- 136 - Pacific War - The Changsha-Hengyang Campaign, June 25 - July 2, 1944

Last time we spoke about the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. The battle of the philippine sea saw Admiral Ozawa toss numerous aircraft carrier attacks against US Task Force 58. The numerous strikes proved terribly ineffective, seeing most Japanese aircraft shot down and failing to return to their carriers. Ozawa’s forces faced issues with uncorrected compass deviations and poor communication leading to misidentified targets and unsuccessful attacks. The American pilots managed to intercept and shoot down incredible numbers of Japanese aircraft, dealing Ozawa a terrifying defeat. By the end, they had lost three carriers sunk, two carriers damaged, 395 carrier aircraft, about 200 land-based aircraft, two oilers, and four other damaged ships, with around 3,000 Japanese fatalities. The Americans lost 130 aircraft and 76 aviators, with none of their damaged ships rendered out of service. The Battle of the Philippine Sea, the last carrier-versus-carrier battle of the war, stood out because the most conservative and defensive-minded side emerged victorious.

This episode is the the Changsha-Hengyang Campaign

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Today we are first jumping back into the fighting on Saipan, where General Holland Smith’s forces were preparing for the start of the drive into the center of the island. General Holland Smith's strategy involved the 4th Marine Division advancing along the inland road to secure the area southeast of Mount Tapotchau and take Hill 600, which is just north of Magicienne Bay. Meanwhile, the 2nd Marine Division was tasked with capturing Mounts Tipo Pale and Tapotchau, while the 27th Division stood ready to support either Marine division if needed. On the morning of June 22, after a 10-minute artillery barrage, the offensive began.

On General Schmidt’s front, the 24th Marines moved along the shore, facing obstacles in the form of ravines but still reaching the O-4A Line by 13:30. The 25th Marines, advancing in battalions, secured three small ridgelines before being stopped at the fourth, gaining approximately 2000 yards. By noon, as the connection between the two regiments became weak, Schmidt had to send in the reserve 23rd Marines to bridge the gap and push toward Hill 600. Fighting especially troublesome terrain, the 23d Marines made slow progress. Only light enemy resistance from riflemen and machine gunners was encountered, but contact difficulties and time lost trudging up, down, around and through the rugged ground formations, limited the speed of advance. Progress ceased at a point about 200 yards south of objective O-4A, where the unit dug in. To the west, General Watson also made significant advances. The 6th Marines reached the summit of Mount Tipo Pale while the 8th Marines progressed closer to Mount Tapotchau. However, both units encountered obstacles due to enfilading fire from a Japanese stronghold on Tipo Pale, which remained undefeated for two days. Throughout the night, the 27th Division began relieving the worn-out 25th Marines. The 106th Regiment took position against the eastern slopes of Tapotchau, while the 165th faced off against Death Valley. Due to this shift, Holland Smith instructed the 105th Regiment to move north as the division’s reserve, leaving just its 2nd Battalion to clear Nafutan Point. The following morning, the 27th Division's advance was delayed because its regiments struggled to assemble at the line of departure. Meanwhile, Generals Watson and Schmidt had already resumed their offensive, encountering more resistance than the day before.

The 8th Marines initially encountered little resistance as they moved towards Tapotchau, but were stopped when the 106th Regiment had yet to advance. To the left, Colonel Riseley’s 3rd Battalion managed to advance about 400 yards, while the rest of the forces faced the Tipo Pale strongpoint. The 23rd Marines, attacking with battalions in column, Dillon’s 2d Battalion leading, advanced rapidly over rough terrain against machine-gun and rifle fire from Hill 600. Approached from the south. Hill 600 presented an extremely steep slope; and, in the words of the battalion commander, “It was all you could do to climb it, let alone light up it.” The number of Japanese defending the height was not great, but the area was admirably suited for defense and, for about 30 minutes, the fight was close and vicious. Hand grenades passed back and forth as in an overgrown, uncontrolled game of “hot potato.” Despite their struggle against gravity and an obstinate foe, Dillon’s Marines seized the peak and set up a hasty defense against counterattack. From its newly-won position, Dillon’s battalion had an unimpaired view of the whole of Kagman Peninsula. This surge had been executed without benefit of contact with the 27th Division on the left; and, when it was apparent that the latter was still some distance to the rear. General Schmidt ordered the 23d to hold up its advance until Army elements had tied in. Though the peak of the hill was securely in the hands of the 2d Battalion, the battle continued. The hill’s northern slope, cloaked in thick vegetation, was alive with Japanese soldiers. Dillon endeavored to strip them of their concealment by burning the area with flamethrowers, but the efforts were largely unsuccessful. Throughout the remainder of the day and during the night the grenade pitching continued.

In the afternoon, General Ralph Smith’s forces began their assault, with the 106th encountering a strongpoint known as Hell’s Pocket and the 165th being stopped by heavily fortified positions on Purple Heart Ridge. The nature of the terrain facing the 27th Division was to have an unusually vital bearing on the unit’s operations for many days to come. This terrain is well described by the historian attached to the division at Saipan: “The whole mountain [Tapotchau] was stoutly defended by the enemy, but the situation on the two flanks of it was somewhat unusual. On the west side of the peak, the ground sloped sharply to the sea. On the east, Kagman Point side, it dropped in sheer cliffs to a bench or plateau, some six hundred feet below the summit. This plateau, a saddle-shaped piece of land, was some twelve hundred yards across and bordered on the east by a low chain of hills covered with heavy foliage. Beyond them the ground sloped down to Kagman Point on the east or dropped off abruptly to Magicienne Bay on the southeast. The cliffs of Mt. Tapotehau and the chain of hills made a corridor out of the plateau. In the fighting which ensued this corridor was named Death Valley by the men who fought there and the chain of hills came to be known as Purple Heart Ridge.”

At d three divisions of Japanese troops and tanks were massing in front of the 27th Infantry Division. The expected enemy attack materialized at about 6:30, when Japanese tanks struck near the boundary between the 165th and 106th Regiments. The combined efforts of 37mm guns and bazookas in the areas of the 2d Battalion, 165th, and the 3d Battalion, 106th, destroyed five Japanese tanks, but a sixth escaped. This was not enough for the intruders. At about 7:30, in company with infantrymen, five more Japanese tanks struck the right center of the 106th Infantry. The 3d Battalion’s Antitank Platoon and the 1st Platoon of the Regimental Cannon Company accounted for four of the tanks while the fifth, though suffering a hit, broke through the 3d Battalion’s lines. Firing wildly, it sprayed the battalion aid station with machine-gun bullets and set fire to a large ammunition dump nearby. The resultant exploding shells forced the right of the 3d Battalion to withdraw about 100 yards, returning to its original positions after the lire had burned itself out. Holland Smith expressed displeasure over the 27th Division's failure to start its attack on time. He was even more upset when he found out that Colonel Bishop’s 2nd Battalion had not made progress at Nafutan Point. As a result, Major-General Sanderson Jarman had to brief Ralph Smith, who committed to ensuring his regiments advanced on schedule the next day.

On June 24, the 106th and 165th Regiments once again struggled to advance against strong resistance and difficult terrain. An attack toward Nafutan Point in the south also failed, prompting Holland Smith to remove Ralph Smith from command and temporarily appoint Jarman to lead the 27th Division. Colonel Geoffrey O'Connell was assigned to clear Nafutan. In contrast, the 2nd Marines made progress toward Garapan and reached Radio Road on the O-6 Line, where they repelled two strong enemy counterattacks. On the right of the 2nd Marine Division, the 8th Marines continued the fight over nightmarish terrain. As Lieutenant Colonel Hays’ 1sl Battalion moved into the attack, the troublesome pocket, developed on the previous day, came alive again. Matted with undergrowth and trees, the irregular coral limestone formation was favorable for the type of defense the Japanese were employing. Improving the area’s natural assets, they had developed a honeycomb of underground positions. The 1st Battalion, utilizing the most unspectacular of tactics, plodded at its unpleasant task of sealing the caves and killing the occupants. The former chore proved the easier, since in most cases the Japanese had not neglected to plan routes and methods of escape. When the “cavemen" had done as much damage as possible from one position, they would retire to another from which to resume the fight. Shortly after midday, the coordinated efforts of combat engineers armed with flame-throwers, bazookas and demolitions and riflemen showed results; the pocket was eliminated and contact with the 6th Marines again established. By late afternoon the battalion reached the edge of a vast cleared area, desirable from the defense-for-the-night point of view. Since the next satisfactory site was 700 yards farther to the north, the unit halted and dug in. Major Larsen’s 3d Battalion, advancing along the base of a cliff, made good progress, limited only by fairly difficult terrain and the necessity of maintaining contact with flank units. Above the 3d Battalion, along the top of the cliff, moved Lieutenant Colonel Tompkins’ 1st Battalion. 29th Marines. Here the cliff was broken into a rough plateau dotted with smaller plateaus of coral limestone which con tinned rising like irregular stair steps toward Mt Tapotcliau’s crest. The undergrowth in this area was a tangle of fern trees, the roots of which spread out three to eight feet above ground like the ribs of an inverted umbrella, overgrown and interlaced with a strait-jacket of vines. On the battalion’s right flank was a narrow flat ledge covered with grass five feet high and the usual tangle of trees. This ledge, part of the north-south ridge leading to Mt. Tapotchau, was within machine-gun range of the summit. Moving through this intricate snarl was like attempting to swim through a fishermen's net, and Tompkins’ battalion became overextended. At this juncture Colonel Wallace, commanding the 8th Marines, ordered the 2d Battalion to move in behind Tompkins’ right to protect the open flank. As the 8th Marines dug in for the night after an advance of about 700 yards, it again became essential to commit the 37mm Platoon from the Regimental Weapons Company to extend south along the ridge facing the hiatus between the 2nd and 27th Divisions.

Schmidt's division also moved east on Kagman Peninsula, with the 23rd Marines reaching Chacha village and the 24th Marines making rapid coastal gains of around 1200 yards. The next day, while the 2nd Marines held their ground outside Garapan and the 6th Marines tackled the Tipo Pale strongpoint, Colonel Wallace's forces finally attacked Mount Tapotchau. However, the summit was secured by a bold patrol along a ridge line on the right flank, which had to fend off multiple Japanese counterattacks. The 27th Division, under new leadership, resumed its attack, with the 165th taking one-third of Purple Heart Ridge and the 106th making a small entry into Death Valley before withdrawing during the night under enemy pressure. Further south, O'Connell struggled to make headway at Nafutan Point, while on Kagman Peninsula, Schmidt's Marines faced minimal resistance and secured Kagman Hill and the Brown Beaches along the O-6 Line. Additionally, recognizing their desperate situation, Generals Igeta and Saito requested reinforcements from Tinian. 

From Sunharon Harbor on the west coast of Tinian, 11 personnel barges carrying a company of the 1st Battalion, 135th Regiment moved out during darkness of 25-26 June bent upon reinforcing Saipan. Spotted by the destroyer Bancroft and the destroyer escort Elden, the barges were fired upon and dispersed. One was reported sunk, while the remainder scurried back to Tinian Town. Later, at about 2:25am, LCI(G)s 438 and 456 observed several barges moving out of Tanapag Harbor on Saipan’s west coast. Immediately opening fire, the LCI(G)s accounted for one sunk and a second damaged; the remainder returned to Tanapag. Both LCI(G)s received some damage during this repulse, however. The 438 received 12 holes in her hull from one of the barges’ 37mm guns, damaging the fire main, starting batteries and radar. The 456 suffered less, with only slight damage to her winch and refrigerator. The 438 suffered one man killed and two wounded and the 456 two wounded. A report from one of the LCIs that the Japanese barges had unleashed torpedoes during this action was later substantiated by a prisoner of war who stated that there were at least three torpedoes fired at U. S. ships at this time.

The Americans responded by initiating a systematic bombardment of Tinian on June 26.Air and naval gunfire alternated daily, working first in one half and then in the other, while artillery fired on any targets escaping other attention. A target map was maintained, information exchanged and new targets posted. Cruisers Birmingham, Montpelier and Indianapolis, using both air and direct shipboard spot, were assigned to execute the naval gunfire portion of the plan, while planes would be provided by Carrier Support Groups One and Two. Meanwhile, Schmidt’s Marines were clearing the Kagman Peninsula, and the 6th Marines bypassed the Tipo Pale strongpoint and secured the ridge linking it to Tapotchau. 

In the 8th Marines zone the day’s advances were small. On the left the 1st Battalion regulated its progress on that of the 6th Marines. On the right the 2d Battalion’s advance was restrained because of the lack of contact with 27th Division elements. In the 8th Marines’ center, the 3rd Battalion and the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, made only small gains. The attached 2nd Battalion, 25th Marines, remained with the regiment during the greater portion of the day, Company E being used in the lines, while the remainder of the battalion was employed in mopping-up operations. As already noted, the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, could move only as fast as the 6th Marines to its left if it were to retain contact. The cleeply-gashed ground, more than enemy opposition, governed the rate of advance. One unusual enemy tactic employed against the battalion at this time is worthy of note: bundles of picric acid blocks were catapulted upon the Marines by Japanese soldiers located in the craggy rocks along the route. This device showed originality but little else; no casualties were inflicted upon the Marines. Higher on Tapotehau’s western slopes, the 3rd Battalion also fought through difficult terrain. A statement from the 8th Marines’ action report gives an indication of the problems in that zone: “To go from the left flank of 3/8 to the right flank of 3/8 required a two hour and 40 minute march over rough terrain.” At some points the Japanese threw or rolled grenades and demolition charges down upon the Marines as they struggled through the hilly thickets. And as if that were not enough, Japanese positioned above directed plunging machine-gun fire upon the advancing men. The 3d Battalion’s left flank kept pace with the 1st Battalion, but the right flank lagged behind. By nightfall the 3d Battalion’s lines stretched almost north and south along the base of a steep slope. On 25 June the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, less one company, had secured a foothold on the summit of Mt. Tapotchau. It remained on 26 June, then, for Company B to move up the mountain’s western slope and join the battalion. While waiting for this unit, Lieutenant Colonel Tompkins sent a 25-man combat patrol from Company A to seize the northernmost rise of Tapotehau’s crest. This patrol was repulsed after some hard fighting, and it became apparent that this area would have to be thoroughly battered before a successful effort could be made. In the meantime Company B reached the mountain to,. combing the area on the way. From the 2d Battalion position , the Marines observed men of the 2nd Battalion, 106th Infantry, attempting to move up on the division flank. By the close of the day, however, a gap of 600 yards still existed. To protect the exposed flank, the 2nd Battalion bent its lines to the shape of a horseshoe with one company facing north, one east, and one south. To sum up, the most important developments in the 8th Marines’ sector during the day were the straightening of several small bulges in the lines and consolidation of the dominating heights won on 25 June.

The 106th Regiment, under Colonel Albert Stebbins, failed to launch its attack amid confusion. The 165th Regiment bypassed Death Valley and joined the 4th Marine Division. In the south, after heavy bombardment, O'Connell began making progress against Nafutan Point. Life had not been pleasant for the Japanese defenders on Nafutan Point. From seaward, destroyers pounded the rocks and caves unmercifully; from land, a monotonously heavy volume of fire was maintained by 40mm and 90mm anti-aircraft guns, and 81mm and 60mm mortars, as well as fires of the light tank platoon, the self-propelled mount, and small arms of the 2nd Battalion, 105th Regiment. Movement on the point was rendered very difficult, and the shortage of food and water became acute. As a result, on June 26, Captain Sasaki, commanding the 317th Independent Infantry Battalion of the 47th Independent Mixed Brigade, determined to move his battalion from the Nafutan Point trap and join other Japanese forces which he believed to be in the vicinity of Hill 500. This attack, though better planned than the average Japanese effort, achieved very little, and Sasaki’s password “seven lives for one’s country” remained only a slogan.

However, during the night, the trapped Japanese forces managed to break through O’Connell’s defenses. Moving undiscovered through the thinly spread outposts of the 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry, Sasaki’s force headed for Aslito Airfield. The only indication that men of the 2d Battalion had that the enemy was on the move came at about 0200 when “an extremely large group” stumbled into the command post, about 1,500 yards in rear of the front lines. After a lively skirmish, in which the soldiers suffered 24 casualties, the intruders disappeared. The next morning the bodies of 27 Japanese were found in the immediate command post area. At about 0230 Sasaki’s force struck Aslito Airfield. All U. S. personnel in that area were alerted after the enemy succeeded in setting fire to one P-47 and damaging three others. Seabees and engineers quickly rallied to their unexpected mission, cleared the field of Japanese and set up a hasty defense. At 0430 the Commander, Air Defense Command, reported that enemy .50-caliber machine guns and 20mm guns were firing on Aslito Airfield. After causing confusion at the airfield, the force advanced toward Hill 500, where they expected to find Colonel Oka's 47th Independent Mixed Brigade Headquarters . At about 0520 there were two surprises: the first was to Sasaki’s men, who received an unexpected reception from the 25th Marines on Hill 500, and the second surprise was for the 25th Marines, who were not expecting visitors and, in some cases, found the Japanese in their midst before they realized that anything was afoot. Both participants quickly recovered from the shock, however, and a lively small arms and hand grenade battle ensued. At about the same time, the 14th Marines, in artillery firing positions between Hill 500 and Aslito Airfield, was attacked by another portion of Sasaki’s force. The brunt of this assault was borne by the 2nd Battalion led by Lieutenant Colonel Wilson, which held its fire until a precariously late moment, mistaking the advancing Japanese column for a large U. S. Army patrol scheduled to pass through the area at about this time. A savagely-fought, close-in battle ensued, virtually annihilating the attacking force. Total 14th Marines’ casualties in the skirmish were 33 killed and wounded, while 143 Japanese bodies lay sprawled in the regiment’s immediate area. With the coming of daylight, the 25th Marines were assigned the mission of mopping up the stragglers from the abortive enemy effort of the previous night. Total Japanese losses in the fight around Aslito Airfield, at Hill 500, and in the 14th Marines’ area, plus the 27 June mop-up by the 25th Marines, amounted to approximately 500 dead. The participants, some of whom wore United States uniforms and carried M-1 rifles, appeared greatly in need of water and rations. Yet that is all for Saipan for now, as we will be traveling over to China War.

After the success of Operation Kogo, the Japanese planned for General Yokoyama’s 11th Army to initiate a three-pronged assault in Hunan. The 34th, 58th, 68th, and 116th Divisions would head straight for Changsha, while the 3rd, 13th, and 27th Divisions provided coverage on the eastern flank by advancing towards Liling. Meanwhile, the 40th Division, the 17th Independent Mixed Brigade, and the 5th Independent Brigade secured the Dongting Lake region on the western flank. Additionally, the 70th Division in Jiangxi would launch a diversionary attack towards Hunan. On the night of May 27, following heavy artillery bombardment, Yokoyama initiated his offensive. The 34th, 58th, 68th, and 116th Divisions crossed the Xinqiang River swiftly, while the 3rd, 13th, and 27th Divisions moved south towards Liling. Furthermore, the 216th Regiment launched an amphibious operation towards Yingtianzhen and Xiangyin, catching the Chinese defenders off guard. The following day, the 40th Division and the 109th Regiment began their assault southwards, capturing Anxiang, Nan, Tianxingzhou, and the port of Sanxianhu by May 30. Simultaneously, the 5th and 17th Brigades advanced west towards the Songzizhong River to secure the northern shores of Dongting Lake.

In the east, the Japanese forces encountered minimal resistance and advanced almost 100 kilometers, capturing Tongcheng, Nanjiangzhen, Pingjiang, and Changshouzhen by June 1. In the center, the main Japanese divisions breached the 20th Army’s positions at Guanwang and Changlezhen and reached the Guluo River on June 3. With the enemy seemingly in full retreat, Yokoyama’s forces continued southward, hindered only by a sudden downpour, and reached the Laodao River line by June 6, preparing to besiege Changsha. However, heavy rains delayed these preparations, allowing General Xue Yue time to gather his forces around the city. According to a prearranged plan, the 11th Army used the 27th Division to repair the Chongyang-Tongcheng-Pingjiang-Liuyang road and all engineer regiments under the direct command of the Field Engineer commander to repair the Xinqiang-Xinshizhen-Mianhuapo-Changsha road. Continuous rains, however, greatly delayed the road work and turned the roads into a sea of mud. Lines of communication became extremely difficult to maintain and, until the middle of June, the Japanese first-line troops received very few supplies from the rear. In spite of strenuous efforts on the part of the Army to improve these two roads, they eventually had to be abandoned. The situation became critical as all field artillery and motor units became congested on the muddy Yueyang-Changsha road. In the meantime, the 40th Division crossed Dongting Lake to seize Yuanjiang, making contact with elements of the 58th Division at Qiaokou.

On June 11, the 40th Division successfully took control of the Yiyang area, while the 34th Division bypassed the Tamoshan Range and launched an attack towards Yuelu Mountain and Fengshupu. The 68th and 116th Divisions bypassed Changsha and moved forward towards Guanqiao, Changlingxiang, and Yisuhe, and the 3rd and 13th Divisions advanced towards Liuyang, facing significant resistance in the region. Despite this, Liuyang fell on June 14, after which the 13th Division proceeded towards Liling. Finding himself completely surrounded, Xue Yue decided to leave Changsha and retreat towards Liling. In the earlier three battles of Changsha, the Chinese had managed to defend the city and counterattack from the flanks; however, both the western and eastern flanks had now fallen to the Japanese, leaving the defenders with no choice but to withdraw.

Now I want to take a short detour. Since mid-1943, the Americans had been constructing airfields in India, Ceylon, and China to house 16 squadrons of B-29 Superfortress Very-Long-Range heavy bombers under Brigadier-General Kenneth Wolfe's 20th Bomber Command. As part of Operation Matterhorn, these bombers were assigned to target locations in Japan, Manchuria, Korea, Formosa, Indochina, and the Dutch East Indies. A key target was the Japanese steel industry, which relied on a few coke plants situated in Kyushu, Manchuria, and Korea—within reach of the B-29s stationed in Chengdu. Before launching an attack on Japan, Wolfe decided to conduct a test combat mission against the Makkasan railway yard facilities in Bangkok, Thailand. On June 5, at 05:45, Brigadier-General LaVerne Saunders led 98 B-29s on a 2,261-mile round trip from India, marking the longest mission of the war up to that point. 

Each bomber carried a fuel load of 6846 US gallons and 5 short tons of bombs; three groups carried 500-pound general-purpose bombs while the fourth carried M18 incendiary bombs. The XX Bomber Command wanted to test out the new M18 incendiary bombs and the large number of wooden buildings and freight cars and a small oil facility in the area offered good targets. The resulting 134000-pound takeoff weight was too heavy for the temporary field at Charra, so the 444th Bombardment Group had to stage from the other three fields. The attack was launched at 5:45 local time on 5 June 1944 to avoid high ground temperatures that were bad for the R-3350 engines and to allow the whole mission to be conducted in daylight. Wolfe had suggested a night-time raid, but Arnold insisted on daylight precision bombing.

Only 77 bombers reached Bangkok, conducting a chaotic series of bombing runs between 10:52 and 12:32 due to cloud cover. The bomber's aim was to destroy the Memorial Bridge and a major power plant. They missed and instead knocked down tram lines and destroyed a Japanese military hospital as well as the headquarters of the Japanese secret police. No civilian buildings were damaged, a fact that aroused admiration among the Thai authorities. It was only in 1947 that the Thais discovered the American bombers had been aiming at the Memorial Bridge, almost two and-a-half kilometres away. Following the raid, schools and universities were closed in Bangkok and children moved out of the city for their safety.

Upon returning to India, 42 B-29s had to land at alternative airfields due to low fuel, leading to the loss of five bombers and 15 aircrew fatalities. Despite the setbacks, the mission was deemed successful enough for Wolfe to plan a night attack on Japan for June 15. The B-29s began relocating to Chengdu on June 13 to prepare for the strike against the Imperial Iron and Steel Works in Yawata, producing approximately 2,250,000 metric tons of steel annually, or 24% of Japan's steel output.

On June 15 at 16:16, Saunders led 68 B-29s on a 3,182-mile round trip to Yawata. Although some bombers crashed during takeoff, 47 reached the city and attacked for nearly two hours starting at 12:28. Only forty-seven of the sixty-eight B–29s launched hit the target area: one crashed en route, six jettisoned their bombs because of mechanical difficulties, and seven bombed secondary targets or targets of opportunity. Only 15 American aircraft visually aimed their bombs, as Yawata was obscured by darkness and smoke, with 32 others bombing via radar. Two more B-29s targeted Laoyao harbor, while five attacked other nearby targets. In total, 107 tons of bombs were dropped during the raid.

While returning to Chengdu, three additional B-29 bombers were lost in China. In total, seven B-29s and 55 crew members were lost by the Americans, who managed only to inflict minor damage on Yawata. However, this marked the first attack on the Japanese home islands since the Doolittle raid in April 1942, signaling the start of the strategic bombing campaign against Japan. This raid caused panic in Japanese society, prompting Tokyo to pressure Yokoyama to quickly conquer Changsha and then target the B-29 airfields in central China. As a result, on June 16, the 58th Division launched its assault on Changsha, with the 34th Division also attacking Yuelu and Fengshupu. Changsha fell two days later, leading to the collapse of Chinese resistance in the area. By June 22, Liling and Pingxiang were also captured, allowing the Japanese to gain control over the Jiangxi-Zhejiang railway. Upon hearing of the defeat at Changsha, the Allies worried about the role of Kuomintang forces during Operation Ichi-Go. President Roosevelt proposed placing the entire Nationalist Army under General Stilwell, a suggestion that infuriated Chiang Kai-Shek and was quickly rejected, “Due to our errors in Henan and Changsha, the prestige of our nation and our army, including that of the military command, has been questioned. The foreigners haven’t respected neither our combatants nor our commanders. This offense is more intolerable than the Japanese occupation of our homeland by force of arms.” Meanwhile, Yokoyama's next target was Hengyang to the south, where he planned to encircle the city using the 116th and 68th Divisions while the 40th Division secured Xiangxiang to the west. To the east, the 3rd and 13th Divisions would advance beyond You to secure Leiyang, with support from the 27th Division. The 216th Regiment was set to move upstream along the Xiang Jiang to attack Hengyang from the northeast.

Meanwhile, in Henan, General Uchiyama continued his offensive by capturing the Hotsin Airdrome on May 30 and occupying the towns of Lingbao and Wenxiang by June 11. However, the Chinese forces managed to regroup, ambush, and counterattack the Japanese troops, reclaiming the recently lost towns and ultimately forcing the Japanese to retreat from Loyang and other towns by June 15. Nonetheless, the railway remained under Japanese control and was further reinforced with the capture of Runan and Shangcai on June 16.

Back in Hunan, the second phase of Yokoyama's offensive got off to a strong start as the 40th secured Xiangxiang, trapping many retreating Chinese soldiers and compelling them to surrender. Meanwhile, the 68th and 116th moved quickly toward Hengyang, with the 68th occupying Hengyang airfield on June 26 and the 116th reaching the sector northwest of Hengyang the next day. On that day, the 68th also maneuvered around the city, crossing the Xiangjiang River to launch an attack on Hengyang from the southwest.

Both divisions commenced their assault on Hengyang, but the strong Chinese fortifications held by the well-prepared defenders proved impenetrable. The attackers faced a shortage of ammunition and were further challenged by General Chennault's B-25s, P-40s and P-51s, who bombed and strafed the besiegers. As a result, Major-General Fang Xianjue's 10th Army repelled all Japanese assaults by the end of June. The heavy Japanese losses during these attacks, including severe injuries to Lieutenant-General Sakuma Tameto, compelled Yokoyama to suspend the attacks on July 2 until his artillery could support the siege. Yet that will be all for the China front for today as we are now heading over to Biak.

After General Fuller was relieved on June 15th, General Eichelberger assumed command and decided to follow General Doe’s plans for the June 16th attack. The 186th Infantry's unit began attacking eastward along the ridge shortly after 9:00. Company E led, with the 2d Platoon on the ridge, the 3d Platoon in flats 100 yards to the north, and the 1st Platoon 100 yards beyond the 3d. The 2d Platoon quickly found itself in a maze of Japanese positions and was halted by Japanese automatic weapons fire. The 1st Platoon of Company G thereupon moved up on Company E's right and began advancing along the southern slope of the low ridge. Together, the two platoons continued eastward against slackening resistance. They cleared innumerable enemy slit trenches, foxholes, and bunkers, destroyed several machine guns of various calibers, and at 10:50 reached the lines of the 3d Battalion, 162d Infantry. The task of closing the ridge line gap was completed in less than two hours, many of the previous Japanese defenders apparently having withdrawn north into the West Caves the preceding night.

The Americans also moved northeast but encountered heavy resistance from enemy machine-gun and mortar fire. After intense artillery support, the battalion regrouped and attacked again in the afternoon, reaching the western limits of the West Caves positions. However, concerned about a possible counterattack on his left flank, Doe decided to pull his forces back to the low ridge while Haney's 2nd Battalion took over from the 2nd Battalion, 186th Regiment. The 2nd Battalion, 186th Regiment could look back on the day's operations with a good deal of satisfaction. It had closed the gap on the low ridge; it had located the western limits of the enemy's West Caves positions; it had discovered that more Japanese troops were located north of the enemy encampment area both along the main road and on ridges west and northwest of Hill 320; it had eliminated most of the machine-gun nests and rifle pits in the encampment area and many of those on high, forested ground near that bivouac; it had destroyed many Japanese automatic weapons and rifles; and it had killed at least 65 Japanese. The battalion in turn lost 15 men killed and 35 wounded. There had been only local patrolling by the rest of the units in the forward area during the day, for the 1st Battalions of the 162nd and 186th Regiments had been kept in place by American artillery and mortar fire which supported the operations of the 2nd Battalion, 186th Regiment.

On June 17, after identifying the western limits of the West Caves, Doe instructed Newman's 1st Battalion to advance northwest to high ground while Haney's 1st Battalion moved south and southwest towards the West Caves. Facing strong opposition, the 162nd Battalion, supported by tanks, managed to eliminate several pillboxes before being halted around midday. At the same time, the 186th Battalion approached the high ground from the east and joined forces with Haney's Company C, which had just cleared the final major enemy position on the hill. The Americans then continued their westward attack but made only modest progress by nightfall. With the high ground overlooking the West Caves secured, Doe planned to launch a coordinated attack on the strongpoint the following day. However, on June 18, Eichelberger changed his plans due to dissatisfaction with the progress of the operation. Instead, the 162nd and 186th Regiments reorganized for a coordinated attack, with Newman assigned to attack the rear of the West Caves position while the 3rd Battalion, 163rd Regiment gathered near Hill 320 to block enemy reinforcements. 

The main effort was to be made by the 186th Infantry, the 2d and 3d Battalions of which were to attack from the southwest and west while the 1st Battalion struck from the east. The 162d Infantry would hold its positions. An egg-shaped terrain feature on the low ridge 1,000 yards northeast of Borokoe Drome and on the left flank of the 186th Infantry's prospective line of advance was to be seized for flank security and as a line of departure for subsequent attacks north and northeast. On 18 June only local patrolling was undertaken, while the bulk of the troops rested or redeployed in preparation for the attack on the 19th. The egg-shaped feature was secured against no opposition and a few Japanese stragglers along the low ridge in the area were mopped up. The regiment was to advance east from the egg-shaped protrusion of the low ridge with the 2nd Battalion leading, two companies abreast. The 3rd Battalion was to follow the 2nd, and the 1st Battalion would start moving northwestward once the other two had begun moving east. The attack, which was to begin at 6:30 on the 19th, would be supported by the 121st, 167th, 205th, and 947th Field Artillery Battalions, Company D of the 641st Tank Destroyer Battalion, and ten tanks of the 603d Tank Company.

Furthermore, the 34th Regiment was deployed to relieve the 186th west of Mokmer Drome, prepared to take over Borokoe and Sorido Dromes as per Eichelberger's orders. On the morning of June 19, following intense artillery preparation, Eichelberger's offensive began, with Newman's 2nd and 3rd Battalions attacking east and then northwest against light rifle fire and eventually reaching a rugged, heavily-forested coral ridge west of Hill 320 by midday. Around noon, Newman's 1st Battalion started clearing the southern extension of the coral ridge line, successfully advancing through the Japanese encampment area up the road to the 2nd Battalion's position by late afternoon. Facing minimal resistance, the 186th Regiment surrounded the rear of the Japanese in the West Caves, preventing reinforcement or escape. Eichelberger's plans for the next day involved the 186th continuing its operations in the Hill 320 area and the western ridges, while the 162nd attacked the West Caves and the 34th advanced towards the airdromes. On the morning of June 20, Haney's 1st Battalion, supported by two tanks, attacked the West Caves, facing lighter resistance initially but ultimately being halted by heavy Japanese fire. At the same time, Newman's troops extensively patrolled and discovered the Teardrop position, while the 34th Regiment quickly took control of the Borokoe and Sorido Dromes and Sorido village, facing minimal opposition.

During the 1st Battalion, 162nd Regiment again moved up to the West Caves on June 21 and sent patrols out to clear Japanese riflemen from brush and crevices on hillocks north and northwest of the caves. The patrols, actually flamethrower teams supported by riflemen, accomplished their mission without much difficulty while the rest of the battalion, again covered by two tanks from the 603rd Tank Company, surrounded the sump depressions. The infantry and tanks concentrated on the most westerly of three large sinkholes comprising the West Caves. The tanks fired into cave entrances; the infantrymen lobbed hand grenades into holes and crevices within reach; and all Japanese observed were quickly killed by rifle fire. But the battalion was unable to force its way into the main entrance to the underground caverns. Fire into this entrance was also ineffective, for the opening was shielded by stalagmites and stalactites. Engineers poured the contents of five gasoline drums into the cavern through crevices or seepage points found on the surface of the ground. Flamethrowers then ignited the gasoline and the 1st Battalion withdrew to await developments. There were no immediately apparent results and, since it was believed that the West Caves were still strongly held, the battalion did not attempt to send any more men into the entrance. In the late afternoon the unit again pulled back to its bivouac area.

The attacks during the night of June 21-22 had apparently resulted from a decision on the part of Colonel Kuzume to acknowledge defeat. In an impressive ceremony in the West Caves, Colonel Kuzume, surrounded by his staff, burned the colors of the 222nd Regiment and, according to some American reports, disemboweled himself in the tradition of the Samurai. Japanese reports of the Biak action state that Colonel Kuzume did not die then but was killed in action or committed suicide some days later. Whatever the cause and date of his death, on the night of June 21-22 Colonel Kuzume had instructed the forces remaining in the West Caves to withdraw to the north and west. Many of the remaining troops of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 222nd Regiment, who had originally held the low ridge north of Mokmer Drome, had already been killed or had moved north, and most of the Japanese killed by the 186th Regiment during the night of June 21-22 were identified as members of the 221st Regiment, elements of which had been included in the reinforcements sent to Biak after Z Day.

At 4:00 am on June 22, the Japanese launched another attack, relying on stealth, hand grenades, and bayonets. Japanese poured out of the caves and rushed northwest up the road toward the lines of the 186th Infantry, attempting to escape to the west or north. At 2100 Japanese infantry, supported by light machine guns and light mortars, hit the southeast flank of the American regiment. When the Japanese were about fifty yards away, the 186th Infantry's .50-caliber machine guns opened fire and broke up the attack. Undaunted, the Japanese made another break-through attempt about midnight, this time supported only by light mortars. Machine guns, both .50- and .30-caliber, aided by Company G's 60-mm. mortars, forced the enemy to withdraw for a second time.

This final assault was so fierce that the enemy reached the 186th's foxholes, resulting in hand-to-hand combat across the regiment's southern flank. Mortar fire eventually scattered the disorganized enemy, though small groups of Japanese soldiers continued to mount sporadic attacks until dawn. Haney’s 1st Battalion continued to face enemy resistance at the West Caves; however, after dropping two 500-pound TNT charges into one of the cave entrances, the Americans initially reported the caves cleared. This assessment proved premature when another small group of Japanese attempted to breach the 186th Regiment's lines later that night.

 

On the following morning, Haney’s 1st Battalion set up a permanent camp around the various caves and indentations, continuing their search through the area. Although the remaining Japanese troops were trapped in a hopeless situation, they managed to hold their ground. It wasn't until the afternoon of June 25 that any soldiers managed to access the caves, but without making any deep inroads. It wasn't until June 27 that patrols reached the innermost parts of the West Caves. The stench of rotting Japanese bodies was revolting, and the sight nauseating. The entire cave area was strewn with Japanese bodies or parts of bodies. One gruesome area had apparently been used as an aid station and another possibly as a butcher shop for cannibalistically inclined survivors of the carnage since June 18. Three more Japanese were killed in the caves during the day, and large quantities of equipment and documents were found. Because of the advanced stage of decomposition of many of the dead, a complete count of Japanese bodies could not be made, but before overpowering odors drove the patrols out of the caves 125 more or less whole bodies were counted. This was considered a minimum figure, for no estimate could be made of the numbers of Japanese represented by separated arms, legs, or torsos and it was impossible to guess how many Japanese had been sealed in smaller caves or crevices by artillery and mortar fire or by explosions of TNT and Japanese ammunition within the caves.

With the suppression of Japanese cave positions near Mokmer airfield, the strip was finally operational, and P-40s and B-24s started using it from June 22. Between June 22 and 24, the 186th Regiment also took down some Japanese positions northwest of its perimeter. By June 25, Colonel Newman managed to subdue the Teardrop position. Despite lacking supplies and water, some Japanese managed to flee westward, where the 34th Regiment would eventually clean up the area by the end of June. Over at the East Caves from 7 through 10 June the 4.2-inch mortars of the 2d Platoon, Company D, 641st Tank Destroyer Battalion, lobbed over 1,000 shells into the East Caves area. On the 9th and 10th, tanks in LCT's cruising offshore added their fire, and on the latter day the 205th and 947th Field Artillery Battalions swung into action against the East Caves. Bombardments by artillery, mortars, tanks, and destroyers continued from 11-13 June, but the Japanese still managed to deny to the HURRICANE. Task Force the use of the coastal road during much of the period. In between artillery and naval gunfire concentrations, elements of the 3d Battalion, 163d Infantry, probed more deeply into the Japanese positions from the north and northeast and located the north flank of the main enemy defenses. By noon on the 13th, the combination of American fire and infantry action had succeeded in silencing enough of the Japanese fire so that truck convoys could safely use the coastal road without interruptions for the first time. Infantry patrolling and all types of bombardment continued from 14 through 23 June, but the Japanese still occasionally harassed truck convoys along the coastal road. On the 23d or 24th (the records are contradictory) there was undertaken a series of aerial bombardment missions which are among the shortest on record. Fifth Air Force B-25's, based on Mokmer Drome, took off from that field to skip-bomb the East Caves. Although most of the bombs missed the main sump holes, the air missions did cause many explosions and started a number of fires in the East Caves. For a few days, at least, almost all the enemy fire was silenced.

On 27 June Company E, 542d Engineer, Boat and Shore Regiment, started to construct a jetty near Mokmer, and in connection with this mission began working a gravel pit at the base of the ridge northwest of the village. Japanese mortar and rifle fire from the East Caves impeded the latter work and on 29 June 4.2-inch mortars and tanks had to be moved back into the area to shell the caves and protect the engineers. Within three days the mortars fired over 800 rounds into the caves. The engineer company, borrowing bazookas from an infantry unit, sent its own patrols into the caves, and Company I, 163d Infantry, sent patrols back into the area from the north. On 30 June the 205th Field Artillery Battalion sent one gun of Battery C to a position near Mokmer village to place about 800 rounds of smoke and high explosive shells into the caves. Light harassing fire continued, however, and on 3 July elements of Company E, 542d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, moved into the caves under cover of tank fire from the base of the ridge. Some tunnels were sealed shut, twelve Japanese were killed, and two light machine guns were captured. Almost simultaneously, Company E, 163d Infantry, pushed into the caves from Mokmer village. Neither the engineer nor the infantry unit met as much resistance as had been anticipated. Patrolling throughout the caves was continued on the 4th and 5th, and on the latter day a platoon of Company E, 163d Infantry, entered the larger sump holes, where were found many automatic weapons, mortars, rifles, all types of ammunition, food, clothing, cooking utensils, and pioneer equipment. The next day loudspeakers and interpreters were sent into the caves to persuade the few remaining Japanese to surrender. Only ten Japanese, of whom eight were killed, were seen in the area. The Japanese who had lived uninjured through the heavy bombardments since 7 June had evacuated the East Caves. The few Japanese left alive in the East Caves after 6 July were still capable of causing some trouble. On 15 July six souvenir hunters of the Royal Australian Air Force (elements of which were staging through Biak for operations farther west) were killed near the caves. Tanks and infantry were sent into the area to mop up the remaining Japanese and recover the Australian dead. On the 16th and 17th, three badly mutilated bodies of Australian airmen were found and two Japanese machine gun nests were wiped out. On the 20th the infantry and tanks returned to the caves, found the other Australian bodies, and eliminated the last enemy resistance.

Meanwhile, the determined and resourceful defenders of the Ibdi Pocket resisted repeated attacks from the 2nd Battalion, 163rd Regiment and ongoing artillery barrages. By the end of June, the Japanese had been pushed into a 600-yard-square area, with American patrols continuing the cleanup in July. Through the use of bazookas, flamethrowers, tanks, and artillery, the remaining Japanese were gradually confined to an even smaller area until the pocket was cleared on July 28.

The American forces would then mop-up the remainder of the island up to August 20, accounting for a total of 4700 Japanese dead and 220 captured since the start of the battle. Total American casualties were an estimated 400 killed, 2000 wounded, 150 injured in action and 5 missing. Additionally, there were 7234 non-battle casualties due to sickness, many of whom were returned to duty.

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Operation Ichi-Go was continuing its horror show deeper into central China. B-29 Superfortresses are arriving to the scene, first from India and China, but as the Pacific Island hoping campaign makes more and more progress, soon they will be lifting off from airfields much closer to the Japanese home islands.