The Pacific War - week by week

- 192 - Pacific War Podcast - Operation Downfall - July 22 - 29, 1945

Last time we spoke about the fall of Wewak. In June 1945, Allied forces, led by General George Stevens, intensified their campaign to capture the strategic town of Wewak in New Guinea. After years of grueling combat, they relentlessly pressed against entrenched Japanese defenses, including the remnants of General Mano's 41st Division. The Australians achieved critical victories by securing vital supply routes and establishing new airfields, facilitating their advance. By May 8, after intense fighting, Australian troops effectively seized Wewak Point, eliminating entrenched Japanese soldiers in bunkers and caves. Despite suffering casualties, the Australians distinguished themselves through bravery and tactical ingenuity. Ultimately, the successful capture of Wewak marked a pivotal moment in the Pacific campaign, showcasing the determination and spirit of the Allies as they pushed towards victory in the Pacific Theater, bringing an end to a crucial chapter of the war.

This episode is Operation Downfall

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

After the fall of Okinawa, the Allies were mopping up campaigns across the Asia-Pacific and planning for what was assumed to be the most cataclysmic battle yet, the invasion of the Japanese home islands. First we are going to travel back to Luzon. By mid-June, General Krueger’s 6th Army had successfully captured all key objectives in northern Luzon, southern Luzon, and the area east of Manila, which serves as the capital of the Philippines. Although General Yokoyama’s poorly equipped 41st Army had been rapidly scattered and forced into hiding, General Yamashita’s Shobu Group still retained enough strength to continue its resistance in northern Luzon. The Shobu Group was primarily gathering its units in a desperate last-stand position along the rugged valley of the Asin River, an area known for its difficult terrain. Interestingly, General Krueger underestimated Yamashita's strategic intentions, still expecting him to make his final stand in the Cagayan Valley, located in the northern part of Luzon. With this assumption, Krueger believed that if General Beigthler’s 37th Division could maintain its rapid advance towards Aparri, situated at the northern tip of Luzon, they might be able to conclude the Luzon Campaign in a pivotal stroke.

However, intelligence indicated that units of the Shobu Group were retreating into the Cordillera Central mountain range, a formidable natural barrier, located between Routes 4 and 11. In response, Krueger ordered the 1st Corps to exert strong pressure on this mountainous region from the north, south, and west. To implement this strategy, General Swift directed the 6th, 25th, and 33rd Divisions to clear the supply route between Baguio and Aritao, ultimately sealing off Yamashita's last-stand position from the south. Meanwhile, Colonel Volckmann's guerrilla forces were instructed to advance east from Cervantes to capture the crucial junction of Routes 4 and 11 at Sabangan. Recognizing the importance of controlling key roadways, the 63rd Regiment was tasked with pushing up Route 4 to seize the strategic location of Kiangan. In the south, the 130th Regiment began probing southeast towards Pigkian, while the 20th Regiment continued to apply pressure on the remnants of the now-battered 2nd Tank Division. Ultimately, General Iwanaka’s weakened forces narrowly avoided entrapment along the Bambang-Pingkian road, retreating northward via treacherous mountain trails and river valleys. They reached the Tubliao area just as early July arrived, illustrating the persistent and relentless nature of this campaign.

Looking northward from Cervantes, Volckmann’s guerrilla fighters launched attacks toward both Mankayan and Sabangan. By the end of June, their efforts had pressured the beleaguered 19th Division to hastily withdraw from Bontoc, a significant town located in central Luzon, and Sabangan. However, General Ozaki’s forces maintained a formidable defensive position at the Lepanto Mine, an area known for its mineral wealth and strategic significance. On June 16, the 63rd Regiment began its advance up Route 4, which runs north through the central highlands toward Kiangan, a town that was critical for controlling the region. By the evening of the following day, American forces had successfully breached the defensive line established by the 105th Division at the Rayambugan Farm School, a local educational institution that was repurposed for military use during the conflict. Continuing their push, the 63rd Regiment encountered the main defenses of General Tsuda on June 19 along Route 4. However, over five days of fierce fighting, utilizing only one battalion for the attack, gained little ground for the Americans. Recognizing the need for greater force, they reinforced their assault on June 24. By June 26, the 63rd began to break through towards Hucab, a small settlement, and by June 29, they had overcome the last organized resistance in the area.

Meanwhile, the 37th Division also made significant advances. Resuming its drive up Route 5 on June 17, the 148th Regiment successfully pushed forward to Naguilian, a town that marks a key waypoint on this route. Two days later, the front-line troops reached Bangag, yet here they encountered increased resistance. They were now facing elements of Major-General Yuguchi Shuntaro’s 80th Brigade, which was attempting to move south along Route 5. In a series of running engagements from June 19 to 23, the 37th Division inflicted heavy casualties, killing over 600 Japanese soldiers and capturing nearly 285 more in the challenging fifteen-mile stretch between Bangag and Balasig. The remnants of the Yuguchi Force were ultimately forced to retreat eastward into the rugged and uncharted wilderness of the Sierra Madre mountain range, illustrating the intense and chaotic nature of the conflict.

General Krueger deemed it essential to execute an airborne operation over the northern Cagayan Valley to ensure the success of the 37th Division's advance. It’s possible that Krueger’s motivation also stemmed from a desire to secure northern Luzon before the 8th Army took control of operations, which was scheduled for July 1. Despite contrary reports from various sources, including the United States Armed Forces in the Philippines Northern Luzon, 1st Corps, the 37th Division, and ALAMO scout teams, Krueger concluded that Japanese forces in the Cagayan Valley were retreating "in wild disorder on Highway 5 towards Aparri." It’s worth noting that, in actuality, the general movement of Japanese troops had been southward for weeks, and no Japanese unit intended to take refuge in Aparri, a flatland area surrounded by mountains that made it a poor defensive position. Based on his assessment of the situation, Krueger decided that in order to achieve the complete destruction of the fleeing enemy forces, he would launch a vertical envelopment of airborne troops to close any escape routes and prevent the Japanese from evading capture in Aparri. Consequently, on June 21, Krueger ordered a battalion combat team from the 511th Parachute Infantry of the 11th Airborne Division to parachute near Aparri on June 23. However, on June 21, the Connolly Task Force entered Aparri without facing any opposition. By the evening of June 22, elements of the Task Force had advanced ten miles south along Route 5, managing to secure the Camalaniugan Airstrip, a crucial airfield integral to the logistics of both sides. Despite the successes of the reinforced Connolly Task Force, Krueger did not change his mind about the desirability and necessity for the airdrop. Instead, he concluded that the "seizure of Aparri without opposition by elements of the Connolly Task Force on 21 June 1945, together with the almost unopposed advance of the 37th Division, indicated clearly that the time had come for mounting the airborne troops to block the enemy's retreat in the Cagayan Valley." It is not clear just what retreat Krueger expected to block.

On the morning of June 23, the paratroopers dropped into Camalaniugan unchallenged and immediately began their advance southward to make contact with the 37th Division. That same day, the 129th Regiment took over the offensive, heading north towards Tuguegarao, a significant town in the region. Tuguegarao fell without resistance by June 25. By nightfall, forward elements of the 129th had pushed ten miles beyond Tuguegarao, reaching the town of Iguig. The following day, June 26, the forces made contact with the paratroopers at the Paret River, further solidifying their position. By the close of June, Japanese resistance in the Cagayan Valley had subsided, and General Yamashita’s Shobu Group, still capable of fighting, found itself encircled in a last-stand area that would become known as the Kiangan Pocket, named by the Filipino-American forces engaged in its reduction. As the campaign progressed, the last elements of the 25th and 33rd Divisions were relieved. General Gill’s 32nd Division took over control of the Baguio-Ambuclao sector, while the bulk of General Hurdis’ 6th Division assembled at Hucab. This marked a significant transition as it signaled the conclusion of operations for Krueger’s 6th Army and Swift’s 1st Corps. The command would soon shift to General Eichelberger’s 8th Army and General Griswold’s 14th Corps, who would carry out further operations throughout Luzon.

General Griswold's plans called for relentless pressure to be maintained against the Shobu Group, which was concentrated in an area known as the Kiangan Pocket. In line with this strategy, Volckmann’s guerrilla fighters continued their assaults towards key locations such as Mankayan, Sabangan, and Bontoc. The 126th and 127th Regiments advanced north along Route 11 and into the Agno Valley, engaging mixed forces from the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade and the 19th Division. Simultaneously, the 20th and 63rd Regiments were preparing to renew their attack against the 105th Division located at Kiangan, as the advance led by General Hurdis had been halted by torrential rains that had severely damaged roads and bridges. Meanwhile, the 1st Regiment made its own push northward along Route 4 towards Banaue, a town famous for its rice terraces and mountainous landscape.

On July 9, Volckmann’s 15th Regiment finally secured Sabangan. The following day, the 11th Regiment captured Bontoc while the 66th Regiment began to break through the defenses set up by General Ozaki in the Lepanto Mines-Mankayan area. By July 12, Kiangan fell to the 63rd Regiment; however, they soon faced even heavier rains, which compelled General Hurdis to halt his advance once again. On July 20, the 1st Regiment reached Banaue. The next day, they made contact with elements of the guerrilla 11th Regiment at Polis Pass before turning east along Route 389. Here, they aimed to engage a concentration of around 2,500 Japanese soldiers from the 103rd Division and the 4th Air Division. Back in the west, Mankayan also fell on July 20. Five days later, elements of the 15th and 66th Regiments made contact at the junction where Routes 11 and 393 intersect. The 19th Division was withdrawing into the upper Agno Valley to establish defensive positions, blocking the northern, western, and southern approaches to Toccucan, a small but strategically important area. The 15th and 121st Regiments began their assaults toward Toccucan, but they soon encountered remnants of the 19th Division, who proved to be still capable of effective resistance. At the same time, the 66th Regiment moved south along Route 11 to establish contact with troops from the 32nd Division, pressing the offensive forward.

Looking east on July 24, the 20th Regiment took over positions at Kiangan and began an advance towards Kiangkiang and the Asin River. However, the Americans encountered greater resistance than anticipated along this route, making only a meager gain of three miles by August 15. At the same time, other units were dispatched south towards Tubliao to block the retreat of General Iwanaka’s remaining forces. On July 29, elements of the 66th and 127th Regiments finally established contact near Gambang. They then shifted east into the Agno Valley, close to Buguias, and initiated a southward drive to link up with the 126th Regiment, which they successfully met on August 8. By August 15, Volckmann’s guerrillas found themselves four miles short of Toccucan from the northwest and a mile and a half short from the west. In the eastern front, elements of the 1st and 11th Regiments advanced south from Banaue along Route 390, reaching a point about five miles south of Banaue by August 9. That same day, they also cleared Route 389 to the east, securing additional pathways for movement. Additionally, during this time, the 37th Division conducted vigorous patrols east of the Cagayan River, pushing enemy troops deeper into the Sierra Madre mountains. Unfortunately, this relentless pressure resulted in an estimated 1,000 Japanese casualties by August 15. Throughout a month and a half of grueling fighting in steep, treacherous terrain and under miserable weather conditions, the Filipino-American forces struggled to project any significant strength into the Asin Valley. They suffered approximately 1,650 casualties in total. In contrast, the 8th Army estimated that Japanese casualties during the same period reached around 13,500, with many killed or succumbing to starvation and disease.

This marked the effective conclusion of the Luzon Campaign, a campaign that would soon be overshadowed by Japan's surrender. General Yamashita estimated in June that he had sufficient supplies to sustain his forces until mid-September. Given the scale of effort the 8th Army was willing to dedicate to the campaign between July 1 and August 15, it seems likely that Yamashita would have met this deadline. When food supplies were depleted, Yamashita planned for his most effective remaining troops to attempt a breakout from the Asin Valley into the mountains of far northwestern Luzon, where he hoped to find more provisions. Those not involved in the breakout were to conduct banzai attacks along all fronts to cover the retreat of the main forces. Yamashita anticipated that whether or not the breakout succeeded, it would signal the complete disintegration of his forces. He even planned to commit hara-kiri amidst the chaos of battle. As a result, the end of the war arrived about a month before Yamashita was prepared to officially acknowledge his defeat. By any measure, the Shobu Group accomplished the delaying mission that Yamashita had envisioned. Throughout the 6th Army's control of operations on Luzon, the maximum commitment of major ground forces against the Shobu Group included four reinforced U.S. Army infantry divisions, one separate regiment combat team, an armored group, Volckmann’s , and the Buena Vista Regiment. When hostilities ceased on August 15, the Shobu Group was still "entertaining" three reinforced divisions: the 6th, 32nd, and 37th. Additionally, it had a significantly strengthened, the Buena Vista Regiment, and various other guerrilla units. After the war concluded, approximately 50,500 Japanese troops emerged from the mountains of northern Luzon, with nearly 40,000 of these coming from the Asin Valley's last-stand area. Ultimately, the war ended with about a third of the Shobu Group's peak strength still alive and capable of conducting organized and determined delaying operations. It is clear that, over the seven and a half months since January 9, the Shobu Group executed a remarkably effective delaying action. Despite the circumstances, the 14th Area Army had achieved its objective of tying down as many Allied forces as possible in Luzon. This diversion was critical, as it allowed the Japanese Empire valuable time to fortify its defenses in the Home Islands. 

Reflecting back to January, General Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko’s General Defense Command was operating with a modest force for the land and air defense of Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu, and the Izu Islands. The primary focus had been on building naval and air power for Operation Sho-Go. In Kyushu and southwestern Honshu, the Western District Army, led by Lieutenant-General Yokoyama Isamu, consisted of only the 86th Division and the 12th Air Division. Meanwhile, the Central District Army, commanded by Lieutenant-General Kawabe Masakazu in central Honshu and Shikoku, had the 44th and 73rd Divisions supported by the 11th Air Division. To the northeast, in Honshu and the Izu Islands, General Fujie Keisuke's Eastern District Army maintained the 72nd Division, along with both the 1st and 3rd Imperial Guards Divisions, the 66th and 67th Independent Mixed Brigades, and the 10th Air Division. Additionally, Lieutenant-General Uemura Toshimichi’s 36th Army was positioned as a mobile reserve in the Kanto and Shizuoka area, comprised of the 81st and 93rd Divisions, along with the 4th Tank Division. Further north, Lieutenant-General Higuchi Kiichiro’s 5th Area Army had deployed the 7th and 77th Divisions, the 1st Air Division, and the 12th Air Fleet stationed in Hokkaido. It also maintained a mixed brigade at Karafuto. Lieutenant-General Terakura Shozo commanded the 27th Army in the Kuril Islands, which included the 42nd and 91st Divisions, along with the 43rd and 69th Independent Mixed Brigades, and the 3rd and 4th Amphibious Brigades, as well as the Chishima 1st Brigade and Naval Base Force. The air situation was equally dire; Japan had only around 550 aircraft available for offensive operations and a total of about 770 aircraft and 1,200 anti-aircraft guns designated for defensive roles.

As preparations for Operation Ten-Go unfolded, the air and ground units in Japan underwent significant reorganization in February. This restructuring led to the formation of several military commands, including Admiral Ugaki's 5th Air Fleet based in Kyushu, Vice-Admiral Maeda Minoru's 10th Air Fleet in Kanto, Lieutenant-General Yoshimoto Teiichi’s 11th Area Army in northeast Honshu, derived from the now-defunct 27th Army, and additional area armies such as Fujie’s 12th in east-central Honshu, Lieutenant-General Okada Tasuku’s 13th in west-central Honshu, Kawabe’s 15th in western Honshu and Shikoku, and Yokoyama’s 16th in Kyushu. The reorganization of high-level military headquarters was not the sole initiative at this time. The Japanese Empire also approved a large-scale mobilization plan that called for the deployment of 42 divisions, 18 independent mixed brigades, and six tank brigades, amounting to approximately 1.5 million personnel. Following the fall of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, and with intelligence indicating that the Soviet Union was redeploying troops from the European theater to the Far East, Japan began preparing for the defense of its homeland.

This preparation involved activating the 1st and 2nd General Armies to replace the General Defense Command and implementing Operation Ketsu-Go. The strategy for Operation Ketsu-Go outlined that the Imperial Japanese Army would strive to defeat American forces while their invasion fleet remained at sea. The plan aimed to deliver a decisive blow against the American naval forces by first destroying as many aircraft carriers as possible, utilizing the special attack units from both the Air Force and Navy. As the amphibious forces approached the range of homeland airbases, the entire air combat strength would be deployed for continuous day and night assaults against these ships. The focus of these air operations was to disrupt American landing plans, targeting primarily troop and equipment transports. Should any American forces successfully land, these would be swiftly assaulted by the IJA to secure a decisive victory. The primary objective of the ground operation was to eliminate the American landing force right on the beach. Operation Ketsu-Go was designed as a comprehensive joint defense effort, mobilizing the full capabilities of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Navy's essential role was to protect the coasts by attacking invasion fleets using combined surface, submarine, and air forces. The Air General Army would closely coordinate with the Navy to locate and destroy American transports at sea. If the invasion forces succeeded in landing, the local Area Army would take command of all naval ground forces in its assigned territory and would exercise operational control over air units in support of the ground operations. A key component of the Ketsu-Go operational planning involved reinforcing sectors under attack by units transferred from other regions. Given that U.S. air raids had already severely impacted the transportation network, plans were made for troop movements to be conducted on foot. If the battle at the beach held no promise of a successful outcome, the conflict would inevitably shift to fighting inland. To prepare for this, interior resistance was planned. Guard units and Civilian Defense Corps personnel, along with elements of field forces serving as a nucleus, would be utilized as resistance troops. Their mission would involve attriting American forces through guerrilla warfare, espionage, deception, disruption of supply areas, and blockades as enemy landing forces advanced inland. This operation divided Japanese territory into seven zones, where air and naval special attack forces were directed to eliminate invading forces at sea and to establish an aggressive coastal defense. Field Marshal Sugiyama Hashime’s 1st General Army established its headquarters in Tokyo, assuming control over the 11th, 12th, and 13th Area Armies. Meanwhile, Field Marshal Hata Shunroku’s 2nd General Army set up its headquarters in Hiroshima, overseeing the 15th and 16th Area Armies. Additionally, to provide a cohesive command structure for all Army air units participating in the campaign, an Air General Army headquarters was formed under Kawabe. On the naval front, Admiral Toyoda took command of the General Navy Command, granting him supreme operational authority over all Navy surface and air forces.

In the coming months, the Japanese continued to prepare for the anticipated invasion by mobilizing new units and diverting existing forces from Manchuria and other regions. By August, Yoshimoto’s 11th Area Army had been reinforced to include seven infantry divisions and two infantry brigades. The 12th Area Army, now under General Tanaka Shizuichi, was significantly larger, comprising 20 infantry divisions, two tank divisions, eight infantry brigades, three tank brigades, three artillery brigades, and one anti-aircraft brigade. Okada’s 13th Area Army was organized with six infantry divisions, three infantry brigades, one tank brigade, one artillery brigade, and one anti-aircraft brigade. The 15th Area Army, under the command of Lieutenant-General Uchiyama Eitaro, was formed with eight infantry divisions, three infantry brigades, one artillery brigade, one anti-aircraft brigade, and two tank regiments. Yokoyama’s 16th Area Army included a substantial force of 15 infantry divisions, eight infantry brigades, three tank brigades, three artillery brigades, and one anti-aircraft brigade. Additionally, Higuchi’s 5th Area Army consisted of six infantry divisions and two infantry brigades.

In tandem with these ground preparations, Lieutenant-General Sugawara Michio’s 6th Air Army and Ugaki’s 5th Air Fleet were assigned the critical role of launching a powerful air counterattack against the American invasion fleet, targeting carriers, gunnery ships, and transport vessels. In conjunction with elements from the 1st Air Army, 5th Air Army, 3rd Air Fleet, and 10th Air Fleet, the Japanese strategy focused on executing strikes against US carriers. For this task, 330 IJNAF aircraft were specifically assigned. An additional 250 aircraft from both the IJAAF and IJNAF were designated to target gunnery ships, while transports would be subjected to round-the-clock suicide attacks over a span of 10 days. Various aircraft types,including trainers, transports, float planes, bombers, and obsolete fighters, would be used in kamikaze missions. The air assaults on the transports would also incorporate all available aircraft not assigned to other operational duties. Although Japanese fighters had limited effectiveness against B-29 raids, they were expected to inflict damage on the invasion fleet. It was essential, however, that IJAAF and IJNAF fighters first establish air superiority over the targeted areas. Achieving this goal was a questionable assumption, especially given the formidable strength of US air power. By the end of June, nearly 8,000 aircraft, predominantly kamikazes, had been assembled for what was expected to be a decisive battle, with an estimated additional 2,500 planes likely to be produced by the end of September. To enhance their efforts, Kaiten suicide midget submarines and various special attack units were also designated to target any invading fleet, underscoring the significance of suicide attacks in Japanese military strategy. The hope was that these suicide, or tokko, units would inflict a 30 to 50 percent loss on the invading forces. However, as of June 30, only 1,235 surface special-attack boats and 324 underwater types had been produced, significantly hampering Japan's preparations for the impending decisive battle.

In preparation for the seizure of Japan's industrial heart through an amphibious invasion, General MacArthur was laying the groundwork for a significant military operation. On April 3, the Joint Chiefs of Staff designated him as the Commander in Chief of the United States Army Forces in the Pacific. This appointment granted him administrative control over all Army resources in the Pacific, with the exceptions of the 20th Air Force, the Alaskan Command, and the Southeast Pacific forces. Additionally, all naval resources in the Pacific, except those in the Southeast Pacific Area, were placed under Admiral Nimitz's control, making them available for major operations against Japan. With the conclusion of the war in Europe, plans were proposed to redeploy 10 infantry divisions, 5 armored divisions, and 72 air groups to the Pacific. Consequently, the total forces in the Pacific were set to increase from approximately 1.4 million Army troops as of June 30 to nearly 2,439,400 by December 31. On June 2, the 20th Air Force was reorganized into the U.S. Army Strategic Air Force under General Carl Spaatz. This command would oversee the newly formed 20th Air Force led by Lieutenant-General Nathan Twinning, which had been reorganized from the 21st Bomber Command, and Lieutenant-General James Doolittle’s 8th Air Force, which was restructured from the 20th Bomber Command and slated for deployment in the Ryukyus. Simultaneously, MacArthur was developing plans for Operation Downfall, the ambitious strategy for invading Japan. This operation envisaged a massive offensive against the islands of Kyushu and Honshu, utilizing all available combined resources from the Army, Navy, and Air Forces.

The invasion plan consisted of two key operations: Operation Olympic and Operation Coronet. The American plan for the invasion of Kyushu focused on seizing only the southern part of the island, delineated by a line extending from Tsuno on the east coast to Sendai on the west. The 3,000 square miles included within this boundary were considered sufficient to provide the necessary air bases for short-range support in the final operations planned against the industrial centers of Honshu. Within the selected southern region for invasion, known as the "Olympic" plan, there were four lowland areas identified as suitable for the development of major airfields. The first area extended from Kagoshima, located on the western shore of Kagoshima Bay, through a narrow corridor to the Kushikino plain along the East China Sea. The second area ran northward from Shibushi on Ariake Bay, traversing a winding valley to Miyakonojo. The third area began at Kanoya, situated east of Kagoshima Bay, and followed the coastline of Ariake Bay. The fourth and largest area was located north of Miyazaki on the east coast.

Four months after American troops first landed on Kyushu, the next decisive amphibious operation against Japan was set to be launched. Code-named Coronet, this invasion targeted the Kanto Plain area of Honshu and was scheduled for March 1, 1945. The operation was tasked to two armies: the First and the Eighth, assigned to conduct a major assault against the heartland of Japan. Their immediate objective was to destroy all opposition and secure the Tokyo-Yokohama area. General MacArthur would personally command the landing forces and oversee ground operations on the mainland. Accompanying him would be the advance echelon of his General Headquarters, which would operate as the Army Group Headquarters in the field. The initial landings would involve 10 reinforced infantry divisions, 3 marine divisions, and 2 armored divisions. These forces, launched from the Philippines and Central Pacific bases, would be continuously protected by the ships and aircraft of the Pacific Fleet, alongside land-based air support. Thirty days after the initial assault, each army was set to be reinforced by a corps of 3 additional divisions. Five days following this reinforcement, an airborne division and an AFPAC Reserve Corps consisting of another 3 divisions would be made available. In total, these 25 divisions were tasked with seizing the Kanto Plain, including the general areas of Tokyo and Yokohama, and carrying out any further operations necessary to overcome Japanese resistance. The strategic reserve for the entire operation would comprise a corps of 3 divisions located in the Philippines, along with sufficient reinforcements from the United States, allowing for the deployment of 4 divisions per month.

For Operation Olympic, General Krueger’s 6th Army was appointed to lead the effort, employing a total of 14 divisions that were already positioned in the Pacific. Meanwhile, the 1st and 8th Armies were designated to conduct Operation Coronet, comprising a total of 25 divisions primarily sourced from the redeployment of troops and equipment from the European theater. Eichelberger’s 8th Army planned to land on Sagami Bay and subsequently fan out to secure the western shores of Tokyo Bay, reaching as far north as Yokohama. Concurrently, General Courtney Hodges’ 1st Army was set to land at the Kujukuri beaches, with the objective of pushing west and south to clear the eastern shores of both Tokyo and Sagami Bays. To mitigate the risks associated with landing on the heavily fortified and well-garrisoned islands of Japan, a comprehensive campaign of air-sea blockade and bombardment was advocated. 

The 20th Air Force, launching from bases in the Marianas and the Ryukyus, aimed to cripple Japan's industrial capacity by ruthlessly attacking factories and transportation systems. This steady assault from the massive B-29 bombers was expected to severely diminish Japan's ability to sustain its large military organization and effectively distribute its remaining power. Simultaneously, carrier task forces would conduct repeated raids on crucial coastal areas, targeting enemy naval and air forces, disrupting shore and sea communications, and supporting long-range bombers in their strikes against strategic objectives. The Far East Air Force, also based in the Ryukyus, would focus on selected targets intended to dismantle Japan's air capabilities both in the homeland and in nearby regions of North China and Korea. By intercepting shipping and shattering communication lines, the Far East Air Force aimed to complete the isolation of southern Kyushu, preparing it for an amphibious assault. As the target date approached, it was planned that these air raids would intensify, culminating in an all-out effort from X-10 to X-Day. In the final ten days before the landing phase, the combined bombing power of all available planes, both land-based and carrier-based, would be unleashed in a massive assault. The objectives included reducing enemy defenses, destroying remaining air forces, isolating the target area, and facilitating preliminary minesweeping and naval bombardment operations. The fortifications within the designated landing areas would be overwhelmed by tons of explosives, while naval vessels and engineering units worked to eliminate underwater mines and barriers. With such concentrated power backing them, it was anticipated that the amphibious forces would be able to execute their assault landings with minimal losses. This strategy aimed to minimize casualties, further diminish Japan's air capabilities, and cut off reinforcements from Asia. There was even a possibility that such measures could compel Japan to surrender, thus eliminating the need for a significant landing on the Home Islands. In a notable first, Admiral Spruance’s 5th Fleet and Admiral Halsey’s 3rd Fleet were to operate simultaneously. Admiral Spruance's fleet would focus on the landing operations, while Admiral Halsey’s fleet would provide strategic support through raids on Honshu and Hokkaido.

On July 28, the 16 fast carriers of Admiral McCain’s Task Force 38 and the four British carriers of Admiral Rawlings’ Task Force 37 commenced operations to weaken the air, naval, and shipping capabilities of the Home Islands. By mid-August, Vice-Admiral John Towers was assigned command of a reinforced Task Force 38, tasked with executing a series of strikes against Japan east of the 135th meridian, while General Kenney’s Ryukyus-based Far Eastern Air Forces targeted objectives to the west. Additionally, Rawlings’ Task Force 37, enhanced to nine carriers, launched diversionary strikes against Hong Kong and Canton. Starting on October 18, the 3rd Fleet began aggressive operations against aircraft, airfields, and shipping in Kyushu, Shikoku, and Honshu to isolate the assault area for the upcoming Kyushu invasion. Six days later, the Fast Carrier Task Force was divided into Task Force 38 and Task Force 58. Task Force 38 retained 12 fast carriers specifically for strikes against Japan. The pre-invasion air strikes, surface bombardments, and minesweeping operations in the Kyushu landing zones commenced, steadily increasing in intensity as they approached X-Day on November 1. The ten fast carriers of Vice-Admiral Frederick Sherman’s Task Force 58 would provide direct support for the Kyushu landings, which were to be conducted by Admiral Turner’s Task Force 40, consisting of 800 warships and 1,500 transports. In this effort, three Fire Support groups, each accompanied by an escort carrier group, would launch preemptive assaults on the designated Olympic landing zones. 

Off southeastern Kyushu’s Ariake Bay, Rear Admiral Richard Connolly's 3rd Fire Support Group (TG 41.3), comprising 6 old battleships, 6 cruisers, 13 destroyers, and 34 support craft, was tasked with eliminating coastal batteries at Toi Misaka, Hi Saki, and Ariake Bay. Additionally, they would target seaplane bases and suicide boat/submarine pens at Oshima, Odatsu, Biro Jima, and Sakida, followed by softening defenses at the XI Corps landing beaches. Meanwhile, approximately 30 miles north along Kyushu’s southeastern coast, Rear Admiral Ingolf Kiland’s 7th Fire Support Group (TG 41.7), consisting of 3 old battleships, 8 cruisers, 11 destroyers, and 35 support craft, would bombard coastal batteries, suicide-boat nests, and seaplane bases located at Tozaki Hana, Hososhima, and Miyazaki. This group would also destroy rail junctions at Tsumo Jogasaki and Tsuno to disrupt reinforcements heading south, before finally shelling the I Corps invasion beaches near Miyazaki. Off southwestern Kyushu, Rear Admiral Giraud Wright’s 5th Fire Support Group (TG 41.5), with 4 old battleships, 10 cruisers, 14 destroyers, and 74 support craft, was set to hammer fortifications within the Koshiki Retto and at the beaches between Kaminokawa and Kushikino. Their mission included knocking out Noma Misaki and Hashimi Saki coastal batteries, the Akune seaplane base, and Kushikino’s airfield, while also cutting the Akune–Kushikino road and rail lines. Ultimately, they would provide heavy fire support for the V Amphibious Corps landing beaches. Meanwhile, General Krueger planned to first secure Kagoshima and Ariake Bays as crucial ports of entry. Following that, the objective was to push inland as far as the Tsuno-Sendai line to block mountain defiles and prevent any enemy reinforcements from the north.

As a preliminary operation, on October 28, the reinforced 40th Division, now under Brigadier-General Donald Myers, was assigned to seize positions in the Koshiki Island group opposite Sendai. The objective was to establish emergency naval and seaplane bases on these islands while also clearing the sea routes to the coastal invasion area of Kushikino. The 40th Division was also tasked with making preliminary landings on the four islands of Tanega, Make, Take, and Lo off the southern tip of Kyushu, with the goal of safeguarding the passage of friendly shipping through the strategic Osumi Strait. On November 1, General Krueger's three main corps were set to conduct simultaneous assault landings in the designated objective areas. Major-General Harry Schmidt’s 5th Amphibious Corps would land near Kushikino, drive eastward to secure the western shore of Kagoshima Bay, and then turn north to block the movement of enemy reinforcements from upper Kyushu. Meanwhile, General Hall’s 11th Corps was to land at Ariake Bay, capture Kanoya, advance to the eastern shore of Kagoshima Bay, and then move northwestward to Miyakonojo. Following this, Swift’s 1st Corps would assault Miyazaki on the east coast, subsequently moving southwest to occupy Miyakonojo and clear the northern shore of Kagoshima Bay, thereby protecting the northeast flank. Additionally, Major-General Charles Ryder’s 9th Corps, initially held in reserve, was selected to execute a diversionary feint off the island of Shikoku while the other three assault corps advanced on the actual landing beaches. Finally, Krueger kept the 77th Division and the 11th Airborne Division in Area Reserve, prepared to follow up the invasion forces. Should these units prove insufficient to fulfill their assigned tasks, a buildup from units earmarked for Coronet would be initiated at a rate of three divisions per month.

On the other side, the Japanese anticipated that Kyushu would be the next target and identified the same beaches selected for Operation Olympic as the most likely landing sites. In response, Generals Hata and Yokoyama concentrated the formidable 57th Army under Lieutenant-General Nishihara Kanji around the areas of Ariake Bay and Miyazaki. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General Nakazawa Mitsuo commanded the 40th Army, which was positioned in the Ijuin-Kagoshima sector to the west. Hata's mobile reserves were stationed near Mount Kurishima, consisting of at least five divisions and several independent brigades, prepared to swiftly engage enemy forces before they could establish secure beachheads. Although Yokoyama and Hata did not anticipate an invasion in northern and central Kyushu, they had many units distributed throughout the region. The Japanese government prioritized defensive preparations for Kyushu over those for Honshu, hoping that a fierce defense of Kyushu would deter American forces from attempting a similar operation on Honshu.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

General Krueger's forces tackled Japan's Shobu Group in Luzon, while preparing for Operation Downfall, the invasion of Japan itself. Despite tough terrain, American forces made significant gains, encircling the Japanese. Meanwhile, Japan readied for defense, mobilizing troops and launching air counterattacks. As the Allies pressed forward, the impending invasion loomed, with strategies developed to land on Kyushu and Honshu. Ultimately, intense battles shaped the eve of an operation that would determine the war’s fate and change history forever.

- 191 - Pacific War Podcast - Fall of Wewak - July 15 - 22, 1945

Last time we spoke about the end of the Bougainville campaign. In June 1945, the Australia and Allied forces intensified their campaign in the Pacific, spearheaded by General Hammer, as they battled entrenched Japanese troops on Bougainville. Following the capture of the Soraken Peninsula, the Australians aimed to control the strategic Hongorai River but faced fierce resistance. Meanwhile, General Kanda adjusted his strategies, pulling back Japanese forces to a defensive perimeter around Buin, allowing his troops to regroup. Australian battalions, notably the 24th and 57th/60th, pressed forward, making significant gains despite encountering numerous obstacles, including concealed mines and relentless counterattacks. The turning point came when they crossed the Hongorai River, marking a vital milestone in their advance. Ultimately, the combination of perseverance and tactical maneuvers set the stage for future successes within the broader context of the Pacific Theater.

This episode is the Fall of Wewak

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

In the last episode we finished off the Bougainville campaign. Now its been 4 long ass grueling years for the boys fighting in New Guinea. Today we are finally going to finish that story. 

As we last saw, by early April 1945, General George Stevens and his 6th Australian Division were making significant strides in their Wewak offensive. The campaign, aimed at capturing the strategically important town of Wewak, was crucial for disrupting Japanese forces in New Guinea and aiding in their eventual defeat. Brigadier King’s 16th Brigade had effectively secured the But and Dagua areas, notable locations that played vital roles in the region's agricultural landscape and supply lines. Simultaneously, Brigadier Moten’s 17th Brigade was concentrating its efforts along the Ninab River, a key waterway that would facilitate the final drive toward Maprik, a town essential for both its infrastructure and resources. Facing intense Australian pressure, the remnants of General Mano’s 41st Division were forced to retreat northwestward to Wora, a strategic village located near the coast, while the Miyake Force reorganized itself along the defensive line formed by the Imbia, Neligum, Kumbungua, and Bainy rivers. This area is characterized by its rugged terrain, dense jungles, and numerous waterways, making it a challenging environment for military operations. On April 3, General Moten ordered the 2/7th Battalion to advance toward Maprik and the Agricultural Station, aiming to seize this vital supply center. At the same time, the 2/6th Battalion was tasked with moving towards the Screw River to block any potential enemy retreats to the north. Hayforce, a composite group of Australian troops, was directed to push forward to the Maprik-Marui road. This mission was critical as it aimed to establish a new airfield, designated as Hayfield, to alleviate the pressing supply issues faced by Australian forces. The Australians began their assault towards Maprik, yet they quickly discovered that the enemy was well-prepared to defend this food-producing region. Throughout the week, they were largely limited to patrol actions as they engaged with scattered enemy forces. Concurrently, Hayforce advanced eastward, encountering strong resistance at Wora on April 10. This strategic location, once teeming with activity, had become a focal point for Japanese defense. On April 12, feeling increasingly under pressure, General Mano opted to abandon Wora, allowing him to concentrate his forces more effectively at Bainyik. This decision was pivotal, as it permitted Australian forces to secure the site of the proposed airstrip, enhancing their logistical capabilities. 

Meanwhile patrols had been pressing on from village to village. On 28th March, for example, Sergeant J. W. Hedderman, of the 2/6th, a notable leader in these as in earlier operations, had led a reconnaissance to Kulkuil and Gwanginan. Next day he led a fighting patrol which took Kulkuil with a carefully-planned surprise attack. On the 30th Lieutenant Errey's platoon (16), with Hedderman as platoon sergeant, attacked Gwanginan. Hedderman confused the enemy by shouting to imaginary platoons to right and left (thus incidentally drawing fire on himself); and when the leading section was halted he brought down supporting fire and enabled it to move again. A man was wounded within 10 yards of the enemy's pits; Hedderman went forward, killed two Japanese with grenades, and dragged his comrade to safety. The enemy were 25 to 30 strong and the attack failed despite these gallant efforts. Hedderman covered the withdrawal, firing until all others had gone. On 30th March a patrol found Mairoka clear of the enemy and on 4th April Lieutenant Gordon's platoon established a patrol base there. On the 7th Errey's platoon attacked a village to the east of the Milak villages but without success, Lieutenant Errey being killed, and Sergeant Layfield wounded. Chicanambu was occupied on the 9th. On April 15, two companies from the 2/6th pushed eastward towards the Screw River. Over the next five days, they faced strong opposition as they engaged in fierce skirmishes and patrol actions to secure critical territories, ultimately capturing Wambak, Kombichagi, and Bungara. Each of these locations represented not only strategic advantages but also a deepening impact on the local population and the broader campaign dynamics.

On April 15, 1945, the 2/7th Battalion launched its main assault, with one company advancing towards the line of Nimrod Creek. This location, nestled within the dense jungles of New Guinea, proved to be strategically significant yet perilous. As they approached, Australian troops encountered heavily defended and camouflaged pillboxes, fortifications designed to protect the Japanese troops stationed in the area. Despite the challenges, they managed to secure a long, kunai-covered spur to the northeast of a critical area known as Maprik 2 by the following day. On April 17, another company from the 2/7th continued the offensive, advancing toward a target referred to as Maprik 1. They reached a point approximately 400 yards northwest of the objective but soon found themselves in a precarious situation as they became surrounded on both flanks the next day. It was not until April 19 that they successfully broke through to the southwest, escaping their encirclement.

 

The House Tamboran feature, a prominent ridge north of Maprik 1, was finally secured on April 20. This strategic high ground was essential for controlling the surrounding terrain and allowing further advances in the area. The following day, the 2/7th began probing towards the Maprik airstrip and Bainyik. Their efforts to secure the airstrip were fruitful within the next few days; however, they faced staunch resistance at both Maprik 2 and Bainyik, where Japanese forces continued to mount a determined defense. On April 25, the Australians crossed the Screw River, a vital waterway that flows through this region, on their way toward Midpum Creek, which they reached the following day. This movement was crucial for maintaining momentum in the campaign. While the 2/7th Battalion was engaged in heavy fighting, patrols from the 2/6th Battalion successfully secured the Neligum villages, although they encountered strong Japanese resistance at Mangumbu. This locality, bordered by lush vegetation and steep hills, served as a vital defensive position for Japanese forces.

Simultaneously, intelligence reports about a small enemy contingent under Lieutenant-Colonel Takenaga Masaharu positioned at Tau prompted a swift response. On April 16, a platoon from the 2/5th Battalion departed from Aitape, a coastal town known for its strategic significance during the campaign. They tracked down the Japanese troops and engaged them at Kubriwat on April 24. After the Kubriwat engagement, Colonel Takenaga's troops managed to shake off pursuit by the Australians; yet as the Australians continued to harass them, Takenaga ultimately decided that they would surrender. They took a leaflet containing a notice of surrender that one of the soldiers had been carrying, added some conditions underneath in English, tied it to a pole for the Australians to find, and left the area. Scouts from Miles' platoon then found the leaflet and brought it back with them. On May 2, the Australian platoon spotted Takenaga's unit near Womgrer village, and asked a native to help them make contact. Two truce bearers from the Japanese side came to the Australians to negotiate, and on the following day Takenaga's unit surrendered at Womgrer and were disarmed. At the time of surrender, Takenaga's unit consisted of 42 men: five officers (including Takenaga), four warrant officers, and 33 non-commissioned officers and soldiers. They were equipped with five light machine guns, 17 rifles, five pistols, and 750 rounds of ammunition. The prisoners, escorted by Miles' platoon, marched for three days in an orderly fashion to Maprik Airport, and were then transported to Aitape. Takenaga's unit were held in Aitape for around one month, before being broken up and sent to prison camps in Lae and in Australia, where they received good treatment. They were all interrogated, and in particular, Takenaga was transported to Manila for a detailed interrogation. As well as giving character information about the commanders of the 18th Army, Takenaga gave his opinion of how the Allies should deal with Emperor Hirohito: "If the Emperor is killed then the Japanese people will resist until the bitter end, but if there is an order from the Emperor then they will probably surrender peacefully." Back in the Maprik sector, while Hayforce conducted probing operations and successfully captured Yentagim in early May, the Miyake Force began a withdrawal toward the Loanim-Yamil-Kumbungua line. This defensive line was a series of natural features and fortified positions designed to obstruct the advancing Australian troops. On the northern flank, the 2/6th Battalion also continued to patrol eastward, successfully securing the strategically important Mangumbu on May 2. This advancement not only disrupted enemy operations but also paved the way for further Australian advances in the region.

On May 8, 1945, the 2/7th Battalion launched a decisive attack, successfully capturing part of the Kumbungua Ridge, a strategically significant high ground dominating the surrounding terrain. Two flame-throwers had now been received by the 2/7th and on 8th May these were used to drive the enemy from part of the narrow steep-sided Kumbungua ridge. The Japanese made off, abandoning 30 weapon-pits, but engaged the Australians from a knoll farther up the ridge. Just three days later, they captured the southern end of the ridge while another company moved to occupy Waigakum 1, a forward position that offered a crucial vantage point over the area. Flame-throwers were proving very effective. On 10th May the 2/7th occupied Waigakum 1, and on the 11th a platoon with flame-throwers attacked and took a position where the defenders abandoned 50 packs. Another platoon approached the knoll at the south end of the Kumbungua ridge from the south, attacked up a steep slope and put to flight the defenders who abandoned 25 packs and 100 sticks of gelignite. The Japanese opened fire, however, from higher up and, the ground being unsuitable for defence, the platoon withdrew. By May 13, following effective air support that softened enemy defenses, central Kumbungua was found abandoned by Japanese forces, a testament to the pressure the Australians had applied. The following day, after another heavy bombardment from both aircraft and artillery, the entire ridge was finally secured, marking a significant accomplishment in the campaign. Pressing on, the Australians cleared the area northeast of Kalabu by May 26. However, they faced stiff resistance and found it challenging to make further advances. As a result, the 2/7th Battalion reorganized to defend the captured positions, consolidating their gains to ensure they could withstand potential counterattacks from the tenacious enemy.

In the meantime, on May 17, Waigakum 2 fell to Australian troops. This success forced the cutoff remnants of General Mano’s 41st Division to begin their retreat to the east, as the Australians patrolled further towards Malba, another critical location along their advance. The loss of Waigakum to the 2/7th Battalion in mid-May had a very upsetting effect on the Japanese. It was the point of junction between Miyake Force, now 800 strong, and the 41st Division and, according to General Yoshiwara, this loss led directly to the withdrawal from Kalabu and Loanim. On the 19th a platoon, guided by natives, surprised six Japanese in a garden south-east of Kalabu. Here Private Jenkins" came upon one Japanese asleep outside a weapon-pit. As he was within feet of me (wrote Jenkins later) I thought it was an excellent opportunity to take a prisoner so I woke him with a light kick and pulled him to his feet with my left hand, keeping my Owen gun in my right. I had managed to get my prisoner some paces from his position when a slight noise alerted his mates and they opened fire on the patrol. With this the Jap broke from my grasp and I was forced to shoot him. One other Japanese was killed and the others made off.Turning their attention northward, the 2/6th Battalion attempted to attack the village of Jamei on May 20. However, they were met with fierce resistance from Japanese defenders, which compelled the Australians to bombard the area intensively with artillery and air strikes until the enemy was finally forced to retreat on May 25. While the Australians were continuing to probe towards Yamil, elements of the 2/7th Battalion executed successful attacks in the Malba area, which was ultimately secured by the end of the month. This marked a crucial step in their advance as they pushed deeper into enemy territory.

Meanwhile, in the coastal sector, Brigadier King’s 16th Brigade concentrated its efforts east of the But River, extending up to the Kofi area. At the same time, Brigadier Martin’s 29th Brigade assembled at But, preparing for the final drive toward Wewak, a town that had become a strategic target for Allied forces in their campaign to eradicate Japanese presence in New Guinea. On April 14, the 2/1st Battalion passed through the lines of the 2/2nd Battalion, launching an attack toward the Karawop-Wisling area. This sector, known for its rugged topography and dense underbrush, finally fell to the relentless Australian assaults two days later after a series of intense company-level attacks. On April 25, the 2/1st Battalion occupied the crucial 1800 Feature without facing any opposition. This high ground provided them with significant tactical advantages in the ongoing conflict. Meanwhile, the 2/3rd Battalion, positioned to the north, successfully launched an attack on Boiken Plantation. Their efforts were rewarded as they advanced to Kalimboa the following day, further consolidating Australian positions in the region.

On April 27, 1945, the 2/2nd Battalion moved swiftly through the advancing lines, pushing forward to Hawain and crossing the river in their quest to engage Japanese forces. Concurrently, the 2/3rd Battalion patrolled south along Boiken Creek, where they encountered significant enemy resistance in the Koanumbo area. After a series of determined assaults, this area was ultimately secured by May 2, allowing the Australians to fortify their positions. At this point in the campaign, Brigadier Martin’s 19th Brigade took over the advance towards Cape Wom, and subsequently, the strategic objective of Wewak. This movement coincided with preparations by Lieutenant-Colonel Eric Hennessy’s 2/6th Commando Regiment, which was organizing for a surprise landing east of Cape Moem, a critical maneuver aimed at outflanking Japanese defenses. On May 3, the 2/4th Battalion advanced from Hawain, managing to cover six miles without facing any opposition. By the next day, they reached Wom without incident. As night fell, Australian patrols had already established a presence along the Waringe River, preparing for further actions. During this time, patrols targeted Japanese stragglers in the vicinity, eliminating several and gathering intelligence. Reconnaissance units were then sent forward to Minga Creek to assess enemy positions while the 2/4th secured Yarabos on May 7, progressively tightening the noose around Japanese defenses.

Meanwhile, the 2/8th Battalion, positioned on the right flank, engaged in a series of minor clashes, successfully capturing Ranimboa on May 4, followed by Numikim just days later. These advances were crucial in pressuring the remaining Japanese forces, which, under Generals Adachi and Nakano, were increasingly evident in their abandonment of the substantial base at Wewak. Their main forces began to withdraw over the rugged terrain of the Prince Alexander Mountains, leaving behind strong rearguards tasked with covering their exit routes from Wewak. To counter this withdrawal, the 2/11th Battalion and the 2/7th Commando Squadron were dispatched on a wide encircling movement towards the Sauri villages and Wirui Mission, aiming to cut off the retreating Japanese forces. Meanwhile, the 2/4th Battalion crossed Minga Creek and launched an attack towards Wewak on May 8, seeking to claim the final strategic stronghold. Two days later, bolstered by supporting tanks and artillery, the 2/4th Battalion initiated a vigorous assault on Wewak Point. This area, positioned at the very tip of the peninsula, was essential for controlling the coastal approaches to Wewak. After a hard-fought engagement, the Australians successfully seized the entirety of Wewak Point, subsequently mopping up the remaining Japanese soldiers who had entrenched themselves in the caves along the cliffs, effectively concluding the intense fighting in this region. At 12.15 two companies were ordered to mop up.cThat afternoon a flame-thrower fired into a bunker apparently lit a dump of bombs which blew up. Smith's company found several occupied caves and, since the Japanese would not surrender, merely picqueted them until engineers arrived and blew up the entrances, sealing the Japanese in. It was estimated that about 50 perished in the caves; by midnight 65 other dead had been counted and three 75-mm guns and two 20-mm had been captured. In a brilliant action the Australians, supported by tanks and more than 40 field guns, had lost only 2 killed and 17 wounded. Mopping up was continued next day, and no live Japanese remained on the point by midday. Finally it was estimated that from 180 to 200 Japanese had been killed.

On May 11, 1945, following their progress along the Big Road, the 2/11th Battalion set out to occupy the strategic 620, 710, and 770 Features. However, they soon encountered unexpected resistance over the following days. This was not merely an isolated skirmish; it was part of a broader engagement as they pressed their advance against the entrenched Japanese defenders. Meanwhile, an important operation was unfolding to the west. The 2/9th and 2/10th Commando Squadrons, supported by a small flotilla formed around the sloop Swan, successfully landed on Dove Bay’s Red Beach, located just to the west of Forok Point. This maneuver was critical, as it disrupted Japanese supply lines and provided the Australians with a foothold to cut off the Wewak Road. Following their landing, the squadrons dispatched patrols eastward, further isolating Japanese forces.

The next day, the 2/3rd Machine-Gun Battalion secured the junction of the Wewak Road and Forok Creek, a key point for controlling the surrounding areas, while the 2/9th Commando Squadron patrolled past Mandi, gaining valuable intelligence. The 2/4th Battalion, capitalizing on this chaos, pressed forward to secure the Wewak airfield and the Wirui Mission, both of which were vital for maintaining air support and supply routes in the theater of operations. On May 13, the 2/11th Battalion successfully captured the 620 Feature, a crucial hill that provided vantage points over the battlefield. However, they struggled to take the 710 Feature the next day, as Japanese resistance intensified in the rugged foothills south of the Big Road. 

On 14th May, the 2/11th being heavily engaged in the foothills south of the Big Road, Lt Martin had ordered the 2/4th to attack Wirui Mission, which was on a steep kunai-covered hill about 300 feet high dominating the airfield. Approaching from the east through tall kunai the leading com-pany with a troop of tanks soon took the first objective-dominating ground about half way up the hill. Captain Smith's company passed through and, with the tanks, whose crews estimated that they killed about 30 Japanese, reached the top. By nightfall the top and the eastern slopes were held but the Japanese were fighting back from bunkers on the north-west slopes. Next day Smith's company attacked these remaining bunkers. The lead-ing section was halted by intense fire after several men had been hit. Private Kenna, in the supporting section, which was firing on the bunkers at a range of only 50 yards, stood up in the kunai grass in full view of the enemy and fired his Bren at one of the Japanese machine-gun posts. The Japanese machine-gunners returned his fire but failed to hit him. Kenna then said to Private Rau who was beside him that the Japanese "had a bead on him" and he asked for Rau's rifle. Still standing, he fired four rifle shots and silenced the enemy post. He then took the Bren again and opened fire on another post about 70 yards away and silenced it too. The remaining post was then knocked out by a tank; soon the 2/4th and 2/11th were in contact. About 40 Japanese were killed and perhaps 20 escaped in the fight for the mission. Large quantities of weapons, vehicles, generators, tele-phones and other equipment were found there. Possession of Wirui Mission gave complete control of the Wewak coastal plain. Captured papers made it possible to make a fairly precise estimate of the forces immediately round Wewak: Kato Force, built round the 25th Airfield Battalion and about 300 strong, was holding from Sauri to Wirui Creek; Jinka Force, about 400 strong, was holding from Wirui Creek to the east, including Boram airfield, and south into the range as far as Passam; to the east was Aoyama Force, of unknown strength; the coastal plain to a depth of about 1,000 yards was not held in strength, and it was thought that there would be little opposition on the coast at least as far as Boram airfield

Supported by artillery fire and through persistent efforts, the 2/11th finally took the 710 Feature on May 15, which allowed them to begin patrolling towards the 770 Feature and the nearby Klewalin, two additional strongholds that were key to the entire operation. Simultaneously, since May 11, the 2/7th Commando Squadron had been engaged in fierce fighting. They maneuvered through a series of knolls in the Sauri villages area, which they ultimately cleared by May 16, further tightening the noose around Japanese defenses. On that same day, after intense air and naval bombardments prepared the way, the 2/8th Battalion began their advance toward Boram. This crucial location fell into their hands unopposed by nightfall, allowing significant advances in the Australian front line. However, on May 17, as the 2/8th Battalion continued its push to the mouth of Boram Creek, they encountered a strongly-held Japanese position. This area, characterized by intricate terrain and dense jungle cover, presented formidable challenges as they sought to advance further into Japanese-occupied territory.

The enemy bunkers would remain a formidable obstacle until May 20, when a heavy bombardment finally rendered them inoperative. Following this, the Australians seized the opportunity to exploit their gains and advanced further east to occupy Cape Moem. This maneuver allowed them to establish contact with the commando force at Brandi Plantation just two days later, strengthening their foothold along the coast. On May 24, the 2/11th Battalion occupied the strategic 770 feature after enduring its own heavy bombardment. Three days later, they managed to destroy the last remnants of enemy forces south of the 710 feature, marking a significant step in the campaign. On May 25, the 2/4th Battalion also launched a patrol into the village of Koigin, taking the location after a sharp and intense fight. However, amidst these operations, Brigadier Martin fell ill with malaria and was temporarily replaced by Lieutenant-Colonel John Bishop, a shift that would guide the troops through the operational challenges ahead.

By the end of May, the 6th Division had pushed most remnants of the Japanese 18th Army away from the coast, including their vital base at Wewak. The Japanese forces were now confined within the rugged, mountainous terrain, squeezed between the 17th Brigade, positioned forward of Maprik to the west, and the remainder of the 6th Division to the north. In preparation for the next phase of their campaign, General Moten set out to secure the line from Solongan to Kulauru Mission. The 2/5th Battalion relieved the 2/7th Battalion and moved against Kulauru and Ulupu, while the 2/6th Battalion advanced towards Yamil. The Australians acted swiftly and decisively, rapidly capturing Newton’s Knoll and Palketia during the first week of June. On June 10, after extensive air strikes and bombardments weakened enemy defenses, the 2/6th Battalion successfully entered Yamil. Just three days later, on June 13, the 2/5th Battalion continued their momentum by capturing Yamil 3 and Yuman as the beleaguered Miyake Force began its retreat towards Ulupu, indicating the deteriorating situation for Japanese forces in the region. Despite the Australians’ relentless advance and the heavy bombardment inflicted upon them, the Japanese remained determined to defend Kunai Spur. Their tenacity meant that the Australians could only secure Yamil 4 on June 24, underscoring the intensity of the fighting in this strategic area. At this critical juncture, the 2nd New Guinea Battalion arrived in the Hayfield area to patrol southwards towards Kwimbu, Mikau, and Kunjinge. These movements further reinforced the Australian positions and set the stage for the continuing efforts to dismantle the last remnants of Japanese resistance in the region.

On June 11, 1945, the 2/8th Battalion successfully seized Hill 1 after a concentrated air and artillery bombardment that softened up the enemy defenses. This pivotal victory allowed them to establish a critical foothold in the area, vital for subsequent operations. Just five days later, on June 16, both artillery and aircraft targeted Hill 2 and Shiburangu, two crucial positions that had become points of interest in the ongoing campaign. After numerous attempts and repeated efforts by the infantry, the Australians ultimately captured Hill 2, a strategic vantage point that further pressured Japanese forces in the region.At 8 a.m. on 16th June aircraft struck both Hill 2 and Shiburangu and then the artillery began a program in which 3,000 rounds were fired. One company began to advance on Hill 2 at 9.30. Warrant-Officer Fisk's platoon, which was forward, met heavy fire from snipers on both flanks and machine-gun fire from the hills and lost one man killed and one wounded. It withdrew to the cover of the spur and moved to outflank the enemy on the left. Meanwhile at 9.45 a second company had taken the pocket without opposition. At 10 a.m. the first company was still held. The men rested under the lip of the hill while the artillery again bombarded the enemy's positions and flame-throwers were brought forward. At 1.30 the company surged over the crest of the hill and, after close fighting in which each bunker was grenaded, the surviving Japanese fled leaving 38 visible dead and perhaps another 20 buried by the air and artillery bombardment. The Australians lost 2 killed and 3 wounded. "Aerial bombing coupled with artillery concentration does not deter the enemy from fighting nor unsettle him unduly," wrote the battalion diarist. "Such fanatical resistance in face of such odds makes the capturing of these strong points no light task." Meanwhile, the 2/4th Battalion worked diligently to clear the eastern side of the Koigin-Tazaki track, progressing 600 yards south of Koigin by June 13. This advancement helped secure vital supply routes and reinforced the Australians' operational capabilities.

On June 14, the Australians continued their momentum by successfully securing Mount Kawakubo, another significant terrain feature. Five days later, on June 19, the 2/4th and 2/11th Battalions launched a coordinated attack towards Tazaki. Thanks to the overwhelming support of air and artillery bombardments, Tazaki ultimately fell into Australian hands by June 24, marking yet another victory in their relentless push against Japanese defenses. On June 22, the 2/8th captured the last knoll before Shiburangu. Following this success, artillery began to register targets on Shiburangu, setting the stage for a significant assault. By June 27, after a particularly heavy air and artillery bombardment that saturated the area with firepower, the 2/8th Battalion launched a bold attack to seize Shiburangu. Utilizing an outflanking maneuver, they managed to surprise the fierce defenders, overcoming their determined resistance. As the 2/4th Battalion cleared the remaining enemy pockets in the Tazaki area, the 2/8th Battalion pressed their advantage, attacking and securing the area to the west on July 3. The two battalions effectively linked up two days later, solidifying their control over the region and paving the way for further advances in the campaign.

Looking back to the southwest, after nearly three weeks of stiff resistance, the Japanese finally abandoned Kunai Spur on July 3, 1945. This withdrawal opened the door for Australian forces, who swiftly occupied Ulupu just two days later. The effort to clear the surrounding area began in earnest, but it wasn’t until July 8 that the strongly-held northern knoll was taken after intense fighting. On July 9, through a sustained bombardment, the Japanese were driven out of Ulum, marking a significant breakthrough; their defense system had been shattered. Following this success, patrols from the 2/5th Battalion advanced rapidly, moving forward about 2000 yards with only minor skirmishes. They reached and occupied Kulauru Mission on July 11, reinforcing the Australians' control over the area. Pressing northeast, the remaining Japanese forces in the vicinity were rapidly dispersed, and by July 18, Ilipem fell into Australian hands. During this time, the 2/6th Battalion was busy securing the Ulunkohoitu Ridge, further consolidating the Australians’ hold on the region.

At the same time, the 2nd New Guinea Battalion had been probing south and east, successfully securing critical locations such as Kongambe, Kwandaning, Naila, and Gisanambu. With the Japanese now regrouping along the Kaboibus-Ahegulim-Gwalip line, General Moten aimed to accelerate the advance, directing both the 2nd New Guinea Battalion and the rested 2/7th Battalion to converge on Gwalip. Meanwhile, the 2/5th and 2/6th Battalions pressed east towards Kaboibus. Despite facing challenges and some failed attacks against Dunbit and Aoniaru, the New Guineans were able to concentrate their forces near Gwalip by July 22, and five days later, Sigora fell to their determined assault. On July 30, they launched an attack and captured Ulama, nearly catching General Mano’s headquarters at Winge in the process, which forced the defenders to retreat towards Suaui. As momentum continued to build, the 2/5th Battalion pressed on, supported by heavy air strikes. By August 1, they had successfully taken Gwenik, further disrupting Japanese lines. The following day, as the Australians advanced along the Kaboibus Ridge, they successfully occupied the Kaboibus villages. To their astonishment, they encountered only minor opposition, underscoring the disarray within the Japanese ranks as the Australians continued their relentless push through the region.

On August 4, 1945, the 2/5th Battalion successfully seized Ahegulim, a strategic location that added to their momentum. Three days later, they captured Malabeim, completing their objectives in the region. Following this success, the Australians began probing towards Mount Irup, further extending their influence over the landscape. Concurrently, on August 6, the 2/7th Battalion embarked on a wide movement from Sigora aimed at Kiarivu, reaching this target two days later. This advance was part of a broader campaign in which New Guinean troops also secured key areas such as Miyamboara and Mananingi, reflecting the persistent efforts of Moten’s 17th Brigade as they conducted their final offensive actions. Turning to the eastern front, the 8th Brigade’s 30th and 35th Battalions had relieved the 2/4th and 2/11th Battalions in early July, taking charge of the Wirui Creek-Mandi area. On July 13, Brigadier Martin, who had resumed command of the 19th Brigade, ordered the 2/8th Battalion to capture the critical positions known as The Blot and Hambrauri. Following this directive, the Australians successfully attacked and seized The Blot the very next day.

On July 16, Hambrauri 1 fell into Australian hands without opposition, allowing them to begin probing towards another strategically important feature: St. Patrick's. After significant preparations and a heavy bombardment, St. Patrick's was captured on July 21. The following day, the 2/8th Battalion captured Hambrauri 2 with little resistance, showcasing their growing operational effectiveness. During this time, the 2/1st Battalion executed a diversionary thrust along the Sambukaua Track, drawing Japanese attention away from main Australian advances. Simultaneously, the 2/6th Commando Regiment faced daring infiltration attempts to the west in the vicinity of Boiken, further complicating the operational landscape. 

On June 24 five Japanese approaching along the beach entered the Angau compound at Wisling, stole 3 Owen guns, a pistol, and 3 Japanese rifles. A patrol followed these marauders, killed 2 and retrieved the weapons. Next day about 10 Japanese ambushed a party of the 2/10th Commando Squadron south of Boiken Plantation and killed Lieutenant Martin and wounded 4 others; and that night about 20 stole into the plantation. On June 28 signs were found that some 35 Japanese had slept the previous night 400 yards from a commando perimeter. On July 23 a commando patrol had a sharp clash with perhaps 40 Japanese in the hills south of Wanpea and more than 15 miles west of Wewak; 8 Japanese were killed as well as 4 Australians. The Japanese were justly proud of the valour and successes of the raiding parties which harassed the Australians between Wewak and Dagua in May, June and July. Several groups were organised and trained for these enterprises, the most celebrated being led by Lieutenant Saito Hachiro of the 78th Regiment who had first earned fame as a patrol leader in the Huon Peninsula fighting. In June his party set off to raid Maprik, but was intercepted, Saito and most of his followers being killed. From June 15 onwards two parties of raiders operated in the Karawop and Boiken areas with the object of diverting their enemy's strength away from the 51st Division farther east. These parties, which claimed to have killed more than 100 Australians (a wild overestimate) were the ones coped with by the 2/6th Commando Regiment. Another series of raids in late July and early August were considered less successful, because of improved Australian security measures.

On July 25, Japanese General Adachi issued orders for a "last stand" around the areas of Nyakombi and Sassuia. The main body of the 18th Army was now in an are facing north and west. The 51st Division was on the right opposing the troops advancing from Wewak, the 20th Division in the centre and the 41st on the left. Yoshiwara had now reported that the food resources of the Sepik area were less than had been believed, though there might be more in the hinterland. Already about 2,800 troops were stationed in the Sepik Valley from Marienberg to about Kanganaman and were living off the country. Adachi decided to make a last stand in the area embracing, in the north, Nyakombi and Sassuia. Here they would fight on "as long as ammunition and food are available and at least until the end of September". Liaison was to be maintained with the force in the Sepik area which was to prepare to carry on "ambush warfare" after the main force had been wiped out. This plan had been conveyed to Field Marshal Terauchi, commanding the Southern Army, and he approved it on 8th July.

Despite its many setbacks during the campaign, Terauchi sent a citation to the 18th Army. It was the first time that a Japanese army had been so honoured. The citation ran: "To the 18th Army and all attached units: With Lieut-General Hatazo Adachi as your com-mander, you have fought vigorously for three years in north-east New Guinea, where numerous epidemics prevailed and where the terrain was hitherto unknown to any Japanese. When the enemy occupied the west coast in April 1944, to cut off supplies, you learned to live off grass and trees, and by making the best of the situation, you conquered all unfavourable conditions. Officers and soldiers alike displayed the true spirit of the Japanese Army. Wherever you encountered the enemy, you crushed them and inflicted many casualties. You have inspired fear into the hearts of the enemy and diverted their sea and air strength, thereby contributing much to the Southern Army's operations and furthermore, to all the Armies of the Empire. You were able to accomplish this through the excellent leadership, planning, fidelity and character of your Army Commander. By the sense of sincerity, loyalty and moral obligation of all the troops, you have set a model for all men to follow. I hereby present this citation and proclaim this to all the Armies."  Amidst these developments, Major General Stevens was orchestrating a series of troop reliefs along the front lines. King’s 16th Brigade was set to replace the 19th Brigade, which in turn would relieve the 17th Brigade to the west, ensuring continuous pressure on Japanese positions while maintaining the momentum of the Australian advance.

Consequently, on July 28, 1945, the 2/2nd Battalion relieved the 2/8th in the Hambrauri area, immediately dispatching patrols to probe towards Numoikum. Their operational efforts culminated in the successful seizure of Mount Shoto on August 2. By August 6, with the backing of artillery fire, the Australians had secured Numoikum and Rindogim. However, this marked the last offensive action in the area, as the Australians shifted their focus to patrolling forward in order to consolidate their gains. By the end of the Aitape-Wewak Campaign, the 6th Division had sustained significant casualties, with 442 men killed and 1,141 wounded, while inflicting heavy losses on Japanese forces, estimated at around 9,000 killed and capturing 269 prisoners. With this chapter closed, it was time to shift the scene to Balikpapan, where the conclusion of the Borneo Campaign awaited. As we rejoin the action, by July 9, General Milford’s 7th Australian Division had largely secured the Balikpapan area. Brigadier Chilton’s 18th Brigade executed a successful landing at Penadjam, Djinabora, and Teloktebang on the western side of the bay. Simultaneously, Brigadier Eather’s 25th Brigade advanced towards Batuchampar along Milford Highway, while Brigadier Dougherty’s 21st Brigade secured key positions in the Sepinggang and Manggar areas.

On July 10, the 2/31st Battalion secured the Cello position and the fallen-timber area directly in front with crucial support from artillery and tanks. In a bold move, one of their companies launched an attack towards the position known as Coke; however, this assault was met with fierce resistance and was ultimately repelled by intense crossfire from well-entrenched defenders. To the left of their advance, the 2/6th Commando Squadron probed toward Sumber Kiri, successfully securing the village and bolstering the Australians' hold in the region. At this moment, the 2/27th Battalion took over the left flank at Manggar, which allowed the exhausted 2/14th Battalion to probe towards Sambodja without risk of being outflanked. The next day, as the 2/27th moved through the 2/14th to occupy Lamaru, the 2/25th Battalion began the process of relieving the weary 2/31st, ensuring that fresh forces could continue the advance. On July 12, the commandos initiated probing operations towards a position known as Charm, successfully occupying both Cloncurry and Abash in the following two days. These captures were significant in securing the area and maintaining the momentum of the Australian advance through Balikpapan.

After extensive patrolling on both sides of the highway, the 2/25th Battalion finally dispatched two companies on July 14 to occupy the strategic locations of Cart and Calm. These efforts led to the successful securing of Cocoa, Calm, and Chair, all achieved without resistance. That same day, to the east, patrols discovered Amborawang and the ridges north of Bale unoccupied. Recognizing this opportunity, the 2/27th Battalion moved into the area three days later. On July 15, the 2/9th Battalion sent patrols towards Separi and along the Parehpareh River, aiming to cut the enemy's lines of communication. Concurrently, the 2/25th Battalion solidified its control over Cart, enabling them to dominate the highway from both the east and west. However, their position was soon contested as they faced a series of heavy Japanese counterattacks during the following nights, testing their resolve and defensive capabilities. By July 17, the 2/25th had moved to occupy Charm, situated prominently by the highway, while a company from the 2/33rd Battalion took over Cart, allowing both units to repel yet another strong night counterattack from Japanese forces. The next day, the 2/27th finally entered the unoccupied Sambodja area, while patrols began to probe westward toward the Milford Highway.

On July 19, the 2/31st Battalion cleared the last remnants of Japanese presence from the highway, paving the way for uninterrupted Australian operations. The following day, the 2/25th destroyed a robust enemy pocket, allowing them to occupy Abide without further incident. On July 21, the remaining Japanese forces retreated from the Batuchampar area, prompting the Australians to push toward Pope’s Track while extensively patrolling northward. By this time, the bulk of the 2/1st Pioneer Battalion had been landed at Djinabora, establishing a patrol base in the Tempadung area. A week later, following a naval bombardment, the Australians occupied Pamaluan and began probing operations to the east and north. This series of actions marked the conclusion of the Battle of Balikpapan. The Australians opted to halt any offensive operations at this point and instead focus on consolidating their positions through enhanced patrolling. During the course of the battle, Australian forces tragically suffered 229 killed and 634 wounded, while inflicting significant losses on the Japanese, with approximately 2,032 killed and 63 captured. Thus, Australian casualties for the broader Borneo Campaign totaled around 2,100, while Japanese losses were estimated at around 4,700.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

General George Stevens led brave troops against the entrenched Japanese forces aiming to capture the strategic town of Wewak. Despite fierce resistance and rugged terrain, they successfully advanced, featuring key victories after relentless battles. Australian artillery and infantry engaged in daring assaults, securing vital positions like the Kumbungua Ridge and establishing airfields. As the campaign progressed, Japanese forces dwindled, ultimately surrendering at Wewak. 

- 190 - Pacific War Podcast - Victory on Bougainville - July 8 - 15, 1945

Last time we spoke about the allied invasion of Balikpapan. In June 1945, the war in the Pacific escalated as American forces, spearheaded by Generals Eichelberger and Krueger, fiercely battled the entrenched Japanese on Luzon. Despite harsh conditions and fierce resistance, the Americans made crucial advances, capturing key positions that rekindled hope for the Filipino people. Concurrently, preparations for the invasion of Balikpapan intensified. The Australian 7th Division assembled for a July 1 amphibious assault against a heavily fortified Japanese defense, known for its formidable coast artillery and entrenched positions. The Australians faced fierce opposition upon landing; however, skilled maneuvering and robust artillery support allowed them to swiftly gain a foothold. As the Australians secured their beachhead, they marked the beginning of a challenging campaign against determined Japanese forces in Balikpapan, setting the stage for further confrontations in the Pacific theater. 

This episode is Victory at Bougainville 

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

We last left off on Bougainville, by mid-April, Brigadier Heathcote Hammer’s 15th Brigade had commenced its crucial task of relieving Brigadier Field’s weary and battered 7th Brigade. This transition came at a pivotal moment when Brigadier Stevenson’s 11th Brigade successfully secured the Soraken Peninsula, a strategic point on Bougainville's southern coast, while also continuing their efforts to contain enemy forces along the notorious Numa Numa Trail, a crucial supply route for Japanese troops. Supported by reinforcements in artillery and air power, Generals Savige and Bridgeford were optimistic about continuing their limited offensive toward the south. Their immediate objective was to capture the line of the Hongorai River, considered a significant tactical advantage, followed by the Hari River, which would serve as the 15th Brigade’s main aim. On the opposing side, General Kanda had learned a harsh lesson about the ineffectiveness of banzai charges during the fierce fighting at the Battle of Slater’s Knoll. This costly experience prompted him to alter his strategy significantly. He decided to pull his remaining troops back to a defensive perimeter focused around Buin, which is located in the southern region of Bougainville. Here, he reinforced his defenses with garrison troops from Kieta, situated on the eastern side of Bougainville, the Shortlands Islands to the northwest, and the Fauros Islands to the northeast. However, with this concentration of forces not expected to be operational until July, the troops stationed in the forward areas were tasked with executing a critical delaying action in the meantime, buying precious time for reinforcements to arrive.

Meanwhile, on April 17, the Australian 24th Battalion began its advance along the Buin Road, a vital route for both supply and troop movement. Two companies made their way toward Dawe’s Creek, while another company launched an assault against the enemy strongholds at Kindara. Remarkably, they broke through enemy lines the following day, pushing further to Sindou Creek and Umam Creek. Here, they faced multiple sharp counterattacks over the next week, demonstrating the fierce resistance from Japanese forces determined to hold their ground. As patrols moved deeper into the thick jungle on either side of the Buin Road, the struggle became increasingly intense. Each advance was hard-fought, marked by skirmishes that tested the resolve and endurance of the Australian soldiers. Finally, on April 26, the advance resumed in earnest, making rapid gains toward the Hongorai River. The combination of heavy air support and relentless artillery bombardment had effectively dispelled any opposition along the route, allowing the Australians to push forward with renewed vigor.

By May 4, as the 24th Battalion finally approached the banks of the Hongorai River, they encountered significant resistance. However, on the 4th Lieutenant Lawn's platoon was advancing with two tanks and a bulldozer when the crew of the leading tank came to a log across the road and saw movement in the bush. A burst of machine-gun fire from the tank cut the leaves away and revealed the barrel of a field gun. The first round fired from the tank's 2-pounder disabled the enemy gun and the enemy seemed to flee. Farther ahead, however, a mine exploded at the rear of the second tank. It was discovered that it had been exploded with a wire by a Japanese concealed in the bush. Henceforward mines and concealed guns were encountered more and more frequently. They were detected chiefly by the practised eyes of the engineer teams of Major Needham's 15th Field Company who became increasingly skilful. Mechanical detectors were defeated by several sorts of mine employed wooden boxes filled with T.N.T., for example; but their presence was betrayed by protruding fuses, wires, disturbed earth, and confirmed by prodding with a bayonet. As the 24th Battalion neared the Hongorai it became evident that the Japanese intended to make the Australians pay a price for each advance, and that they were willing to trade a field gun for a tank at every opportunity. On the 4th and many later occasions leading tanks were fired on at a range of a few yards by guns cleverly concealed beside the track, but in positions from which the Japanese could not hope to extricate them. In other respects also the Japanese tactics were improving and their striking power was strengthened. Each forward Australian battalion was now under frequent artillery fire, evidently directed by Japanese observers who remained close to the Australian advance, and it was this which was now causing most of the casualties. The shells usually burst in the trees and their fragments were scattered over a wide area with lethal effects. To counter the tanks the Japanese were now establishing their positions not astride the track but about 100 yards from it in places where the tanks could not reach them until a side track had been made.

The Hongorai River, a critical geographical landmark, ran through Bougainville's lush terrain, acting as both a natural barrier and tactical objective. In late April, the 9th Battalion had continued to push forward across the Huio River, a vital waterway that intersected with Japanese defenses. They faced some enemy resistance but managed to clear the Horinu-Rumiki Trail by the end of the month. This narrow, winding path had strategic importance, connecting various units and enabling supplies to move closer to the frontline. On May 3, the 9th Battalion was finally relieved by the 57th/60th Battalion, which, due to its relative inexperience, found progress challenging along the Commando Road a route named after the elite Australian commandos who often operated in this area. Their inexperience in facing seasoned Japanese troops led to slower advances in the crucial days that followed.

Meanwhile, the 2/8th Commando Squadron had been conducting deep reconnaissance patrols towards the Hari River and along the Tiger Road, determined to discover the extent of Japanese defenses south of the Hongorai. The Tiger Road, notorious for its rugged conditions, was pivotal for troop movements in the region. On May 5, the 24th Battalion, now bolstered by a newly assigned tank squadron, resumed its advance with renewed determination. However, they were once again halted by fierce defenders who launched a strong yet costly counterattack the following morning. This desperate but valiant effort by the Japanese troops resulted in significant casualties and demonstrated their resolve to maintain control of the Hongorai line. Subsequently, the Japanese forces ultimately abandoned their positions along the Hongorai during the night. Finally, on May 7, the Australians reached the Hongorai River, marking a significant milestone in their campaign. At that moment, the 57th/60th Battalion was securing a crucial crossing over the Hongorai on the Commando Road, enabling further advances into enemy territory.

With the next objective focused on the line stretching from the Hari River to Monoitu and Kapana, Brigadier Hammer’s battalions shifted their tactics for the second and third weeks of May. They undertook deep patrols into Japanese-occupied territory, gathering vital intelligence while also seeking to harass the enemy and disrupt their operations. Additionally, the commandos maintained their patrols along the challenging Tiger Road and established a new patrol base further north at Monorei. This base would serve as a critical outpost for monitoring enemy movements and launching further operations. Meanwhile, the 58th/59th Battalion explored the rugged areas south of the Buin Road, successfully clearing the Aitara Mission. This mission played a crucial role in their broader strategies, as it prepared them to execute a wide flanking maneuver aimed at cutting the road east of the Hongorai, further encircling Japanese forces.

To support the advancing Australian forces, New Zealand aircraft launched significant attacks on Japanese concentrations positioned along the Buin and Commando Roads. On May 17, the 57th/60th Battalion crossed the upper reaches of the Hongorai River, advancing across a wide front along the Commando Road to draw the enemy's attention to that area. On the eve of this move Hammer issued an order of the day in a characteristic style. He spoke of his "undying admiration" for and "extreme confidence" in his men and told them that the next few weeks might see the major defeat of the Japanese in south Bougainville. "Go to battle as you have done in the last month and no enemy can withstand you." In the subsequent days, they successfully secured territory up to the Torobiru River, creating pressure on the Japanese lines and disrupting their defensive operations. On May 20, following a powerful air and artillery bombardment, the 24th Battalion finally launched its long-anticipated assault across the Hongorai River. This marked a turning point as they occupied the strategically significant Egan’s Ridge by May 22. Egan’s Ridge offered an elevated position that overlooked the surrounding terrain, making it crucial for controlling movement in the vicinity.

Meanwhile, the 58th/59th Battalion executed a stealthy wide flanking maneuver towards Mayberry’s Crossing, positioning themselves strategically to disrupt Japanese supply lines and communication. On May 21, the Australians moved out once more to cut the Buin Road at Runai, an essential route that facilitated movement and supplies for the Japanese forces. In the following days, the remaining sections of this critical road were secured as the Japanese forces west of the Hari River were forced to retreat, effectively diminishing their operational capabilities in the region. As these operations unfolded, the 2/8th Commando Squadron established a new base on Morokaimoro, positioning themselves for further reconnaissance and engagements. They began patrolling towards Taitai and the Mivo River, both vital points of interest as the Australians sought to gather intelligence on enemy movements.

In the meantime, the 57th/60th Battalion pressed on to capture the Oso Junction by May 27. However, they encountered harassment from night raiding parties and artillery fire, which highlighted the persistent threat of Japanese resistance in this area. On 2nd June the main advance was resumed, the 58th/59th moving forward without opposition through positions which had been "completely devastated by air, artillery and mortars". "Not one enemy was found alive or dead," wrote the battalion diarist, "although a strong smell of death pervaded the whole area." A prisoner taken later in the day said that the air strike had completely demoralised the defenders, and when they heard the tanks approaching they had fled. On the left the 57th/60th reached the Sunin River against slight opposition. On the 3rd and 4th the 58th/59th continued the advance, moving slowly because of the need to disarm an unprecedentedly large number of mines and booby-traps-more than 100 in three days-until they reached the Peperu River. Patrols moving stealthily forward to the Hari and across it found evidence of much confusion, many positions dug but unoccupied, and small groups of Japanese at large. It was decided to attack frontally towards the Hari next day. At the same time, the 57th/60th Battalion also reached the Sunin River, facing only slight opposition during their advance. On June 6, the 58th/59th Battalion launched an attack towards the Hari River, but despite their efforts, they only managed to gain about 500 yards against strong defensive positions held by the Japanese. The next three days proved challenging as the 58th/59th Battalion, supported by tanks, found their progress impeded by swampy terrain, a road littered with hidden mines, and intermittent shellfire threatening their advance. The combined obstacles of the natural environment and determined enemy resistance severely limited their ability to make significant gains.

In light of the pressing circumstances, Brigadier Hammer made a pivotal decision to send the 58th/59th Battalion on a shallow outflanking march to the north. Their mission was clear: cut the Buin Road several miles east of the Hari River. At the same time, the 57th/60th Battalion was tasked with thrusting wide to the south, maneuvering around the Ogorata River to intercept the same road near Rusei. After four days of concentrated air and artillery bombardment designed to weaken enemy defenses, the 58th/59th Battalion commenced its operation on June 12. They sent two companies forward to secure a position along the road, located 2,000 yards east of the Hari. This forward position was critical for their strategy to disrupt Japanese supply lines. Two days later, on June 14, these forces continued their advance eastward toward the Ogorata River, while the remainder of the battalion engaged the enemy at the Hari ford, a crucial crossing point. Despite the fierce opposition, the ford was finally secured on June 15, following another extensive bombardment that significantly diminished the Japanese presence along the road west of the Ogorata. This success was instrumental in facilitating further operations in the area. 

Concurrently, the 57th/60th Battalion had embarked on their mission on June 11, making slow but steady progress through the challenging, trackless bush. They ultimately found a path leading from Kingori to Rusei, where they began encountering Japanese resistance. Pushing through treacherous swampy terrain and dense bamboo thickets, the Australians reached the Buin Road at Rusei by June 15, successfully coordinating with patrols from the 58th/59th Battalion the following day. In addition to securing Rusei, a robust patrol from the 57th/60th Battalion set out along the northern flank to establish a patrol base north of Musaraka. This base detected a significant enemy presence behind them, leading to a critical reassessment of their positions. Consequently, in late June, the 24th Battalion was dispatched to take over the Taitai-Kingori-Katsuwa area, reinforcing the Australian foothold and securing vital routes in the region. Meanwhile, back to the south, the 57th/60th Battalion began to push eastward toward the Mobiai River on June 16. However, their advance quickly met strong opposition just 400 yards into enemy territory. Faced with determined resistance, the battalion executed a wide outflanking maneuver, a tactical shift that successfully forced the Japanese forces to withdraw by June 19, allowing the Australians to continue their advance.

In the following days, the 57th/60th Battalion pressed steadily forward, ultimately encountering increased opposition near the Mobiai River on June 24. A heavy bombardment was launched in an attempt to dislodge the entrenched Japanese forces, but it proved ineffective. However, the next day, the Japanese troops had mysteriously withdrawn, allowing the Australians to secure a vital crossing over the river. Taking advantage of this opportunity, the 58th/59th Battalion moved in to occupy the newly attained Mobiai positions. Meanwhile, the 57th/60th and 24th Battalions advanced farther north, preparing for an outflanking maneuver aimed at Shishigatero, a critical tactical point lying to the northeast. In anticipation of an Australian offensive, General Kanda dispatched the 23rd Regiment to establish a defensive base near the Mivo ford. This strategic relocation was part of his preparations for the final defenses behind the Mivo River, as Japanese troops sought to hold their ground against the advancing Australians.

By June 28, the 57th/60th and 24th Battalions reached their designated assembly areas, where they successfully repelled several Japanese counterattacks. The next morning, they began their advance southeast, shrouded in the loud thunder of artillery barrages that paved the way for their push. They reached the Buin Road at the confluence of the Ivana, Koopani, and Mivo Rivers, making significant headway. At the same time, the 58th/59th Battalion aimed to open the road for the 24th Battalion, positioned about 1,000 yards away. However, they encountered sharp resistance from Japanese forces defending their positions fiercely. Following this notable success, as Hammer’s units faced and repelled various Japanese counterattacks at their new positions, General Bridgeford directed Brigadier Noel Simpson’s 29th Brigade to the frontline to relieve the beleaguered 15th Brigade. Each incoming battalion was met with sharp clashes as they moved up, as Japanese forces sought to maintain their hold on strategic territory. Finally, on July 10, Hammer’s units were relieved, a long-awaited reprieve after weeks of grueling combat. Despite the shift in command, Simpson’s battalions began sending patrols forward in preparation for a crossing of the Mivo River. Unfortunately, due to the heavy resistance encountered and the onset of relentless rains that would continue throughout the month, this final offensive was never carried out. Instead, the troops were limited to vigorous patrolling activities during July and August, maintaining a presence but unable to launch significant offensives in the harsh conditions.

Many of these patrols encountered fierce opposition, signaling that the enemy intended to mount a determined defense along the Mivo line. These patrols regularly captured crucial documents from Japanese soldiers ambushed along the tracks leading to their forward positions, allowing Australian forces to construct a clearer picture of the enemy’s intentions and deployments. Among these daring reconnaissance missions was one conducted by a patrol from the 42nd Battalion, led by Lieutenant Oldfield. Tasked with scouting a potential crossing at the Mivo, Oldfield and four other soldiers discovered the river was in flood. Undeterred, they stripped off their gear, swam across the turbulent waters, and advanced 500 yards beyond the riverbank, without any weapons.

The weight of the Australian artillery and mortar bombardments altered the enemy’s tactics. Rather than holding fixed positions, the Japanese began to dig in less and instead employed a strategy of hit-and-run raids and ambushes executed by small groups of three to ten men. Before July 10 arrived, the relentless rain compelled a second postponement of the advance; the new date for the operation was set for July 24. However, the downpour continued to intensify. By July 10, even the patrols could not cross the flooded Mivo. "Torrential rain flooded the divisional area, reducing the Buin Road to a treacherous sea of mud and creating a series of islands between the various rivers." On July 17, conditions worsened further, with a dramatic eight inches of rain falling in just 36 hours. The new challenge was no longer about advancing troops but ensuring that the men were fed where they remained. Virtually all the bridges along the lines of communication were washed away, and all the rivers were flooded; the Mivo was now surging at a speed of twelve miles an hour. As a result, the forward units could only be supplied via air transport. It would take weeks to repair the damaged roads and bridges, leading to D-day being postponed until late August.

As the southern operations unfolded, General Savige made a strategic decision to bring Brigadier Arnold Potts’ 23rd Brigade from Munda and its surrounding islands to Torokina. Upon arrival, Savige immediately tasked the 27th Battalion with taking over the central sector beyond Pearl Ridge. The Australians quickly began bombing and launching attacks in the Berry's Hill-Hunt's Hill area, ultimately securing this crucial location on May 16. Following the seizure of Berry's Hill, the 27th Battalion conducted patrols toward key positions at Sisivie, Tokua, Base Point 3, and Wearne’s Hill throughout late May. On June 3, they initiated an attack towards Tiernan’s Spur, making significant progress before being relieved by the 7th Battalion. The 7th Battalion, upon taking over, adopted an aggressive posture, and on June 11, they attacked Tiernan’s Spur, successfully securing the feature this time. Soon after, a combination of reconnaissance and air bombardment set the stage for an assault on Wearne’s Hill on June 16. However, they encountered strong opposition and were unable to seize its crest until June 20.

In parallel operations, a company captured Sisivie without encountering resistance on June 12. Another company was dispatched to establish a forward base in the Wakunai Valley, successfully creating observation posts that overlooked Inus Point and the large Numa Numa Plantation by June 21. After conducting extensive bombardments against remaining Japanese positions, the Australians finally secured the remainder of Wearne's Hill on June 24. Starting June 26, the 7th Battalion began probing towards Centre Hill, which they ultimately found abandoned on July 6. Meanwhile, on July 3, Tokua was occupied as a base for future operations probing north toward Ibu and Buritsiotorara. Artillery and aircraft continued to harass North Hill, which was finally captured on July 13. Just five days later, Cameron’s Hill was also successfully attacked and secured. The 7th Battalion then pressed forward along the main track towards Charlie Creek and McInnes Hill, achieving their objectives by August 8 as the remaining Japanese forces were forced to retire to Numa Numa.

Looking north, the 55th/53rd Battalion took over from the exhausted 26th Battalion in early April, following the fall of the Soraken Peninsula. Upon assuming command, Lieutenant Colonel Stevenson immediately directed the 55th/53rd to cross the Nagam River and launch an attack towards Pora Pora, a key strategic location in the region. The battalion pressed on along the main coastal track, but on April 13, they faced an unsuccessful assault against the enemy positioned at McKinnon's Ridge. Meanwhile, a company from the battalion moved through an inland route, encountering no resistance as they advanced to a position just two miles from Pora Pora. Recognizing the resolute enemy defenses along the main track, the Australians initiated a program of heavy artillery bombardment, complemented by flanking maneuvers designed to outmaneuver the entrenched defenders. This relentless strategy began to pay off, eventually forcing the Japanese to retreat on April 21. During this critical period, the unopposed company on the inland track continued to push forward until it was only one mile from Pora Pora.

In the following four days, the 55th/53rd Battalion fought its way into the Pora Pora bottleneck, engaging in fierce combat that successfully expelled the Japanese forces by April 30. With this victory, the Australians were able to continue their advance northward, making rapid gains against a retreating enemy. On May 4, they captured the Ratsua jetty, a vital logistics point that facilitated further operations. Two columns of the 55th/53rd commenced a swift march towards Ruri Bay, while a company from the 26th Battalion successfully seized Torokori Island on May 6. Three days later, as they finally approached Ruri Bay, the Australians successfully repelled an enemy ambush. However, Brigadier Stevenson’s orders were now to halt their advance at the Ratsua-Ruri Bay line and focus on active patrolling extending northward to Tarbut and Tarlena. Despite this directive, the situation became increasingly precarious. The Japanese, bolstered by four small provisional battalions of naval troops under Captain Kato Ekichi, grew aggressive beyond the established line. Daily patrol clashes erupted, with Australian positions and supply lines subjected to constant ambushes.

Recognizing the need for reinforcements, the weary 55th/53rd Battalion was relieved by the 26th Battalion on May 21. In response, the 26th immediately dispatched two companies to thrust forward in the area south and east of Buoi Plantation. However, these units quickly encountered strong counterattacks, while patrols faced heavy resistance around Siara and Chindawon. As Stevenson's forces found themselves facing a fortified opponent stronger than anticipated, permission was granted to send two companies from the 31st/51st Battalion to take over the western sector on June 3. Despite this reinforcements, the Australians continued to struggle to make meaningful progress northward. After the 26th Battalion had been in the line for three hard weeks its diarist wrote that the campaign had become one of "holding a superior number of enemy by the aggressive action of a tired depleted battalion-companies were no more than half strength and had been in forward areas continuously for four months". The battalion's fighting strength on 3rd June was only 23 officers and 353 other ranks. The constant patrolling, the artillery fire and the raids on jeep trains on tracks well to the rear were wearing down the men's spirits.

In response to the persistent challenges, a strategic decision was made to outmaneuver the Japanese by landing a reinforced company of the 31st/51st Battalion at Porton Plantation, aiming to approach the enemy from the western flank. During the early hours of June 8, the assault force successfully landed unopposed and swiftly established a perimetric defense reaching 150 yards inland. However, the surprised defenders quickly regrouped, unleashing a barrage of machine-gun fire that effectively thwarted the unloading of heavy weapons, reserve ammunition, and essential supplies. Although supporting artillery fire was effectively directed at the Japanese positions, the Australians soon found themselves pinned down as Captain Kato reinforced the defenses surrounding their perimeter. To complicate matters further, a convoy of Australian supplies and reinforcements attempting to reach the newly established perimeter was successfully repelled by the tenacious defenders during the night.

The next morning, it was decided to withdraw the force late that evening. However, as the Australians prepared for their retreat, the Japanese launched a strong counterattack from three sides. The enemy attacked in relentless waves, and although they were met with devastating Australian fire, the pressure forced the company to pull back towards the beach. In the morning they launched what was evidently intended as a final blow, thrusting from three sides. Now estimated at over 400 they attacked in waves and were mowed down by the Australian fire. To confuse their enemy they shouted English phrases such as "Watch the right flank", "Throw it in the middle", "It's only me, Jack", and so on. The Australians pulled back towards the beach and at 1 p.m. 

During the afternoon, three landing craft moved towards the beach under heavy enemy fire in an effort to embark the soldiers. Unfortunately, two of the crafts were overloaded and became stranded. One eventually drifted off with the tide during the evening; however, the other remained besieged by heavy fire throughout the night. On June 10, Australian forces continued their attempts to rescue the stranded men, launching efforts under the cover of a strong air attack. At dawn on June 10, there were 38 living men on board the besieged landing craft, commanded by Corporal Hall. Their meager arsenal included two Bren guns, five Owen submachine guns, and nine rifles. The remaining rations consisted of eight tins of fruit or vegetables, three or four tins of meat, and three tins of condensed milk. Corporal Hall devised a defensive plan to maximize their chances of survival. He removed the wooden shelves under the overlapping sides of the ALCA to create protective cover under the flaps for all the troops. The dismantled wireless set was discarded overboard to free up additional space. To assist with breathing during rising tides, each man was issued six-inch lengths of copper piping. A continuous watch was kept from the coxswain’s enclosure to monitor Japanese movements and report any developments. The soldiers cleaned and oiled their weapons using lubricant sourced from the engines, ensuring that they were well-maintained and ready for use. A medical kit was placed in the capable hands of a member of the 19th Australian Field Ambulance, who diligently distributed morphine and dressings as needed. At 15:30 on June 10, a concerted effort to rescue the stranded survivors commenced. An intense and precise air attack targeted the enemy positions, but unfortunately, it failed to hit the pillbox from which most of the fire directed at the barge was originating. Bombers dropped inflated rubber rafts near the landing craft in an attempt to assist, but Japanese gunfire prevented any men from reaching these lifelines. Under the cover of an artillery smoke screen, a landing craft attempted to reach the shore. However, enemy fire wounded several crew members, including the coxswain, damaging the steering gear and causing the craft to circle out of control. Amidst this chaos, Corporal Hall attempted to silence the pillbox with a Bren gun, but his efforts were in vain. In a desperate bid to assist the aircraft in locating the target, he splashed bullets towards the pillbox, yet the attempt proved futile as the damaged landing craft was forced to withdraw.

They successfully repelled several Japanese parties attempting to swim out to the immobilized craft during the night. Finally, in the early hours of June 11, the besieged Australians were rescued by three assault boats, managing to pull them from the critical situation. In this endeavor, the Australian forces suffered significant losses, with 23 men reported killed or missing and 106 wounded. Among these casualties, five killed and seven wounded belonged to the 42nd Landing Craft Company. Estimates suggest that the Japanese forces faced losses of approximately 147 confirmed dead, with an additional 50 likely killed. The infantry units suffered specifically dire consequences, with two officers killed and three wounded, these included both company commanders, leaving only Lieutenants Patterson and Reiter, two young veterans from the 6th Division, as the sole surviving leaders from six platoon commanders. Additionally, 14 other ranks were reported killed or missing, while 57 were wounded. Of those wounded, five were sent to the field ambulance suffering from exposure, and nine sustained cuts and bruises. The repulse of the Australian attempt to land near Porton on June 8, 9, and 10 significantly boosted Japanese morale. Observers reported that the landing occurred on a rough strip of beach, making it difficult for the enemy to negotiate the surrounding reefs. The high ground in the vicinity provided an excellent vantage point for the Japanese, allowing for optimal placement of automatic weapons. In response to the Australian advance, Captain Kato swiftly dispatched 150 troops from Chabai to reinforce the approximately 100 men already engaged in combat. These reinforcements succeeded in thwarting any further enemy landings, ultimately pushing the Australians back to the beach, from where their remaining forces were evacuated in haste. Kato estimated that around 250 Australians had landed, resulting in the loss of 60 killed and 100 wounded, alongside 26 Japanese fatalities. If the Japanese report regarding their own losses is accurate, it suggests that both sides engaged in this grim action sustained approximately equal losses. Moreover, during this battle, the reinforced 26th Battalion failed to exploit this diversionary attack, missing the opportunity to push against the stubborn resistance of Captain Kato’s isolated posts. On June 20, Brigadier Potts’ 23rd Brigade began taking over the northern sector, with orders to contain the Japanese forces in the Bonis Peninsula and patrol towards Buka Passage. This relief operation was completed by the end of the month. However, the 8th and 27th Battalions continued to face harassment from Kato’s deep patrols throughout July. Ultimately, the overextended 27th Battalion on the right flank was withdrawn on July 22 to allow the 8th Battalion to successfully attack and capture Commo Ridge the following day.

On July 24, the 8th Battalion launched an unsuccessful attack on Part Ridge. However, this heavy assault shook the defenders, paving the way for the Australians to capture the ridge against light opposition on August 5. This marked the last major action of the Bougainville Campaign. In total, Savige’s 2nd Corps endured losses of 516 Australians killed and 1,572 wounded. It is estimated that approximately 8,500 Japanese soldiers were killed by Australian forces and their native allies, while an additional 9,800 succumbed to illness during the Australian period on Bougainville. By the end of the campaign, only 23,571 men remained out of about 65,000 who had been on the island when the Americans launched their attack in November 1943. Now, attention turned westward to Balikpapan, where General Milford’s 7th Australian Division successfully landed on July 1. They secured an important perimeter extending through Santosa Hill, Parramatta, Mount Malang, and Stalkudo. The battle resumed the following day, with the 2/14th Battalion advancing along the Vasey Highway to seize the Sepinggang airstrip unopposed. Meanwhile, the 2/3rd Commando Squadron took over the area northeast of Stalkudo, though they made little progress toward the Lady Schofield feature due to heavy enemy fire. The 2/27th Battalion strengthened and extended its hold on the high ground northwest of Stalkudo. The 2/16th Battalion pressed northward, successfully capturing Resort, Owen, and Oxley without sustaining any losses. The 2/12th Battalion took Potts and consolidated its position on Portee. The 2/10th Battalion conducted mopping-up operations in the secured areas, patrolling vigorously forward, and also seized Mount Sepuluh. Lastly, the 2/9th Battalion, supported by a troop of tanks, cleared Kandasan town along the coast as far as Signal Hill. By the end of the day, Brigadier Eather’s 25th Brigade had landed to take over the central portions of the front, tasked with pushing inland astride the Milford Highway.

On July 3, one company of the 2/10th Battalion advanced through the port, while another cleared the Tank Plateau, and a third focused on the lower ground between the plateau and Parramatta. Concurrently, the 2/9th Battalion, supported by its troop of tanks, successfully took the Santosa barracks, which they had bypassed the previous day. The division now held a bridgehead approximately five miles wide and one mile deep, successfully securing one of the two airstrips. On July 3, light aircraft began operating from this newly established base. However, unloading heavy equipment and stores proved to be a challenging task, causing considerable anxiety among the troops. A swell made it difficult to transfer loads to Landing Craft Tank (LCTs) and small craft, while it was impossible to run the Landing Ship Tank (LSTs) directly onto the beach. By 06:00 on July 3, progress was evident, with 985 vehicles and 1,932 tons of various equipment and stores successfully landed, alongside 16,950 men ashore. Later that morning, an LST began unloading at a pontoon jetty constructed on Green Beach by an American naval construction battalion. The captured port was a scene of devastation, characterized by wrecked workshops and warehouses, leaving little more than twisted, rusty steel and piles of rubble where houses once stood. The seven wharves designed for ocean-going vessels had all been burned, rendering them unusable. Among the debris, one dump of scrap iron collected by the Japanese from the ruins measured 520 yards long, with another scrap pile opposite it stretching about 150 yards.

As unloading operations continued on the main beaches, the 2/14th Battalion began moving towards the Manggar airstrip but found themselves halted at Batakan Kechil. The 2/27th Battalion took over the defense of the Sepinggang strip, and the 2/3rd Commando Squadron discovered the Lady Schofield feature abandoned, allowing their patrols to press on more than a mile across the high ground overlooking the Sepinggang River. Meanwhile, the 2/33rd Battalion encountered heavy opposition in the hills above Chilton Road but managed to capture Opus, Operator, and Oxygen, as well as a height to the northeast named Orange. The 2/31st Battalion advanced along Milford Highway, facing increasing opposition, but they rapidly secured the junction with Chilton Road. However, they were unable to capture the strong enemy defenses at Nobody and Nurse. The 2/12th Battalion began a march towards Pandansari but had to assault Nail to eliminate the threat of enemy harassing fire. The following day, while the 2/33rd Battalion occupied Letter and Lewis, the 2/31st found Nobody and Nurse abandoned, allowing them to easily secure these features. One company also took control of Nail and began probing towards Lodge. At the same time, the 2/14th Battalion resumed its advance towards Manggar. They successfully crossed the river and pushed 1,300 yards across the airstrip without facing any opposition. However, after midday, heavy Japanese fire unexpectedly swept across the airfield, resulting in the deaths of several officers at the control tower. Despite this setback, and aided by the fire from destroyer Eaton, the Australians pressed on and ultimately secured Manggar and its airfield.

By the end of the day, General Milford had successfully pushed the enemy out of Balikpapan and further secured the Sepinggang and Manggar strips. However, it became clear that Admiral Kamada was attempting to withdraw the remnants of his force to the Batuchampar area, aiming to delay any advance along the Milford Highway for as long as possible. The 454th Independent Battalion continued to hold the commanding terrain north of Manggar, and on July 5, its defenses came under intense naval, air, and artillery bombardment, which initially failed to silence the Japanese guns. Meanwhile, Brigadier Eather pressed his advance north in the center. The 2/25th Battalion took control of the positions at Nurse and Nail, while the 2/33rd pressed on against dwindling opposition to capture Mackay, Marshall, Mutual, and Margin. The 2/31st Battalion moved forward to seize Letter and Lewis, followed by the capture of Laverton and Liverpool. Recognizing the necessity of securing the western side of Balikpapan Bay to facilitate port operations, Milford ordered Brigadier Chilton’s 18th Brigade to land the reinforced 2/9th Battalion at Penadjam. Following a naval and artillery bombardment, the landing was executed unopposed during the afternoon of July 5, with patrols of the 2/9th immediately probing north and south to secure the perimeter. The following day, a patrol moved south toward Nanang village and onward to the Sesumpu River, while other units explored the area towards the Riko River and Separi. On July 6, the 2/33rd Battalion successfully attacked and captured Metal and Muffle, but they were ultimately repelled from Judge. Meanwhile, the 2/25th pressed onward, taking control of Liverpool and occupying Huon.

Looking southeast, the 2/14th Battalion began to probe enemy positions on this day. A strong patrol successfully captured Waites’ Knoll but had to repel a series of strong counterattacks during the night, while another patrol was forced back along Vasey Highway. Over the next few days, the Australians continued to engage, probing and bombarding the commanding enemy positions. Ultimately, the 2/14th launched an attack and captured the Frost and Brown features on July 9, effectively eliminating the enemy threat in that area. Meanwhile, the 2/16th Battalion and the 2/5th Commando Squadron attacked an enemy concentration at Gate on July 6 and secured the position two days later, further solidifying their hold on Grand by July 9. To the northwest, on July 7, the 2/25th Battalion moved to Cult and then attempted an assault on Jam but was repelled by fierce defenders. The following day, while Jam underwent probing and bombardment, the 2/33rd Battalion discovered Justice abandoned after heavy shelling and pressed on toward Joint and Judge. Concurrently, Brigadier Eather had dispatched the 2/6th Commando Squadron into the hills overlooking the Sumber River. They successfully occupied Job on July 8 and seized Freight the following day. By July 9, after a concentrated artillery barrage, Jam, Joint, and Judge finally fell as the 25th Brigade secured the first stretch of the Milford Highway to Batuchampar. The 2/31st Battalion then advanced to a road bend due north of Junior, where they encountered an ambush by Japanese raiders. Meanwhile, a company of the 2/9th Battalion landed unopposed at Djinabora on the afternoon of July 8, and on the following day, a patrol base was established at Teloktebang.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

General Hammer launched a fierce campaign across Bougainville, battling entrenched Japanese troops, they secured the strategic Soraken Peninsula and advanced toward the vital Hongorai River. By July, they had reached the Hari River, significantly weakening Japanese defenses. However, relentless rain hindered further operations.

- 189 - Pacific War Podcast - The Invasion of Balikpapan - July 1 - 8, 1945

Last time we spoke about liberation of Luzon.. American forces, led by General Eichelberger and supported by General Krueger's armies, relentlessly advanced against the entrenched Japanese defenders of General Yamashita’s 14th Area Army. Amid thick jungle and treacherous terrain, battles raged through the northern mountain ranges, as American troops aimed to restore the Filipino government. Facing overwhelming odds, the Japanese forces displayed extraordinary resilience, temporarily halting American progress. Remarkable efforts from General Swift’s 1st Corps across Routes 9 and 11 led to significant breakthroughs as American forces captured critical positions, including Sablan and Baguio. However, the Japanese command, complacent and misjudging the American strategy, fell into disarray. As the tide turned with relentless American assaults, key Japanese positions were systematically dismantled. By late April, most of Luzon was liberated, restoring hope and autonomy to the Filipino people. 

This episode is Invasion of Balikpapan

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

The battles for Okinawa and Luzon just closed up, and today we are going to be venturing back to the Dutch East Indies. As we left off in mid-May, the tides of war were shifting dramatically on the island of Luzon, with General Krueger's 6th Army celebrating significant victories across the region. In the north, General Swift’s 1st Corps had successfully secured the scenic Baguio area, known for its lush mountains and cool climate, a stark contrast to the tropical heat that engulfed much of the Philippines. Yet, the fighting was far from over, as fierce battles continued on three major fronts. Colonel Volckmann’s guerrilla 121st Regiment was making strides, snagging much of the strategically vital Bessang Pass, a crucial artery connecting northern Luzon to the central regions. However, their success came at a cost, leaving them overextended amidst fierce Japanese resistance. Meanwhile, General Gill’s weary 32nd Division managed to claim dominance over the rugged terrain of Salacsac Pass along the historic Villa Verde Trail, known for its breathtaking views and treacherous paths that had challenged both soldiers and their supply lines.

General Mullins’ 25th Division achieved a remarkable breakthrough by capturing the key Balete Pass, opening the way for further advances. Not stopping there, the 25th Division pressed onward, quickly redirecting their focus northward towards the town of Santa Fe. By May 24, the 27th Regiment had cleared the Sawmill River valley, an area teeming with dense foliage and rugged hills, a significant accomplishment that paved the way for the next objectives. From there, the 1st Battalion expertly maneuvered eastward against the imposing Kanami Ridge. On May 22, the 161st Regiment dealt a heavy blow to Japanese positions in a stronghold on Mount Haruna, a location known for its steep, challenging slopes. Following this triumph, they began their descent down the northern slopes of Haruna Ridge, gearing up for a critical junction with the Villa Verde Trail by May 27. Meanwhile, the 35th Regiment launched a vigorous assault from Balete Pass, systematically clearing out the remaining Japanese caves and fortifications by May 26, culminating in the capture of Santa Fe the very next day. At Salacsac, the Japanese forces, led by General Iwanaka, initiated a limited counteroffensive, presumably to buy time for a strategic evacuation of their increasingly tenuous positions. If delay was indeed Iwanaka's intention, he executed it well; it wasn’t until May 19 that the American supply line was finally deemed secure again. The 2nd Battalion of the 128th Regiment resumed its push east from Hill 525, but the progress was slow. By May 22, the 1st Battalion had only managed to advance a mere 500 yards east from Hill 508, while the 3rd Battalion commenced a southward and southeastward advance from Hill 516 on May 16. It was not until May 24 that the relentless fighting in the region bore fruit, leading to the eventual clearing of the area, and Salacsac Pass was officially declared secured.

On that pivotal day, General Iwanaka began the difficult task of withdrawing the remnants of his battered forces northward, retreating up the winding valley of the Imugan River. This river, which flows through a lush, verdant landscape, would serve as a vital sanctuary, albeit one fraught with danger for the disheartened Japanese troops. Meanwhile, the American forces were gaining ground. The 2nd Battalion aggressively seized control of Hill 527, a position that provided a commanding view of the surrounding area, crucial for planning further advances. The 126th Regiment took decisive action, utilizing trucks to transport troops swiftly along Route 5 to Balete Pass before launching an assault toward Imugan from the east and southeast. Concurrently, the guerrilla 1st Battalion of the Buena Vista Regiment embarked on a northward push from Valdez, culminating in the hard-fought capture of Hill 528 on May 28. This hill, commanding and steep, presented a formidable challenge but also promised a vantage point critical for any further operations in the region. The very next day, Imugan finally succumbed to the relentless pressure of the advancing American forces, marking a significant milestone as the Villa Verde Trail came firmly under American control. This development effectively concluded the arduous operations of the 32nd Division. It was a costly campaign for General Gill; the division suffered approximately 825 men killed, 2,160 wounded, with an alarming 6,000 classified as non-battle casualties. In stark contrast, the Japanese defense was decimated, with at least 5,750 of the 8,750 troops they had deployed to defend the trail lying dead.

As we gaze northward, we find Colonel Volckmann’s guerrillas, who had extended themselves too thinly across Bessang Pass and into the challenging terrain of Yubo Ridge. The aftermath of their overreach saw them facing fierce Japanese counterattacks that swiftly pushed them back across Lamagan Ridge in the latter part of May. However, a small contingent managed to hold tenaciously onto the eastern slopes of Langiatan Hill, a strategic position that allowed them to maintain some level of influence in the region. Additionally, a robust force from the Japanese 76th Regiment assembled south of Butac, planning an offensive northward. However, this advance was met with fierce resistance from the guerrilla 15th Regiment, who successfully repelled the attack. Seizing the momentum, Volckmann directed the 15th Regiment into a new offensive eastward, and by the end of May, they had successfully re-secured their foothold up to Lamagan Ridge. Meanwhile, elements of the 121st Regiment executed a remarkable retaking of both Langiatan Hill and Yubo Ridge, gradually restoring control over this strategically vital area. Looking south, we find General Hall's 11th Corps vigorously engaged in two crucial offensives aimed at capturing Ipo Dam and Wawa Dam, both essential water reservoirs located east of Manila. The strategic importance of these dams cannot be overstated; they were vital not only for securing fresh water but also for controlling the flow of operations in the region. However, the relentless heavy downpours that characterized the season rendered air support missions impractical, exacerbating an already challenging supply situation for the advancing troops. As a result, General Wing’s 43rd Division was forced to pause its offensive late on May 14 to reassess and devise new attack plans. 

As of late May 14, the 43rd Division found itself in a precarious situation, necessitating a halt to operations to devise new attack plans. To this point, the division had made limited progress toward securing Route 52, a crucial supply line vital for their mission to capture Ipo Dam. Recognizing the urgency, General Wing decided it was essential to commit the 169th Regiment to a targeted attack to clear this road, as it would serve as a critical route for both supply and evacuation in the coming days. The adverse weather conditions had created a significant operational hindrance. For nearly the entire duration of their offensive, intermittent rains had severely disrupted ground and aerial supply chains, as well as evacuation and the crucial air support operations necessary for a successful advance. Ground conditions had become challenging, and division engineers struggled to construct and maintain supply roads at a pace even close to that of the infantry's advances. Consequently, supply drops and hand-carried provisions were just sufficient to keep combat units barely above the minimum required levels, but the evacuation of sick and wounded soldiers remained a pressing issue that plagued the division. By May 14, the situation worsened significantly. For the first time since May 6, the 5th Air Force was completely grounded, unable to conduct any air support or supply missions due to the worsening weather conditions. This represented a troubling turning point for the 43rd Division. Moreover, intelligence reports indicated that sizable groups from the Japanese Tomono and Hanabusa Detachments had shifted their focus away from their defenses along Route 52, moving instead to confront the 103rd and 172nd Regiments attacking from the south. General Wing recognized that this presented a timely opportunity for the 169th Regiment. Striking directly along Route 52 would likely be far easier and less costly than it would have been just a week prior. Furthermore, a successful offensive by the 169th could not only expedite the capture of Ipo Dam but also prevent further eastward redeployments of Japanese forces. This would be a vital maneuver, potentially relieving pressure from Fork Ridge, where the left flank of the 172nd Regiment was currently bogged down in fierce fighting. Time was of the essence, and decisive action was required to turn the tide in favor of the 43rd Division.

The situation was critical; delay would allow Japanese forces to fortify their defenses further. In response, Wing mapped out a robust plan: he directed the 103rd Regiment to capture the Route 52 terminus at Ipo Dam itself, which was crucial for any further advances. Their orders included not only taking control of the dam but also clearing the high ground north of the road and west of the dam to ensure a secure position against any possible counterattacks. Additionally, he tasked the 172nd Regiment with seizing Hill 804, a vantage point that could provide vital intelligence and support to the offensive, while the 169th Regiment was directed to eliminate the last Japanese defenders in the Bigti area before advancing eastward along Route 52 to connect with the 172nd. A break in the weather finally came on May 17, allowing the 43rd Division to launch their offensive with much-needed air support. Aircraft successfully dropped napalm and strafed Japanese defensive positions, a strategy that proved devastatingly effective. General Kawashima, facing mounting losses, ultimately ordered the remnants of his command to withdraw to an assembly point on the western slopes of Mount Maranat, a retreat that revealed their deteriorating ability to hold the line. With the air support providing a critical advantage, the 103rd Regiment advanced boldly and swiftly cleared the last Japanese holdouts from Hill 860, securing an essential position. However, it was the guerrilla forces, under the command of Colonel Augustin, from the Marking Regiment who achieved a historic victory by capturing Ipo Dam shortly after noon. His patrols descended the slopes of Hill 803, crossed the Angat River at the dam, and triumphantly raised the American flag over the powerhouse on the south bank, a potent symbol of liberation and resistance. Simultaneously, the 172nd Regiment seized control of Fork Ridge, further tightening the noose around Japanese forces, while the 169th Regiment secured strategic ground from Hill 535 to Osboy Ridge, pushing forward with relentless determination.

In the following four days, the 43rd Division, supported by the fearless Marking guerrillas, meticulously mopped up the area west of Ipo Dam. Their efforts culminated in the successful opening of Route 52 from Bigti to Ipo on May 19, a critical milestone that allowed for the unhindered movement of troops and supplies. By May 21, they completed the operation by clearing out the last pockets of organized resistance in the region west of the dam and south of the Angat River, a crucial waterway that would play a significant role in sustaining American operations. With the capture of Ipo Dam intact, General Wing achieved his primary objective, making a significant contribution to addressing Manila's pressing water supply problems. This success would have lasting implications for the civilians and military alike, as the dam was key to ensuring a reliable water supply in the region. The 43rd Division maintained its momentum, continuing mopping-up operations through May 31. They patrolled eastward across the Ipo River, pressed northeast up the Angat from the dam, and scoured the areas that had witnessed some of the most intense fighting during the campaign. The cost of these operations was notable; Wing’s forces suffered losses of 120 killed and 515 wounded, while the Kawashima Force endured devastating casualties, with over 2,700 men killed and approximately 115 captured during the grueling battle.

Meanwhile, General Chase's 38th Division pressed forward with its offensive against Wawa Dam, following the failure of General Yokoyama’s most recent counteroffensive. The 145th Regiment found itself holding a precariously exposed salient at Mount Binicayan, which severely hampered their ability to launch an effective attack toward Wawa Dam. Japanese positions on the high ground to the north of the dam dominated the narrow, winding road with artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire, making any advance perilous. In response to this daunting challenge, General Chase decided to launch an offensive with the 151st Regiment in the area north of the Marikina River, targeting the formidable Mounts Pamitinan and Hapanong-Banoy. This bold maneuver was contingent upon the 152nd Regiment gaining momentum in its attack to clear Woodpecker Ridge. As such, on May 19 and 20, the 152nd Regiment executed enveloping maneuvers centered on Woodpecker Ridge, ultimately breaking through enemy lines on May 21. The breakthrough was dramatically supported by the introduction of medium tanks and flamethrower tanks, powerful assets that helped turn the tide of battle. The following day, what began as a breakthrough rapidly escalated into a rout of Japanese defenders. By May 25, the 152nd Regiment had established control over the strategic junction of the Marikina and Bosoboso Rivers, a key position that not only bolstered their operational capabilities but also positioned them for further advances in the ongoing campaign.

As Japanese resistance began to dissipate under the relentless pressure from the advancing American forces, the 149th Regiment, which had successfully relieved the 145th at Mount Binicayan, launched a bold strike toward Wawa Dam on May 27. Encountering little to no opposition, they secured the dam intact the following morning, marking a significant victory. It was on May 27 that General Yokoyama ordered a general retreat, recognizing the untenable position of his forces. Acting on these instructions, General Kobayashi's remaining troops fell back, pursued by vigilant patrols from the 38th Division. With Wawa Dam secured, General Chase shifted his strategy; rather than launching direct assaults against organized Japanese lines, he opted to focus on mopping up operations and pursuing the retreating enemy. The human cost of the campaign was significant. Chase’s forces sustained losses of 160 killed and 590 wounded, while the Kobayashi Force suffered catastrophic losses, with over 10,000 men killed since the onset of the offensive. 

Shifting focus southeast, the 7th Cavalry and Lieutenant Colonel Bernard Anderson’s guerrillas converged on the coastal town of Infanta in late May. Faced with overwhelming pressure, the Japanese naval garrison retreated westward into the Sierra Madre mountains, a rugged and dense area that posed challenges for both sides. Infanta ultimately fell on May 25, and by the evening of the following day, the reinforced 7th Cavalry had successfully cleared the entire flat, rice-rich region surrounding the town, encountering only scattered and ineffective resistance. In a strategic move bolstered by overwater supply movements, the 7th Cavalry implemented an aggressive patrolling program to the southwest, seeking out any remaining enemy forces. Meanwhile, the 8th Cavalry focused its efforts on clearing the northern section of Santa Maria Valley, advancing northward into the Sierra Madre. By the end of May, the Shimbu Group, once a significant Japanese fighting force, was rendered ineffective. Its main units began to disband, breaking into small groups in a desperate bid to forage for food or to navigate their way to safety in northern Luzon.

At the end of May, the Shimbu Group still boasted a strength of nearly 26,000 men, over half of its total personnel as of February 20. However, the remaining survivors were not the elite forces they once were. The relentless campaigns by the 11th and 14th Corps had decimated the best-trained and most well-equipped units, leaving behind a shell of what had once been a formidable fighting force. Of the approximately 13,000 survivors still organized into units, their combat effectiveness had deteriorated so significantly that it's worthy of mention only in passing. Meanwhile, about 13,000 others were struggling to survive without proper organization; roughly 5,000 of these were receiving whatever limited medical treatment the Shimbu Group could provide. The remaining 8,000 men had essentially lost all structure, scattering into small groups to forage for food or attempting to make their way north to Luzon, where they hoped to find safety and sustenance.

The supply situation faced by the Shimbu Group at the end of May was even more dire than its personnel situation. They had been unable to transport significant portions of their vast stockpiles of supplies into the Sierra Madre mountains, a shortfall that would prove catastrophic for their survival. The only supplies they still possessed in any quantity were ammunition for small arms and machine guns, alongside medical materials for treating combat wounds. The most pressing issue, however, was a critical lack of food. The early loss of several key agricultural regions, including the Bosoboso Valley, the shores of Laguna de Bay, the Santa Maria Valley, and the fertile Infanta region, had deprived the Shimbu Group of expected food stocks. Most of the supplies brought out of Manila had already been consumed. For instance, the organized remnant of the Noguchi Force could currently allocate a meager two ounces of rice per day for each man—a portion that would undoubtedly vanish by mid-June. The Kobayashi Force fared little better, while the Kawashima Force managed to issue slightly more, around six to eight ounces of rice daily. The troops were gradually reduced to scavenging for survival, resorting to eating roots, bark, grass, and whatever food they could find in long-abandoned Filipino gardens. It’s worth noting that after just a few days in June, there wasn’t a single pig, carabao, or dog left alive within sight of the remnants of the Shimbu Group. Recognizing that mere existence was the overarching challenge, General Yokoyama hoped to regroup his organized units and move them into areas where they might have some chance to cultivate food, scattering them through the challenging terrain of the Sierra Madre. This desperate strategy highlighted the dire straits faced by the Shimbu Group as their chances for survival dwindled.

Meanwhile, the Noguchi Force received orders to transfer its main strength to the mountainous region along the eastern shore of Laguna de Bay, where some of its elements were already positioned. This shift aimed to gather their forces in a more favorable terrain, potentially allowing for better access to resources. The Kobayashi Force was tasked with establishing a defensive sector in the area north of Mount Purro and east of Wawa. In a coordinated effort, the 31st Infantry, minus its 3rd Battalion, along with various miscellaneous troops from the 8th Division, were ordered to occupy positions north of the Lenatin River, enhancing their defensive capabilities in a strategic location. The remnants of the Kawashima Force, already in the process of withdrawing from the Ipo Dam area, were instructed to relocate to the mountains east of San Miguel, approximately 22 miles northwest of Ipo. This area was believed to have more abundant food supplies, crucial for the survival of their forces. However, as circumstances unfolded, this transfer later proved impossible. Unable to move effectively, the bulk of the Kawashima Force remained entrenched in the area surrounding Mount Inuman, where they faced mounting challenges in sustaining their troops.

In the following month, General Hall directed the 38th Division and Major Edwin Ramsey’s 2nd Provisional Regiment to pursue the remnants of Yokoyama’s forces as they moved eastward toward Santa Iñez. Meanwhile, the 112th Cavalry employed various mountain and river valley trails to mount a converging attack from the south. They encountered light opposition and successfully captured the town on June 9, further consolidating their gains in the region. At the same time, patrols from the 43rd Division reported no signs of organized resistance north and east of Ipo Dam. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade, alongside Anderson’s guerrillas, effectively dispersed the last organized remnants of the Kogure Detachment and the remaining Japanese naval units at Lamon Bay. By the end of June, the only indication of organized Japanese resistance in an area extending five miles north and ten miles east of Wawa Dam was found in the Lenatin River valley, approximately three miles north of Santa Iñez. This development forced the remnants of Yokoyama’s forces into trackless and only partially explored wilderness, significantly complicating their ability to regroup or launch further operations. The operations throughout June were costly for Hall, resulting in approximately 110 men killed and 370 wounded. In contrast, Japanese losses during the month were staggering, amounting to 7,540 killed or found dead, alongside 1,105 captured. 

Looking back north, General Yamashita aimed to avoid a similar fate for his northern forces. Ever since the fall of Baguio, he had been meticulously planning for the ultimate withdrawal of the Shobu Group deep into the Cordillera Central.  On May 5, less than two weeks following the fall of Baguio, General Yamashita disseminated an outline plan for future operations to the major components of the Shobu Group throughout northern Luzon. His strategy was built on three fundamental premises: Estimation of Enemy Actions: Yamashita assessed that the 6th Army would concentrate its main effort on a northward drive along Route 5, anticipating that General Krueger would only launch secondary attacks toward Bontoc via Routes 4 and 11. This understanding allowed him to anticipate the flow of enemy movements and allocate his resources more effectively. Timing for Resource Stripping: He calculated that the Shobu Group would have approximately three months during which it could strip the Cagayan and Magat Valleys of the essential food and military supplies needed for a protracted stand in the mountains. During this period, the group aimed to transport this matériel into the Cordillera Central through the junction of Routes 4 and 5, located near Bagabag, 25 miles north on Route 5 from Bambang. Control of Key Routes: Yamashita recognized that the success of his planned withdrawal and future delaying actions hinged on maintaining control over the Routes 4-5 junction for as long as possible. He estimated that his defenses south of Santa Fe would be robust enough to hold until mid-June. Additionally, he planned to construct new defensive positions across Route 5 between Santa Fe and Bambang, enabling him to contain the 1st Corps south of Bambang until the end of June. Most crucially, he believed that he would be able to retain control of the Junction of Routes 4 and 5 until the end of July, which was essential for his operational strategy. His initial perimeter encompassed the vital Route 11 terminus of the Baguio-Aritao supply road, as well as key locations such as Bessang Pass, Bontoc, Banaue, Oriung Pass, and Santa Fe In his May 5 plan, Yamashita outlined the necessity of holding the Salacsac Pass-Balete Pass line until mid-June while constructing additional defenses between Santa Fe and Bambang. After mid-June, the Japanese forces were to withdraw to a second perimeter, extending through Ambuclao, Mankayan, Sabangan, Bontoc, Oriung Pass, and Bambang, strategically positioning themselves for potential future engagements.

Yamashita understood that these defenses would need to hold until July, when the defenders would be expected to retreat to his last-stand positions centered around Bokod, Mankayan, Polis Pass, the Rayambugan Farm School, and Bambang. He anticipated that the Shobu Group would be compelled to hold their ground until annihilation at these key locations. On April 27, the 103rd Division received orders from the Area Army to transfer its main strength to the Cauayan-Cabagan area, leaving behind only the Yuguchi Detachment 80th Brigade Headquarters in Aparri, which comprised a meager two battalions of nuclear infantry. Yamashita’s plans called for virtually abandoning the Cagayan Valley, temporarily retaining only the 103rd Division, which was significantly outnumbered and equated to less than two American Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs), particularly since the Araki Force was stationed in the Cervantes area.

The primary duty of the 103rd Division would be to gather all available resources in the valley, including rice and livestock such as carabaos, and dispatch these supplies into the Cordillera Central through Bagabag. Once this crucial task was completed, the division would also withdraw into the mountains, aligning with Yamashita’s broader strategic objectives. Yamashita’s decision to abandon the Cagayan Valley made logical sense. He realized that the forces he had remaining could not hold the valley for much longer. Additionally, there seemed little necessity to maintain a strong presence there any further. Initially, he had kept units in the valley to harvest and gather food, deny the Allied Air Forces of the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) the use of airfields for strikes against Formosa and Okinawa, and hold onto Aparri in the hope that supplies and reinforcements might still reach Luzon. However, by early May, Yamashita concluded that the situation at Okinawa was largely resolved, negating any strategic purpose behind holding the valley airfields. The hope for reinforcements had long since faded, and crucially, his troops had already gathered the early rice harvest from the valley. With no new crop expected to come in until late September, Yamashita recognized that he would not be able to harvest this future crop, further solidifying his decision to withdraw. Yamashita also ordered the 79th Brigade to take over the defense of Banaue, while directing the 105th Division to defend both the Magat Valley and the Bato Bridge area against potential airborne attacks. However, by the end of May, the situation deteriorated significantly: Santa Fe had fallen, and the retreat of the 10th Division had devolved into a chaotic rout. This development put the defenders at risk of allowing the enemy to reach Bambang before they could establish any strong delaying positions south of the town.

In response, Yamashita ordered the 10th Division and the 2nd Tank Division to assemble for a defensive stand across Route 5 at Bato Bridge. He also repositioned the 105th Division to the Rayambugan Farm School and directed the 103rd Division to occupy the vacated defenses at Oriung Pass. Despite these strategic maneuvers, time was not on their side. General Krueger wasted no time launching an aggressive pursuit northward, immediately sending the relatively fresh 37th Division to drive straight up Route 5 from Santa Fe to Bagabag. This force was then to swing east through Oriung Pass into the Cagayan Valley, continuing its advance north along Route 5 toward Aparri. To prepare for a larger offensive, Krueger also intended to use the 25th and 33rd Divisions in the initial assault against the Japanese home islands. To this end, he directed the 32nd Division to take over operations in the Baguio area, while the 6th Division was tasked with relieving the 25th at Santa Fe before striking northwest up Route 4 into the deep Cordillera Central, pursuing the Japanese forces further into the mountainous terrain.

Finally, Swift was ordered to execute limited attacks up Route 11 from Baguio, maintain the guerrilla offensive against Cervantes, and deploy the Connolly Task Force to follow Route 3 around the northwest tip of Luzon to secure the Aparri region. Leading the charge, the 129th Regiment of the 37th Division advanced north from Santa Fe on May 31, quickly encountering a reinforced provisional anti-tank unit just south of Aritao. This unit managed to delay the town's capture until June 5. However, the following day, Bambang fell without resistance, and the 129th faced only token opposition at Bato Bridge before ultimately reaching Bayombong on June 7. On June 8, the 145th Regiment took over the lead, and by nightfall, they had seized the crucial junction of Routes 4 and 5 near Bagabag without a fight. Advancing further, the 145th crossed the Magat River on June 9 and pressed toward Oriung Pass, where they rapidly engaged the reinforced 179th Independent Battalion. Although the outgunned and outnumbered defenders valiantly delayed the advance, the 145th pushed through the pass along Route 5 and secured it late on June 12. This breakthrough prompted the bulk of the 103rd Division to decide on a strategic retreat toward the Bontoc-Natonin area, while the remnants of the 4th Air Division abandoned Echague to join this withdrawal. By the evening of June 13, the 145th finally halted its advance at Santiago, while the 148th Regiment worked to neutralize the remaining Japanese positions at Oriung Pass. With these positions secured, the offensive resumed, resulting in the fall of the Echague airbase on June 14, followed by the occupation of Cauayan two days later.

As we can see, neither the 10th Division nor the 2nd Tank Division managed to reach Bagabag in time to impede the American advance; the latter was assembling along the Bambang-Pingkian road. On June 12, the 20th Regiment initiated a southwest drive along this road from Bambang. Two days later, elements of the 126th Regiment began pushing west toward Pingkian from Aritao, thereby applying significant pressure on Iwanaka’s beleaguered troops. Meanwhile, the 10th Division had become hopelessly cut off east of Route 5 and had retreated to the Old Spanish Trail south of Aritao. On June 11, the 25th Division launched a two-pronged attack against this isolated group, forcing General Okamoto’s remnants to retreat eastward deep into the Sierra Madre. In the meantime, General Clarkson dispatched the 130th Regiment up Route 11, where they encountered the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade, which was only capable of weak resistance. Poor weather conditions hindered the 33rd Division's operations in the following days, but by June 15, elements of the 130th Regiment had swung east along the Baguio-Aritao supply road and reached Ambuclao on the Agno River. To the north, Volckmann continued his offensive throughout June, deploying the 121st Regiment to clear Route 4 and secure the northern half of Lamagan Ridge. The 15th Regiment was tasked with advancing to seize Upper Cadsu Ridge and then moving generally northeast along the south side of Route 4. Additionally, the still-arriving 66th Regiment aimed to secure the area south of Butac and swing to the east on the 15th's right flank. As a result, both Lamagan Ridge and Lower Cadsu Ridge were cleared by June 5, with the 15th Regiment then turning its focus toward Upper Cadsu while the 121st Regiment advanced directly toward Bessang Pass.

Volckmann’s Provisional Battalion launched an attack on Magun Hill and, after a series of minor setbacks, succeeded in clearing much of the area by June 10. On that day, the 121st Regiment initiated a final assault toward Bessang Pass, advancing from the west and southwest. The following day, the Provisional Battalion began pressing in from the north and northeast. Meanwhile, the 15th Regiment overran the last organized resistance on Upper Cadsu on June 12, just as the 66th Regiment was reaching the southwestern corner of the ridge. Supported by artillery, the 121st finally overcame the last organized defenses at Bessang Pass on June 14, establishing contact with the Provisional Battalion east of the pass. On the same day, the final pockets of opposition crumbled before the 15th and 66th Regiments south of the pass. Consequently, the remnants of Japanese forces fled east along Route 4 toward Cervantes, pursued by elements of the 15th and 121st Regiments, which successfully secured the town before dark on June 15. During this final offensive, the guerrillas suffered losses of 119 men killed and 120 wounded, while exaggerated estimates placed Japanese losses at around 2,600 killed. At the same time, by mid-June, the guerrilla 11th and 14th Regiments had cleared almost all the valley west of the Cagayan River, stretching from Cauayan north to Aparri. They also gained complete control over Route 11 from Bontoc to the valley, effectively preventing the 103rd Division from joining Yamashita’s last-stand positions. Meanwhile, the Connolly Task Force, after a largely uneventful march, approached Aparri and began an attack on June 11 to clear the last Japanese forces from the area. The last event forcing Yamashita to alter his plans came on 13 June, when the 6th Division's 63d Infantry began probing northwest up Route 4 from Bagabag. The reconnaissance foreshadowed a push that Yamashita especially feared, since Route 4 provided direct access to the deep Cordillera Central. The 105th Division, with defenses across Route 4 at the Rayambugan Farm School, did not have sufficient strength to hold the highway, Yamashita knew.

Recognizing that he could not hope to maintain control along any of the three perimeters he had established in May, Yamashita issued new orders for a strategic withdrawal to a last-stand area. This new perimeter would be set up along the inhospitable valley of the Asin River, positioned between Routes 4 and 11. Accordingly, the orders were as follows: The 105th Division was to retreat from Route 4 to the Pacdan-Antipolo line. The 2nd Tank Division was to move north and hold the line from Tubliao to Antipolo. The 23rd Division was tasked with defending along the Adaoay-Bokod line. The 58th Independent Mixed Brigade was to hold the Agno Valley from Buguias south to Adaoay. The 19th Division was to consolidate the bulk of its forces into the Agno Valley, defending the river line from the Loo Valley south to Buguias. The 79th Brigade was assigned to defend Route 390 at Hapao. Once this last-stand perimeter collapsed, Yamashita planned for all remaining forces to retreat into the barren Asin Valley between Toccucan and Kiangkiang, prepared to fight to the death. The area behind this new last-stand perimeter boasted excellent defensive terrain, and Yamashita estimated that most of his units had sufficient ammunition for machine guns, mortars, and small arms to hold their positions for an extended period. However, the Shobu Group faced dire challenges: they were virtually out of medical supplies, had no clothing stocks, and their food reserves would be completely exhausted by mid-September. If they were not annihilated by the advancing Filipino-American forces, the Shobu Group could only anticipate a slow death by starvation and disease.

Now, it’s time to shift focus from the Philippines and head to Borneo to cover the preparations for the invasion of Balikpapan, codenamed Operation Oboe II. As the 9th Australian Division completed its tasks in North Borneo, General Milford’s 7th Australian Division was assembling at Morotai for the upcoming invasion scheduled for July 1. Milford’s plan entailed an amphibious assault on a two-brigade front between the Klandasan Besar River and Klandasan town, where the Japanese had established their strongest defenses.  In June, it was estimated that approximately 3,900 troops were stationed around Balikpapan, composed of: 1,500 in mobile units. 2,400 in anti-aircraft, air force, and base units. Additionally, there were 1,100 Japanese workers, 2,400 Indonesians, and 1,000 Formosans present. Near Samarinda, it was believed there were about 1,500 troops, plus possibly a battalion that had recently arrived from Tarakan. Experience had demonstrated that when estimating the strength of the enemy's resistance, every Japanese and Formosan, whether part of a fighting unit, base unit, or civilian labor group, had to be regarded as a combatant. Key defensive features included: At least 18 coast-defense guns, primarily located on ridges overlooking the sea. 26 heavy dual-purpose guns and 78 medium and light anti-aircraft guns. Offshore, between Klandasan and Manggar, rows of stout poles were driven into the seabed, horizontally braced with timber, and protected with barbed wire. An almost continuous anti-tank ditch, from 12 to 14 feet wide, extended above the beach from Stalkudo to Sepinggang. Extensive trench systems, with many tunnel openings, were detected on the ridges overlooking Klandasan. Numerous concrete strongpoints and a continuous line of bunkers lined the beach’s fringe. This area was among the most strongly fortified that the Australians had encountered during the war. Indeed, Air Vice-Marshal Bostock, responsible for air support of the landing, cautioned the Prime Minister in a letter that these meticulously prepared defenses might result in Australian casualties comparable to those experienced during the landing at Gallipoli. It appeared that the Japanese had established their main defenses on the slopes overlooking the beaches from Klandasan to Stalkudo. The Australian staff believed the Japanese would attempt to contain the invaders within their beachhead area for as long as possible, before withdrawing inland, either south to Bandjermasin or overland to Bintulu in Sarawak. Additionally, it was anticipated that the enemy would direct burning oil onto the beach unless the oil tanks were destroyed during the preliminary bombardment.

Brigadier Ivan Dougherty’s 21st Brigade was to land with one battalion on Green Beach, while Brigadier Frederick Chilton’s 18th Brigade would go ashore with two battalions on the Yellow and Red Beaches. Once a beachhead was secured, the 18th Brigade would seize the high ground dominating the town and clear the harbor for use, while the 21st Brigade would advance along the coast to capture the airstrips. Additionally, Brigadier Kenneth Eather’s 25th Brigade, held in reserve, was set to land on July 2 with the likely objective of thrusting inland along the Milford Highway. Although Admiral Barbey favored a landing site farther east, possibly at Sepinggang, where their ships could be positioned more safely and further from Japanese coastal defense guns, Milford countered with sound reasoning: “Why land up the coast and have to fight miles through jungle, which suits the enemy, when you can go straight in under heavy supporting fire, which the enemy can't withstand, in comparatively open and favorable country?” Supported by General Morshead, this plan received approval, and by June 16, the 7th Division was successfully assembled at Morotai. Admiral Noble’s Task Force 78 would once again transport the Australian troops to the landing area, supported by Rear-Admiral Ralph Riggs’ cruiser group and Rear-Admiral William Sample’s escort carriers.

Against the Japanese defenses, Admiral Kamada’s 22nd Special Base Force consisted of approximately 3,900 troops, with 1,500 in mobile units and 2,400 in anti-aircraft, air force, and base units, in addition to an estimated 4,500 laborers. In preparation for the invasion, aircraft from the Royal Australian Air Force and the 5th and 13th Air Forces began bombarding enemy defenses and storage tanks on June 4. These attacks intensified a week later as they specifically targeted Japanese gun positions. On June 15, Noble’s minesweepers arrived to clear the sea around Balikpapan of magnetic mines, but faced losses, with three ships sunk and three damaged during the operation. Ten days later, American underwater demolition teams began working to locate and breach the underwater obstacles, often under heavy gunfire. To further confuse the enemy, efforts were made to create the impression that the landing would occur at Manggar. This included spreading rumors, landing a reconnaissance party in that area, and demolishing underwater obstacles at both Manggar and Sepinggang. Finally, on June 26, Noble’s convoy set sail from Morotai. After an uneventful voyage, they reached Balikpapan unmolested just before dawn on July 1. During the morning, Riggs’ cruisers and Noble’s destroyers shelled the landing beaches and the defenses behind them, continuing the bombardment until the first waves of landing craft were within 1,300 yards of the shore, at which point the fire shifted to the flanks and rear of the enemy positions. About an hour before the landing, a combined rocket barrage and low-level airstrike were executed, followed by a second rocket barrage just ten minutes before the troops hit the beaches. In total, during the 20 days leading up to the assault, the Balikpapan-Manggar area received 3,000 tons of bombs, 7,361 rockets, 38,052 shells, and 114,000 rounds from automatic weapons, all aimed at crippling the formidable Japanese defenses. Covered by a successful bombardment, the assault waves finally hit the beaches just before 09:00. However, due to navigation errors, the troops were put ashore at the wrong locations. The 2/27th Battalion landed on Yellow Beach instead of Green Beach and quickly captured the Ration, Romilly, Rottnest, and Charlie's Spur positions. The 2/12th Battalion landed on Red Beach instead of Yellow, necessitating a northeast swing to take over Ration and reduce the remaining Japanese defenses in the area. A platoon was also detached to push inland along Vasey Road to seize Portee, while other elements secured Parkes, Plug, and Blyth’s Junction. The 2/10th Battalion, correctly landing on Red Beach, rapidly seized the high ground in front of them. Patrols found Prudent and Petersham Junction to be unoccupied. The 2/10th then assembled at Petersham Junction and captured the lower slopes of Hill 87, successfully taking the hill under assault by noon. Meanwhile, Dougherty landed his reserve units, which also came ashore further west than expected on Yellow Beach. The 2/16th Battalion quickly assembled at Ravenshoe and captured Record, Pigeon, and Mount Malang. By 11 a.m. the battalion was on Ravenshoe, whence Malang and Pigeon were visible. Advancing under sharp fire Captain Madigan's company on the left took Record about 4 p.m., killing 46 Japanese. At 4.5 Captain R. H. Christian's company launched a concerted attack on Malang, sup-ported by the fire of artillery, mortars and machine-guns, and using a flame-thrower. The hill was taken and 40 Japanese were killed. The Australians lost four killed, including the leading platoon commander, Lieutenant Armstrong, and 14 wounded. By nightfall the 2/16th held a line through Malang, Pigeon and Record. It had lost 6 killed or died of wounds in the day and 24 wounded; 86 Japanese dead had been counted. 

The 2/14th Battalion advanced swiftly to secure a bridgehead over the Klandasan Besar and seized the Stalkudo ridge. The 2/5th Commando Squadron passed through this bridgehead and attacked northeast but encountered heavy opposition. Returning to Hill 87, the 2/10th Battalion assaulted and captured Parramatta in the afternoon, aided by artillery and tanks, while patrols further secured Newcastle and the Cracking Plant by dusk. A patrol led by Sergeant A. A. Evans was sent out from Davey's platoon towards Newcastle. They silenced a bunker with a flame-thrower, and came to a house from which Japanese were firing. They overcame this position with grenades and small arms fire and then moved on to New-castle. As Evans reached Newcastle he saw the surviving Japanese making off towards Portee. Davey's platoon now occupied Newcastle and the other platoon took up positions on Parramatta. The seizure of Parramatta gave the 2/10th observation over the low ground to the north and the northern end of the town, and tied the battalion in with the 2/12th on Portee; the Japanese were now in a very poor position to counter-attack from the western end of the beach-head. Lieutenant Russack of Sanderson's company led a patrol to the Cracking Plant where it silenced a Japanese pill-box. This patrol was strafed by American aircraft, but worse was to follow. At 4.55 American carrier-borne aircraft made a run over Parramatta from the west and dropped bombs and fired rockets across Hill 87, which had then been in the hands of the 2/10th for four hours and a half. Much of this fire landed in the area into which Captain Brocksopp's" company ("D") had moved and where Daly's command post was established. Three were killed, including Lance-Sergeant Hackett, a veteran of several cam-paigns, and 14 wounded, including Major G. R. Miethke and two other officers. Air panels were displayed in all platoon areas after this. Daly decided to hold that night as far forward as Newcastle, on which he placed two platoons plus a platoon of the 2/1st Machine Gun Bat-talion, all under Captain Bowie. In the day the battalion had lost 13 killed and 30 wounded, but 216 Japanese dead were counted. That night 24 more Japanese were killed while trying to penetrate the Australians' positions and no Australian was hit. All night there were fires round about where houses were burning, and the blazing oil tanks on the Tank Plateau 600 yards to the west of the Parramatta ridge lit up the landscape. Finally, Brigadier Chilton also landed the reserve 2/9th Battalion on Red Beach and sent it west in the afternoon to occupy Klandasan town, leading to the capture of Santosa Hill by nightfall. Thus, the Australians successfully landed at Balikpapan and secured a sizable beachhead, marking the beginning of what would become a fierce and challenging battle.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

In June 1945, American forces, led by Generals Eichelberger and Krueger, fought fiercely against Japanese troops in Luzon, achieving significant victories despite heavy resistance. The tide turned as they captured key positions, restoring hope to Filipinos. Meanwhile, preparations for the Balikpapan invasion intensified. The 7th Australian Division readied for an amphibious assault on July 1 against well-fortified Japanese defenses. Despite facing strong opposition, the Australians successfully landed at various beaches, seizing vital ground.

- 188 - Pacific War Podcast - Liberation of Luzon - June 24 - July 1, 1945

Last time we spoke about the victory at Okinawa.. As American forces led by General Buckner advanced, they captured strategic key points, driving the Japanese into a desperate retreat. Despite overwhelming odds, the remaining Japanese defenders, embodying the samurai spirit, fought to the bitter end, hoping to gain time for their homeland's defenses. On June 21, faced with inevitable defeat, Generals Ushijima and Cho chose to commit seppuku in honor of their duty. Their tragic decision underscored the deep commitment to their cause, an adherence to the warrior code. By this point, countless Japanese soldiers surrendered, acknowledging the futility of their fight. As the month drew to a close, the Americans secured Okinawa, a hard-won victory shadowed by staggering casualties, more than 107,000 Japanese lives lost and significant American losses. This battle not only symbolized the relentless spirit of those who fought but also the tragic costs of war, forever etched in history as a vivid reminder of sacrifice and the haunting price of conflict.

This episode is Liberation of Luzon

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

For most, the battle of Okinawa basically ends the Pacific War, but the truth is the war was raging all over the place. The second most noticeable place would be Luzon, where the remnants of General Yamashit’as 14th Area Army were still resisting in the northern and eastern mountain ranges. Yet here too, the curtains were beginning to fall.

As we last left off, it was mid-April 1945, and the fierce struggle for the liberation of Luzon was reaching a critical phase. General Eichelberger’s 8th Army was actively engaged in offensives across the Visayas and Mindanao, while General Krueger’s 6th Army focused its might on two primary sectors in Luzon. The stakes were high, the liberation of Luzon was crucial for securing Manila and restoring the Filipino government that had been disrupted by the war. In the northern sector, General Swift’s 1st Corps was grappling with General Yamashita’s formidable Shobu Group, who were entrenched in this mountainous terrain, making the fighting particularly arduous. Meanwhile, General Hall’s 11th Corps was applying relentless pressure on the opposing Shimbu Group, led by General Yokoyama, in the vital areas east of Manila. Starting in the northern reaches of Luzon, we find General Clarkson’s 33rd Division making tangible advances, having secured Route 11 up to Camp 3, as well as segments of the Galiano Road and the Tuba Trail. This area, known for its treacherous paths and thick jungle, posed significant challenges, but the troops pressed on. Northward, General Beightler’s 37th Division was also on the move, with its 129th Regiment overcoming all enemy resistance along Route 9, reaching the critical town of Sablan by April 14. Not to be overlooked, Colonel Volckmann’s guerrilla 121st Regiment had carved a path up Route 4 to the strategically important Bessang Pass, known for its rugged terrain that offers a natural defense. General Mullins’ 25th Division was making notable progress towards Balete Pass, gaining crucial footholds on Crump Hill and Myoko Ridge. These positions were essential as they provided elevated vantage points over the surrounding valleys. On the western front, General Gill’s 32nd Division had successfully secured the western Salacsac Pass but still faced stiff enemy positions in the eastern pass, where Japanese forces were well-prepared to defend. With the arrival of the bulk of the 37th Division in early April, Swift was poised to launch a dynamic two-division drive towards Baguio, a city nestled in the mountains that had become a strategic goal due to its position and resources. While Clarkson’s units continued to engage in patrol actions in the Arboredo, Agno, and Ambayabang River valleys, there was limited progress in these areas. However, the 129th Regiment initiated a decisive attack on Sablan on April 11, successfully breaching Japanese defenses there by April 14. On that pivotal day, the 148th Regiment took charge of securing Route 9 through Calot, a vital corridor for advancing troops. Meanwhile, the 130th Regiment encountered fierce resistance as it pushed west of Asin along the Galiano Road, exemplifying the tenacity of Japanese forces determined to hold their ground.

As the battle raged, General Yamashita was already strategizing to evacuate Baguio. By April 19, he made the decision to relocate to the Bambang front, leaving Major-General Utsunomiya Naokata, one of his trusted chiefs of staff, in command of the remaining forces.  Despite the growing pressure on Route 9, the Japanese command seemed out of touch by the second week of April 1945. They inaccurately assessed that the primary thrust of General Swift's 1st Corps would come along Route 11, allowing them to become complacent. This misplaced confidence led to a failure to redeploy troops to counter the increasing threat on their right flank. Instead of fortifying their defenses, they appeared to adopt an inexplicable, almost defeatist attitude, unusual for a military as disciplined as the Imperial Japanese Army. Compounding this lack of urgency was the intense effort from the 14th Area Army headquarters to evacuate civilians and supplies from Baguio, a city perched high in the Cordillera Central mountain range. This evacuation served as a clear signal that the situation was deteriorating, yet the Japanese command remained strangely passive. Yamashita's mindset regarding the unfolding crisis was evident when he made personal preparations to depart for the Bambang front on April 19. In a move echoing his earlier strategy for the Bambang area, he established an independent command for the Baguio front before his departure. Utsunomiya's responsibilities also included nominal command over the 19th Division, stationed north of Baguio, but his control was hampered by significant communication difficulties that plagued the Japanese forces. The first notable action Utsunomiya took was to relieve the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade from the 23rd Division's control, seeking to streamline command. Under Yamashita’s directive to hold Baguio for as long as possible before retreating to a new defensive line, Utsunomiya issued an order for all troops along the existing Main Line of Resistance  "hold out to the last man." His tone betrayed the grim reality, coming across as almost ironic given the mounting pressures they faced.

Meanwhile, General Sato’s 58th Independent Mixed Brigade was frantically working to fortify defenses along Route 9, southeast of Calot. However, their efforts came too late to prevent the 148th Regiment from swiftly capturing Yagyagan on April 15, gaining a crucial foothold in the area. In response to this setback, Sato began sending reinforcements to the Irisan Gorge starting April 16, apparently under Utsunomiya's orders. This narrow, treacherous gorge, surrounded by steep cliffs, was seen as a pivotal point for a last-ditch defense. The Japanese troops managed to repel the initial assaults from the 148th Regiment on April 17, but as night fell, the Americans executed a series of enveloping maneuvers, ultimately securing Ridge A. The following morning, the 148th seized Ridge C; however, their frontal assaults against Ridge B were met with fierce resistance and ended in failure.

On April 19, the tide began to turn. After a devastating air strike and concentrated artillery fire that neutralized most of the Japanese positions on Ridge F, the Americans finally captured Ridge B. Concurrently, other American units seized Hills D and E, effectively cutting off the Japanese retreat route. The relentless pressure continued, and the next day, Ridges F and G were subjected to intense attacks, which ultimately resulted in their capture. This relentless campaign forced the Japanese to withdraw to Ridge H, where they continued to regroup. After heavy bombardment, the Irisan Gorge was finally cleared on April 21, sending the surviving defenders scrambling in retreat. As these operations unfolded, the 130th Regiment was busy repositioning two battalions from the Galiano Road to the junction of the Yagyagan Trail along Route 9, poised to mount a coordinated attack on Asin from both the east and west. On April 22, they launched their offensive, catching the Japanese defenders by surprise and effectively dismantling their defenses. By the afternoon of April 23, the Galiano Road was opened for American forces, marking a significant advancement in their campaign.

Concurrently, the 129th Regiment had taken over operations from the 148th Regiment and advanced against only scattered resistance, making significant progress as far southeast as the junction of the highway and the Galiano Road. However, their advance was ultimately halted due to concerns about a potential threat from the north. Seizing on this hesitation, General Utsunomiya decided to leave small delaying forces at Trinidad and Baguio, while initiating a general withdrawal to the north and northeast. With Utsunomiya's defensive lines weakened, American patrols were able to enter Baguio on April 24, met with surprisingly little resistance. By April 26, the 129th had effectively secured most of the city, facing only negligible opposition. Simultaneously, elements from the 123rd and 130th Regiments worked diligently to eliminate the remaining Japanese defenses on nearby Mount Calugong, along the Tuba Trail, and on Mount Mirador, ensuring the area was cleared for further American operations. Despite these American successes, Utsunomiya managed to escape with approximately 10,000 troops to the Baguio-Aritao supply road, a crucial evacuation route for Japanese forces. As the end of April approached and into the first days of May, the 37th Division continued to mop up the surrounding areas, further securing Trinidad. Meanwhile, the 33rd Division also pressed forward, capturing the Balinguay-Itogon-Pitican sector, enhancing their control over the region. Looking eastward, General Gill’s demoralized 32nd Division was still engaged in fierce fighting through the Salacsac Pass, hampered in their advance along the Villa Verde Trail. 

During the second week of April 1945, observers from the 6th Army headquarters reported alarming morale issues within the 32nd Division, echoing concerns that General Krueger had personally noted during previous visits to the front lines. The soldiers of the 126th and 128th Regiments were on the brink of complete mental and physical exhaustion. Front-line troops, many of whom had spent significant time overseas, were becoming overly cautious, possibly from the toll of constant combat. Conversations among the men frequently centered around one urgent topic: their rotation back to the United States. The once aggressive spirit characteristic of these combat troops was waning rapidly. With dwindling numbers and pervasive personnel issues, it was clear that the division would struggle to mount any spectacular gains in the coming days. If they couldn’t quicken their pace along the critical Villa Verde Trail, reaching their objective, Santa Fe, by the targeted date of June 1 appeared increasingly unlikely. Delays would be catastrophic; they risked being trapped on the trail by the heavy rains of the impending wet season, which typically began in late May. Such circumstances would severely hinder their ability to withdraw and salvage their equipment from the treacherous mountainous terrain. Meanwhile, the Japanese forces retained key terrain advantages, allowing them to economically utilize their troops and reinforce their front lines almost at will. In stark contrast, the rugged landscape severely restricted the 32nd Division’s maneuverability, forcing them to repeatedly launch costly frontal assaults with their diminishing strength. While terrain and weather conditions presented significant challenges, the growing personnel crisis loomed as a critical factor likely to further limit the division's progress in the days ahead. Compounding their challenges, General Iwanaka’s reconstituted 2nd Tank Division had suffered heavy casualties, leaving General Konuma unable to provide further reinforcements. On April 17, the rested 127th Regiment finally began its move to relieve the beleaguered 128th Regiment at the western pass, launching operations to clear the last remnants of Japanese forces from the Hill 506-507 area. Although Hill 506B fell rapidly on April 19, and Hill 507C was captured three days later, American forces struggled to completely clear Hill 507D until May 2, underscoring the tenacity of the Japanese defenders.

Despite the challenges, enough ground had been cleared by April 26 for the 2nd Battalion to initiate a drive east along and south of the Villa Verde Trail, aiming for the strategically important Hill 508. The Japanese forces, sensing this new threat, responded with fierce counterattacks from both the east and north, managing to delay the American capture of Hill 508 until April 29. The intense fighting illustrated the importance of this elevation, which offered vital visibility over the surrounding landscapes. In the days that followed, the 2nd Battalion expanded its control over Hill 508, establishing a defensive block on the Villa Verde Trail to the north while successfully repelling a series of heavy Japanese counterattacks. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion made significant strides by attacking and capturing Hill 509, further consolidating American positions in the area. Simultaneously, the 2nd Battalion of the 126th Regiment launched an offensive south from Hill 511, seizing Hill 515 on April 24. They advanced into the area north of Hill 508 while the 1st Battalion navigated through the rugged terrain of Hills 513 and 514, pressing southward to Hill 516. Their advance culminated in the capture of the crest of Hill 525, where they established a critical block on the Villa Verde Trail. However, the cost of these advances was significant. Due to the heavy losses incurred during these operations, the barely rested 128th Regiment began the process of relieving the exhausted 126th on May 3. Shortly after, the 128th's 2nd Battalion launched an assault southeast, successfully capturing Hill 526 on May 7, while some elements initiated a drive towards Hill 527. To the further east, General Mullins’ 25th Division was persistently pushing its Santa Fe offensive against stubborn Japanese resistance. In a stroke of fortune, a successful aerial reconnaissance mission revealed that ground located just 1,000 yards west of their position might offer a more favorable route of advance to Balete Ridge, providing a welcome alternative to the challenging Myoko mass itself.

On April 22, a reconnaissance force from the 27th Regiment successfully moved undetected to the southern slope of Balete Ridge, positioning themselves for a critical advance. The following day, the rest of the 2nd Battalion began to push toward Lone Tree Hill, while other units continued to exert pressure on the entrenched Japanese defenses at Myoko. Moving forward with enthusiasm and encountering negligible resistance, the Americans reached Lone Tree Hill on April 25, effectively bypassing the main concentrations of enemy forces. By April 27, the 2nd Battalion had advanced an impressive half mile beyond Lone Tree Hill, with its forward elements only three-quarters of a mile from Balete Pass. However, they were compelled to halt their advance due to the potential threat of an enemy counterattack looming on the horizon. Meanwhile, on April 23, the 35th Regiment began its ascent up Kapintalan Ridge, steadily making progress despite the challenging terrain. By April 27, their leading troops had reached a prominent knob located midway between Route 5 and Lone Tree Hill. The 161st Regiment was also making strides, continuing its attack northward towards Kembu Ridge, where they successfully secured Hill 4625 and the entirety of Highley Ridge by April 28. On that same day, the 27th Regiment began reinforcing their positions on Lone Tree Hill, while elements of the 2nd Battalion initiated a southwest push along Kapintalan Ridge to support the 35th Regiment advancing up Route 5. However, they encountered a formidable strongpoint and were only able to gain 350 yards of new ground northeast from the knob. Simultaneously, elements of the 27th Regiment advanced a modest 500 yards southwest by May 4, indicating the ongoing struggle. That morning, the 1st Battalion of the 161st Regiment seized the southeastern nose of Kembu Ridge, securing a valuable tactical position. At the same time, the 2nd Battalion pushed troops onto the ridge, extending their reach half a mile to the northwest, further consolidating American control in the area.

As a breakthrough appeared imminent, General Krueger began dispatching Beightler’s 37th Division to the Bambang front on May 2, with all elements of the division departing the Baguio area just three days later. With these reinforcements securing his rear and taking control of the Myoko massif, General Mullins ordered the 27th and 161st Regiments to concentrate their forces for a coordinated attack aimed at enveloping Balete Pass from both the east and west. On May 5, the 161st swiftly broke through Kembu Ridge and advanced to Haruna Ridge, while the 27th Regiment pushed west-northwest along Wolfhound Ridge. However, they faced fierce resistance, gaining only 350 yards against tenacious Japanese defenders. On May 8, Company I successfully launched a southwest offensive from their stronghold along a bare-crested ridge, while Company A deployed on Kenbu Ridge and began ascending the final sections of the Digdig River gorge. The following day, these two companies finally made contact with each other and linked up with the 161st on Haruna Ridge. By May 10, Wolfhound Ridge was secured, coinciding with elements of the 35th Regiment completing the clearance of Route 5 from Kapintalan to the pass. In the meantime, the 35th Regiment, along with units from the 27th, continued their assault on Kapintalan Ridge, which was ultimately secured by May 13. Meanwhile, the 148th Regiment renewed its attacks on Myoko Ridge, where Japanese resistance began to collapse by May 11. With these gains, Balete Pass was now secure. The Americans had incurred 565 men killed and 1,745 wounded during the drive, while General Okamoto’s 10th Division experienced catastrophic losses, with nearly 7,000 men killed and a complete breakdown of their control and communications.

Reflecting on the situation in Salacsac, by May 8, the Japanese position was deteriorating rapidly. In response, General Iwanaka made the critical decision to dispatch troops aimed at cutting the supply line to the 2nd Battalion of the 128th Regiment, with the intention of safeguarding his main stronghold at Mount Imugan. On that day, the 1st Battalion of the 128th Regiment began to push eastward, facing strong resistance, while elements of the 2nd Battalion moved west from Hill 526, struggling to make any significant progress. By May 10, Japanese forces successfully severed the track between Hills 525 and 516, forcing much of the 128th and one battalion of the 127th Regiment to allocate considerable resources to eliminate the Japanese pocket that had formed in that area. Meanwhile, the 33rd Division was left disheartened as it found itself assigned a holding mission to secure the Baguio-Bauang-San Fernando area. Their operations were limited to minor local gains and long-range reconnaissance, which did little to impact the overall situation. 

During May 1945, the only significant action undertaken by the 33rd Division took place along a trail connecting Santa Rosa in the Ambayabang Valley to Tebbo, located on the Agno River five miles south of Pitican. The division focused its efforts on clearing Japanese forces from the high ground situated between the main trail and the upper reaches of the Ambayabang Valley. On May 9, a battalion of the 130th Regiment advanced south from Baguio via Pitican and reached Tebbo, only to find the barrio abandoned. Meanwhile, on May 5, the 136th Regiment began its advance up the Ambayabang Valley. Approximately three miles south of Tebbo, they became embroiled in a ten-day battle, resulting in the deaths of a few hundred Japanese troops. However, these enemy forces posed little threat to the 33rd Division, their primary mission being to block American attacks toward the Baguio-Aritao supply road from the south. As the rainy season approached, 1st Corps and the 33rd Division had long since abandoned plans to use the valley as a route of advance against the Japanese supply lines. Consequently, the 136th Regiment relinquished the terrain it had gained along the valley and the trail to Tebbo almost immediately after capturing it. By May 15, all troops of the 33rd Division began their withdrawal, a challenging task compounded by heavy rains that had transformed the Pitican-Tebbo trail and the trails in the Ambayabang Valley into quagmires. The final destruction of the Japanese blocking force in the valley had little impact on the strategic plans or dispositions of 1st Corps or the Shobu Group, as the Japanese quickly replenished their outposts. By the end of May, the 33rd Division was left executing reconnaissance missions without significant enemy contact or major advances. The division remained in a state of restless anticipation, awaiting developments on the Bontoc and Bambang fronts before the 6th Army would authorize a new drive deeper into the rugged mountains of northern Luzon.

Turning to the north, the guerrilla 121st Regiment achieved a significant victory on April 21 by overrunning the last Japanese positions on Lamagan Ridge. About a week later, they completed their occupation of Lower Cadsu. However, during the first part of May, the 121st Regiment faced formidable challenges as they advanced over steep terrain against increasingly fortified Japanese defenses, bolstered by reinforcements from General Ozaki’s 19th Division. In the south, Hall’s 11th Corps made good progress throughout mid-April, successfully pushing General Yokoyama’s 41st Army, previously known as the Shimbu Group, further east from Manila. Concurrently, General Hurdis’ 6th Division continued its offensive against the Kobayashi Detachment at Wawa Dam, achieving a notable success by securing the crest of Mount Mataba on April 17, marking a significant tactical gain in the ongoing battle.

Despite General Hurdis’ hopes to swiftly advance against Mount Pacawagan and Wawa Dam, persistent personnel issues forced him to halt any offensive actions until the 145th Regiment could relieve the 20th Regiment in the Montalban area. The 145th eventually began its assault on Pacawagan on April 21. However, even with effective supporting fire that destroyed much of the enemy's defenses, American forces struggled to secure a foothold on the mountain until the end of the month. Meanwhile, the 1st and 63rd Regiments continued to hold their occupied ground until they were relieved late in April by the 151st and 152nd Regiments of General Chase’s 38th Division, which then officially assumed control of the offensive operations. In the southern part of Manila, significant water supply problems prompted General Hall to redeploy General Wing’s 43rd Division northward in preparation for an offensive against Ipo Dam. 

By mid-April 1945, an acute water shortage had developed within the city of Manila. General MacArthur informed General Krueger about the dire situation, noting that south of the Pasig River, Manila had access to no water sources except for that supplied by Army tank trucks and shallow, often contaminated wells. This shortage significantly hampered sewage disposal throughout the city, as water pressure from the overtaxed Novaliches Reservoir, the only reliable source was insufficient to carry off waste. As a result, flush toilets were frequently clogged, forcing many citizens to resort to using gutters and esteros for defecation. Restaurants and nightclubs, which were heavily frequented by off-duty American troops, struggled to maintain even minimum sanitary standards. The situation was exacerbated by a steady influx of military units and civilians into the metropolitan area, raising concerns about the imminent threat of severe epidemics breaking out in the city.

On April 19, MacArthur suggested to Krueger that the 6th Army could resolve Manila’s water supply crisis by seizing "the reservoir in the Montalban area." He inquired how soon the installation could be captured. This query puzzled Krueger, who was aware that the only true reservoirs linked to the Manila water system were located west of the Marikina River and had been under American control since February. Furthermore, Krueger understood that Wawa Dam, the nearest water supply installation to Montalban, was no longer connected to the metropolitan system. He subsequently asked MacArthur if by "reservoir in the Montalban area," he meant Ipo Dam, the only major water installation still in Japanese hands. Krueger’s question seemingly led to further examination of Manila’s water system at General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area (GHQ SWPA). On April 22, MacArthur radioed back to Krueger, confirming that Ipo Dam was indeed the preferred objective. He emphasized that capturing the Ipo installation would effectively solve Manila’s water supply problems. Upon receiving this directive, Krueger ordered the 11th Corps to launch a drive on Ipo Dam as soon as possible.

This shift in forces meant the 112th Cavalry Regiment had to move south to take over the vacated positions. General Wing conducted a reconnaissance-in-force that revealed the Kawashima Force’s defenses south of Route 52 were considerably weaker than those around the main highway. In light of this intelligence, the plan for assault was set into motion. On the night of May 6, the 103rd Regiment was ordered to advance towards Mount Katitinga and prepare to attack the dam. Supporting this effort, the 172nd Regiment would strike across a two-mile-wide front to the left of the 103rd towards the dam, while the 169th Regiment was tasked with demonstrating along Route 52 to pin down Japanese forces in the Bigti region. Additionally, Marking's Fil-American Yay Regiment at Norzagaray was to make a feint drive eastward north of the Angat River, targeting Mount Kabuyao.

During the first three days of May, General Chase conducted probing attacks in preparation for a concerted offensive aimed at Wawa Dam, which was set to begin on May 4. Simultaneously, General Yokoyama observed what he believed to be a slowdown in enemy progress, leading him to conclude that American forces must be redeploying northward or evacuating from Luzon entirely. This prompted him to prepare a limited counteroffensive, consisting of a series of harassing and delaying actions designed to pin down enemy forces on this front. Consequently, Yokoyama was not anticipating a major offensive on May 4. However, on that day, the 145th Regiment managed to gain up to 1,000 yards along the northern and northeastern slopes of Pacawagan, while the 152nd Regiment advanced approximately 500 yards northward along Woodpecker Ridge. Although these territorial gains were not monumental, Yokoyama became increasingly concerned about the strength of the American attacks and made the urgent decision to launch his counteroffensive. As Japanese forces hurried to reposition for their counterattacks, the 145th Regiment struck eastward, successfully seizing the rocky summit of Mount Binicayan. Meanwhile, the 152nd continued its efforts along Woodpecker Ridge. This coordinated assault completely surprised General Kobayashi’s troops, rendering their planned counterattack impossible as they were forced to shift their focus to defending their critical positions. In the southern sector, General Kawashima dispatched one battalion toward Montalban; however, the heavy air assaults that preceded Wing’s offensive made it impossible for the Japanese unit to organize effectively for their attack. Adding to the Japanese troubles, the remnants of the Noguchi Force were unable to provide any significant reinforcements. Despite the surprise and disarray among the Japanese defenders, they could not prevent the 145th from capturing the crest of Binicayan on May 9. The troops stationed on Woodpecker Ridge experienced some success by halting the advance of the 152nd and initiated a week of increasingly aggressive dawn and dusk raids starting on May 14.

Recognizing the futility of the ongoing conflict, which had resulted in over 1,300 Japanese casualties, General Yokoyama ordered an immediate withdrawal of all units involved on May 15. However, these orders would not reach the front lines until a week later. In the meantime, capitalizing on the element of surprise achieved during the night attack on May 6, General Wing launched an offensive that made excellent progress. The 103rd Regiment rapidly gained control of the western slopes of Katitinga and advanced swiftly along the ridgeline toward Hill 1000. Meanwhile, the 172nd Regiment reached the foot of a rocky ridge two miles southeast of Bigti, and the Marking Regiment encountered no resistance as it marched over seven miles eastward, ultimately halting just a mile and a half northwest of Kabuyao. The only significant resistance encountered occurred at Hill 535, where elements of a guerrilla unit were repelled by Japanese defenders. The unexpectedly weak Japanese opposition prompted the 43rd Division to sustain its offensive momentum without pause. By May 11, the 103rd had secured Hills 805 and 810, while the 172nd was probing Japanese defenses on Fork Ridge and advancing to the southwestern slopes of rocky Hill 815. The Marking Regiment had successfully overrun Kabuyao, though they were unable to capture Four-Corner Hill. At this point, Japanese resistance began to stiffen as American forces clashed with General Kawashima’s main defenses. In response, Wing ordered the 169th Regiment to mount a limited attack on Osboy Ridge and directed the Marking guerrillas to launch a strong assault toward Ipo. Supported by artillery, Colonel Marcus Augustin succeeded in breaking through Four-Corner Hill on May 12, marking a critical turning point in the offensive.

Unaware of Kawashima’s precarious situation, Yokoyama directed the Kawashima Force to initiate a new counterattack against the left and left rear of the 38th Division, deeming the situation for the Kobayashi Force to be more critical. As a result, Kawashima was compelled to divert one battalion for this unnecessary assault, which weakened the Japanese defenses. This strategic miscalculation enabled General Wing to make significant gains on May 13, with the 103rd Regiment capturing Hill 860, the 172nd clearing much of Hill 815, and the Marking guerrillas seizing the summit of Hill 803. The extent of these advances prompted Kawashima to ultimately disregard Yokoyama’s orders and recall his assault battalion. This battalion promptly mounted a counterattack against the Americans in a futile attempt to regain lost ground, managing only to restrict the 103rd and 172nd Regiments to minor gains on May 14. Simultaneously, Colonel Augustin’s patrols crossed the Angat River unopposed, discovering that the dam remained intact and the powerhouse on the south bank was largely undamaged. However, the patrol force, too weak to hold these installations, retreated before dawn to the crest of Hill 803, where the remainder of the regiment was occupied with mopping up remaining resistance. Looking further south, General Griswold’s 14th Corps had already secured most of southern Luzon and had successfully landed General MacNider’s 158th Regiment in the Bicol Peninsula. In response, the remnants of the Fuji Force and the depleted Kogure Detachment decided to evacuate the open Santa Maria Valley, opting to retreat to more defensible positions at the Kapatalin Sawmill. This allowed Griswold to move the 7th and 8th Cavalry Regiments into the valley, with the former beginning a drive along Route 455 on May 6.

Following a heavy air and artillery bombardment, the cavalrymen launched their assault on the sawmill on May 9 and swiftly overran the enemy defenses by mid-afternoon. After a brief pause to reorganize, the 7th Cavalry advanced up Route 455, leaving their vehicles behind, and reached Lamon Bay by May 13. Meanwhile, on the Bicol Peninsula, progress had been agonizingly slow throughout late April. It wasn’t until April 28 that the Cituinan Hills were fully secured, leading to the collapse of organized Japanese resistance in the region. Following this, the 158th Regiment began moving northwestward toward Iriga and San Agustin, rapidly overrunning the remaining weak enemy positions along Route 1. Progress continued to be painfully slow, and it was not until 28 April that organized Japanese resistance finally collapsed. The task of clearing the Cituinan Hills cost the 158th Infantry approximately 40 men killed and 235 wounded; the Japanese lost almost 700 men killed in the region. Although the 158th RCT did not know it, the reduction of the Cituinan Hills marked the end of large-scale organized resistance on the Bicol Peninsula, where no more than 1,400 Japanese remained alive as of the end of April. Simultaneously, the 5th Cavalry Regiment captured Calauag on April 14 and began a two-pronged advance toward San Agustin by the end of the month. On May 2, San Agustin was finally taken as elements of both regiments converged there. Guerrillas had informed XIV Corps, which acquired control of the 158th RCT on 22 April, that a Japanese force of some 2,500 men was dug in along the slopes of Mt. Isarog, an extinct volcano centering eight miles northeast of San Agustin. This report the 5th Cavalry and 158th Infantry proved false in a series of patrol actions between 2 and 15 May. The next day, the 16th, General MacNider radioed to General Griswold that the Bicol Peninsula was secure and that no signs of organized Japanese resistance remained. The two regiments continued patrolling for some weeks until, on 6 June, the 5th Cavalry returned to southern Luzon. The 158th RCT busied itself with the problem of reorganizing and equipping guerrilla forces and in mid-June turned over responsibility for further mopping up to the Filipinos. To that time the operations to clear the Bicol Peninsula had cost the USArmy units involved approximately 95 men killed and 475 wounded. The Japanese had lost over 2,800 killed and 565 captured, including 350 Formosan labor troops whom the Japanese Army had left to fend for themselves.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

In June 1945, amidst the Pacific War, American forces sought to liberate Luzon from General Yamashita's entrenched troops. Under Generals Eichelberger and Krueger, the 8th Army faced fierce resistance in the mountains and vital routes. As Japanese defenders struggled, the Americans advanced strategically, leading to fierce battles across treacherous terrain.  The turning point came with the seizure of Baguio, crucial for the campaign.

- 187 - Pacific War Podcast - Victory at Okinawa - June 17 - 24, 1945

Last time we spoke about the North Borneo Offensive. General Buckner's 10th Army captured strategic locations, including Shuri Castle, marking a turning point. Simultaneously, General Eichelberger's forces liberated Mindanao, overcoming tough Japanese defenses in the mountainous terrain. As they approached Malaybalay, fierce resistance resulted in heavy casualties, but the Americans persisted, inflicting significant losses on their foes. By June 9, the Americans pressed further into the enemy's defensive lines, leading to intense combat. The Marines landed on the Oroku Peninsula, where fierce fighting revealed the tenacity of the Japanese defenders. General Ushijima prepared for a final stand, as American forces began to encircle and dismantle Japanese positions. As the campaign unfolded, Australians under Brigadier Whitehead launched the North Borneo Offensive, landing on Tarakan and swiftly pushing the Japanese into the rugged interior. 

This episode is Victory at Okinawa

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Okinawa was more than just a battlefield; it became a symbol of sacrifice, the last heroic stand of a fading empire. By this point in the war, Japan was facing inevitable defeat, yet their resolve remained unbroken. They clung to the samurai spirit, determined to fight to the bitter end out of honor and duty. The stakes were high. Japan needed precious time to fortify its home islands, to stretch the conflict as long as possible. To achieve this, over 100,000 brave souls were sent into the fray, sacrificing their lives to slow the American advance and inflict as many casualties as they could. As we've explored in previous episodes, this fierce determination fueled their resistance. And now, we stand at a pivotal moment, the final days of the Battle of Okinawa, the last major confrontation of the Pacific War.

As we last left the battlefield, it was June 16, General Buckner’s 10th Army had made significant strides, capturing most of southern Okinawa and finally breaking through the last major enemy defenses at the Yaeju Dake-Yuza Dake Escarpment. The remnants of General Ushijima’s 32nd Army were now locked in a desperate fight to hold onto the Kiyamu Peninsula, slowly being pushed back toward the sea and their ultimate demise. The following day, June 17, the assault continued with renewed determination. General Geiger’s 3rd Amphibious Corps pressed on through Kunishi Ridge, while General Hodge’s 24th Corps worked to consolidate its hard-won gains in the escarpment. On the west coast, General Shepherd’s 6th Marine Division took action as Colonel Roberts’ 22nd Marines stepped in to relieve the weary 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines at the northern slope of Mezado Ridge. With a fierce spirit, they began to push southward, successfully securing most of the ridge.

To the east, General Del Valle’s 1st Marine Division forged ahead. Colonel Snedeker’s fresh 3rd Battalion took over from the exhausted 1st Battalion and advanced 1,400 yards to seize the high ground just east of Mezado. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines fought hard to capture the remaining positions of Kunishi Ridge, achieving only a gradual extension to the east. Colonel Griebel’s 3rd Battalion moved in behind them to reinforce the isolated Marines, bravely fending off a fierce counterattack under the cover of night. Further east, Colonel Dill’s 382nd Regiment systematically eliminated the last enemy positions in the Yuza-Ozato-Yuza Dake area, while Colonel Halloran’s 381st Regiment held firm and maintained their lines. In a key maneuver, Colonel Pachler’s 17th Regiment launched a successful assault, capturing Hill 153 before Colonel Green’s 184th Regiment took over during the night. Lastly, Colonel Finn’s 32nd Regiment secured the reverse slopes of Hill 115, preparing to launch an attack on Mabuni and Hill 89. By nightfall, Hodge’s 24th Corps had firmly secured all the commanding heights of the Yaeju Dake-Yuza Dake Escarpment. Most of Mezado Ridge and Kunishi Ridge were now in American hands, and Colonel Wallace’s 8th Marines had landed in the rear to bolster the western push. For the first time, American forces across the line looked down upon nearly eight square miles of enemy-held territory, a staggering view of what lay ahead.

Realizing they were forced from their last defensive positions and that their destruction was imminent, the 32nd Army began to unravel, collapsing into chaos. On June 18, Hodge’s troops seized the opportunity to strike decisively. The 32nd Regiment advanced down the coast toward Mabuni, facing increasing resistance. The 184th Regiment moved down the reverse slopes of Hill 153, closing in on Medeera, while the 381st Regiment speedily crossed the plateau, tackling scattered enemy fire to seize the high ground just 400 yards north of Medeera. Simultaneously, Dill’s 3rd Battalion crashed through a rugged maze of caves and pillboxes, making a daring 600-yard advance to the base of the rocky ridge north of Aragachi. To the west, Griebel’s 1st Battalion circled the eastern end of Kunishi Ridge, battling heavy resistance to gain the lower slopes of Hill 79. Further west, Roberts’ 2nd Battalion pushed through the 3rd and aimed for Kuwanga Ridge, successfully seizing an 1,800-yard stretch by late afternoon. As they advanced, the 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines moved forward to occupy the eastern end of the ridge. Meanwhile, the remainder of the 22nd Marines began to mop up the remnants of resistance on Mezado Ridge. Tragedy struck when Colonel Roberts was tragically killed by a sniper near his observation post during this operation. Lieutenant-Colonel August Larson would succeed him in command. Sadly, Roberts would not be the only American commander to fall that day.

In the heart of the Marine line, the 8th Marines were finally called into action in the morning to relieve the weary 7th Marines. After a rigorous artillery bombardment to soften up the enemy defenses, Wallace’s 2nd Battalion began its advance south toward the Kuwanga-Makabe Road, successfully capturing the high ground just north of the road by late afternoon. Meanwhile, General Buckner decided to visit Wallace’s command post on Mezado Ridge around midday. He observed the 8th Marines’ steady progress in the valley, taking stock of their relentless push forward. Tragically, as he was leaving the observation post, disaster struck. Five artillery shells rained down, one striking a coral outcrop near him. The jagged shards of coral filled the air, and Buckner was mortally wounded in the chest. He died within minutes, just days shy of achieving his goal: the complete capture of Okinawa.

With Buckner's passing, General Geiger, as the senior troop commander, took over temporary command of the 10th Army for the remainder of the battle. Buckner became the highest-ranking American military officer killed in World War II and would hold that somber distinction throughout the entire 20th century. On June 18, the final written order from General Ushijima of the 32nd Army outlined a daring escape plan. He designated an officer to lead the "Blood and Iron Youth Organization," tasked with conducting guerrilla warfare once organized combat had ceased. Simultaneously, he ordered his remaining troops to make their way to the northern mountains of Okinawa, where a small band of guerrillas was rumored to be operating.  In his message he congratulated them on fulfilling their "assigned mission in a manner which leaves nothing to regret." He urged them to "fight to the last and die for the eternal cause of loyalty to the Emperor."

This movement was not to happen in haste. Soldiers were instructed to travel in small groups of two to five over the course of several days. They were urged to don civilian clothes and avoid confrontation whenever possible. In a clever stratagem, most of the army staff officers were directed to leave the command post disguised as native Okinawans, aiming to infiltrate American lines and find safety in northern Okinawa. Some individuals, like Colonel Yahara, were entrusted with the mission of reaching Japan to report to the Imperial General Headquarters. Others were tasked with organizing guerrilla operations, focusing on harassing the rear areas of the 10th Army and Island Command, determined to continue the fight against the American forces in any way they could. Again I have read Yahara’s book on the battle of Okinawa and despite being full of apologetic stuff and attempts to make himself look better, its one of the most insightful books on the Japanese perspective. You get a lot of information on how bad it was for the Okinawan civilians in caves, harrowing stuff. I highly recommend it.

The American attack pressed on into June 19, though it faced delays due to the influx of civilian and military prisoners. Not all of the 32nd Army survivors were imbued with a will "to die for the eternal cause of loyalty to the Emperor." Loudspeakers mounted on tanks in the 7th Division's front lines and on LCI's that cruised up and down the coast line were successful in convincing over 3,000 civilians to surrender. Far more significant, however, were the 106 Japanese soldiers and 238 Boeitai who voluntarily gave up during the division's advance on 19 June. The relentless attack of American troops, coupled with intensive efforts by psychological warfare teams, brought in increasing numbers of battle-weary Japanese and Okinawans who had decided that the war was lost and their cause was hopeless. It is not inconceivable that every enemy soldier who surrendered meant one less American casualty as the wind-up drive of Tenth Army continued.

Despite these challenges, the 32nd Regiment advanced to within just 200 yards of the outskirts of Mabuni. Meanwhile, the 184th and 381st Regiments coordinated their efforts, closing in on Medeera from the south and east. The 382nd Regiment pressed forward, overcoming fierce resistance as they reached the ridges overlooking Aragachi. Tragically, General Easley became the third major high-ranking casualty in just two days. The 5th Marines launched multiple assaults on Hills 79 and 81, but their efforts were met with fierce opposition and ended in failure. Wallace’s 3rd Battalion, facing only light resistance, captured Ibaru Ridge, the last high ground before the sea, before pushing onward to the coastal cliffs. On the eastern front, Griebel’s 3rd Battalion successfully seized Makabe and then joined forces with the 8th Marines to secure the coastal zone. Colonel Shapley’s 4th Marines advanced alongside the 8th Marines throughout most of the day but were unable to reach the coast, halted by a formidable enemy position along the Kiyamu-Gusuku hill mass. Further south, Colonel Whaling’s 29th Marines passed through the 22nd Marines and moved rapidly, also facing light resistance, reaching the base of the Kiyamu-Gusuku hill mass to link up with the 4th Marines before nightfall. As darkness enveloped the battlefield, Shepherd launched an attack on the hill mass. The 4th Marines successfully seized Hill 80, but they could only establish strong positions on the left flank of Hill 72. The 29th Marines encountered minimal opposition as they swept forward toward the southern coast. Meanwhile, the 5th Marines continued their relentless assaults on Hills 79 and 81, managing to capture most of Hill 79 before losing the crest at the last moment. Their tank-infantry assaults against Hill 81, however, once again ended in defeat.

Looking east toward Hodge’s front on June 21, the 382nd Regiment cleared out the last remnants in Aragachi, while the 381st Regiment seized the northern outskirts of Medeera. In the dark hours of June 20, the last courier contact was made between the Medeera pocket and the Hill 89 pocket. General Amamiya, commander of the 24th Division, issued a desperate order directing all his units "to fight to the last man in their present positions." At the time he gave this ultimatum, he had very few infantrymen left to defend the Medeera position. The relentless advance of the Marines had nearly annihilated the 22nd and 32nd Regiments, while the 96th Division had decimated the 89th Regiment at Yuza Dake and Aragachi. With their ranks severely depleted, the remaining defenders were a ragtag collection of artillerymen, drivers, corpsmen, engineers, Boeitai, and headquarters personnel drawn from nearly every unit of the L-Day island garrison. Those who managed to avoid surrender or sought to evade capture fought with the fierce determination of fanatics, resolutely defending their positions against overwhelming odds.

Meanwhile, Colonel Coolidge’s 305th Regiment, engaged in a vigorous mopping-up operation behind the lines of the 96th Division, prepared for an assault on Makabe Ridge. The 184th Regiment managed to secure the hills overlooking Udo, and despite facing fierce resistance from hidden enemy forces in coral outcroppings and caves along the coastal cliffs, the 32nd Regiment fought its way to the eastern slope of Hill 89. Throughout June 21, a series of small local attacks and mopping-up actions occupied most units of the 24th Corps, often interrupted to allow large numbers of civilians and soldiers to surrender. In spite of the bitter and costly resistance, the 32nd Regiment successfully secured Mabuni and advanced up to the tableland atop Hill 89. Coolidge’s 1st Battalion launched an assault on the hill south of Medeera behind a heavy mortar barrage, successfully capturing its crest.

The 5th Marines completed the capture of Hill 79 and undertook a heavy, costly assault that ultimately led to the capture of Hill 81. The 7th and 8th Marines began the crucial task of flushing out remaining Japanese holdouts, while also dealing with the increasing wave of soldiers and civilians choosing to surrender. The 4th Marines executed a successful double envelopment of Hill 72 that secured the strategic Kiyamu-Gusuku ridge, and the 29th Marines met only very light resistance during their sweep of Ara Saki, the southernmost point of the island. This swift progress and the obvious collapse of major enemy opposition prompted General Geiger to declare that the island of Okinawa was secure and that organized enemy resistance had come to an end. That night, in a tragic turn of events, Generals Ushijima and Cho committed Seppuku in the cave housing their command post. 

On the night of June 21, Lieutenant General Ushijima Mitsuru and Lieutenant General Cho Isamu, the commander and chief of staff of the 32nd Army, fulfilled their final obligation to the Emperor in a deeply traditional manner. In accordance with the warrior code of their homeland, they atoned for their inability to halt the American advance by committing Seppuku. On the evening of their planned departure, Ushijima hosted a banquet in the cave that served as their command post, featuring a large meal prepared by his cook, Tetsuo Nakamutam. The banquet was generously complemented with sake and the remaining stock of captured Black & White Scotch whisky provided by Cho. At 03:00 on June 22, both generals, adorned in their full field uniforms decorated with medals, led a small party of aides and staff officers out onto a narrow ledge at the cave entrance, which overlooked the ocean. American soldiers of the 32nd Regiment were stationed less than 100 feet away, completely unaware of the solemn preparations taking place for the suicide ceremony. First, Ushijima bared his abdomen to the ceremonial knife and thrust inward, followed by Cho, who then fell to the ground. As Ushijima made his final act, a simultaneous slash from the headquarters adjutant’s saber struck his bowed neck. The two generals were secretly buried immediately after their deaths, their bodies going undiscovered until June 25, when patrols from the 32nd Regiment found them at the foot of the seaward cliff-face of Hill 89. General Cho had penned his own simple epitaph, stating, “22nd day, 6th month, 20th year of the Showa Era. I depart without regret, fear, shame, or obligations. Army Chief of Staff; Army Lieutenant General Cho, Isamu, age of departure 51 years. At this time and place, I hereby certify the foregoing.” Their deaths were witnessed by Colonel Yahara, who was the most senior officer captured by American forces. Yahara had requested Ushijima’s permission to commit suicide as well, but the general had refused, saying, "If you die, there will be no one left who knows the truth about the battle of Okinawa. Bear the temporary shame but endure it. This is an order from your army commander." While many die-hard groups continued to fight until annihilation, an unprecedented number of Japanese soldiers, both officers and enlisted men, began to surrender.

On that fateful day, Operation Ten-Go’s final breaths were marked by the launch of the two-day tenth Kiksui mass attack, which saw only 45 kamikaze aircraft take to the skies. While this desperate attempt succeeded in sinking LSM-59 and damaging the destroyer escort Halloran, as well as the seaplane tenders Curtiss and Kenneth Whiting, the next day would bring even less impact, with only two landing ships sustaining damage during the final attack of the campaign. As communications from the 32nd Army fell silent, a deeply regretful Admiral Ugaki was forced to conclude the grim reality of their situation. He felt “greatly responsible for the calamity” but recognized that there was seemingly no alternative course that might have led to success. Throughout the defense of Okinawa, approximately 6,000 sorties were flown, including at least 1,900 kamikaze missions. However, the losses were staggering, with over 4,000 aircraft lost during these attacks. In contrast, Allied forces suffered the loss of 763 planes in the Okinawa campaign, with 305 of those being operational losses.

Since the operation commenced, naval losses for Iceberg totaled an alarming 4,992 sailors dead, with 36 ships sunk and 374 damaged, accounting for 17% of all American naval losses in the Pacific War. Meanwhile, extensive and coordinated mop-up operations in southern Okinawa were essential before the area could be deemed secure for the planned construction of supply depots, airfields, training areas, and port facilities. In response, Colonel Mason’s 1st Marines and Colonel Hamilton’s 307th Regiment established blocking positions in the hills above the Naha-Yonabaru valley to thwart any Japanese attempts to infiltrate north. On June 22, the four assault divisions that had previously shattered the Kiyamu Peninsula defenses received orders to prepare for a sweeping advance to the north. Their mission was clear: destroy any remaining resistance, blow and seal all caves, bury the dead, and salvage any equipment, both friendly and enemy, left on the battlefield.

The following day, General Joseph Stilwell arrived to take command of the 10th Army during the mop-up phase of the campaign. Meanwhile, units from the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions were engaged on the Komesu and Kiyamu-Gusuku Ridges, while the 7th Division probed Hill 89 and Mabuni. In the Medeera pocket, Coolidge’s 3rd Battalion successfully seized Hill 85 on June 22. The 96th Division intensified its focus in the Medeera-Aragachi area, with elements of the 381st Regiment mopping up the last holdouts in the ruins of Medeera by June 23. Two days later, after a thorough search of the area south of the Yaeju Dake-Yuza Dake Escarpment, the 10th Army finally initiated its drive northward, with both corps taking responsibility for the ground they had captured in the previous month. On the morning of June 26, the reinforced Fleet Marine Force Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion landed unopposed on Kumejima, marking it as the last and largest of the Okinawa Islands selected for radar and fighter director sites. By the end of June, the mop-up operations in southern Okinawa had resulted in an estimated 8,975 Japanese killed and 3,808 prisoners of war added to the 10th Army's total. Overall, the Americans counted a staggering total of 10,755 prisoners of war and 107,539 Japanese dead, along with an estimated 23,764 believed to be sealed in caves or buried by their comrades. This cumulative casualty figure of 142,058 was "far above a reasonable estimate of military strength on the island," prompting 10th Army intelligence officers to conclude that at least 42,000 civilians had tragically fallen victim to artillery, naval, and air attacks due to their unfortunate proximity to Japanese combat forces and installations. American losses were also substantial, with 7,374 men recorded dead, 31,807 wounded, and 239 missing, in addition to 26,221 non-battle casualties.

But now, it’s time to leave Okinawa and return to Borneo to continue covering the North Borneo Offensive. As we last observed, by mid-June, General Wootten’s 9th Australian Division had successfully executed two major amphibious landings on Brunei Bay. Brigadier Porter’s 24th Brigade occupied most of Labuan Island, with the exception of the Pocket, while Brigadier Windeyer’s 20th Brigade secured the Brunei area. By June 16, Wootten decided that since the enemy was withdrawing and showing no signs of mounting an attack, he would take control of the high ground stretching from Mempakul and Menumbok to Cape Nosong. This strategic move aimed to prevent the enemy from utilizing the track from Kota Klias to Karukan and to secure beaches for supply points during the planned advance northward. Accordingly, Porter ordered the 2/28th Battalion to reduce the Pocket. The recently landed 2/12th Commando Squadron was tasked with mopping up the outlying areas of the island. Meanwhile, the 2/32nd Battalion began preparing for an amphibious movement to Weston on the mainland east of Labuan, with plans to reconnoiter across country and by river towards Beaufort. The 2/43rd Battalion and the 2/11th Commando Squadron were also set to prepare for an amphibious reconnaissance in the Mempakul area. On June 14, the 2/28th Battalion launched its initial attack against the Pocket, following an artillery barrage. However, they were forced to withdraw in the face of intense machine-gun and mortar fire. In response, the 2/12th Field Regiment took over, bombarding the Pocket for the next six days and nights, hurling a staggering total of 140 tons of shells into it.

On June 16, the 2/28th Battalion launched another assault, this time supported by tanks from the north, successfully capturing Lyon Ridge, despite sustaining heavy losses. After several more days of relentless artillery, naval, and air bombardment, the 2/28th launched a final assault on June 21, just as the Japanese attempted to send two raiding parties to infiltrate through the Australian lines and attack Labuan town and its airstrip. Although these raiders managed to catch the confused defenders off guard and inflicted several casualties, they were ultimately dealt with swiftly and without causing significant damage. Meanwhile, with the combined support of tanks and artillery, the 2/28th Battalion attacked the reduced garrison at the Pocket, breaking through Lushington Ridge and Eastman Spur to eliminate the remaining Japanese positions and completely clear the area.

By the end of the Battle of Labuan, the Australians had achieved a decisive victory, with 389 Japanese soldiers killed and 11 taken prisoner, while suffering 34 Australian fatalities and 93 wounded. In parallel, following a successful reconnaissance on June 16, the 2/32nd Battalion landed unopposed at Weston on June 17. They quickly secured the area and established a patrol base at Lingkungan. Over the next few days, Australian patrols began probing north towards Bukau, occasionally clashing with Japanese parties. A company from the 2/32nd Battalion also established a patrol base at Gadong up the Padas River, finding no Japanese presence in the surrounding regions. From this position, the Australians were able to patrol along the Padas River in small craft, discovering they could reach Beaufort rapidly using this route, catching the enemy off guard. Meanwhile, on June 19, the 2/43rd Battalion and the 2/11th Independent Company landed unopposed at Mempakul, further solidifying the Australian presence in the area.

Two days later, while the commandos worked to clear the Klias Peninsula, the 2/43rd Battalion launched an amphibious expedition up the Klias River. This mission successfully navigated through Singkorap and reached Kota Klias, confirming that Japanese forces were not present in significant strength along the river. As a result, the 2/43rd Battalion set out on June 22 to occupy Kota Klias without encountering any resistance. Given this positive momentum, Brigadier Porter ordered the 2/28th Battalion to take over operations from the 2/32nd Battalion in and around Weston. At the same time, the 2/43rd Battalion was tasked with marching through Kandu to attack Beaufort from the north. Additionally, the 2/32nd Battalion was directed to probe north along the Padas River and along the railway, drawing enemy attention away from the main Australian advance.

Looking south, while the 2/17th Battalion remained around Brunei and the 2/15th Battalion probed along the river toward Limbang, Windeyer had ordered the 2/13th Battalion to prepare for an amphibious movement to the Miri-Lutong area. Brunei town had been severely battered by Allied bombers and Japanese demolitions. The troops were critical of the air force's practice of bombing conspicuous buildings even when they were unlikely to contain anything of military importance. In Brunei, for example, the bazaar and the cinema were destroyed, but neither was likely to have contained any Japanese men or material and their destruction and the destruction of similar buildings added to the distress of the civilians. The infantryman on the ground saw the effects of bombing at the receiving end. “The impression was gained, says the report of the 20th Brigade, that, in the oil producing and refining centres-Seria, Kuala Belait, Lutong, Miri much of the destruction served no military purpose. The destruction of the native bazaar and shop area in Kuala Belait, Brunei, Tutong and Miri seemed wanton.“ On June 16, the 2/17th finally moved out and occupied Tutong, successfully crossing the river at its mouth. From there, the battalion began its movement along the coast toward Seria. However, despite the strategic importance of the town’s oil wells, there was only one encounter with the enemy at the Bira River on June 20 before the town was occupied the following day, only to find the oil wells ablaze. 

At Seria, the oil wells were ablaze. From the broken pipes that topped each well, burning oil gushed forth like fire from immense, hissing Bunsen burners. The pressure was so intense that the oil, as clear as petrol, only ignited several inches away from the pipe. Once ignited, it transformed into a tumbling cloud of flame, accompanied by billowing blue-black smoke. At approximately 1,000 feet, the plumes from more than 30 fires merged into a single canopy of smoke. This horrifying spectacle of waste persisted day and night. The men around Seria fell asleep to the hissing and rumbling of an entire oilfield engulfed in flames and awoke to the same din. The Japanese had set fire to 37 wells, destroyed buildings and bridges, and attempted to incapacitate vehicles, pumps, and other equipment by removing essential components and either discarding them in rivers or burying them. Consequently, the Australian engineers faced the daunting task of extinguishing the fires with only their own equipment, along with abandoned gear they could repair or make functional. They relied on assistance from local natives who had observed the Japanese hiding parts and employed methods of improvisation and selective cannibalization to tackle the crisis. Meanwhile, by June 19, raiding elements of the 2/15th Battalion had successfully secured Limbang. From this location, they began sending patrols up the Limbang River toward Ukong, along the Pandaruan River to Anggun, and east toward Trusan.

The following day, after a naval bombardment by three American destroyers, the 2/13th Battalion landed unopposed at Lutong and quickly secured the area. On June 21, the Australians crossed the river and advanced into Miri without facing any resistance, successfully occupying the town and its oilfield by June 23. Turning their attention back north, on June 24, the 2/43rd Battalion began its advance toward Beaufort, swiftly moving through Kandu and reaching a position just north of the Padas River the next day. In response to their progress, Brigadier Porter ordered the 2/32nd Battalion to seize the railway terminus and the spur leading down to the river just south of Beaufort, while the 2/43rd focused on capturing the high ground dominating Beaufort from the north and east. This coordinated attack was launched on June 26. By the end of the day, the leading company of the 2/32nd had reached the Padas River, approximately 2,000 yards west of the railway terminus, while the leading company of the 2/43rd secured the railway north of the Padas, similarly positioned about 2,000 yards from Beaufort. On June 27, the 2/43rd continued their offensive, rapidly capturing the high ground overlooking Beaufort. During the afternoon, one company ascended Mount Lawley and pursued the retreating Japanese, cutting off their escape route at a track junction, while another company moved into the town, taking possession early that night. In the following hours and throughout June 28, the Australians faced a series of heavy counterattacks as they worked to consolidate their positions. Meanwhile, the 2/32nd Battalion successfully captured the railway terminus, encountering only slight opposition, with one company executing a wide flanking maneuver to the Padas just upstream from Beaufort.

Under heavy bombardment from artillery and mortars, the bulk of the 368th Independent Battalion began to retreat along the Australian-held track in the early hours of June 29. While many were killed during this withdrawal, most managed to escape. At intervals groups of two or three walked into the company area in the darkness and were killed. Fire was strictly controlled, and one platoon was credited with having killed 21 Japanese with 21 single shots fired at ranges of from five to 15 yards. One Japanese walked on to the track 50 yards from the foremost Australian Bren gun position and demanded the surrender of the Australians who were blocking the Japanese line of retreat. According to one observer his words were: "Surrender pliz, Ossie. You come. No?" He was promptly shot. One company counted 81 Japanese killed with "company weapons only" round the junction and estimated that at least 35 others had been killed; six Australians were slightly wounded. 

By morning, the fighting was virtually over, and the mop-up of the disorganized enemy force commenced. The attack on Beaufort cost the 24th Brigade 7 men killed and 38 wounded, while the Australians counted 93 Japanese dead and took two prisoners. Meanwhile, the 2/28th Battalion secured Lumadan village, where it made contact with the 2/32nd. Porter then ordered this battalion to pursue the retreating Japanese eastward, successfully securing the Montenior Besar railway bridge by July 4. The 2/32nd Battalion proceeded to attack toward Papar, encountering little opposition as they captured Membakut on July 5, followed by Kimanis on July 10, and finally Papar on July 12. Turning back south, the 2/17th Battalion occupied Kuala Belait on June 24, where they discovered evidence of a massacre of Indian prisoners of war. 

Indian prisoners of war began reaching the lines of the 2/17th Battalion at Seria on June 22. By the end of the month, a total of 41 had arrived, reporting a horrific event: on June 14, the Japanese had slaughtered a portion of a group of more than 100 Indian prisoners at Kuala Belait. The Australians discovered 24 charred bodies at the site, along with evidence indicating that others had also been killed. A report by the 2/17th noted, "The motive for the massacre is not clear, and whether a partial loss of rations, the waving of flags, or simply Japanese brutality was responsible cannot be determined." The surviving Indians were found to be starving, with many suffering from illness. Colonel Broadbent remarked, "The loyalty and fortitude of these Indians has been amazing and is a lesson to us all. Even now, their standard of discipline is high."

Two days later, patrols made contact with the 2/13th Battalion at the Baram River. Pushing south along Riam Road, the patrols of the 2/13th clashed with the Japanese at South Knoll, which they captured by the end of the month. Throughout July, the 2/13th continued patrolling down Riam Road against some opposition, eventually pushing the Japanese beyond Bakam by August. At the same time, the 2/17th conducted deep patrols southward from Kuala Belait, particularly along the Baram River toward Bakung, Marudi, and Labi. Overall, Australian losses during the North Borneo Offensive totaled 114 killed and 221 wounded, while they captured 130 prisoners and accounted for at least 1,234 Japanese killed.

Following the conclusion of conventional military operations, Wootten’s troops began to support the efforts of Australian-sponsored native guerrillas operating in Sarawak under Operation Semut and in British North Borneo as part of Operation Agas.  Between March and July 1945, five Special Operations Australia “SOA” parties were inserted into North Borneo. The Agas 1 and 2 parties established networks of agents and guerrillas in northwestern Borneo, while the Agas 4 and 5 parties, landed on the east coast, achieved little in their missions. The Agas 3 party investigated the Ranau area at the request of the 1st Corps. The results of Operation Agas were mixed; although its parties established control over their respective areas of operation and provided intelligence of variable quality, they were responsible for killing fewer than 100 Japanese soldiers. In parallel, as part of Operation Semut, over 100 Allied personnel, mainly Australians, were inserted by air into Sarawak from March 1945, organized into four parties. These parties were tasked with collecting intelligence and establishing guerrilla forces. The indigenous Dayaks of Sarawak's interior enthusiastically joined these guerrilla groups, essentially allowing SOA personnel to lead small private armies. No. 200 Flight RAAF and the Royal Australian Navy's Snake-class junks played crucial roles in this campaign, facilitating the insertion of SOA personnel and supplies. The guerrilla forces launched attacks to gain control of the interior of Sarawak, while the 9th Division focused on coastal areas, oilfields, plantations, and ports in North Borneo. The guerrillas operated from patrol bases around Balai, Ridan, and Marudi, as well as in the mountains and along key waterways, including the Pandaruan and Limbang Rivers, and along the railway connecting Beaufort and Tenom. Their objective was to disrupt Japanese troop movements and interdict forces as they withdrew from the main combat zone. The RAAF conducted air strikes to support these lightly armed guerrillas, who at times had to evade better-armed Japanese units. These guerrilla forces successfully raided several key towns and facilities, significantly disrupting enemy movements and efforts. It is estimated that over 1,800 Japanese soldiers were killed in North Borneo through guerrilla actions, particularly by the fearsome Dayak people, whose fierce tactics and local knowledge played a crucial role in these operations.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

In the final throes of the Pacific War, the Battle of Okinawa became a fierce battleground of sacrifice and honor. As American forces, led by General Buckner, advanced, they shattered Japanese defenses, pushing them into a desperate retreat. On June 21, General Ushijima and Lieutenant General Cho, recognizing their imminent defeat, committed seppuku, adhering to the samurai code. The chaotic battle led to staggering casualties, with many Japanese soldiers surrendering, realizing their cause was lost. By June’s end, Okinawa was secured, symbolizing not only a victory but also the tragic cost of war, with countless lives lost on both sides.

- 186 - Pacific War Podcast - North Borneo Offensive - June 10 - 17, 1945

Last time we spoke about the Liberation of Mindanao. In the spring of 1945, as the battle for Okinawa intensified, American forces relentlessly confronted entrenched Japanese troops. General Buckner's 10th Army faced fierce resistance amidst harsh weather and dwindling supplies. Despite these challenges, they captured the strategic Shuri Castle, marking a critical turning point as Japanese troops retreated. Simultaneously, the liberation of Mindanao was underway. American troops, under General Eichelberger, rapidly advanced, overcoming fortified Japanese defenses in mountainous terrain. With the 24th Division securing key locations like Digos and Davao, the 31st Division pushed northward against General Morozumi’s forces. Despite stubborn resistance, American forces displayed tenacity and courage, leading to significant victories. By May 20, the Americans approached Malaybalay, where remnants of the 30th Field Artillery Regiment held their ground. As Japanese troops attempted to regroup, they faced relentless assaults from the advancing American divisions. Throughout the campaign, the Americans endured heavy casualties, but their determination led to more than 10,000 Japanese losses.

This episode is the North Borneo Offensive

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

As we continue our story, by June 9, General Buckner's forces had pushed through to the enemy's main defensive line on the Kiyamu Peninsula. It was there that General Ushijima was preparing to make his final stand. Meanwhile, General Shepherd’s 6th Marine Division landed on the Oroku Peninsula, determined to dismantle a stubborn pocket held by Admiral Ota’s naval units. On June 10, the pace of the assault quickened dramatically. Colonel Shapley’s 4th Marines broke through enemy defenses, capturing the strategic Hills 58 and 55(2). At the same time, Colonel Roberts’ 22nd Marines secured Hills 28 and 55(1). Although Colonel Whaling's 29th Marines made only limited progress, they effectively identified the last significant pocket of resistance in the high ground west of Oroku village. Looking south, General Del Valle’s 1st Marine Division also reignited its offensive. Colonel Snedeker’s 7th Marines successfully advanced into Itoman and Tera, while Colonel Mason’s 1st Marines, supported by tanks, cleared the southern slopes of the key ridge between Tera and Yuza, capturing Yuza Hill in the process. To the east, General Bradley’s 96th Division launched a renewed attack, bolstered by artillery and tank support. Colonel May’s 383rd Regiment advanced approximately 700 yards toward the town of Yuza. Meanwhile, Colonel Halloran’s 381st Regiment pushed into Yunagusuku and Tomui. However, they faced fierce resistance, quickly encountering heavy machine-gun fire originating from the heights of Yaeju Dake, which halted their advance.

Meanwhile, General Arnold’s 7th Division continued its relentless push toward Nakaza, employing the full might of their tanks and artillery. Colonel Finn’s 32nd Regiment steadily advanced onto the eastern slopes of Hill 95, pressing toward Hanagusuku. At the same time, Colonel Pachler’s 17th Regiment fought to solidify its precarious position on the southeast end of Yaeju Dake. Back at sea, a kamikaze attack tragically sank the destroyer William D. Porter. That same day, Admiral McCain’s Task Force 38 unleashed a barrage of bombs and artillery on Minami Daito Island before retreating to Leyte-Samar after 89 consecutive days off the coast of Okinawa. This marked the conclusion of their role in Operation Iceberg. The following day, the sustained pressure from Arnold's offensive began to fracture General Suzuki’s 44th Independent Mixed Brigade on both flanks.Seas of flame engulfed Hill 95 on 11 June as 1/32 slowly advanced toward the crest of the enemy position behind the jets of armored flame throwers. Flame fuel was pumped and sprayed from hoses over portions of the ridge inaccessible to tanks and then ignited. Infantrymen moved among the still hot and smoking rocks and drove back the surviving defenders. That night the battalion dug in just short of the Hill 95 peak. Although little forward progress was made by 2/32 or the 17th Infantry on 11 June, the enemy position was considerably weakened. Intensive fire from supporting weapons was concentrated against the slopes of Yaeju Dake, and strong patrols cleaned out enemy groups that held positions near the 7th Division front lines. The 32nd Regiment achieved a significant victory by capturing the peak of Hill 95, while the 17th Regiment struggled to make further headway

To the west, advances in the 96th Division zone were minimal as Bradley's regiments focused on consolidating their newly-won positions amidst intense enemy fire. Simultaneously, at Yuza Hill, fierce counterattacks were thwarted, and Mason’s 2nd Battalion accomplished the critical capture of Hill 69, just west of Ozato, despite heavy machine-gun fire coming from Yuza Dake. Further east, ahead of the 7th Marines, some 800 yards from the southern fringes of the two settlements, lay "the scene of the most frantic, bewildering, and costly close-in battle on the southern tip of Okinawa"Kunishi Ridge. This precipitous coral escarpment constituted the western-most anchor of the last heavily defended line on Okinawa. The ridge contained innumerable caves, emplacements, and tombs on both the forward and reverse slopes. The intervening area between this formidable fortress and the lines of the 7th Marines was a broad valley of grassy fields and rice paddies which offered no protection to advancing infantry. The supporting tanks were restricted to two approaches into the position: a road across the valley which cut through the center of the ridge and another along the coast line. Both of these routes were covered by anti-tank guns. Shortly after noon patrols from the 1st and 2nd Battalions moved out with armored support to probe the Japanese defenses. Intense frontal fire from Kunishi Ridge, enfilade fire from the enemy on Hill 69 opposing the attack of 2/1, and artillery concentrations directed at the tanks forced a withdrawal at 14:47. Because of the complete fire coverage of the open valley enjoyed by the Japanese, both from the heights and slopes of the ridge itself and from the Yuza Dake area, it was apparent that a daylight assault of the position would be a costly affair. Consequently, after Colonel Snedeker had made a personal reconnaissance of the objective from a light liaison plane, it was determined to attack at night. The commanding officers of the assault battalions were oriented on the general plan during the afternoon. The central road and a line of telephone poles was designated as the boundary between battalions upon which the assault units would guide. The scheme of maneuver contemplated a penetration of the ridge where the road passed through it, followed by an expansion of the initial foothold to the right and left flanks to secure the remainder of the objective in the regimental zone of action. Normal artillery would be placed alternately on Kunishi Ridge and Mezado Ridge (500-600 yards southwest of Kunishi) until H-Hour and thereafter on the latter. On June 11, General Shepherd launched a concerted attack. The 22nd Marines successfully secured the Tomigusuki area and Hill 53, while the 29th Marines faced stiff opposition, making only limited gains against the heavily fortified hills west of Oroku. Meanwhile, the 4th Marines worked to strengthen their line, completing the encirclement of Ota’s naval forces. Nevertheless, the ramparts of the Oroku fortress were cracking, and Admiral Ota released his last dispatch to General Ushijima: “Enemy tank groups are now attacking our cave headquarters. The Naval Base Force is dying gloriously at this moment… We are grateful for your past kindnesses and pray for the success of the Army.”

During the night, artillery units successfully targeted and either killed or dispersed a group of Japanese troops attempting to cross the Kokuba River. Meanwhile, 51 infiltrators were eliminated as they tried to breach the lines held by the 22nd Marines. The following day, the 4th and 29th Marines intensified their efforts to compress the enemy pocket west of Tomigusuki, breaking through to seize Easy Hill while the 22nd Marines consolidated their positions. The capture of this key terrain feature forced the enemy into the alluvial flats along the coast between Oroku and Hill 53. "In the late afternoon enemy troops began displaying flags of surrender. Language officers equipped with loud speaker systems were dispatched to the front line areas to assist in the surrender of those Japs who desired to. The attempt was partially successful, 86 enemy soldiers voluntarily laid down their arms."

For several days General Buckner had been sending messages to the Japanese commander by radio broadcast and air drops pointing out the hopelessness of the enemy situation in an attempt to persuade General Ushijima to surrender. During the afternoon of 11 June, Tenth Army representatives were conducted to the 2d Battalion OP overlooking Itoman to await any enemy party that might desire to negotiate. At 1700 all fire was suspended in the 7th Marines' area pending the doubtful appearance of a white flag. About 15 Japanese wearing white headgear appeared in the 1/7 zone in front of Company A at 1740, but dispersed when hailed. Six of the enemy surrendered to Company C at 1802, but the situation returned to normal two minutes later when hostile mortar fire fell on the captors' position. Final orders for the resumption of the attack were issued by Colonel Snedeker about 2000 setting H-Hour at 0330, 12 June. Both 1/7 and 2/7 were to make the assault with one company each, and at 0225 Company C moved out to establish contact with Company F on the line of departure. The attack was launched on schedule at 0330 and at 0500 Companies B and G moved out in support of the assault companies. Concurrently, Company F reached the objective at a point 500 yards north of Mezado village, as Company C came up on its left to extend the line eastward. The enemy was completely surprised and several small groups were wiped out by Company C while they were engaged in preparing breakfast. At the same time, the 1st Battalion extended the line eastward toward Kunishi. However, the Japanese quickly regrouped, pinning down the attackers for the rest of the day, though the Marines managed to reinforce and consolidate their hard-won gains. By midnight the positions there could be considered reasonably secure. But as General del Valle put it, "The situation was one of those tactical oddities of this peculiar warfare. We were on the ridge. The Japs were in it, both on the forward and reverse slopes." Elsewhere, the 1st Marines focused on mopping up Hill 69, dispatching patrols south through Ozato and maintaining their defenses on Yazu Hill. To the east, another pre-dawn attack initiated by the 17th Regiment caught the defenders off guard. 

Colonel Pachler had compelling reasons for favoring a night operation. The defenders held a significant advantage in observation, which had posed serious challenges when the 3rd Battalion of the 17th Infantry seized the southeast end of the escarpment. The coral wall of the escarpment was particularly high at this end, and the narrow routes leading to the high ground were easily controlled by Japanese fire. After days of holding positions at the base of the 170-foot cliff, the troops had grown familiar with the terrain and, as their commander, Major Maynard Weaver, noted, they were eager to reach the top and finally see something new. The night attack was primarily planned for the 1st Battalion, but Colonel Pachler decided to coordinate a move to expand the territory held by the 3rd Battalion as well. The final plan involved three assault companies: Company A would occupy a cluster of coral about a hundred yards beyond the edge of the escarpment, near the boundary between the 7th and 96th Divisions. Company B aimed for a similar objective located about 200 yards to the southeast, while Company L was assigned to capture a small hill situated between the 1st Battalion's targets and the positions held by the 3rd Battalion since June 11. Each company was given a separate route: Company A’s path led straight up the cliff’s face, Company B needed to head south to reach a break in the escarpment before turning right toward its goal, and Company L had an accessible objective near the edge of the escarpment.

Movement was set to begin at 0400 on June 12. Since the attack relied on stealth, no artillery preparation was planned. However, two battalions of 105-mm artillery, one battery of 155-mm howitzers, and an 8-inch howitzer battalion were scheduled to deliver heavy harassing fire during the night. Additionally, 21 batteries registered their fire on the afternoon of June 11 and were ready to provide protective artillery support if needed once the objectives were reached. For added firepower, a section of heavy machine guns was assigned to each assault company. Colonel Pachler meticulously planned the attack, ensuring that every soldier involved understood the details of the operation. Reconnaissance patrols had scouted the trails leading to the high ground, and demolition teams had already prepared known cave positions at the cliff's face with satchel charges. Despite thorough preparations, there was a collective apprehension about potential confusion caused by the unknown conditions of darkness. This anxiety was amplified at 2000 on the night of June 11 when the 7th Division G-2 Section intercepted an enemy radio message indicating, "Prepare to support the attack at 2300." Soon after, another intercepted message stated, "If there are any volunteers for the suicide penetration, report them before the contact which is to be made one hour from now." Meanwhile, from dusk until almost 2300, the Japanese unleashed a heavy artillery barrage, leading front-line troops to anticipate a counterattack. That counterattack did come, aimed at the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Infantry, which had reached the summit of Hill 95 earlier that day, as well as against the 96th Division. However, there was no enemy activity observed in the 17th Infantry's sector.

As night illumination and harassing fire ceased shortly before 0400, the attack proceeded according to plan. The companies moved out in single file. Remarkably, a heavy fog settled over southern Okinawa, creating the perfect conditions for concealment while allowing the troops to follow their paths without confusion. On the high ground, Company A encountered a few civilians wandering about, while the leading platoon of Company B unexpectedly came across three Japanese soldiers as they reached the shelf of the escarpment. The Americans chose to ignore them and continued silently on their way, with the enemy surprisingly not opening fire. By 0530, just minutes after dawn, Companies A and B were in position without firing a single shot. Company L also successfully reached its objective, and eager to capitalize on the fog and absence of enemy fire, its commander sent a support platoon to a small hill fifty yards beyond. This objective was secured quickly, but not without incident; two enemy soldiers were killed in the process. The platoon leader reported their progress but quickly called for mortar fire as about fifty Japanese troops approached in a column. The Americans opened fire with rifles and BARs, disrupting the formation and resulting in thirty-seven enemy soldiers killed, while the rest managed to escape.

The men of the 1st Battalion celebrated the success of the night attack. Shortly after Company A took position, four enemy soldiers stumbled into view and were swiftly eliminated. A few moments later, another four followed suit, meeting the same fate. Company B remained undisturbed until around 0530 when Japanese soldiers attempted to emerge from several caves within the company's area. Although the cave entrances were heavily reinforced with concrete and couldn’t be sealed with demolition charges, the Marines guarded the openings and shot at the Japanese as they appeared. Not long after daylight, Company C began clearing the caves at the base of the escarpment, eventually regrouping with the rest of the battalion on the high ground. By 0800, the situation had stabilized, and the 17th Infantry held strong positions on Yaeju Dake. During the night, the Japanese had withdrawn their front-line troops from Yaeju Dake to escape the punishing artillery fire, intending to reoccupy it before the anticipated 0700 attack. Fifteen hours after the 32nd Infantry fought their way to the top of Hill 95, the 17th Infantry had executed a masterful night attack to seize their portion of Yaeju Dake. Throughout the day, the 2nd Battalion of the 17th Infantry relieved Companies I and K, and with Company L attached and supported by medium and flame tanks, continued the offensive. The 1st Battalion maintained its position, firing at enemy soldiers who were slow to realize that their defensive terrain had been lost. Company B alone accounted for sixty-three Japanese soldiers killed throughout the day.

Taking advantage of this breakthrough, the 381st Regiment advanced to occupy the slopes of Yaeju Dake, while the 383rd extended the division front and secured Yuza. As the situation unfolded, Japanese troops maintained control over Big Apple Peak, which towered about sixty feet above the surrounding plateau. However, by the evening of June 12, the 7th and 96th Divisions had succeeded in forcing the reconstituted 44th Independent Mixed Brigade from the southeastern end of the enemy’s line. General Ushijima acted swiftly, given the limitations imposed by his damaged communication system and the chaos among his front-line units. With his artillery nearly silenced by enemy bombardments and his supplies dwindling faster than his manpower, Ushijima's only hope lay in sending more troops into the relentless shellfire and flames unleashed by American forces sweeping across the frontline.

His urgent order read: “The enemy in the 44th IMB sector has finally penetrated our main line of resistance. The plan of the 44th IMB is to annihilate, with its main strength, the enemy penetrating the Yaeju-Dake sector. The Army will undertake to reoccupy and hold its Main Line of Resistance to the death. The 62nd Division will place two selected infantry battalions under the command of the CG, 44th IMB.” Unfortunately, the 64th Brigade, the part of the 62nd Division that had shifted from Shuri to reserve positions near Makabe, didn’t receive this order until late on June 13, a full thirty hours after it became critical. This piecemeal commitment of reserve troops proved to be grossly inadequate. By June 13, the 44th Brigade was teetering on the brink of destruction. When reinforcements finally arrived, they found the remnants of the 44th Brigade overwhelmed and absorbed into the reinforcing battalions, with still not enough men to hold the line. In a last-ditch effort, the enemy committed the main strength of the 62nd Division, his final reserve, with a desperate plea for cooperation and orders to "reoccupy and secure the Main Line of Resistance." However, by the time the 62nd Division moved onto the line, they ran headlong into General Hodge's forces, who were advancing southward across the coral-studded plateau. The Americans pressed forward, shielded by the fire of machine guns and tanks, advancing over the bodies of Japanese defenders who had fought fiercely to hold their last stronghold "to the death."

On June 13, General Arnold resumed his assault against the rapidly disintegrating 44th Independent Mixed Brigade. The 32nd Regiment successfully secured the Hill 95-Hanagusuku area, while the 17th Regiment expanded its control over the escarpment’s summit. To the west, May’s 3rd Battalion and Halloran’s 2nd Battalion struggled to capture the top of the escarpment despite repeated attempts. However, they significantly diminished the defenders' strength with a relentless volume of covering fire. At the same time, May’s 1st Battalion advanced through Yuza and swept southward to successfully secure Ozato. Meanwhile, General Del Valle prepared to commit the 1st Marines to the fight on Kunishi Ridge, as the isolated 7th Marines continued to be pinned down by heavy Japanese fire, relying on tanks for supplies and evacuation. Further north, the 29th Marines launched an attack southeast to eliminate the enemy pocket, while Shapley’s 3rd Battalion moved swiftly toward the beach, progressively chasing the demoralized Japanese forces from the thick brush and marshy terrain along the waterfront. As they reached the sea wall, the assault turned into a rout. Some of the enemy threw down their arms and fled at the Marines' approach. Large numbers surrendered; but some fought back with hand grenades in desperate, individual last ditch stands, while many more used grenades to destroy themselves in despair. The sea wall was reached at noon, and the remainder of the day was spent running to earth small groups hiding in the cane fields and rice paddies. In the late afternoon General Shepherd notified General Geiger that all organized resistance on Oroku had ceased. In the early hours of June 14, Mason’s 2nd Battalion advanced toward Kunishi Ridge, tenaciously fighting their way to positions east of the 7th Marines, which remained isolated. Simultaneously, Shepherd’s reinforced Reconnaissance Company successfully landed on Senaga Island, completing the occupation of the Oroku Peninsula. Looking south once again, May’s 1st Battalion completed the cleanup in Ozato but soon had to withdraw from its vulnerable position, while the rest of the 383rd Regiment pressed forward to the edge of the escarpment west of Yaeju Dake. To the east, despite heavy mortar and machine-gun fire, the 381st Regiment maintained constant pressure on the northern face of Yaeju Dake, finally reaching the top of the escarpment by nightfall. Their success allowed them to link up with the 7th Division, which dealt a crushing blow to the 13th Independent Battalion, advancing approximately 300 yards across the front.

After a night of disorganized counterattacks and infiltration attempts, the 7th Division launched an assault toward Hills 115 and 153, advancing about 1,200 yards and reaching the outer slopes of the hill positions. To the west, the 381st Regiment and May’s 3rd Battalion successfully secured the escarpment between Yuza and Yaeju Dake, although the remainder of the 383rd struggled to move forward due to heavy fire from Yuza Dake. On Kunishi Ridge, the pressure from the Japanese remained relentless, restricting the 7th Marines to only minor local gains. However, Mason’s 2nd Battalion managed to inch its way along the ridge, successfully extending the line by about 200 yards to the east. Behind them, Colonel Griebel’s 5th Marines began to relieve the weary 1st Marines, with Griebel’s 2nd Battalion finally moving forward during the night to support Mason’s isolated 2nd Battalion. On June 16, after an intense bombardment of artillery, mortars, and rockets, the 7th Marines finally broke through. Snedeker’s 1st Battalion advanced along the northern slope of Kunishi Ridge, while the 2nd Battalion extended the line into the initial high ground of the Mezado hill mass.

Concurrently, Griebel’s 2nd Battalion advanced, making slow but steady progress until they secured a coral peak on the ridge that commanded their position. To the east, the 62nd Division, attempting to move from its reserve locations southwest of Makabe to support the faltering Japanese lines, faced devastating fire from artillery, ship guns, and aerial bombardments of rockets and napalm. Seizing the opportunity created by the relentless bombardment of enemy rear areas, Bradley launched his battalions through the Yuza Dake perimeter. Colonel Dill’s 382nd Regiment pushed through the 383rd and advanced toward Ozato, aiming to gain control of the high ground southwest of Yuza, while May’s 3rd Battalion successfully captured Yuza Dake. Additionally, the 381st Regiment gained approximately 600 yards along its front, reaching the saddle between Yuza Dake and Hill 153. Meanwhile, the 17th Regiment pressed onto the forward slopes of Hill 153, and the 32nd Regiment, driving down the coast, took Hill 115, effectively eliminating the 15th Independent Mixed Regiment. Back at sea, despite a significant depletion of Japanese air strength, a kamikaze attack succeeded in sinking the destroyer Twiggs. 

But now, it’s time to leave Okinawa and turn our attention to Borneo, where we continue covering the Australian offensive. As we last noted, by May 6, Brigadier Whitehead’s 26th Australian Brigade had successfully landed on Tarakan, pushing the Japanese garrison into the island’s rugged interior. By the evening of 6th May fairly copious information obtained from prisoners and Indonesians and from captured documents indicated that the enemy had about 390 naval troops in the Mount Api area, about 400 troops and civilians in the Fukukaku headquarters area (embracing Hills 105 and 102), 200 from Sesanip along Snags Track to Otway, 300 on Otway and in District VI, 300 in the Amal River area and 60 at Cape Juata. Having lost the airfield and the water-purifying plant and hospitals "the enemy at this time was displaying a decided disinclination to hold ground. In particular he was shunning any ground which could be subjected to heavy bombing, shelling, or attack by tanks; or against which large-scale attacks could be launched by our troops"; and he was directing his operations to delaying the attackers, particularly with mines, booby-traps, suicide raids, and isolated parties fighting to the death in tunnels and dugouts. The 4th Company of Tokoi Force (IJA) plus the 1st Company of the 2nd Naval Guard Force were on Hill 105, Margy and Janet; the 1st Company of Tokoi Force, and other troops were on Hill 102. In the north was a composite group.

To secure the recently captured airfield from potential counterattacks, raids, or indirect fire, Brigadier Whitehead decided to deploy the 2/48th Battalion to gain the high ground north of the town, reaching up to Snags Track. The 2/4th Commando Squadron was tasked with advancing along Snags Track toward the Sesanip oilfields, while the 2/3rd Pioneers were assigned to sweep the high ground east of the town and move along John’s Track to the mouth of the Ama River. Meanwhile, the Dutch company was to clear the unoccupied Cape Batu peninsula, a task that proved surprisingly straightforward. In the Mount Api area, however, the 2/23rd Battalion faced fierce resistance, particularly at Tiger and along Crazy Ridge, resulting in minimal progress until they were relieved by the 2/24th Battalion on May 9. Further to the right, the 2/48th Battalion seized Otway without opposition, and the commandos successfully cleared Snags Track up to Haigh’s by May 8, though tanks could not advance any further. The pioneers, on the other hand, encountered heavy resistance along John’s Track, which they couldn’t overcome until May 9. That day, a long-distance patrol from the 2/24th Battalion also succeeded in driving the Japanese out of the Juata oilfields after a skirmish. On May 10, while the 2/48th and the commandos patrolled aggressively forward, the pioneers began their assault on the heavily defended Helen feature, which would successfully repel repeated Australian attacks for the next five days. Simultaneously, the 2/24th faced strong resistance in the Mount Api area but tenaciously pushed forward to Hill 105 on May 11, capturing Tiger the following night. They conducted patrols that probed about 1,000 yards southeast, cutting Snags Track at several points. On May 12, the 2/48th set out to cut King’s Track and clear the heights from Sykes to Butch. The next morning, they successfully attacked and captured the knoll north of Snags Track.

Meanwhile, following a highly effective air bombardment, the key Helen feature was found abandoned on May 15. This allowed the pioneers to clear John’s Track and reach the coast at the mouth of the Amal River. Concurrently, the commandos secured the Agnes feature, followed by the 2/24th Battalion’s capture of Elbow on May 16. The remaining positions on Hill 105 were then subjected to intensive bombing and bombardment, leading to an Australian assault on May 19. They finally captured the feature the following day. In the meantime, the 2/48th Battalion moved to Agnes to attack the Freda feature on May 14. 

It was now evident that if the Freda hill was to be taken the attack must have heavier support. Therefore, on 22nd May, 12 Liberators and 12 Lightnings were sent out with bombs and napalm, but the cloud was so low that some of the heavy bombers did not find the objective. Then the artillery and mortars fired, and a two-company attack went in, the infantry moving very close behind the barrage. Gooden's company thrust from the east, and Captain Nicholas's advanced with one platoon pushing east along Snags Track towards Track Junction Knoll and another pressing north. The former platoon (Lieutenant Harvey), moving through very difficult country along a razor-back so narrow that only two men could be deployed on it, edged forward under heavy fire; after losing one killed and 4 wounded and finding the enemy becoming stronger Harvey manoeuvred out of this position. It was then found that a wounded man was not with them, so Harvey and three volunteers thrust back and engaged the enemy fiercely while the wounded man was carried out. During the day Gooden's company on the right had encountered two strongly-held knolls. Derrick's platoon succeeded in cutting the saddle between them and taking one knoll. Derrick's platoon and another launched “a most courageous attack up the steep slopes of Knoll 2 in the fading light. Here, in some of the heaviest and most bitter close-in fighting of the whole campaign these two platoons finally reached the top and secured the Knoll after inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy.... [Lance-Sergeant] Fennells time and again ... crawled ahead of the attacking troops, even to within five yards of the enemy, and gained vital information. On one occasion, when his section was forced to ground he had charged the Jap positions with his Owen gun blazing and had silenced the enemy post, killing the occupants. In a similar manner, Private W. R. How found the advance of the troops checked by a well-sited pill-box, raced forward with his Owen firing until within grenade range, and then, throwing grenades, moved in for the kill until he fell wounded. He had silenced the post and killed the machine-gunner, thus allowing the advance to continue.” At this stage 28 enemy dead had been counted; one Australian had been killed and 15 wounded. 

Unfortunately, the Japanese counterattacked the following day, effectively recapturing the position. Following a devastating combination of air and artillery bombardment, the Australians managed to secure Freda and Track Junction Knoll on May 25. During this time, the 2/23rd Battalion remained in close contact with a resolute enemy at Janet and Margy but struggled to make significant progress. The 2/24th Battalion continued probing northward and captured the Droop feature on May 26. After another failed attack on May 29, a heavy air and artillery bombardment supported the 2/23rd as they finally captured Margy on May 31. Concurrently, the 2/24th successfully attacked and held the Poker Hills. On June 1, the 2/48th Battalion then attacked Hill 102, supported by aircraft and machine-gun fire. Lieutenant O'Rourke's platoon attacked, following an artillery barrage as closely as they could, and bringing with them three flame-throwers. They gained the forward slopes without being fired on and then saw five Japanese moving towards them, evidently to re-enter their positions after the bombing. These were fired on while the flame-throwers were brought into action. One operator sprayed the slope from side to side while another fired straight up it. “The result was devastating (said O'Rourke later). The hill was set completely ablaze to a depth of 50 yards, two of the five Japs were set on fire and the other three killed in their posts. The platoon was able to advance almost immediately through the flames, and with the help of the flame-throwers the feature was com-pletely captured within 15 minutes of the advance commencing. The flame which was fired up a slight rise hit the trees on the crest and also sprayed the reverse slope and had the effect of completely demoralising the enemy.“ While the Australians launched an unsuccessful assault on Wally, the 2/23rd Battalion was engaged in clearing out the remaining Japanese forces from Margy and its surrounding areas.

On June 6, the Australians finally secured Wally, and the 2/24th Battalion also managed to capture Roger. In the early hours of June 10, the Japanese launched a counterattack toward Hill 105, but it was easily repelled. At the same time, the defenders began preparing for a withdrawal northeast into the island’s interior, planning to split into independent groups to wage guerrilla warfare. Despite the looming withdrawal, Whitehead’s battalions commenced attacks on Beech 2, Joyce, and Linda on June 11. However, progress was slow over the next three days, with the only notable achievement being the capture of Sandy on June 13. By nightfall that day, the Japanese finally began their withdrawal, leaving behind only rearguards to hold the crucial Essie Track. This allowed the Australians to capture the abandoned features of Linda, Joyce, Clarice, Hilda Paddy, Melon, and Aunty on June 14. The next day, the Australians took Nelly and Faith, but the Japanese rearguard on Essie Ridge managed to temporarily halt their pursuit. Eventually, however, Essie Ridge was overrun, and by June 16, Fukukaku was cleared. The 2/48th Battalion then pursued the Japanese as they fled eastward from Essie. On June 18, they caught a few but found that a large group had scattered into smaller parties. By June 19, patrols were radiating east, north, and west in pursuit, with Japanese forces standing firm at several points. Ultimately, the fall of Hill 90 on June 20 marked the end of organized resistance on Tarakan. Following this victory, Whitehead initiated a mop-up operation that would continue until the war's end. While the 26th Brigade was fighting to secure Tarakan, General Wootten’s 9th Australian Division was preparing to launch the invasion of the Brunei Bay area of north Borneo, codenamed Operation Oboe VI.

At the Manila conference in April General Morshead had learnt that OBOE I (Tarakan), OBOE VI (north Borneo) and OBOE II (Balikpapan) were to be carried out in that order. 34 LSTs would be allotted for OBOE VI but had to be released by 23 days after the landing. There were other fairly severe restrictions on the vessels available: the one boat battalion of the American Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment and the one amphibian tractor battalion allotted to OBOE VI had to be used for Balikpapan. Morshead and his staff arrived back at Morotai from Manila on April 21 and next day the Corps issued its staff study of the north Borneo operation, and the 9th Division's staff, which from April 4 to 17 had been planning an operation against Balikpapan, began preparing an outline plan for an attack on Brunei Bay instead. This was presented to Corps and approved on April 26; the final plan, which contained no major changes, was approved on May 16. Meanwhile a variety of problems had arisen at the Corps level and above. On May 1, 2200 troops and 1200 vehicles (including guns) of the 9th Division were still in the Cairns or Atherton areas awaiting shipment, and some of the stores and equipment were not scheduled to arrive at Morotai until May 25, two days after the proposed date of the landing. It also appeared that, on the day of the landing, the 24th Brigade would lack some unit stores and vehicles, and the 20th Brigade would possess only one battalion; there would be no field or anti-aircraft guns, a shortage of signal vehicles and equipment, no equipment for building wharves and bulk oil storage, and neither of the casualty clearing stations allotted would be present.

Due to a series of issues at the Corps level and above, the invasion plan had been scaled down to a landing by a brigade on Labuan Island and just a battalion on Muara Island, with the operation further postponed to June 10. The strategy involved landing Brigadier Selwyn Porter’s 24th Brigade on Victoria Harbor’s Brown Beaches to capture the Labuan airfield and eliminate all hostile forces on the island. Simultaneously, Brigadier William Windeyer’s 20th Brigade would put ashore the 2/15th Battalion on Muara Island’s White Beach and the 2/17th Battalion on Brunei Bluff’s Green Beach. These units were tasked with capturing Brooketon and securing the southern and western sides of Muara Island, setting the stage for an advance on Brunei Town. Upon capturing these objectives, the 9th Division was to occupy and defend the Brunei Bay-Beaufort area and take control of the Miri-Lutong-Seria regions. Once again, Admiral Barbey’s Naval Attack Force, primarily comprising Admiral Royal’s transports and Admiral Berkey’s cruisers, was designated to facilitate the amphibious movement of troops to Brunei Bay. In preparation for the invasion, American and Australian air forces, under General Kenney’s command, targeted airfields and other military installations, focusing particularly on destroying bridges on the railway to Jesselton to prevent the arrival of reinforcements to Labuan by rail. On June 4, Barbey’s convoy finally departed Morotai, embarking on its 1,100-mile voyage to Brunei Bay. Air attacks intensified on June 5, successfully rendering the Papar River bridge unusable. Four days later, on June 9, the air campaign reached its peak: 54 Liberators and 24 Mitchells launched strikes against targets on Labuan, while 23 Liberators targeted the Brooketon area.

In the meantime, minesweepers successfully cleared a channel into the bay, destroying 69 mines between June 7 and 9. Berkey’s cruisers sailed ahead and shelled the Brown, White, and Green Beaches in the two days leading up to the landings. The convoy finally arrived at the main channel between Labuan Island and Brunei Bluff just before sunrise on June 10, fully prepared to execute the invasion. Opposing them, General Baba’s 37th Army had assembled General Nozaki’s depleted 56th Independent Mixed Brigade in the Brunei Bay sector. This included two battalions near Brunei, one at Beaufort, and one garrisoning Labuan. Additionally, the 553rd Independent Battalion was stationed in the Miri area; however, none of these units were equipped to make a stand at the beaches. At 08:15, Barbey’s warships commenced a bombardment of the southern beaches as the troops were loading onto the landing vessels. Shortly after 09:05, the first waves began to advance, preceded by craft firing rockets and artillery. As anticipated, there was no opposition on the landing areas. The 2/15th Battalion successfully reached the shore at 09:15, followed by the 2/17th Battalion, which made landfall three minutes later, approximately 1,000 yards east of its intended location. By dusk, the 2/15th had scoured the swampy terrain of Muara Island and reported no Japanese presence. The 2/17th pushed forward a few miles along the road to Brunei, while the 2/13th Battalion landed and moved into reserve behind the 2/17th. Meanwhile, the 2/28th Battalion landed without incident at 09:15 and quickly secured Labuan town, with the 2/43rd Battalion following ashore at 09:20 to initiate the advance toward the airfield. 

There was no opposition until 10:45, when the leading troops came under rifle fire just south of Flagstaff Hill. This post was quickly bypassed and taken, but the Australians continued to face strong resistance from the 371st Independent Battalion. Despite this, the defenders could not prevent the 2/43rd from capturing the airfield by nightfall. During the day, Porter also landed the 2/11th Commando Squadron on the unoccupied Hamilton Peninsula, with one troop initiating a move north along Charlie Track. On June 11, while the 2/43rd patrolled north and west, overcoming some opposition, the 2/28th slowly advanced toward the Able and Baker routes, where they encountered the bulk of enemy resistance. Meanwhile, after repelling an enemy patrol overnight, the 2/17th continued its advance to Brunei unopposed, with a company from the 2/15th moving up the Brunei River to land about four miles downstream from the town. The following day, the 2/17th reached and seized the airstrip, finally encountering defenses manned by the 366th Independent Battalion. On Labuan, the 2/43rd moved unopposed to Hamilton Road and successfully linked up with the commandos, leaving behind one company and three tanks to destroy a bypassed stronghold to the northwest. At the same time, the 2/28th probed the strongly held area astride MacArthur Road and to its west, making good progress to compress the resilient enemy into a pocket. On June 13, although the 2/43rd occupied an emergency airstrip at Timbalai, the primary objective remained to continue compressing the enemy into "the Pocket" and mop up the remainder of the island.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

Australian troops, under Brigadier Whitehead, landed on Tarakan, swiftly overcoming Japanese strongholds. By May 20, they began the North Borneo Offensive, achieving significant territorial gains amid brutal combat. As Japanese forces faltered, some surrendered, signaling a turning tide. The campaign showcased immense courage and sacrifice, with heavy casualties on both sides, ultimately paving the way for Allied victories in the Pacific theater.

- 185 - Pacific War Podcast - the Liberation of Mindanao - June 3 - 10, 1945

Last time we spoke about the fall of Shuri. In the unforgiving terrain of Okinawa during May 1945, American Marines confronted fierce resistance from entrenched Japanese forces. Amidst heavy rain and dwindling supplies, General Buckner’s 10th Army battled uphill toward Shuri, a critical stronghold. With communication crumbling and morale wavering, the Americans pressed on, launching daring patrols. The situation reached a turning point when intelligence revealed the Japanese withdrawal plans. Buckner ordered continuous pressure, leading to the capture of significant strategic points like Shuri Castle, which was relentlessly bombarded prior to the Marine assault. On May 29, as the last remnants of Japanese forces fled south, American soldiers swept through Shuri, which lay in utter ruin, a testament to the devastating power of the campaign. 

This episode is the Liberation of Mindanao

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Last week we covered the fall of Shuri and today we continue the brutal brawl for Okinawa and the liberation of Mindanao.

As we last saw, the Japanese retreat from the Shuri line opened the path for General Buckner’s 10th Army to move southward, with only General Fujioka’s 62nd Division and a few minor rearguards standing in their way. On June 3, General Arnold’s 7th Division continued its offensive to the south. Colonel Pachler’s 17th Regiment successfully secured the area of Itokazu. Meanwhile, Colonel Green’s 184th Regiment pushed toward the coast to completely cut off the Chinen Peninsula. Colonel Finn’s 32nd Regiment was diverted into the rugged hills nearby to clean up any remaining resistance. To the west, despite persistent bad weather and challenging supply conditions, General Bradley’s 96th Division also achieved success. Colonel May’s 383rd Regiment secured the locations of Kamizato and Tera against relatively light resistance. At the same time, Colonel Halloran’s 381st Regiment advanced to seize the entire Inasomi area. Looking northwest, General Del Valle’s 1st Marine Division encountered stronger opposition. The bulk of the 5th Marines managed to push only as far as Tsukasa before being pinned down. In a strategic move, Colonel Griebel’s 2nd Battalion executed a wide swing through May’s rear area to capture the Gisushi region. Colonel Snedeker’s 7th Marines made steady progress through the Kokuba Valley, facing small enemy blocking forces, in order to extend the line held by the 5th Marines. Meanwhile, at sea, Admiral Ugaki launched his 9th mass Kikisui attack. This operation, featuring just 50 kamikaze aircraft, faced heavy obstacles due to Typhoon Viper but still managed to damage 2 vessels. In another development, after successfully occupying Torishima Island on May 12, Colonel Clarence Wallace’s 8th Marines landed on Iheyajima without encountering any opposition. In addition, preparations for the shore-to-shore assault of General Shepherd’s 6th Marine Division were completed. Colonel Shapley’s 4th Marines were set to land on the Nishikoku beaches before securing the Oroku Peninsula and its airfield. Consequently, during the early hours of June 4, Shepherd’s Reconnaissance Company successfully assaulted Ono-Yama Island, while Shapley’s assault battalions began the shore-to-shore movement to Nishikoku under the cover of artillery and naval bombardment. Despite some mechanical failures on the LVTs, the Marines successfully landed at 06:00 under sporadic machine-gun fire and then pushed onto the high ground 300 yards inland against minor resistance. After securing the initial foothold, the attack slowed against increasing resistance on the left flank. Because of this, the reserve 3rd Battalion was landed at 08:45 and subsequently advanced to the edge of the airdrome. 

During the day development of the enemy's defense had revealed an inordinate number of automatic weapons, ranging in various calibers up to 40mm. Subsequently, it was disclosed that the Japanese had stripped the armament from the air defenses and damaged aircraft in the area and integrated these weapons into the ground fortifications to stiffen materially the resistance on Oroku. Besides meeting with the most extensive mine fields yet encountered during the campaign, on this day the 6th Division had its first contact with an awesome weapon: an 8-inch rocket that exploded with terrific concussion. However, there was little fragmentation and accuracy was poor. While the noise the huge projectiles made, tumbling through the air end over end, sounded "like a locomotive from hell" to the troops, the rockets were mainly a source of annoyance and caused few casualties. Rockets continued to fall in the rear areas during the night, snipers and infiltrators were active, and the entire front came under intermittent heavy mortar fire. This landing allowed Shepherd to bring in Colonel Whaling’s 29th Marines by midday, which then secured the Kikibana area of Naha Bay, while the 4th Marines captured one-third of Naha’s airfield. To the east, the Americans encountered less resistance than before, as the 62nd Division and other minor rearguards completed their withdrawal from the intermediate lines south of Shuri to a reserve area south of the new Kiyamu Peninsula lines. Recognizing this change, Buckner shifted the corps boundary to the west, assigning General Geiger’s 3rd Amphibious Corps the task of isolating the Oroku Peninsula and occupying the Itoman-Kunishi sector, while General Hodge’s 24th Corps advanced toward the Yaeju Dake-Yuza Dake escarpment. 

As a result, the 7th Marines were able to move south to seize Takanyuta and isolate Admiral Ota's forces on the Oroku Peninsula. The atrocious weather had converted the already muddy roads to impassable morasses. Transport was hopelessly mired north of the Kokuba Gawa. South of the river the "trails were only negotiable by foot troops, vehicles could not have been used" even if it had been possible to bring them across the inlet. The 5th Marines managed to secure the Hill 107 area without opposition before being relieved by Colonel Mason’s 1st Marines. However, the 1st Marines were unable to continue their push south toward Shindawaku Ridge due to a flooded stream. Meanwhile, Mason’s 3rd Battalion attempted a wide envelopment through the 96th Division zone but was quickly halted in front of Tera. Food was scarce, but through the wholehearted cooperation of the 96th Division the Marines procured two meals of K rations per man. It was the considered opinion of at least one member of 3/1 that "this day probably was the most miserable spent on Okinawa by men of this battalion." To compound these problems and discomforts, the 3d Battalion also found itself without a supply route or communications with the regiment 11,000 yards to the rear.

Further east, the 383rd Regiment advanced rapidly, engaging isolated but strong enemy delaying groups as they secured the outskirts of Iwa. Matching this progress, the 381st Regiment advanced all the way to the hills north of Aragusuku, facing steadily increasing resistance. Additionally, while the 17th Regiment established positions controlling the Minatoga-Meka road, the 184th Regiment advanced against patchy and ineffective resistance until the Minatoga area was secured. The following morning, Admiral McCain’s Task Force 38 launched strikes on Okinawa and Kyushu. Unfortunately, poor situational awareness from Admiral Halsey caused the 3rd Fleet to inadvertently enter Typhoon Viper. This storm inflicted varying degrees of damage to four carriers, two escort carriers, three cruisers, one destroyer, and one tanker, while also destroying 76 planes. Additionally, kamikaze attacks succeeded in damaging the battleship Mississippi and heavy cruiser Louisville. Back on Okinawa, Shepherd’s attack on the Oroku Peninsula commenced and progressed slowly but steadily against uniformly stubborn resistance. The 4th Marines secured most of the airfield and the Toma high ground, while the 29th Marines fought laboriously to advance toward Mura and Oroku, gaining up to 1,000 yards.

To the east, the 7th Marines advanced to positions just north of Hanja, while the 1st Marines bypassed the inundated area in front of them by swinging east and following their 3rd Battalion toward Iwa. In fact, Mason’s 3rd Battalion launched another attack aimed at Shindawaku Ridge, advancing over 3,000 yards to the area west of Iwa. Despite muddy conditions and rainy weather, Hodge’s infantrymen continued to penetrate the enemy outpost zone, developing the edges of the main Japanese battle position. The outpost line of Kiyamu Peninsula was fully manned on June 4. Japanese Army headquarters estimated that the strength of its now concentrated forces totaled 30000, distributed as follows: 24th Division and attached units, 12000; 62nd Division and attached units, 7000; 44th IMB and attached units, 3000; 5th Artillery Command and attached units, 3000; and units directly under 32nd Army command, 5000. The difference in total strength between the 50000-man estimate late in May and the 30000 left in Kiyamu Peninsula was attributed to "attrition during retirement operations." Only about 20% of the remaining troops were survivors of the original crack infantry-artillery units; the rest were untrained rear echelon personnel or Boeitai. Most senior commanders at battalion level and above were still alive, however, and capable of bolstering the fighting spirit of their motley collection of men. But the 32nd Army had suffered grievous losses in weapons and equipment since L-Day. Hand grenades and explosives were almost entirely expended. 4 out of every 5 machine guns had been destroyed, and the supply of heavy infantry cannon and mortars had been reduced to the vanishing point. Despite the fact that 2 150mm guns, 16 150mm howitzers, and 10 AAA guns had been successfully withdrawn to the Kiyamu battle position, artillery ammunition levels were insufficient for more than 10 days of sustained firing. General Ushijima's 32nd Army was in desperate straits, its destruction merely a question of time, but the tradition, discipline, and indoctrination of Japanese military forces promised only a violent, last-ditch, man-to-man struggle before the battle for Okinawa was ended.

By June 6, the 7th Division reached the outskirts of Gushichan, and the 96th Division advanced toward Shindawaku and Tomui. To the west, the 1st Marines finally captured Shindawaku and cleared the bypassed area behind them. Meanwhile, the 7th Marines attacked toward Hill 108, advancing 1,000 yards before encountering stiff resistance and ultimately dug in around Dakiton. Additionally, Colonel Roberts’ 22nd Marines arrived to contain the Oroku Peninsula in the Hill 103 sector. Although the 29th Marines and Shapley’s 1st Battalion made little progress in the Oroku-Mura area due to strong enemy resistance. Meanwhile the terrain confronting the 3rd Battalion there "consisted of a series of small temple-like hills, each of which had been converted into a fortress . . . from which mutually supporting automatic weapons could cover adjacent positions and deny the open ground between the hills." These gun positions were well dug-in and impervious to artillery fire. Because the narrow roads in the area had been made impassable by mines and shell cratering, tank support was not forthcoming, and a day of bitter fighting netted 3/29 a gain of a scant 150 yards. The remainder of the 4th Marines attacked Naha Airfield where counter fire from tanks, artillery, and support craft was immediately laid down. An urgent call for an air strike on the island was answered in less than half an hour, and "as rack after rack of bombs fell on the Nip positions, the troops stood up and cheered." The artillery piece was soon silenced, but 20mm fire was received spasmodically. Nevertheless, 3/4 pressed forward with its open flank covered by continued air strikes on Senaga Shima and completed the capture of Naha airfield before noon, whence they pushed south toward Gushi. At sea, kamikaze attacks crashed into and damaged two destroyer minesweepers, while also causing further damage to escort carrier Natoma Bay and destroyer Anthony on June 7. That day, Shepherd’s Marines faced stiff resistance all along the front. The 4th Marines reduced Little Sugar Loaf where stiff resistance and bitter fighting characterized the action in the center and on the left of the 4th Marines' area. However, the attack forged ahead against machine-gun fire coming "from everywhere," while "countless caves were methodically cleaned out and sealed by the old process of direct fire, flame, and demolitions."Meanwhile the 29th Marines entered Oroku, and the 22nd Marines captured Hill 103 and the area south of Tamigusuki. 

To the southeast, the 7th Marines overran Hanja and Hill 108, ultimately digging in just north of Zawa and linking up with the 1st Marines, which also advanced up to 1,200 yards as they secured Hill 75 and pushed toward Yuza. Further east, the primary offensive efforts of the 7th and 96th Divisions on June 7 and 8 were focused on probing enemy defenses and advancing assault battalions to more favorable positions for an attack. Additionally, by the afternoon of June 8, the 32nd Regiment successfully relieved the exhausted 184th in the Gushichan area. On that same day, the 1st Marines pressed forward to the high ground overlooking the Mukue River, while the 7th Marines moved through Zawa and began probing enemy positions in Itoman, encountering stiffened resistance. The first LVT's, supported by LVTa's, arrived at the newly-uncovered beaches at noon on 8 June, and shortly thereafter General Hodge sent General del Valle "congratulations for cutting the island in two."

Meanwhile, on Oroku, the 29th Marines made little progress as they stalled at a key ridgeline on the left. The 4th Marines committed all three of their battalions to the attack, successfully securing the areas of Hill 39 and Gushi Ridge. The 22nd Marines continued to pivot on their right, seizing Hill 55 and making good progress along the front toward Chiwa and Tomigusuki. On June 9, although the 22nd Marines managed to secure Hill 55 and push to Hill 28, little advancement was achieved to the north. Concurrently, the 4th Marines were able to slowly push to the outskirts of Chiwa and Uibaru, with patrols clearing out Chiwa and Whaling’s 3rd Battalion extending the front to the north. The action in the zone of the 4th Marines on 9 June remained unchanged from that of preceding days: “The advance was still slow and tedious against bitter resistance. Every Jap seemed to be armed with a machine gun, and there was still the same light and heavy mortar fire. Casualties continued to mount and the number of Japs killed soared over the maximum of 1500 which were supposed to be defending and there were still plenty left.”

In the meantime, to the south, Del Valle sent strong patrols across the Mukue, which began to encounter significant enemy resistance. Consequently, the 7th Marines were unable to push toward Tera and Itoman. Further east, Hodge finally launched a corps attack to the south. The 96th Division focused its efforts on softening the enemy positions on the escarpment in front of them, while the 7th Division carried out the offensive. The 32nd Regiment attempted to attack the eastern end of Hill 95 but was unsuccessful; however, they managed to locate and identify the most troublesome sources of enemy fire for destruction. On a more positive note, the 17th Regiment gained a precarious foothold on the southern end of Yaeju Dake, just north of Nakaza, where they would withstand several Japanese counterattacks throughout the night. The first and greatest obstacle confronting Wallace's attack was the open ground over which both assault companies had to move. Wallace used all available support and the men camouflaged themselves with grass and rice plants, but enemy fire began almost as soon as the leading platoons moved into the open. The infantrymen crawled through the slimy rice paddies on their stomachs. Within an hour Company I was strung from the line of departure to the base of the objective which two squads had reached. About this time the Japanese opened fire with another machine gun, separating the advance squads with a band of fire. This left one squad to continue the attack; the remainder of the company was unable to move, cut off by fire or strung across the rice paddies. Those men in the squad still free to operate lifted and pulled each other to the edge of the cliff and crawled quietly forward through the high grass on top. Pfc. Ignac A. Zeleski, a BAR man, moved so stealthily that he almost touched the heels of one Japanese. Zeleski killed him, and the other men killed eight more Japanese within the first ten minutes. Another squad reached the top of the escarpment about an hour later but was caught in cross and grazing fire from three machine guns, and the entire 8-man squad was killed. Gradually, however, a few more men reached the top, and by evening there were twenty men from Company I holding a small area at the escarpment rim. Company K had a similar experience. Accurate enemy fire killed one man, wounded two others, and halted the company when it was from 200 to 300 yards from its objective. For forty-five minutes the attack dragged on until S/Sgt. Lester L. Johnson and eight men maneuvered forward through enemy fire, gained the high ground, and concentrated their fire on the enemy machine gun that was firing on the remainder of the company. This did not silence the gun but did prevent the gunner from aiming well, and Johnson waved for the rest of the company to follow. By 1330 of 9 June Company K was consolidated on the southeastern tip of the Yaeju-Dake. That evening, three small but determined counterattacks, with sustained grenade fire between each attempt, hit the small force from Company I, which held off the attackers with a light machine gun and automatic rifles. Additionally, Wallace’s 1st Battalion successfully landed unopposed on Aguni Island to establish air warning and fighter director installations. 

However, it’s now time to leave Okinawa and shift our focus to the Philippines to cover the continuation of General Eichelberger’s Mindanao Campaign. As we last saw, by May 3, General Sibert’s 10th Corps had successfully invaded the island and secured the key Kabacan road junction. General Woodruff’s 24th Division occupied Digos and Davao, while General Martin’s 31st Division advanced up the Sayre Highway toward Kibawe. Thanks to the arrival of the 162nd Regiment from Zamboanga, the 31st Division was now able to send another regiment, the 155th, to assist in the push north against General Morozumi’s 30th Division. In response to the rapid advance of the 31st Division as far as Kibawe, Morozumi was assembling his units at Malaybalay in preparation for a retreat eastward to the Agusan Valley. He dispatched the 3rd Battalion of the 74th Regiment to the south to delay the Americans in the vicinity of Maramag, at least until May 10.

Meanwhile, after capturing Davao, Woodruff’s goal was to mop up the sector and destroy General Harada’s 100th Division in the mountainous interior. The 100th Division located the southern anchor of its defenses at Catigan, 13 miles southwest of Davao, and the northern anchor in hills some twelve miles north of Davao. The Davao River, flowing generally south-southeast into Davao Gulf at Davao, divided the defensive forces into two groupments. The Right Sector Unit, west of the river, was composed of 5 infantry battalions, 3 regular and 2 provisional. The territory east of the river was the responsibility of the Left Sector Unit--2 regular infantry battalions, 2 provisional battalions, and the Air Force's Hosono Unit of ill-armed service personnel. The Right and Left Sector Units had a little artillery attached, for General Harada kept under his direct control most of the artillery as well as many engineer and service units. As a reserve Harada had about a battalion of regular infantry. The central and strongest portion of Harada's defenses rested its right on rising ground overlooking Libby Airdrome, two miles northwest of Talomo on the coast. From this point the central defenses, along which Harada initially deployed three battalions, extended eastward across the Talomo River and some rough hills to the west bank of the Davao River. The focal point of the central defenses was Mintal, four miles up Route 1-D from Talomo. Anticipating ultimate withdrawal into the mountains via Route 1-D, the southeastern section of the so-called Kibawe-Talomo trail, Harada had prepared defenses in depth along the highway and along ancillary roads paralleling it. Much of the region west of the Davao River from Talomo northwest twelve miles to Calinan was covered with overgrown abaca, or hemp, plantations. Resembling banana plants, and growing to a height of about 20 feet, the abaca plants had originally been planted in rows 10 feet apart, with 10 feet between plants. With harvesting slack during the war, the plantations had become thick with shoots, and older plants had grown to a foot or so in diameter. Plants of various sizes were, in April 1945, scarcely a foot apart. Visibility was virtually nil, and the heat at the hemp plantations was like that of an oven.

With the 162nd Regiment taking control of Digos and the area stretching from Illana Bay's shores inland to Kabacan, Woodruff was now free to utilize his entire division to engage the enemy forces in the Davao area. At the start of May, the 21st Regiment had already launched an attack to clear Libby Airdrome, Route 1-D between Mintal and Talomo, and Mintal itself. They successfully reached Mintal by May 3, effectively forcing Harada to reinforce his defenses near the Talomo River. Although the airdrome was cleared two days later, subsequent efforts up Route 1-D toward Mintal were repelled by fiercely defending Japanese forces. Due to this resistance, elements of the 34th Regiment attempted to drive north along the high ground on the east bank of the Talomo River to bypass the Japanese defenses on Route 1-D. On May 8, the 21st Regiment finally crossed to the east side at Mintal; however, in the face of Japanese artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire, they had to withdraw back to the west bank two days later. At the same time, the 19th Regiment was expanding its hold in the Davao area, striking into the high ground controlling the coast road immediately west of the Davao River on May 10. They also cleared scattered Japanese strongpoints on hills just north of Davao and on Samal Island. Two days later, the 21st Regiment again attacked northward along the east bank of the Talomo, successfully clearing out numerous positions from which the Japanese had directed fire on Route 1-D. By May 14, the highway all the way north to Mintal was finally secured.

In the meantime, the 124th Regiment started north from Kibawe on May 6. However, the recently arrived Japanese defenders at Maramag managed to delay the occupation of this town until May 12, thus accomplishing their task more than adequately. Despite this success, Eichelberger had shrewdly sensed that Morozumi would attempt to make a last stand in the hills northwest of Davao. Therefore, he decided to land the 108th Regiment behind enemy lines in the Macajalar Bay area to expedite the conquest of Mindanao and open a new supply route to the 31st Division. Accordingly, on May 10, the 108th Regiment landed unopposed along the southeastern shore of Macajalar Bay, making contact almost immediately with guerrilla units operating in the region. This regiment then drove down the Sayre Highway to meet the 31st Division advancing from the south, encountering no significant resistance until May 13, when it faced strong Japanese defenses near Dalirig. With its rear protected by the recently landed 3rd Battalion of the 164th Regiment, the 108th proceeded to attack the enemy positions with great intensity, finally forcing the Japanese to retreat to the area east of Malaybalay by May 16. Concurrently, on May 13, the 155th Regiment passed through the 124th Regiment to continue the drive northward, meeting little opposition but facing supply problems. By May 20, the Americans finally reached the outskirts of Malaybalay, where fire from remnants of the 30th Field Artillery Regiment halted their advance. Realizing that the regiment could not haul its weapons into the mountains east of Malaybalay, Morozumi had left the unit at Malaybalay to fight a rear-guard action, which was successful in keeping the 155th Infantry out of the town until late on 21 May. On 22 and 23 May the 155th continued up Sayre Highway, encountering elements of Morozumi's Northern Sector Unit that had not learned that American troops had reached Malaybalay and were still withdrawing southward to join the 30th Division's main body. Pressed by troops of the 108th Infantry, 40th Division, which had already landed at Macajalar Bay, the retreating forces gave the 155th Infantry little trouble and, about 1400 on 23 May, the 155th made contact with the 108th Infantry near Impalutao, twelve miles northwest of Malaybalay. Its share in the task of clearing Sayre Highway cost the 31st Division approximately 90 men killed and 250 wounded, while the 108th Infantry, 40th Division, lost roughly 15 men killed and 100 wounded. Together, the two units killed almost 1,000 Japanese during their operations along the highway, and captured nearly 25 more. Nevertheless, the 30th Division had managed to escape east this time to establish new positions near Silae.

Back in Davao, on May 15, Woodruff directed the 21st and 34th Regiments to attack abreast to the north and northwest, targeting the Japanese center. Meanwhile, the 19th Regiment advanced north to clear the northeastern shores of Davao Gulf, link up with the guerrilla forces north of the gulf, and ultimately swing westward against the 100th Division's left flank forces. Surprised by the lack of enemy attacks against his flanks, Harada concluded that the American forces intended to neglect his flanks in favor of a frontal assault on his center. As a result, he weakened the defenses of the Left Sector Unit to reinforce the Mintal line, leaving only Admiral Doi’s air-naval troops to defend his left flank. On May 17, Woodruff renewed his offensive. The 19th Regiment struck north to establish contact with the guerrilla 107th Division, while the 34th Regiment began clearing the coastal hills between the Talomo and Davao Rivers and attacked northwest toward Tugbok. The 21st Regiment also drove north toward Tugbok in the face of determined opposition. Progress in the following days was slow due to intense artillery, machine-gun, rocket, mortar, and rifle fire. However, by May 27, the 21st Regiment seized the Tugbok area, with the 34th Regiment arriving the next day to relieve them. As Harada’s strongest defenses had been breached, he ordered a general withdrawal to a hastily established second line crossing Route 1-D in the vicinity of Ula. Furthermore, the 19th Regiment managed to establish contact with the guerrillas by May 24 as it secured Route 1 north of Davao.

On May 29, the 19th Regiment struck westward toward Doi's Mandog defenses, closing in two days later to engage the naval troops in fierce combat. Concurrently, on May 30, the 34th Regiment attacked toward Ula, which fell easily the following day, though progress then slowed in the face of fanatic resistance. Reinforced by the recently arrived 3rd Battalion of the 163rd Regiment on June 4, the 34th began to make headway beyond Ula on the secondary road, gaining one mile by June 6 before swinging east toward Mandog. The next day, having overrun Doi’s outer defenses, the 19th Regiment advanced steadily into the main positions near Mandog, which ultimately fell by June 9, just as the 34th was reaching the area. Continuing northward, the 34th was almost three miles north of Ula along both roads and found few signs of organized Japanese resistance by June 11. However, the 19th Regiment would not clear the hills north of Mandog until June 15. In the meantime, the 21st Regiment struck north from Lamogan on May 31 along secondary roads west of Route 1-D, ultimately seizing Wangan on June 16 and forcing Harada’s battered forces to commence a full retreat northward in disarray. After the fall of Culanan three days later, Harada finally decided to retreat to a new line near the Bannos River. Yet Woodruff’s troops continued to pursue them, rapidly crossing the Tamogan River and inflicting heavy casualties on the retreating enemy until they reached the mountain barrio of Kibangay on June 26, where the pursuit was finally halted.

Looking back to the north, with Sayre Highway cleared, the 124th Regiment began probing into the mountains to the east in late May, encountering heavy resistance, rough terrain, bad weather, and supply problems. Nevertheless, by June 5, Morozumi abandoned his plan to hold the Silae area for a month and slowly began moving his best troops eastward toward Waloe in the Agusan River valley, harassed by Filipino guerrillas along the way. In the end, Silae was finally occupied on June 9, with troops of the 108th Regiment pushing further to the Bobonawan River four days later. Additionally, the 155th Regiment arrived on the Pulangi River on June 12, while elements of the 162nd Regiment struck twenty miles into the mountains east from Maramag by June 26. On June 25, the 1st Battalion of the 155th Regiment successfully landed on Butuan Bay and managed to reach Waloe before the Japanese on June 27, dispersing the 3rd Battalion of the 41st Regiment that was holding the area. However, the Japanese retreat was so slow that Morozumi was still assembling his forces about seven miles up the Agusan from Waloe by the end of the war. 

Far to the northwest, units of the 31st Division had been probing southeast along the upper section of the Kibawe-Talomo trail ever since early May, and on the 11th of that month a battalion combat team of the 167th Infantry launched the reconnaissance-in-force directed by General Sibert.  Japanese along this section of the trail, about 1,000 men in all, comprised a conglomerate mass of service troops with a small leavening of infantry. Control was vested in General Tomochika, chief of staff of the 35th Army, who had set up a small headquarters groupment near barrio Pinamola, about twenty miles southeast of Kibawe. The Japanese force had a defensive potential far greater than its strength and nature would indicate, for the terrain gave the Japanese every conceivable advantage. Bounded on both sides by dense jungle and thick rain forest, the trail as far as Pinamola ran up and down steep ridges and was scarcely jeep-wide. Rains of late May soon rendered all sections of the trail completely impassable to wheeled vehicles, and supplies had to come in by airdrop, supplemented when possible by hand-carrying parties and laden Carabaos. The mud was so deep that often troops had to pull, push, or even jack the Carabaos out of gooey holes. Delayed by the Japanese, the terrain, and the weather, the 167th Infantry's battalion did not reach the Pulangi River, thirteen miles southeast of Kibawe, until 29 May. 

Then, although the Japanese from the trail could no longer offer any threat to the 31st Division, the battalion continued south toward Pinamola, aided considerably by guerrillas. The remnants of the 1st Battalion, 74th Infantry, and the South Sector Unit, 30th Division, which had been driven into the mountains along Highway 3 by the swift American advance in central Mindanao had meanwhile been attached to Tomochika’s forces early in June. Troops of the 167th Infantry finally reached Pinamola on 30 June as the remaining Japanese were withdrawing southward another eight miles to the crossing of the Kuluman River. Progress as far as Pinamola had cost the 167th Infantry approximately 60 men killed and 180 wounded, while the Japanese had lost almost 400 killed along the same section of the trail. Elements of the 167th Infantry held along the northwestern section of the Kibawe-Talomo trail until the end of the war, and as of 15 August the regiment was preparing to send troops across the Kuluman River to continue the advance southeastward. On that date nearly 30 miles of Japanese-improved trail, only 19 air miles--still separated the 167th Infantry from guerrilla units operating in the vicinity of Kibangay. Organized remnants of Harada's 100th Division holed up until the end of the war in rugged terrain north of this 30-mile stretch of the trail.

Finally, the 24th Reconnaissance Troop successfully landed on the southeastern shore of Sarangani Bay on July 4 to establish contact with the guerrilla 116th Regiment, subsequently clearing the bay's shores against negligible resistance. On July 12, the 1st Battalion of the 21st Regiment landed on the northwest shore, just as two provisional battalions were arriving in the area from different directions. The three forces began to clear the area, successfully locating and destroying the only Japanese unit in the region by July 25. This concluded the campaign in Mindanao, during which the Americans suffered 820 men killed and 2,880 wounded. In turn, almost 10,540 Japanese were killed in eastern Mindanao by June 30, with the pursuing Filipino-American units killing another 2,325 Japanese by the war's end. Roughly 600 Japanese prisoners were captured, over 250 of whom were civilians, before August. After the war, about 22,250 Japanese troops and 11,900 civilians turned themselves in. It is also estimated that an additional 8,235 Japanese lost their lives due to starvation and disease between April and the war's end.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

In the spring of 1945, the fierce battle for Okinawa escalated as General Buckner's troops captured crucial strongholds, pushing the Japanese forces into retreat. Meanwhile the liberation of Mindanao was kicking up. American forces launched a rapid invasion, confronting Japanese defenders who were heavily fortified in the mountainous regions. Despite the stubborn resistance, American troops relentlessly battled, ultimately culminating in significant victories and paving the way for liberation.

- 184 - Pacific War Podcast - the Fall of Shuri - May 27 - June 3, 1945

Last time we spoke about the breakthrough on Okinawa. Despite relentless attacks on critical positions like Sugar Loaf Hill and Wana Ridge, American Marines encountered heavy casualties. Yet, they persisted, inching forward against tenacious resistance. As mid-May approached, the situation for Japanese commanders deteriorated. Encircled and suffering significant losses, they began plotting a retreat to more defensible positions. On the ground, Marines battled through mud and enemy fire, showcasing incredible resolve amidst dire circumstances. Communication crumbled, supplies dwindled, and morale waned, yet the determination of both sides was undeniable. By late May, the tides shifted further in favor of the Allies, marking pivotal breakthroughs despite the challenges. Amidst ruin and chaos, the relentless struggle for control over Okinawa symbolized the brutal nature of war and the unwavering spirit of those fighting on both sides, setting the stage for an eventual Allied victory. 

This episode is the Fall of Shuri

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

As we last left off, the battle for Okinawa was reaching a critical juncture. General Buckner’s 10th Army had made significant gains, successfully breaking through the fortified Japanese defenses on both flanks. The 6th Marine Division, under General Shepherd, had effectively established control over the Naha area, while General Arnold’s 7th Division achieved an impressive penetration at Yonabaru. However, despite these advancements, the remainder of the American forces faced formidable obstacles. They were grappling with relentless rain, fierce enemy resistance, and severe supply shortages, which left them effectively stalled in front of Shuri. In response to the encroaching American forces, General Ushijima had dispatched General Fujioka’s 62nd Division to launch a counter-offensive aimed at driving the invaders out of Yonabaru. Meanwhile, Ushijima was preparing his 32nd Army for a strategic withdrawal south to the Kiyamu Peninsula. Fortunately for the Americans, they had caught wind of the defenders' intentions. Recognizing the urgency of the situation, on May 27, General Buckner ordered his troops to apply strong and unrelenting pressure on the enemy. The goal was clear: keep the Japanese forces off balance and prevent an easy transition to new defensive positions. Although the continuing downpour hindered the possibility of a large-scale, coordinated army-wide attack, it did not deter Buckner’s strategy. Instead, he initiated a series of strong combat patrols along the front lines, which immediately encountered stiff resistance from Japanese troops that had not yet begun their withdrawal. On the west coast, as patrols from Colonel Roberts’ 22nd Marines scouted the area, they discovered that the Japanese had largely abandoned Naha. This news spurred the 2nd Battalion into action. They crossed the Asato River, moved through the lines established by Shepherd’s Reconnaissance Company, and pressed deeper into the western part of Naha. Simultaneously, Colonel Shapley’s 4th Marines made their last desperate push to extend American control into eastern Naha, fighting valiantly against the entrenched enemy. Farther east, Colonel Finn’s 32nd Regiment once again faced fierce resistance from the hastily committed 62nd Division, which staunchly defended its position. However, not all was lost; patrols from Colonel Green’s 184th Regiment managed to reach Inasomi, meeting only scattered resistance. This breakthrough provided a crucial indication that the enemy had no intention of withdrawing into the Chinen Peninsula.

As the clocks struck midnight, a significant yet largely unnoticed transition occurred in the waters off Okinawa: Admiral Halsey’s 3rd Fleet relieved Admiral Spruance’s 5th Fleet. For the troops ashore, this change in command went by without a hint of recognition. The same ships and task groups continued their crucial support for ground operations, now operating under new numerical designations and leadership. However, Halsey faced an immediate challenge as Admiral Ugaki launched an extensive Kikisui attack, a large-scale kamikaze assault involving 110 enemy aircraft. The day of May 27 proved costly, with three destroyers, one destroyer minesweeper, two transports, one subchaser, and two auxiliary ships all suffering damage. The following morning brought clear skies, which only heightened the danger for American naval forces. Several kamikaze aircraft succeeded in sinking the destroyer USS Drexler, while also inflicting damage on a transport ship, three freighters, and a landing craft throughout the day. Meanwhile, on land, Colonel Whaling’s rehabilitated 29th Marines took over from the battered 4th Marines along the west coast. The 1st Battalion executed a concerted attack alongside the 22nd Marines, advancing successfully by 250 yards through the rubble-strewn city of Naha. In an impressive display of momentum, Roberts’ men pushed forward unopposed toward the Kokuba estuary, eventually encountering resistance near Ono-Yama Island. To the east, the improvement in weather allowed Colonel Mason’s 1st Marines to launch a coordinated offensive. The 2nd Battalion fought valiantly, climbing to the peak of 110 Meter Hill. The forward elements of Company E gained the hill crest but were forced to withdraw by vicious enemy fire which raked their positions. Lieutenant Colonel Magee felt that his depleted battalion, down to a total strength of 277 men in the rifle companies, might recapture the hill, but "it could not possibly hold it against a strong enemy counterattack." Although new replacements were available to regiments for training or other use, a division order prevented their being sent to front line units during a battle situation that called for the utmost in skill and knowledge of veterans. Throughout most of the morning and all of the afternoon, 2/1 concentrated the fire of its supporting weapons on the reverse slopes of 110 Meter Hill and engaged the Japanese in a fierce and continuous fire fight. Nightfall brought no cessation of enemy resistance, and many infiltrators were killed in the battalion's lines. In contrast, the 3rd Battalion experienced relatively little opposition, allowing some patrols to penetrate into Wana Draw. At the same time, Colonel Griebel’s 3rd Battalion effectively moved its front line to the Asato River, while his 1st Battalion achieved a significant milestone by capturing Beehive Hill. However, despite the break in the rain, the conditions on the ground rendered large-scale movements impractical, stalling further advances across the battlefield.

Despite Arnold’s determined efforts to push west through Fujioka’s blocking positions, progress was minimal. Nevertheless, he was able to consolidate his grip on the Ozato hill mass as Green’s 2nd Battalion advanced to a position within 1,000 yards of Shinazato, strategically located at the neck of the Chinen Peninsula. The lack of success from the 62nd Division in driving back the breaching American forces reinforced General Ushijima’s resolve to evacuate Shuri while the opportunity still existed. In light of this, he ordered the withdrawal to commence the following evening. On May 29, while the 7th Reconnaissance Troop managed to scout a significant portion of the Chinen Peninsula without incident, the 7th and 96th Divisions faced fierce resistance as they attacked toward the road network south of Shuri. The enemy’s resolute defense resulted in only minimal gains for the American assault units. General Bruce's 77th Division, after what can be described as "a day almost entirely spent in hand-to-hand combat," found itself unable to penetrate the intense cordon of defensive fire that protected the Japanese positions. In stark contrast, to the west, Griebel’s 1st Battalion made a rapid advance, quickly gaining the crest of Shuri Ridge. They launched a bold assault on Shuri Castle.

On May 25, as part of the final stages of the Okinawa campaign, the American battleship USS Mississippi bombarded the castle for three days, and by May 27, it was engulfed in flames. That night, the Japanese forces retreated, abandoning Shuri while US troops pursued them southward. The 1st Battalion of the 5th Marines had started its attack on 29 May with Companies B and C in assault and Company A following in trace of Company C. The Marines quickly gained the crest of Shuri Ridge and Lieutenant Colonel Shelburne requested permission for one of his companies to storm Shuri Castle which commanded his position. Although the castle was in the zone of action of the 77th Infantry Division, General del Valle gave his assent to the request in view of the great danger of enemy action from the strong point. The 1st Marine Division commander felt that "at that time the position of the 77th Division was such that it would have taken several hard day's fighting through enemy resistance" before the castle could be taken. Company A drove east along the muddy ridge line, overwhelming the few Japanese in its path, and by 1015 the castle, core of the Shuri bastion, had been secured. The Marine unit entered Shuri through a gap in the covering forces caused by the withdrawal of the 3d Battalion, 15th Independent Mixed Regiment of the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade, in the course of the Japanese retreat from Shuri. This seems to have been the only notable instance of confusion and mistake in the Japanese withdrawal operation as a whole. Everywhere else around Shuri the Japanese still held their covering positions in the front lines. The 77th Division, which had scheduled air strikes and a heavy artillery bombardment on the castle heights for 29 May, received little prior warning of the Marines' assault and "was barely able to avert [its] called strikes in time." Without taking any credit away from Company A of the 5th Marines for its feat of capturing Shuri Castle, its success was clearly the result of the combined effort of all the assault and support troops of Tenth Army which had maintained relentless pressure on the enemy defenses and paved the way for the breakthrough. 

Capitalizing on this momentum, General Del Valle swiftly reorganized his forces to bypass Wana Draw and consolidate these crucial gains. Meanwhile, Griebel’s 3rd Battalion maneuvered down the division boundary, reaching a position just 2,000 yards from the village of Kokuba, prompting Whaling’s 3rd Battalion to push their lines forward by approximately 600 yards. In a coordinated effort, the 29th Marines executed a wheeling assault on 29 May with 1/29 pivoting on 3/29 and attacking south and then east to bring the regiment on line with the 22d Marines. The ultimate objective of the 1st Battalion's attack was the high ground northwest of Shichina. The approach to the objective was over low and open terrain which drew the comment from regiment that it was "about as suitable to fighting as a billiard table." Fire from strong points in tombs and caves on the small hills and ridges to the front kept the advance to a slow pace, and the assault companies, A and C, dug in slightly to the left rear of the positions of the 22d Marines at nightfall. On another front, Roberts’ 1st Battalion successfully crossed the Kokuba River and advanced toward Telegraph Hill in east Naha. However, despite their efforts, intense fighting erupted throughout the day without yielding any significant gains.

Back at sea, the threat of kamikaze attacks returned with ferocity, yet this time, American defenses held strong, resulting in only a single destroyer and one transport sustaining damage. As night fell, the Japanese began their long-anticipated withdrawal. General Amamiya’s 24th Division commenced disengagement, moving southward while leaving a small force, including the 22nd Independent Battalion, to cover their retreat at Shuri. Meanwhile, General Suzuki’s 44th Independent Mixed Brigade held their defensive lines outside Naha, and the 62nd Division maintained its positions near Chan and Karadera. By dawn on May 30, the bulk of the 32nd Army had successfully evacuated the Shuri lines, slipping away from the flanking maneuvers of Buckner’s 10th Army. Thanks to a continuous curtain of rain, General Ushijima executed a meticulously planned "properly deft withdrawal." His covering forces were strategically positioned to provide him with the necessary time to organize a defensive stance on the Kiyamu Peninsula. However, the Americans, ever vigilant, were quick to capitalize on the enemy's disarray, maintaining relentless pressure on the faltering Japanese front. On the west coast, Roberts’ 2nd and 3rd Battalions crossed the canal, seamlessly moving through the 1st Battalion to take up the assault. They pushed forward tenaciously until they captured the entire area encompassing Telegraph Hill and Hill 27.

A network of Japanese machine gun positions hidden in the clusters of tombs on the low hills to the Marines' front made progress slow and costly. Enemy machine guns emplaced in burial tombs on Hill 27 in east Naha temporarily checked the infantry. Heavy sniper fire whipped the lines and killed Lieutenant Colonel Woodhouse of 2/22 who was forward controlling his battalion's attack. Major John G. Johnson, the executive officer, took command immediately and continued a steady pressure. During most of the day tanks were unable to reach the position, but in the afternoon three worked their way along the road north of the hill, and their direct fire enabled the marines to seize it. The advance consisted of a series of local assaults and mop-up actions that brought the battalion to secure hill positions overlooking the Kokuba Estuary and the rail line leading to the north by nightfall. Lieutenant Colonel Shisler's 3d Battalion passed through 1/22 during the morning's attack and behind a screen of artillery, mortars, naval gunfire, and rockets drove onto the high ground at the eastern outskirts of Naha. By means of a series of holding attacks and flank assaults, Shisler was able to move his companies into the maze of enemy defenses where close quarter grenade and small-arms exchanges decided the issue. Once the dominating ground was won, the battalion was subjected to intense artillery and mortar fire.

At the same time, Whaling’s 1st Battalion joined the offensive, encountering fierce resistance as they pressed through 600 yards of enemy territory. To the east, the Marines under Del Valle shifted their focus to vigorous patrolling, as the supply situation gradually improved thanks to dedicated carrying parties and aerial air drops. Despite their efforts, the 306th Regiment's assault on 110 Meter Hill encountered heavy opposition once again. However, Colonel Hamilton’s 307th Regiment finally achieved a breakthrough, seizing the strategic Three Sisters. Dorothy Hill, a fortress directly east of Shuri and a tower of strength in the enemy's inner line for the past two weeks, was attacked by the 3d Battalion, 307th Infantry, 77th Division. The first platoon to reach the base of the hill was pinned down by heavy fire, the platoon leader and all noncommissioned officers being wounded. Other platoons maneuvered into position and finally one squad reached the crest at the right end. This entering wedge enabled two companies to reach the top, from which they discovered three levels of caves on the reverse slope. They went to work methodically, moving from right to left along the top level, burning and blasting each cave and dugout, the flame-thrower and satchel-charge men covered by riflemen. When work on the top level was finished, the second level of caves and tunnels received similar treatment, and then the third and lowest level. That night fifteen Japanese who had survived the day's fighting crawled out of the blasted caves and were killed by Americans from their foxholes. A great amount of enemy equipment, including ten destroyed 150-mm- guns and twenty-five trucks, was found on the south (reverse) side of Dorothy Hill, testifying to the enemy fire power at this strong point. On 30 May, the 77th Division also took Jane Hill on its left flank and then almost unopposed took Tom Hill, the highest point of ground in the Shuri area, by 1700. This critical victory paved the way for Colonel Smith’s forces to advance into the northern outskirts of Shuri through Ishimmi.

In a remarkable display of coordination, Colonel Dill’s 382nd Regiment finally secured the strategic Hen Hill and Oboe Hill areas, while also capturing Hector Hill on their left flank. For nine days elements of the 96th Division had been stalemated at the base of Hen Hill, just northeast of Shuri. On the 30th, Company F and one platoon of Company G, 382d Infantry, resumed the attack on Hen Hill. Pfc. Clarence B. Craft, a rifleman from Company G, was sent out ahead with five companions to test the Japanese positions. As he and his small group started up the slope, they were brought under heavy fire from Japanese just over the crest, and a shower of grenades fell on them. Three of the men were wounded and the other two were stopped. Craft, although a new replacement and in his first action, kept on going, tossing grenades at the crest. From just below the crest he threw two cases of grenades that were passed up to him from the bottom, those of the enemy going over his head or exploding near him. He then leaped to the crest and fired at point-blank range into the Japanese in a trench a few feet below him. Spurred by Craft's example, other men now came to his aid. Reloading, Craft pursued the Japanese down the trench, wiped out a machine gun nest, and satchel-charged the cave into which the remaining Japanese had retreated. Altogether, in the taking of Hen Hill as a result of Craft's action, about seventy Japanese were killed, at least twenty-five of whom were credited to Craft himself. This daring action won him the Congressional Medal of Honor. To the left (east), Company F at the same time engaged in a grenade battle for Hector Hill, using ten cases of grenades in the assault on the crest. It was finally won after a satchel charge was hurled over the top and lit in the enemy trench on the other side, parts of Japanese bodies and pieces of enemy equipment hurtling into the sky in the blast. Hen and Hector Hills had fallen by 1400.

Southeast of their position, Colonel May’s 2d Battalion, 383d Infantry, reached Love Hill and dug in, although scattered fire was still received from a machine gun in a nook of Charlie Hill and there were a few live Japanese on Love itself. In the afternoon the 3d Battalion, 383d Infantry, left its foxholes on Oboe, where it had experienced so great an ordeal, and proceeded down the reverse slope of the hill, finding only a few scattered Japanese. That night the 383d Infantry expressed a heartfelt sentiment when it reported "infinite relief to have Conical Hill behind us." Although there had been suicidal stands in a few places by the last of the holding force, the advances had been rapid.

Simultaneously, Colonel Halloran’s 381st Regiment effectively reduced the Conical Hill-Cutaway area and seized Roger Hill, both regiments then advancing toward the vital Naha-Yonabaru road. At the same time, the 32nd Regiment launched a coordinated offensive that allowed them to successfully capture Oak, Ella, and June Hills. This advance brought Finn’s troops directly into confrontation with Mabel and Hetty Hills, facing the formidable defenses of Chan. Meanwhile, strong patrols from the 184th Regiment ventured into the Chinen Peninsula's strongholds, encountering only light enemy resistance, a turn of events that buoyed American morale. As night fell, the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade and the 24th Division began their long-anticipated evacuation from Shuri. They pulled back behind the second line of blocking positions north of Tsukasan, executing their withdrawal amidst a progressively decreasing barrage of artillery and mortar fire. Consequently, when Buckner’s assault troops launched their offensive against the Shuri positions on the morning of May 31, they were met with an eerie silence, the stillness only interrupted by sporadic sniper fire and the distant crack of machine guns.The 77th Division swiftly took 110 Meter Hill and advanced into Shuri with little to no resistance. Concurrently, Mason’s units surrounding Shuri Castle moved north unopposed, aiding in the occupation of the battered ruins and the troublesome Wana Draw. 

Shuri, the second town of Okinawa, lay in utter ruin. There was no other city, town, or village in the Ryukyus that had been destroyed so completely. Naha too had been laid waste. Certain villages which had been strong points in the enemy's defense, such as Kakazu, Dakeshi, Kochi, Arakachi, and Kunishi, had been fought over and leveled to the ground. But none of these compared with the ancient capital of the Ryukyus. It was estimated that about 200000 rounds of artillery and naval gunfire had struck Shuri. Numerous air strikes had dropped 1000-pound bombs on it. Mortar shells by the thousands had arched their way into the town area. Only two structures, both of concrete, the big normal school at the southwestern corner and the little Methodist church, built in 1937, in the center of Shuri, had enough of their walls standing to form silhouettes on the skyline. The rest was flattened rubble. The narrow paved and dirt streets, churned by high explosives and pitted with shell craters, were impassable to any vehicle. The stone walls of the numerous little terraces were battered down. The rubble and broken red tile of the houses lay in heaps. The frame portion of buildings had been reduced to kindling wood. Tattered bits of Japanese military clothing, gas masks, and tropical helmets-the most frequently seen items-and the dark-colored Okinawan civilian dress lay about in wild confusion. Over all this crater of the moon landscape hung the unforgettable stench of rotting human flesh. To  the west, Griebel’s 1st Battalion built upon Mason’s gains, but it was the 3rd Battalion that led the main effort, successfully pushing to the hills just north of Shichina.Meanwhile, General Bradley's advancing battalions moved rapidly toward their assigned objectives, spending much of the day mopping up isolated enemy holdouts. This relentless advance effectively pinched off the 77th Division, further consolidating American control in the region.

On the extreme left flank, Halloran’s 1st Battalion faced enemy forces defending the Tsukasan line, marking the only area where the 96th Division failed to reach the corps boundary. However, the Shuri area had now been completely secured, and contact was made with Del Valle’s Marines in the center. On the flanks, though, Buckner’s units continued to encounter fierce resistance from the tenacious Japanese defenders. The 32nd Regiment, battling bravely through a series of heavily fortified strongpoints held stubbornly by Fujioka’s troops, managed to seize Duck Hill, consolidate its positions on Turkey Hill, and capture the forward face of Mabel. Ultimately, they halted their advance just short of Chan. Meanwhile, on the west coast, Shepherd’s Marines pushed forward with support from tanks and artillery, targeting the strategic high ground west of Shichina and Kokuba. However, their advance was stalled by intense enemy fire emanating from Hill 46. During the night, the battered 44th Independent Mixed Brigade executed a withdrawal southeast towards the Kiyamu Peninsula, covered by the 62nd Division, which quickly established a new defensive line along the Kokuba River and around Tsukasan. With the fall of Shuri and the withdrawal of Japanese forces, Buckner’s troops had emerged victorious in one of the most difficult and bloody battles of the Pacific War. By the end of May, reports indicated that approximately 62,548 Japanese soldiers had been confirmed killed, with another estimated 9,529 thought to have perished, 64,000 of whom were believed to have fallen in the fierce fighting within the Shuri fortified zone alone. While these casualty figures may be somewhat exaggerated, there is little doubt that Japanese forces, especially their infantry combat units, had suffered severe depletion. In contrast, General Geiger’s 3rd Amphibious Corps recorded significant losses of its own, with 1,718 killed, 8,852 wounded, and 101 missing during the fighting around Shuri. Additionally, the losses for General Hodge’s 24th Corps over two months of combat totaled an alarming 26,044 casualties.

On June 1, the American forces faced surprisingly little opposition from the enemy. A frustrated General Buckner, who had hoped to trap the defenders at Shuri, ordered his troops to advance rapidly in pursuit of the retreating Japanese units. With the 77th Division methodically mopping up remnants in the Shuri zone, General Hodge made a strategic decision. He shifted the 7th Division toward the east and ordered the 96th Division to move south to relieve the 32nd Regiment, taking up the western end of the Corps line. This strategic relief enabled Arnold to immediately push south with both the 17th and 184th Regiments in assault, managing to advance approximately 1,100 yards toward Okota and Batan despite increasingly stiff resistance from smaller enemy units. To the northwest, a coordinated attack by the Marine divisions successfully secured all high ground overlooking the primary east-west road in the Kokuba Valley. The 5th Marines anchored their position on the hills east of Shichina, while Shepherd’s regiments seized the dominating heights north of Kokuba. Recognizing the strategic importance of the Oroku Peninsula, General Geiger planned a shore-to-shore landing there. To gather intelligence, Shepherd dispatched his Reconnaissance Company to conduct an amphibious reconnaissance of the peninsula that evening. Their findings confirmed that the peninsula was not fortified with significant enemy strength. The following day, Colonel Snedeker’s 7th Marines advanced to relieve the 6th Marine Division on the west coast. The 2nd Battalion continued the momentum by crossing the Kokuba River, moving into the hills on the south bank. Meanwhile, to the east, the 5th Marines also crossed the upper branch of the river and pressed forward to secure the ridgeline that controlled the approaches to Tsukasan. This maneuver effectively placed the entire Naha-Yonabaru road firmly in American hands, further tightening their grip on the battlefield.

That evening, Shepherd dispatched his Reconnaissance Company to conduct an amphibious reconnaissance of the Oroku Peninsula. Their mission revealed that the peninsula was not heavily defended, opening up opportunities for American forces. Further east, the 383rd Regiment successfully cleared out Chan and seized the high ground just north of Tera and Kamizato. Meanwhile, the 381st Regiment conducted repeated assaults on hill positions that impeded its advance, ultimately managing to penetrate to Karadera. The 7th Division maintained relentless pressure on the retreating garrison of the Chinen Peninsula, advancing its lines by 2,400 yards toward Itokazu and Kerabaru. Now, it’s time to shift our focus away from Okinawa and examine the latest operations of General LeMay’s 21st Bomber Command. Since the invasion of Okinawa, Admiral Nimitz had requested that the B-29 Superfortress heavy bombers assist his naval forces in countering the deadly kamikaze attacks. In response, LeMay dispatched 53 bombers to target airfields at Kanoya on April 8, although the city of Kagoshima ended up being bombed instead. On April 17, 134 B-29s were sent against Kyushu, successfully neutralizing enemy airfield operations for 18 hours. However, as we've observed, the Japanese continued to launch both scattered and mass kamikaze attacks. To address this ongoing threat, the 21st Bomber Command, bolstered by the arrival of Brigadier General Roger Ramey’s 58th Bombardment Wing, dedicated 75% of its combat effort to providing direct tactical support for the Okinawa campaign up to May 11. During this period, they flew a total of 2,104 sorties against 17 airfields in Kyushu and Shikoku. Although they did not fully neutralize these targets, significant damage was inflicted on enemy storage, maintenance, and repair facilities. The bombers also served to keep the Japanese off balance, significantly disrupting their ability to plan and execute large, coordinated attacks. In total, 24 B-29s were destroyed and 233 damaged during these operations, while 134 enemy interceptors were shot down.

Between the strikes on Kyushu, General LeMay managed to fit in several medium-strength precision attacks against the Japanese aircraft industry, along with two large-scale night incendiary missions in the Tokyo Bay area. The first of these missions took place on April 13, when 327 B-29s dropped an impressive 2,139 tons of ordnance on the arsenal district of Tokyo, located northwest of the Imperial Palace. The resulting fires consumed 11.4 square miles of this crucial industrial zone, destroying arsenal plants responsible for manufacturing and storing small arms, machine guns, artillery, bombs, gunpowder, and fire-control mechanisms. Just two nights later, on April 15, 303 bombers executed another incendiary attack, dropping 1,930 tons of explosives with equal success. This raid devastated 6 square miles in Tokyo, 3.6 square miles in Kawasaki, and 1.5 square miles in Yokohama, which suffered collateral damage from the fire spills. Cumulatively, these two raids resulted in the destruction of 217,130 buildings in Tokyo and Yokohama and 31,603 in Kawasaki. On April 24, 131 B-29s conducted a highly successful precision strike against the Tachikawa plant of the Hitachi Aircraft Corporation. Although the next planned attack was thwarted by inclement weather, 148 B-29s struck Kure on May 5, delivering devastating damage. After being relieved from support for the Okinawa operation on May 11, LeMay initiated a month of heavy fire raids to complete the campaign that had begun in March, while also addressing top-priority precision targets as opportunities arose. Accordingly, on May 14, 529 B-29s were dispatched to strike northern Nagoya, with 472 successfully dropping 2,515 tons of munitions, resulting in the burning of 3.15 square miles and inflicting significant damage to Mitsubishi's No. 10 engine works. Just two nights later, 522 bombers returned to Nagoya, with 457 of them effectively delivering 3,609 tons over the dock and industrial areas in the southern part of the city, burning 3.82 square miles and causing extensive damage to Mitsubishi's No. 5 aircraft works. These two incendiary attacks finished Nagoya as an objective for area attacks. Good targets remained in the city, and the command was to return six more times for precision attacks before V-J Day. But the industrial fabric of the city had been ruined in the earlier precision attacks and in the fire raids that had burned out twelve square miles of a total built-up urban area of about forty square miles. In all, 113460 buildings had been destroyed, 3866 persons had been killed and 472701 rendered homeless. The displacement of workers aggravated the difficulties caused by physical damage and had an important effect on civilian morale. 

After a week of respite, temporarily interrupted by a 318-plane precision attack on the Tachikawa Aircraft Company, 562 B-29s were dispatched to strike Tokyo once more on May 23. Out of these, 520 bombers reached their target, dropping an impressive 3,646 tons of explosives over the district stretching southward from the Imperial Palace along the west side of Tokyo Harbor. Despite encountering strong opposition, this attack resulted in the destruction of 5.3 square miles of area. Two nights later, 502 B-29s returned to Tokyo, targeting the area just north of their previous hit. They faced heavy resistance again, dropping 3,262 tons of incendiaries on the city, which resulted in the destruction of 16.8 square miles, marking the largest area devastated in a single Tokyo raid. In light of the heavy casualties suffered during these last two strikes, General LeMay decided to assign P-51s from Iwo Jima to escort future attacks. As a result, on May 29, 517 B-29s were escorted by 101 P-51 fighters during an assault on Yokohama. These bombers successfully dropped 2,570 tons of munitions, burning out 6.9 square miles while the escorting fighters engaged in fierce battles against about 150 aggressive interceptors. Meanwhile, General Whitehead’s 5th Air Force was conducting an extensive program of area bombing against Formosa, experimenting with various types of bombs and tactics in preparation for future attacks on the Japanese mainland. Taihoku, the capital and political and financial center of Taiwan, was subjected to constant aerial bombardment. The largest strike against modern-day Taipei, known as the Taihoku Air Raid, occurred on May 31, when units of the Fifth Air Force consisting of 117 Consolidated B-24 Liberator heavy bombers were sent to conduct the largest air raid ever on Taiwan. The bombing began from around ten o'clock in the morning and lasted until one o'clock in the afternoon, during which the attack was non-stop. The Americans met virtually no resistance from the Japanese, mainly due to the attrition the Japanese air forces had suffered in the Aerial Battle of Taiwan-Okinawa, which completely exhausted Japan's fighter units in Taiwan. They successfully dropped approximately 3,800 bombs targeting military units and governmental facilities. The Office of the Governor-General of Taiwan suffered a direct hit, in spite of the building being heavily camouflaged to avoid being targeted. The building suffered extensive damage from fire caused by the bombs and almost collapsed on itself; it was rendered unoccupiable and was not repaired until the Nationalist Chinese takeover. Other facilities hit during the bombing included the residence of the Assistant Governor-General, Taiwan Railway Hotel, Office of Governor-General Library, Army Headquarters, Taihoku Imperial University, Taihoku Station, Bank of Taiwan, Taihoku High Court, Taihoku New Park, and many other facilities. Many civilian installations were damaged, including Taihoku Prefectural Taihoku First Girls' High School, Huashan Catholic Church of Taihoku, and the famous Lungshan Temple of Manka, which was hit in the main building and the left corridor; many precious artifacts and art works in the temple were lost in the ensuing fire. As a result of the extensive bombing campaigns, more than 3,000 civilians lost their lives. Tens of thousands were displaced or left homeless, and countless buildings were destroyed, either directly by the attacks or by the fires they ignited. This devastation left a profound impact on the local population and infrastructure, marking yet another tragic chapter in the toll of the war.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

In the midst of the brutal Battle of Okinawa, American Marines faced relentless resistance as they pushed towards Shuri. Despite heavy casualties and daunting conditions, the tide turned when General Buckner ordered aggressive assaults that outmaneuvered the encircled Japanese forces. After days of relentless combat, they captured the stronghold, leading to the collapse of Japanese defenses. As the dust settled, Shuri lay in ruins, marking a pivotal moment in the Pacific War and showcasing the indomitable spirit of both American and Japanese soldiers.

- 183 - Pacific War Podcast - the Breakthrough on Okinawa - May 20 - 27, 1945

Last time we spoke about the battle of Malacca strait. In the intense Battle of the Malacca Strait, Japanese forces undertook a desperate evacuation amidst relentless attacks by the Allies. After suffering heavy casualties from previous confrontations, the Japanese regrouped and attempted to maintain their defensive positions. However, under the pressure of determined Allied assaults and strategic maneuvers, they faced increasingly fierce resistance. As the Allies advanced, they successfully overwhelmed Japanese defenses, leading to significant losses for the opposing forces. The battle transformed into a pivotal moment in the Pacific War as Japanese resistance crumbled, ultimately shifting the tide toward Allied victory. This clash not only showcased the harsh realities of war but also underscored the relentless determination of both sides as they fought for dominance in the region, marking a crucial step towards the conclusion of the conflict.

This episode is the Breakthrough on Okinawa

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

As of mid-May, General Buckner's forces had made steady, albeit slow, progress against the determined Japanese defenders on the Shuri defensive line. On May 16, the offensive continued. Colonel Schneider's 22nd Marines and Colonel Whaling's 29th Marines launched yet another unsuccessful assault on Sugar Loaf Hill, while Colonel Snedeker's 7th Marines exhausted their strength in a failed attempt to seize Wana Ridge. To the east, Colonel Coolidge's 305th Regiment advanced 200 yards closer to Shuri. Colonel Hamilton's 307th Regiment nearly captured Flattop and Chocolate Drop Hill but was ultimately pushed back. Colonel Dill's 382nd Regiment successfully cleared Dick Hill but came under intense fire from Oboe Hill. Meanwhile, Colonel May's 383rd Regiment made only minor gains on the southeastern slopes of Conical Hill and Love Hill, even as tanks broke through toward Yonabaru for the first time. The following day, the 383rd Regiment maintained pressure on Conical and Love Hills, prompting General Bradley to commit part of Colonel Halloran's 381st Regiment to the attack. To the west, the 382nd Regiment staged a hard-fought advance of 200 yards but was unable to capture Oboe Hill. 

Slowly the 77th Division forces between Flattop and Route 5 were reducing enemy positions bearing on the area in front of the 307th Infantry. By 17 May this progress began to show in the advances of the foot troops around Chocolate Drop. Covered by company heavy weapons out on both flanks, infantrymen worked around both sides of the hill to the huge caves on the reverse slope. Inside were 4 antitank guns, 1 field piece, 4 machine guns, 4 heavy mortars, and a American 60-mm. mortars. By nightfall the caves had been partially sealed off. During the night an enemy force launched a counterattack against the American positions around the hill but was repulsed with the loss of twenty-five Japanese killed. On the 17th another bitter struggle raged on Flattop. The struggle swayed back and forth across the narrow crest of the hill. Company K, the assaulting unit, had been reduced to fourteen infantrymen by the end of the day; finally it was forced back off the top. Tanks tried to go through the road cut between Flattop and Dick Hill, but two of them were disabled by mines, leaving the cut blocked. The road cut was later blown along its entire length by seven tons of bangalore torpedoes to remove the mines. Company E continued to push toward Ishimmi Ridge, where they faced a series of heavy Japanese counterattacks. Coolidge's 3rd Battalion and the rest of Hamilton's 2nd Battalion dug in just a few hundred yards north of Shuri and Ishimmi in the highway valley. Meanwhile, Coolidge's 1st Battalion was halted by heavy fire from 110 Meter Hill and the extensive fortress houses in Shuri's suburbs. The intense fighting had nearly depleted the 22nd Regiment, prompting General Amamiya to direct the 32nd Regiment to take over the defense of Shuri along a line extending from Ishimmi to Oboe.

Meanwhile, on Wana, the 7th Marines launched a renewed attack but were once again repelled. However, the 5th Marines succeeded in advancing to Hill 55. Further west, the bulk of the 29th Marines attacked toward Half Moon Hill, successfully reaching its forward slopes but later having to withdraw to more defensive positions overnight. Whaling’s 2nd Battalion also mounted relentless assaults on Sugar Loaf, each time suffering heavy losses in repelled attacks. As dusk fell, Japanese planes targeted American shipping, successfully damaging the destroyer Douglas H. Fox. On May 18, tanks played a crucial role in a successful assault on Sugar Loaf, executing a double envelopment while securing the top of the hill. The 2nd Battalion then advanced to Horseshoe Hill, while the remainder of the 29th Marines managed to secure the forward slopes of Half Moon.After a night of sporadic bombardment from enemy artillery and mortars, 3/7 again attempted to gain a foothold on Wana Ridge. During the morning supporting weapons concentrated their fire on the forward slopes and crest of the objective and at noon Company I, followed by a platoon of Company L, jumped off and fought its way to the ridge. The assault troops' gains "were measured in yards won, lost, and then won again." Finally, mounting casualties inflicted by enemy grenade and mortar fire forced Lieutenant Colonel Hurst to pull back his forward elements and consolidate his lines on positions held the previous night.

On the right flank of the division front the isolated platoon from Company E of 2/5 was unsuccessful in exploiting its hold on the western slopes of Hill 55. The men were driven to cover by intense enemy fire, and tanks again had to be called upon to supply ammunition and rations to the outpost. During the morning operations the 5th Marines laid protective fire with tanks and assault guns along Wana Ridge to support 3/7's advance. At noon, under cover of this fire, Company F sent one rifle platoon and an attached platoon of engineers into Wana village to use flame throwers and demolitions against the enemy firing positions in the ruins. Numbers of grenade dischargers, machine guns, and rifles were found in Wana and the tombs behind it and destroyed. Further advance into the draw was not feasible until the 7th Marines could occupy the high ground on the eastern end of the ridge and furnish direct supporting fire to troops advancing in the draw below. At 1700 the troops were ordered to return to their lines for the night. n the center, General Bruce pressed his attack deeper into the Shuri defenses, with Coolidge’s 3rd Battalion gaining 150 yards along the Ginowan-Shuri highway and Hamilton’s 2nd Battalion advancing up to 300 yards toward Ishimmi, although attacks against 110 Meter Hill and Flattop failed to gain ground. On the morning of 18 May, orders were given to stay at all costs. Lieutenant Bell said firmly, "We stay." The men resigned themselves to a last-ditch stand. Their grenades exhausted and their machine guns and mortars destroyed, the remaining men salvaged every clip of ammunition from the bandoleers of the dead. Spare workable rifles were loaded and bayonets laid alongside. Enemy pressure increased steadily during the day. Some Americans were shot at close range as they darted from hole to hole to escape grenades. At one time eight knee mortars were pounding the ridge, firing in pairs. Friendly artillery could to some extent keep off the charging Japanese but seemed unable to ferret out the enemy mortars, which were well protected. The moans of wounded men, many of whom were in pitiful condition from lack of water and of medical aid, added to the strain. All canteens had been emptied the previous night. Nevertheless, battle discipline remained excellent. The worst problem concerned the replacements, who were courageous but inexperienced. Thrust suddenly into a desperate situation, some of them failed at crucial moments. One man saw two Japanese attacking a sergeant thirty feet away, but his finger froze on the trigger. Another shouted wildly for a comrade to shoot some Japanese while his own rifle lay in his hands. Another saw an enemy soldier a few yards from his hole, pulled the trigger, and discovered that he had forgotten to reload. By the end of the ordeal, however, the replacements who survived were battle-hardened veterans. During the afternoon the 307th attempted to reinforce the small group. Elements of Company C tried to cross the open ground north of Ishimmi Ridge. Only the commander and five men reached Company E. The men scrambled safely into foxholes, but the commander, shot through the head while racing toward the command post, fell dead on the parapet of the command post foxhole. Spirits rose considerably when word came later in the afternoon that a litter-bearing unit of eighty men would try to get through in the evening. Enemy fire slackened after dark, and the first of the litter bearers arrived at about 2200. They immediately started back carrying casualties. Walking wounded accompanied them. The litter bearers moved swiftly and managed to avoid being seen in the light of flares. Through splendid discipline and good luck eighteen men were carried out in two and a half hours, and others walked out. The litter teams had brought some water and ammunition and the troops drank for the first time since the day before. The second sleepless night on the ridge passed. The 382nd Regiment continued to face heavy resistance from Oboe Hill but managed to secure the road cut between Flattop and Dick Hill. Meanwhile, Halloran’s 3rd Battalion could only push about 400 yards south due to the relentless mortar and small-arms fire coming from Hogback Ridge. At sea, a low-flying kamikaze aircraft struck LST-808 off Iejima, resulting in the deaths of 17 men.

The following day, while the 382nd and 383rd Regiments focused on neutralizing the cave positions and gun emplacements in the uneven terrain between Conical and Dick Hills, Halloran’s 3rd Battalion launched an attack to the south and west toward Sugar Hill but made little progress due to the heavy defensive fire. In the center, the 307th Regiment systematically worked to eliminate enemy firing positions on the high ground in front of them, employing every available weapon for the task. Colonel Smith’s rehabilitated 306th Regiment began moving up to replace the battered 305th, with its 3rd Battalion relieving Coolidge’s 3rd Battalion and portions of Hamilton’s 2nd Battalion along the low ground bordering the highway to Shuri, including the isolated men at Ishimmi Ridge. 

On 19 May the enemy seemed to intensify his efforts to recapture Ishimmi Ridge. The besieged troops wondered whether his supply of men and ammunition was inexhaustible. The Japanese launched several attacks which were repulsed with great difficulty. Only the support of artillery and mortars, together with self-propelled mounts firing with precision on both flanks of Ishimmi Ridge, prevented the enemy from making an attack in strength which would have overrun the American positions. One enemy attack of platoon strength was dispersed by mortar and machine-gun fire and by a four-battalion time-on-target artillery concentration. Japanese mortar fire continued to fall on Ishimmi, however, and took its toll during the day. A message arrived during the morning that Company E would be relieved that evening. By noon the radio had become so weak that further communication with the company was impossible. The day wore slowly on. By 2100 there was still no sign of the relief. Shortly afterward, however, rifle fire intensified to the rear, a sign of activity there. At 2200 Company L, 3d Battalion, 306th Infantry, arrived. The relief was carried out in pitch darkness; each member of Company E left as soon as a replacement reached his position. As the haggard survivors were about to descend the ridge at 0300, a bursting shell hit two of the newcomers; one of them had to be evacuated on a poncho. Carrying its own wounded, Company E followed a white tape to the rear and arrived safely. Of the 204 officers and men of the reinforced company that had made the night attack on Ishimmi, 156 had been killed or wounded. There were 28 privates, 1 noncommissioned officer, and 2 officers left of the original 129 members of Company E. The platoon sent in relief by Company C had gone out with 58 effectives and returned with 13. Of the 17 men in the heavy weapons section only 4 came back. Company E had spearheaded a several-hundred-yard advance toward Shuri, however, and with the help of supporting weapons had killed hundreds of Japanese around Ishimmi.

The 7th Marines launched one last unsuccessful assault on Wana Ridge before being relieved by Colonel Mason’s rested 1st Marines. Meanwhile, after repelling a strong night counterattack, the exhausted 29th Marines were also relieved by Colonel Shapley’s reserve 4th Marines, which made additional advances alongside the 22nd Marines, now under Colonel Harold Roberts. Four new regiments had been committed over the past few days to revitalize the offensive. On May 20, Shapley’s assault battalions gained more ground on Horseshoe Hill but were still unable to reach the crest of Half Moon, though they successfully repelled another strong night counterattack. To the east, Mason’s 2nd Battalion advanced rapidly to the base of 110 Meter Hill and captured part of Wana Ridge, while his 3rd Battalion secured a firm hold on the northern slope. Concurrently, the 5th Marines attacked southwest along the Naha-Shuri Road and successfully captured the high ground.

Meanwhile, in coordination with the 1st Marines, Coolidge’s 1st Battalion and Smith’s 3rd Battalion made a slow, grinding advance of about 150 yards, positioning themselves within 200 yards of the outskirts of Shuri in the highway valley. At the same time, the 382nd Regiment expanded its hold on the reverse slope of Dick Hill but remained unable to penetrate Oboe Hill. The 307th Regiment consolidated and expanded its positions around Chocolate Drop, finally seizing Flattop. Reducing the tiny hill continued to be ticklish work because enemy positions to the south still overlooked the area. The fighting was still so confused that three wounded Americans lay south of Chocolate Drop for two days before relief arrived. By that time two had died and the third was so delirious that he thought he was still fighting Japanese and had to be forcibly subdued. By 20 May the caves were completely sealed off. The enemy made a final attempt to retake Chocolate Drop, attacking in company strength, but was repelled with the loss of half his force. On the same day the 3d Battalion, using tanks, flame throwers, and demolition teams, finally secured the crest of Flattop. The final American attack started with a saturation shower of grenades. A chain of men extending from the base of Flattop passed hand grenades to the troops lined up along the crest, who threw the missiles as fast as they could pull out the pins. Having seized the advantage, the infantry moved down the reverse slope blasting caves with satchel charges and flame throwers. Tanks along the road cut accounted for many of the Japanese. BY 1545 Flattop had fallen. More than 250 enemy bodies lay on the crest and reverse slope of the hill.

Further east, Halloran’s 3rd Battalion made a slow but steady advance down the eastern slopes of Hogback, reaching the foot of Sugar Hill despite constant grenade duels with an enemy fighting desperately to hold every inch of ground. Additionally, the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 383rd Regiment fought their way to jump-off positions within 300 yards of Love Hill, destroying enemy strongpoints that had obstructed their advance for a week. Meanwhile, back at sea, Japanese aircraft managed to damage two destroyers and three transports. The following day, the 383rd again attacked Love Hill but was ultimately forced to withdraw from its base due to fierce defensive fire. Despite this setback, May’s 2nd Battalion successfully supported the 381st Regiment in clearing Hogback and pushing to the top of Sugar Hill. To the west, the 382nd advanced quickly against moderate opposition toward Oboe Hill and Hen Hill, encountering retreating enemy units moving toward the high ground at Shuri. Concurrently, the 307th pushed 350 yards south of Flattop before being halted by enemy forces at the Three Sisters, while the 306th completed the relief of the 305th, with its 3rd Battalion advancing 200 yards unopposed to the eastern slopes of 110 Meter Hill.

Meanwhile, the 1st Marines continued their assault along Wana Ridge, making only limited gains at the Draw, where the 5th Marines held out and aggressively patrolled forward. The 4th Marines began their push toward the Asato River, achieving a costly advance of about 200 yards on Horseshoe. By nightfall, heavy rains began to fall, significantly impeding efforts to resupply assault troops and replenish forward ammunition dumps. Amidst this torrential downpour on May 22, Shapley’s 1st and 3rd Battalions slogged through the "gooey slick mud" to reach the bank of the rain-swollen river. This prompted the Japanese to evacuate Naha and establish new defensive positions on the Kokuba Hills. To the east, the continuous rain flooded Wana Draw with mud and water, transforming it into a makeshift lake. For the next few days, General Del Valle’s Marines were forced to attack without support, leading to aggressive patrolling rather than organized assaults.

The prospects of success for the infantry alone, slogging through the mud without the support of other arms, were not encouraging. Tanks bogged down, helplessly mired. Amphibian tractors were unable to negotiate the morass, and front-line units, which had depended on these vehicles for carrying supplies forward in bad weather, now had to resort to hand carrying of supplies and of the wounded. These were back breaking tasks and were performed over areas swept by enemy fire. Mortar and artillery smoke was used as far as possible to give concealment for all movement. Litter cases were carried back through knee-deep mud. Living conditions of front-line troops were indescribably bad. Foxholes dug into the clay slopes caved in from the constant soaking, and, even when the sides held, the holes had to be bailed out repeatedly. Clothes and equipment and the men's bodies were wet for days. The bodies of Japanese killed at night lay outside the foxholes, decomposing under swarms of flies. Sanitation measures broke down. The troops were often hungry. Sleep was almost impossible. The strain began to take a mounting toll of men. Under these conditions the Marine attack against Wana Ridge was soon at a standstill. The action degenerated into what was called in official reports "aggressive patrolling." Despite inactivity, enemy mortar and artillery fire continued to play against the American front lines, especially at dusk and at night. In the center, Bruce’s 77th Division faced similar challenges, with the 306th Regiment stalled and the 307th Regiment again unsuccessfully attacking the Three Sisters. There, Company A became isolated at the base of the forward slope of Jane Hill, nearly cut off by intense enemy mortar and machine-gun fire. For the following week, the 382nd Regiment struggled to make headway on Hen and Oboe Hills, where fierce hand-to-hand combat erupted. Similarly, all attempts by the 383rd Regiment to breach the defenses of Love Hill on the western side of Conical failed, as the 381st was also unable to make any progress against Cutaway.

General Hodge had also moved General Arnold’s rehabilitated 7th Division to assembly areas just north of Conical Hill to spearhead the advance toward Yonabaru and the high ground south of the village. Strengthened by 1,691 replacements and 546 men returned to duty from hospitals since it left the lines on 9 May, the 7th Division moved up to forward assembly areas just north of Conical Hill and prepared to make the dash through the corridor. At 1900 on 21 May the 184th Infantry, chosen by General Arnold to lead the way, was in place at Gaja Ridge, at the northern base of Conical. The initial move of the envelopment was to be made in the dead of the night and in stealth. General Buckner felt that "if the 7th can swing round, running the gauntlet, it may be the kill."

As part of this operation, the 2nd Battalion of the 184th Regiment moved out from Gaja Ridge during the night, swiftly and silently passing through Yonabaru in the early morning hours to capture Spruce Hill and Chestnut Hill in a surprise attack. Colonel Green’s 3rd Battalion then followed the 2nd Battalion through Yonabaru, but their assault on Juniper and Bamboo Hills was unsuccessful as the surprised defenders regrouped. The following day, Green’s two battalions continued to push toward these initial objectives, ultimately securing a solid line that stretched from the coastline across the southern slopes of Chestnut, and then over to Juniper and Bamboo by day’s end. This success allowed Colonel Finn’s 32nd Regiment to pass through Yonabaru and advance westward along the Naha-Yonabaru valley to assault the enemy’s western hill defenses focused around Oak Hill.On the west coast, after a successful night reconnaissance of the Asato River, the 4th Marines rapidly crossed the river under cover of smoke, beginning their advance toward a low ridge 500 yards south of the Asato. However, as previously noted, the torrential rain had turned every draw and gully into a sticky morass of knee- and thigh-deep mud in the center. The steep slopes of the hills and ridges, treacherous under the best of conditions, became virtually unassailable. Consequently, full-scale coordinated attacks had to be canceled, and only localized gains could be achieved.

Despite the breakthrough in the center, the Japanese command remained concerned about the threat posed to the flanks of the Shuri bastion by American advances along both coasts. While they believed the Naha breakthrough could be contained, every available soldier was deployed to establish a defensive line stretching from the southwest slopes of Conical Hill through Yonawa to the road junction village of Chan, aiming to eliminate Arnold’s spearhead that had penetrated into the Naha-Yonabaru valley. General Ushijima feared that his forces were being gradually encircled in the Shuri fortress, where they would become “easy prey” to overwhelming American firepower. In light of this situation, Ushijima began planning a withdrawal to the Chinen Peninsula or the southernmost part of the island, the Kiyamu Peninsula. This decision was met with resistance from General Fujioka, who expressed concern that thousands of severely wounded men would have to be abandoned during the retreat. 

Although the holding of the heights surrounding the city had been the keystone of the Japanese preferred plan, several factors now militated against its retention. There were an estimated 50000 surviving officers and men to be crammed into a final defense zone less than a mile in diameter. Once these troops were surrounded, the Japanese believed that they would be rendered ineffectual and become "easy prey" to overwhelming American fire superiority. In addition, Japanese long-range artillery pieces, many of which were still intact, could not be effectively utilized within the limited space that would be available. The best chance of prolonging the battle for Okinawa seemed to rest in defending the Kiyamu Peninsula region which was dominated by the Yaeju Dake-Yuza Dake Escarpment. Natural and artificial caves, sufficient to accommodate the whole of the surviving army, abounded in the area. The 24th Division, which had organized the terrain, had left a considerable amount of ammunition and weapons there when it moved north to the Shuri lines. The principal roads in southern Okinawa led directly to the proposed position, thus facilitating the movement of large bodies of men in the shortest possible time. These roads also gave American tanks an excellent route of advance, but only to the outposts of the defensive zone where cliffs, hills, and precipitous ridges barred the way. To add weight to his argument, General Amamiya indicated that his 24th Transport Regiment had preserved enough trucks to move the Shuri munitions reserve to the new position within five nights if weather conditions permitted. General Ushijima, after considering the respective positions of his staff and commanders, decided to order the move to Kiyamu. 

Although General Suzuki preferred the Chinen Peninsula, which his brigade had fortified, most officials supported a move to the Kiyamu Peninsula, where Amamiya’s 24th Division had previously established defenses in the natural and artificial caves of the Yaeju Dake-Yuza Dake Escarpment. Thus, transportation of wounded personnel and munitions reserves to the south commenced at midnight on May 23, with the bulk of the 32nd Army scheduled to begin their withdrawal six days later. 

On the night of 25 May, the remnants of the 62d Division were to pull out of the Shuri line and move through Tsukasan to counterattack the Americans. The relatively strong 22d Independent Infantry Battalion, which had been in reserve throughout most of the fighting in April and May, was directed to hold the Shuri front in place of the division. The orders to General Fujioka were "to annihilate the enemy rushing from the Yonabaru area." Failing this, the division was at least to stop the American advance long enough to allow the main body of the Thirty-second Army to retire. In order to gain time to organize the new positions, the holding force left on the Shuri front was to fight on until 31 May. Withdrawing units were to leave behind strong rearguards which would defend a line along the Kokuba Gawa to the hills north of Tsukasan and Chan and then south through Karadera to the east coast until the night of 2 June. Then a second line centered on Tomusu, approximately 2,000 yards farther south, would be held until the night of 4 June. By that time the Thirty-second Army would be firmly set up within its Itoman-Yunagusuku-Gushichan outpost zone. Admiral Ota's naval force was directed to hold the west flank of the withdrawal corridor and begin its own retreat when ordered by 32nd Army. During the night, Admiral Ugaki initiated his seventh mass Kikisui attack, launching 165 kamikaze aircraft that inflicted only light damage on landing craft.

On May 24, while engineers constructed a bridge over the Asato River to facilitate vehicle movement, the 4th Marines suffered heavy casualties as they attempted to advance through the muddy, flooded valley and low clay hills. Simultaneously, Shepherd’s Reconnaissance Company crossed the lower Asato and roamed the streets of northwestern Naha without encountering any resistance. To the east, Dill’s 1st Battalion faced a brutal counterattack that inflicted significant casualties and nearly drove the Americans from Oboe Hill. Following Ushijima’s directives, the 32nd and 184th Regiments began to encounter increasing resistance as they sought to expand their control over the valley and the high ground to the south. This culminated in a series of aggressive nighttime counterattacks that ultimately slowed and halted the western advance of the 7th Division. During the night, Japanese forces conducted heavy raids on American airfields at Kadena, Yontan, and Iejima. However, these attacks were merely a diversion for Operation Gi-Gou, a suicide raid against Kadena and Yontan. In this operation, twelve Ki-21 heavy bombers, carrying Giretsu Kuteitai special airborne assault troops, aimed to crash land on the airfields to deploy commandos tasked with destroying aircraft stationed there. 

After the start of B-29 attacks on Tokyo from bases in the Mariana Islands, the 1st Raiding Brigade of the Teishin Shudan was ordered to form a commando unit for a "special operations" mission to attack and destroy the bombers on the Aslito Airfield on Saipan. Captain Okuyama Michiro, commander of the brigade's engineering company and trained in sabotage and demolition was selected as mission leader. He selected an additional 126 men from his own team, the 4th Company of the 1st Raiding Regiment, to form the first Giretsu Airborne Unit. It was initially organized with a command section and five platoons and one independent squad, based at the Imperial Japanese Army's air academy at Saitama. The group unit also included eight intelligence officers and two radio men from the Nakano School. Giretsu operations were to be undertaken at night, beginning with air strikes by bombers. After this, commando units would be inserted onto the target airfield by crash landing their transports. The fact that there was no provision for extraction of the strike force, along with the rejection of surrender in Japanese military doctrine at the time, meant that the Giretsu ground operations were effectively suicide attacks. Though the Saipan attack was eventually cancelled, the 6th Air Army ultimately requested the deployment of the Giretsu Special Forces to neutralize the Okinawa airfields. The 6th Air Army accordingly began preparations for the attack in early May. Led by Captain Okuyama, the raid force moved from Nishitsukuba to Kumamoto as it continued to prepare for the assault, codenamed Operation Gi-Gou. Aircraft for the raid came from the 3rd Independent Air Unit based in the vicinity of Hamamatsu. The raid force consisted of 120 commandos broken up into a headquarters section and five flights, each containing twenty men. They were to be transported by twelve Mitsubishi Ki-21s stripped of their guns and with additional forward and rear exits added to assist raiders with exiting. The timing of the raid was also meant to coincide with the withdrawal of the 32nd Army from the Shuri Line in southern Okinawa. Of the twelve bombers dispatched, four encountered engine trouble and returned to base, while three were intercepted by American night fighters en route to Okinawa. The remaining five Ki-21 bombers approached Yontan Airfield at low altitude and engaged Marine anti-aircraft gunners from the 1st Provisional Anti-aircraft Artillery Group. As a result, four of the bombers were shot down or crash-landed; however, a small number of Giretsu commandos survived this wave and commenced their mission to attack aircraft on the airfield.

The fifth bomber, however, successfully evaded anti-aircraft fire and belly-landed approximately 100 meters from the control tower. About 10 commandos disembarked and attacked aircraft and air personnel with grenades. In the ensuing chaos, the Japanese commandos killed two Americans, wounded 18, destroyed nine aircraft, damaged 29 more, and set a fuel dump ablaze, destroying 70,000 gallons of aviation gasoline. After twelve hours of mayhem, however, American troops hunted down the commandos and exterminated them to a man. Despite this partial success, the Japanese operation occurred against a backdrop of heavy losses, with American fighters and anti-aircraft fire claiming a total of 150 Japanese planes on May 24. During the course of three days, Ugaki committed a total of 387 Navy planes and 174 Army planes to his kamikaze attacks, which continued through May 25. These attacks successfully sank the destroyer Bates, one transport, and one landing craft, while further damaging two destroyers, one destroyer minesweeper, one minesweeper, one transport, and one Liberty ship. On the same day, Admiral Rawlings’ Task Force 57 launched its final strikes in the Okinawa area before retiring late on May 25, having completed the Royal Navy’s Iceberg mission.

On land, while Shepherd’s Reconnaissance Company occupied the deserted ruins of Naha, the 4th Marines fought to seize Machisi Ridge and continued pushing into the eastern outskirts of Naha. However, across the remainder of the 10th Army front, assault units struggled to make progress due to the havoc wreaked by the rain and the stiffened Japanese resistance. That night, in accordance with the withdrawal plan, the 62nd Division began moving its remaining 3,000 men to counter the advance of the 7th Division, hoping to delay the American advance long enough for the main body of the 32nd Army to retreat.

The arrival of additional forces on the Ozato-Mura front had little significant impact, primarily serving to strengthen the covering and holding force. On May 26, the 184th Regiment successfully cleared the Hemlock-Locust Hill Escarpment. Meanwhile, the 32nd Regiment was brought nearly to a standstill in front of the Japanese defensive line across the Yonabaru valley. Looking west, Del Valle’s Marines observed large numbers of enemy troops withdrawing from Shuri and were able to pinpoint their location for naval guns, artillery, and aircraft to bombard. However, despite penetrating the Shuri defensive line on both flanks, the day yielded minimal progress. At sea, further kamikaze attacks caused damage to one destroyer, one destroyer minesweeper, and a subchaser. In total, Ugaki’s raids over the past three days resulted in the deaths of 103 sailors. 

Believing the fast carriers’ continued value off Okinawa had become dubious, back on May 18 Mitscher had requested that TF 58 be relieved from its Okinawa station. Spruance regretfully declined. A week later an increasingly weary Mitscher reported: “For two and a half months [Task Force 58] operated daily in a 60nm square area East of Okinawa, less than 350nm from Kyushu. This was necessitated by the restricted area available and the necessity for being able to cover [the] Amami Gunto airfields, intercept air raids before they could reach Okinawa, and still furnish air support to ground forces. There was no other location from which all these things could be done.” Reflecting on the months of unrelenting stress, tedium, and fatigue, TG 58.1’s screen commander, Captain Tom Hederman, signaled Rear Admiral J.J. Jocko Clark: “See Hebrews 13, verse 8.” Consulting his Bible aboard Hornet, Clark read: “Jesus Christ the same yesterday, and today, and forever.” Amused, Clark forwarded the verse to his entire Task Group, adding, “No disrespect intended.” Clark then signaled Mitscher, “What the hell are we doing out here, anyway?” Mitscher’s response: “We are a highspeed stationary target for the Japanese air force.” Indeed, TF 58 had already suffered over 2,000 Iceberg fatalities.

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The brutal Battle of Okinawa was reaching a critical point as General Buckner's forces pressed against fierce Japanese defenses. Struggles unfolded over Sugar Loaf Hill and Wana Ridge, with Marines suffering heavy casualties but slowly gaining ground. By late May, the dire situation prompted Japanese commanders to plan a retreat to more defensible positions as American forces closed in. Despite challenging conditions, the Allies pushed forward, marking a decisive breakthrough in the Pacific War.