- 62 - Pacific War - Battle of Rennell Island, January 24 - 31, 1943

Last time we spoke about the offensive against the Gifu. The estimation of the Gifu defenses proved to be greatly underestimated and it was only after the Sea Horse was taken and the Gifu was severely isolated that its defenders began to crumble. At the last minute 100 Japanese came out screaming, tossing grenades and bullets, but ultimately the Gifu was taken and now the American forces on Guadalcanal could focus on pursuing the Japanese fleeing west. We also finished up the Buna-Gona campaign with the fall of Sanananda. The Japanese fought bitterly tooth and nail to retain their last toehold from their failed Port Moresby campaign. The evacuation was a disaster leading countless wounded and ill Japanese to commit suicide while their comrades fled for their lives trying to break through the allied lines. Those lucky enough to get past the gauntlet of fire went to Salamaua and Lae, where they would have to continue the fight over New Guinea.

This episode is the battle of Rennell Island

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Last time we saw the conclusion to one of the bloodiest battles fought in New Guinea, let alone the Pacific War. The battle of Buna-Gona took the lives of countless Americans, Australians, Japanese and native Papuans whose misery almost never gets spoken about. We also saw a ton of action over on Starvation Island. The Sea Horse was captured, thus greatly isolating the fortified Gifu. When the Gifu’s defenders realized they were cut off from the rest of the army, they made one last hurray into oblivion. 100 or so screaming Japanese stormed out of the Gifu with rifles, pistols, swords and grenades in hand to hurt the Americans as much as they could. After their suicidal charge, the Gifu had finally fallen and now the Americans could focus their attention west. 

By January 17th the first phase of the 14th corps western offensive had ended. The 25th division reduced 3 pockets of Japanese that emerged 2 days prior and the 2nd marine division smashed the Japanese around Hill’s 83/84. On the 12th, the 27th infantry had captured the Horse’s Head, cutting off Major Nishiyama’s units then numbering 200 survivors out of an original 600. He was forced to make a last stand. He smoked his last cigarette with tears in his eyes as he had to look his men in the eyes and tell them all to prepare to die, he wrote in his diary that their calm acceptance to this moved him greatly. For the next 2 days he and the men looked for an area they could best serve to give up their lives, to make it meaningful. While Nishiyama kept a strong face for the men, following the orders to make a final stand, privately in his diary he debated with himself if he should try to withdraw the men on his own authority and as he wrote it “even at the expense of my honor”. He knew very well he could make a cover story to save face, some sort of false pretext to save the men from annihilation. But to do so did not only mean dishonoring himself, it meant to dishonor the whole unit. Over the course of those 2 days he sent a runner to the division HQ and General Ito sanctioned a withdrawal and thus Nishiyama and his 200 men escaped annihilation with their honor intact. It was very fortunate for them as General Patchs next phase of the offensive was set to begin on January 16th. The 14th corps next objective was a line from Hill 87 going northeast to the beach. This would contain Hills 87, 88 and 89. The 6th marines of the 2nd marine division and the 182 infantry would secure the right side and the 25th division would advance in the southern portion seizing hills 87, 88 and 89. 4 infantry regiments of the 147th infantry would be held back to guard the airfields.

The 27th infantry of the 25th division would advance astride a narrow ridge called the snake to assault Hill 87 from the east, which the Americans assumed would be heavily fortified. The 161st infantry would perform a deep envelopment from the Galloping Horse to the southwest capturing Hills X,Y and Z then perform a flanking maneuver to seize Hills 88 and 89. The 25th infantry would protect the southern flank of the 161st and would continue to exterminate pockets of Japanese in the area.  Exterminate by the way is a very cruel and fitting term for the way they were going about the business, for many of these so-called pockets were nothing more than abandoned, starving Japanese. By the 21st, Hills X and Y were taken by the 161st with relatively minor resistance. Then the 161st planned to deploy the 1st battalion to guard the southern flank while the 2nd and 3rd battalions got off Hill 7 to march towards Hill 87 when circumstances changed. 

On January the 21st, the 27th infantry was advancing on the narrow front with the 1st battalion as their spearhead, and behind them were the 3rd and 2nd battalions. The next morning at 6:30am, the 25th divisions artillery began tossing over 3654 shells upon Hills 87,88 and 89. At that point the 1st battalion advanced down the “snake’s back” where they took out 3 Japanese machine gun nests trying to block their advance to the snakes tail. By 9:10am the 1st battalion was on its way to assault Hill 87. It looked from afar that Hill 87 held light opposition. After the 1st battalion seized the hill at 9:40, the 161st infantry was ordered to cross Hill Y to Z while the rest of the regiment turned north to follow along the snake behind the 27th infantry. Now while this was occurring, Brigadier General Robert Spragins was sent by General Patch to give General Collins leading the 25th authority to have them advance upon Kokumbona as rapidly as possible. The 25th’s boundaries were extended to Hills 91, 98 and 99 which were like stepping stones towards Kokumbona.

Without pause the 1st battalion took Hill 88 and then 89 by 11am. Then at 2pm it received the orders to seize Hill 90. By the time night was coming on, Hills 90 and 91 would be seized and this all tossed the Japanese defensive plans into chaos. During the night of January 22nd, the 17th Army HQ marched to Cape Esperance and the 38th division began to extract all the units it still was in contact with. But the huge thrusts made by the 27th infantry were pinching off the 2nd divisions flank and the Yano battalion. The 2nd division had orders to hold its position until sundown of january 23rd, but with the enemy advancing so much, Maruyama had ordered his men to pull back at 5am. Most of the 2nd division succeeded to pull back, but the Nitto Battalion of about 50 men all died holding their position. When the 17th army found out they were very angered by Maruyama. However unbeknownst to them, Maruyama pretty much saved countless Japanese lives as on January 23rd, the 27th infantry performed a 2 pronged. The 3rd battalion hit Hills 98 and 99 while the 1st battalion marched for Kokumbona. By 3:30 Kokumbona was captured, this was all done in astonishingly quick time, they could have overrun and annihilated Maruyama’s men had he not pulled out. Overall between January 10th to the 27th, the 27th infantry had suffered 66 deaths including 7 officers.

Now taking Kokumbona caused major changes for both the Americans and Japanese. For the Japanese the obvious change was many units were withdrawing while others who did not receive the orders to pull out would be smashed by the americans now thrust along the coast. The 6th marines were assaulting Japanese forces who had failed to withdraw and by January 24th the remnants of the 27th regiment were annihilated just a bit due east of Kokumbona. Now the 25th had made it to the area, joining CAM divisions consisting of the 147th, 182nd and 6th marines to advance further west. From the American perspective it looked like the Japanese might be aiming to perform a counteroffensive, so General Patch retained at least one division at the Lunga airfield incase. This of course was not the case as the 17th army was now hyper mobilizing its withdrawal and to do so it organized new coast defense units, made up of the ill and wounded. Men of the 38th and 2nd divisions were sent to Cape Esperance and Kamimbo, while the Yano battalion was deployed along the Marmura river by the 25th. Colonel Konuma in charge of rear guard duty took his men to the Bonegi river where he hoped to make a stand on its eastern bank to regain time lost because of 27th’s incredible advances. On January 24th and 25th his men scattered into independent groups hindering the enemy's advance short of the Poha river. 

The CAM division ran into the Yano Battalion at around 1pm on January 26th which the marines said gave them heavy resistance. Major Yano’s forces were gradually pushed back half a mile west of the Maruma by the 28th and the next day they had to withdraw across the Bonegi leaving the battered 2nd infantry group to face the American advance. On the 30th the 147th infantry got hit by the American vanguard. 1000 men crossed the Bonegi, but were quickly chased back to the east bank. The next day the 147th performed an envelopment maneuver using 2 companies which crossed the Bonegi. This resulted in what the Japanese called “considerable losses”, leading them to extract their forces away from Bonegi. By February the 1st the 147th fled for their lives as the Destroyer Wilson began bombarding the Bonegi area. 

Now we have to take a pause about the ground offensive going on to talk a bit about the air and sea. American intelligence found the Vila-Stanmore area on Kolombangara to be associated with radio traffic directing aviation units on Ballale. They sent reconnaissance to go look and found a nascent air base and began to suspect it was a staging area for barges and other small vessels trying to smuggle supplies to Munda. This prompted Admiral Halsey to plan an attack upon Vila-Stanmore to destroy the Munda air strength. Halsey gave Admiral Aisnworth the assignment of bombarding, he would come from the Kula Gulf while Munda would be hit by aerial bombardment. Ainsworth had task force 67 consisting of 4 light cruisers and 7 destroyers.  Japanese search planes located Ainsworth on the afternoon of January 23rd, prompting them to launch Betty’s from the 701st and 705st air groups. Ainsworth managed to slip by them during the night, and at 2am his cruisers and destroyers fire over 2000 6 inch shells and 1500 4 inch shells in 30 minutes. According to the Japanese over in Kolombangara, they sustained heavy material damage that delayed construction efforts, killed 5 men and wounded 20. Meanwhile the 30 Betty’s hunting down Ainsworth finally caught a glimpse of his force because of the muzzle flashes. Before the Betty’s could toss torpedoes, Ainsworth pulled the ships into rain squalls and used radar directed 5 inch antiaircraft fire to hit the enemy. Around 8am 24 dauntless, 17 avengers and 18 Wildcats from Saratoga delivered 23 tons of bombs upon Munda. Neither Munda nor Vila-Stanmore played a crucial role in Operation KE fortunately for the Japanese. 

On January 25th, 54 Zeros and 18 Betty’s left Rabaul to perform a live-bait role. Another 24 Zeros left Buin to join this but weather prevented 18 of them. The air force reached Guadalcanal at 1:40pm as the Cactus airforce tossed 18 Wildcats and 6 P-38’s to meet them. 4 zeros were shot down with another 6 heavily damaged. A second raid was made by the IJA’s 6th air division. 9 Kawasaki KI-48 Lily bombers, 74 Nakajima Ki-43 Oscar fighters and 2 Mitsubishi Ki-46 Dinah’s departed Buka and Shortland at around 9am on January 27th. The Cactus airforce tossed up a dozen wildcats, 6 P-38s and 10 P-40s over Lunga to battle them all the way towards the Russels. 6 Oscars were downed as the Lily’s bombed the Matanikau for little effect. A third raid set for January 29th had to be postponed because something big was cooking up around Rennell Island.

The campaign to claim air superiority had fallen short of its goals, prompting the southeast area fleet to request Operation KE be postponed, but the 8th area army adamantly insisted the evacuation must proceed as fast as possible. Now the IJN had sent some submarine supply missions to the 17th army in late december and on January 8th, American intelligence began to look closely at their radio traffic. They managed to decipher some signals predicting  submarine transport runs set for January 26, 27 and 29. On the 29th the Kiwi and Moa, 2 out of 4 new zealand corvettes operating from Tulagi were hunting off the coast of Kamimbo when Lt Commander Bridson of Kiwi sighted the I-1 at 9:05. He dropped 2 depth charges forcing the submarine to surface and an eruption of 4 inch gunfire began. The skipper of the Kiwi ordered full speed and to ran the submarine drawing protest from Kiwi’s chief engineer, but Lt Commander Bridson said “shut up! There’s a weekend’s leave in Auckland dead ahead of us”. Thus Kiwi smashed into the submarines port side, causing a breach in her and send troops aboard her to start jumping overboard. As Kiwi backed away she began firing upon the landing barges strapped to the submarine. Then Brison yelled “hit her again! It’ll be a weeks leave! Once more for a fortnight!”. The Kiwi smashed into her again causing diesel oil to spout everywhere. After this rather hilarious battle that went on for 90 minutes, Bridson withdraw allowing the Moa to hold the fight. Aboard the I-1, captain Lt Commander Eichi Sakamoto had been operating the periscope when the depth charges hit the submarine. He scrambled her to the surface and her gun crew managed to fire 2 salvos at the Kiwi before fusillade fire from Kiwi cut the gunners and Sakamoto down. This prompted the submarines navigator to rush down the ladder screaming “swords!swords!”. The navigator, apparently a famous swordsman remerged topside, sword in hand and tried to jump aboard the Kiwi during her ramming venture. He grabbed onto one of her rails as riflemen on top I-1 tried firing at her. After being rammed for the third time, 47 soldiers jumped overboard swimming to shore as the Moa captured the navigator, that must have been a funny sight. The I-1 lay twisted in the water as the Japanese desperately tried to scuttle her. Later in february, Australian divers would manage to loot the submarine finding 200,000 pages of secret documents providing cryptographic materials and valuable JN-25 code information.

In mid to late January, Admiral Nimitz and Halsey both regarded the dramatic accumulation of IJN shipping, vigorous air activity and all the radio chatter to be pointing towards some sort of new offensive in the southern solomons. They were looking at this anxiously because the projected withdrawal of the 2nd marine division was coming up. They had procrastinated the last removal of the marines for quite some time. So, in order to shield the movement of troop transports and counter possible IJN surface ship threats, Halsey deployed the kitchen sink in the south pacific. On January 29th, a carrier group built around Enterprise rendevouzed with Saratoga’s task force. Task force 67 consisting of 4 cruisers and 4 destroyers joined up with Admiral Lee’s task force 64 consisting of 3 battleships and 4 destroyers. They escorted Task force 62.8 consisting of 4 transports and 4 destroyers maintaining a course 100 miles to Lunga Point through the Lengo Channel. Close by the cover this was also task force 18 consisting of 6 cruisers and 6 destroyers sailing due south of Guadalcanal. Yes there are going to be a lot of task forces, growing exponentially henceforth.

Rear Admiral Richard Giffen commanded task force 18, a new face to the pacific, he had spent the war thus far in the atlantic and mediterranean sea and was a favorite of Admiral King’s. He was tasked by Halsey to rendezvous with Captain Robert Briscoe who was commanding the Cactus striking force consisting of 4 destroyers off Cape Chunter. Once they met up, Giffen was to lead them on a daylight sweep up the Slot as the transports unloaded at Lunga on the 30th. Now Giffen needed to meet up with Briscoe for 9pm and in order to make the deadline he detached his escort carriers Suewanna and Chenango with 2 destroyers so the rest of his force could pull up to 24knots. During the afternoon, unidentified aircraft began lighting up his task force 18’s radar. His escort carriers began tossing up groups of wildcats and radar equipped avengers to get a clearer picture, but poor weather was hindering their efforts and Giffen refused to break radio silence as were his orders. In the mid afternoon 32 Betty’s of the 701st and 705st air groups took off from Rabaul with the intent to perform night aerial torpedo attacks.

Around twilight, task force 18 was set up in a column formation spaced out around 2500 yard apart arranged perfectly to face off against another surface fleet, but in quite a terrible position for anti-aircraft maneuvers. By 7:00 his flagship Cruiser Wichita’s radar began showing what looked like a Japanese hornet nest of bombers. The Japanese airwave came from the west circling around the task force to gain the darker backdrop of the eastern sky for their approach. At 7:19 16 Betty’s from the 705th commenced their attack. Anti-aircraft fire began to spurt, but Giffen remained hell-bent on making his rendezvous so the kept the speed going and ceased having his formation perform zigzagging maneuvers. This obviously aided the Japanese pilots who began dropping white flares along each side of the task force column to help guide the bombers torpedo runs. At 7:38 Lt Commander Joji Higai took his force of 15 Betty’s from the 701sy and began their runs. At 9:40 a torpedo hit Chicago on her starboard side, followed 2 minutes later by another, halting Chicago. Another torpedo hit Witchita, but it was a dud. Still Giffen did not feel the need to change course nor lower speed. To decrease their visibility from the enemy he ordered the gunners to cease any firing unless they had an absolute target. Chicago’s crews had stopped her flooding, leaving her listing 11 degrees. Chicago’s engineers were trying to crank her engines to keep her up to speed, but it simply was not in the cards, so Giffen deployed the Louisville to tow the injured Chicago to safety. 

On January 30th, Chicago was limping behind Louisville at 3knots while Giffens task force 18 continued. Halsey dispatched the destroyer transports Sands and tug Navajo to relieve Louisville so she could rejoin the task force. From the early morning to 2pm, task force 18’s radar screens displaying multiple Japanese reconnaissance aircraft coming from Rabaul. Admiral Kusaka was greatly relieved to find out Task force 18 was dealt an injury thus preventing it from threatening the first run of Operation KE. Kusaka predicted the Chicago would slip beyond the radius of her fighter cover from guadalcanal so he sent another air strike to attack the vulnerable ship. However unbeknownst to him, the escort carriers Suwannee, Chenango and Enterprise were shuttling wildcats to protect Chicago. 

Another group of 11 Bettys from the 751st air group lifted off at 12:05. A coast watcher warned Chicago and Enterprise of the threat around 3:05 allowing the carrier to launch fighters to intercept shortly after 4pm. Admiral Nimitz advised Giffen alongside the Japanese aircraft there were also 10 enemy submarines deployed south and southeast of guadalcanal. But Halsey ordered Giffen to change course for Efate with the battle worthy cruisers at 3pm, thus task force 18 divided, leaving the Chicago stripped of her shield of anti-aircraft batteries as the fighters were heading off with the rest of the force. Chicago would have only 4 wildcats running cap over her and at 3:40 the Betty’s began to emerge. When enterprise understood the plight of the Chicago she sent force 6 more Wildcats to intercept, prompting the Betty’s to rush for Chicago. Only 2 Wildcats managed to attack the Betty’s before they released their loads.

In all but a minute the Japanese desperately tried to toss their fish into the sea as the American pilots downed 3 Betty’s likewise into the sea. Chicago tried its best to put up anti-aircraft fire, with her gunners claiming to down 4 Bettys as they attacked. 5 torpedo wakes emerged all converging upon Chicago. At 4:24 one torpedo hit her forward, followed seconds later by 3 others which ripped open Chicago's midship. The catastrophic damage prompted Captain Davis to immediately order abandon ship. As Davis recounted “Chicago rolled slowly over her starboard side and settled by the stern, with colors flying”. 56 men, including 6 officers died aboard Chicago leaving 1069 survivors.

The Japanese pilots also came across the destroyer LaVallette which had valiantly turned back at the last minute to help chicago. 3 Betty’s surged at her with one dropping a torpedo at just 300 yards away. The torpedo hit LaVallette’s port side abreast her forward engine room. 21 of her crew were killed, but her engineers managed to get her back to fighting condition quickly and she pulled away. 12 Betty’s had been lost that day, including Lt Commander Higai, one of their best Betty pilots for the IJN. The sinking of Chicago greatly frustrated Admiral Nimitz. In his official report of the event to King he wrote “especially regrettable because it might have been prevented.” Yeah Nimitz was frankly pretty pissed off. There was a long list of errors that led to the Chicago’s fate. For one, Giffen was obsessed with keeping his rendezvous time and this led him to not consider the formation of his force, the amount of aerial support and to be blunt it was a tactical disaster. To make matters worse, some of his warships were carrying the super secret at the time VT proximity fuze. Nimitz vented his anger at his staff threatening to shoot anyone who announced the loss of the Chicago. 

During the afternoon of January 31st, american intelligence decyphered a dispatch stating Kondo’s advance force had departed Truk 2 days early and this triggered Nimitz to alert his subordinates in the south pacific to expect a major Japanese operation was about to begin. The little battle of Rennell island had taken out the Chicago, but it also postponed the beginning of Operation KE now being slated for February 1st. The reinforcement Unit which was responsible for the evacuation was gathering its cruisers and over 21 destroyers at Shortland. Army officers were assured that the nominated commander of the Reinforcement unit for operation KE, Rear Admiral Satsuma Kimura led the finest flotilla in the IJN, destroyer squadron 10. But on January 19th, Kimura was injured when the submarine Nautilus damaged his flagship Akizuki near Shortland, prompting his replacement for Rear Admiral Koyanagi. At the same time, Admiral Kusaka secured the appointment of Rear Admiral Shintaro Hashimoto as commander of the Reinforcement Unit, prompting Koyanami to be held in reserve capacity. The 11th air fleet and 6th air division were responsible for maintaining the daylight CAP over the reinforcement units runs, but at night it would be the R Area air force. the 60 float planes of the R Area air force would sweep ahead of the reinforcement unit trying to shield them from the troublesome american PT boats.  Operation KE relied heavily on some plans revolving around the Russell islands, if the destroyers failed to extract the 17th army it would fall upon landing craft from the Russell islands. Many army officers also hoped to install a temporary garrison and base in the Russells to work as a feint. Thus on January 28th, 6 destroyers bearing 328 men went to the Russells. And so soon, the grand operation would be unleashed.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

The hybrid force of US soldiers and Marines seized Kokumbona, greatly hindering Operation KE’s timetable. Alongside this the battle of Rennell Island also added to hinder Operation KE’s, to add further misery to its future success. Could the IJA/IJN work together to pull it all off, time will tell!