- 64 - Pacific War - Battle of Wau, February 7-14, 1943

Last time we spoke about the successful execution of operation KE. The Japanese feints had proven to be effective as by the time the Americans figured out what was going on, the Japanese had managed to evacuate 10652 men. It was an incredible achievement given the vast disparity in fire power between the Japanese and the Americans. Over 6 months of blood, sweat and tears had been poured over 2500 miles of jungle that made up starvation island. With just mop up operations left for guadalcanal, now Douglas MacArthur and Admiral King sought aggressive pushes into the south pacific. Admiral Yamamoto attempt to create a more favorable situation in the south pacific to bring the Americans to the negotiating table had failed and with the loss of Guadalcanal the empire of the rising sun had officially lost the initiative in the war. Yet while the Solomons campaign was drawing closer to an end, the battle for New Guinea raged on.

This episode is: the Battle of Wau

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

The situation in the Pacific had basically reversed with the Japanese defeat at guadalcanal. The Japanese now were forced onto the defensive while the allies stole the initiative and would go on the offensive. Despite the grand success of operation KE, Guadalcanal was a decisive defeat and it had dramatically drained the empire of its resources. Along with that defeat came the loss of the Buna-Gona area, the last toehold of the failed operation to seize Port Moresby. Both of these large campaign losses shocked the Japanese commanders, but while operation KE was ongoing, the Japanese also had focused their attention on New Guinea and would embark on a new offensive.

Facing mounting losses at Guadalcanal and Buna-Gona-Sanananda, General Hitoshi Imamura acting on orders from the Imperial HQ on january 4th, ordered the evacuation of the remnants of his army from both places. By early february this left 3500 troops evacuated from Buna-Sanananda and 13,000 from Guadalcanal. Most of these men were sick and exhausted from fighting for months and thus could not be reconstituted quickly. Japan had basically lost more than 35,000 men fighting two futile campaigns. 

General Imamura had decided to strongly reinforce New Guinea, but with the loss of Buna-Gona, the Japanese would require new landing sites. It was envisioned that the 2nd special naval base units of Rear Admiral Kamada Michiaki and the Konishi battalion of the 21st regiment would land at Wewak while 2 battalions of the 21st regiment led by lt colonel Harada Noriyoshi would land at Madang. These areas would be secured so new airfields could be built. Alongside this the 31st road construction unit would be sent to occupy Tuluvu in Cape Gloucester with a force of SNLF marines to secure a landing site at Finschhafen

The convoys carrying the Madang and Wewak occupation forces departed from Rabaul on December 16, while a surface support force including one aircraft carrier headed south from Truk to cover the operation. The Wewak force reached its destination without mishap on December 18, but the Madang force underwent both air and submarine attack off the New Guinea coast, the cruiser and flagship Tenryu sinking as a result of torpedo hits. Despite these attacks, the convoy continued to Madang and unloaded its troops early on December 19. By the start of the new year the airfield construction was on way and General Imamura planned to bring 2 army divisions to reinforce New Guinea consisting of the 20th and 41st divisions and some extra air units once the airfields were ready.

Meanwhile General Hatazo Adachi over in New Guinea had no intention of conceding Papua to the allies. On January the 5th, he sent the Okabe Detachment to Lae, a regimental group of the 51st division led by Major General Okabi Toru. However General MacArthur’s intelligence group correctly predicted the convoy was sailing to reinforce Lae. It was thanks to Ultra which was feeding Japanese shipping codes to the USAAR and RAAF since January 3rd 1943 giving them a distinct advantage. Aerial reconnaissance indicated the convoy consisted of 2 cruisers, 4 destroyers and 4 transports along the south central coast of New Britain alongside a considerable fighter screen. Despite some terrible weather, MacArthurs bombers with P-38 lightning fighters claimed they had taken down an estimated 50 aircraft while only losing 10 themselves. The real figures were closer to 9 enemy aircraft being shot down. During the night, a sortie of Australian PBY catalina’s managed to sink 1 transport, killing 465 Japanese and wounding another 85. This was followed up by a strike gorup of 12 B-25s which hit another transport severely damaging it. Despite the air attacks the Japanese had managed to land an estimated 4000 troops, a sufficient number to begin a planned offensive aimed at Wau.

The 51st divisional troops that had landed at Lae were battle hardened veterans of the China War. After the bulk of the division was ferried to Salamaua, the garrison there amounted to around 6500 men. Major General Okabe sent a few hundred men down the coast to help evacuate the survivors of the Buna-Gona battle. This action convinced the Australians that the Japanese high command was performing a major offensive, this time aimed at Wau. The commander of this campaign was Colonel Maruoka leading 2500 men. His force moved quickly marching upon Mubo from which he planned to use a little used trail towards Wau. In planning the route for the attack on Wau, the Japanese command had utilized a copy of a pre-war Australian 1:250,000 scaled, uncontoured map of the region. Okabe ended up selecting an old and direct track parallel to the Black Cat Track, which was later termed the Jap Track. However, as the map showed no contours, it gave no real indication of the extreme difficulty of the terrain through which this route would pass. Once they left the Black Cat Track, the Japanese would also have to hack a path through the jungles, as there was no defined path towards Wau.As was the case with the disastrous Kokoda track campaign, the Japanese had no good maps and miscalculated the time it would take to make the trek over such difficult terrain. More crucial was the lack of supply dumps, the men who would make this trek would literally have to carry their own supplies, a recurring nightmare for the Japanese in the Pacific. 

General Blamey saw the threat posed by the Japanese reinforcing the garrison at Lae and wrote to General Herring on January the 8th. “Whether the intention of this force is to push forward from the Lae and Salamaua area towards Wau remains to be seen. This event has always been present in my mind and I have kept the 17th Brigade A.I.F. intact either to meet this threat or as the spearhead of an advance in this area.” Blamey then dispatched his plans for the disposition of allied forces in New Guinea. The US 41st division would retain the Buna area, while the battered 32nd division would be withdrawn to the mainland for refitting and training. The 32nd would be replaced by 2 australian brigades, with one of them being the 17th brigade coming up from Milne Bay. The 17th brigade was led by Brigadier Murray Moten and their job was to defend Wau and its approaches. In order to pull this off, the 2/6th and 2/7th had to be brought as fast as possible. On the 13th leading elements of the 2/6th were landed at Wau, but terrible weather forced many others to turn back, some of which were aircraft carrying Moten and the main sections of his HQ who had to turn back to Port Moresby. Despite the weather setback, the bulk of the 2/6th, 28 officers and 535 men were fully unloaded by the 19th. As the weather cleared up the rest of the 2/6th and leading elements of the 2/5th arrived and Moten sent Lt Colonel Starr to command the 2/5th, taking those men down a trail towards the Mubo area. Meanwhile the 2/6th were given the task of defending the Bulolo valley.

General Herring promised Blamey he would expedite the transport for the rest of the 2/5th as fast as possible and the main body would arrive by the 27th. Moten received word the Japanese were moving into the Guadalgasal Gap Area, but he believed this was defensive in nature. He wrote to Blamey stating “the raid on Mubo has undoubtedly disturbed the Japanese commander and I feel he fears that it might be a preliminary to an attack on Salamua similar in strength to those which have defeated him at Buna and Sanananda”. And so it was Moten seemed to believe Wau was in no danger for the time being, because the Japanese were simply reacting to the allied movements, but he was quite wrong. On the 24th, Captain Winning was leading a patrol and confirmed the Japanese were marching towards the village of Wandumi using a trail hardly ever used by anyone, covered thickly in vegetation. It was parallel to what was called the Black cat trail and the Japanese had cleverly chosen it to hide their movements. When Moten received the news he immediately sent the 2/6th from the Black Cat Mine Area to launch an offensive to stop the Japanese advance. 

Meanwhile Okabe’s men were managing to evade the allies by using the so called Jap track, but the difficult terrain was taking a heavy toll and the food was beginning to dwindle. The Japanese began their march carrying 14 days worth of rations and as they departed Salamaua they had been told the amount they carried should last them 20 days. This led Okabe to try and raise morale for the men by shouting “we are short of food, let us quickly capture Way and get food from the enemy!” Okabe’s men were having a horrible time trekking through the vegetation and Okabe began considering pulling back to Mubo to replenish supplies, but then his scouts discovered Wau was within their reach. Okabe was encouraged so he continued the march and sent a coded radio message back to Salamaua stating he was going to capture Wau and that he urgently needed more supplies. The reply he received was “immediately occupy Wau and secure supplies from the enemy”.

It was at Wandumi on the morning of the 28th when the Japanese fell upon some Australian positions manned by Company A led by Captain Wilfred Sherlock. Maruoka had planned to attack Wau that very night using his 1st battalion on the left flank, the 2nd battalion on the right and the 3rd held in reserve. Sherlocks men were met with heavy fire and were forced to move to nearby cover southwest. They would be reinforced by a platoon of the 2/5th alongside some Commandos and the fighting lasted until the late afternoon. Sherlock personally led a bayonet charge to repel some Japanese infiltrators and reclaim lost territory which ultimately allowed his men to hold on for the night. Sherlocks men were running out of ammunition so Moten sent the recently landed C company of the 2/5th to reinforce them. As the men arrived, Sherlock withdrew over to the Bulolo river where they performed a fighting withdrawal hoping to delay the Japanese long enough for more reinforcements to make it over to Wau. Sherlock and his men came to a large cedar log that had felled across the river between two huge boulders at the point where Crystal Creek flowed into the river. Sherlock called “come on boys” as he began to straddle the log to make his way across. As he was doing so a Japanese machine gun company opened fire as Sherlock cried out “are you an Aussie?” As he was being fired upon his men could hear him further say “i’ll soon find out whether you are a bloody Aussie or not”. Those would be his last words as he was soon shot dead by machine gun fire. Sherlocks men would continue to resist performing a fighting withdrawal and delaying the Japanese a full day.

The delaying engagement made by Sherlock and his men would turn out to be the decisive moment for the battle of Wau. Back on the 23rd as the fighting over in Buna-Gona had ended, this had freed up much needed aircraft that could support Way. 52 brand new Dakota’s of the US 317th Troop carrier group had just arrived in Australia, having been expedited rapidly as a result of General Douglas MacArthur pleading for their use for the Buna fight. They were quickly flown over to Port Moresby to help the 374th Troop carrier group fly out the 17th infantry brigade over to Way. Now the Australians could rely on around 40 aircraft operating daily to Way. On January 29th, 57 landings were made, bringing the majority of the 2/7th infantry battalion and the remainder of the 2/5th. The Japanese air forces missed their opportunity to smash the transports and only ground forces near the Wau area managed to inflict minimal damage using small arms fire. 40 aircraft made over 66 trips on January the 30th, unloading 25 pounders of the 2/1st field regiment and almost 700 rounds of ammunition. Captain R.J Wise would lead the artillery regiment that same day they had landed to shell a concentration of over 300 Japanese troops between the villages of Wandumi and Kaisenik alongside aerial attacks by Beaufighters of the No. 30 RAAF Squadron. The next day 35 aircraft would make 71 trips, followed by 53 trips on february 1st bringing the 2/3rd independent company. Now the Kanga force consisted of 3000 troops, decisively turning the scale of war for Wau.

 

After taking Wandumi the Japanese divided their forces with their right flank following the Bululo river attacking Sherlocks force heading northeast to Way. The other advanced along the main road and their HQ was established along Crystal Creek. The Japanese plans unraveled quickly as the Australians attacked the advancing column just before they hit Mubo causing them 116 casualties. Lt Colonel Seki’s 2nd battalion heading up the main road was held up by Australian forces for ove r48 hours suffering 75 casualties. The Japanese not well hidden by foliage the entire while were straffed by allied aircraft daily. On the 28th 6 Japanese were moving along the Crystal Creek Road when they stumbled just 400 yards short of the airfield there before they were discovered and annihilated. A major problem Maruoka’s men were facing was running into steep ravines just before being ambushed by Australians. Regardless Maruoka planned for a general attack to take place on the 29th, but this was thwarted by the arrival of over 800 fresh troops of the 2/5th and 2/7th being brought over via aircraft transport. They were quickly rushed over into defensive positions and began to bombard the Japanese using 25 pounders. Okabe’s men had lost the element of surprise gained by the clever use of the Jap Track.

Moten soon ordered the 2/7th to counter attack the Japanese towards a point known as Leahy’s Farm. One section of the battalion occupied some high ground due west of the farm while the bulk advanced towards a key spur under artillery and mortar support. The high ground section led by Major Walker unleashed machine gun and artillery fire into over 400 Japanese moving along the road from Leahy’s farm unaware of their position. The casualties were heavy and within minutes Australian Beaufighters emerged to the scene adding to the carnage. Despite the losses the Japanese held firm and stopped Walker’s section from halting their advance west. The fighting over the course of the next few days was greatly confused and centered upon the defense of Way against many thrusts made by the Japanese from the southwest. Reinforcements continued to pour in and by February the 1st, Motan had 201 officers, and nearly 3000 soldiers at his disposal. The greatest threat to Way was found in the Crystal Creek Area where the 2/5th battalion was blocking the Japanese as smaller units attacked near Leahy’s farm and the Black Cat Mine. On february 3rd Moten notified the New Guinea Force HQ that the “crucial period” of the Wau defenses had passed and now he was releasing a larger portion of his forces to perform offensive operations.

Now taking a side step back down south to the Buna-Gona area, by February 7th the entire Buna Detachment had assembled at the Mambare where countless landing vessels, totaling 20 barges or so, were pouring down from Lae. These vessels were going to bring the men up to Lae as two companies of the Okabe detachment would perform clearing operations along the Mambare river to try and establish a hold off point thus thwarting allied pursuers. By the 11th the Japanese survivors would finally start their last journey towards Lae and Salamaua, but it was an agonizingly slow process because they would only move by night. By late april the South Seas detachment was finally evacuated in full to Rabaul, where the 18th Army finally dissolved them. The once most famous detachment of the IJA was thus reabsorbed into the 55th division which was fighting in Burma. 

Back over in the Wau front, on February 2nd Major Warfe was ordered to attack Woody Island, but the Japanese were well dug in behind a steep-banked creek. The Australians took heavy casualties and were forced to pull back. After 2 days, Warfe launched another attack on the 4th, this time with more information about the Japanese defensive positions and with more artillery support. The Australians lashed out with artillery, mortar and machine gun fire this time aimed at known Japanese positions. Then the Australians performed a bayonet charge forcing the Japanese to withdraw back to the Bulolo River by the 6th. At the same time the Japanese began to regroup around the Crystal Creek area to prepare for a possible withdrawal.

Moten now grabbed the initiative ordering the 2/5th and 2/7th to launch a major offensive against the enemy, moving up a supply route. A new trail was cut eastward to the Jap Trail used above a junction to cut off the Japanese retreat. A small unit of Australians took Leahy’s farm on the 5th and burned all the buildings in the vicinity that might prove useful to the Japanese. The Japanese were well dug in and offered a determined resistance. As the Japanese were being pushed back towards the Crystal Creek area they suddenly unleashed their first and only major air attack against Wau. On Febuary 6th, 29 Ki-43 Hayabusa fighters and 9 Ki-48 Lily bombers departed Lae to lay waste to Way’s airfield. That morning a routine flight of C-47’s with 8 P-39 Airacobra fighter escorts were transporting men to the area when they stumbled upon some of the Japanese fighters. The allied pilots claimed they shot down no less than 11 aircraft in the scuffle. Having been alerted of the airstrike, 8 P-40 Kittyhawks scrambled to help and their pilots claimed taking down another 7 aircraft. During the entire day of aerial engagements, allied pilots claimed down 23 Japanese aircraft. The Japanese had inflicted only minimal damage upon the airfield and managed to take down a single Wirraway and a grounded Dakota transport.

The war over the sky was a decisive victory for the allies at Way, the following day the 2/5th continued to pressure the Japanese at Crystal Creek. For two days the Australians hammered the Japanese positions which were held by men who were now on the brink of starvation, their rations having run out on them. Allied artillery, mortar and Machine guns gradually pushed the Japanese out of the area. On the 9th a major breakthrough was made as Company B of the 2/5th pushed through towards Skindiwai leaving many Japanese fleeing to the hills near Wandumi. At this point Okabe had determined the next best option was to pull the men back to Mubo before his entire force was annihilated. Yet as the Japanese prepared for a final retreat they were dealt a nasty surprise along the Jap track. The 2/6th battalion had effectively cut off the track and were harassing the desperate Japanese struggling to head east. Lt Colonel Frederick Wood leading the 2/6th battalion die, being shot in the head, thus allowing a brief pause in which the Japanese were able to break free and continue their retreat.

To aid the struggling Japanese as they withdrew, over in Mubo a fresh detachment of men were sent to engage the Australian pursuers led by Major Warfe. They managed to push back Warfes commandos around the Waipali area. It would only be by the 21st that Okabe’s men managed to reach the relative safety of Mubo, but with that the battle for Wau had come to an end. The Japanese had lost over 1000 men in their failed attack upon Wau, while the Australians suffered around 350 casualties.

Ultimately it was the actions of Captain Sherlock and his men that won the decisive point of the battle. They had delayed the Japanese advance long enough for the reinforcement of Wau to be met. For Sherlocks gallantry he was mentioned in Dispatches as so

Captain Wilfrid Holden "Bill" Sherlock Mentioned in Dispatches

 

"At Wandumi, on the morning of 28 January, Sherlock's under-strength company, bolstered by twenty men of the 2nd/5th Independent Company, was attacked by the main body of a Japanese force which was approaching Wau from the east along a disused track not known to the Australian defenders.

 

Despite being reinforced during the afternoon, Sherlock's party remained heavily outnumbered, but held its ground until early next morning. When one of his platoons had been overrun at 3 p.m., he had led a counter-attack with fixed bayonets. Forced to withdraw shortly after 3 a.m. on 29 January, he took his troops across a single-log bridge over the swollen Bulolo River. Pursuing Japanese machine-gunners fired on them. Sherlock turned to face the enemy and was heard shouting defiantly above bursts of gunfire until he was killed.

 

The grim determination, resolution and courage of Sherlock and his men enabled the Australian command to build up sufficient forces at Wau to defeat the Japanese assault over the next two days. Sherlock's leadership accounted in large part for this achievement."

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

The battle for Wau was a catastrophic failure for the Japanese and a rather remarkable achievement by the Australian forces on New Guinea. Captain Sherlock would be remembered as the man who thwarted what could have been a Japanese seizure of an important air field.