seeing the allied forces. Regardless a company was sent to the Boganon mountain area, that rose some 41000 feet.

The torrential rain caused a ton of delays for the construction of the new landing strip. In the meantime the 21st brigade patrolled as much as they could. The 2/16th and 2/14th patrolled west of the Mosia river finding no enemy. On the 6th, the 25th brigade sent patrols in all directions north of the Ramu Valley. They found signs of the enemy recently leaving the Boparimpum area; the same at Koram. Just a bit north of Koram, it looked like there was a Japanese outpost on some high ground. Patrols took care near this outpost as it was expected Japanese snipers were there, but when further prodded it seemed abandoned. The 2/2nd independent company patrolled the area of Sepu towards the Waimeriba crossing of the Ramu finding only signs the enemy had recently vacated the area. A small patrol skirmished with the enemy between Saus and Usini. Kesawai would be found unoccupied on the 5th. Overall it was concluded the Japanese had abandoned the Ramu Valley entirely. 

On the 6th, Generals Vasey and Wootten received a signal that the 2/2nd, 2/4th, 2/6th and 2/7th independent companies would become cavalry commando squadrons which did not sit well with the experienced commandos. Since the beginning of 1943, the term “commando” had been increasingly used to describe a member of an independent company. The term was quite alien to the Australian Army, and the tasks undertaken by independent companies since the beginning of the pacific war were not at all like that of what British commandos did. In the short space of two years, the independent companies had built up a proud tradition  and the men regarded the term “independent company” as a much better description of what they did than the terms “cavalry” or “commando” and thus resented the change of title.

The next day, Dougherty’s 2/16th battalion occupied Bebei and the 2/27th battalion cautiously investigated the upper reaches of the Uria and Faria river valleys. When the men went past the Faria river towards some high ground they suddenly came across a party of 8 Japanese. A fight broke out as they killed 3 of the 8 Japanese receiving no casualties themselves. The Japanese looked to be withdrawing and the Australians dug in for the night in a place designated Guy’s Post atop Buff’s Knoll. These prodding actions prompted Nakai to order the 2nd battalion, 78th regiment to launch a counterattack against Buff’s Knoll. An hour after midnight during a particularly rainy night, a Japanese platoon charged up the knoll. The first attack lasted about half and hour before petering out. The Australian company consolidated around Guy’s Post established a defensive perimeter through out the night. However the night attack ultimately failed for the Japanese as they were not familiar with the terrain and the heavy rain made a mess of their advance. On the morning of October 8th, the Japanese tried to push again while the 2/27th consolidated their position in the Faria area. The Japanese barely budged the Australians and on October 9th, Colonel Bishop ordered the company to advance forward astride the main Japanese route going east towards the Kankiryo saddle. The man at Guy’s Post followed them an hour or so behind as they skirmished with Japanese towards Trevors ridge and John’s knoll. They would kill roughly 11 Japanese as they occupied both Trevors ridge and Johns knoll. Yet this is all for today on New Guinea as we are going to travel back to the CBI theater who we have not talked about in some time.

Going way back to 1942, the Japanese empire had been at its zenith forcing the allies to come up with some special operations such as the Chindits. Our old onion necklace wearing friend Brigadier Wingate was running that show, but General Blamey also created his “inter-allied Services Department” known as the ISD. They were a military intelligence unit formed around several British special operations officers who had escaped Singapore before it hell. Inside the ISD later named the Services Reconnaissance Department, a raiding/commando unit was formed called the Z special unit. They were primarily Australian, but also held some British, Dutch, New Zealander, Timorese and Indonesian members. After escaping places like Singapore, and Sumatra, British Captain Ivan Lyon joined the units and became one of their leaders. He devised a plan to attack Japanese shipping in Singapore Harbor.

His plan designated Operation Jaywick, called for traversing to the harbor in a vessel disguised as an Asian fishing boat. Then they were to use folboats or folding canoes to get over to enemy ships and attach limpet mines to them. Lyon was promoted to Major and began rigorous training 17th volunteers at Camp X,  a clifftop overlooking Refuge Bay to the north of Sydney. The men worked for weeks digging, breaking rock and clearing scrub around the campsite and parade ground, which worked as prelude to the long, and progressively longer days they would spent canoeing. There were plenty of route marches across rocky hills which Lyon said “consisted of point-to-point walking or scrambling, compass work, stalking and attacks’. The men were tested on elementary navigation, chart reading, tide tables, visual signaling with semaphore and morse and the use of prismatic compasses on land and sea. They trained using a variety of weapons such as Owen sub machine guns, Brens, Lewis guns, all with the view to shoot down enemy aircraft. The practiced unarmed combat, grenade tossing, limpet mining and gelignite. They also received numerous lectures on ship engines. By early 1943, the 17 men had been reduced to 10. They were then given a captured Japanese coastal fish carrier named the Krait which was powered by a Deutz four cylinder engine, had a beam of 11 feet and a range of 8000 miles with a max speed of 6.5 knots. They modified  the vessel to increase her storage capacity. On August 4th, the Krait departed Cairns en route to the submarine base at Exmouth Gulf on the northwest corner of Australia. On September 2nd, Lyon’s commandos began their long and dangerous voyage sailing through the Lombok strait to Singapore. None of the men knew about the plan prior to the attack nor their destination.  It was on the third day that Lyon gathered the men to disclose the truth. ‘He said, “Righto, do you know where we’re going?”’Some of the men said they believed it was Surabaya in East Java. After Lyon revealed their destination, Moss Berryman recalled ‘They couldn’t believe it when they were told they were going to Singapore “to blow up a few ships”’Lyon could see one or two of the men were stunned at the thought of going so deep inside enemy territory. Jones recalled ‘Nobody expected to be going that far and there was sort of talk about how dangerous it was,’. Lyon reassured the men that wasn’t the case. ‘This is not a dangerous trip, it’s an experience.’ But for anyone who didn’t fancy it, Lyon said he understood and he would ‘drop you off at the first island we come to and if you’re there when we come back we’ll pick you up’. It was a smart psychological play as he knew on one would dare lose face in front of his mates. Lyon stared at their faces and they returned his gaze. No one moved. They were all fully committed.

Their safety depending on maintaining the disguise of a local fishing boat, so the raiders stained their skin brown with dye to appear more Asiatic, I guess its sort of like the prime minister of my country on Halloween. Cramped on the Krait, the commandos reached the Java sea and passed the south west corner or Borneo getting 50 miles off her coast by September 14th. The enemy’s high activity in the area forced Lyon to detour towards Panjang island with the intention of making their way to Durian island. Yet when they approached Durian island they spotted a observation post so they turned back to Panjang which lies approximately 25 miles south of Singapore. 

On september 20th, 6 men on 3 canoes carrying 9 limpet mines each departed the Krait enroute to Singapore harbor. The raiders passed through Bulan and the Batam islands on september 22nd, reaching Donas island the next day. On the 24th Lyon sighted 13 sizable ships in the harbor, so he told the men they would be hitting them that night. Lyon distributed cyanide pills to all the men and told them ‘I leave it up to yourselves to decide what you want to do. But I can tell you now that if you get caught you won’t have a very good time of it. They’re not known for being gentlemen, the Japanese. Don’t delude yourselves in thinking you are tough enough to resist interrogation. You could be tortured enough to give away the whole story. You may not be able to do anything about it. Above all, they had to think of their mates on the Krait. If they fell into enemy hands, the Japanese would want to know how we arrived in Singapore’

The men rowed through the capricious tide, but it soon forced them back towards Dongas, instead they moved to Suber island the next day. On the night of september 26th, Lyon’s raiders departed again, Canoe 1 held Lyon and Huston; Canoe 2 Davidson and falls and Canoe 3 Page and jones. Canoe 2 would hit the north shipping in Keppel Harbor while 1 and 3 would hit examination anchorage and the wharf at Pulau Bukon. Canoe 2 had the strongest men and was given the additional task of returning to Pompong to rendezvous with the Krait 

Canoe 2 steered through an anchored ketch on the edge of the main channel, continuing between the islands of Biakang Mati and Tekukor. They arrived to Keppel Harbor and set their sights on a 6000 ton cargo ship sitting low in the water, indicating she had a full load. The found a second target, also a 6000 ton cargo vessel and a third ship of similar proportions, though the last looked not fully loaded. At 1:15am they attached the last of their 9 limpet mines, 3 per ship and made their escape towards Panjang. 

The other two canoes had a much easier paddle from Subar. The tide was running east to west, allowing them to go with ease to their target. The paddled together until 9:30 when they separated. At Pulau Bukom an older freighter was mined amidship and around the engine rooms. Then they spotted a modern freighter with engines after and 3 sets of goalpost masts and another 6000 ton old freighter. Over in Examination Anchorage nothing suitable was found, so the raiders mined a tanker even though it was probably impossible to sink with mines. All 4 ships were mined, the men ate some chocolate rations and made their escape towards Dongas. The ships combined comprised around 39000 tons between them.

On the way back, the exhausted commandos heard the distant explosions and the chaos that erupted in Singapore. When dawn broke, in Examination anchorage one ship was partially submerged, while two more would sink and 3 were heavily damaged including the tanker Shosei Mary. Canoe 2 and 3 waited until the commotion died down before returning to Panjang, reuniting with everyone aboard the Krait by October 2nd. Their return back to Australia was relatively uneventful, except for one tense incident in the Lombok strait when a IJN minesweeper approached their ship. The commandos remained cool and the minesweeper simply carried on.

 

The Japanese would retaliate for what happened during Operation Jaywick. On October 10th, the Kempeitai, those are military police of the IJA for those of you who dont know, you can sort of picture the Gestapo, but not quite the same. They went to Changi Prison in Singapore and began reading out a list of civilian names. These named men were taken away for interrogation, torture and in many cases execution. Over the course of 6 months, 50 Europeans and Australians suffered a brutal inquisition. They were beaten with knotted ropes, electrically shocked, had nails driven into the feet, the old cigarettes burnt onto their hands, arms and on their genitals ouch. They were waterboarded and in total 16 men would die. But no credible information was taken from any of them. The Japanese were far more brutal to the Malays and Chinese. Countless were tortured, interrogated and many executed with their severed heads put on posts around the city. After it was all said and done the Kempeitai filled a report speculating the raid had been carried out by two chinese and one Malay. They didn’t believe it and their superiors did not either. The 6 months of horror is known as the Double Tenth Massacre.

 

There was another unit formed known as the M special Unit, which was a joint Australian, New Zealand, Dutch and British reconnaissance unit formed as a successor to the Coastwatchers. Their role was to gather intelligence on Japanese shipping and troop movements. To do this, small teams were landed behind enemy lines by sea, air and land. One of their first operations was Locust led by Lt Jack Fryer. A group of 4 men departed Benabena overland on January 21st and advance to Lumi airstrip. They formed a base camp thee and began observing the Japanese. In conjunction to Locust was operation Whiting, which was a team of 5 Dutchmen led by Sergeant Huibert Staverman who also departed Benabena to establish a coast-watching station in the hills above Hollandia, reaching Aitape by mid september. Unfortunately the operation would be a catastrophe as the Dutch were ambushed around Aitape. Sergeant Staverman, Corporal D.J Topman, privates H Pattiwal, M Reharing and radio operator Sergeant Len Siffleet were publicly executed at Eitape beach on October 24th of 1943.

 

Another important development was the Japanese seizure of Macau. Unlike the case of Portuguese held Timor taken in 1942, the Japanese has respected Portuguese neutrality in Macau. However there was a huge influx of Chinese, American and European refugees coming from Guangdong and Hong Kong and this aroused Japanese suspicions. After the fall of Hong Kong, the British had established a clandestine support organization inside Macau trying to gain intelligence on the Japanese in an effort rescue the prisoners from Hong Kong. British army aid group known as BAAG, was under the command of Lt Colonel Lindsay Tasman Ride. They operated out of Hong Kong, Waichow, Guilin, Sanbu, Kaiping, Kunming and other places. They had planned out escape routes from Macau for local Chinese using the route through Shekki or via the sea to a place called To Fuk. Guangzhouwan was another escape route that wealthy Chinese and other nationalities with resources could buy passage through. Another route used a heavily armed motor junk that went to the north west point of Macau, Kong CHung and took them as far as Sam Fau. From there with aid, they could get to Guilin and then Chongqing. 

 

But then a blockade was imposed on the Chinese mainland. Macau’s survival depended upon receiving rice and fuel from places like Vichy controlled Indochina and Guangzhouwan, but after the Japanese occupied them Macau suffered critical food shortages. Macau’s ships were not allowed to be used by Portuguese to carry food and thus were dependent on foreign ships. On the night of August 18th, the British ship Sian, under Portuguese protection was commandeered by a combined fleet of Japanese and pro-Japanese Chinese run ships, which illegally entered Macau’s inner harbor. There was a shootout leading to 20 dead British sailors and the Japanese allegedly discovered that the ship was transporting a shipment of illegal weapons to be sold to the NRA. The next morning Lt General Tanaka Hisakzu of the 23rd army ordered troops across the border who clashed briefly with Macau police forces before Lisbon ordered them to not resist. 

 

Governor Mauricio Teixeira was forced to collaborate with the Japanese who starting in September demanded the installation of Japanese advisors or full blown military occupation. The result was Macau becoming a protectorate. The isolated port city became a center for smuggling and black market activities…which it kinda still is today haha.

 

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The battle for Vella Lavella was over, the Japanese yet again proved themselves experts at the art of evacuation. The battle for Finschhafen was not over by any means and now the allies were cautiously proceeding forward lest they repeat any mistakes learnt in Buna-Gona, Lae and Salamaua.