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Last time we spoke about liberation of Luzon.. American forces, led by General Eichelberger and supported by General Krueger's armies, relentlessly advanced against the entrenched Japanese defenders of General Yamashita’s 14th Area Army. Amid thick jungle and treacherous terrain, battles raged through the northern mountain ranges, as American troops aimed to restore the Filipino government. Facing overwhelming odds, the Japanese forces displayed extraordinary resilience, temporarily halting American progress. Remarkable efforts from General Swift’s 1st Corps across Routes 9 and 11 led to significant breakthroughs as American forces captured critical positions, including Sablan and Baguio. However, the Japanese command, complacent and misjudging the American strategy, fell into disarray. As the tide turned with relentless American assaults, key Japanese positions were systematically dismantled. By late April, most of Luzon was liberated, restoring hope and autonomy to the Filipino people.
This episode is Invasion of Balikpapan
Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.
The battles for Okinawa and Luzon just closed up, and today we are going to be venturing back to the Dutch East Indies. As we left off in mid-May, the tides of war were shifting dramatically on the island of Luzon, with General Krueger's 6th Army celebrating significant victories across the region. In the north, General Swift’s 1st Corps had successfully secured the scenic Baguio area, known for its lush mountains and cool climate, a stark contrast to the tropical heat that engulfed much of the Philippines. Yet, the fighting was far from over, as fierce battles continued on three major fronts. Colonel Volckmann’s guerrilla 121st Regiment was making strides, snagging much of the strategically vital Bessang Pass, a crucial artery connecting northern Luzon to the central regions. However, their success came at a cost, leaving them overextended amidst fierce Japanese resistance. Meanwhile, General Gill’s weary 32nd Division managed to claim dominance over the rugged terrain of Salacsac Pass along the historic Villa Verde Trail, known for its breathtaking views and treacherous paths that had challenged both soldiers and their supply lines.
General Mullins’ 25th Division achieved a remarkable breakthrough by capturing the key Balete Pass, opening the way for further advances. Not stopping there, the 25th Division pressed onward, quickly redirecting their focus northward towards the town of Santa Fe. By May 24, the 27th Regiment had cleared the Sawmill River valley, an area teeming with dense foliage and rugged hills, a significant accomplishment that paved the way for the next objectives. From there, the 1st Battalion expertly maneuvered eastward against the imposing Kanami Ridge. On May 22, the 161st Regiment dealt a heavy blow to Japanese positions in a stronghold on Mount Haruna, a location known for its steep, challenging slopes. Following this triumph, they began their descent down the northern slopes of Haruna Ridge, gearing up for a critical junction with the Villa Verde Trail by May 27. Meanwhile, the 35th Regiment launched a vigorous assault from Balete Pass, systematically clearing out the remaining Japanese caves and fortifications by May 26, culminating in the capture of Santa Fe the very next day. At Salacsac, the Japanese forces, led by General Iwanaka, initiated a limited counteroffensive, presumably to buy time for a strategic evacuation of their increasingly tenuous positions. If delay was indeed Iwanaka's intention, he executed it well; it wasn’t until May 19 that the American supply line was finally deemed secure again. The 2nd Battalion of the 128th Regiment resumed its push east from Hill 525, but the progress was slow. By May 22, the 1st Battalion had only managed to advance a mere 500 yards east from Hill 508, while the 3rd Battalion commenced a southward and southeastward advance from Hill 516 on May 16. It was not until May 24 that the relentless fighting in the region bore fruit, leading to the eventual clearing of the area, and Salacsac Pass was officially declared secured.
On that pivotal day, General Iwanaka began the difficult task of withdrawing the remnants of his battered forces northward, retreating up the winding valley of the Imugan River. This river, which flows through a lush, verdant landscape, would serve as a vital sanctuary, albeit one fraught with danger for the disheartened Japanese troops. Meanwhile, the American forces were gaining ground. The 2nd Battalion aggressively seized control of Hill 527, a position that provided a commanding view of the surrounding area, crucial for planning further advances. The 126th Regiment took decisive action, utilizing trucks to transport troops swiftly along Route 5 to Balete Pass before launching an assault toward Imugan from the east and southeast. Concurrently, the guerrilla 1st Battalion of the Buena Vista Regiment embarked on a northward push from Valdez, culminating in the hard-fought capture of Hill 528 on May 28. This hill, commanding and steep, presented a formidable challenge but also promised a vantage point critical for any further operations in the region. The very next day, Imugan finally succumbed to the relentless pressure of the advancing American forces, marking a significant milestone as the Villa Verde Trail came firmly under American control. This development effectively concluded the arduous operations of the 32nd Division. It was a costly campaign for General Gill; the division suffered approximately 825 men killed, 2,160 wounded, with an alarming 6,000 classified as non-battle casualties. In stark contrast, the Japanese defense was decimated, with at least 5,750 of the 8,750 troops they had deployed to defend the trail lying dead.
As we gaze northward, we find Colonel Volckmann’s guerrillas, who had extended themselves too thinly across Bessang Pass and into the challenging terrain of Yubo Ridge. The aftermath of their overreach saw them facing fierce Japanese counterattacks that swiftly pushed them back across Lamagan Ridge in the latter part of May. However, a small contingent managed to hold tenaciously onto the eastern slopes of Langiatan Hill, a strategic position that allowed them to maintain some level of influence in the region. Additionally, a robust force from the Japanese 76th Regiment assembled south of Butac, planning an offensive northward. However, this advance was met with fierce resistance from the guerrilla 15th Regiment, who successfully repelled the attack. Seizing the momentum, Volckmann directed the 15th Regiment into a new offensive eastward, and by the end of May, they had successfully re-secured their foothold up to Lamagan Ridge. Meanwhile, elements of the 121st Regiment executed a remarkable retaking of both Langiatan Hill and Yubo Ridge, gradually restoring control over this strategically vital area. Looking south, we find General Hall's 11th Corps vigorously engaged in two crucial offensives aimed at capturing Ipo Dam and Wawa Dam, both essential water reservoirs located east of Manila. The strategic importance of these dams cannot be overstated; they were vital not only for securing fresh water but also for controlling the flow of operations in the region. However, the relentless heavy downpours that characterized the season rendered air support missions impractical, exacerbating an already challenging supply situation for the advancing troops. As a result, General Wing’s 43rd Division was forced to pause its offensive late on May 14 to reassess and devise new attack plans.
As of late May 14, the 43rd Division found itself in a precarious situation, necessitating a halt to operations to devise new attack plans. To this point, the division had made limited progress toward securing Route 52, a crucial supply line vital for their mission to capture Ipo Dam. Recognizing the urgency, General Wing decided it was essential to commit the 169th Regiment to a targeted attack to clear this road, as it would serve as a critical route for both supply and evacuation in the coming days. The adverse weather conditions had created a significant operational hindrance. For nearly the entire duration of their offensive, intermittent rains had severely disrupted ground and aerial supply chains, as well as evacuation and the crucial air support operations necessary for a successful advance. Ground conditions had become challenging, and division engineers struggled to construct and maintain supply roads at a pace even close to that of the infantry's advances. Consequently, supply drops and hand-carried provisions were just sufficient to keep combat units barely above the minimum required levels, but the evacuation of sick and wounded soldiers remained a pressing issue that plagued the division. By May 14, the situation worsened significantly. For the first time since May 6, the 5th Air Force was completely grounded, unable to conduct any air support or supply missions due to the worsening weather conditions. This represented a troubling turning point for the 43rd Division. Moreover, intelligence reports indicated that sizable groups from the Japanese Tomono and Hanabusa Detachments had shifted their focus away from their defenses along Route 52, moving instead to confront the 103rd and 172nd Regiments attacking from the south. General Wing recognized that this presented a timely opportunity for the 169th Regiment. Striking directly along Route 52 would likely be far easier and less costly than it would have been just a week prior. Furthermore, a successful offensive by the 169th could not only expedite the capture of Ipo Dam but also prevent further eastward redeployments of Japanese forces. This would be a vital maneuver, potentially relieving pressure from Fork Ridge, where the left flank of the 172nd Regiment was currently bogged down in fierce fighting. Time was of the essence, and decisive action was required to turn the tide in favor of the 43rd Division.
The situation was critical; delay would allow Japanese forces to fortify their defenses further. In response, Wing mapped out a robust plan: he directed the 103rd Regiment to capture the Route 52 terminus at Ipo Dam itself, which was crucial for any further advances. Their orders included not only taking control of the dam but also clearing the high ground north of the road and west of the dam to ensure a secure position against any possible counterattacks. Additionally, he tasked the 172nd Regiment with seizing Hill 804, a vantage point that could provide vital intelligence and support to the offensive, while the 169th Regiment was directed to eliminate the last Japanese defenders in the Bigti area before advancing eastward along Route 52 to connect with the 172nd. A break in the weather finally came on May 17, allowing the 43rd Division to launch their offensive with much-needed air support. Aircraft successfully dropped napalm and strafed Japanese defensive positions, a strategy that proved devastatingly effective. General Kawashima, facing mounting losses, ultimately ordered the remnants of his command to withdraw to an assembly point on the western slopes of Mount Maranat, a retreat that revealed their deteriorating ability to hold the line. With the air support providing a critical advantage, the 103rd Regiment advanced boldly and swiftly cleared the last Japanese holdouts from Hill 860, securing an essential position. However, it was the guerrilla forces, under the command of Colonel Augustin, from the Marking Regiment who achieved a historic victory by capturing Ipo Dam shortly after noon. His patrols descended the slopes of Hill 803, crossed the Angat River at the dam, and triumphantly raised the American flag over the powerhouse on the south bank, a potent symbol of liberation and resistance. Simultaneously, the 172nd Regiment seized control of Fork Ridge, further tightening the noose around Japanese forces, while the 169th Regiment secured strategic ground from Hill 535 to Osboy Ridge, pushing forward with relentless determination.
In the following four days, the 43rd Division, supported by the fearless Marking guerrillas, meticulously mopped up the area west of Ipo Dam. Their efforts culminated in the successful opening of Route 52 from Bigti to Ipo on May 19, a critical milestone that allowed for the unhindered movement of troops and supplies. By May 21, they completed the operation by clearing out the last pockets of organized resistance in the region west of the dam and south of the Angat River, a crucial waterway that would play a significant role in sustaining American operations. With the capture of Ipo Dam intact, General Wing achieved his primary objective, making a significant contribution to addressing Manila's pressing water supply problems. This success would have lasting implications for the civilians and military alike, as the dam was key to ensuring a reliable water supply in the region. The 43rd Division maintained its momentum, continuing mopping-up operations through May 31. They patrolled eastward across the Ipo River, pressed northeast up the Angat from the dam, and scoured the areas that had witnessed some of the most intense fighting during the campaign. The cost of these operations was notable; Wing’s forces suffered losses of 120 killed and 515 wounded, while the Kawashima Force endured devastating casualties, with over 2,700 men killed and approximately 115 captured during the grueling battle.
Meanwhile, General Chase's 38th Division pressed forward with its offensive against Wawa Dam, following the failure of General Yokoyama’s most recent counteroffensive. The 145th Regiment found itself holding a precariously exposed salient at Mount Binicayan, which severely hampered their ability to launch an effective attack toward Wawa Dam. Japanese positions on the high ground to the north of the dam dominated the narrow, winding road with artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire, making any advance perilous. In response to this daunting challenge, General Chase decided to launch an offensive with the 151st Regiment in the area north of the Marikina River, targeting the formidable Mounts Pamitinan and Hapanong-Banoy. This bold maneuver was contingent upon the 152nd Regiment gaining momentum in its attack to clear Woodpecker Ridge. As such, on May 19 and 20, the 152nd Regiment executed enveloping maneuvers centered on Woodpecker Ridge, ultimately breaking through enemy lines on May 21. The breakthrough was dramatically supported by the introduction of medium tanks and flamethrower tanks, powerful assets that helped turn the tide of battle. The following day, what began as a breakthrough rapidly escalated into a rout of Japanese defenders. By May 25, the 152nd Regiment had established control over the strategic junction of the Marikina and Bosoboso Rivers, a key position that not only bolstered their operational capabilities but also positioned them for further advances in the ongoing campaign.
As Japanese resistance began to dissipate under the relentless pressure from the advancing American forces, the 149th Regiment, which had successfully relieved the 145th at Mount Binicayan, launched a bold strike toward Wawa Dam on May 27. Encountering little to no opposition, they secured the dam intact the following morning, marking a significant victory. It was on May 27 that General Yokoyama ordered a general retreat, recognizing the untenable position of his forces. Acting on these instructions, General Kobayashi's remaining troops fell back, pursued by vigilant patrols from the 38th Division. With Wawa Dam secured, General Chase shifted his strategy; rather than launching direct assaults against organized Japanese lines, he opted to focus on mopping up operations and pursuing the retreating enemy. The human cost of the campaign was significant. Chase’s forces sustained losses of 160 killed and 590 wounded, while the Kobayashi Force suffered catastrophic losses, with over 10,000 men killed since the onset of the offensive.
Shifting focus southeast, the 7th Cavalry and Lieutenant Colonel Bernard Anderson’s guerrillas converged on the coastal town of Infanta in late May. Faced with overwhelming pressure, the Japanese naval garrison retreated westward into the Sierra Madre mountains, a rugged and dense area that posed challenges for both sides. Infanta ultimately fell on May 25, and by the evening of the following day, the reinforced 7th Cavalry had successfully cleared the entire flat, rice-rich region surrounding the town, encountering only scattered and ineffective resistance. In a strategic move bolstered by overwater supply movements, the 7th Cavalry implemented an aggressive patrolling program to the southwest, seeking out any remaining enemy forces. Meanwhile, the 8th Cavalry focused its efforts on clearing the northern section of Santa Maria Valley, advancing northward into the Sierra Madre. By the end of May, the Shimbu Group, once a significant Japanese fighting force, was rendered ineffective. Its main units began to disband, breaking into small groups in a desperate bid to forage for food or to navigate their way to safety in northern Luzon.
At the end of May, the Shimbu Group still boasted a strength of nearly 26,000 men, over half of its total personnel as of February 20. However, the remaining survivors were not the elite forces they once were. The relentless campaigns by the 11th and 14th Corps had decimated the best-trained and most well-equipped units, leaving behind a shell of what had once been a formidable fighting force. Of the approximately 13,000 survivors still organized into units, their combat effectiveness had deteriorated so significantly that it's worthy of mention only in passing. Meanwhile, about 13,000 others were struggling to survive without proper organization; roughly 5,000 of these were receiving whatever limited medical treatment the Shimbu Group could provide. The remaining 8,000 men had essentially lost all structure, scattering into small groups to forage for food or attempting to make their way north to Luzon, where they hoped to find safety and sustenance.
The supply situation faced by the Shimbu Group at the end of May was even more dire than its personnel situation. They had been unable to transport significant portions of their vast stockpiles of supplies into the Sierra Madre mountains, a shortfall that would prove catastrophic for their survival. The only supplies they still possessed in any quantity were ammunition for small arms and machine guns, alongside medical materials for treating combat wounds. The most pressing issue, however, was a critical lack of food. The early loss of several key agricultural regions, including the Bosoboso Valley, the shores of Laguna de Bay, the Santa Maria Valley, and the fertile Infanta region, had deprived the Shimbu Group of expected food stocks. Most of the supplies brought out of Manila had already been consumed. For instance, the organized remnant of the Noguchi Force could currently allocate a meager two ounces of rice per day for each man—a portion that would undoubtedly vanish by mid-June. The Kobayashi Force fared little better, while the Kawashima Force managed to issue slightly more, around six to eight ounces of rice daily. The troops were gradually reduced to scavenging for survival, resorting to eating roots, bark, grass, and whatever food they could find in long-abandoned Filipino gardens. It’s worth noting that after just a few days in June, there wasn’t a single pig, carabao, or dog left alive within sight of the remnants of the Shimbu Group. Recognizing that mere existence was the overarching challenge, General Yokoyama hoped to regroup his organized units and move them into areas where they might have some chance to cultivate food, scattering them through the challenging terrain of the Sierra Madre. This desperate strategy highlighted the dire straits faced by the Shimbu Group as their chances for survival dwindled.
Meanwhile, the Noguchi Force received orders to transfer its main strength to the mountainous region along the eastern shore of Laguna de Bay, where some of its elements were already positioned. This shift aimed to gather their forces in a more favorable terrain, potentially allowing for better access to resources. The Kobayashi Force was tasked with establishing a defensive sector in the area north of Mount Purro and east of Wawa. In a coordinated effort, the 31st Infantry, minus its 3rd Battalion, along with various miscellaneous troops from the 8th Division, were ordered to occupy positions north of the Lenatin River, enhancing their defensive capabilities in a strategic location. The remnants of the Kawashima Force, already in the process of withdrawing from the Ipo Dam area, were instructed to relocate to the mountains east of San Miguel, approximately 22 miles northwest of Ipo. This area was believed to have more abundant food supplies, crucial for the survival of their forces. However, as circumstances unfolded, this transfer later proved impossible. Unable to move effectively, the bulk of the Kawashima Force remained entrenched in the area surrounding Mount Inuman, where they faced mounting challenges in sustaining their troops.
In the following month, General Hall directed the 38th Division and Major Edwin Ramsey’s 2nd Provisional Regiment to pursue the remnants of Yokoyama’s forces as they moved eastward toward Santa Iñez. Meanwhile, the 112th Cavalry employed various mountain and river valley trails to mount a converging attack from the south. They encountered light opposition and successfully captured the town on June 9, further consolidating their gains in the region. At the same time, patrols from the 43rd Division reported no signs of organized resistance north and east of Ipo Dam. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade, alongside Anderson’s guerrillas, effectively dispersed the last organized remnants of the Kogure Detachment and the remaining Japanese naval units at Lamon Bay. By the end of June, the only indication of organized Japanese resistance in an area extending five miles north and ten miles east of Wawa Dam was found in the Lenatin River valley, approximately three miles north of Santa Iñez. This development forced the remnants of Yokoyama’s forces into trackless and only partially explored wilderness, significantly complicating their ability to regroup or launch further operations. The operations throughout June were costly for Hall, resulting in approximately 110 men killed and 370 wounded. In contrast, Japanese losses during the month were staggering, amounting to 7,540 killed or found dead, alongside 1,105 captured.
Looking back north, General Yamashita aimed to avoid a similar fate for his northern forces. Ever since the fall of Baguio, he had been meticulously planning for the ultimate withdrawal of the Shobu Group deep into the Cordillera Central. On May 5, less than two weeks following the fall of Baguio, General Yamashita disseminated an outline plan for future operations to the major components of the Shobu Group throughout northern Luzon. His strategy was built on three fundamental premises: Estimation of Enemy Actions: Yamashita assessed that the 6th Army would concentrate its main effort on a northward drive along Route 5, anticipating that General Krueger would only launch secondary attacks toward Bontoc via Routes 4 and 11. This understanding allowed him to anticipate the flow of enemy movements and allocate his resources more effectively. Timing for Resource Stripping: He calculated that the Shobu Group would have approximately three months during which it could strip the Cagayan and Magat Valleys of the essential food and military supplies needed for a protracted stand in the mountains. During this period, the group aimed to transport this matériel into the Cordillera Central through the junction of Routes 4 and 5, located near Bagabag, 25 miles north on Route 5 from Bambang. Control of Key Routes: Yamashita recognized that the success of his planned withdrawal and future delaying actions hinged on maintaining control over the Routes 4-5 junction for as long as possible. He estimated that his defenses south of Santa Fe would be robust enough to hold until mid-June. Additionally, he planned to construct new defensive positions across Route 5 between Santa Fe and Bambang, enabling him to contain the 1st Corps south of Bambang until the end of June. Most crucially, he believed that he would be able to retain control of the Junction of Routes 4 and 5 until the end of July, which was essential for his operational strategy. His initial perimeter encompassed the vital Route 11 terminus of the Baguio-Aritao supply road, as well as key locations such as Bessang Pass, Bontoc, Banaue, Oriung Pass, and Santa Fe In his May 5 plan, Yamashita outlined the necessity of holding the Salacsac Pass-Balete Pass line until mid-June while constructing additional defenses between Santa Fe and Bambang. After mid-June, the Japanese forces were to withdraw to a second perimeter, extending through Ambuclao, Mankayan, Sabangan, Bontoc, Oriung Pass, and Bambang, strategically positioning themselves for potential future engagements.
Yamashita understood that these defenses would need to hold until July, when the defenders would be expected to retreat to his last-stand positions centered around Bokod, Mankayan, Polis Pass, the Rayambugan Farm School, and Bambang. He anticipated that the Shobu Group would be compelled to hold their ground until annihilation at these key locations. On April 27, the 103rd Division received orders from the Area Army to transfer its main strength to the Cauayan-Cabagan area, leaving behind only the Yuguchi Detachment 80th Brigade Headquarters in Aparri, which comprised a meager two battalions of nuclear infantry. Yamashita’s plans called for virtually abandoning the Cagayan Valley, temporarily retaining only the 103rd Division, which was significantly outnumbered and equated to less than two American Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs), particularly since the Araki Force was stationed in the Cervantes area.
The primary duty of the 103rd Division would be to gather all available resources in the valley, including rice and livestock such as carabaos, and dispatch these supplies into the Cordillera Central through Bagabag. Once this crucial task was completed, the division would also withdraw into the mountains, aligning with Yamashita’s broader strategic objectives. Yamashita’s decision to abandon the Cagayan Valley made logical sense. He realized that the forces he had remaining could not hold the valley for much longer. Additionally, there seemed little necessity to maintain a strong presence there any further. Initially, he had kept units in the valley to harvest and gather food, deny the Allied Air Forces of the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) the use of airfields for strikes against Formosa and Okinawa, and hold onto Aparri in the hope that supplies and reinforcements might still reach Luzon. However, by early May, Yamashita concluded that the situation at Okinawa was largely resolved, negating any strategic purpose behind holding the valley airfields. The hope for reinforcements had long since faded, and crucially, his troops had already gathered the early rice harvest from the valley. With no new crop expected to come in until late September, Yamashita recognized that he would not be able to harvest this future crop, further solidifying his decision to withdraw. Yamashita also ordered the 79th Brigade to take over the defense of Banaue, while directing the 105th Division to defend both the Magat Valley and the Bato Bridge area against potential airborne attacks. However, by the end of May, the situation deteriorated significantly: Santa Fe had fallen, and the retreat of the 10th Division had devolved into a chaotic rout. This development put the defenders at risk of allowing the enemy to reach Bambang before they could establish any strong delaying positions south of the town.
In response, Yamashita ordered the 10th Division and the 2nd Tank Division to assemble for a defensive stand across Route 5 at Bato Bridge. He also repositioned the 105th Division to the Rayambugan Farm School and directed the 103rd Division to occupy the vacated defenses at Oriung Pass. Despite these strategic maneuvers, time was not on their side. General Krueger wasted no time launching an aggressive pursuit northward, immediately sending the relatively fresh 37th Division to drive straight up Route 5 from Santa Fe to Bagabag. This force was then to swing east through Oriung Pass into the Cagayan Valley, continuing its advance north along Route 5 toward Aparri. To prepare for a larger offensive, Krueger also intended to use the 25th and 33rd Divisions in the initial assault against the Japanese home islands. To this end, he directed the 32nd Division to take over operations in the Baguio area, while the 6th Division was tasked with relieving the 25th at Santa Fe before striking northwest up Route 4 into the deep Cordillera Central, pursuing the Japanese forces further into the mountainous terrain.
Finally, Swift was ordered to execute limited attacks up Route 11 from Baguio, maintain the guerrilla offensive against Cervantes, and deploy the Connolly Task Force to follow Route 3 around the northwest tip of Luzon to secure the Aparri region. Leading the charge, the 129th Regiment of the 37th Division advanced north from Santa Fe on May 31, quickly encountering a reinforced provisional anti-tank unit just south of Aritao. This unit managed to delay the town's capture until June 5. However, the following day, Bambang fell without resistance, and the 129th faced only token opposition at Bato Bridge before ultimately reaching Bayombong on June 7. On June 8, the 145th Regiment took over the lead, and by nightfall, they had seized the crucial junction of Routes 4 and 5 near Bagabag without a fight. Advancing further, the 145th crossed the Magat River on June 9 and pressed toward Oriung Pass, where they rapidly engaged the reinforced 179th Independent Battalion. Although the outgunned and outnumbered defenders valiantly delayed the advance, the 145th pushed through the pass along Route 5 and secured it late on June 12. This breakthrough prompted the bulk of the 103rd Division to decide on a strategic retreat toward the Bontoc-Natonin area, while the remnants of the 4th Air Division abandoned Echague to join this withdrawal. By the evening of June 13, the 145th finally halted its advance at Santiago, while the 148th Regiment worked to neutralize the remaining Japanese positions at Oriung Pass. With these positions secured, the offensive resumed, resulting in the fall of the Echague airbase on June 14, followed by the occupation of Cauayan two days later.
As we can see, neither the 10th Division nor the 2nd Tank Division managed to reach Bagabag in time to impede the American advance; the latter was assembling along the Bambang-Pingkian road. On June 12, the 20th Regiment initiated a southwest drive along this road from Bambang. Two days later, elements of the 126th Regiment began pushing west toward Pingkian from Aritao, thereby applying significant pressure on Iwanaka’s beleaguered troops. Meanwhile, the 10th Division had become hopelessly cut off east of Route 5 and had retreated to the Old Spanish Trail south of Aritao. On June 11, the 25th Division launched a two-pronged attack against this isolated group, forcing General Okamoto’s remnants to retreat eastward deep into the Sierra Madre. In the meantime, General Clarkson dispatched the 130th Regiment up Route 11, where they encountered the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade, which was only capable of weak resistance. Poor weather conditions hindered the 33rd Division's operations in the following days, but by June 15, elements of the 130th Regiment had swung east along the Baguio-Aritao supply road and reached Ambuclao on the Agno River. To the north, Volckmann continued his offensive throughout June, deploying the 121st Regiment to clear Route 4 and secure the northern half of Lamagan Ridge. The 15th Regiment was tasked with advancing to seize Upper Cadsu Ridge and then moving generally northeast along the south side of Route 4. Additionally, the still-arriving 66th Regiment aimed to secure the area south of Butac and swing to the east on the 15th's right flank. As a result, both Lamagan Ridge and Lower Cadsu Ridge were cleared by June 5, with the 15th Regiment then turning its focus toward Upper Cadsu while the 121st Regiment advanced directly toward Bessang Pass.
Volckmann’s Provisional Battalion launched an attack on Magun Hill and, after a series of minor setbacks, succeeded in clearing much of the area by June 10. On that day, the 121st Regiment initiated a final assault toward Bessang Pass, advancing from the west and southwest. The following day, the Provisional Battalion began pressing in from the north and northeast. Meanwhile, the 15th Regiment overran the last organized resistance on Upper Cadsu on June 12, just as the 66th Regiment was reaching the southwestern corner of the ridge. Supported by artillery, the 121st finally overcame the last organized defenses at Bessang Pass on June 14, establishing contact with the Provisional Battalion east of the pass. On the same day, the final pockets of opposition crumbled before the 15th and 66th Regiments south of the pass. Consequently, the remnants of Japanese forces fled east along Route 4 toward Cervantes, pursued by elements of the 15th and 121st Regiments, which successfully secured the town before dark on June 15. During this final offensive, the guerrillas suffered losses of 119 men killed and 120 wounded, while exaggerated estimates placed Japanese losses at around 2,600 killed. At the same time, by mid-June, the guerrilla 11th and 14th Regiments had cleared almost all the valley west of the Cagayan River, stretching from Cauayan north to Aparri. They also gained complete control over Route 11 from Bontoc to the valley, effectively preventing the 103rd Division from joining Yamashita’s last-stand positions. Meanwhile, the Connolly Task Force, after a largely uneventful march, approached Aparri and began an attack on June 11 to clear the last Japanese forces from the area. The last event forcing Yamashita to alter his plans came on 13 June, when the 6th Division's 63d Infantry began probing northwest up Route 4 from Bagabag. The reconnaissance foreshadowed a push that Yamashita especially feared, since Route 4 provided direct access to the deep Cordillera Central. The 105th Division, with defenses across Route 4 at the Rayambugan Farm School, did not have sufficient strength to hold the highway, Yamashita knew.
Recognizing that he could not hope to maintain control along any of the three perimeters he had established in May, Yamashita issued new orders for a strategic withdrawal to a last-stand area. This new perimeter would be set up along the inhospitable valley of the Asin River, positioned between Routes 4 and 11. Accordingly, the orders were as follows: The 105th Division was to retreat from Route 4 to the Pacdan-Antipolo line. The 2nd Tank Division was to move north and hold the line from Tubliao to Antipolo. The 23rd Division was tasked with defending along the Adaoay-Bokod line. The 58th Independent Mixed Brigade was to hold the Agno Valley from Buguias south to Adaoay. The 19th Division was to consolidate the bulk of its forces into the Agno Valley, defending the river line from the Loo Valley south to Buguias. The 79th Brigade was assigned to defend Route 390 at Hapao. Once this last-stand perimeter collapsed, Yamashita planned for all remaining forces to retreat into the barren Asin Valley between Toccucan and Kiangkiang, prepared to fight to the death. The area behind this new last-stand perimeter boasted excellent defensive terrain, and Yamashita estimated that most of his units had sufficient ammunition for machine guns, mortars, and small arms to hold their positions for an extended period. However, the Shobu Group faced dire challenges: they were virtually out of medical supplies, had no clothing stocks, and their food reserves would be completely exhausted by mid-September. If they were not annihilated by the advancing Filipino-American forces, the Shobu Group could only anticipate a slow death by starvation and disease.
Now, it’s time to shift focus from the Philippines and head to Borneo to cover the preparations for the invasion of Balikpapan, codenamed Operation Oboe II. As the 9th Australian Division completed its tasks in North Borneo, General Milford’s 7th Australian Division was assembling at Morotai for the upcoming invasion scheduled for July 1. Milford’s plan entailed an amphibious assault on a two-brigade front between the Klandasan Besar River and Klandasan town, where the Japanese had established their strongest defenses. In June, it was estimated that approximately 3,900 troops were stationed around Balikpapan, composed of: 1,500 in mobile units. 2,400 in anti-aircraft, air force, and base units. Additionally, there were 1,100 Japanese workers, 2,400 Indonesians, and 1,000 Formosans present. Near Samarinda, it was believed there were about 1,500 troops, plus possibly a battalion that had recently arrived from Tarakan. Experience had demonstrated that when estimating the strength of the enemy's resistance, every Japanese and Formosan, whether part of a fighting unit, base unit, or civilian labor group, had to be regarded as a combatant. Key defensive features included: At least 18 coast-defense guns, primarily located on ridges overlooking the sea. 26 heavy dual-purpose guns and 78 medium and light anti-aircraft guns. Offshore, between Klandasan and Manggar, rows of stout poles were driven into the seabed, horizontally braced with timber, and protected with barbed wire. An almost continuous anti-tank ditch, from 12 to 14 feet wide, extended above the beach from Stalkudo to Sepinggang. Extensive trench systems, with many tunnel openings, were detected on the ridges overlooking Klandasan. Numerous concrete strongpoints and a continuous line of bunkers lined the beach’s fringe. This area was among the most strongly fortified that the Australians had encountered during the war. Indeed, Air Vice-Marshal Bostock, responsible for air support of the landing, cautioned the Prime Minister in a letter that these meticulously prepared defenses might result in Australian casualties comparable to those experienced during the landing at Gallipoli. It appeared that the Japanese had established their main defenses on the slopes overlooking the beaches from Klandasan to Stalkudo. The Australian staff believed the Japanese would attempt to contain the invaders within their beachhead area for as long as possible, before withdrawing inland, either south to Bandjermasin or overland to Bintulu in Sarawak. Additionally, it was anticipated that the enemy would direct burning oil onto the beach unless the oil tanks were destroyed during the preliminary bombardment.
Brigadier Ivan Dougherty’s 21st Brigade was to land with one battalion on Green Beach, while Brigadier Frederick Chilton’s 18th Brigade would go ashore with two battalions on the Yellow and Red Beaches. Once a beachhead was secured, the 18th Brigade would seize the high ground dominating the town and clear the harbor for use, while the 21st Brigade would advance along the coast to capture the airstrips. Additionally, Brigadier Kenneth Eather’s 25th Brigade, held in reserve, was set to land on July 2 with the likely objective of thrusting inland along the Milford Highway. Although Admiral Barbey favored a landing site farther east, possibly at Sepinggang, where their ships could be positioned more safely and further from Japanese coastal defense guns, Milford countered with sound reasoning: “Why land up the coast and have to fight miles through jungle, which suits the enemy, when you can go straight in under heavy supporting fire, which the enemy can't withstand, in comparatively open and favorable country?” Supported by General Morshead, this plan received approval, and by June 16, the 7th Division was successfully assembled at Morotai. Admiral Noble’s Task Force 78 would once again transport the Australian troops to the landing area, supported by Rear-Admiral Ralph Riggs’ cruiser group and Rear-Admiral William Sample’s escort carriers.
Against the Japanese defenses, Admiral Kamada’s 22nd Special Base Force consisted of approximately 3,900 troops, with 1,500 in mobile units and 2,400 in anti-aircraft, air force, and base units, in addition to an estimated 4,500 laborers. In preparation for the invasion, aircraft from the Royal Australian Air Force and the 5th and 13th Air Forces began bombarding enemy defenses and storage tanks on June 4. These attacks intensified a week later as they specifically targeted Japanese gun positions. On June 15, Noble’s minesweepers arrived to clear the sea around Balikpapan of magnetic mines, but faced losses, with three ships sunk and three damaged during the operation. Ten days later, American underwater demolition teams began working to locate and breach the underwater obstacles, often under heavy gunfire. To further confuse the enemy, efforts were made to create the impression that the landing would occur at Manggar. This included spreading rumors, landing a reconnaissance party in that area, and demolishing underwater obstacles at both Manggar and Sepinggang. Finally, on June 26, Noble’s convoy set sail from Morotai. After an uneventful voyage, they reached Balikpapan unmolested just before dawn on July 1. During the morning, Riggs’ cruisers and Noble’s destroyers shelled the landing beaches and the defenses behind them, continuing the bombardment until the first waves of landing craft were within 1,300 yards of the shore, at which point the fire shifted to the flanks and rear of the enemy positions. About an hour before the landing, a combined rocket barrage and low-level airstrike were executed, followed by a second rocket barrage just ten minutes before the troops hit the beaches. In total, during the 20 days leading up to the assault, the Balikpapan-Manggar area received 3,000 tons of bombs, 7,361 rockets, 38,052 shells, and 114,000 rounds from automatic weapons, all aimed at crippling the formidable Japanese defenses. Covered by a successful bombardment, the assault waves finally hit the beaches just before 09:00. However, due to navigation errors, the troops were put ashore at the wrong locations. The 2/27th Battalion landed on Yellow Beach instead of Green Beach and quickly captured the Ration, Romilly, Rottnest, and Charlie's Spur positions. The 2/12th Battalion landed on Red Beach instead of Yellow, necessitating a northeast swing to take over Ration and reduce the remaining Japanese defenses in the area. A platoon was also detached to push inland along Vasey Road to seize Portee, while other elements secured Parkes, Plug, and Blyth’s Junction. The 2/10th Battalion, correctly landing on Red Beach, rapidly seized the high ground in front of them. Patrols found Prudent and Petersham Junction to be unoccupied. The 2/10th then assembled at Petersham Junction and captured the lower slopes of Hill 87, successfully taking the hill under assault by noon. Meanwhile, Dougherty landed his reserve units, which also came ashore further west than expected on Yellow Beach. The 2/16th Battalion quickly assembled at Ravenshoe and captured Record, Pigeon, and Mount Malang. By 11 a.m. the battalion was on Ravenshoe, whence Malang and Pigeon were visible. Advancing under sharp fire Captain Madigan's company on the left took Record about 4 p.m., killing 46 Japanese. At 4.5 Captain R. H. Christian's company launched a concerted attack on Malang, sup-ported by the fire of artillery, mortars and machine-guns, and using a flame-thrower. The hill was taken and 40 Japanese were killed. The Australians lost four killed, including the leading platoon commander, Lieutenant Armstrong, and 14 wounded. By nightfall the 2/16th held a line through Malang, Pigeon and Record. It had lost 6 killed or died of wounds in the day and 24 wounded; 86 Japanese dead had been counted.
The 2/14th Battalion advanced swiftly to secure a bridgehead over the Klandasan Besar and seized the Stalkudo ridge. The 2/5th Commando Squadron passed through this bridgehead and attacked northeast but encountered heavy opposition. Returning to Hill 87, the 2/10th Battalion assaulted and captured Parramatta in the afternoon, aided by artillery and tanks, while patrols further secured Newcastle and the Cracking Plant by dusk. A patrol led by Sergeant A. A. Evans was sent out from Davey's platoon towards Newcastle. They silenced a bunker with a flame-thrower, and came to a house from which Japanese were firing. They overcame this position with grenades and small arms fire and then moved on to New-castle. As Evans reached Newcastle he saw the surviving Japanese making off towards Portee. Davey's platoon now occupied Newcastle and the other platoon took up positions on Parramatta. The seizure of Parramatta gave the 2/10th observation over the low ground to the north and the northern end of the town, and tied the battalion in with the 2/12th on Portee; the Japanese were now in a very poor position to counter-attack from the western end of the beach-head. Lieutenant Russack of Sanderson's company led a patrol to the Cracking Plant where it silenced a Japanese pill-box. This patrol was strafed by American aircraft, but worse was to follow. At 4.55 American carrier-borne aircraft made a run over Parramatta from the west and dropped bombs and fired rockets across Hill 87, which had then been in the hands of the 2/10th for four hours and a half. Much of this fire landed in the area into which Captain Brocksopp's" company ("D") had moved and where Daly's command post was established. Three were killed, including Lance-Sergeant Hackett, a veteran of several cam-paigns, and 14 wounded, including Major G. R. Miethke and two other officers. Air panels were displayed in all platoon areas after this. Daly decided to hold that night as far forward as Newcastle, on which he placed two platoons plus a platoon of the 2/1st Machine Gun Bat-talion, all under Captain Bowie. In the day the battalion had lost 13 killed and 30 wounded, but 216 Japanese dead were counted. That night 24 more Japanese were killed while trying to penetrate the Australians' positions and no Australian was hit. All night there were fires round about where houses were burning, and the blazing oil tanks on the Tank Plateau 600 yards to the west of the Parramatta ridge lit up the landscape. Finally, Brigadier Chilton also landed the reserve 2/9th Battalion on Red Beach and sent it west in the afternoon to occupy Klandasan town, leading to the capture of Santosa Hill by nightfall. Thus, the Australians successfully landed at Balikpapan and secured a sizable beachhead, marking the beginning of what would become a fierce and challenging battle.
I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.
In June 1945, American forces, led by Generals Eichelberger and Krueger, fought fiercely against Japanese troops in Luzon, achieving significant victories despite heavy resistance. The tide turned as they captured key positions, restoring hope to Filipinos. Meanwhile, preparations for the Balikpapan invasion intensified. The 7th Australian Division readied for an amphibious assault on July 1 against well-fortified Japanese defenses. Despite facing strong opposition, the Australians successfully landed at various beaches, seizing vital ground.

Tuesday Jun 24, 2025
- 188 - Pacific War Podcast - Liberation of Luzon - June 24 - July 1, 1945
Tuesday Jun 24, 2025
Tuesday Jun 24, 2025
Last time we spoke about the victory at Okinawa.. As American forces led by General Buckner advanced, they captured strategic key points, driving the Japanese into a desperate retreat. Despite overwhelming odds, the remaining Japanese defenders, embodying the samurai spirit, fought to the bitter end, hoping to gain time for their homeland's defenses. On June 21, faced with inevitable defeat, Generals Ushijima and Cho chose to commit seppuku in honor of their duty. Their tragic decision underscored the deep commitment to their cause, an adherence to the warrior code. By this point, countless Japanese soldiers surrendered, acknowledging the futility of their fight. As the month drew to a close, the Americans secured Okinawa, a hard-won victory shadowed by staggering casualties, more than 107,000 Japanese lives lost and significant American losses. This battle not only symbolized the relentless spirit of those who fought but also the tragic costs of war, forever etched in history as a vivid reminder of sacrifice and the haunting price of conflict.
This episode is Liberation of Luzon
Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.
For most, the battle of Okinawa basically ends the Pacific War, but the truth is the war was raging all over the place. The second most noticeable place would be Luzon, where the remnants of General Yamashit’as 14th Area Army were still resisting in the northern and eastern mountain ranges. Yet here too, the curtains were beginning to fall.
As we last left off, it was mid-April 1945, and the fierce struggle for the liberation of Luzon was reaching a critical phase. General Eichelberger’s 8th Army was actively engaged in offensives across the Visayas and Mindanao, while General Krueger’s 6th Army focused its might on two primary sectors in Luzon. The stakes were high, the liberation of Luzon was crucial for securing Manila and restoring the Filipino government that had been disrupted by the war. In the northern sector, General Swift’s 1st Corps was grappling with General Yamashita’s formidable Shobu Group, who were entrenched in this mountainous terrain, making the fighting particularly arduous. Meanwhile, General Hall’s 11th Corps was applying relentless pressure on the opposing Shimbu Group, led by General Yokoyama, in the vital areas east of Manila. Starting in the northern reaches of Luzon, we find General Clarkson’s 33rd Division making tangible advances, having secured Route 11 up to Camp 3, as well as segments of the Galiano Road and the Tuba Trail. This area, known for its treacherous paths and thick jungle, posed significant challenges, but the troops pressed on. Northward, General Beightler’s 37th Division was also on the move, with its 129th Regiment overcoming all enemy resistance along Route 9, reaching the critical town of Sablan by April 14. Not to be overlooked, Colonel Volckmann’s guerrilla 121st Regiment had carved a path up Route 4 to the strategically important Bessang Pass, known for its rugged terrain that offers a natural defense. General Mullins’ 25th Division was making notable progress towards Balete Pass, gaining crucial footholds on Crump Hill and Myoko Ridge. These positions were essential as they provided elevated vantage points over the surrounding valleys. On the western front, General Gill’s 32nd Division had successfully secured the western Salacsac Pass but still faced stiff enemy positions in the eastern pass, where Japanese forces were well-prepared to defend. With the arrival of the bulk of the 37th Division in early April, Swift was poised to launch a dynamic two-division drive towards Baguio, a city nestled in the mountains that had become a strategic goal due to its position and resources. While Clarkson’s units continued to engage in patrol actions in the Arboredo, Agno, and Ambayabang River valleys, there was limited progress in these areas. However, the 129th Regiment initiated a decisive attack on Sablan on April 11, successfully breaching Japanese defenses there by April 14. On that pivotal day, the 148th Regiment took charge of securing Route 9 through Calot, a vital corridor for advancing troops. Meanwhile, the 130th Regiment encountered fierce resistance as it pushed west of Asin along the Galiano Road, exemplifying the tenacity of Japanese forces determined to hold their ground.
As the battle raged, General Yamashita was already strategizing to evacuate Baguio. By April 19, he made the decision to relocate to the Bambang front, leaving Major-General Utsunomiya Naokata, one of his trusted chiefs of staff, in command of the remaining forces. Despite the growing pressure on Route 9, the Japanese command seemed out of touch by the second week of April 1945. They inaccurately assessed that the primary thrust of General Swift's 1st Corps would come along Route 11, allowing them to become complacent. This misplaced confidence led to a failure to redeploy troops to counter the increasing threat on their right flank. Instead of fortifying their defenses, they appeared to adopt an inexplicable, almost defeatist attitude, unusual for a military as disciplined as the Imperial Japanese Army. Compounding this lack of urgency was the intense effort from the 14th Area Army headquarters to evacuate civilians and supplies from Baguio, a city perched high in the Cordillera Central mountain range. This evacuation served as a clear signal that the situation was deteriorating, yet the Japanese command remained strangely passive. Yamashita's mindset regarding the unfolding crisis was evident when he made personal preparations to depart for the Bambang front on April 19. In a move echoing his earlier strategy for the Bambang area, he established an independent command for the Baguio front before his departure. Utsunomiya's responsibilities also included nominal command over the 19th Division, stationed north of Baguio, but his control was hampered by significant communication difficulties that plagued the Japanese forces. The first notable action Utsunomiya took was to relieve the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade from the 23rd Division's control, seeking to streamline command. Under Yamashita’s directive to hold Baguio for as long as possible before retreating to a new defensive line, Utsunomiya issued an order for all troops along the existing Main Line of Resistance "hold out to the last man." His tone betrayed the grim reality, coming across as almost ironic given the mounting pressures they faced.
Meanwhile, General Sato’s 58th Independent Mixed Brigade was frantically working to fortify defenses along Route 9, southeast of Calot. However, their efforts came too late to prevent the 148th Regiment from swiftly capturing Yagyagan on April 15, gaining a crucial foothold in the area. In response to this setback, Sato began sending reinforcements to the Irisan Gorge starting April 16, apparently under Utsunomiya's orders. This narrow, treacherous gorge, surrounded by steep cliffs, was seen as a pivotal point for a last-ditch defense. The Japanese troops managed to repel the initial assaults from the 148th Regiment on April 17, but as night fell, the Americans executed a series of enveloping maneuvers, ultimately securing Ridge A. The following morning, the 148th seized Ridge C; however, their frontal assaults against Ridge B were met with fierce resistance and ended in failure.
On April 19, the tide began to turn. After a devastating air strike and concentrated artillery fire that neutralized most of the Japanese positions on Ridge F, the Americans finally captured Ridge B. Concurrently, other American units seized Hills D and E, effectively cutting off the Japanese retreat route. The relentless pressure continued, and the next day, Ridges F and G were subjected to intense attacks, which ultimately resulted in their capture. This relentless campaign forced the Japanese to withdraw to Ridge H, where they continued to regroup. After heavy bombardment, the Irisan Gorge was finally cleared on April 21, sending the surviving defenders scrambling in retreat. As these operations unfolded, the 130th Regiment was busy repositioning two battalions from the Galiano Road to the junction of the Yagyagan Trail along Route 9, poised to mount a coordinated attack on Asin from both the east and west. On April 22, they launched their offensive, catching the Japanese defenders by surprise and effectively dismantling their defenses. By the afternoon of April 23, the Galiano Road was opened for American forces, marking a significant advancement in their campaign.
Concurrently, the 129th Regiment had taken over operations from the 148th Regiment and advanced against only scattered resistance, making significant progress as far southeast as the junction of the highway and the Galiano Road. However, their advance was ultimately halted due to concerns about a potential threat from the north. Seizing on this hesitation, General Utsunomiya decided to leave small delaying forces at Trinidad and Baguio, while initiating a general withdrawal to the north and northeast. With Utsunomiya's defensive lines weakened, American patrols were able to enter Baguio on April 24, met with surprisingly little resistance. By April 26, the 129th had effectively secured most of the city, facing only negligible opposition. Simultaneously, elements from the 123rd and 130th Regiments worked diligently to eliminate the remaining Japanese defenses on nearby Mount Calugong, along the Tuba Trail, and on Mount Mirador, ensuring the area was cleared for further American operations. Despite these American successes, Utsunomiya managed to escape with approximately 10,000 troops to the Baguio-Aritao supply road, a crucial evacuation route for Japanese forces. As the end of April approached and into the first days of May, the 37th Division continued to mop up the surrounding areas, further securing Trinidad. Meanwhile, the 33rd Division also pressed forward, capturing the Balinguay-Itogon-Pitican sector, enhancing their control over the region. Looking eastward, General Gill’s demoralized 32nd Division was still engaged in fierce fighting through the Salacsac Pass, hampered in their advance along the Villa Verde Trail.
During the second week of April 1945, observers from the 6th Army headquarters reported alarming morale issues within the 32nd Division, echoing concerns that General Krueger had personally noted during previous visits to the front lines. The soldiers of the 126th and 128th Regiments were on the brink of complete mental and physical exhaustion. Front-line troops, many of whom had spent significant time overseas, were becoming overly cautious, possibly from the toll of constant combat. Conversations among the men frequently centered around one urgent topic: their rotation back to the United States. The once aggressive spirit characteristic of these combat troops was waning rapidly. With dwindling numbers and pervasive personnel issues, it was clear that the division would struggle to mount any spectacular gains in the coming days. If they couldn’t quicken their pace along the critical Villa Verde Trail, reaching their objective, Santa Fe, by the targeted date of June 1 appeared increasingly unlikely. Delays would be catastrophic; they risked being trapped on the trail by the heavy rains of the impending wet season, which typically began in late May. Such circumstances would severely hinder their ability to withdraw and salvage their equipment from the treacherous mountainous terrain. Meanwhile, the Japanese forces retained key terrain advantages, allowing them to economically utilize their troops and reinforce their front lines almost at will. In stark contrast, the rugged landscape severely restricted the 32nd Division’s maneuverability, forcing them to repeatedly launch costly frontal assaults with their diminishing strength. While terrain and weather conditions presented significant challenges, the growing personnel crisis loomed as a critical factor likely to further limit the division's progress in the days ahead. Compounding their challenges, General Iwanaka’s reconstituted 2nd Tank Division had suffered heavy casualties, leaving General Konuma unable to provide further reinforcements. On April 17, the rested 127th Regiment finally began its move to relieve the beleaguered 128th Regiment at the western pass, launching operations to clear the last remnants of Japanese forces from the Hill 506-507 area. Although Hill 506B fell rapidly on April 19, and Hill 507C was captured three days later, American forces struggled to completely clear Hill 507D until May 2, underscoring the tenacity of the Japanese defenders.
Despite the challenges, enough ground had been cleared by April 26 for the 2nd Battalion to initiate a drive east along and south of the Villa Verde Trail, aiming for the strategically important Hill 508. The Japanese forces, sensing this new threat, responded with fierce counterattacks from both the east and north, managing to delay the American capture of Hill 508 until April 29. The intense fighting illustrated the importance of this elevation, which offered vital visibility over the surrounding landscapes. In the days that followed, the 2nd Battalion expanded its control over Hill 508, establishing a defensive block on the Villa Verde Trail to the north while successfully repelling a series of heavy Japanese counterattacks. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion made significant strides by attacking and capturing Hill 509, further consolidating American positions in the area. Simultaneously, the 2nd Battalion of the 126th Regiment launched an offensive south from Hill 511, seizing Hill 515 on April 24. They advanced into the area north of Hill 508 while the 1st Battalion navigated through the rugged terrain of Hills 513 and 514, pressing southward to Hill 516. Their advance culminated in the capture of the crest of Hill 525, where they established a critical block on the Villa Verde Trail. However, the cost of these advances was significant. Due to the heavy losses incurred during these operations, the barely rested 128th Regiment began the process of relieving the exhausted 126th on May 3. Shortly after, the 128th's 2nd Battalion launched an assault southeast, successfully capturing Hill 526 on May 7, while some elements initiated a drive towards Hill 527. To the further east, General Mullins’ 25th Division was persistently pushing its Santa Fe offensive against stubborn Japanese resistance. In a stroke of fortune, a successful aerial reconnaissance mission revealed that ground located just 1,000 yards west of their position might offer a more favorable route of advance to Balete Ridge, providing a welcome alternative to the challenging Myoko mass itself.
On April 22, a reconnaissance force from the 27th Regiment successfully moved undetected to the southern slope of Balete Ridge, positioning themselves for a critical advance. The following day, the rest of the 2nd Battalion began to push toward Lone Tree Hill, while other units continued to exert pressure on the entrenched Japanese defenses at Myoko. Moving forward with enthusiasm and encountering negligible resistance, the Americans reached Lone Tree Hill on April 25, effectively bypassing the main concentrations of enemy forces. By April 27, the 2nd Battalion had advanced an impressive half mile beyond Lone Tree Hill, with its forward elements only three-quarters of a mile from Balete Pass. However, they were compelled to halt their advance due to the potential threat of an enemy counterattack looming on the horizon. Meanwhile, on April 23, the 35th Regiment began its ascent up Kapintalan Ridge, steadily making progress despite the challenging terrain. By April 27, their leading troops had reached a prominent knob located midway between Route 5 and Lone Tree Hill. The 161st Regiment was also making strides, continuing its attack northward towards Kembu Ridge, where they successfully secured Hill 4625 and the entirety of Highley Ridge by April 28. On that same day, the 27th Regiment began reinforcing their positions on Lone Tree Hill, while elements of the 2nd Battalion initiated a southwest push along Kapintalan Ridge to support the 35th Regiment advancing up Route 5. However, they encountered a formidable strongpoint and were only able to gain 350 yards of new ground northeast from the knob. Simultaneously, elements of the 27th Regiment advanced a modest 500 yards southwest by May 4, indicating the ongoing struggle. That morning, the 1st Battalion of the 161st Regiment seized the southeastern nose of Kembu Ridge, securing a valuable tactical position. At the same time, the 2nd Battalion pushed troops onto the ridge, extending their reach half a mile to the northwest, further consolidating American control in the area.
As a breakthrough appeared imminent, General Krueger began dispatching Beightler’s 37th Division to the Bambang front on May 2, with all elements of the division departing the Baguio area just three days later. With these reinforcements securing his rear and taking control of the Myoko massif, General Mullins ordered the 27th and 161st Regiments to concentrate their forces for a coordinated attack aimed at enveloping Balete Pass from both the east and west. On May 5, the 161st swiftly broke through Kembu Ridge and advanced to Haruna Ridge, while the 27th Regiment pushed west-northwest along Wolfhound Ridge. However, they faced fierce resistance, gaining only 350 yards against tenacious Japanese defenders. On May 8, Company I successfully launched a southwest offensive from their stronghold along a bare-crested ridge, while Company A deployed on Kenbu Ridge and began ascending the final sections of the Digdig River gorge. The following day, these two companies finally made contact with each other and linked up with the 161st on Haruna Ridge. By May 10, Wolfhound Ridge was secured, coinciding with elements of the 35th Regiment completing the clearance of Route 5 from Kapintalan to the pass. In the meantime, the 35th Regiment, along with units from the 27th, continued their assault on Kapintalan Ridge, which was ultimately secured by May 13. Meanwhile, the 148th Regiment renewed its attacks on Myoko Ridge, where Japanese resistance began to collapse by May 11. With these gains, Balete Pass was now secure. The Americans had incurred 565 men killed and 1,745 wounded during the drive, while General Okamoto’s 10th Division experienced catastrophic losses, with nearly 7,000 men killed and a complete breakdown of their control and communications.
Reflecting on the situation in Salacsac, by May 8, the Japanese position was deteriorating rapidly. In response, General Iwanaka made the critical decision to dispatch troops aimed at cutting the supply line to the 2nd Battalion of the 128th Regiment, with the intention of safeguarding his main stronghold at Mount Imugan. On that day, the 1st Battalion of the 128th Regiment began to push eastward, facing strong resistance, while elements of the 2nd Battalion moved west from Hill 526, struggling to make any significant progress. By May 10, Japanese forces successfully severed the track between Hills 525 and 516, forcing much of the 128th and one battalion of the 127th Regiment to allocate considerable resources to eliminate the Japanese pocket that had formed in that area. Meanwhile, the 33rd Division was left disheartened as it found itself assigned a holding mission to secure the Baguio-Bauang-San Fernando area. Their operations were limited to minor local gains and long-range reconnaissance, which did little to impact the overall situation.
During May 1945, the only significant action undertaken by the 33rd Division took place along a trail connecting Santa Rosa in the Ambayabang Valley to Tebbo, located on the Agno River five miles south of Pitican. The division focused its efforts on clearing Japanese forces from the high ground situated between the main trail and the upper reaches of the Ambayabang Valley. On May 9, a battalion of the 130th Regiment advanced south from Baguio via Pitican and reached Tebbo, only to find the barrio abandoned. Meanwhile, on May 5, the 136th Regiment began its advance up the Ambayabang Valley. Approximately three miles south of Tebbo, they became embroiled in a ten-day battle, resulting in the deaths of a few hundred Japanese troops. However, these enemy forces posed little threat to the 33rd Division, their primary mission being to block American attacks toward the Baguio-Aritao supply road from the south. As the rainy season approached, 1st Corps and the 33rd Division had long since abandoned plans to use the valley as a route of advance against the Japanese supply lines. Consequently, the 136th Regiment relinquished the terrain it had gained along the valley and the trail to Tebbo almost immediately after capturing it. By May 15, all troops of the 33rd Division began their withdrawal, a challenging task compounded by heavy rains that had transformed the Pitican-Tebbo trail and the trails in the Ambayabang Valley into quagmires. The final destruction of the Japanese blocking force in the valley had little impact on the strategic plans or dispositions of 1st Corps or the Shobu Group, as the Japanese quickly replenished their outposts. By the end of May, the 33rd Division was left executing reconnaissance missions without significant enemy contact or major advances. The division remained in a state of restless anticipation, awaiting developments on the Bontoc and Bambang fronts before the 6th Army would authorize a new drive deeper into the rugged mountains of northern Luzon.
Turning to the north, the guerrilla 121st Regiment achieved a significant victory on April 21 by overrunning the last Japanese positions on Lamagan Ridge. About a week later, they completed their occupation of Lower Cadsu. However, during the first part of May, the 121st Regiment faced formidable challenges as they advanced over steep terrain against increasingly fortified Japanese defenses, bolstered by reinforcements from General Ozaki’s 19th Division. In the south, Hall’s 11th Corps made good progress throughout mid-April, successfully pushing General Yokoyama’s 41st Army, previously known as the Shimbu Group, further east from Manila. Concurrently, General Hurdis’ 6th Division continued its offensive against the Kobayashi Detachment at Wawa Dam, achieving a notable success by securing the crest of Mount Mataba on April 17, marking a significant tactical gain in the ongoing battle.
Despite General Hurdis’ hopes to swiftly advance against Mount Pacawagan and Wawa Dam, persistent personnel issues forced him to halt any offensive actions until the 145th Regiment could relieve the 20th Regiment in the Montalban area. The 145th eventually began its assault on Pacawagan on April 21. However, even with effective supporting fire that destroyed much of the enemy's defenses, American forces struggled to secure a foothold on the mountain until the end of the month. Meanwhile, the 1st and 63rd Regiments continued to hold their occupied ground until they were relieved late in April by the 151st and 152nd Regiments of General Chase’s 38th Division, which then officially assumed control of the offensive operations. In the southern part of Manila, significant water supply problems prompted General Hall to redeploy General Wing’s 43rd Division northward in preparation for an offensive against Ipo Dam.
By mid-April 1945, an acute water shortage had developed within the city of Manila. General MacArthur informed General Krueger about the dire situation, noting that south of the Pasig River, Manila had access to no water sources except for that supplied by Army tank trucks and shallow, often contaminated wells. This shortage significantly hampered sewage disposal throughout the city, as water pressure from the overtaxed Novaliches Reservoir, the only reliable source was insufficient to carry off waste. As a result, flush toilets were frequently clogged, forcing many citizens to resort to using gutters and esteros for defecation. Restaurants and nightclubs, which were heavily frequented by off-duty American troops, struggled to maintain even minimum sanitary standards. The situation was exacerbated by a steady influx of military units and civilians into the metropolitan area, raising concerns about the imminent threat of severe epidemics breaking out in the city.
On April 19, MacArthur suggested to Krueger that the 6th Army could resolve Manila’s water supply crisis by seizing "the reservoir in the Montalban area." He inquired how soon the installation could be captured. This query puzzled Krueger, who was aware that the only true reservoirs linked to the Manila water system were located west of the Marikina River and had been under American control since February. Furthermore, Krueger understood that Wawa Dam, the nearest water supply installation to Montalban, was no longer connected to the metropolitan system. He subsequently asked MacArthur if by "reservoir in the Montalban area," he meant Ipo Dam, the only major water installation still in Japanese hands. Krueger’s question seemingly led to further examination of Manila’s water system at General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area (GHQ SWPA). On April 22, MacArthur radioed back to Krueger, confirming that Ipo Dam was indeed the preferred objective. He emphasized that capturing the Ipo installation would effectively solve Manila’s water supply problems. Upon receiving this directive, Krueger ordered the 11th Corps to launch a drive on Ipo Dam as soon as possible.
This shift in forces meant the 112th Cavalry Regiment had to move south to take over the vacated positions. General Wing conducted a reconnaissance-in-force that revealed the Kawashima Force’s defenses south of Route 52 were considerably weaker than those around the main highway. In light of this intelligence, the plan for assault was set into motion. On the night of May 6, the 103rd Regiment was ordered to advance towards Mount Katitinga and prepare to attack the dam. Supporting this effort, the 172nd Regiment would strike across a two-mile-wide front to the left of the 103rd towards the dam, while the 169th Regiment was tasked with demonstrating along Route 52 to pin down Japanese forces in the Bigti region. Additionally, Marking's Fil-American Yay Regiment at Norzagaray was to make a feint drive eastward north of the Angat River, targeting Mount Kabuyao.
During the first three days of May, General Chase conducted probing attacks in preparation for a concerted offensive aimed at Wawa Dam, which was set to begin on May 4. Simultaneously, General Yokoyama observed what he believed to be a slowdown in enemy progress, leading him to conclude that American forces must be redeploying northward or evacuating from Luzon entirely. This prompted him to prepare a limited counteroffensive, consisting of a series of harassing and delaying actions designed to pin down enemy forces on this front. Consequently, Yokoyama was not anticipating a major offensive on May 4. However, on that day, the 145th Regiment managed to gain up to 1,000 yards along the northern and northeastern slopes of Pacawagan, while the 152nd Regiment advanced approximately 500 yards northward along Woodpecker Ridge. Although these territorial gains were not monumental, Yokoyama became increasingly concerned about the strength of the American attacks and made the urgent decision to launch his counteroffensive. As Japanese forces hurried to reposition for their counterattacks, the 145th Regiment struck eastward, successfully seizing the rocky summit of Mount Binicayan. Meanwhile, the 152nd continued its efforts along Woodpecker Ridge. This coordinated assault completely surprised General Kobayashi’s troops, rendering their planned counterattack impossible as they were forced to shift their focus to defending their critical positions. In the southern sector, General Kawashima dispatched one battalion toward Montalban; however, the heavy air assaults that preceded Wing’s offensive made it impossible for the Japanese unit to organize effectively for their attack. Adding to the Japanese troubles, the remnants of the Noguchi Force were unable to provide any significant reinforcements. Despite the surprise and disarray among the Japanese defenders, they could not prevent the 145th from capturing the crest of Binicayan on May 9. The troops stationed on Woodpecker Ridge experienced some success by halting the advance of the 152nd and initiated a week of increasingly aggressive dawn and dusk raids starting on May 14.
Recognizing the futility of the ongoing conflict, which had resulted in over 1,300 Japanese casualties, General Yokoyama ordered an immediate withdrawal of all units involved on May 15. However, these orders would not reach the front lines until a week later. In the meantime, capitalizing on the element of surprise achieved during the night attack on May 6, General Wing launched an offensive that made excellent progress. The 103rd Regiment rapidly gained control of the western slopes of Katitinga and advanced swiftly along the ridgeline toward Hill 1000. Meanwhile, the 172nd Regiment reached the foot of a rocky ridge two miles southeast of Bigti, and the Marking Regiment encountered no resistance as it marched over seven miles eastward, ultimately halting just a mile and a half northwest of Kabuyao. The only significant resistance encountered occurred at Hill 535, where elements of a guerrilla unit were repelled by Japanese defenders. The unexpectedly weak Japanese opposition prompted the 43rd Division to sustain its offensive momentum without pause. By May 11, the 103rd had secured Hills 805 and 810, while the 172nd was probing Japanese defenses on Fork Ridge and advancing to the southwestern slopes of rocky Hill 815. The Marking Regiment had successfully overrun Kabuyao, though they were unable to capture Four-Corner Hill. At this point, Japanese resistance began to stiffen as American forces clashed with General Kawashima’s main defenses. In response, Wing ordered the 169th Regiment to mount a limited attack on Osboy Ridge and directed the Marking guerrillas to launch a strong assault toward Ipo. Supported by artillery, Colonel Marcus Augustin succeeded in breaking through Four-Corner Hill on May 12, marking a critical turning point in the offensive.
Unaware of Kawashima’s precarious situation, Yokoyama directed the Kawashima Force to initiate a new counterattack against the left and left rear of the 38th Division, deeming the situation for the Kobayashi Force to be more critical. As a result, Kawashima was compelled to divert one battalion for this unnecessary assault, which weakened the Japanese defenses. This strategic miscalculation enabled General Wing to make significant gains on May 13, with the 103rd Regiment capturing Hill 860, the 172nd clearing much of Hill 815, and the Marking guerrillas seizing the summit of Hill 803. The extent of these advances prompted Kawashima to ultimately disregard Yokoyama’s orders and recall his assault battalion. This battalion promptly mounted a counterattack against the Americans in a futile attempt to regain lost ground, managing only to restrict the 103rd and 172nd Regiments to minor gains on May 14. Simultaneously, Colonel Augustin’s patrols crossed the Angat River unopposed, discovering that the dam remained intact and the powerhouse on the south bank was largely undamaged. However, the patrol force, too weak to hold these installations, retreated before dawn to the crest of Hill 803, where the remainder of the regiment was occupied with mopping up remaining resistance. Looking further south, General Griswold’s 14th Corps had already secured most of southern Luzon and had successfully landed General MacNider’s 158th Regiment in the Bicol Peninsula. In response, the remnants of the Fuji Force and the depleted Kogure Detachment decided to evacuate the open Santa Maria Valley, opting to retreat to more defensible positions at the Kapatalin Sawmill. This allowed Griswold to move the 7th and 8th Cavalry Regiments into the valley, with the former beginning a drive along Route 455 on May 6.
Following a heavy air and artillery bombardment, the cavalrymen launched their assault on the sawmill on May 9 and swiftly overran the enemy defenses by mid-afternoon. After a brief pause to reorganize, the 7th Cavalry advanced up Route 455, leaving their vehicles behind, and reached Lamon Bay by May 13. Meanwhile, on the Bicol Peninsula, progress had been agonizingly slow throughout late April. It wasn’t until April 28 that the Cituinan Hills were fully secured, leading to the collapse of organized Japanese resistance in the region. Following this, the 158th Regiment began moving northwestward toward Iriga and San Agustin, rapidly overrunning the remaining weak enemy positions along Route 1. Progress continued to be painfully slow, and it was not until 28 April that organized Japanese resistance finally collapsed. The task of clearing the Cituinan Hills cost the 158th Infantry approximately 40 men killed and 235 wounded; the Japanese lost almost 700 men killed in the region. Although the 158th RCT did not know it, the reduction of the Cituinan Hills marked the end of large-scale organized resistance on the Bicol Peninsula, where no more than 1,400 Japanese remained alive as of the end of April. Simultaneously, the 5th Cavalry Regiment captured Calauag on April 14 and began a two-pronged advance toward San Agustin by the end of the month. On May 2, San Agustin was finally taken as elements of both regiments converged there. Guerrillas had informed XIV Corps, which acquired control of the 158th RCT on 22 April, that a Japanese force of some 2,500 men was dug in along the slopes of Mt. Isarog, an extinct volcano centering eight miles northeast of San Agustin. This report the 5th Cavalry and 158th Infantry proved false in a series of patrol actions between 2 and 15 May. The next day, the 16th, General MacNider radioed to General Griswold that the Bicol Peninsula was secure and that no signs of organized Japanese resistance remained. The two regiments continued patrolling for some weeks until, on 6 June, the 5th Cavalry returned to southern Luzon. The 158th RCT busied itself with the problem of reorganizing and equipping guerrilla forces and in mid-June turned over responsibility for further mopping up to the Filipinos. To that time the operations to clear the Bicol Peninsula had cost the USArmy units involved approximately 95 men killed and 475 wounded. The Japanese had lost over 2,800 killed and 565 captured, including 350 Formosan labor troops whom the Japanese Army had left to fend for themselves.
I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.
In June 1945, amidst the Pacific War, American forces sought to liberate Luzon from General Yamashita's entrenched troops. Under Generals Eichelberger and Krueger, the 8th Army faced fierce resistance in the mountains and vital routes. As Japanese defenders struggled, the Americans advanced strategically, leading to fierce battles across treacherous terrain. The turning point came with the seizure of Baguio, crucial for the campaign.

Tuesday Jun 17, 2025
- 187 - Pacific War Podcast - Victory at Okinawa - June 17 - 24, 1945
Tuesday Jun 17, 2025
Tuesday Jun 17, 2025
Last time we spoke about the North Borneo Offensive. General Buckner's 10th Army captured strategic locations, including Shuri Castle, marking a turning point. Simultaneously, General Eichelberger's forces liberated Mindanao, overcoming tough Japanese defenses in the mountainous terrain. As they approached Malaybalay, fierce resistance resulted in heavy casualties, but the Americans persisted, inflicting significant losses on their foes. By June 9, the Americans pressed further into the enemy's defensive lines, leading to intense combat. The Marines landed on the Oroku Peninsula, where fierce fighting revealed the tenacity of the Japanese defenders. General Ushijima prepared for a final stand, as American forces began to encircle and dismantle Japanese positions. As the campaign unfolded, Australians under Brigadier Whitehead launched the North Borneo Offensive, landing on Tarakan and swiftly pushing the Japanese into the rugged interior.
This episode is Victory at Okinawa
Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.
Okinawa was more than just a battlefield; it became a symbol of sacrifice, the last heroic stand of a fading empire. By this point in the war, Japan was facing inevitable defeat, yet their resolve remained unbroken. They clung to the samurai spirit, determined to fight to the bitter end out of honor and duty. The stakes were high. Japan needed precious time to fortify its home islands, to stretch the conflict as long as possible. To achieve this, over 100,000 brave souls were sent into the fray, sacrificing their lives to slow the American advance and inflict as many casualties as they could. As we've explored in previous episodes, this fierce determination fueled their resistance. And now, we stand at a pivotal moment, the final days of the Battle of Okinawa, the last major confrontation of the Pacific War.
As we last left the battlefield, it was June 16, General Buckner’s 10th Army had made significant strides, capturing most of southern Okinawa and finally breaking through the last major enemy defenses at the Yaeju Dake-Yuza Dake Escarpment. The remnants of General Ushijima’s 32nd Army were now locked in a desperate fight to hold onto the Kiyamu Peninsula, slowly being pushed back toward the sea and their ultimate demise. The following day, June 17, the assault continued with renewed determination. General Geiger’s 3rd Amphibious Corps pressed on through Kunishi Ridge, while General Hodge’s 24th Corps worked to consolidate its hard-won gains in the escarpment. On the west coast, General Shepherd’s 6th Marine Division took action as Colonel Roberts’ 22nd Marines stepped in to relieve the weary 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines at the northern slope of Mezado Ridge. With a fierce spirit, they began to push southward, successfully securing most of the ridge.
To the east, General Del Valle’s 1st Marine Division forged ahead. Colonel Snedeker’s fresh 3rd Battalion took over from the exhausted 1st Battalion and advanced 1,400 yards to seize the high ground just east of Mezado. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines fought hard to capture the remaining positions of Kunishi Ridge, achieving only a gradual extension to the east. Colonel Griebel’s 3rd Battalion moved in behind them to reinforce the isolated Marines, bravely fending off a fierce counterattack under the cover of night. Further east, Colonel Dill’s 382nd Regiment systematically eliminated the last enemy positions in the Yuza-Ozato-Yuza Dake area, while Colonel Halloran’s 381st Regiment held firm and maintained their lines. In a key maneuver, Colonel Pachler’s 17th Regiment launched a successful assault, capturing Hill 153 before Colonel Green’s 184th Regiment took over during the night. Lastly, Colonel Finn’s 32nd Regiment secured the reverse slopes of Hill 115, preparing to launch an attack on Mabuni and Hill 89. By nightfall, Hodge’s 24th Corps had firmly secured all the commanding heights of the Yaeju Dake-Yuza Dake Escarpment. Most of Mezado Ridge and Kunishi Ridge were now in American hands, and Colonel Wallace’s 8th Marines had landed in the rear to bolster the western push. For the first time, American forces across the line looked down upon nearly eight square miles of enemy-held territory, a staggering view of what lay ahead.
Realizing they were forced from their last defensive positions and that their destruction was imminent, the 32nd Army began to unravel, collapsing into chaos. On June 18, Hodge’s troops seized the opportunity to strike decisively. The 32nd Regiment advanced down the coast toward Mabuni, facing increasing resistance. The 184th Regiment moved down the reverse slopes of Hill 153, closing in on Medeera, while the 381st Regiment speedily crossed the plateau, tackling scattered enemy fire to seize the high ground just 400 yards north of Medeera. Simultaneously, Dill’s 3rd Battalion crashed through a rugged maze of caves and pillboxes, making a daring 600-yard advance to the base of the rocky ridge north of Aragachi. To the west, Griebel’s 1st Battalion circled the eastern end of Kunishi Ridge, battling heavy resistance to gain the lower slopes of Hill 79. Further west, Roberts’ 2nd Battalion pushed through the 3rd and aimed for Kuwanga Ridge, successfully seizing an 1,800-yard stretch by late afternoon. As they advanced, the 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines moved forward to occupy the eastern end of the ridge. Meanwhile, the remainder of the 22nd Marines began to mop up the remnants of resistance on Mezado Ridge. Tragedy struck when Colonel Roberts was tragically killed by a sniper near his observation post during this operation. Lieutenant-Colonel August Larson would succeed him in command. Sadly, Roberts would not be the only American commander to fall that day.
In the heart of the Marine line, the 8th Marines were finally called into action in the morning to relieve the weary 7th Marines. After a rigorous artillery bombardment to soften up the enemy defenses, Wallace’s 2nd Battalion began its advance south toward the Kuwanga-Makabe Road, successfully capturing the high ground just north of the road by late afternoon. Meanwhile, General Buckner decided to visit Wallace’s command post on Mezado Ridge around midday. He observed the 8th Marines’ steady progress in the valley, taking stock of their relentless push forward. Tragically, as he was leaving the observation post, disaster struck. Five artillery shells rained down, one striking a coral outcrop near him. The jagged shards of coral filled the air, and Buckner was mortally wounded in the chest. He died within minutes, just days shy of achieving his goal: the complete capture of Okinawa.
With Buckner's passing, General Geiger, as the senior troop commander, took over temporary command of the 10th Army for the remainder of the battle. Buckner became the highest-ranking American military officer killed in World War II and would hold that somber distinction throughout the entire 20th century. On June 18, the final written order from General Ushijima of the 32nd Army outlined a daring escape plan. He designated an officer to lead the "Blood and Iron Youth Organization," tasked with conducting guerrilla warfare once organized combat had ceased. Simultaneously, he ordered his remaining troops to make their way to the northern mountains of Okinawa, where a small band of guerrillas was rumored to be operating. In his message he congratulated them on fulfilling their "assigned mission in a manner which leaves nothing to regret." He urged them to "fight to the last and die for the eternal cause of loyalty to the Emperor."
This movement was not to happen in haste. Soldiers were instructed to travel in small groups of two to five over the course of several days. They were urged to don civilian clothes and avoid confrontation whenever possible. In a clever stratagem, most of the army staff officers were directed to leave the command post disguised as native Okinawans, aiming to infiltrate American lines and find safety in northern Okinawa. Some individuals, like Colonel Yahara, were entrusted with the mission of reaching Japan to report to the Imperial General Headquarters. Others were tasked with organizing guerrilla operations, focusing on harassing the rear areas of the 10th Army and Island Command, determined to continue the fight against the American forces in any way they could. Again I have read Yahara’s book on the battle of Okinawa and despite being full of apologetic stuff and attempts to make himself look better, its one of the most insightful books on the Japanese perspective. You get a lot of information on how bad it was for the Okinawan civilians in caves, harrowing stuff. I highly recommend it.
The American attack pressed on into June 19, though it faced delays due to the influx of civilian and military prisoners. Not all of the 32nd Army survivors were imbued with a will "to die for the eternal cause of loyalty to the Emperor." Loudspeakers mounted on tanks in the 7th Division's front lines and on LCI's that cruised up and down the coast line were successful in convincing over 3,000 civilians to surrender. Far more significant, however, were the 106 Japanese soldiers and 238 Boeitai who voluntarily gave up during the division's advance on 19 June. The relentless attack of American troops, coupled with intensive efforts by psychological warfare teams, brought in increasing numbers of battle-weary Japanese and Okinawans who had decided that the war was lost and their cause was hopeless. It is not inconceivable that every enemy soldier who surrendered meant one less American casualty as the wind-up drive of Tenth Army continued.
Despite these challenges, the 32nd Regiment advanced to within just 200 yards of the outskirts of Mabuni. Meanwhile, the 184th and 381st Regiments coordinated their efforts, closing in on Medeera from the south and east. The 382nd Regiment pressed forward, overcoming fierce resistance as they reached the ridges overlooking Aragachi. Tragically, General Easley became the third major high-ranking casualty in just two days. The 5th Marines launched multiple assaults on Hills 79 and 81, but their efforts were met with fierce opposition and ended in failure. Wallace’s 3rd Battalion, facing only light resistance, captured Ibaru Ridge, the last high ground before the sea, before pushing onward to the coastal cliffs. On the eastern front, Griebel’s 3rd Battalion successfully seized Makabe and then joined forces with the 8th Marines to secure the coastal zone. Colonel Shapley’s 4th Marines advanced alongside the 8th Marines throughout most of the day but were unable to reach the coast, halted by a formidable enemy position along the Kiyamu-Gusuku hill mass. Further south, Colonel Whaling’s 29th Marines passed through the 22nd Marines and moved rapidly, also facing light resistance, reaching the base of the Kiyamu-Gusuku hill mass to link up with the 4th Marines before nightfall. As darkness enveloped the battlefield, Shepherd launched an attack on the hill mass. The 4th Marines successfully seized Hill 80, but they could only establish strong positions on the left flank of Hill 72. The 29th Marines encountered minimal opposition as they swept forward toward the southern coast. Meanwhile, the 5th Marines continued their relentless assaults on Hills 79 and 81, managing to capture most of Hill 79 before losing the crest at the last moment. Their tank-infantry assaults against Hill 81, however, once again ended in defeat.
Looking east toward Hodge’s front on June 21, the 382nd Regiment cleared out the last remnants in Aragachi, while the 381st Regiment seized the northern outskirts of Medeera. In the dark hours of June 20, the last courier contact was made between the Medeera pocket and the Hill 89 pocket. General Amamiya, commander of the 24th Division, issued a desperate order directing all his units "to fight to the last man in their present positions." At the time he gave this ultimatum, he had very few infantrymen left to defend the Medeera position. The relentless advance of the Marines had nearly annihilated the 22nd and 32nd Regiments, while the 96th Division had decimated the 89th Regiment at Yuza Dake and Aragachi. With their ranks severely depleted, the remaining defenders were a ragtag collection of artillerymen, drivers, corpsmen, engineers, Boeitai, and headquarters personnel drawn from nearly every unit of the L-Day island garrison. Those who managed to avoid surrender or sought to evade capture fought with the fierce determination of fanatics, resolutely defending their positions against overwhelming odds.
Meanwhile, Colonel Coolidge’s 305th Regiment, engaged in a vigorous mopping-up operation behind the lines of the 96th Division, prepared for an assault on Makabe Ridge. The 184th Regiment managed to secure the hills overlooking Udo, and despite facing fierce resistance from hidden enemy forces in coral outcroppings and caves along the coastal cliffs, the 32nd Regiment fought its way to the eastern slope of Hill 89. Throughout June 21, a series of small local attacks and mopping-up actions occupied most units of the 24th Corps, often interrupted to allow large numbers of civilians and soldiers to surrender. In spite of the bitter and costly resistance, the 32nd Regiment successfully secured Mabuni and advanced up to the tableland atop Hill 89. Coolidge’s 1st Battalion launched an assault on the hill south of Medeera behind a heavy mortar barrage, successfully capturing its crest.
The 5th Marines completed the capture of Hill 79 and undertook a heavy, costly assault that ultimately led to the capture of Hill 81. The 7th and 8th Marines began the crucial task of flushing out remaining Japanese holdouts, while also dealing with the increasing wave of soldiers and civilians choosing to surrender. The 4th Marines executed a successful double envelopment of Hill 72 that secured the strategic Kiyamu-Gusuku ridge, and the 29th Marines met only very light resistance during their sweep of Ara Saki, the southernmost point of the island. This swift progress and the obvious collapse of major enemy opposition prompted General Geiger to declare that the island of Okinawa was secure and that organized enemy resistance had come to an end. That night, in a tragic turn of events, Generals Ushijima and Cho committed Seppuku in the cave housing their command post.
On the night of June 21, Lieutenant General Ushijima Mitsuru and Lieutenant General Cho Isamu, the commander and chief of staff of the 32nd Army, fulfilled their final obligation to the Emperor in a deeply traditional manner. In accordance with the warrior code of their homeland, they atoned for their inability to halt the American advance by committing Seppuku. On the evening of their planned departure, Ushijima hosted a banquet in the cave that served as their command post, featuring a large meal prepared by his cook, Tetsuo Nakamutam. The banquet was generously complemented with sake and the remaining stock of captured Black & White Scotch whisky provided by Cho. At 03:00 on June 22, both generals, adorned in their full field uniforms decorated with medals, led a small party of aides and staff officers out onto a narrow ledge at the cave entrance, which overlooked the ocean. American soldiers of the 32nd Regiment were stationed less than 100 feet away, completely unaware of the solemn preparations taking place for the suicide ceremony. First, Ushijima bared his abdomen to the ceremonial knife and thrust inward, followed by Cho, who then fell to the ground. As Ushijima made his final act, a simultaneous slash from the headquarters adjutant’s saber struck his bowed neck. The two generals were secretly buried immediately after their deaths, their bodies going undiscovered until June 25, when patrols from the 32nd Regiment found them at the foot of the seaward cliff-face of Hill 89. General Cho had penned his own simple epitaph, stating, “22nd day, 6th month, 20th year of the Showa Era. I depart without regret, fear, shame, or obligations. Army Chief of Staff; Army Lieutenant General Cho, Isamu, age of departure 51 years. At this time and place, I hereby certify the foregoing.” Their deaths were witnessed by Colonel Yahara, who was the most senior officer captured by American forces. Yahara had requested Ushijima’s permission to commit suicide as well, but the general had refused, saying, "If you die, there will be no one left who knows the truth about the battle of Okinawa. Bear the temporary shame but endure it. This is an order from your army commander." While many die-hard groups continued to fight until annihilation, an unprecedented number of Japanese soldiers, both officers and enlisted men, began to surrender.
On that fateful day, Operation Ten-Go’s final breaths were marked by the launch of the two-day tenth Kiksui mass attack, which saw only 45 kamikaze aircraft take to the skies. While this desperate attempt succeeded in sinking LSM-59 and damaging the destroyer escort Halloran, as well as the seaplane tenders Curtiss and Kenneth Whiting, the next day would bring even less impact, with only two landing ships sustaining damage during the final attack of the campaign. As communications from the 32nd Army fell silent, a deeply regretful Admiral Ugaki was forced to conclude the grim reality of their situation. He felt “greatly responsible for the calamity” but recognized that there was seemingly no alternative course that might have led to success. Throughout the defense of Okinawa, approximately 6,000 sorties were flown, including at least 1,900 kamikaze missions. However, the losses were staggering, with over 4,000 aircraft lost during these attacks. In contrast, Allied forces suffered the loss of 763 planes in the Okinawa campaign, with 305 of those being operational losses.
Since the operation commenced, naval losses for Iceberg totaled an alarming 4,992 sailors dead, with 36 ships sunk and 374 damaged, accounting for 17% of all American naval losses in the Pacific War. Meanwhile, extensive and coordinated mop-up operations in southern Okinawa were essential before the area could be deemed secure for the planned construction of supply depots, airfields, training areas, and port facilities. In response, Colonel Mason’s 1st Marines and Colonel Hamilton’s 307th Regiment established blocking positions in the hills above the Naha-Yonabaru valley to thwart any Japanese attempts to infiltrate north. On June 22, the four assault divisions that had previously shattered the Kiyamu Peninsula defenses received orders to prepare for a sweeping advance to the north. Their mission was clear: destroy any remaining resistance, blow and seal all caves, bury the dead, and salvage any equipment, both friendly and enemy, left on the battlefield.
The following day, General Joseph Stilwell arrived to take command of the 10th Army during the mop-up phase of the campaign. Meanwhile, units from the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions were engaged on the Komesu and Kiyamu-Gusuku Ridges, while the 7th Division probed Hill 89 and Mabuni. In the Medeera pocket, Coolidge’s 3rd Battalion successfully seized Hill 85 on June 22. The 96th Division intensified its focus in the Medeera-Aragachi area, with elements of the 381st Regiment mopping up the last holdouts in the ruins of Medeera by June 23. Two days later, after a thorough search of the area south of the Yaeju Dake-Yuza Dake Escarpment, the 10th Army finally initiated its drive northward, with both corps taking responsibility for the ground they had captured in the previous month. On the morning of June 26, the reinforced Fleet Marine Force Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion landed unopposed on Kumejima, marking it as the last and largest of the Okinawa Islands selected for radar and fighter director sites. By the end of June, the mop-up operations in southern Okinawa had resulted in an estimated 8,975 Japanese killed and 3,808 prisoners of war added to the 10th Army's total. Overall, the Americans counted a staggering total of 10,755 prisoners of war and 107,539 Japanese dead, along with an estimated 23,764 believed to be sealed in caves or buried by their comrades. This cumulative casualty figure of 142,058 was "far above a reasonable estimate of military strength on the island," prompting 10th Army intelligence officers to conclude that at least 42,000 civilians had tragically fallen victim to artillery, naval, and air attacks due to their unfortunate proximity to Japanese combat forces and installations. American losses were also substantial, with 7,374 men recorded dead, 31,807 wounded, and 239 missing, in addition to 26,221 non-battle casualties.
But now, it’s time to leave Okinawa and return to Borneo to continue covering the North Borneo Offensive. As we last observed, by mid-June, General Wootten’s 9th Australian Division had successfully executed two major amphibious landings on Brunei Bay. Brigadier Porter’s 24th Brigade occupied most of Labuan Island, with the exception of the Pocket, while Brigadier Windeyer’s 20th Brigade secured the Brunei area. By June 16, Wootten decided that since the enemy was withdrawing and showing no signs of mounting an attack, he would take control of the high ground stretching from Mempakul and Menumbok to Cape Nosong. This strategic move aimed to prevent the enemy from utilizing the track from Kota Klias to Karukan and to secure beaches for supply points during the planned advance northward. Accordingly, Porter ordered the 2/28th Battalion to reduce the Pocket. The recently landed 2/12th Commando Squadron was tasked with mopping up the outlying areas of the island. Meanwhile, the 2/32nd Battalion began preparing for an amphibious movement to Weston on the mainland east of Labuan, with plans to reconnoiter across country and by river towards Beaufort. The 2/43rd Battalion and the 2/11th Commando Squadron were also set to prepare for an amphibious reconnaissance in the Mempakul area. On June 14, the 2/28th Battalion launched its initial attack against the Pocket, following an artillery barrage. However, they were forced to withdraw in the face of intense machine-gun and mortar fire. In response, the 2/12th Field Regiment took over, bombarding the Pocket for the next six days and nights, hurling a staggering total of 140 tons of shells into it.
On June 16, the 2/28th Battalion launched another assault, this time supported by tanks from the north, successfully capturing Lyon Ridge, despite sustaining heavy losses. After several more days of relentless artillery, naval, and air bombardment, the 2/28th launched a final assault on June 21, just as the Japanese attempted to send two raiding parties to infiltrate through the Australian lines and attack Labuan town and its airstrip. Although these raiders managed to catch the confused defenders off guard and inflicted several casualties, they were ultimately dealt with swiftly and without causing significant damage. Meanwhile, with the combined support of tanks and artillery, the 2/28th Battalion attacked the reduced garrison at the Pocket, breaking through Lushington Ridge and Eastman Spur to eliminate the remaining Japanese positions and completely clear the area.
By the end of the Battle of Labuan, the Australians had achieved a decisive victory, with 389 Japanese soldiers killed and 11 taken prisoner, while suffering 34 Australian fatalities and 93 wounded. In parallel, following a successful reconnaissance on June 16, the 2/32nd Battalion landed unopposed at Weston on June 17. They quickly secured the area and established a patrol base at Lingkungan. Over the next few days, Australian patrols began probing north towards Bukau, occasionally clashing with Japanese parties. A company from the 2/32nd Battalion also established a patrol base at Gadong up the Padas River, finding no Japanese presence in the surrounding regions. From this position, the Australians were able to patrol along the Padas River in small craft, discovering they could reach Beaufort rapidly using this route, catching the enemy off guard. Meanwhile, on June 19, the 2/43rd Battalion and the 2/11th Independent Company landed unopposed at Mempakul, further solidifying the Australian presence in the area.
Two days later, while the commandos worked to clear the Klias Peninsula, the 2/43rd Battalion launched an amphibious expedition up the Klias River. This mission successfully navigated through Singkorap and reached Kota Klias, confirming that Japanese forces were not present in significant strength along the river. As a result, the 2/43rd Battalion set out on June 22 to occupy Kota Klias without encountering any resistance. Given this positive momentum, Brigadier Porter ordered the 2/28th Battalion to take over operations from the 2/32nd Battalion in and around Weston. At the same time, the 2/43rd Battalion was tasked with marching through Kandu to attack Beaufort from the north. Additionally, the 2/32nd Battalion was directed to probe north along the Padas River and along the railway, drawing enemy attention away from the main Australian advance.
Looking south, while the 2/17th Battalion remained around Brunei and the 2/15th Battalion probed along the river toward Limbang, Windeyer had ordered the 2/13th Battalion to prepare for an amphibious movement to the Miri-Lutong area. Brunei town had been severely battered by Allied bombers and Japanese demolitions. The troops were critical of the air force's practice of bombing conspicuous buildings even when they were unlikely to contain anything of military importance. In Brunei, for example, the bazaar and the cinema were destroyed, but neither was likely to have contained any Japanese men or material and their destruction and the destruction of similar buildings added to the distress of the civilians. The infantryman on the ground saw the effects of bombing at the receiving end. “The impression was gained, says the report of the 20th Brigade, that, in the oil producing and refining centres-Seria, Kuala Belait, Lutong, Miri much of the destruction served no military purpose. The destruction of the native bazaar and shop area in Kuala Belait, Brunei, Tutong and Miri seemed wanton.“ On June 16, the 2/17th finally moved out and occupied Tutong, successfully crossing the river at its mouth. From there, the battalion began its movement along the coast toward Seria. However, despite the strategic importance of the town’s oil wells, there was only one encounter with the enemy at the Bira River on June 20 before the town was occupied the following day, only to find the oil wells ablaze.
At Seria, the oil wells were ablaze. From the broken pipes that topped each well, burning oil gushed forth like fire from immense, hissing Bunsen burners. The pressure was so intense that the oil, as clear as petrol, only ignited several inches away from the pipe. Once ignited, it transformed into a tumbling cloud of flame, accompanied by billowing blue-black smoke. At approximately 1,000 feet, the plumes from more than 30 fires merged into a single canopy of smoke. This horrifying spectacle of waste persisted day and night. The men around Seria fell asleep to the hissing and rumbling of an entire oilfield engulfed in flames and awoke to the same din. The Japanese had set fire to 37 wells, destroyed buildings and bridges, and attempted to incapacitate vehicles, pumps, and other equipment by removing essential components and either discarding them in rivers or burying them. Consequently, the Australian engineers faced the daunting task of extinguishing the fires with only their own equipment, along with abandoned gear they could repair or make functional. They relied on assistance from local natives who had observed the Japanese hiding parts and employed methods of improvisation and selective cannibalization to tackle the crisis. Meanwhile, by June 19, raiding elements of the 2/15th Battalion had successfully secured Limbang. From this location, they began sending patrols up the Limbang River toward Ukong, along the Pandaruan River to Anggun, and east toward Trusan.
The following day, after a naval bombardment by three American destroyers, the 2/13th Battalion landed unopposed at Lutong and quickly secured the area. On June 21, the Australians crossed the river and advanced into Miri without facing any resistance, successfully occupying the town and its oilfield by June 23. Turning their attention back north, on June 24, the 2/43rd Battalion began its advance toward Beaufort, swiftly moving through Kandu and reaching a position just north of the Padas River the next day. In response to their progress, Brigadier Porter ordered the 2/32nd Battalion to seize the railway terminus and the spur leading down to the river just south of Beaufort, while the 2/43rd focused on capturing the high ground dominating Beaufort from the north and east. This coordinated attack was launched on June 26. By the end of the day, the leading company of the 2/32nd had reached the Padas River, approximately 2,000 yards west of the railway terminus, while the leading company of the 2/43rd secured the railway north of the Padas, similarly positioned about 2,000 yards from Beaufort. On June 27, the 2/43rd continued their offensive, rapidly capturing the high ground overlooking Beaufort. During the afternoon, one company ascended Mount Lawley and pursued the retreating Japanese, cutting off their escape route at a track junction, while another company moved into the town, taking possession early that night. In the following hours and throughout June 28, the Australians faced a series of heavy counterattacks as they worked to consolidate their positions. Meanwhile, the 2/32nd Battalion successfully captured the railway terminus, encountering only slight opposition, with one company executing a wide flanking maneuver to the Padas just upstream from Beaufort.
Under heavy bombardment from artillery and mortars, the bulk of the 368th Independent Battalion began to retreat along the Australian-held track in the early hours of June 29. While many were killed during this withdrawal, most managed to escape. At intervals groups of two or three walked into the company area in the darkness and were killed. Fire was strictly controlled, and one platoon was credited with having killed 21 Japanese with 21 single shots fired at ranges of from five to 15 yards. One Japanese walked on to the track 50 yards from the foremost Australian Bren gun position and demanded the surrender of the Australians who were blocking the Japanese line of retreat. According to one observer his words were: "Surrender pliz, Ossie. You come. No?" He was promptly shot. One company counted 81 Japanese killed with "company weapons only" round the junction and estimated that at least 35 others had been killed; six Australians were slightly wounded.
By morning, the fighting was virtually over, and the mop-up of the disorganized enemy force commenced. The attack on Beaufort cost the 24th Brigade 7 men killed and 38 wounded, while the Australians counted 93 Japanese dead and took two prisoners. Meanwhile, the 2/28th Battalion secured Lumadan village, where it made contact with the 2/32nd. Porter then ordered this battalion to pursue the retreating Japanese eastward, successfully securing the Montenior Besar railway bridge by July 4. The 2/32nd Battalion proceeded to attack toward Papar, encountering little opposition as they captured Membakut on July 5, followed by Kimanis on July 10, and finally Papar on July 12. Turning back south, the 2/17th Battalion occupied Kuala Belait on June 24, where they discovered evidence of a massacre of Indian prisoners of war.
Indian prisoners of war began reaching the lines of the 2/17th Battalion at Seria on June 22. By the end of the month, a total of 41 had arrived, reporting a horrific event: on June 14, the Japanese had slaughtered a portion of a group of more than 100 Indian prisoners at Kuala Belait. The Australians discovered 24 charred bodies at the site, along with evidence indicating that others had also been killed. A report by the 2/17th noted, "The motive for the massacre is not clear, and whether a partial loss of rations, the waving of flags, or simply Japanese brutality was responsible cannot be determined." The surviving Indians were found to be starving, with many suffering from illness. Colonel Broadbent remarked, "The loyalty and fortitude of these Indians has been amazing and is a lesson to us all. Even now, their standard of discipline is high."
Two days later, patrols made contact with the 2/13th Battalion at the Baram River. Pushing south along Riam Road, the patrols of the 2/13th clashed with the Japanese at South Knoll, which they captured by the end of the month. Throughout July, the 2/13th continued patrolling down Riam Road against some opposition, eventually pushing the Japanese beyond Bakam by August. At the same time, the 2/17th conducted deep patrols southward from Kuala Belait, particularly along the Baram River toward Bakung, Marudi, and Labi. Overall, Australian losses during the North Borneo Offensive totaled 114 killed and 221 wounded, while they captured 130 prisoners and accounted for at least 1,234 Japanese killed.
Following the conclusion of conventional military operations, Wootten’s troops began to support the efforts of Australian-sponsored native guerrillas operating in Sarawak under Operation Semut and in British North Borneo as part of Operation Agas. Between March and July 1945, five Special Operations Australia “SOA” parties were inserted into North Borneo. The Agas 1 and 2 parties established networks of agents and guerrillas in northwestern Borneo, while the Agas 4 and 5 parties, landed on the east coast, achieved little in their missions. The Agas 3 party investigated the Ranau area at the request of the 1st Corps. The results of Operation Agas were mixed; although its parties established control over their respective areas of operation and provided intelligence of variable quality, they were responsible for killing fewer than 100 Japanese soldiers. In parallel, as part of Operation Semut, over 100 Allied personnel, mainly Australians, were inserted by air into Sarawak from March 1945, organized into four parties. These parties were tasked with collecting intelligence and establishing guerrilla forces. The indigenous Dayaks of Sarawak's interior enthusiastically joined these guerrilla groups, essentially allowing SOA personnel to lead small private armies. No. 200 Flight RAAF and the Royal Australian Navy's Snake-class junks played crucial roles in this campaign, facilitating the insertion of SOA personnel and supplies. The guerrilla forces launched attacks to gain control of the interior of Sarawak, while the 9th Division focused on coastal areas, oilfields, plantations, and ports in North Borneo. The guerrillas operated from patrol bases around Balai, Ridan, and Marudi, as well as in the mountains and along key waterways, including the Pandaruan and Limbang Rivers, and along the railway connecting Beaufort and Tenom. Their objective was to disrupt Japanese troop movements and interdict forces as they withdrew from the main combat zone. The RAAF conducted air strikes to support these lightly armed guerrillas, who at times had to evade better-armed Japanese units. These guerrilla forces successfully raided several key towns and facilities, significantly disrupting enemy movements and efforts. It is estimated that over 1,800 Japanese soldiers were killed in North Borneo through guerrilla actions, particularly by the fearsome Dayak people, whose fierce tactics and local knowledge played a crucial role in these operations.
I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.
In the final throes of the Pacific War, the Battle of Okinawa became a fierce battleground of sacrifice and honor. As American forces, led by General Buckner, advanced, they shattered Japanese defenses, pushing them into a desperate retreat. On June 21, General Ushijima and Lieutenant General Cho, recognizing their imminent defeat, committed seppuku, adhering to the samurai code. The chaotic battle led to staggering casualties, with many Japanese soldiers surrendering, realizing their cause was lost. By June’s end, Okinawa was secured, symbolizing not only a victory but also the tragic cost of war, with countless lives lost on both sides.

Tuesday Jun 10, 2025
- 186 - Pacific War Podcast - North Borneo Offensive - June 10 - 17, 1945
Tuesday Jun 10, 2025
Tuesday Jun 10, 2025
Last time we spoke about the Liberation of Mindanao. In the spring of 1945, as the battle for Okinawa intensified, American forces relentlessly confronted entrenched Japanese troops. General Buckner's 10th Army faced fierce resistance amidst harsh weather and dwindling supplies. Despite these challenges, they captured the strategic Shuri Castle, marking a critical turning point as Japanese troops retreated. Simultaneously, the liberation of Mindanao was underway. American troops, under General Eichelberger, rapidly advanced, overcoming fortified Japanese defenses in mountainous terrain. With the 24th Division securing key locations like Digos and Davao, the 31st Division pushed northward against General Morozumi’s forces. Despite stubborn resistance, American forces displayed tenacity and courage, leading to significant victories. By May 20, the Americans approached Malaybalay, where remnants of the 30th Field Artillery Regiment held their ground. As Japanese troops attempted to regroup, they faced relentless assaults from the advancing American divisions. Throughout the campaign, the Americans endured heavy casualties, but their determination led to more than 10,000 Japanese losses.
This episode is the North Borneo Offensive
Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.
As we continue our story, by June 9, General Buckner's forces had pushed through to the enemy's main defensive line on the Kiyamu Peninsula. It was there that General Ushijima was preparing to make his final stand. Meanwhile, General Shepherd’s 6th Marine Division landed on the Oroku Peninsula, determined to dismantle a stubborn pocket held by Admiral Ota’s naval units. On June 10, the pace of the assault quickened dramatically. Colonel Shapley’s 4th Marines broke through enemy defenses, capturing the strategic Hills 58 and 55(2). At the same time, Colonel Roberts’ 22nd Marines secured Hills 28 and 55(1). Although Colonel Whaling's 29th Marines made only limited progress, they effectively identified the last significant pocket of resistance in the high ground west of Oroku village. Looking south, General Del Valle’s 1st Marine Division also reignited its offensive. Colonel Snedeker’s 7th Marines successfully advanced into Itoman and Tera, while Colonel Mason’s 1st Marines, supported by tanks, cleared the southern slopes of the key ridge between Tera and Yuza, capturing Yuza Hill in the process. To the east, General Bradley’s 96th Division launched a renewed attack, bolstered by artillery and tank support. Colonel May’s 383rd Regiment advanced approximately 700 yards toward the town of Yuza. Meanwhile, Colonel Halloran’s 381st Regiment pushed into Yunagusuku and Tomui. However, they faced fierce resistance, quickly encountering heavy machine-gun fire originating from the heights of Yaeju Dake, which halted their advance.
Meanwhile, General Arnold’s 7th Division continued its relentless push toward Nakaza, employing the full might of their tanks and artillery. Colonel Finn’s 32nd Regiment steadily advanced onto the eastern slopes of Hill 95, pressing toward Hanagusuku. At the same time, Colonel Pachler’s 17th Regiment fought to solidify its precarious position on the southeast end of Yaeju Dake. Back at sea, a kamikaze attack tragically sank the destroyer William D. Porter. That same day, Admiral McCain’s Task Force 38 unleashed a barrage of bombs and artillery on Minami Daito Island before retreating to Leyte-Samar after 89 consecutive days off the coast of Okinawa. This marked the conclusion of their role in Operation Iceberg. The following day, the sustained pressure from Arnold's offensive began to fracture General Suzuki’s 44th Independent Mixed Brigade on both flanks.Seas of flame engulfed Hill 95 on 11 June as 1/32 slowly advanced toward the crest of the enemy position behind the jets of armored flame throwers. Flame fuel was pumped and sprayed from hoses over portions of the ridge inaccessible to tanks and then ignited. Infantrymen moved among the still hot and smoking rocks and drove back the surviving defenders. That night the battalion dug in just short of the Hill 95 peak. Although little forward progress was made by 2/32 or the 17th Infantry on 11 June, the enemy position was considerably weakened. Intensive fire from supporting weapons was concentrated against the slopes of Yaeju Dake, and strong patrols cleaned out enemy groups that held positions near the 7th Division front lines. The 32nd Regiment achieved a significant victory by capturing the peak of Hill 95, while the 17th Regiment struggled to make further headway
To the west, advances in the 96th Division zone were minimal as Bradley's regiments focused on consolidating their newly-won positions amidst intense enemy fire. Simultaneously, at Yuza Hill, fierce counterattacks were thwarted, and Mason’s 2nd Battalion accomplished the critical capture of Hill 69, just west of Ozato, despite heavy machine-gun fire coming from Yuza Dake. Further east, ahead of the 7th Marines, some 800 yards from the southern fringes of the two settlements, lay "the scene of the most frantic, bewildering, and costly close-in battle on the southern tip of Okinawa"Kunishi Ridge. This precipitous coral escarpment constituted the western-most anchor of the last heavily defended line on Okinawa. The ridge contained innumerable caves, emplacements, and tombs on both the forward and reverse slopes. The intervening area between this formidable fortress and the lines of the 7th Marines was a broad valley of grassy fields and rice paddies which offered no protection to advancing infantry. The supporting tanks were restricted to two approaches into the position: a road across the valley which cut through the center of the ridge and another along the coast line. Both of these routes were covered by anti-tank guns. Shortly after noon patrols from the 1st and 2nd Battalions moved out with armored support to probe the Japanese defenses. Intense frontal fire from Kunishi Ridge, enfilade fire from the enemy on Hill 69 opposing the attack of 2/1, and artillery concentrations directed at the tanks forced a withdrawal at 14:47. Because of the complete fire coverage of the open valley enjoyed by the Japanese, both from the heights and slopes of the ridge itself and from the Yuza Dake area, it was apparent that a daylight assault of the position would be a costly affair. Consequently, after Colonel Snedeker had made a personal reconnaissance of the objective from a light liaison plane, it was determined to attack at night. The commanding officers of the assault battalions were oriented on the general plan during the afternoon. The central road and a line of telephone poles was designated as the boundary between battalions upon which the assault units would guide. The scheme of maneuver contemplated a penetration of the ridge where the road passed through it, followed by an expansion of the initial foothold to the right and left flanks to secure the remainder of the objective in the regimental zone of action. Normal artillery would be placed alternately on Kunishi Ridge and Mezado Ridge (500-600 yards southwest of Kunishi) until H-Hour and thereafter on the latter. On June 11, General Shepherd launched a concerted attack. The 22nd Marines successfully secured the Tomigusuki area and Hill 53, while the 29th Marines faced stiff opposition, making only limited gains against the heavily fortified hills west of Oroku. Meanwhile, the 4th Marines worked to strengthen their line, completing the encirclement of Ota’s naval forces. Nevertheless, the ramparts of the Oroku fortress were cracking, and Admiral Ota released his last dispatch to General Ushijima: “Enemy tank groups are now attacking our cave headquarters. The Naval Base Force is dying gloriously at this moment… We are grateful for your past kindnesses and pray for the success of the Army.”
During the night, artillery units successfully targeted and either killed or dispersed a group of Japanese troops attempting to cross the Kokuba River. Meanwhile, 51 infiltrators were eliminated as they tried to breach the lines held by the 22nd Marines. The following day, the 4th and 29th Marines intensified their efforts to compress the enemy pocket west of Tomigusuki, breaking through to seize Easy Hill while the 22nd Marines consolidated their positions. The capture of this key terrain feature forced the enemy into the alluvial flats along the coast between Oroku and Hill 53. "In the late afternoon enemy troops began displaying flags of surrender. Language officers equipped with loud speaker systems were dispatched to the front line areas to assist in the surrender of those Japs who desired to. The attempt was partially successful, 86 enemy soldiers voluntarily laid down their arms."
For several days General Buckner had been sending messages to the Japanese commander by radio broadcast and air drops pointing out the hopelessness of the enemy situation in an attempt to persuade General Ushijima to surrender. During the afternoon of 11 June, Tenth Army representatives were conducted to the 2d Battalion OP overlooking Itoman to await any enemy party that might desire to negotiate. At 1700 all fire was suspended in the 7th Marines' area pending the doubtful appearance of a white flag. About 15 Japanese wearing white headgear appeared in the 1/7 zone in front of Company A at 1740, but dispersed when hailed. Six of the enemy surrendered to Company C at 1802, but the situation returned to normal two minutes later when hostile mortar fire fell on the captors' position. Final orders for the resumption of the attack were issued by Colonel Snedeker about 2000 setting H-Hour at 0330, 12 June. Both 1/7 and 2/7 were to make the assault with one company each, and at 0225 Company C moved out to establish contact with Company F on the line of departure. The attack was launched on schedule at 0330 and at 0500 Companies B and G moved out in support of the assault companies. Concurrently, Company F reached the objective at a point 500 yards north of Mezado village, as Company C came up on its left to extend the line eastward. The enemy was completely surprised and several small groups were wiped out by Company C while they were engaged in preparing breakfast. At the same time, the 1st Battalion extended the line eastward toward Kunishi. However, the Japanese quickly regrouped, pinning down the attackers for the rest of the day, though the Marines managed to reinforce and consolidate their hard-won gains. By midnight the positions there could be considered reasonably secure. But as General del Valle put it, "The situation was one of those tactical oddities of this peculiar warfare. We were on the ridge. The Japs were in it, both on the forward and reverse slopes." Elsewhere, the 1st Marines focused on mopping up Hill 69, dispatching patrols south through Ozato and maintaining their defenses on Yazu Hill. To the east, another pre-dawn attack initiated by the 17th Regiment caught the defenders off guard.
Colonel Pachler had compelling reasons for favoring a night operation. The defenders held a significant advantage in observation, which had posed serious challenges when the 3rd Battalion of the 17th Infantry seized the southeast end of the escarpment. The coral wall of the escarpment was particularly high at this end, and the narrow routes leading to the high ground were easily controlled by Japanese fire. After days of holding positions at the base of the 170-foot cliff, the troops had grown familiar with the terrain and, as their commander, Major Maynard Weaver, noted, they were eager to reach the top and finally see something new. The night attack was primarily planned for the 1st Battalion, but Colonel Pachler decided to coordinate a move to expand the territory held by the 3rd Battalion as well. The final plan involved three assault companies: Company A would occupy a cluster of coral about a hundred yards beyond the edge of the escarpment, near the boundary between the 7th and 96th Divisions. Company B aimed for a similar objective located about 200 yards to the southeast, while Company L was assigned to capture a small hill situated between the 1st Battalion's targets and the positions held by the 3rd Battalion since June 11. Each company was given a separate route: Company A’s path led straight up the cliff’s face, Company B needed to head south to reach a break in the escarpment before turning right toward its goal, and Company L had an accessible objective near the edge of the escarpment.
Movement was set to begin at 0400 on June 12. Since the attack relied on stealth, no artillery preparation was planned. However, two battalions of 105-mm artillery, one battery of 155-mm howitzers, and an 8-inch howitzer battalion were scheduled to deliver heavy harassing fire during the night. Additionally, 21 batteries registered their fire on the afternoon of June 11 and were ready to provide protective artillery support if needed once the objectives were reached. For added firepower, a section of heavy machine guns was assigned to each assault company. Colonel Pachler meticulously planned the attack, ensuring that every soldier involved understood the details of the operation. Reconnaissance patrols had scouted the trails leading to the high ground, and demolition teams had already prepared known cave positions at the cliff's face with satchel charges. Despite thorough preparations, there was a collective apprehension about potential confusion caused by the unknown conditions of darkness. This anxiety was amplified at 2000 on the night of June 11 when the 7th Division G-2 Section intercepted an enemy radio message indicating, "Prepare to support the attack at 2300." Soon after, another intercepted message stated, "If there are any volunteers for the suicide penetration, report them before the contact which is to be made one hour from now." Meanwhile, from dusk until almost 2300, the Japanese unleashed a heavy artillery barrage, leading front-line troops to anticipate a counterattack. That counterattack did come, aimed at the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Infantry, which had reached the summit of Hill 95 earlier that day, as well as against the 96th Division. However, there was no enemy activity observed in the 17th Infantry's sector.
As night illumination and harassing fire ceased shortly before 0400, the attack proceeded according to plan. The companies moved out in single file. Remarkably, a heavy fog settled over southern Okinawa, creating the perfect conditions for concealment while allowing the troops to follow their paths without confusion. On the high ground, Company A encountered a few civilians wandering about, while the leading platoon of Company B unexpectedly came across three Japanese soldiers as they reached the shelf of the escarpment. The Americans chose to ignore them and continued silently on their way, with the enemy surprisingly not opening fire. By 0530, just minutes after dawn, Companies A and B were in position without firing a single shot. Company L also successfully reached its objective, and eager to capitalize on the fog and absence of enemy fire, its commander sent a support platoon to a small hill fifty yards beyond. This objective was secured quickly, but not without incident; two enemy soldiers were killed in the process. The platoon leader reported their progress but quickly called for mortar fire as about fifty Japanese troops approached in a column. The Americans opened fire with rifles and BARs, disrupting the formation and resulting in thirty-seven enemy soldiers killed, while the rest managed to escape.
The men of the 1st Battalion celebrated the success of the night attack. Shortly after Company A took position, four enemy soldiers stumbled into view and were swiftly eliminated. A few moments later, another four followed suit, meeting the same fate. Company B remained undisturbed until around 0530 when Japanese soldiers attempted to emerge from several caves within the company's area. Although the cave entrances were heavily reinforced with concrete and couldn’t be sealed with demolition charges, the Marines guarded the openings and shot at the Japanese as they appeared. Not long after daylight, Company C began clearing the caves at the base of the escarpment, eventually regrouping with the rest of the battalion on the high ground. By 0800, the situation had stabilized, and the 17th Infantry held strong positions on Yaeju Dake. During the night, the Japanese had withdrawn their front-line troops from Yaeju Dake to escape the punishing artillery fire, intending to reoccupy it before the anticipated 0700 attack. Fifteen hours after the 32nd Infantry fought their way to the top of Hill 95, the 17th Infantry had executed a masterful night attack to seize their portion of Yaeju Dake. Throughout the day, the 2nd Battalion of the 17th Infantry relieved Companies I and K, and with Company L attached and supported by medium and flame tanks, continued the offensive. The 1st Battalion maintained its position, firing at enemy soldiers who were slow to realize that their defensive terrain had been lost. Company B alone accounted for sixty-three Japanese soldiers killed throughout the day.
Taking advantage of this breakthrough, the 381st Regiment advanced to occupy the slopes of Yaeju Dake, while the 383rd extended the division front and secured Yuza. As the situation unfolded, Japanese troops maintained control over Big Apple Peak, which towered about sixty feet above the surrounding plateau. However, by the evening of June 12, the 7th and 96th Divisions had succeeded in forcing the reconstituted 44th Independent Mixed Brigade from the southeastern end of the enemy’s line. General Ushijima acted swiftly, given the limitations imposed by his damaged communication system and the chaos among his front-line units. With his artillery nearly silenced by enemy bombardments and his supplies dwindling faster than his manpower, Ushijima's only hope lay in sending more troops into the relentless shellfire and flames unleashed by American forces sweeping across the frontline.
His urgent order read: “The enemy in the 44th IMB sector has finally penetrated our main line of resistance. The plan of the 44th IMB is to annihilate, with its main strength, the enemy penetrating the Yaeju-Dake sector. The Army will undertake to reoccupy and hold its Main Line of Resistance to the death. The 62nd Division will place two selected infantry battalions under the command of the CG, 44th IMB.” Unfortunately, the 64th Brigade, the part of the 62nd Division that had shifted from Shuri to reserve positions near Makabe, didn’t receive this order until late on June 13, a full thirty hours after it became critical. This piecemeal commitment of reserve troops proved to be grossly inadequate. By June 13, the 44th Brigade was teetering on the brink of destruction. When reinforcements finally arrived, they found the remnants of the 44th Brigade overwhelmed and absorbed into the reinforcing battalions, with still not enough men to hold the line. In a last-ditch effort, the enemy committed the main strength of the 62nd Division, his final reserve, with a desperate plea for cooperation and orders to "reoccupy and secure the Main Line of Resistance." However, by the time the 62nd Division moved onto the line, they ran headlong into General Hodge's forces, who were advancing southward across the coral-studded plateau. The Americans pressed forward, shielded by the fire of machine guns and tanks, advancing over the bodies of Japanese defenders who had fought fiercely to hold their last stronghold "to the death."
On June 13, General Arnold resumed his assault against the rapidly disintegrating 44th Independent Mixed Brigade. The 32nd Regiment successfully secured the Hill 95-Hanagusuku area, while the 17th Regiment expanded its control over the escarpment’s summit. To the west, May’s 3rd Battalion and Halloran’s 2nd Battalion struggled to capture the top of the escarpment despite repeated attempts. However, they significantly diminished the defenders' strength with a relentless volume of covering fire. At the same time, May’s 1st Battalion advanced through Yuza and swept southward to successfully secure Ozato. Meanwhile, General Del Valle prepared to commit the 1st Marines to the fight on Kunishi Ridge, as the isolated 7th Marines continued to be pinned down by heavy Japanese fire, relying on tanks for supplies and evacuation. Further north, the 29th Marines launched an attack southeast to eliminate the enemy pocket, while Shapley’s 3rd Battalion moved swiftly toward the beach, progressively chasing the demoralized Japanese forces from the thick brush and marshy terrain along the waterfront. As they reached the sea wall, the assault turned into a rout. Some of the enemy threw down their arms and fled at the Marines' approach. Large numbers surrendered; but some fought back with hand grenades in desperate, individual last ditch stands, while many more used grenades to destroy themselves in despair. The sea wall was reached at noon, and the remainder of the day was spent running to earth small groups hiding in the cane fields and rice paddies. In the late afternoon General Shepherd notified General Geiger that all organized resistance on Oroku had ceased. In the early hours of June 14, Mason’s 2nd Battalion advanced toward Kunishi Ridge, tenaciously fighting their way to positions east of the 7th Marines, which remained isolated. Simultaneously, Shepherd’s reinforced Reconnaissance Company successfully landed on Senaga Island, completing the occupation of the Oroku Peninsula. Looking south once again, May’s 1st Battalion completed the cleanup in Ozato but soon had to withdraw from its vulnerable position, while the rest of the 383rd Regiment pressed forward to the edge of the escarpment west of Yaeju Dake. To the east, despite heavy mortar and machine-gun fire, the 381st Regiment maintained constant pressure on the northern face of Yaeju Dake, finally reaching the top of the escarpment by nightfall. Their success allowed them to link up with the 7th Division, which dealt a crushing blow to the 13th Independent Battalion, advancing approximately 300 yards across the front.
After a night of disorganized counterattacks and infiltration attempts, the 7th Division launched an assault toward Hills 115 and 153, advancing about 1,200 yards and reaching the outer slopes of the hill positions. To the west, the 381st Regiment and May’s 3rd Battalion successfully secured the escarpment between Yuza and Yaeju Dake, although the remainder of the 383rd struggled to move forward due to heavy fire from Yuza Dake. On Kunishi Ridge, the pressure from the Japanese remained relentless, restricting the 7th Marines to only minor local gains. However, Mason’s 2nd Battalion managed to inch its way along the ridge, successfully extending the line by about 200 yards to the east. Behind them, Colonel Griebel’s 5th Marines began to relieve the weary 1st Marines, with Griebel’s 2nd Battalion finally moving forward during the night to support Mason’s isolated 2nd Battalion. On June 16, after an intense bombardment of artillery, mortars, and rockets, the 7th Marines finally broke through. Snedeker’s 1st Battalion advanced along the northern slope of Kunishi Ridge, while the 2nd Battalion extended the line into the initial high ground of the Mezado hill mass.
Concurrently, Griebel’s 2nd Battalion advanced, making slow but steady progress until they secured a coral peak on the ridge that commanded their position. To the east, the 62nd Division, attempting to move from its reserve locations southwest of Makabe to support the faltering Japanese lines, faced devastating fire from artillery, ship guns, and aerial bombardments of rockets and napalm. Seizing the opportunity created by the relentless bombardment of enemy rear areas, Bradley launched his battalions through the Yuza Dake perimeter. Colonel Dill’s 382nd Regiment pushed through the 383rd and advanced toward Ozato, aiming to gain control of the high ground southwest of Yuza, while May’s 3rd Battalion successfully captured Yuza Dake. Additionally, the 381st Regiment gained approximately 600 yards along its front, reaching the saddle between Yuza Dake and Hill 153. Meanwhile, the 17th Regiment pressed onto the forward slopes of Hill 153, and the 32nd Regiment, driving down the coast, took Hill 115, effectively eliminating the 15th Independent Mixed Regiment. Back at sea, despite a significant depletion of Japanese air strength, a kamikaze attack succeeded in sinking the destroyer Twiggs.
But now, it’s time to leave Okinawa and turn our attention to Borneo, where we continue covering the Australian offensive. As we last noted, by May 6, Brigadier Whitehead’s 26th Australian Brigade had successfully landed on Tarakan, pushing the Japanese garrison into the island’s rugged interior. By the evening of 6th May fairly copious information obtained from prisoners and Indonesians and from captured documents indicated that the enemy had about 390 naval troops in the Mount Api area, about 400 troops and civilians in the Fukukaku headquarters area (embracing Hills 105 and 102), 200 from Sesanip along Snags Track to Otway, 300 on Otway and in District VI, 300 in the Amal River area and 60 at Cape Juata. Having lost the airfield and the water-purifying plant and hospitals "the enemy at this time was displaying a decided disinclination to hold ground. In particular he was shunning any ground which could be subjected to heavy bombing, shelling, or attack by tanks; or against which large-scale attacks could be launched by our troops"; and he was directing his operations to delaying the attackers, particularly with mines, booby-traps, suicide raids, and isolated parties fighting to the death in tunnels and dugouts. The 4th Company of Tokoi Force (IJA) plus the 1st Company of the 2nd Naval Guard Force were on Hill 105, Margy and Janet; the 1st Company of Tokoi Force, and other troops were on Hill 102. In the north was a composite group.
To secure the recently captured airfield from potential counterattacks, raids, or indirect fire, Brigadier Whitehead decided to deploy the 2/48th Battalion to gain the high ground north of the town, reaching up to Snags Track. The 2/4th Commando Squadron was tasked with advancing along Snags Track toward the Sesanip oilfields, while the 2/3rd Pioneers were assigned to sweep the high ground east of the town and move along John’s Track to the mouth of the Ama River. Meanwhile, the Dutch company was to clear the unoccupied Cape Batu peninsula, a task that proved surprisingly straightforward. In the Mount Api area, however, the 2/23rd Battalion faced fierce resistance, particularly at Tiger and along Crazy Ridge, resulting in minimal progress until they were relieved by the 2/24th Battalion on May 9. Further to the right, the 2/48th Battalion seized Otway without opposition, and the commandos successfully cleared Snags Track up to Haigh’s by May 8, though tanks could not advance any further. The pioneers, on the other hand, encountered heavy resistance along John’s Track, which they couldn’t overcome until May 9. That day, a long-distance patrol from the 2/24th Battalion also succeeded in driving the Japanese out of the Juata oilfields after a skirmish. On May 10, while the 2/48th and the commandos patrolled aggressively forward, the pioneers began their assault on the heavily defended Helen feature, which would successfully repel repeated Australian attacks for the next five days. Simultaneously, the 2/24th faced strong resistance in the Mount Api area but tenaciously pushed forward to Hill 105 on May 11, capturing Tiger the following night. They conducted patrols that probed about 1,000 yards southeast, cutting Snags Track at several points. On May 12, the 2/48th set out to cut King’s Track and clear the heights from Sykes to Butch. The next morning, they successfully attacked and captured the knoll north of Snags Track.
Meanwhile, following a highly effective air bombardment, the key Helen feature was found abandoned on May 15. This allowed the pioneers to clear John’s Track and reach the coast at the mouth of the Amal River. Concurrently, the commandos secured the Agnes feature, followed by the 2/24th Battalion’s capture of Elbow on May 16. The remaining positions on Hill 105 were then subjected to intensive bombing and bombardment, leading to an Australian assault on May 19. They finally captured the feature the following day. In the meantime, the 2/48th Battalion moved to Agnes to attack the Freda feature on May 14.
It was now evident that if the Freda hill was to be taken the attack must have heavier support. Therefore, on 22nd May, 12 Liberators and 12 Lightnings were sent out with bombs and napalm, but the cloud was so low that some of the heavy bombers did not find the objective. Then the artillery and mortars fired, and a two-company attack went in, the infantry moving very close behind the barrage. Gooden's company thrust from the east, and Captain Nicholas's advanced with one platoon pushing east along Snags Track towards Track Junction Knoll and another pressing north. The former platoon (Lieutenant Harvey), moving through very difficult country along a razor-back so narrow that only two men could be deployed on it, edged forward under heavy fire; after losing one killed and 4 wounded and finding the enemy becoming stronger Harvey manoeuvred out of this position. It was then found that a wounded man was not with them, so Harvey and three volunteers thrust back and engaged the enemy fiercely while the wounded man was carried out. During the day Gooden's company on the right had encountered two strongly-held knolls. Derrick's platoon succeeded in cutting the saddle between them and taking one knoll. Derrick's platoon and another launched “a most courageous attack up the steep slopes of Knoll 2 in the fading light. Here, in some of the heaviest and most bitter close-in fighting of the whole campaign these two platoons finally reached the top and secured the Knoll after inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy.... [Lance-Sergeant] Fennells time and again ... crawled ahead of the attacking troops, even to within five yards of the enemy, and gained vital information. On one occasion, when his section was forced to ground he had charged the Jap positions with his Owen gun blazing and had silenced the enemy post, killing the occupants. In a similar manner, Private W. R. How found the advance of the troops checked by a well-sited pill-box, raced forward with his Owen firing until within grenade range, and then, throwing grenades, moved in for the kill until he fell wounded. He had silenced the post and killed the machine-gunner, thus allowing the advance to continue.” At this stage 28 enemy dead had been counted; one Australian had been killed and 15 wounded.
Unfortunately, the Japanese counterattacked the following day, effectively recapturing the position. Following a devastating combination of air and artillery bombardment, the Australians managed to secure Freda and Track Junction Knoll on May 25. During this time, the 2/23rd Battalion remained in close contact with a resolute enemy at Janet and Margy but struggled to make significant progress. The 2/24th Battalion continued probing northward and captured the Droop feature on May 26. After another failed attack on May 29, a heavy air and artillery bombardment supported the 2/23rd as they finally captured Margy on May 31. Concurrently, the 2/24th successfully attacked and held the Poker Hills. On June 1, the 2/48th Battalion then attacked Hill 102, supported by aircraft and machine-gun fire. Lieutenant O'Rourke's platoon attacked, following an artillery barrage as closely as they could, and bringing with them three flame-throwers. They gained the forward slopes without being fired on and then saw five Japanese moving towards them, evidently to re-enter their positions after the bombing. These were fired on while the flame-throwers were brought into action. One operator sprayed the slope from side to side while another fired straight up it. “The result was devastating (said O'Rourke later). The hill was set completely ablaze to a depth of 50 yards, two of the five Japs were set on fire and the other three killed in their posts. The platoon was able to advance almost immediately through the flames, and with the help of the flame-throwers the feature was com-pletely captured within 15 minutes of the advance commencing. The flame which was fired up a slight rise hit the trees on the crest and also sprayed the reverse slope and had the effect of completely demoralising the enemy.“ While the Australians launched an unsuccessful assault on Wally, the 2/23rd Battalion was engaged in clearing out the remaining Japanese forces from Margy and its surrounding areas.
On June 6, the Australians finally secured Wally, and the 2/24th Battalion also managed to capture Roger. In the early hours of June 10, the Japanese launched a counterattack toward Hill 105, but it was easily repelled. At the same time, the defenders began preparing for a withdrawal northeast into the island’s interior, planning to split into independent groups to wage guerrilla warfare. Despite the looming withdrawal, Whitehead’s battalions commenced attacks on Beech 2, Joyce, and Linda on June 11. However, progress was slow over the next three days, with the only notable achievement being the capture of Sandy on June 13. By nightfall that day, the Japanese finally began their withdrawal, leaving behind only rearguards to hold the crucial Essie Track. This allowed the Australians to capture the abandoned features of Linda, Joyce, Clarice, Hilda Paddy, Melon, and Aunty on June 14. The next day, the Australians took Nelly and Faith, but the Japanese rearguard on Essie Ridge managed to temporarily halt their pursuit. Eventually, however, Essie Ridge was overrun, and by June 16, Fukukaku was cleared. The 2/48th Battalion then pursued the Japanese as they fled eastward from Essie. On June 18, they caught a few but found that a large group had scattered into smaller parties. By June 19, patrols were radiating east, north, and west in pursuit, with Japanese forces standing firm at several points. Ultimately, the fall of Hill 90 on June 20 marked the end of organized resistance on Tarakan. Following this victory, Whitehead initiated a mop-up operation that would continue until the war's end. While the 26th Brigade was fighting to secure Tarakan, General Wootten’s 9th Australian Division was preparing to launch the invasion of the Brunei Bay area of north Borneo, codenamed Operation Oboe VI.
At the Manila conference in April General Morshead had learnt that OBOE I (Tarakan), OBOE VI (north Borneo) and OBOE II (Balikpapan) were to be carried out in that order. 34 LSTs would be allotted for OBOE VI but had to be released by 23 days after the landing. There were other fairly severe restrictions on the vessels available: the one boat battalion of the American Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment and the one amphibian tractor battalion allotted to OBOE VI had to be used for Balikpapan. Morshead and his staff arrived back at Morotai from Manila on April 21 and next day the Corps issued its staff study of the north Borneo operation, and the 9th Division's staff, which from April 4 to 17 had been planning an operation against Balikpapan, began preparing an outline plan for an attack on Brunei Bay instead. This was presented to Corps and approved on April 26; the final plan, which contained no major changes, was approved on May 16. Meanwhile a variety of problems had arisen at the Corps level and above. On May 1, 2200 troops and 1200 vehicles (including guns) of the 9th Division were still in the Cairns or Atherton areas awaiting shipment, and some of the stores and equipment were not scheduled to arrive at Morotai until May 25, two days after the proposed date of the landing. It also appeared that, on the day of the landing, the 24th Brigade would lack some unit stores and vehicles, and the 20th Brigade would possess only one battalion; there would be no field or anti-aircraft guns, a shortage of signal vehicles and equipment, no equipment for building wharves and bulk oil storage, and neither of the casualty clearing stations allotted would be present.
Due to a series of issues at the Corps level and above, the invasion plan had been scaled down to a landing by a brigade on Labuan Island and just a battalion on Muara Island, with the operation further postponed to June 10. The strategy involved landing Brigadier Selwyn Porter’s 24th Brigade on Victoria Harbor’s Brown Beaches to capture the Labuan airfield and eliminate all hostile forces on the island. Simultaneously, Brigadier William Windeyer’s 20th Brigade would put ashore the 2/15th Battalion on Muara Island’s White Beach and the 2/17th Battalion on Brunei Bluff’s Green Beach. These units were tasked with capturing Brooketon and securing the southern and western sides of Muara Island, setting the stage for an advance on Brunei Town. Upon capturing these objectives, the 9th Division was to occupy and defend the Brunei Bay-Beaufort area and take control of the Miri-Lutong-Seria regions. Once again, Admiral Barbey’s Naval Attack Force, primarily comprising Admiral Royal’s transports and Admiral Berkey’s cruisers, was designated to facilitate the amphibious movement of troops to Brunei Bay. In preparation for the invasion, American and Australian air forces, under General Kenney’s command, targeted airfields and other military installations, focusing particularly on destroying bridges on the railway to Jesselton to prevent the arrival of reinforcements to Labuan by rail. On June 4, Barbey’s convoy finally departed Morotai, embarking on its 1,100-mile voyage to Brunei Bay. Air attacks intensified on June 5, successfully rendering the Papar River bridge unusable. Four days later, on June 9, the air campaign reached its peak: 54 Liberators and 24 Mitchells launched strikes against targets on Labuan, while 23 Liberators targeted the Brooketon area.
In the meantime, minesweepers successfully cleared a channel into the bay, destroying 69 mines between June 7 and 9. Berkey’s cruisers sailed ahead and shelled the Brown, White, and Green Beaches in the two days leading up to the landings. The convoy finally arrived at the main channel between Labuan Island and Brunei Bluff just before sunrise on June 10, fully prepared to execute the invasion. Opposing them, General Baba’s 37th Army had assembled General Nozaki’s depleted 56th Independent Mixed Brigade in the Brunei Bay sector. This included two battalions near Brunei, one at Beaufort, and one garrisoning Labuan. Additionally, the 553rd Independent Battalion was stationed in the Miri area; however, none of these units were equipped to make a stand at the beaches. At 08:15, Barbey’s warships commenced a bombardment of the southern beaches as the troops were loading onto the landing vessels. Shortly after 09:05, the first waves began to advance, preceded by craft firing rockets and artillery. As anticipated, there was no opposition on the landing areas. The 2/15th Battalion successfully reached the shore at 09:15, followed by the 2/17th Battalion, which made landfall three minutes later, approximately 1,000 yards east of its intended location. By dusk, the 2/15th had scoured the swampy terrain of Muara Island and reported no Japanese presence. The 2/17th pushed forward a few miles along the road to Brunei, while the 2/13th Battalion landed and moved into reserve behind the 2/17th. Meanwhile, the 2/28th Battalion landed without incident at 09:15 and quickly secured Labuan town, with the 2/43rd Battalion following ashore at 09:20 to initiate the advance toward the airfield.
There was no opposition until 10:45, when the leading troops came under rifle fire just south of Flagstaff Hill. This post was quickly bypassed and taken, but the Australians continued to face strong resistance from the 371st Independent Battalion. Despite this, the defenders could not prevent the 2/43rd from capturing the airfield by nightfall. During the day, Porter also landed the 2/11th Commando Squadron on the unoccupied Hamilton Peninsula, with one troop initiating a move north along Charlie Track. On June 11, while the 2/43rd patrolled north and west, overcoming some opposition, the 2/28th slowly advanced toward the Able and Baker routes, where they encountered the bulk of enemy resistance. Meanwhile, after repelling an enemy patrol overnight, the 2/17th continued its advance to Brunei unopposed, with a company from the 2/15th moving up the Brunei River to land about four miles downstream from the town. The following day, the 2/17th reached and seized the airstrip, finally encountering defenses manned by the 366th Independent Battalion. On Labuan, the 2/43rd moved unopposed to Hamilton Road and successfully linked up with the commandos, leaving behind one company and three tanks to destroy a bypassed stronghold to the northwest. At the same time, the 2/28th probed the strongly held area astride MacArthur Road and to its west, making good progress to compress the resilient enemy into a pocket. On June 13, although the 2/43rd occupied an emergency airstrip at Timbalai, the primary objective remained to continue compressing the enemy into "the Pocket" and mop up the remainder of the island.
I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.
Australian troops, under Brigadier Whitehead, landed on Tarakan, swiftly overcoming Japanese strongholds. By May 20, they began the North Borneo Offensive, achieving significant territorial gains amid brutal combat. As Japanese forces faltered, some surrendered, signaling a turning tide. The campaign showcased immense courage and sacrifice, with heavy casualties on both sides, ultimately paving the way for Allied victories in the Pacific theater.

Tuesday Jun 03, 2025
- 185 - Pacific War Podcast - the Liberation of Mindanao - June 3 - 10, 1945
Tuesday Jun 03, 2025
Tuesday Jun 03, 2025
Last time we spoke about the fall of Shuri. In the unforgiving terrain of Okinawa during May 1945, American Marines confronted fierce resistance from entrenched Japanese forces. Amidst heavy rain and dwindling supplies, General Buckner’s 10th Army battled uphill toward Shuri, a critical stronghold. With communication crumbling and morale wavering, the Americans pressed on, launching daring patrols. The situation reached a turning point when intelligence revealed the Japanese withdrawal plans. Buckner ordered continuous pressure, leading to the capture of significant strategic points like Shuri Castle, which was relentlessly bombarded prior to the Marine assault. On May 29, as the last remnants of Japanese forces fled south, American soldiers swept through Shuri, which lay in utter ruin, a testament to the devastating power of the campaign.
This episode is the Liberation of Mindanao
Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.
Last week we covered the fall of Shuri and today we continue the brutal brawl for Okinawa and the liberation of Mindanao.
As we last saw, the Japanese retreat from the Shuri line opened the path for General Buckner’s 10th Army to move southward, with only General Fujioka’s 62nd Division and a few minor rearguards standing in their way. On June 3, General Arnold’s 7th Division continued its offensive to the south. Colonel Pachler’s 17th Regiment successfully secured the area of Itokazu. Meanwhile, Colonel Green’s 184th Regiment pushed toward the coast to completely cut off the Chinen Peninsula. Colonel Finn’s 32nd Regiment was diverted into the rugged hills nearby to clean up any remaining resistance. To the west, despite persistent bad weather and challenging supply conditions, General Bradley’s 96th Division also achieved success. Colonel May’s 383rd Regiment secured the locations of Kamizato and Tera against relatively light resistance. At the same time, Colonel Halloran’s 381st Regiment advanced to seize the entire Inasomi area. Looking northwest, General Del Valle’s 1st Marine Division encountered stronger opposition. The bulk of the 5th Marines managed to push only as far as Tsukasa before being pinned down. In a strategic move, Colonel Griebel’s 2nd Battalion executed a wide swing through May’s rear area to capture the Gisushi region. Colonel Snedeker’s 7th Marines made steady progress through the Kokuba Valley, facing small enemy blocking forces, in order to extend the line held by the 5th Marines. Meanwhile, at sea, Admiral Ugaki launched his 9th mass Kikisui attack. This operation, featuring just 50 kamikaze aircraft, faced heavy obstacles due to Typhoon Viper but still managed to damage 2 vessels. In another development, after successfully occupying Torishima Island on May 12, Colonel Clarence Wallace’s 8th Marines landed on Iheyajima without encountering any opposition. In addition, preparations for the shore-to-shore assault of General Shepherd’s 6th Marine Division were completed. Colonel Shapley’s 4th Marines were set to land on the Nishikoku beaches before securing the Oroku Peninsula and its airfield. Consequently, during the early hours of June 4, Shepherd’s Reconnaissance Company successfully assaulted Ono-Yama Island, while Shapley’s assault battalions began the shore-to-shore movement to Nishikoku under the cover of artillery and naval bombardment. Despite some mechanical failures on the LVTs, the Marines successfully landed at 06:00 under sporadic machine-gun fire and then pushed onto the high ground 300 yards inland against minor resistance. After securing the initial foothold, the attack slowed against increasing resistance on the left flank. Because of this, the reserve 3rd Battalion was landed at 08:45 and subsequently advanced to the edge of the airdrome.
During the day development of the enemy's defense had revealed an inordinate number of automatic weapons, ranging in various calibers up to 40mm. Subsequently, it was disclosed that the Japanese had stripped the armament from the air defenses and damaged aircraft in the area and integrated these weapons into the ground fortifications to stiffen materially the resistance on Oroku. Besides meeting with the most extensive mine fields yet encountered during the campaign, on this day the 6th Division had its first contact with an awesome weapon: an 8-inch rocket that exploded with terrific concussion. However, there was little fragmentation and accuracy was poor. While the noise the huge projectiles made, tumbling through the air end over end, sounded "like a locomotive from hell" to the troops, the rockets were mainly a source of annoyance and caused few casualties. Rockets continued to fall in the rear areas during the night, snipers and infiltrators were active, and the entire front came under intermittent heavy mortar fire. This landing allowed Shepherd to bring in Colonel Whaling’s 29th Marines by midday, which then secured the Kikibana area of Naha Bay, while the 4th Marines captured one-third of Naha’s airfield. To the east, the Americans encountered less resistance than before, as the 62nd Division and other minor rearguards completed their withdrawal from the intermediate lines south of Shuri to a reserve area south of the new Kiyamu Peninsula lines. Recognizing this change, Buckner shifted the corps boundary to the west, assigning General Geiger’s 3rd Amphibious Corps the task of isolating the Oroku Peninsula and occupying the Itoman-Kunishi sector, while General Hodge’s 24th Corps advanced toward the Yaeju Dake-Yuza Dake escarpment.
As a result, the 7th Marines were able to move south to seize Takanyuta and isolate Admiral Ota's forces on the Oroku Peninsula. The atrocious weather had converted the already muddy roads to impassable morasses. Transport was hopelessly mired north of the Kokuba Gawa. South of the river the "trails were only negotiable by foot troops, vehicles could not have been used" even if it had been possible to bring them across the inlet. The 5th Marines managed to secure the Hill 107 area without opposition before being relieved by Colonel Mason’s 1st Marines. However, the 1st Marines were unable to continue their push south toward Shindawaku Ridge due to a flooded stream. Meanwhile, Mason’s 3rd Battalion attempted a wide envelopment through the 96th Division zone but was quickly halted in front of Tera. Food was scarce, but through the wholehearted cooperation of the 96th Division the Marines procured two meals of K rations per man. It was the considered opinion of at least one member of 3/1 that "this day probably was the most miserable spent on Okinawa by men of this battalion." To compound these problems and discomforts, the 3d Battalion also found itself without a supply route or communications with the regiment 11,000 yards to the rear.
Further east, the 383rd Regiment advanced rapidly, engaging isolated but strong enemy delaying groups as they secured the outskirts of Iwa. Matching this progress, the 381st Regiment advanced all the way to the hills north of Aragusuku, facing steadily increasing resistance. Additionally, while the 17th Regiment established positions controlling the Minatoga-Meka road, the 184th Regiment advanced against patchy and ineffective resistance until the Minatoga area was secured. The following morning, Admiral McCain’s Task Force 38 launched strikes on Okinawa and Kyushu. Unfortunately, poor situational awareness from Admiral Halsey caused the 3rd Fleet to inadvertently enter Typhoon Viper. This storm inflicted varying degrees of damage to four carriers, two escort carriers, three cruisers, one destroyer, and one tanker, while also destroying 76 planes. Additionally, kamikaze attacks succeeded in damaging the battleship Mississippi and heavy cruiser Louisville. Back on Okinawa, Shepherd’s attack on the Oroku Peninsula commenced and progressed slowly but steadily against uniformly stubborn resistance. The 4th Marines secured most of the airfield and the Toma high ground, while the 29th Marines fought laboriously to advance toward Mura and Oroku, gaining up to 1,000 yards.
To the east, the 7th Marines advanced to positions just north of Hanja, while the 1st Marines bypassed the inundated area in front of them by swinging east and following their 3rd Battalion toward Iwa. In fact, Mason’s 3rd Battalion launched another attack aimed at Shindawaku Ridge, advancing over 3,000 yards to the area west of Iwa. Despite muddy conditions and rainy weather, Hodge’s infantrymen continued to penetrate the enemy outpost zone, developing the edges of the main Japanese battle position. The outpost line of Kiyamu Peninsula was fully manned on June 4. Japanese Army headquarters estimated that the strength of its now concentrated forces totaled 30000, distributed as follows: 24th Division and attached units, 12000; 62nd Division and attached units, 7000; 44th IMB and attached units, 3000; 5th Artillery Command and attached units, 3000; and units directly under 32nd Army command, 5000. The difference in total strength between the 50000-man estimate late in May and the 30000 left in Kiyamu Peninsula was attributed to "attrition during retirement operations." Only about 20% of the remaining troops were survivors of the original crack infantry-artillery units; the rest were untrained rear echelon personnel or Boeitai. Most senior commanders at battalion level and above were still alive, however, and capable of bolstering the fighting spirit of their motley collection of men. But the 32nd Army had suffered grievous losses in weapons and equipment since L-Day. Hand grenades and explosives were almost entirely expended. 4 out of every 5 machine guns had been destroyed, and the supply of heavy infantry cannon and mortars had been reduced to the vanishing point. Despite the fact that 2 150mm guns, 16 150mm howitzers, and 10 AAA guns had been successfully withdrawn to the Kiyamu battle position, artillery ammunition levels were insufficient for more than 10 days of sustained firing. General Ushijima's 32nd Army was in desperate straits, its destruction merely a question of time, but the tradition, discipline, and indoctrination of Japanese military forces promised only a violent, last-ditch, man-to-man struggle before the battle for Okinawa was ended.
By June 6, the 7th Division reached the outskirts of Gushichan, and the 96th Division advanced toward Shindawaku and Tomui. To the west, the 1st Marines finally captured Shindawaku and cleared the bypassed area behind them. Meanwhile, the 7th Marines attacked toward Hill 108, advancing 1,000 yards before encountering stiff resistance and ultimately dug in around Dakiton. Additionally, Colonel Roberts’ 22nd Marines arrived to contain the Oroku Peninsula in the Hill 103 sector. Although the 29th Marines and Shapley’s 1st Battalion made little progress in the Oroku-Mura area due to strong enemy resistance. Meanwhile the terrain confronting the 3rd Battalion there "consisted of a series of small temple-like hills, each of which had been converted into a fortress . . . from which mutually supporting automatic weapons could cover adjacent positions and deny the open ground between the hills." These gun positions were well dug-in and impervious to artillery fire. Because the narrow roads in the area had been made impassable by mines and shell cratering, tank support was not forthcoming, and a day of bitter fighting netted 3/29 a gain of a scant 150 yards. The remainder of the 4th Marines attacked Naha Airfield where counter fire from tanks, artillery, and support craft was immediately laid down. An urgent call for an air strike on the island was answered in less than half an hour, and "as rack after rack of bombs fell on the Nip positions, the troops stood up and cheered." The artillery piece was soon silenced, but 20mm fire was received spasmodically. Nevertheless, 3/4 pressed forward with its open flank covered by continued air strikes on Senaga Shima and completed the capture of Naha airfield before noon, whence they pushed south toward Gushi. At sea, kamikaze attacks crashed into and damaged two destroyer minesweepers, while also causing further damage to escort carrier Natoma Bay and destroyer Anthony on June 7. That day, Shepherd’s Marines faced stiff resistance all along the front. The 4th Marines reduced Little Sugar Loaf where stiff resistance and bitter fighting characterized the action in the center and on the left of the 4th Marines' area. However, the attack forged ahead against machine-gun fire coming "from everywhere," while "countless caves were methodically cleaned out and sealed by the old process of direct fire, flame, and demolitions."Meanwhile the 29th Marines entered Oroku, and the 22nd Marines captured Hill 103 and the area south of Tamigusuki.
To the southeast, the 7th Marines overran Hanja and Hill 108, ultimately digging in just north of Zawa and linking up with the 1st Marines, which also advanced up to 1,200 yards as they secured Hill 75 and pushed toward Yuza. Further east, the primary offensive efforts of the 7th and 96th Divisions on June 7 and 8 were focused on probing enemy defenses and advancing assault battalions to more favorable positions for an attack. Additionally, by the afternoon of June 8, the 32nd Regiment successfully relieved the exhausted 184th in the Gushichan area. On that same day, the 1st Marines pressed forward to the high ground overlooking the Mukue River, while the 7th Marines moved through Zawa and began probing enemy positions in Itoman, encountering stiffened resistance. The first LVT's, supported by LVTa's, arrived at the newly-uncovered beaches at noon on 8 June, and shortly thereafter General Hodge sent General del Valle "congratulations for cutting the island in two."
Meanwhile, on Oroku, the 29th Marines made little progress as they stalled at a key ridgeline on the left. The 4th Marines committed all three of their battalions to the attack, successfully securing the areas of Hill 39 and Gushi Ridge. The 22nd Marines continued to pivot on their right, seizing Hill 55 and making good progress along the front toward Chiwa and Tomigusuki. On June 9, although the 22nd Marines managed to secure Hill 55 and push to Hill 28, little advancement was achieved to the north. Concurrently, the 4th Marines were able to slowly push to the outskirts of Chiwa and Uibaru, with patrols clearing out Chiwa and Whaling’s 3rd Battalion extending the front to the north. The action in the zone of the 4th Marines on 9 June remained unchanged from that of preceding days: “The advance was still slow and tedious against bitter resistance. Every Jap seemed to be armed with a machine gun, and there was still the same light and heavy mortar fire. Casualties continued to mount and the number of Japs killed soared over the maximum of 1500 which were supposed to be defending and there were still plenty left.”
In the meantime, to the south, Del Valle sent strong patrols across the Mukue, which began to encounter significant enemy resistance. Consequently, the 7th Marines were unable to push toward Tera and Itoman. Further east, Hodge finally launched a corps attack to the south. The 96th Division focused its efforts on softening the enemy positions on the escarpment in front of them, while the 7th Division carried out the offensive. The 32nd Regiment attempted to attack the eastern end of Hill 95 but was unsuccessful; however, they managed to locate and identify the most troublesome sources of enemy fire for destruction. On a more positive note, the 17th Regiment gained a precarious foothold on the southern end of Yaeju Dake, just north of Nakaza, where they would withstand several Japanese counterattacks throughout the night. The first and greatest obstacle confronting Wallace's attack was the open ground over which both assault companies had to move. Wallace used all available support and the men camouflaged themselves with grass and rice plants, but enemy fire began almost as soon as the leading platoons moved into the open. The infantrymen crawled through the slimy rice paddies on their stomachs. Within an hour Company I was strung from the line of departure to the base of the objective which two squads had reached. About this time the Japanese opened fire with another machine gun, separating the advance squads with a band of fire. This left one squad to continue the attack; the remainder of the company was unable to move, cut off by fire or strung across the rice paddies. Those men in the squad still free to operate lifted and pulled each other to the edge of the cliff and crawled quietly forward through the high grass on top. Pfc. Ignac A. Zeleski, a BAR man, moved so stealthily that he almost touched the heels of one Japanese. Zeleski killed him, and the other men killed eight more Japanese within the first ten minutes. Another squad reached the top of the escarpment about an hour later but was caught in cross and grazing fire from three machine guns, and the entire 8-man squad was killed. Gradually, however, a few more men reached the top, and by evening there were twenty men from Company I holding a small area at the escarpment rim. Company K had a similar experience. Accurate enemy fire killed one man, wounded two others, and halted the company when it was from 200 to 300 yards from its objective. For forty-five minutes the attack dragged on until S/Sgt. Lester L. Johnson and eight men maneuvered forward through enemy fire, gained the high ground, and concentrated their fire on the enemy machine gun that was firing on the remainder of the company. This did not silence the gun but did prevent the gunner from aiming well, and Johnson waved for the rest of the company to follow. By 1330 of 9 June Company K was consolidated on the southeastern tip of the Yaeju-Dake. That evening, three small but determined counterattacks, with sustained grenade fire between each attempt, hit the small force from Company I, which held off the attackers with a light machine gun and automatic rifles. Additionally, Wallace’s 1st Battalion successfully landed unopposed on Aguni Island to establish air warning and fighter director installations.
However, it’s now time to leave Okinawa and shift our focus to the Philippines to cover the continuation of General Eichelberger’s Mindanao Campaign. As we last saw, by May 3, General Sibert’s 10th Corps had successfully invaded the island and secured the key Kabacan road junction. General Woodruff’s 24th Division occupied Digos and Davao, while General Martin’s 31st Division advanced up the Sayre Highway toward Kibawe. Thanks to the arrival of the 162nd Regiment from Zamboanga, the 31st Division was now able to send another regiment, the 155th, to assist in the push north against General Morozumi’s 30th Division. In response to the rapid advance of the 31st Division as far as Kibawe, Morozumi was assembling his units at Malaybalay in preparation for a retreat eastward to the Agusan Valley. He dispatched the 3rd Battalion of the 74th Regiment to the south to delay the Americans in the vicinity of Maramag, at least until May 10.
Meanwhile, after capturing Davao, Woodruff’s goal was to mop up the sector and destroy General Harada’s 100th Division in the mountainous interior. The 100th Division located the southern anchor of its defenses at Catigan, 13 miles southwest of Davao, and the northern anchor in hills some twelve miles north of Davao. The Davao River, flowing generally south-southeast into Davao Gulf at Davao, divided the defensive forces into two groupments. The Right Sector Unit, west of the river, was composed of 5 infantry battalions, 3 regular and 2 provisional. The territory east of the river was the responsibility of the Left Sector Unit--2 regular infantry battalions, 2 provisional battalions, and the Air Force's Hosono Unit of ill-armed service personnel. The Right and Left Sector Units had a little artillery attached, for General Harada kept under his direct control most of the artillery as well as many engineer and service units. As a reserve Harada had about a battalion of regular infantry. The central and strongest portion of Harada's defenses rested its right on rising ground overlooking Libby Airdrome, two miles northwest of Talomo on the coast. From this point the central defenses, along which Harada initially deployed three battalions, extended eastward across the Talomo River and some rough hills to the west bank of the Davao River. The focal point of the central defenses was Mintal, four miles up Route 1-D from Talomo. Anticipating ultimate withdrawal into the mountains via Route 1-D, the southeastern section of the so-called Kibawe-Talomo trail, Harada had prepared defenses in depth along the highway and along ancillary roads paralleling it. Much of the region west of the Davao River from Talomo northwest twelve miles to Calinan was covered with overgrown abaca, or hemp, plantations. Resembling banana plants, and growing to a height of about 20 feet, the abaca plants had originally been planted in rows 10 feet apart, with 10 feet between plants. With harvesting slack during the war, the plantations had become thick with shoots, and older plants had grown to a foot or so in diameter. Plants of various sizes were, in April 1945, scarcely a foot apart. Visibility was virtually nil, and the heat at the hemp plantations was like that of an oven.
With the 162nd Regiment taking control of Digos and the area stretching from Illana Bay's shores inland to Kabacan, Woodruff was now free to utilize his entire division to engage the enemy forces in the Davao area. At the start of May, the 21st Regiment had already launched an attack to clear Libby Airdrome, Route 1-D between Mintal and Talomo, and Mintal itself. They successfully reached Mintal by May 3, effectively forcing Harada to reinforce his defenses near the Talomo River. Although the airdrome was cleared two days later, subsequent efforts up Route 1-D toward Mintal were repelled by fiercely defending Japanese forces. Due to this resistance, elements of the 34th Regiment attempted to drive north along the high ground on the east bank of the Talomo River to bypass the Japanese defenses on Route 1-D. On May 8, the 21st Regiment finally crossed to the east side at Mintal; however, in the face of Japanese artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire, they had to withdraw back to the west bank two days later. At the same time, the 19th Regiment was expanding its hold in the Davao area, striking into the high ground controlling the coast road immediately west of the Davao River on May 10. They also cleared scattered Japanese strongpoints on hills just north of Davao and on Samal Island. Two days later, the 21st Regiment again attacked northward along the east bank of the Talomo, successfully clearing out numerous positions from which the Japanese had directed fire on Route 1-D. By May 14, the highway all the way north to Mintal was finally secured.
In the meantime, the 124th Regiment started north from Kibawe on May 6. However, the recently arrived Japanese defenders at Maramag managed to delay the occupation of this town until May 12, thus accomplishing their task more than adequately. Despite this success, Eichelberger had shrewdly sensed that Morozumi would attempt to make a last stand in the hills northwest of Davao. Therefore, he decided to land the 108th Regiment behind enemy lines in the Macajalar Bay area to expedite the conquest of Mindanao and open a new supply route to the 31st Division. Accordingly, on May 10, the 108th Regiment landed unopposed along the southeastern shore of Macajalar Bay, making contact almost immediately with guerrilla units operating in the region. This regiment then drove down the Sayre Highway to meet the 31st Division advancing from the south, encountering no significant resistance until May 13, when it faced strong Japanese defenses near Dalirig. With its rear protected by the recently landed 3rd Battalion of the 164th Regiment, the 108th proceeded to attack the enemy positions with great intensity, finally forcing the Japanese to retreat to the area east of Malaybalay by May 16. Concurrently, on May 13, the 155th Regiment passed through the 124th Regiment to continue the drive northward, meeting little opposition but facing supply problems. By May 20, the Americans finally reached the outskirts of Malaybalay, where fire from remnants of the 30th Field Artillery Regiment halted their advance. Realizing that the regiment could not haul its weapons into the mountains east of Malaybalay, Morozumi had left the unit at Malaybalay to fight a rear-guard action, which was successful in keeping the 155th Infantry out of the town until late on 21 May. On 22 and 23 May the 155th continued up Sayre Highway, encountering elements of Morozumi's Northern Sector Unit that had not learned that American troops had reached Malaybalay and were still withdrawing southward to join the 30th Division's main body. Pressed by troops of the 108th Infantry, 40th Division, which had already landed at Macajalar Bay, the retreating forces gave the 155th Infantry little trouble and, about 1400 on 23 May, the 155th made contact with the 108th Infantry near Impalutao, twelve miles northwest of Malaybalay. Its share in the task of clearing Sayre Highway cost the 31st Division approximately 90 men killed and 250 wounded, while the 108th Infantry, 40th Division, lost roughly 15 men killed and 100 wounded. Together, the two units killed almost 1,000 Japanese during their operations along the highway, and captured nearly 25 more. Nevertheless, the 30th Division had managed to escape east this time to establish new positions near Silae.
Back in Davao, on May 15, Woodruff directed the 21st and 34th Regiments to attack abreast to the north and northwest, targeting the Japanese center. Meanwhile, the 19th Regiment advanced north to clear the northeastern shores of Davao Gulf, link up with the guerrilla forces north of the gulf, and ultimately swing westward against the 100th Division's left flank forces. Surprised by the lack of enemy attacks against his flanks, Harada concluded that the American forces intended to neglect his flanks in favor of a frontal assault on his center. As a result, he weakened the defenses of the Left Sector Unit to reinforce the Mintal line, leaving only Admiral Doi’s air-naval troops to defend his left flank. On May 17, Woodruff renewed his offensive. The 19th Regiment struck north to establish contact with the guerrilla 107th Division, while the 34th Regiment began clearing the coastal hills between the Talomo and Davao Rivers and attacked northwest toward Tugbok. The 21st Regiment also drove north toward Tugbok in the face of determined opposition. Progress in the following days was slow due to intense artillery, machine-gun, rocket, mortar, and rifle fire. However, by May 27, the 21st Regiment seized the Tugbok area, with the 34th Regiment arriving the next day to relieve them. As Harada’s strongest defenses had been breached, he ordered a general withdrawal to a hastily established second line crossing Route 1-D in the vicinity of Ula. Furthermore, the 19th Regiment managed to establish contact with the guerrillas by May 24 as it secured Route 1 north of Davao.
On May 29, the 19th Regiment struck westward toward Doi's Mandog defenses, closing in two days later to engage the naval troops in fierce combat. Concurrently, on May 30, the 34th Regiment attacked toward Ula, which fell easily the following day, though progress then slowed in the face of fanatic resistance. Reinforced by the recently arrived 3rd Battalion of the 163rd Regiment on June 4, the 34th began to make headway beyond Ula on the secondary road, gaining one mile by June 6 before swinging east toward Mandog. The next day, having overrun Doi’s outer defenses, the 19th Regiment advanced steadily into the main positions near Mandog, which ultimately fell by June 9, just as the 34th was reaching the area. Continuing northward, the 34th was almost three miles north of Ula along both roads and found few signs of organized Japanese resistance by June 11. However, the 19th Regiment would not clear the hills north of Mandog until June 15. In the meantime, the 21st Regiment struck north from Lamogan on May 31 along secondary roads west of Route 1-D, ultimately seizing Wangan on June 16 and forcing Harada’s battered forces to commence a full retreat northward in disarray. After the fall of Culanan three days later, Harada finally decided to retreat to a new line near the Bannos River. Yet Woodruff’s troops continued to pursue them, rapidly crossing the Tamogan River and inflicting heavy casualties on the retreating enemy until they reached the mountain barrio of Kibangay on June 26, where the pursuit was finally halted.
Looking back to the north, with Sayre Highway cleared, the 124th Regiment began probing into the mountains to the east in late May, encountering heavy resistance, rough terrain, bad weather, and supply problems. Nevertheless, by June 5, Morozumi abandoned his plan to hold the Silae area for a month and slowly began moving his best troops eastward toward Waloe in the Agusan River valley, harassed by Filipino guerrillas along the way. In the end, Silae was finally occupied on June 9, with troops of the 108th Regiment pushing further to the Bobonawan River four days later. Additionally, the 155th Regiment arrived on the Pulangi River on June 12, while elements of the 162nd Regiment struck twenty miles into the mountains east from Maramag by June 26. On June 25, the 1st Battalion of the 155th Regiment successfully landed on Butuan Bay and managed to reach Waloe before the Japanese on June 27, dispersing the 3rd Battalion of the 41st Regiment that was holding the area. However, the Japanese retreat was so slow that Morozumi was still assembling his forces about seven miles up the Agusan from Waloe by the end of the war.
Far to the northwest, units of the 31st Division had been probing southeast along the upper section of the Kibawe-Talomo trail ever since early May, and on the 11th of that month a battalion combat team of the 167th Infantry launched the reconnaissance-in-force directed by General Sibert. Japanese along this section of the trail, about 1,000 men in all, comprised a conglomerate mass of service troops with a small leavening of infantry. Control was vested in General Tomochika, chief of staff of the 35th Army, who had set up a small headquarters groupment near barrio Pinamola, about twenty miles southeast of Kibawe. The Japanese force had a defensive potential far greater than its strength and nature would indicate, for the terrain gave the Japanese every conceivable advantage. Bounded on both sides by dense jungle and thick rain forest, the trail as far as Pinamola ran up and down steep ridges and was scarcely jeep-wide. Rains of late May soon rendered all sections of the trail completely impassable to wheeled vehicles, and supplies had to come in by airdrop, supplemented when possible by hand-carrying parties and laden Carabaos. The mud was so deep that often troops had to pull, push, or even jack the Carabaos out of gooey holes. Delayed by the Japanese, the terrain, and the weather, the 167th Infantry's battalion did not reach the Pulangi River, thirteen miles southeast of Kibawe, until 29 May.
Then, although the Japanese from the trail could no longer offer any threat to the 31st Division, the battalion continued south toward Pinamola, aided considerably by guerrillas. The remnants of the 1st Battalion, 74th Infantry, and the South Sector Unit, 30th Division, which had been driven into the mountains along Highway 3 by the swift American advance in central Mindanao had meanwhile been attached to Tomochika’s forces early in June. Troops of the 167th Infantry finally reached Pinamola on 30 June as the remaining Japanese were withdrawing southward another eight miles to the crossing of the Kuluman River. Progress as far as Pinamola had cost the 167th Infantry approximately 60 men killed and 180 wounded, while the Japanese had lost almost 400 killed along the same section of the trail. Elements of the 167th Infantry held along the northwestern section of the Kibawe-Talomo trail until the end of the war, and as of 15 August the regiment was preparing to send troops across the Kuluman River to continue the advance southeastward. On that date nearly 30 miles of Japanese-improved trail, only 19 air miles--still separated the 167th Infantry from guerrilla units operating in the vicinity of Kibangay. Organized remnants of Harada's 100th Division holed up until the end of the war in rugged terrain north of this 30-mile stretch of the trail.
Finally, the 24th Reconnaissance Troop successfully landed on the southeastern shore of Sarangani Bay on July 4 to establish contact with the guerrilla 116th Regiment, subsequently clearing the bay's shores against negligible resistance. On July 12, the 1st Battalion of the 21st Regiment landed on the northwest shore, just as two provisional battalions were arriving in the area from different directions. The three forces began to clear the area, successfully locating and destroying the only Japanese unit in the region by July 25. This concluded the campaign in Mindanao, during which the Americans suffered 820 men killed and 2,880 wounded. In turn, almost 10,540 Japanese were killed in eastern Mindanao by June 30, with the pursuing Filipino-American units killing another 2,325 Japanese by the war's end. Roughly 600 Japanese prisoners were captured, over 250 of whom were civilians, before August. After the war, about 22,250 Japanese troops and 11,900 civilians turned themselves in. It is also estimated that an additional 8,235 Japanese lost their lives due to starvation and disease between April and the war's end.
I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.
In the spring of 1945, the fierce battle for Okinawa escalated as General Buckner's troops captured crucial strongholds, pushing the Japanese forces into retreat. Meanwhile the liberation of Mindanao was kicking up. American forces launched a rapid invasion, confronting Japanese defenders who were heavily fortified in the mountainous regions. Despite the stubborn resistance, American troops relentlessly battled, ultimately culminating in significant victories and paving the way for liberation.

Tuesday May 27, 2025
- 184 - Pacific War Podcast - the Fall of Shuri - May 27 - June 3, 1945
Tuesday May 27, 2025
Tuesday May 27, 2025
Last time we spoke about the breakthrough on Okinawa. Despite relentless attacks on critical positions like Sugar Loaf Hill and Wana Ridge, American Marines encountered heavy casualties. Yet, they persisted, inching forward against tenacious resistance. As mid-May approached, the situation for Japanese commanders deteriorated. Encircled and suffering significant losses, they began plotting a retreat to more defensible positions. On the ground, Marines battled through mud and enemy fire, showcasing incredible resolve amidst dire circumstances. Communication crumbled, supplies dwindled, and morale waned, yet the determination of both sides was undeniable. By late May, the tides shifted further in favor of the Allies, marking pivotal breakthroughs despite the challenges. Amidst ruin and chaos, the relentless struggle for control over Okinawa symbolized the brutal nature of war and the unwavering spirit of those fighting on both sides, setting the stage for an eventual Allied victory.
This episode is the Fall of Shuri
Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.
As we last left off, the battle for Okinawa was reaching a critical juncture. General Buckner’s 10th Army had made significant gains, successfully breaking through the fortified Japanese defenses on both flanks. The 6th Marine Division, under General Shepherd, had effectively established control over the Naha area, while General Arnold’s 7th Division achieved an impressive penetration at Yonabaru. However, despite these advancements, the remainder of the American forces faced formidable obstacles. They were grappling with relentless rain, fierce enemy resistance, and severe supply shortages, which left them effectively stalled in front of Shuri. In response to the encroaching American forces, General Ushijima had dispatched General Fujioka’s 62nd Division to launch a counter-offensive aimed at driving the invaders out of Yonabaru. Meanwhile, Ushijima was preparing his 32nd Army for a strategic withdrawal south to the Kiyamu Peninsula. Fortunately for the Americans, they had caught wind of the defenders' intentions. Recognizing the urgency of the situation, on May 27, General Buckner ordered his troops to apply strong and unrelenting pressure on the enemy. The goal was clear: keep the Japanese forces off balance and prevent an easy transition to new defensive positions. Although the continuing downpour hindered the possibility of a large-scale, coordinated army-wide attack, it did not deter Buckner’s strategy. Instead, he initiated a series of strong combat patrols along the front lines, which immediately encountered stiff resistance from Japanese troops that had not yet begun their withdrawal. On the west coast, as patrols from Colonel Roberts’ 22nd Marines scouted the area, they discovered that the Japanese had largely abandoned Naha. This news spurred the 2nd Battalion into action. They crossed the Asato River, moved through the lines established by Shepherd’s Reconnaissance Company, and pressed deeper into the western part of Naha. Simultaneously, Colonel Shapley’s 4th Marines made their last desperate push to extend American control into eastern Naha, fighting valiantly against the entrenched enemy. Farther east, Colonel Finn’s 32nd Regiment once again faced fierce resistance from the hastily committed 62nd Division, which staunchly defended its position. However, not all was lost; patrols from Colonel Green’s 184th Regiment managed to reach Inasomi, meeting only scattered resistance. This breakthrough provided a crucial indication that the enemy had no intention of withdrawing into the Chinen Peninsula.
As the clocks struck midnight, a significant yet largely unnoticed transition occurred in the waters off Okinawa: Admiral Halsey’s 3rd Fleet relieved Admiral Spruance’s 5th Fleet. For the troops ashore, this change in command went by without a hint of recognition. The same ships and task groups continued their crucial support for ground operations, now operating under new numerical designations and leadership. However, Halsey faced an immediate challenge as Admiral Ugaki launched an extensive Kikisui attack, a large-scale kamikaze assault involving 110 enemy aircraft. The day of May 27 proved costly, with three destroyers, one destroyer minesweeper, two transports, one subchaser, and two auxiliary ships all suffering damage. The following morning brought clear skies, which only heightened the danger for American naval forces. Several kamikaze aircraft succeeded in sinking the destroyer USS Drexler, while also inflicting damage on a transport ship, three freighters, and a landing craft throughout the day. Meanwhile, on land, Colonel Whaling’s rehabilitated 29th Marines took over from the battered 4th Marines along the west coast. The 1st Battalion executed a concerted attack alongside the 22nd Marines, advancing successfully by 250 yards through the rubble-strewn city of Naha. In an impressive display of momentum, Roberts’ men pushed forward unopposed toward the Kokuba estuary, eventually encountering resistance near Ono-Yama Island. To the east, the improvement in weather allowed Colonel Mason’s 1st Marines to launch a coordinated offensive. The 2nd Battalion fought valiantly, climbing to the peak of 110 Meter Hill. The forward elements of Company E gained the hill crest but were forced to withdraw by vicious enemy fire which raked their positions. Lieutenant Colonel Magee felt that his depleted battalion, down to a total strength of 277 men in the rifle companies, might recapture the hill, but "it could not possibly hold it against a strong enemy counterattack." Although new replacements were available to regiments for training or other use, a division order prevented their being sent to front line units during a battle situation that called for the utmost in skill and knowledge of veterans. Throughout most of the morning and all of the afternoon, 2/1 concentrated the fire of its supporting weapons on the reverse slopes of 110 Meter Hill and engaged the Japanese in a fierce and continuous fire fight. Nightfall brought no cessation of enemy resistance, and many infiltrators were killed in the battalion's lines. In contrast, the 3rd Battalion experienced relatively little opposition, allowing some patrols to penetrate into Wana Draw. At the same time, Colonel Griebel’s 3rd Battalion effectively moved its front line to the Asato River, while his 1st Battalion achieved a significant milestone by capturing Beehive Hill. However, despite the break in the rain, the conditions on the ground rendered large-scale movements impractical, stalling further advances across the battlefield.
Despite Arnold’s determined efforts to push west through Fujioka’s blocking positions, progress was minimal. Nevertheless, he was able to consolidate his grip on the Ozato hill mass as Green’s 2nd Battalion advanced to a position within 1,000 yards of Shinazato, strategically located at the neck of the Chinen Peninsula. The lack of success from the 62nd Division in driving back the breaching American forces reinforced General Ushijima’s resolve to evacuate Shuri while the opportunity still existed. In light of this, he ordered the withdrawal to commence the following evening. On May 29, while the 7th Reconnaissance Troop managed to scout a significant portion of the Chinen Peninsula without incident, the 7th and 96th Divisions faced fierce resistance as they attacked toward the road network south of Shuri. The enemy’s resolute defense resulted in only minimal gains for the American assault units. General Bruce's 77th Division, after what can be described as "a day almost entirely spent in hand-to-hand combat," found itself unable to penetrate the intense cordon of defensive fire that protected the Japanese positions. In stark contrast, to the west, Griebel’s 1st Battalion made a rapid advance, quickly gaining the crest of Shuri Ridge. They launched a bold assault on Shuri Castle.
On May 25, as part of the final stages of the Okinawa campaign, the American battleship USS Mississippi bombarded the castle for three days, and by May 27, it was engulfed in flames. That night, the Japanese forces retreated, abandoning Shuri while US troops pursued them southward. The 1st Battalion of the 5th Marines had started its attack on 29 May with Companies B and C in assault and Company A following in trace of Company C. The Marines quickly gained the crest of Shuri Ridge and Lieutenant Colonel Shelburne requested permission for one of his companies to storm Shuri Castle which commanded his position. Although the castle was in the zone of action of the 77th Infantry Division, General del Valle gave his assent to the request in view of the great danger of enemy action from the strong point. The 1st Marine Division commander felt that "at that time the position of the 77th Division was such that it would have taken several hard day's fighting through enemy resistance" before the castle could be taken. Company A drove east along the muddy ridge line, overwhelming the few Japanese in its path, and by 1015 the castle, core of the Shuri bastion, had been secured. The Marine unit entered Shuri through a gap in the covering forces caused by the withdrawal of the 3d Battalion, 15th Independent Mixed Regiment of the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade, in the course of the Japanese retreat from Shuri. This seems to have been the only notable instance of confusion and mistake in the Japanese withdrawal operation as a whole. Everywhere else around Shuri the Japanese still held their covering positions in the front lines. The 77th Division, which had scheduled air strikes and a heavy artillery bombardment on the castle heights for 29 May, received little prior warning of the Marines' assault and "was barely able to avert [its] called strikes in time." Without taking any credit away from Company A of the 5th Marines for its feat of capturing Shuri Castle, its success was clearly the result of the combined effort of all the assault and support troops of Tenth Army which had maintained relentless pressure on the enemy defenses and paved the way for the breakthrough.
Capitalizing on this momentum, General Del Valle swiftly reorganized his forces to bypass Wana Draw and consolidate these crucial gains. Meanwhile, Griebel’s 3rd Battalion maneuvered down the division boundary, reaching a position just 2,000 yards from the village of Kokuba, prompting Whaling’s 3rd Battalion to push their lines forward by approximately 600 yards. In a coordinated effort, the 29th Marines executed a wheeling assault on 29 May with 1/29 pivoting on 3/29 and attacking south and then east to bring the regiment on line with the 22d Marines. The ultimate objective of the 1st Battalion's attack was the high ground northwest of Shichina. The approach to the objective was over low and open terrain which drew the comment from regiment that it was "about as suitable to fighting as a billiard table." Fire from strong points in tombs and caves on the small hills and ridges to the front kept the advance to a slow pace, and the assault companies, A and C, dug in slightly to the left rear of the positions of the 22d Marines at nightfall. On another front, Roberts’ 1st Battalion successfully crossed the Kokuba River and advanced toward Telegraph Hill in east Naha. However, despite their efforts, intense fighting erupted throughout the day without yielding any significant gains.
Back at sea, the threat of kamikaze attacks returned with ferocity, yet this time, American defenses held strong, resulting in only a single destroyer and one transport sustaining damage. As night fell, the Japanese began their long-anticipated withdrawal. General Amamiya’s 24th Division commenced disengagement, moving southward while leaving a small force, including the 22nd Independent Battalion, to cover their retreat at Shuri. Meanwhile, General Suzuki’s 44th Independent Mixed Brigade held their defensive lines outside Naha, and the 62nd Division maintained its positions near Chan and Karadera. By dawn on May 30, the bulk of the 32nd Army had successfully evacuated the Shuri lines, slipping away from the flanking maneuvers of Buckner’s 10th Army. Thanks to a continuous curtain of rain, General Ushijima executed a meticulously planned "properly deft withdrawal." His covering forces were strategically positioned to provide him with the necessary time to organize a defensive stance on the Kiyamu Peninsula. However, the Americans, ever vigilant, were quick to capitalize on the enemy's disarray, maintaining relentless pressure on the faltering Japanese front. On the west coast, Roberts’ 2nd and 3rd Battalions crossed the canal, seamlessly moving through the 1st Battalion to take up the assault. They pushed forward tenaciously until they captured the entire area encompassing Telegraph Hill and Hill 27.
A network of Japanese machine gun positions hidden in the clusters of tombs on the low hills to the Marines' front made progress slow and costly. Enemy machine guns emplaced in burial tombs on Hill 27 in east Naha temporarily checked the infantry. Heavy sniper fire whipped the lines and killed Lieutenant Colonel Woodhouse of 2/22 who was forward controlling his battalion's attack. Major John G. Johnson, the executive officer, took command immediately and continued a steady pressure. During most of the day tanks were unable to reach the position, but in the afternoon three worked their way along the road north of the hill, and their direct fire enabled the marines to seize it. The advance consisted of a series of local assaults and mop-up actions that brought the battalion to secure hill positions overlooking the Kokuba Estuary and the rail line leading to the north by nightfall. Lieutenant Colonel Shisler's 3d Battalion passed through 1/22 during the morning's attack and behind a screen of artillery, mortars, naval gunfire, and rockets drove onto the high ground at the eastern outskirts of Naha. By means of a series of holding attacks and flank assaults, Shisler was able to move his companies into the maze of enemy defenses where close quarter grenade and small-arms exchanges decided the issue. Once the dominating ground was won, the battalion was subjected to intense artillery and mortar fire.
At the same time, Whaling’s 1st Battalion joined the offensive, encountering fierce resistance as they pressed through 600 yards of enemy territory. To the east, the Marines under Del Valle shifted their focus to vigorous patrolling, as the supply situation gradually improved thanks to dedicated carrying parties and aerial air drops. Despite their efforts, the 306th Regiment's assault on 110 Meter Hill encountered heavy opposition once again. However, Colonel Hamilton’s 307th Regiment finally achieved a breakthrough, seizing the strategic Three Sisters. Dorothy Hill, a fortress directly east of Shuri and a tower of strength in the enemy's inner line for the past two weeks, was attacked by the 3d Battalion, 307th Infantry, 77th Division. The first platoon to reach the base of the hill was pinned down by heavy fire, the platoon leader and all noncommissioned officers being wounded. Other platoons maneuvered into position and finally one squad reached the crest at the right end. This entering wedge enabled two companies to reach the top, from which they discovered three levels of caves on the reverse slope. They went to work methodically, moving from right to left along the top level, burning and blasting each cave and dugout, the flame-thrower and satchel-charge men covered by riflemen. When work on the top level was finished, the second level of caves and tunnels received similar treatment, and then the third and lowest level. That night fifteen Japanese who had survived the day's fighting crawled out of the blasted caves and were killed by Americans from their foxholes. A great amount of enemy equipment, including ten destroyed 150-mm- guns and twenty-five trucks, was found on the south (reverse) side of Dorothy Hill, testifying to the enemy fire power at this strong point. On 30 May, the 77th Division also took Jane Hill on its left flank and then almost unopposed took Tom Hill, the highest point of ground in the Shuri area, by 1700. This critical victory paved the way for Colonel Smith’s forces to advance into the northern outskirts of Shuri through Ishimmi.
In a remarkable display of coordination, Colonel Dill’s 382nd Regiment finally secured the strategic Hen Hill and Oboe Hill areas, while also capturing Hector Hill on their left flank. For nine days elements of the 96th Division had been stalemated at the base of Hen Hill, just northeast of Shuri. On the 30th, Company F and one platoon of Company G, 382d Infantry, resumed the attack on Hen Hill. Pfc. Clarence B. Craft, a rifleman from Company G, was sent out ahead with five companions to test the Japanese positions. As he and his small group started up the slope, they were brought under heavy fire from Japanese just over the crest, and a shower of grenades fell on them. Three of the men were wounded and the other two were stopped. Craft, although a new replacement and in his first action, kept on going, tossing grenades at the crest. From just below the crest he threw two cases of grenades that were passed up to him from the bottom, those of the enemy going over his head or exploding near him. He then leaped to the crest and fired at point-blank range into the Japanese in a trench a few feet below him. Spurred by Craft's example, other men now came to his aid. Reloading, Craft pursued the Japanese down the trench, wiped out a machine gun nest, and satchel-charged the cave into which the remaining Japanese had retreated. Altogether, in the taking of Hen Hill as a result of Craft's action, about seventy Japanese were killed, at least twenty-five of whom were credited to Craft himself. This daring action won him the Congressional Medal of Honor. To the left (east), Company F at the same time engaged in a grenade battle for Hector Hill, using ten cases of grenades in the assault on the crest. It was finally won after a satchel charge was hurled over the top and lit in the enemy trench on the other side, parts of Japanese bodies and pieces of enemy equipment hurtling into the sky in the blast. Hen and Hector Hills had fallen by 1400.
Southeast of their position, Colonel May’s 2d Battalion, 383d Infantry, reached Love Hill and dug in, although scattered fire was still received from a machine gun in a nook of Charlie Hill and there were a few live Japanese on Love itself. In the afternoon the 3d Battalion, 383d Infantry, left its foxholes on Oboe, where it had experienced so great an ordeal, and proceeded down the reverse slope of the hill, finding only a few scattered Japanese. That night the 383d Infantry expressed a heartfelt sentiment when it reported "infinite relief to have Conical Hill behind us." Although there had been suicidal stands in a few places by the last of the holding force, the advances had been rapid.
Simultaneously, Colonel Halloran’s 381st Regiment effectively reduced the Conical Hill-Cutaway area and seized Roger Hill, both regiments then advancing toward the vital Naha-Yonabaru road. At the same time, the 32nd Regiment launched a coordinated offensive that allowed them to successfully capture Oak, Ella, and June Hills. This advance brought Finn’s troops directly into confrontation with Mabel and Hetty Hills, facing the formidable defenses of Chan. Meanwhile, strong patrols from the 184th Regiment ventured into the Chinen Peninsula's strongholds, encountering only light enemy resistance, a turn of events that buoyed American morale. As night fell, the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade and the 24th Division began their long-anticipated evacuation from Shuri. They pulled back behind the second line of blocking positions north of Tsukasan, executing their withdrawal amidst a progressively decreasing barrage of artillery and mortar fire. Consequently, when Buckner’s assault troops launched their offensive against the Shuri positions on the morning of May 31, they were met with an eerie silence, the stillness only interrupted by sporadic sniper fire and the distant crack of machine guns.The 77th Division swiftly took 110 Meter Hill and advanced into Shuri with little to no resistance. Concurrently, Mason’s units surrounding Shuri Castle moved north unopposed, aiding in the occupation of the battered ruins and the troublesome Wana Draw.
Shuri, the second town of Okinawa, lay in utter ruin. There was no other city, town, or village in the Ryukyus that had been destroyed so completely. Naha too had been laid waste. Certain villages which had been strong points in the enemy's defense, such as Kakazu, Dakeshi, Kochi, Arakachi, and Kunishi, had been fought over and leveled to the ground. But none of these compared with the ancient capital of the Ryukyus. It was estimated that about 200000 rounds of artillery and naval gunfire had struck Shuri. Numerous air strikes had dropped 1000-pound bombs on it. Mortar shells by the thousands had arched their way into the town area. Only two structures, both of concrete, the big normal school at the southwestern corner and the little Methodist church, built in 1937, in the center of Shuri, had enough of their walls standing to form silhouettes on the skyline. The rest was flattened rubble. The narrow paved and dirt streets, churned by high explosives and pitted with shell craters, were impassable to any vehicle. The stone walls of the numerous little terraces were battered down. The rubble and broken red tile of the houses lay in heaps. The frame portion of buildings had been reduced to kindling wood. Tattered bits of Japanese military clothing, gas masks, and tropical helmets-the most frequently seen items-and the dark-colored Okinawan civilian dress lay about in wild confusion. Over all this crater of the moon landscape hung the unforgettable stench of rotting human flesh. To the west, Griebel’s 1st Battalion built upon Mason’s gains, but it was the 3rd Battalion that led the main effort, successfully pushing to the hills just north of Shichina.Meanwhile, General Bradley's advancing battalions moved rapidly toward their assigned objectives, spending much of the day mopping up isolated enemy holdouts. This relentless advance effectively pinched off the 77th Division, further consolidating American control in the region.
On the extreme left flank, Halloran’s 1st Battalion faced enemy forces defending the Tsukasan line, marking the only area where the 96th Division failed to reach the corps boundary. However, the Shuri area had now been completely secured, and contact was made with Del Valle’s Marines in the center. On the flanks, though, Buckner’s units continued to encounter fierce resistance from the tenacious Japanese defenders. The 32nd Regiment, battling bravely through a series of heavily fortified strongpoints held stubbornly by Fujioka’s troops, managed to seize Duck Hill, consolidate its positions on Turkey Hill, and capture the forward face of Mabel. Ultimately, they halted their advance just short of Chan. Meanwhile, on the west coast, Shepherd’s Marines pushed forward with support from tanks and artillery, targeting the strategic high ground west of Shichina and Kokuba. However, their advance was stalled by intense enemy fire emanating from Hill 46. During the night, the battered 44th Independent Mixed Brigade executed a withdrawal southeast towards the Kiyamu Peninsula, covered by the 62nd Division, which quickly established a new defensive line along the Kokuba River and around Tsukasan. With the fall of Shuri and the withdrawal of Japanese forces, Buckner’s troops had emerged victorious in one of the most difficult and bloody battles of the Pacific War. By the end of May, reports indicated that approximately 62,548 Japanese soldiers had been confirmed killed, with another estimated 9,529 thought to have perished, 64,000 of whom were believed to have fallen in the fierce fighting within the Shuri fortified zone alone. While these casualty figures may be somewhat exaggerated, there is little doubt that Japanese forces, especially their infantry combat units, had suffered severe depletion. In contrast, General Geiger’s 3rd Amphibious Corps recorded significant losses of its own, with 1,718 killed, 8,852 wounded, and 101 missing during the fighting around Shuri. Additionally, the losses for General Hodge’s 24th Corps over two months of combat totaled an alarming 26,044 casualties.
On June 1, the American forces faced surprisingly little opposition from the enemy. A frustrated General Buckner, who had hoped to trap the defenders at Shuri, ordered his troops to advance rapidly in pursuit of the retreating Japanese units. With the 77th Division methodically mopping up remnants in the Shuri zone, General Hodge made a strategic decision. He shifted the 7th Division toward the east and ordered the 96th Division to move south to relieve the 32nd Regiment, taking up the western end of the Corps line. This strategic relief enabled Arnold to immediately push south with both the 17th and 184th Regiments in assault, managing to advance approximately 1,100 yards toward Okota and Batan despite increasingly stiff resistance from smaller enemy units. To the northwest, a coordinated attack by the Marine divisions successfully secured all high ground overlooking the primary east-west road in the Kokuba Valley. The 5th Marines anchored their position on the hills east of Shichina, while Shepherd’s regiments seized the dominating heights north of Kokuba. Recognizing the strategic importance of the Oroku Peninsula, General Geiger planned a shore-to-shore landing there. To gather intelligence, Shepherd dispatched his Reconnaissance Company to conduct an amphibious reconnaissance of the peninsula that evening. Their findings confirmed that the peninsula was not fortified with significant enemy strength. The following day, Colonel Snedeker’s 7th Marines advanced to relieve the 6th Marine Division on the west coast. The 2nd Battalion continued the momentum by crossing the Kokuba River, moving into the hills on the south bank. Meanwhile, to the east, the 5th Marines also crossed the upper branch of the river and pressed forward to secure the ridgeline that controlled the approaches to Tsukasan. This maneuver effectively placed the entire Naha-Yonabaru road firmly in American hands, further tightening their grip on the battlefield.
That evening, Shepherd dispatched his Reconnaissance Company to conduct an amphibious reconnaissance of the Oroku Peninsula. Their mission revealed that the peninsula was not heavily defended, opening up opportunities for American forces. Further east, the 383rd Regiment successfully cleared out Chan and seized the high ground just north of Tera and Kamizato. Meanwhile, the 381st Regiment conducted repeated assaults on hill positions that impeded its advance, ultimately managing to penetrate to Karadera. The 7th Division maintained relentless pressure on the retreating garrison of the Chinen Peninsula, advancing its lines by 2,400 yards toward Itokazu and Kerabaru. Now, it’s time to shift our focus away from Okinawa and examine the latest operations of General LeMay’s 21st Bomber Command. Since the invasion of Okinawa, Admiral Nimitz had requested that the B-29 Superfortress heavy bombers assist his naval forces in countering the deadly kamikaze attacks. In response, LeMay dispatched 53 bombers to target airfields at Kanoya on April 8, although the city of Kagoshima ended up being bombed instead. On April 17, 134 B-29s were sent against Kyushu, successfully neutralizing enemy airfield operations for 18 hours. However, as we've observed, the Japanese continued to launch both scattered and mass kamikaze attacks. To address this ongoing threat, the 21st Bomber Command, bolstered by the arrival of Brigadier General Roger Ramey’s 58th Bombardment Wing, dedicated 75% of its combat effort to providing direct tactical support for the Okinawa campaign up to May 11. During this period, they flew a total of 2,104 sorties against 17 airfields in Kyushu and Shikoku. Although they did not fully neutralize these targets, significant damage was inflicted on enemy storage, maintenance, and repair facilities. The bombers also served to keep the Japanese off balance, significantly disrupting their ability to plan and execute large, coordinated attacks. In total, 24 B-29s were destroyed and 233 damaged during these operations, while 134 enemy interceptors were shot down.
Between the strikes on Kyushu, General LeMay managed to fit in several medium-strength precision attacks against the Japanese aircraft industry, along with two large-scale night incendiary missions in the Tokyo Bay area. The first of these missions took place on April 13, when 327 B-29s dropped an impressive 2,139 tons of ordnance on the arsenal district of Tokyo, located northwest of the Imperial Palace. The resulting fires consumed 11.4 square miles of this crucial industrial zone, destroying arsenal plants responsible for manufacturing and storing small arms, machine guns, artillery, bombs, gunpowder, and fire-control mechanisms. Just two nights later, on April 15, 303 bombers executed another incendiary attack, dropping 1,930 tons of explosives with equal success. This raid devastated 6 square miles in Tokyo, 3.6 square miles in Kawasaki, and 1.5 square miles in Yokohama, which suffered collateral damage from the fire spills. Cumulatively, these two raids resulted in the destruction of 217,130 buildings in Tokyo and Yokohama and 31,603 in Kawasaki. On April 24, 131 B-29s conducted a highly successful precision strike against the Tachikawa plant of the Hitachi Aircraft Corporation. Although the next planned attack was thwarted by inclement weather, 148 B-29s struck Kure on May 5, delivering devastating damage. After being relieved from support for the Okinawa operation on May 11, LeMay initiated a month of heavy fire raids to complete the campaign that had begun in March, while also addressing top-priority precision targets as opportunities arose. Accordingly, on May 14, 529 B-29s were dispatched to strike northern Nagoya, with 472 successfully dropping 2,515 tons of munitions, resulting in the burning of 3.15 square miles and inflicting significant damage to Mitsubishi's No. 10 engine works. Just two nights later, 522 bombers returned to Nagoya, with 457 of them effectively delivering 3,609 tons over the dock and industrial areas in the southern part of the city, burning 3.82 square miles and causing extensive damage to Mitsubishi's No. 5 aircraft works. These two incendiary attacks finished Nagoya as an objective for area attacks. Good targets remained in the city, and the command was to return six more times for precision attacks before V-J Day. But the industrial fabric of the city had been ruined in the earlier precision attacks and in the fire raids that had burned out twelve square miles of a total built-up urban area of about forty square miles. In all, 113460 buildings had been destroyed, 3866 persons had been killed and 472701 rendered homeless. The displacement of workers aggravated the difficulties caused by physical damage and had an important effect on civilian morale.
After a week of respite, temporarily interrupted by a 318-plane precision attack on the Tachikawa Aircraft Company, 562 B-29s were dispatched to strike Tokyo once more on May 23. Out of these, 520 bombers reached their target, dropping an impressive 3,646 tons of explosives over the district stretching southward from the Imperial Palace along the west side of Tokyo Harbor. Despite encountering strong opposition, this attack resulted in the destruction of 5.3 square miles of area. Two nights later, 502 B-29s returned to Tokyo, targeting the area just north of their previous hit. They faced heavy resistance again, dropping 3,262 tons of incendiaries on the city, which resulted in the destruction of 16.8 square miles, marking the largest area devastated in a single Tokyo raid. In light of the heavy casualties suffered during these last two strikes, General LeMay decided to assign P-51s from Iwo Jima to escort future attacks. As a result, on May 29, 517 B-29s were escorted by 101 P-51 fighters during an assault on Yokohama. These bombers successfully dropped 2,570 tons of munitions, burning out 6.9 square miles while the escorting fighters engaged in fierce battles against about 150 aggressive interceptors. Meanwhile, General Whitehead’s 5th Air Force was conducting an extensive program of area bombing against Formosa, experimenting with various types of bombs and tactics in preparation for future attacks on the Japanese mainland. Taihoku, the capital and political and financial center of Taiwan, was subjected to constant aerial bombardment. The largest strike against modern-day Taipei, known as the Taihoku Air Raid, occurred on May 31, when units of the Fifth Air Force consisting of 117 Consolidated B-24 Liberator heavy bombers were sent to conduct the largest air raid ever on Taiwan. The bombing began from around ten o'clock in the morning and lasted until one o'clock in the afternoon, during which the attack was non-stop. The Americans met virtually no resistance from the Japanese, mainly due to the attrition the Japanese air forces had suffered in the Aerial Battle of Taiwan-Okinawa, which completely exhausted Japan's fighter units in Taiwan. They successfully dropped approximately 3,800 bombs targeting military units and governmental facilities. The Office of the Governor-General of Taiwan suffered a direct hit, in spite of the building being heavily camouflaged to avoid being targeted. The building suffered extensive damage from fire caused by the bombs and almost collapsed on itself; it was rendered unoccupiable and was not repaired until the Nationalist Chinese takeover. Other facilities hit during the bombing included the residence of the Assistant Governor-General, Taiwan Railway Hotel, Office of Governor-General Library, Army Headquarters, Taihoku Imperial University, Taihoku Station, Bank of Taiwan, Taihoku High Court, Taihoku New Park, and many other facilities. Many civilian installations were damaged, including Taihoku Prefectural Taihoku First Girls' High School, Huashan Catholic Church of Taihoku, and the famous Lungshan Temple of Manka, which was hit in the main building and the left corridor; many precious artifacts and art works in the temple were lost in the ensuing fire. As a result of the extensive bombing campaigns, more than 3,000 civilians lost their lives. Tens of thousands were displaced or left homeless, and countless buildings were destroyed, either directly by the attacks or by the fires they ignited. This devastation left a profound impact on the local population and infrastructure, marking yet another tragic chapter in the toll of the war.
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In the midst of the brutal Battle of Okinawa, American Marines faced relentless resistance as they pushed towards Shuri. Despite heavy casualties and daunting conditions, the tide turned when General Buckner ordered aggressive assaults that outmaneuvered the encircled Japanese forces. After days of relentless combat, they captured the stronghold, leading to the collapse of Japanese defenses. As the dust settled, Shuri lay in ruins, marking a pivotal moment in the Pacific War and showcasing the indomitable spirit of both American and Japanese soldiers.

Tuesday May 20, 2025
- 183 - Pacific War Podcast - the Breakthrough on Okinawa - May 20 - 27, 1945
Tuesday May 20, 2025
Tuesday May 20, 2025
Last time we spoke about the battle of Malacca strait. In the intense Battle of the Malacca Strait, Japanese forces undertook a desperate evacuation amidst relentless attacks by the Allies. After suffering heavy casualties from previous confrontations, the Japanese regrouped and attempted to maintain their defensive positions. However, under the pressure of determined Allied assaults and strategic maneuvers, they faced increasingly fierce resistance. As the Allies advanced, they successfully overwhelmed Japanese defenses, leading to significant losses for the opposing forces. The battle transformed into a pivotal moment in the Pacific War as Japanese resistance crumbled, ultimately shifting the tide toward Allied victory. This clash not only showcased the harsh realities of war but also underscored the relentless determination of both sides as they fought for dominance in the region, marking a crucial step towards the conclusion of the conflict.
This episode is the Breakthrough on Okinawa
Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.
As of mid-May, General Buckner's forces had made steady, albeit slow, progress against the determined Japanese defenders on the Shuri defensive line. On May 16, the offensive continued. Colonel Schneider's 22nd Marines and Colonel Whaling's 29th Marines launched yet another unsuccessful assault on Sugar Loaf Hill, while Colonel Snedeker's 7th Marines exhausted their strength in a failed attempt to seize Wana Ridge. To the east, Colonel Coolidge's 305th Regiment advanced 200 yards closer to Shuri. Colonel Hamilton's 307th Regiment nearly captured Flattop and Chocolate Drop Hill but was ultimately pushed back. Colonel Dill's 382nd Regiment successfully cleared Dick Hill but came under intense fire from Oboe Hill. Meanwhile, Colonel May's 383rd Regiment made only minor gains on the southeastern slopes of Conical Hill and Love Hill, even as tanks broke through toward Yonabaru for the first time. The following day, the 383rd Regiment maintained pressure on Conical and Love Hills, prompting General Bradley to commit part of Colonel Halloran's 381st Regiment to the attack. To the west, the 382nd Regiment staged a hard-fought advance of 200 yards but was unable to capture Oboe Hill.
Slowly the 77th Division forces between Flattop and Route 5 were reducing enemy positions bearing on the area in front of the 307th Infantry. By 17 May this progress began to show in the advances of the foot troops around Chocolate Drop. Covered by company heavy weapons out on both flanks, infantrymen worked around both sides of the hill to the huge caves on the reverse slope. Inside were 4 antitank guns, 1 field piece, 4 machine guns, 4 heavy mortars, and a American 60-mm. mortars. By nightfall the caves had been partially sealed off. During the night an enemy force launched a counterattack against the American positions around the hill but was repulsed with the loss of twenty-five Japanese killed. On the 17th another bitter struggle raged on Flattop. The struggle swayed back and forth across the narrow crest of the hill. Company K, the assaulting unit, had been reduced to fourteen infantrymen by the end of the day; finally it was forced back off the top. Tanks tried to go through the road cut between Flattop and Dick Hill, but two of them were disabled by mines, leaving the cut blocked. The road cut was later blown along its entire length by seven tons of bangalore torpedoes to remove the mines. Company E continued to push toward Ishimmi Ridge, where they faced a series of heavy Japanese counterattacks. Coolidge's 3rd Battalion and the rest of Hamilton's 2nd Battalion dug in just a few hundred yards north of Shuri and Ishimmi in the highway valley. Meanwhile, Coolidge's 1st Battalion was halted by heavy fire from 110 Meter Hill and the extensive fortress houses in Shuri's suburbs. The intense fighting had nearly depleted the 22nd Regiment, prompting General Amamiya to direct the 32nd Regiment to take over the defense of Shuri along a line extending from Ishimmi to Oboe.
Meanwhile, on Wana, the 7th Marines launched a renewed attack but were once again repelled. However, the 5th Marines succeeded in advancing to Hill 55. Further west, the bulk of the 29th Marines attacked toward Half Moon Hill, successfully reaching its forward slopes but later having to withdraw to more defensive positions overnight. Whaling’s 2nd Battalion also mounted relentless assaults on Sugar Loaf, each time suffering heavy losses in repelled attacks. As dusk fell, Japanese planes targeted American shipping, successfully damaging the destroyer Douglas H. Fox. On May 18, tanks played a crucial role in a successful assault on Sugar Loaf, executing a double envelopment while securing the top of the hill. The 2nd Battalion then advanced to Horseshoe Hill, while the remainder of the 29th Marines managed to secure the forward slopes of Half Moon.After a night of sporadic bombardment from enemy artillery and mortars, 3/7 again attempted to gain a foothold on Wana Ridge. During the morning supporting weapons concentrated their fire on the forward slopes and crest of the objective and at noon Company I, followed by a platoon of Company L, jumped off and fought its way to the ridge. The assault troops' gains "were measured in yards won, lost, and then won again." Finally, mounting casualties inflicted by enemy grenade and mortar fire forced Lieutenant Colonel Hurst to pull back his forward elements and consolidate his lines on positions held the previous night.
On the right flank of the division front the isolated platoon from Company E of 2/5 was unsuccessful in exploiting its hold on the western slopes of Hill 55. The men were driven to cover by intense enemy fire, and tanks again had to be called upon to supply ammunition and rations to the outpost. During the morning operations the 5th Marines laid protective fire with tanks and assault guns along Wana Ridge to support 3/7's advance. At noon, under cover of this fire, Company F sent one rifle platoon and an attached platoon of engineers into Wana village to use flame throwers and demolitions against the enemy firing positions in the ruins. Numbers of grenade dischargers, machine guns, and rifles were found in Wana and the tombs behind it and destroyed. Further advance into the draw was not feasible until the 7th Marines could occupy the high ground on the eastern end of the ridge and furnish direct supporting fire to troops advancing in the draw below. At 1700 the troops were ordered to return to their lines for the night. n the center, General Bruce pressed his attack deeper into the Shuri defenses, with Coolidge’s 3rd Battalion gaining 150 yards along the Ginowan-Shuri highway and Hamilton’s 2nd Battalion advancing up to 300 yards toward Ishimmi, although attacks against 110 Meter Hill and Flattop failed to gain ground. On the morning of 18 May, orders were given to stay at all costs. Lieutenant Bell said firmly, "We stay." The men resigned themselves to a last-ditch stand. Their grenades exhausted and their machine guns and mortars destroyed, the remaining men salvaged every clip of ammunition from the bandoleers of the dead. Spare workable rifles were loaded and bayonets laid alongside. Enemy pressure increased steadily during the day. Some Americans were shot at close range as they darted from hole to hole to escape grenades. At one time eight knee mortars were pounding the ridge, firing in pairs. Friendly artillery could to some extent keep off the charging Japanese but seemed unable to ferret out the enemy mortars, which were well protected. The moans of wounded men, many of whom were in pitiful condition from lack of water and of medical aid, added to the strain. All canteens had been emptied the previous night. Nevertheless, battle discipline remained excellent. The worst problem concerned the replacements, who were courageous but inexperienced. Thrust suddenly into a desperate situation, some of them failed at crucial moments. One man saw two Japanese attacking a sergeant thirty feet away, but his finger froze on the trigger. Another shouted wildly for a comrade to shoot some Japanese while his own rifle lay in his hands. Another saw an enemy soldier a few yards from his hole, pulled the trigger, and discovered that he had forgotten to reload. By the end of the ordeal, however, the replacements who survived were battle-hardened veterans. During the afternoon the 307th attempted to reinforce the small group. Elements of Company C tried to cross the open ground north of Ishimmi Ridge. Only the commander and five men reached Company E. The men scrambled safely into foxholes, but the commander, shot through the head while racing toward the command post, fell dead on the parapet of the command post foxhole. Spirits rose considerably when word came later in the afternoon that a litter-bearing unit of eighty men would try to get through in the evening. Enemy fire slackened after dark, and the first of the litter bearers arrived at about 2200. They immediately started back carrying casualties. Walking wounded accompanied them. The litter bearers moved swiftly and managed to avoid being seen in the light of flares. Through splendid discipline and good luck eighteen men were carried out in two and a half hours, and others walked out. The litter teams had brought some water and ammunition and the troops drank for the first time since the day before. The second sleepless night on the ridge passed. The 382nd Regiment continued to face heavy resistance from Oboe Hill but managed to secure the road cut between Flattop and Dick Hill. Meanwhile, Halloran’s 3rd Battalion could only push about 400 yards south due to the relentless mortar and small-arms fire coming from Hogback Ridge. At sea, a low-flying kamikaze aircraft struck LST-808 off Iejima, resulting in the deaths of 17 men.
The following day, while the 382nd and 383rd Regiments focused on neutralizing the cave positions and gun emplacements in the uneven terrain between Conical and Dick Hills, Halloran’s 3rd Battalion launched an attack to the south and west toward Sugar Hill but made little progress due to the heavy defensive fire. In the center, the 307th Regiment systematically worked to eliminate enemy firing positions on the high ground in front of them, employing every available weapon for the task. Colonel Smith’s rehabilitated 306th Regiment began moving up to replace the battered 305th, with its 3rd Battalion relieving Coolidge’s 3rd Battalion and portions of Hamilton’s 2nd Battalion along the low ground bordering the highway to Shuri, including the isolated men at Ishimmi Ridge.
On 19 May the enemy seemed to intensify his efforts to recapture Ishimmi Ridge. The besieged troops wondered whether his supply of men and ammunition was inexhaustible. The Japanese launched several attacks which were repulsed with great difficulty. Only the support of artillery and mortars, together with self-propelled mounts firing with precision on both flanks of Ishimmi Ridge, prevented the enemy from making an attack in strength which would have overrun the American positions. One enemy attack of platoon strength was dispersed by mortar and machine-gun fire and by a four-battalion time-on-target artillery concentration. Japanese mortar fire continued to fall on Ishimmi, however, and took its toll during the day. A message arrived during the morning that Company E would be relieved that evening. By noon the radio had become so weak that further communication with the company was impossible. The day wore slowly on. By 2100 there was still no sign of the relief. Shortly afterward, however, rifle fire intensified to the rear, a sign of activity there. At 2200 Company L, 3d Battalion, 306th Infantry, arrived. The relief was carried out in pitch darkness; each member of Company E left as soon as a replacement reached his position. As the haggard survivors were about to descend the ridge at 0300, a bursting shell hit two of the newcomers; one of them had to be evacuated on a poncho. Carrying its own wounded, Company E followed a white tape to the rear and arrived safely. Of the 204 officers and men of the reinforced company that had made the night attack on Ishimmi, 156 had been killed or wounded. There were 28 privates, 1 noncommissioned officer, and 2 officers left of the original 129 members of Company E. The platoon sent in relief by Company C had gone out with 58 effectives and returned with 13. Of the 17 men in the heavy weapons section only 4 came back. Company E had spearheaded a several-hundred-yard advance toward Shuri, however, and with the help of supporting weapons had killed hundreds of Japanese around Ishimmi.
The 7th Marines launched one last unsuccessful assault on Wana Ridge before being relieved by Colonel Mason’s rested 1st Marines. Meanwhile, after repelling a strong night counterattack, the exhausted 29th Marines were also relieved by Colonel Shapley’s reserve 4th Marines, which made additional advances alongside the 22nd Marines, now under Colonel Harold Roberts. Four new regiments had been committed over the past few days to revitalize the offensive. On May 20, Shapley’s assault battalions gained more ground on Horseshoe Hill but were still unable to reach the crest of Half Moon, though they successfully repelled another strong night counterattack. To the east, Mason’s 2nd Battalion advanced rapidly to the base of 110 Meter Hill and captured part of Wana Ridge, while his 3rd Battalion secured a firm hold on the northern slope. Concurrently, the 5th Marines attacked southwest along the Naha-Shuri Road and successfully captured the high ground.
Meanwhile, in coordination with the 1st Marines, Coolidge’s 1st Battalion and Smith’s 3rd Battalion made a slow, grinding advance of about 150 yards, positioning themselves within 200 yards of the outskirts of Shuri in the highway valley. At the same time, the 382nd Regiment expanded its hold on the reverse slope of Dick Hill but remained unable to penetrate Oboe Hill. The 307th Regiment consolidated and expanded its positions around Chocolate Drop, finally seizing Flattop. Reducing the tiny hill continued to be ticklish work because enemy positions to the south still overlooked the area. The fighting was still so confused that three wounded Americans lay south of Chocolate Drop for two days before relief arrived. By that time two had died and the third was so delirious that he thought he was still fighting Japanese and had to be forcibly subdued. By 20 May the caves were completely sealed off. The enemy made a final attempt to retake Chocolate Drop, attacking in company strength, but was repelled with the loss of half his force. On the same day the 3d Battalion, using tanks, flame throwers, and demolition teams, finally secured the crest of Flattop. The final American attack started with a saturation shower of grenades. A chain of men extending from the base of Flattop passed hand grenades to the troops lined up along the crest, who threw the missiles as fast as they could pull out the pins. Having seized the advantage, the infantry moved down the reverse slope blasting caves with satchel charges and flame throwers. Tanks along the road cut accounted for many of the Japanese. BY 1545 Flattop had fallen. More than 250 enemy bodies lay on the crest and reverse slope of the hill.
Further east, Halloran’s 3rd Battalion made a slow but steady advance down the eastern slopes of Hogback, reaching the foot of Sugar Hill despite constant grenade duels with an enemy fighting desperately to hold every inch of ground. Additionally, the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 383rd Regiment fought their way to jump-off positions within 300 yards of Love Hill, destroying enemy strongpoints that had obstructed their advance for a week. Meanwhile, back at sea, Japanese aircraft managed to damage two destroyers and three transports. The following day, the 383rd again attacked Love Hill but was ultimately forced to withdraw from its base due to fierce defensive fire. Despite this setback, May’s 2nd Battalion successfully supported the 381st Regiment in clearing Hogback and pushing to the top of Sugar Hill. To the west, the 382nd advanced quickly against moderate opposition toward Oboe Hill and Hen Hill, encountering retreating enemy units moving toward the high ground at Shuri. Concurrently, the 307th pushed 350 yards south of Flattop before being halted by enemy forces at the Three Sisters, while the 306th completed the relief of the 305th, with its 3rd Battalion advancing 200 yards unopposed to the eastern slopes of 110 Meter Hill.
Meanwhile, the 1st Marines continued their assault along Wana Ridge, making only limited gains at the Draw, where the 5th Marines held out and aggressively patrolled forward. The 4th Marines began their push toward the Asato River, achieving a costly advance of about 200 yards on Horseshoe. By nightfall, heavy rains began to fall, significantly impeding efforts to resupply assault troops and replenish forward ammunition dumps. Amidst this torrential downpour on May 22, Shapley’s 1st and 3rd Battalions slogged through the "gooey slick mud" to reach the bank of the rain-swollen river. This prompted the Japanese to evacuate Naha and establish new defensive positions on the Kokuba Hills. To the east, the continuous rain flooded Wana Draw with mud and water, transforming it into a makeshift lake. For the next few days, General Del Valle’s Marines were forced to attack without support, leading to aggressive patrolling rather than organized assaults.
The prospects of success for the infantry alone, slogging through the mud without the support of other arms, were not encouraging. Tanks bogged down, helplessly mired. Amphibian tractors were unable to negotiate the morass, and front-line units, which had depended on these vehicles for carrying supplies forward in bad weather, now had to resort to hand carrying of supplies and of the wounded. These were back breaking tasks and were performed over areas swept by enemy fire. Mortar and artillery smoke was used as far as possible to give concealment for all movement. Litter cases were carried back through knee-deep mud. Living conditions of front-line troops were indescribably bad. Foxholes dug into the clay slopes caved in from the constant soaking, and, even when the sides held, the holes had to be bailed out repeatedly. Clothes and equipment and the men's bodies were wet for days. The bodies of Japanese killed at night lay outside the foxholes, decomposing under swarms of flies. Sanitation measures broke down. The troops were often hungry. Sleep was almost impossible. The strain began to take a mounting toll of men. Under these conditions the Marine attack against Wana Ridge was soon at a standstill. The action degenerated into what was called in official reports "aggressive patrolling." Despite inactivity, enemy mortar and artillery fire continued to play against the American front lines, especially at dusk and at night. In the center, Bruce’s 77th Division faced similar challenges, with the 306th Regiment stalled and the 307th Regiment again unsuccessfully attacking the Three Sisters. There, Company A became isolated at the base of the forward slope of Jane Hill, nearly cut off by intense enemy mortar and machine-gun fire. For the following week, the 382nd Regiment struggled to make headway on Hen and Oboe Hills, where fierce hand-to-hand combat erupted. Similarly, all attempts by the 383rd Regiment to breach the defenses of Love Hill on the western side of Conical failed, as the 381st was also unable to make any progress against Cutaway.
General Hodge had also moved General Arnold’s rehabilitated 7th Division to assembly areas just north of Conical Hill to spearhead the advance toward Yonabaru and the high ground south of the village. Strengthened by 1,691 replacements and 546 men returned to duty from hospitals since it left the lines on 9 May, the 7th Division moved up to forward assembly areas just north of Conical Hill and prepared to make the dash through the corridor. At 1900 on 21 May the 184th Infantry, chosen by General Arnold to lead the way, was in place at Gaja Ridge, at the northern base of Conical. The initial move of the envelopment was to be made in the dead of the night and in stealth. General Buckner felt that "if the 7th can swing round, running the gauntlet, it may be the kill."
As part of this operation, the 2nd Battalion of the 184th Regiment moved out from Gaja Ridge during the night, swiftly and silently passing through Yonabaru in the early morning hours to capture Spruce Hill and Chestnut Hill in a surprise attack. Colonel Green’s 3rd Battalion then followed the 2nd Battalion through Yonabaru, but their assault on Juniper and Bamboo Hills was unsuccessful as the surprised defenders regrouped. The following day, Green’s two battalions continued to push toward these initial objectives, ultimately securing a solid line that stretched from the coastline across the southern slopes of Chestnut, and then over to Juniper and Bamboo by day’s end. This success allowed Colonel Finn’s 32nd Regiment to pass through Yonabaru and advance westward along the Naha-Yonabaru valley to assault the enemy’s western hill defenses focused around Oak Hill.On the west coast, after a successful night reconnaissance of the Asato River, the 4th Marines rapidly crossed the river under cover of smoke, beginning their advance toward a low ridge 500 yards south of the Asato. However, as previously noted, the torrential rain had turned every draw and gully into a sticky morass of knee- and thigh-deep mud in the center. The steep slopes of the hills and ridges, treacherous under the best of conditions, became virtually unassailable. Consequently, full-scale coordinated attacks had to be canceled, and only localized gains could be achieved.
Despite the breakthrough in the center, the Japanese command remained concerned about the threat posed to the flanks of the Shuri bastion by American advances along both coasts. While they believed the Naha breakthrough could be contained, every available soldier was deployed to establish a defensive line stretching from the southwest slopes of Conical Hill through Yonawa to the road junction village of Chan, aiming to eliminate Arnold’s spearhead that had penetrated into the Naha-Yonabaru valley. General Ushijima feared that his forces were being gradually encircled in the Shuri fortress, where they would become “easy prey” to overwhelming American firepower. In light of this situation, Ushijima began planning a withdrawal to the Chinen Peninsula or the southernmost part of the island, the Kiyamu Peninsula. This decision was met with resistance from General Fujioka, who expressed concern that thousands of severely wounded men would have to be abandoned during the retreat.
Although the holding of the heights surrounding the city had been the keystone of the Japanese preferred plan, several factors now militated against its retention. There were an estimated 50000 surviving officers and men to be crammed into a final defense zone less than a mile in diameter. Once these troops were surrounded, the Japanese believed that they would be rendered ineffectual and become "easy prey" to overwhelming American fire superiority. In addition, Japanese long-range artillery pieces, many of which were still intact, could not be effectively utilized within the limited space that would be available. The best chance of prolonging the battle for Okinawa seemed to rest in defending the Kiyamu Peninsula region which was dominated by the Yaeju Dake-Yuza Dake Escarpment. Natural and artificial caves, sufficient to accommodate the whole of the surviving army, abounded in the area. The 24th Division, which had organized the terrain, had left a considerable amount of ammunition and weapons there when it moved north to the Shuri lines. The principal roads in southern Okinawa led directly to the proposed position, thus facilitating the movement of large bodies of men in the shortest possible time. These roads also gave American tanks an excellent route of advance, but only to the outposts of the defensive zone where cliffs, hills, and precipitous ridges barred the way. To add weight to his argument, General Amamiya indicated that his 24th Transport Regiment had preserved enough trucks to move the Shuri munitions reserve to the new position within five nights if weather conditions permitted. General Ushijima, after considering the respective positions of his staff and commanders, decided to order the move to Kiyamu.
Although General Suzuki preferred the Chinen Peninsula, which his brigade had fortified, most officials supported a move to the Kiyamu Peninsula, where Amamiya’s 24th Division had previously established defenses in the natural and artificial caves of the Yaeju Dake-Yuza Dake Escarpment. Thus, transportation of wounded personnel and munitions reserves to the south commenced at midnight on May 23, with the bulk of the 32nd Army scheduled to begin their withdrawal six days later.
On the night of 25 May, the remnants of the 62d Division were to pull out of the Shuri line and move through Tsukasan to counterattack the Americans. The relatively strong 22d Independent Infantry Battalion, which had been in reserve throughout most of the fighting in April and May, was directed to hold the Shuri front in place of the division. The orders to General Fujioka were "to annihilate the enemy rushing from the Yonabaru area." Failing this, the division was at least to stop the American advance long enough to allow the main body of the Thirty-second Army to retire. In order to gain time to organize the new positions, the holding force left on the Shuri front was to fight on until 31 May. Withdrawing units were to leave behind strong rearguards which would defend a line along the Kokuba Gawa to the hills north of Tsukasan and Chan and then south through Karadera to the east coast until the night of 2 June. Then a second line centered on Tomusu, approximately 2,000 yards farther south, would be held until the night of 4 June. By that time the Thirty-second Army would be firmly set up within its Itoman-Yunagusuku-Gushichan outpost zone. Admiral Ota's naval force was directed to hold the west flank of the withdrawal corridor and begin its own retreat when ordered by 32nd Army. During the night, Admiral Ugaki initiated his seventh mass Kikisui attack, launching 165 kamikaze aircraft that inflicted only light damage on landing craft.
On May 24, while engineers constructed a bridge over the Asato River to facilitate vehicle movement, the 4th Marines suffered heavy casualties as they attempted to advance through the muddy, flooded valley and low clay hills. Simultaneously, Shepherd’s Reconnaissance Company crossed the lower Asato and roamed the streets of northwestern Naha without encountering any resistance. To the east, Dill’s 1st Battalion faced a brutal counterattack that inflicted significant casualties and nearly drove the Americans from Oboe Hill. Following Ushijima’s directives, the 32nd and 184th Regiments began to encounter increasing resistance as they sought to expand their control over the valley and the high ground to the south. This culminated in a series of aggressive nighttime counterattacks that ultimately slowed and halted the western advance of the 7th Division. During the night, Japanese forces conducted heavy raids on American airfields at Kadena, Yontan, and Iejima. However, these attacks were merely a diversion for Operation Gi-Gou, a suicide raid against Kadena and Yontan. In this operation, twelve Ki-21 heavy bombers, carrying Giretsu Kuteitai special airborne assault troops, aimed to crash land on the airfields to deploy commandos tasked with destroying aircraft stationed there.
After the start of B-29 attacks on Tokyo from bases in the Mariana Islands, the 1st Raiding Brigade of the Teishin Shudan was ordered to form a commando unit for a "special operations" mission to attack and destroy the bombers on the Aslito Airfield on Saipan. Captain Okuyama Michiro, commander of the brigade's engineering company and trained in sabotage and demolition was selected as mission leader. He selected an additional 126 men from his own team, the 4th Company of the 1st Raiding Regiment, to form the first Giretsu Airborne Unit. It was initially organized with a command section and five platoons and one independent squad, based at the Imperial Japanese Army's air academy at Saitama. The group unit also included eight intelligence officers and two radio men from the Nakano School. Giretsu operations were to be undertaken at night, beginning with air strikes by bombers. After this, commando units would be inserted onto the target airfield by crash landing their transports. The fact that there was no provision for extraction of the strike force, along with the rejection of surrender in Japanese military doctrine at the time, meant that the Giretsu ground operations were effectively suicide attacks. Though the Saipan attack was eventually cancelled, the 6th Air Army ultimately requested the deployment of the Giretsu Special Forces to neutralize the Okinawa airfields. The 6th Air Army accordingly began preparations for the attack in early May. Led by Captain Okuyama, the raid force moved from Nishitsukuba to Kumamoto as it continued to prepare for the assault, codenamed Operation Gi-Gou. Aircraft for the raid came from the 3rd Independent Air Unit based in the vicinity of Hamamatsu. The raid force consisted of 120 commandos broken up into a headquarters section and five flights, each containing twenty men. They were to be transported by twelve Mitsubishi Ki-21s stripped of their guns and with additional forward and rear exits added to assist raiders with exiting. The timing of the raid was also meant to coincide with the withdrawal of the 32nd Army from the Shuri Line in southern Okinawa. Of the twelve bombers dispatched, four encountered engine trouble and returned to base, while three were intercepted by American night fighters en route to Okinawa. The remaining five Ki-21 bombers approached Yontan Airfield at low altitude and engaged Marine anti-aircraft gunners from the 1st Provisional Anti-aircraft Artillery Group. As a result, four of the bombers were shot down or crash-landed; however, a small number of Giretsu commandos survived this wave and commenced their mission to attack aircraft on the airfield.
The fifth bomber, however, successfully evaded anti-aircraft fire and belly-landed approximately 100 meters from the control tower. About 10 commandos disembarked and attacked aircraft and air personnel with grenades. In the ensuing chaos, the Japanese commandos killed two Americans, wounded 18, destroyed nine aircraft, damaged 29 more, and set a fuel dump ablaze, destroying 70,000 gallons of aviation gasoline. After twelve hours of mayhem, however, American troops hunted down the commandos and exterminated them to a man. Despite this partial success, the Japanese operation occurred against a backdrop of heavy losses, with American fighters and anti-aircraft fire claiming a total of 150 Japanese planes on May 24. During the course of three days, Ugaki committed a total of 387 Navy planes and 174 Army planes to his kamikaze attacks, which continued through May 25. These attacks successfully sank the destroyer Bates, one transport, and one landing craft, while further damaging two destroyers, one destroyer minesweeper, one minesweeper, one transport, and one Liberty ship. On the same day, Admiral Rawlings’ Task Force 57 launched its final strikes in the Okinawa area before retiring late on May 25, having completed the Royal Navy’s Iceberg mission.
On land, while Shepherd’s Reconnaissance Company occupied the deserted ruins of Naha, the 4th Marines fought to seize Machisi Ridge and continued pushing into the eastern outskirts of Naha. However, across the remainder of the 10th Army front, assault units struggled to make progress due to the havoc wreaked by the rain and the stiffened Japanese resistance. That night, in accordance with the withdrawal plan, the 62nd Division began moving its remaining 3,000 men to counter the advance of the 7th Division, hoping to delay the American advance long enough for the main body of the 32nd Army to retreat.
The arrival of additional forces on the Ozato-Mura front had little significant impact, primarily serving to strengthen the covering and holding force. On May 26, the 184th Regiment successfully cleared the Hemlock-Locust Hill Escarpment. Meanwhile, the 32nd Regiment was brought nearly to a standstill in front of the Japanese defensive line across the Yonabaru valley. Looking west, Del Valle’s Marines observed large numbers of enemy troops withdrawing from Shuri and were able to pinpoint their location for naval guns, artillery, and aircraft to bombard. However, despite penetrating the Shuri defensive line on both flanks, the day yielded minimal progress. At sea, further kamikaze attacks caused damage to one destroyer, one destroyer minesweeper, and a subchaser. In total, Ugaki’s raids over the past three days resulted in the deaths of 103 sailors.
Believing the fast carriers’ continued value off Okinawa had become dubious, back on May 18 Mitscher had requested that TF 58 be relieved from its Okinawa station. Spruance regretfully declined. A week later an increasingly weary Mitscher reported: “For two and a half months [Task Force 58] operated daily in a 60nm square area East of Okinawa, less than 350nm from Kyushu. This was necessitated by the restricted area available and the necessity for being able to cover [the] Amami Gunto airfields, intercept air raids before they could reach Okinawa, and still furnish air support to ground forces. There was no other location from which all these things could be done.” Reflecting on the months of unrelenting stress, tedium, and fatigue, TG 58.1’s screen commander, Captain Tom Hederman, signaled Rear Admiral J.J. Jocko Clark: “See Hebrews 13, verse 8.” Consulting his Bible aboard Hornet, Clark read: “Jesus Christ the same yesterday, and today, and forever.” Amused, Clark forwarded the verse to his entire Task Group, adding, “No disrespect intended.” Clark then signaled Mitscher, “What the hell are we doing out here, anyway?” Mitscher’s response: “We are a highspeed stationary target for the Japanese air force.” Indeed, TF 58 had already suffered over 2,000 Iceberg fatalities.
I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.
The brutal Battle of Okinawa was reaching a critical point as General Buckner's forces pressed against fierce Japanese defenses. Struggles unfolded over Sugar Loaf Hill and Wana Ridge, with Marines suffering heavy casualties but slowly gaining ground. By late May, the dire situation prompted Japanese commanders to plan a retreat to more defensible positions as American forces closed in. Despite challenging conditions, the Allies pushed forward, marking a decisive breakthrough in the Pacific War.

Tuesday May 13, 2025
- 182 - Pacific War Podcast - Battle of the Malacca Strait - May 13 - 20, 1945
Tuesday May 13, 2025
Tuesday May 13, 2025
Last time we spoke about the second Okinawa Offensive. In the brutal Second Okinawa Counteroffensive, American forces confronted staunch Japanese defenses, with Captain Ryan leading a valiant charge for territory. Despite fierce resistance and heavy casualties, his troops managed to seize crucial ground, enduring intense hand-to-hand combat atop Ryan Ridge. The battle raged on, with American forces fighting through exhaustion and dwindling supplies, while the Japanese, though determined, faced declining morale as they lost ground. The relentless struggle exemplified extraordinary sacrifice on both sides, but it foreshadowed a turning point in the Pacific campaign. As American advances continued, the tide shifted, marking the beginning of the end for Japanese dominance in the region, ultimately paving the way for Allied victory.
This episode is the Battle of the Malacca Strait
Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.
After the failure of their second offensive, the Japanese turned all their energies toward waging a prolonged battle of attrition. Their losses did not impair immediately their defensive capacities; thus the 24th Corps found no weak point in the Shuri defenses resulting from the ill-starred offensive. By throwing fresh troops into the attack of 4 May Ushijima had been able to maintain his strength all along the line. Nor was there any breakdown in his command and staff operation. Front-line units were reorganized without seeming loss of effectiveness; available reinforcements were carefully allotted to existing regiments; local counterattacks were timed for maximum effect. General Ushijima's chief task now was to keep sufficient combat troops at the front to man his Shuri defenses. It was apparent by 7 May that the strength of the remaining regular infantry was not great enough for this task. Consequently, Ushijima converted service units into infantry combat groups. By mixing service troops with the "regulars," he exacted from them their maximum combat effectiveness. "One man in ten will continue with his rear-echelon duties. The remaining nine men will devote themselves to antitank combat training," one order stated. The reorganization of the 32d Regiment, 24th Division, was typical of the resourcefulness of the Japanese. The regimental headquarters received 5 men from the 24th Transport Regiment. The 1st Battalion kept its own surviving members and was allotted all the survivors of the 2d Battalion, 20 men from the 7th Shipping Depot, 90 from the 24th Transport Regiment, and y from the 26th Sea Raiding Squadron. The 2d Battalion was totally reconstituted from the 29th Independent Infantry Battalion and other units. The 3d Battalion was reorganized in a manner similar to that used with the 1st. It was by this process of piecing units together that the 32d Army was able to stay intact long after the original combat units had been virtually destroyed, a capability which at the time American intelligence officers found "baffling." After his offensive failed, the enemy formed a line in which the relative position of the major units was to remain roughly the same until the end of the battle. On the east the 24th Division, reinforced by two independent battalions, held the line as far as Shuri, with its 89th Regiment on the east, its 22d in the center, and its 32d on the west. The remnants of the battered 62d Division were stretched from a point north of Shuri almost to the west coast, holding about one-third of the line. Along the Asa River estuary was a battalion of the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade. The Japanese husbanded their remaining heavy weapons, especially their artillery, as carefully as they meted out their manpower. On 6 May the Japanese 5th Artillery Command directed its units to "revert to the [defensive] situation which held prior to the attack situation of 3 May." Once again the protection of individual pieces was a cardinal feature of enemy operations. Artillery units were ordered to "use ammunition with the utmost economy" and to "wait and fire for effect against vital targets."
Along the west coast, preliminary plans were underway for the deployment of General Shepherd's 6th Marine Division to the front lines, while General Del Valle's 1st Marine Division continued its assault on the Dakeshi-Awacha hill complex. Colonel Snedeker's 7th Marines secured the coastal flank after capturing the north bank of the Asa River. Meanwhile, Colonel Arthur Mason's 1st Marines focused their efforts on the western approaches to the Dakeshi hill defenses, but they were ultimately repulsed by the tenacious Japanese defenders around Hill 60. In the Awacha Pocket, Colonel Griebel's 5th Marines faced fierce opposition, resulting in only modest territorial gains. To the east, after successfully fending off multiple strong enemy counterattacks, General Bruce's 77th Division advanced 800 yards south toward Hill 187, establishing control over the southern slope of the Maeda Escarpment. Finally, operations in General Arnold's 7th Division area were confined to robust patrols aimed at securing the approaches to Conical Hill and eliminating the remaining fragments of the failed Japanese counteroffensive. Convinced that the Japanese had nearly exhausted their fresh reserves, General Buckner began planning a comprehensive assault on the Shuri defenses with his two corps.
On May 7, General Geiger was assigned to command the 1st Marine Division within the 24th Corps front and oversee the southern movement of the 6th Marine Division, with General Buckner taking direct tactical control of the two-corps assault. Heavy rains on the morning of 7 May delayed the projected IIIAC advance until tanks were able to negotiate the muddy terrain. In the 1st Marines' zone, the new regimental commander, Colonel Arthur T. Mason, ordered 3/1 to support the attack of the 2d Battalion on Hill 60 with all available weapons (four battalions of artillery, a fire support ship, and 81-mm. and 60-mm. mortars) by firing into the enemy reverse slope defenses. All morning long the regiment's mortars concentrated on the enemy position, and at 1400 when tanks finally reached the front lines the battalion attacked with Company E in assault. Artillery fire covered the foot of the objective while mortars and assault guns blanketed the crest and reverse slopes. The company swept to the top of Hill 60 by 1422 in a vivid demonstration of "the effect of properly massed, supporting fires in front of assault troops." Once the company entered the impact zone, however, and supporting fires were shifted to other targets the enemy defenders emerged from their caves and engaged the Marines in hand grenade duels. The fighting was at such close range that it was impossible to keep enough grenades on the line, and the marines used rifle butts against Japanese who tried to storm their position. Gradually the volume of Japanese fire of all types "grew noticeably stronger and progressively more intense so that it was evident that the enemy was receiving large reinforcements." The troops lost their hold at one point, then fought their way to the top again, yet the continuing Japanese fire from the reverse slope of Nan Hill was the decisive factor. The threat of a strong counterattack measured against the dwindling strength of Company E forced Lieutenant Colonel Magee to adjudge the company's advanced position untenable and to order a withdrawal to the previous night's lines.
To the west, the 5th Marines steadily advanced approximately 400 yards in the Awacha Pocket, while the 77th Division gained up to 500 yards of enemy territory despite increasingly fierce resistance. By the end of the day, Colonel Coolidge’s 305th Regiment had relieved the weary 307th. On the east coast, Colonel Green’s 184th Regiment resumed its southward push, quickly capturing Gaja Ridge and William Hill, but faced greater opposition as they approached the western flanks of Conical Hill. Meanwhile, Colonel Pachler’s 17th Regiment continued its assault toward Zebra Hill but could only secure How Hill and make incremental gains on Kochi Ridge, depleting their strength.
The following day, as General Bradley's replenished 96th Division prepared to relieve the 7th, the 184th Regiment managed to occupy the forward slope of Easy Hill near Kibara without armored support. Throughout the rest of the 10th Army front, relentless cold rain effectively canceled planned offensive operations, leading the 1st Marines to focus on dismantling enemy positions on Nan Hill. Colonel Schneider’s 22nd Marines took over from the 7th Marines along the Asa River just as news of the victory in Europe reached the infantry units, prompting a somewhat indifferent reaction from the rain-soaked soldiers preoccupied with the ongoing fighting in Okinawa. Exactly at 1200 every available artillery piece and naval gun fired three volleys at vital enemy targets to apprise the Japanese of the defeat of their Axis partner.
On May 9, Japanese kamikaze pilots launched a series of scattered attacks, damaging the carrier Formidable and two destroyers. In preparation for Buckner’s general offensive, the 22nd Marines patrolled their front to identify suitable crossing sites over the Asa River. Meanwhile, with Nan Hill fully cleared, Mason’s 2nd Battalion renewed its assault on Hill 60, while the 1st Battalion advanced into the high ground to the east, successfully capturing their objective this time. Reinforced by elements of the 7th Marines, the 5th Marines also launched another attack on the Awacha Pocket but continued to encounter fierce resistance. In response, Griebel was tasked with reducing the Awacha defenses using two battalions, while Snedeker’s reinforced 7th Marines pressed the offensive southward. To the east, General Bruce focused his efforts on the 305th Regiment's sector, resulting in the 3rd Battalion securing a foothold on Hill 187.
The 17th Regiment, which had fought tenaciously to capture Kochi Ridge and the high ground west of Conical Hill, was relieved by Colonel Dill’s 382nd Regiment. Concurrently, Colonel May’s 383rd Regiment moved into forward assembly areas behind the 184th and on May 10, took over the positions north of Conical Hill. Both fresh regiments of the 96th Division were then able to destroy enemy strongpoints that had impeded the progress of the weary 7th Division and capture key hills that protected the approaches to Conical. On the west coast, after stealthily constructing a footbridge across the Asa during the night, three companies of the 22nd Marines successfully crossed the river. However, two Japanese "human demolition charges" emerged from hiding and rushed the south end of the footbridge, destroying it.
Despite the challenges, the attack south toward the town of Asa continued, successfully establishing a bridgehead that stretched 1,400 yards long and 350 yards deep by the end of the day. To the east, the 1st Marines launched an assault on the western end of Dakeshi but were pushed back by intense enfilading fire from the ridge. Similarly, although the 7th Marines initially advanced rapidly against scattered opposition, they were ultimately forced to withdraw under heavy Japanese fire. Behind them, after fending off two fierce night counterattacks, the 5th Marines failed to isolate the Awacha Pocket but made significant strides, penetrating deep into the heart of the Awacha defenses. Meanwhile, the 305th Regiment captured additional high ground leading toward the crucial road junction north of Shuri, where the reorganized and reinforced 32nd Regiment had established its primary defenses. The remnants of the 62nd Division were gradually being withdrawn toward Shuri, with General Suzuki’s fresh 44th Independent Mixed Brigade taking over the western sector.
On May 11, General Buckner initiated his general offensive against Shuri, planning to envelop the town from both the west and east. However, this offensive was preceded by Admiral Ugaki’s sixth mass Kikisui strike, during which 150 kamikazes launched successful attacks on American shipping. That morning, the 721st Kokutai’s Sub-Lieutenant Yasunori Seizo led six kamikazes out of Kanoya. By 10:02, Admiral Mitscher was informed of possible bogeys infiltrating the returning TF 58 strike to reach the US carriers. Two minutes later came an overhead Corsair’s sudden frantic warning: “Alert! Alert! Two planes diving on the Bunker Hill!” Almost immediately, Yasunori’s Zero dove out of low overcast toward Bunker Hill and released its payload. The 550lb bomb pierced the flight deck, exited the side of the hull, and exploded above water. Simultaneously, Yasunori’s Zero caromed into the center of Bunker Hill’s flight deck, its gas tank exploding among 34 manned, armed, and fully fueled US fighters, before careening blazing over the side. One minute later, Yasunori’s wingman Ensign Ogawa Kiyoshi roared past Bunker Hill, climbed steeply into a roll, and then dove straight at the carrier. Ogawa released his 550lb bomb, which scored amidships and exploded in the gallery deck, slaughtering much of Mitscher’s staff. Simultaneously, Ogawa deliberately slammed his Zero into Bunker Hill’s island just 100ft from Mitscher. Mitscher’s operations officer, Commander Jimmy Flatley, had just left the gallery deck when Ogawa’s bomb struck, searing his back. Mitscher had observed the entire attack in silence, and just then emerged from the bridge to gaze at the blazing flight deck. The Flag Plot was choked with billowing smoke and Mitscher’s chief-of-staff, a gasping, wheezing Commodore Arleigh Burke, ordered it evacuated. A third Zero then dove on Bunker Hill, but anti-aircraft fire sent it blazing into the sea close aboard. Aboard Bunker Hill, a cascade of gasoline explosions erupted from burning planes aft, while tracers sprayed haphazardly from detonating machine gun ammunition. Speed fell to 10kts and as the crew began intensive firefighting efforts, a slight list developed. Cruiser Wilkes-Barre and three destroyers came alongside to fight fires and rescue 300 men forced overboard, yet most of Bunker Hill’s fighter pilots had been asphyxiated in their ready room. By 11:30, however, damage was largely stabilized. Nevertheless, Bunker Hill had lost 393 men killed and 264 wounded. Although horribly outnumbered, the Americans’ Corsair CAP shot down 50 attackers before the Japanese got through at 0800hrs. Over the next 90 minutes the two violently maneuvering destroyers would claim a combined 42 kills before Evans was disabled by four kamikaze hits. Minutes later Hugh W. Hadley was knocked out by her third kamikaze hit. With his ship dead in the water and blazing uncontrollably, Hugh W. Hadley’s Commander Mullaney ordered all available colors hoisted: “If this ship is going down, she’s going down with all flags flying.” Escorting the destroyers were three LCS(L)s and one LSM(R), who themselves combined to splash 14 Japanese planes before the action mercifully ended. All six ships survived, but the destroyers were towed to Kerama Retto, having suffered a combined 60 killed and 94 wounded. East of Okinawa, a G4M Betty bomber and four Ki-43 Oscars attacked RPS-5 at 0800hrs. One plane crashed destroyer-minelayer Harry F. Bauer (DM-26)’s stern, the kamikaze miraculously “plowing through the rack of depth charges and shoving them into the sea with none of them exploding.” Escorting LCS(L)-88 splashed two Oscars, the second scoring a posthumous 220lb bomb hit on her which killed nine and wounded seven. Back on the west coast, supported by tanks and artillery, the 22nd Marines advanced toward Amike. Their 3rd Battalion established control of the high ground overlooking Naha after an 800-yard advance, while the 1st Battalion gained the coral ridge in front after a series of costly assaults. The 2nd Battalion further extended the line to connect with the 1st Marine Division.
Del Valle’s advance was spearheaded by Mason’s 2nd Battalion, which successfully secured a foothold on the high ground west of Wana despite a heavy artillery bombardment. In constructing the Wana position the Japanese had "taken advantage of every feature of a terrain so difficult it could not have been better designed if the enemy himself had the power to do so." With this natural advantage, the enemy had so organized the area that in order to crack the main line of resistance it was necessary for the 1st Marine Division to wheel towards Shuri and attack directly into the heart of the city's powerful defenses. Any attempt to drive past Shuri and continue the attack to the south would mean unacceptable losses inflicted by artillery, mortar, automatic-weapons, and rifle fire coming from the heights that commanded the division's flank and rear areas. The southernmost branch of the Asa Kawa wandered across the gently rising floor of Wana Draw and through the northern part of Shuri. The low rolling ground bordering the insignificant stream was completely exposed to enemy fire from positions along the reverse slope of Wana Ridge and the military crest of the ridge to the south. At its mouth Wana Draw was approximately 400 yards wide, but it narrowed drastically as it approached the city and the ridge walls closed on the stream bed. Guarding the western end of the draw was Hill 55, rugged terminus of the southern ridge line. The hill bristled with enemy guns whose fields of fire included the whole of the open ground leading to the draw. Defending the Wana position was the 64th Brigade of the 62d Division with remnants of the 15th, 23d, and 273d Independent Infantry Battalions, the 14th Independent Machine Gun Battalion, and the 81st Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion under its command.
The 7th Marines advanced approximately 800 yards, establishing a firm hold on Dakeshi Ridge, while the 5th Marines eliminated the last organized resistance in the Awacha Pocket. In the center of the front, Bruce’s two regiments needed to coordinate more closely with neighboring divisions than with one another. As a result, the 305th Regiment advanced up to 500 yards against fierce resistance, while Colonel Smith’s 306th Regiment struggled to make headway against the formidable defenses of Chocolate Drop Hill and Wart Hill. To the east, after repelling a series of night counterattacks, the 382nd Regiment consolidated its positions on Zebra Hill and continued probing toward the Dick Hills area and the ridges northwest of Kuhazu. The 383rd Regiment quickly secured Easy and Fox Hills, subsequently capturing the summit of Charlie Hill. However, over the next two days, efforts by the 1st Battalion to dislodge the defenders from the top would be thwarted by withering fire from King Hill, while the 2nd Battalion cleared Gaja Ridge and the twin villages of Tobaru and Amaru. On May 12, Dill’s 3rd Battalion executed a successful assault, capturing Baker Hill, although the 1st Battalion’s attack on Dick Baker was repelled by the defenders. To the west, the 306th Regiment only provided support for the advance of the 305th, which faced difficult terrain in the broken ground west of Route 5, managing to gain about 500 yards. Meanwhile, the 7th Marines solidified their hold on Dakeshi Ridge against sporadic opposition, but the 1st Marines found themselves pinned down while trying to improve their positions west of Wana.
The vulnerability of the 6th Marine Division to direct fire from the western slopes of the Shuri massif resulted in significant losses for Schneider’s 2nd Battalion as it fought to seize the high ground overlooking Naha, ultimately being repelled from Sugar Loaf Hill. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion advanced steadily in the center, capturing the high ground north of Asato, while the 3rd Battalion secured commanding positions and conducted patrols through the suburbs of Naha. At sea, scattered kamikaze attacks damaged Admiral Spruance’s flagship, the battleship New Mexico, and inflicted further damage on two additional destroyers the following day. In retaliation, Mitscher directed Task Force 58 to strike Kyushu once again. Back on Okinawa, as Schneider’s 3rd Battalion reconnoitered the northern suburbs of Naha, the 2nd Battalion launched another unsuccessful attack on Sugar Loaf Hill. In light of this resistance and the heavy casualties suffered by the 22nd Marines, Shepherd ordered Colonel Whaling’s 29th Marines to reinforce the effort, but they could only position themselves northwest of Makabe.
To the east, while the 1st Marines faced heavy losses and were repelled at the mouth of Wana Draw, the 7th Marines finally secured Dakeshi Ridge. In the center, the 305th Regiment continued its determined advance into the extremely rugged terrain north and northeast of Shuri, whereas the 306th Regiment once again failed to capture Chocolate Drop Hill and Wart Hill. Coordinated with this, the 382nd Regiment attacked the Dick Hills, successfully securing Dick Baker and Dick Able against light opposition, but ultimately being pushed back from the latter. Further east, May's 2nd Battalion launched a frontal assault on Conical Hill, successfully reaching the northeast crest of the ridge, where it repelled several heavy Japanese counterattacks.
Back at sea, Task Force 58 launched another strike on Kyushu during the early hours of May 14. In response, the Japanese dispatched 28 kamikazes alongside 40 escorts, inflicting heavy damage on Mitscher’s new flagship, the carrier Enterprise, in what would become known as the last action of the Gray Ghost. At 05:25, some 28 Zeros, armed with 1100lb bombs, sortied from Kanoya towards Mitscher’s carriers cruising 130nm southeast of Kyushu. 40 fighters escorted them. Around 06:45 Enterprise detected 4 incoming bogies. 3 were shot down over TF 58, but the fourth, flown by Sub-Lieutenant Tomiyasu Shunsuke, continued closing. Using clouds for cover, Tomiyasu approached Enterprise from astern. Already struck by flak, at 06:57 Tomiyasu’s blazing Zero suddenly appeared 200ft above Enterprise, which erupted with anti-aircraft fire. Although seeming to have overflown his target, Tomiyasu suddenly snap-rolled his burning Zero onto its back and dove almost vertically into Enterprise’s flight deck. Observing from Enterprise’s exposed bridge wing, Flatley rushed back inside and shouted to take cover just as Tomiyasu’s kamikaze hit. The thunderous explosion blew Enterprise’s forward elevator 400ft in the air, rattled the carrier’s bridge, and flung shrapnel against her island. As Flatley emerged from cover he observed an unsmiling Mitscher, arms crossed, standing amid the smoking wreckage. “Jimmy,” Mitscher growled, “tell my Task Group commanders that if the Japs keep this up they’re going to grow hair on my head yet.” Enterprise remained on station, but her flight deck was out of action. TF 58 splashed 3 more planes before Japanese attacks ended at 08:00. That evening TF 58 retired from Kyushu. The following morning, May 15, Mitscher transferred to carrier Randolph, his third flagship in 5 days. Enterprise would detach for repairs in the United States on May 16, having lost 14 dead and 68 wounded. Her war too was over. Honestly for those of you who might not know, the USS Enterprise is the most decorated ship of all time, an absolutely insane history. She was so impressive, my patreons voted for me to do an exclusive episode on her and it took two full episodes to do. If you are interested in the history of the USS Enterprise, please check out my exclusive podcast.
At Okinawa, as positions on Conical Hill were being consolidated, May’s 1st Battalion renewed its attack on Charlie Hill, successfully securing a foothold at its northern end, which was later extended down the southern slope. Simultaneously, Company L launched an assault on King Hill, managing to capture the entire crest. To the west, Dill’s 1st Battalion attacked and captured Dick Able and Dick Right, although they had to relinquish Dick Right after a vigorous Japanese counterattack. The 3rd Battalion also advanced toward Dick Right, establishing a tenuous hold on the position. Further west, the 306th Regiment committed its last remaining strength, a composite battalion, to advance beyond Wart Hill, but it was quickly cut down by overwhelming flanking fire. Similarly, the battered 305th Regiment made little progress in the rugged terrain. Meanwhile, the 7th Marines advanced to within 100 yards of the ridge crest north of Wana, where they were ultimately pinned down by heavy fire. Concurrently, the depleted 1st Marines launched an assault that captured the western tip of Wana Ridge, aided by tanks and artillery, though a fierce night counterattack forced them to withdraw before being relieved by the fresh 5th Marines. Along the coast, the 22nd Marines successfully pushed toward the north bank of the Asato River, but the main action was poised to occur at Sugar Loaf Hill.
Though Schneider’s 2nd Battalion successfully seized the forward slopes of the protective hills north of Sugar Loaf, including Queen Hill, they faced intense enemy fire whenever they attempted to maneuver around or over these hills to launch an attack on Sugar Loaf itself. Nevertheless, the Marines pressed on, and by nightfall, a group of about 40 men under Major Henry Courtney managed to storm the hill, throwing grenades ahead of them and subsequently digging in at the summit to withstand a night of heavy mortar fire and constant counterattacks. This attack was further supported by the 29th Marines, which, after overcoming initial hardships, secured the forward slopes of the hill northeast of Sugar Loaf. During the early hours of May 15, the embattled group atop Sugar Loaf gratefully welcomed the arrival of reinforcements, though it was not before Major Courtney heroically fell while leading a grenade assault against the defenders on the reverse slope.
Despite the reinforcements, enemy pressure on Sugar Loaf intensified, ultimately forcing the battered Marines off the hill. This triggered a fierce Japanese counterattack across a 900-yard front, compelling Schneider’s 2nd Battalion to relinquish the ground immediately north of Sugar Loaf. Fearing a breakthrough, elements of his 1st Battalion seized the hill northwest of Sugar Loaf to help blunt the force of the enemy counterattacks, while the 3rd Battalion relieved the exhausted 2nd across the line. Additionally, the 29th Marines not only played a significant role in repulsing the enemy counterattack but also effectively strengthened its hold on the high ground north of Half Moon Hill.
To the east, while the 7th Marines reorganized and cleared out Dakeshi, the 5th Marines launched their first tank-infantry assault against Wana Draw. At 0630 on 15 May the 5th Marines completed the relief of the 1st, and Colonel Griebel assumed command of the zone of action west of Wana. The 2d Battalion was in assault with the 3d in close support and the 1st in reserve. On the recommendation of the regimental and battalion commanders of both the 1st and 5th Marines, the division decided to subject the high ground on both sides of Wana Draw to a thorough processing by tanks and self-propelled 105mm howitzers before 2/5 attempted to advance across the open ground at the mouth of the draw. With Company F of 2/5 providing fire teams for protection against suicide attackers, nine tanks from Company B, 1st Tank Battalion spent the morning working on the positions at the mouth of the draw. The tanks drew heavy small-arms, mortar, artillery, and AT fire, and accompanying infantry was dispersed to reduce casualties. Because of the open area of operation, the fire teams were still able to cover the tanks at relatively long-ranges. Both sides of the draw were honeycombed with caves and the tanks received intense and accurate fire from every sector at their front. During the morning one 47mm AT gun scored five hits on the attacking armor before NGF silenced it. About noon the tanks withdrew to allow an air strike to be placed in the draw and then return to the attack in reinforced strength. Naval gunfire again silenced a 47mm gun that took the tanks under fire, this time before any damage was done. With the approach of darkness the tanks pulled out of the draw pursued by a fury of enemy fire. The 5th Marines, convinced "that the position would have to be thoroughly pounded before it could be taken," scheduled another day of tank-infantry processing for Wana Draw before making its assault.
In the center, the battered 305th Regiment continued its relentless advance through the irregular terrain west of the main Ginowan-Shuri highway. Simultaneously, Colonel Hamilton’s 307th Regiment finally relieved the exhausted 306th and launched simultaneous attacks on Flattop and Chocolate Drop Hill. The 3rd Battalion slowly maneuvered toward the northern base of the Drop and the north slopes of Flattop, while the 2nd Battalion advanced toward Ishimmi Ridge through the open highway valley. Concurrently, the 382nd Regiment supported the assault on Flattop with its own attack against Dick Hill, successfully capturing its crest but failing to cross the skyline. Meanwhile, the 383rd Regiment struggled to make progress against intense enemy fire from the hill complex southwest of Conical’s peak, although some elements managed to advance up the northwest spur from King Hill amid thick mortar fire.
Now, it’s time to shift our focus from Okinawa to the sea, where we will cover the last destroyer actions of the Second World War. At the beginning of February, with the Southwest Area Fleet staff isolated in the Philippines, Vice-Admiral Fukudome Shigeru formed the 10th Area Fleet to defend the shores of Indonesia and Indochina. The 10th Area Fleet was comprised of the remnants of the 2nd Striking Force. This consisted of the two converted battleship/aircraft carriers Ise and Hyuga, forming the carrier squadron, and the two heavy cruisers Ashigara and Haguro, forming the 5th Cruiser Division. Two more heavy cruisers, Takao and Myoko, were at Singapore where both had reached sanctuary after being badly damaged in the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Myoko had made one attempt to escape back to Japan in December 1944, but had been torpedoed by the US submarine Bergol on the 13th, and had then returned to Singapore. The cruiser Oyodo joined the fleet from February 5 to 20 and a fourth cruiser, Isuzu, joined on March 25 but lasted barely a fortnight before being sunk, on April 7, in a coordinated attack by the US submarines Charr, Gabilan and Besugo, with peripheral assistance from the British submarine Spark. In February Ise and Hyuga were also recalled and sailed on the 10th from Singapore, bound for Japan, carrying aviation spirit and other war materials. With such valuable cargoes the Japanese took great care to safeguard their passage and, by a combination of good luck and bad weather, both evaded numerous attacks by air and by submarine and reached Moji on the 19th. Haguro and Ashigara, and one old destroyer, Kamikaze, were now the only sizable warships left in the 10th Area Fleet to protect the troop evacuations.
At this stage, the Japanese aimed to hold Java, Borneo, and Sumatra for as long as possible while planning their main defensive efforts in Malaya and Indochina. Consequently, they began withdrawing their garrisons from the outlying islands of the Moluccas, Timor, the Lesser Sunda Islands, and the scattered islands of the Panda and Arafura Seas. Anticipating a similar evacuation of Japanese garrisons in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Admiral Arthur Power’s East Indies Fleet had dispatched destroyers on a series of anti-shipping sweeps in the Andaman Sea, successfully destroying several relief convoys. On May 10, Fukudome decided to commence the evacuation of the Andaman Islands, dispatching Vice-Admiral Hashimoto Shintaro’s heavy cruiser Haguro and destroyer Kamikaze to deliver supplies to the islands and return with troops back to Singapore. Additionally, a secondary convoy consisting of one auxiliary vessel and one subchaser was organized to perform the same mission for the Nicobar Islands.
As Allied intelligence uncovered these plans, Vice-Admiral Harold Walker’s Force 61, primarily composed of the battleships Queen Elizabeth and Richelieu and four escort carriers, sailed from Trincomalee to intercept the Japanese ships. However, the Japanese were unwilling to risk a battle, and upon receiving an air reconnaissance warning, they returned to Singapore. Nonetheless, Walker decided to remain in the area, awaiting reinforcements in case the enemy regained the confidence to launch another sortie. On May 14, Fukudome finally resolved to carry out the evacuation again, this time first sending forward his secondary convoy to the Nicobars. This force managed to reach the islands unmolested during the day and successfully embarked 450 troops before setting sail for Penang, although they were later spotted by a patrolling Liberator. In response, Walker dispatched the 21st Aircraft Carrier Squadron and the 26th Destroyer Flotilla to conduct an air and sea sweep off Diamond Point aimed at intercepting and destroying the enemy. On the morning of May 15, some Avengers encountered Haguro and Kamikaze as they returned to the Malacca Strait. As Captain Manley Power’s destroyers rushed to the area, three Avengers launched by the escort carrier Shah attacked Haguro with bombs in the afternoon, causing minimal damage that only compelled Haguro to alter its course eastward. However, this diversion effectively allowed the destroyer force to intercept Hashimoto’s convoy during the night.
As the flotilla closed in on the enemy during the early hours of May 16, Hashimoto reacted desperately by fleeing at full speed to the north, thwarting Power’s carefully laid ambush. Soon after, however, Haguro turned to port, crossing paths with the destroyer Venus, which was closing in at full speed from the west. Surprisingly, Venus failed to launch its torpedoes, prompting Hashimoto to turn south and back into Power’s trap. Haguro’s violent turn away changed the situation dramatically. Saumarez now found the enemy racing down towards her port side at a relative speed of nearly 60 MPH. Kamikaze, following astern of Haguro, passed so close in front of Saumarez from starboard to port that Captain Power had to swing his ship hard to starboard and back to port again to avoid her. Kamikaze passed very close down Saumarez’ port side and was taken under fire by both main and close range armament. Opening with star-shell, Saumarez shifted fire to Haguro herself at 0108, the enemy replying with main and secondary armament. The two enemy ships could now be clearly identified from Saumarez’ bridge, Haguro at about 5,000 yards and Kamikaze about 2,200 yards range. ‘We had a glimpse of the cruiser by starshell, but now it was dark. She looked pretty big and her direction easy to see by her bow-wave and wash. Inclination vague but obviously broad. I thought she was going very fast. Her side was shining like a wet wall, with the reflection of her own starshell from behind us, I think.’ To Lt. Reay Parkinson, also in Saumarez, Haguro ‘seemed to tower above us like a sky-scraper and her guns were depressed to their lowest angle’. Haguro’s fire was accurate and splashes from near misses drenched the bridge personnel, binoculars and sound-powered telephones. But, as Captain Power philosophically remarked, ‘if you are only getting wet there is nothing to worry about’. However, Saumarez was unfortunately not merely getting wet. At about 0111, when Captain Power was just considering turning to fire, ‘one boiler got hit. There was a lot of steam and smoke amidships and a sort of queer silence. The ship was obviously slowing down and I thought she was going to stop.’
Saumarez’ torpedo tubes had been trained to starboard, ready for the bow attack, with torpedoes angled to run 70° left. There was no time to train the tubes to port. Captain Power swung his ship to port ‘like a shotgun’ and at 0113, as Saumarez was slowing down but still swinging hard to port, a salvo of eight torpedoes was fired at Haguro’s beam, at a range of 2,000 yards. Still under heavy fire, Saumarez continued her turn to port to open the range, telegraphs being put to ‘Full Ahead’ to get the utmost speed from whatever engine power remained. A minute after Saumarez’ attack, Verulam made an unmolested attack from 2,000 yards on Haguro’s port bow, firing eight torpedoes. Saumarez and Verulam were rewarded by three hits, shared between them ‘very distinct, three gold-coloured splashes like a Prince of Wales’ feathers, more than twice as high as her bridge’.
Now Haguro was under fire from the destroyers and everywhere she turned there was another destroyer waiting. At 0125 Venus fired six torpedoes and scored one hit. Two minutes later Virago, ordered by Captain (D) to ‘Finish her off’, fired a salvo of eight torpedoes and obtained two hits. She reported that the cruiser’s upper deck was now awash. Missed torpedoes were racing all over the battle scene; in Venus, at the height of the action, the Engineer Officer and the Chief ERA in the engine-room actually heard the whirring sound of two torpedoes passing very close along the ship’s side. Saumarez had retired some five miles to the north-west to collect herself and examine damage. The engine telegraphs were still at ‘Full Ahead’, and Saumarez withdrew further than Captain Power had intended.
Vigilant had been rather ‘left in the cold’ and squeezed out by the other destroyers and was not able to attack until 0151 when she fired eight torpedoes, with one probable hit. Haguro was lying motionless in the water, in her last throes. ‘The rest of the flotilla were snarling round the carcass like a lot of starving wolves round a dying bull. I was too far away to make out what was going on and told them all except Vigilant (who I knew had torpedoes) to come away and join me, with a view to getting formed up and the situation in hand. Of course they did nothing of the sort. I should not have done myself.’ Venus was ordered to ‘Close and make a job of it’ and at 0202 administered the coup de grace with her two remaining torpedoes. At 0206 Venus signalled that the cruiser had sunk. Haguro had gone, in a position about forty-five miles south-west of Penang. Fifty miles away, Cumberland and Richelieu had had tantalising glimpses of starshell and lights but were too late to take part. Saumarez transmitted Vs for Victory and Captain Power signalled: ‘Pick up survivors. Stay no more than ten minutes.’
Kamikaze sustained slight damage from the gunfire but managed to escape, returning the following day to rescue approximately 320 survivors. Nevertheless, over 900 Japanese soldiers lost their lives in the battle, including Vice-Admiral Hashimoto and Rear-Admiral Sugiura Kaju. While the evacuation of the Nicobar Islands was successful, the evacuation of the Andaman Islands proved to be a resounding failure. By the end of the war, with the food situation in the islands becoming critical, the Japanese committed several atrocities against the civilian population. This included the transportation of 300 so-called “useless mouths” to the uninhabited Havelock Island, off South Andaman, where all but eleven of them perished.
I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.
During the intense Battle of the Malacca Strait, Japanese forces attempted a desperate evacuation, facing relentless Allied attacks. Despite fierce resistance, the Allies advanced strategically, leading to significant Japanese losses. Caught in critical confrontations, the Japanese ultimately succumbed, marking a pivotal moment in the Pacific war and shifting the tide toward Allied victory.

Tuesday May 06, 2025
- 181 - Pacific War Podcast - the Second Okinawa Offensive - May 6 - 13, 1945
Tuesday May 06, 2025
Tuesday May 06, 2025
Last time we spoke about the Allied invasion of Borneo. The Allies initiated the invasion of Borneo, commanded by General Morshead. The operation, known as Operation Oboe, aimed to reclaim vital oilfields from the demoralized Japanese forces. Despite their fierce resistance, American troops swiftly captured strategic locations on the island. The Japanese, already struggling with low morale and supply shortages, were unable to mount an effective defense. Amid the intense fighting, Air Commodore Cobby’s forces conducted air assaults on key targets, weakening Japanese positions. As American troops landed on Tarakan Island on May 1, they faced heavy fire but managed to gain significant territory by nightfall. By early May, despite the loss of ground, Japanese forces continued to resist fiercely. This victory in Borneo marked a turning point in the Pacific campaign, ultimately foreshadowing the decline of Japanese influence in the region and paving the way for further Allied advances.
This episode is the Second Okinawa Offensive
Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.
Last we left off, by April 24, General Ushijima's 32nd Army had chosen to abandon the first line of Shuri defenses, with the exception of the extreme right in the Item Pocket area. However, the weary Japanese troops merely withdrew to the next line of prepared positions within the Shuri defense zone, ready to make the American invaders pay for every inch of territory gained. Observing this, General Hodge promptly ordered the 7th, 27th, and 96th Divisions to regroup and enhance their positions through aggressive maneuvers, seizing strategic ground in front of them and pushing back enemy outposts. His forces were also heavily depleted and exhausted, prompting him to plan a final offensive on April 26 before rotating in the relatively fresh 77th Division and the 1st Marine Division for support. Unbeknownst to him, the 62nd Division had suffered significant losses, nearly losing half of its original strength on the left flank. In response, Ushijima decided to move the 24th Division and the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade north to reinforce the Shuri defense zone, establishing a fallback position for retreating forces.This shift also meant that the southern areas were defended only by a hastily assembled Shimajiri Security Force of 5,500 men, drawn from rear-area supply units tasked with delaying any American advances from the south until the main infantry units could return.
The question of a second landing in southern Okinawa was considered by 10th Army most seriously before April 22. General Bruce, commander of the 77th Division, knew that his division would be committed in the Okinawa fighting as soon as lejima was secured. At Leyte the amphibious landing of the 77th Division behind the Japanese line at Ormoc had been spectacularly successful. General Bruce and his staff wished to repeat the move on Okinawa and urged it on the 10th Army command even before the division sailed from Leyte. As the Iejima fighting drew to a close, General Bruce pressed his recommendation to land his division on the southeast coast of Okinawa on the beaches just north of Minatoga. He believed that it would be necessary to effect a juncture with American forces then north of Shuri within ten days if the venture was to be successful. His plan was either to drive inland on Iwa, a road and communications center at the southern end of the island, or to push north against Yonabaru. General Buckner rejected the idea. His assistant chief of staff, G-4, stated that he could supply food but not ammunition for such a project at that time. The Minatoga beaches had been thoroughly considered in the planning for the initial landings and had been rejected because of the impossibility of furnishing adequate logistical support for even one division. The reefs were dangerous, the beaches inadequate, and the area exposed to strong enemy attack. Although beach outlets existed, they were commanded both by the escarpment to the west and by the plateau of the Chinen Peninsula. The 10th Army intelligence officer reported that the Japanese still had their reserves stationed in the south. Both the 24th Division and the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade were still in the area and could move quickly to oppose any landings. Artillery positions on the heights overlooking the beaches were fully manned. The 77th Division would be landing so far south that it would not have the support of the troops engaged to the north or of 24th Corps artillery. The steep terrain near the beaches favored the defense, and any unit there would be isolated. It might be more like Anzio than Leyte, Buckner suggested. Besides that, the three divisions on the line needed to be relieved, and Buckner's three unused divisions would all be needed there.
On April 25, the main focus of action shifted to the Item Pocket, where Captain Bernard Ryan’s Company F of the 165th Regiment surged forward following a 20-minute artillery bombardment to seize the summit of Ryan Ridge. Captain Ryan looked out over the rugged expanse of Ryan Ridge, where the Japanese forces entrenched at the top presented a formidable challenge. They controlled the crucial territory between Ryan and Fox Ridges, creating a dangerous stronghold that threatened his position. For Ryan, the solution lay in artillery fire. He understood that since the supporting fire would fall perpendicular to his attack route, the risk of overshooting or undershooting would be minimal, just a lateral deviation of fifteen yards. With this confidence, he ordered a twenty-minute artillery barrage on the slopes of the ridge.As dawn broke on the morning of the 25th, Ryan gathered his men from Company F. He stressed the importance of a swift ground assault to capitalize on the artillery support. However, this was no easy task; his company was tired, undermanned, and severely low on food and ammunition. Despite these challenges, the two assault platoons sprang into action the moment the first shells began to fall. They charged forward, propelled by the roar of mortars, machine guns, and antitank guns that kept enemy forces at bay.But as they sprinted towards the ridge, the enemy struck back fiercely. Enemy fire and natural obstacles thinned their ranks, yet thirty-one determined soldiers reached the summit. They found themselves standing on a jagged ridge, strewn with rocks and scarred vegetation, a treacherous landscape that added to their struggle. Just as the artillery fire began to fade, the Japanese emerged from their hidden positions: “spider holes,” pillboxes, and tunnels. The Americans stood ready, and for the next twenty minutes, a brutal fight erupted. They engaged in fierce hand-to-hand combat, reminiscent of earlier battles on Item Pocket ridge tops. The outcome was grim; thirty-five Japanese soldiers fell, and many more fled in panic. However, the Americans also paid a price, five were killed, and two wounded. Now, the real challenge began: consolidating their hard-won position. Captain Ryan knew that previous units had ascended these ridges only to be pushed back by the enemy. By late afternoon, only twenty-four effective soldiers remained atop the ridge, with each man averaging a mere six rounds of rifle ammunition. Medical supplies had run dry, and all the aid men had become casualties. Communication was severed, and Ryan could sense the tightening noose as the Japanese regrouped for an assault. Understanding the gravitas of their situation, Ryan devised a bold plan. He arranged for Company I to maneuver around to his right flank, hoping to replicate the success of the morning. At 4:05 PM, just fifteen minutes after artillery support resumed, Ryan and his company made their ascent once more, enduring five additional casualties along the route. Unfortunately, Company I struggled to reach the top, cut off by heavy enemy fire on the slopes. In a moment of desperation, Ryan and two men ventured out into the dark to seek reinforcement, a risky endeavor that could easily end in disaster. Although Company I was still bogged down, Captain Betts from Company K recognized the urgency of the situation and quickly mobilized his men. By midnight, all of Company K had reached the ridge, bolstering Ryan's weary but determined troops. As these events unfolded at Ryan Ridge, other companies from the 165th were locked in a brutal struggle at Gusukuma, located southwest of the ridge. Fierce fighting erupted as soldiers moved from wall to wall, tree to tree, fighting for every inch in the rubble of Gusukuma. Company A faced an unrelenting barrage, enduring fire from eight machine guns and a 47-mm antitank gun, much of which came from the yet-untamed eastern slope of Ryan Ridge. Amidst this chaos, Private First Class Richard King from Company A became a beacon of valor. In a remarkable display of courage, he climbed a tree to eliminate a Japanese soldier perched above and, from his vantage point, went on to kill ten more enemies before night fell. The day had been marked by sacrifice and bravery, with Captain Ryan and his men fighting heroically for every inch of ground gained on Ryan Ridge. As the sun set, they prepared for the challenges that lay ahead, their resolve unwavering amid the turmoil of war.
Meanwhile, other companies of the 165th Regiment engaged fiercely in assaults against Gusukuma, gradually gaining ground at a high cost to both sides. At the same time, the 96th Division consolidated its position in front of Maeda and Kochi, while Colonel Pachler’s 1st Battalion advanced 600 yards with minimal resistance to occupy the slope of Horseshoe Ridge. The following day, April 26, the general offensive resumed, with the bulk of the 165th Regiment continuing its costly advance into the heart of the Item Pocket, successfully clearing Gusukuma as Company F pushed along the crest of Ryan Ridge toward the northern end of the Machinato airstrip. To the east, the 105th Regiment advanced to the southern edge of Nakama, while the 106th Regiment extended the front line toward Yafusu. In the center, Colonel Halloran’s 2nd Battalion launched an assault on the Maeda Escarpment but was quickly repulsed by a brutal barrage of Japanese fire across the front. However, elements of the 383rd Regiment managed to reach the crests of Hills 150 and 152, securing a strategic position to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy below, as tanks and armored flamethrowers moved to the outskirts of Maeda to wreak havoc. At 4 pm in the afternoon General Ushijima issued a terse order: “The enemy with troops following tanks has been advancing into the southern and eastern sectors of Maeda since about 1 pm. The 62d Division will dispatch local units . . . attack the enemy advancing in the Maeda sector and expect to repulse him decisively.” At the same time, adjacent 24th Division units were ordered to cooperate in this effort regardless of division boundary. Two hours later the Japanese commanding general issued another order: "The army will crush the enemy which has broken through near Maeda. The 24th Division will put its main strength northeast of Shuri this evening."
Lastly, Pachler’s 1st Battalion attempted to advance along the western flank of Kochi Ridge, while the 2nd Battalion moved along the eastern flank. Both battalions were immediately repelled by a barrage of enemy fire. The following day, efforts to establish physical contact between the two units proved costly and futile. Meanwhile, Halloran’s 1st Battalion, along with elements of the 383rd Regiment, maneuvered through the saddle between Hills 150 and 152, receiving support from tanks and armored flamethrowers. Although tanks and infantry managed to penetrate to the southern edge of Maeda, the advance was halted by intense enemy fire. Atop the escarpment, an all-out effort was made to reduce a heavily fortified underground pillbox that separated Companies F and G; however, this attempt also failed. Concurrently, as the 105th Regiment organized a defensive line at Nakama, Colonel Stebbins’ 2nd Battalion engaged in fierce combat around Yafusu in an effort to straighten their front lines. Meanwhile, the disorganized 165th Regiment continued clearing the Item Pocket, which was finally declared secure, although many Japanese troops remained hidden in deep caves and tunnels. Due to this disorganization and the sluggish progress in securing the pocket, General Griner ultimately decided to relieve Colonel Kelley of his command of the 165th. The regiment would then spend the remaining days of the month patrolling the Kuwan Inlet south of Machinato airfield. Griner’s overextended and battered division would not undertake any further offensive actions until being relieved at the end of April. At sea, a Japanese suicide boat successfully dropped a depth charge near the destroyer Hutchins, which had to withdraw due to heavy damage. Additionally, Japanese aircraft reemerged during the night, with a kamikaze crashing into and sinking the ammunition ship Canada Victory, while other planes damaged two destroyers and a transport ship. Random factoid by the way, the SS Canada Victory was among the 531 Victory ships constructed during World War II as part of the Emergency Shipbuilding program. Launched by the Oregon Shipbuilding Corporation on January 12, 1944, she was completed on February 28, 1944. The ship was designated VC2-S-AP3 by the United States Maritime Commission, with hull number 93 (1009). Following her completion, the Maritime Commission transferred her to the civilian operator Alaska SS Company.
This was merely a prelude to Admiral Ugaki’s fourth mass Kikisui attack, which launched 115 kamikazes on April 28. While interceptor fighters destroyed most of these aircraft, seven managed to slip past the combat air patrol and crashed into destroyers Daly and Twiggs, the destroyer minesweeper Butler, the evacuation transport Pickney, and the hospital ship Comfort. On the ground, Halloran’s Company K attempted to weaken resistance at the escarpment by moving through the 27th Division zone to the west and advancing southeast towards the Apartment House barracks, where they were met with heavy losses and forced to retreat. Meanwhile, on the western side of Kochi Ridge, Pachler’s 3rd Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion and launched an attack into the gap between the ridge and Zebra Hill. They successfully led Company K through Kochi and into the cut, while Company L moved southward along the western slope. However, upon reaching the cut, both companies were met with a barrage of machine-gun fire, ultimately compelling them to withdraw. To the east, the 32nd Regiment faced delays in initiating their attack due to setbacks around Kochi, despite the successful raids by armored flamethrowers into the heart of Kuhazu. The following day, more kamikaze assaults inflicted additional damage on destroyers Hazelwood and Haggard. By the end of April, American pilots reported 1,216 air-to-air kills, while Japanese sources acknowledged losses exceeding 1,000 aircraft, including 820 destroyed in the first four Kikisui attacks. This left Admiral Ugaki with approximately 370 operational aircraft for future operations. It is also important to note that the Japanese pilots inflicted significant casualties, resulting in Admiral Spruance’s 5th Fleet suffering the loss of 1,853 sailors killed or missing and 2,650 wounded, averaging one and a half ships hit per day.
As April expired, a concerned Nimitz personally visited Okinawa, where Buckner reminded Nimitz that as a land battle, 10th Army operations fell under Army command. “Yes,” Nimitz replied, “but ground though it may be, I’m losing a ship and a half a day. So if this line isn’t moving within five days, we’ll get someone here to move it so we can all get out from under these stupid air attacks.” Nevertheless, by May, 10th Army had thoroughly bogged down into costly, unimaginative frontal assaults against southern Okinawa’s heavily fortified Shuri line. Numerous 10th Army generals urged Buckner to “play the amphib card” and land the reserve 2nd Marine Division in southeastern Okinawa, behind Japanese lines. Buckner ultimately refused, claiming insufficient logistics. Nimitz concurred with Buckner, at least publicly, but few others did. Spruance, Turner, and Mitscher were themselves growing increasingly bitter at 10th Army’s lack of progress, as well as USAAF lethargy constructing fighter airfields ashore that could finally relieve the battered carriers. Touring the developing Okinawa airstrips, a 5th Fleet staff officer discovered that General “Hap” Arnold had secretly been writing Okinawa’s lead USAAF engineer, urging him to divert assigned fighter strip resources into building B-29 bomber airfields instead. An incredulous Spruance went ashore to investigate and discovered the allegation was true. Stunned, Spruance “turned that situation around in about 15 minutes.”
On land, following an unsuccessful tank assault toward Onaga, the 32nd Regiment intensified pressure on enemy positions to the southeast to support operations against Kochi Ridge. However, the 17th Regiment's attacks were still stalled. Meanwhile, after fending off two strong counterattacks that resulted in approximately 265 Japanese casualties, the 383rd Regiment advanced to capture the crest of Hill 318 in fierce close combat. This critical victory finally enabled American forces to direct fire onto Shuri itself. On April 29, the 307th Regiment took over the Maeda Escarpment section of the line from the 381st, and the next morning, the 306th Regiment relieved the 383rd on the left flank of the 96th Division. Simultaneously, the 1st Marines relieved the 165th on the west coast, while the 5th Marines took over the line held by the 105th and 106th Regiments on May 1. Despite ongoing efforts, attacks against Kochi Ridge on April 30 once again failed. However, the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Regiment successfully established Company C on “Chimney Crag” and Company A on the “Roulette Wheel,” located on the ridge southwest of Kuhazu. During the night, large numbers of Japanese infiltrated behind these companies, disrupting the planned relief of the 32nd by the 184th Regiment. This relief, intended to be completed before dawn on May 1, was delayed until late in the afternoon. Despite this setback, Colonel Green’s Company L managed to reach Gaja Ridge, positioned just in front of Conical Hill during the night. Concurrently, Colonel Hamilton’s Company A attempted to mount ladders at the eastern end of the Maeda Escarpment but was quickly repelled by fierce defenders. On the western front, however, Company B successfully captured the edge of the escarpment using cargo nets by nightfall, although they were ultimately forced to withdraw due to heavy counterattacks later that night.
Additionally, Hamilton’s 3rd Battalion moved behind the escarpment to Nakama village, launching an attack eastward toward the Apartment House barracks area. Meanwhile, on the west coast, the 1st Marines had been attempting to advance south for two days but were repelled each time, suffering significant casualties. However, they did succeed in clearing an enemy pocket at Miyagusuku. On May 2, the 5th Marines finally joined the offensive but encountered stubborn resistance, while the 1st Marines continued to struggle to cross the draw south of Nakanishi village in their effort to reach the Jichaku ridge mass. To the east, Hamilton’s Companies A and B positioned troops on the edge of the Maeda Escarpment but made no significant gains due to the enemy's intense machine-gun fire. The 17th Regiment eventually mopped up Onaga village, with the 1st Battalion taking control of the area, although they failed to capture Kochi during their renewed efforts. On May 3, after a dawn artillery preparation, the 1st Battalion on the east and the 3rd Battalion on the west advanced in a coordinated attack, which included a movement by Company C against How Hill on the eastern flank of Kochi Ridge. However, this entire effort was thwarted as heavy enemy artillery and machine-gun fire halted all progress. During 3 May the 1st Battalion, 307th Infantry, fought a desperate grenade battle to win the top of part of the escarpment. The Japanese showered the top with grenades and knee mortars from the reverse slope and with 81-mm. mortar fire from a distance. Men came back across the narrow top of the escarpment to the north side, swearing and crying, saying they would not go back into the fight. "Yet," observed one platoon leader, "in five minutes' time those men would go back there tossing grenades as fast as they could pull the pins."Finally, while the 1st Marines made only limited gains as they pushed toward the Asa River, the 5th Marines successfully cleared the Awacha Pocket and advanced between 300 and 600 yards in their zone.
Unbeknownst to the Americans, their slow, incremental advances and the looming threat of a costly, protracted campaign were far from their only concerns. By the 29th General Cho had argued that in the present state of affairs, the Americans had the upper hand. If the status quo continued, the 32nd Army eventually would be wiped out. At this meeting, only Colonel Yahara spoke for continuing the war of attrition and avoiding an offensive. Yahara pointed out that in modern warfare a superiority of 3 to 1 was usually needed for successful attack. "To take the offensive with inferior forces… is reckless and would lead to certain defeat," he said. Second, the high ground around Minami-Uebaru had already fallen into American hands, giving them a major advantage in defensive terrain. Third, Yahara argued, a hasty offensive would fail, with thousands needlessly lost. Then, 32nd Army's reduced forces would be unable to hold Okinawa for a long period and unable to delay the invasion of Japan. A hasty attack would cause 32nd Army to fail in its duty. And yet, the other young staff members were silent. Cho then declared again that he hoped for an attack to snatch life from the midst of death. At this, Yahara left the room. All the other staff members then agreed to launch an offensive. Cho then tried to manage Yahara by sheer emotional force. At dawn on April 30, before Yahara "had time to splash water on his face," Cho appeared at his quarters. Cho squeezed Yahara's hand and said with genuine enthusiasm that there had been nothing but trouble between them in the past and that they would probably both die together on Okinawa. Cho then asked if Yahara, on this one occasion, would go along with the offensive. As Cho spoke, his tears fell abundantly. Yahara was deeply moved, despite his aloof reputation, and before long he was weeping too. He was overcome by Cho's sudden display of emotion and said, "I consent." Again I have to say, in the “battle of Okinawa” by Yahara, basically his memoirs, in which he notably lies a bunch to cover himself, but I digress, this moment amongst others are really interesting, I highly recommend reading the book.
Cho’s plan outlined that General Amamiya’s 24th Division would lead the main effort on May 4, executing a two-pronged attack on the right half of the line. They intended to sweep past the Tanabaru Escarpment toward Minami-Uebaru hill, ultimately reaching the Futema-Atsuta line. Meanwhile, General Suzuki’s 44th Independent Mixed Brigade was to shift from its reserve position behind the 62nd Division to a location northeast of Shuri and move northwest toward the coastal town of Oyama, effectively cutting off the 1st Marine Division’s retreat. In conjunction with this, General Fujioka’s battered 62nd Division would hold its position on the left flank and mount an offensive once the attacking units on its right had breached enemy lines. Additionally, the 23rd and 26th Shipping Engineer Regiments were tasked with conducting counterlandings in the American rear on the east and west coasts, respectively. The Japanese reasoned that success depended on the extent to which they could support their frontline troops with artillery, tanks, supplies, and communications. Their plans specified in detail the role that each of the support units was to play in the projected operations. Artillery units were ordered to regroup in preparation for the attack. Guns and howitzers were pulled out of cave positions and set up farther south in more open emplacements for greater flexibility. They were to open fire thirty minutes before the attack. When the infantry had driven through the American front lines, artillerymen were to move their weapons forward. The 27th Tank Regiment, hitherto uncommitted, was ordered to move from its position near Yonabaru during the night over several routes and support the attack in the Maeda area. To support this comprehensive offensive, Ugaki was alerted to prepare for the fifth mass Kikisui attack directed against the enemy’s naval forces. Once the plans were finalized and preparations well underway, Ushijima and Cho celebrated with a pre-victory banquet in their chambers at headquarters.
Even as Ushijima's banquet was underway, offensive operations had commenced. Japanese troops infiltrated behind American lines during the night while the shipping engineers prepared for their counterlandings. The 26th and 23d Shipping Engineer Regiments set out up the west and east coasts. On beaches south of Naha and Yonabaru, men of the shipping engineer regiments piled into barges and assault boats. Also, small groups of soldiers with light machine guns infiltrated behind U.S. lines on the night of 3 May to attack Americans as they became visible at dawn. Small units of three or four men, variously designated as "reconnaissance raiding" and "rear harassing" teams, proceeded toward the American lines to attack command posts, heavy weapons, communications, and depots and to send back information by means of smoke signals. The 27th Tank Regiment rumbled up to Ishimmi, several of its tanks being severely damaged by American artillery fire en route.
Ugaki’s fifth Kikisui attack began on the afternoon of May 3, when at least 19 kamikazes sortied from Formosa, stealthily approaching the American convoys. They successfully sank the destroyer Little and one landing craft, while severely damaging two destroyer-minelayers and another landing craft. Additionally, Japanese aircraft targeted shore installations, focusing their efforts on Yontan airfield. In Nakagusuku Bay, a suicide boat further damaged a cargo ship. At 02:00 on May 4, most of the boats from the 26th Shipping Engineer Regiment were spotted approaching the heavily defended area of Kuwan. Armed with antitank guns, heavy machine guns, light arms, and thousands of satchel charges, several hundred men of the 26th Shipping Engineer Regiment headed under overcast skies for landing places below Yontan and Kadena airfields. They miscalculated their position and turned, into the shore at a point where it was heavily defended. At 0200 riflemen of the 1st Marine Division on the sea wall near Kuwan caught sight of ten barges and opened up with concentrated fire. Naval flares lighted up the area. One company fired 1,100 rounds from 60-mm. mortars. Several enemy barges burst into flames. One platoon of marines used fifty boxes of ammunition and burned out six machine-gun barrels as it sprayed the Japanese trying to cross the reef. Although many of the engineers managed to reach the shore, some fled back to the Japanese lines, while others were trapped in Kuwan, where they were mopped up by the Marines at their leisure. A smaller group of Japanese forces advanced almost as far as Chatan, ultimately landing at Isa, where they were contained without much difficulty and destroyed the following day. The amphibious assault was even less successful on the east coast of Okinawa, as the 25th Shipping Engineer Regiment attempted to land near Ouki. Most of these troops were killed by fire from ships in Buckner Bay or by the 7th Division Reconnaissance Troop on land. As a result, the Japanese suffered losses of 500 to 800 men and nearly all their landing craft during these amphibious assaults.
At 05:00, Ugaki initiated his main mass attack, launching 125 kamikazes and 103 escorting fighters from Kyushu to target Admiral Rawlings’ Task Force 57, which was currently striking the Miyako and Ishigaki airfields. Taking advantage of the weakened anti-aircraft defenses, the kamikazes managed to score hits on the carriers Formidable and Indomitable, though both vessels ultimately survived. They also targeted American shipping, successfully sinking destroyers Morrison and Luce, along with three landing craft. Additionally, they inflicted further damage on the light cruiser Birmingham, the escort carrier Sangamon, the destroyer Ingraham, and two destroyer-minelayers, resulting in a total of 589 sailors killed.
On land, following a heavy artillery bombardment during the night, the 24th Division commenced its main assault. In the pitch darkness Japanese troops made their way toward the American front lines. At 0500 two red flares ordered them to attack. As the artillery fire became heavy, a guard of Company A, 17th Infantry, on a hill just north of Onaga, dropped back below the crest for cover. He thought that the enemy would not attack through his own artillery, but the enemy did just that. A few Japanese appeared on the crest and set up a light machine gun. Pfc. Tillman H. Black, a BAR man, killed the gunner, and as more of the enemy came over the crest he killed four Japanese who tried to man the machine gun. The enemy advanced over the crest in ragged groups, enabling Black to hold his own. Soon the whole company was in action and drove the enemy off the crest. The Japanese abandoned three light machine guns, four mortars, and much ammunition.
At another point a surprise attack nearly succeeded. On high ground 1,000 yards east of Onaga a group of Japanese crept up the hill in front of Company I, 184th, commanded by Capt. James Parker. In the sudden onslaught that followed, two heavy machine gun crews abandoned their positions. One of them left its weapon intact, and the Japanese promptly took it over and swung it around on the company. Parker, watching the attack from the ridge, had anticipated the move. The Japanese managed to fire one burst; then Parker destroyed the usurped weapon with his remaining heavy machine gun. For an hour or two longer the Japanese clung to the forward slopes, firing their rifles amid shrill screams, but they made no further progress. By dawn the general pattern of the Japanese attack on the left (east) of the 14th Corps line was becoming clear. In the 184th's sector the enemy's 89th Regiment, following instructions to "close in on the enemy by taking advantage of cover,"had advanced around the east slopes of Conical Hill, crept across the flats, and assembled in force around the "Y ridges" east of Onaga. They had outflanked three companies of the 184th on Chimney Crag and the Roulette Wheel north of Kuhazu, and had also managed to evade the forward battalions of the 17th around Kochi. Another Japanese element had attacked 7th Division lines on the high ground north of Unaha.
At dawn 1st Lt. Richard S. McCracken, commanding Company A, 184th, observed 2,000 Japanese soldiers in the open area east and north of Kuhazu. They were perfect "artillery meat." Unable to get through to his artillery support, McCracken called his battalion commander, Colonel Maybury, and described the lucrative targets. Maybury was equally pleased. McCracken suggested, however, that the Colonel should not be too happy--a group of Japanese at that moment was within 100 yards of Maybury's observation post. There was indeed a party of Japanese busily unlimbering two 75-mm, howitzers just below Maybury. But Company C, 17th Infantry, had spotted this activity, and within a few minutes maneuvered tanks into position and scattered the enemy group. Artillery eliminated the Japanese caught in the open. A mortar duel ensued, sometimes at ranges of 250 yards. The 3d Battalion, 32d, also poured fire on the enemy there. After the impetus of the attack was lost, a Japanese officer stood out on open ground and waved his saber to assemble his men for an attack. American mortarmen waited for a worth-while target to develop, then put mortar fire on it. Four times the officer assembled a group, only to have his men killed or scattered, before he was finally killed.
While the 7th Division was repelling the Japanese attack in the eastern sector of the 14th Corps line, the 77th Division was blunting the other enemy "spearhead" in the center. Here the Japanese 32d Regiment, supported by tanks and engineers, attacked behind intense artillery fire. This sector was the critical point of attack, for a break-through here would enable the supporting 44th Independent Mixed Brigade to cut west and isolate the 1st Marine Division. Transportation difficulties beset the 32d Regiment almost from the start. During the night light tanks drove out of Shuri up the Ginowan road (Route 5), but American artillery interdicting the road prevented medium tanks from following. The mediums had to take a long detour, which was in such poor condition that only two of the tanks could enter into the attack. Trucks and artillery also were slowed down. Even foot troops had trouble in moving. One Japanese infantryman recorded that his column was shelled on the way and that everyone except himself and one other was wounded. Another wrote of encountering "terrific bombardment" on the way to Kochi. These difficulties severely handicapped the 32d Regiment in ensuing operations. Supported by nine light tanks, the 3d Battalion led the assault of the 32d Regiment against the 306th Infantry, 77th Division, before dawn on 4 May. The enemy mounted his assault from southeast of Hill 187 and hit the 77th where Route 5 curled around the east end of Urasoe-Mura Escarpment. The Japanese drove into the front lines of the 1st Battalion, 306th, near Maeda. Shortly before daylight, when the Japanese infantry had failed to take its initial objectives east of Hill 187, Colonel Murakami, commanding the 27th Tank Regiment, became impatient and recklessly committed his own infantry company, a standard element of a Japanese tank regiment. American artillery fire destroyed one platoon, disrupting the attack, and daylight found the surviving troops in a precarious position across from the American lines. Colonel Murakami ordered the company to withdraw, but artillery fire prevented a retreat during the day. When the Japanese used smoke for concealment, the Americans simply blanketed the obscured area with shell fire. The survivors straggled back to their front lines after nightfall. All the light tanks that had supported the attack were lost.
By 07:30, the 306th Regiment had effectively repelled the enemy. The Japanese, broken up into small groups, attempted to withdraw across terrain subjected to heavy artillery and mortar fire, but few made it through. By 08:00, the 89th Regiment had also been pushed beyond grenade range along the entire front of the 7th Division. Instead of retreating or pressing the assault, however, Kanayama’s troops made the critical mistake of milling about in the exposed flatlands, rendering them easy targets for American heavy weaponry. As a result, the 89th Regiment suffered severe losses from concentrated land, naval, and air bombardment, losing half its strength. Colonel Yoshida’s 22nd Regiment in the center fared no better; its advance was delayed by the necessity of laying smoke, and it encountered significant hardships when the smoke unexpectedly cleared. In the center of the line the Japanese 22d Regiment was never able to fulfill its role of following up the "successful" advance of flank units, and the regiment spent the day locked in a violent fire fight with men of 3/306, 3/17, and 1/17 holding the Kochi-Onaga area. The Japanese reported the 22d "was not able attain results worth mentioning."
Unbeknownst to the Americans, elements of the 1st Battalion of the 22nd Regiment had penetrated more than 1,000 yards behind American lines near Kochi, identifying a significant weak point before pulling back to the regimental line. Nevertheless, due to the overall failure of the 24th Division, the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade was not even committed to the attack. On the fronts at Maeda and the west coast, American forces made some gains. Hamilton’s 1st Battalion successfully executed a complex demolition assault on the extensive cave-tunnel-pillbox network located about 200 feet west of the eastern end of the escarpment, effectively repulsing several subsequent counterattacks and inflicting approximately 600 casualties on the Japanese. The 5th Marines also advanced up to 400 yards through hotly contested terrain during the day. Although pinned down in the coastal area, Colonel Chappell’s 1st Battalion managed to break through a defile east of Jichaku, while the 3rd Battalion secured a ridge approximately 400 yards ahead of its position.
Despite the apparent failure of the Japanese attack, Amamiya refused to abandon the offensive, ordering a renewed effort during the night. Kitago’s uncommitted 1st Battalion, along with the attached 26th Independent Battalion, was directed to penetrate the enemy lines northwest of Kochi in a night attack, aiming to replicate the breakthrough achieved by elements of the 1st Battalion of the 22nd Regiment. Following another artillery bombardment, the Japanese launched their assault against the 306th Regiment at 02:00 on May 5. However, this attack was quickly disrupted by American artillery. Three hours later, the Japanese struck again, this time supported by tanks. They pressed through artillery and mortar fire to engage the 306th in close combat. Fierce firefights erupted along the regiment's entire line, resulting in the Japanese suffering 248 dead during the fighting. Amid the chaos, a significant portion of Kitago’s 1st Battalion successfully infiltrated behind American lines, breaching the defenses at a point between Route 5 and Kochi. While approximately 90 of the infiltrators were quickly killed while assaulting the command post of the 306th Regiment, around 450 Japanese troops crossed the divisional boundary and managed to reoccupy the town of Tanabaru and the Tanabaru Escarpment, effectively cutting off the supply road for the 17th Regiment. In response, Pachler sent Company E to eliminate the infiltrators, but they underestimated the enemy's strength and were repelled with heavy losses. With Company E stalled on the eastern slope of the escarpment, Company F, supported by tanks, attempted a broad flanking maneuver. They successfully pushed through Tanabaru, spending the day destroying the enemy’s hastily established defenses. Company E then took over the assault, and by nightfall, they had reached the top of the Tanabaru Escarpment following a mortar preparation.
The relentless battle for the Tanabaru Escarpment continued for the next two days, resulting in the Japanese losing 462 killed behind American lines. Only a few men managed to escape the Tanabaru death trap and return to the Shuri lines. Made even more desperate by the failure of Amamiya’s grand attack, the ragtag battalions of the 62nd Division fought to the death to defend the vital western approaches to Shuri, ensuring that every yard gained came at a steep price in Marine lives. Each pillbox, cave, and tomb became a stronghold that unleashed a torrent of fire against the attacking Marines from all directions. Despite this fierce resistance, Del Valle’s units made significant progress on May 5. The 5th Marines advanced their lines by an average of 300 yards, while the 1st Marines seized the high ground along the Asa River. At the Maeda Escarpment, the reverse slope was slowly captured as caves were blasted and sealed off. By midnight, it became clear to Ushijima that the counteroffensive had failed, with the Japanese suffering approximately 6,227 dead and losing 59 artillery pieces. In turn, the 7th and 77th Divisions, which had absorbed the brunt of the enemy counterattack, sustained 714 losses. Despite these heavy casualties, the 1st Marine Division, which continued its push to the south, incurred corresponding losses of 649 men. This indicated that the Americans experienced greater losses due to the Japanese defensive tactics of attrition. However, the morale of the 32nd Army had been shattered, as the Japanese abandoned all hope for a successful outcome from the operation. Nevertheless, the 24th Division and 5th Artillery Command were ordered to reorganize and shift to a holding action. This strategy aimed to bleed American strength by forcing the 10th Army to maintain its slow, deadly, yard-by-yard advance into the fire of prepared positions.
I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.
In the fierce Second Okinawa Counteroffensive, weary American troops pressed into determined Japanese defenses. Captain Ryan's valor led to hard-won territory despite heavy casualties. As chaos unfolded, Japanese morale waned, marking a turning point. The relentless battle showcased unparalleled sacrifice, foreshadowing the Allies' gradual victory in the Pacific.

Tuesday Apr 29, 2025
Tuesday Apr 29, 2025
Last time we spoke about the invasion of Mindanao. In April 1945, the US launched the invasion of Mindanao under General Eichelberger, focusing on Illana Bay. Initial assaults were swift, and American forces quickly captured vital areas due to the disarray among Japanese troops, who were struggling with low morale and supply shortages. The Japanese were under significant pressure, with commanders ill-prepared to mount a robust defense as American troops advanced toward Davao. Fierce battles unfolded, including attempts to seize key positions, but Japanese forces, that included remnants from earlier campaigns, faced overwhelming and relentless assaults. Despite stiff resistance in some areas, the Americans ultimately made considerable territorial gains, significantly weakening Japanese positions. This successful operation in Mindanao laid crucial groundwork for further advances in the Pacific theater, marking a decisive phase in the war as the tide turned heavily in favor of the Allies. As this chapter closed, it was evident that the end of Japanese resistance in the region was drawing near.
This episode is the Allied Invasion of Borneo
Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.
A long time ago, in a galaxy far away we talked about the Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies. Now it is time to talk about how the Dutch strikes back. . . well not exactly, but I wanted to finish the star wars reference.
For an extended period, the Australian forces that had valiantly fought on the island of New Guinea during a crucial phase of the Allied war effort had been assigned to garrison duties in remote areas, conducting minor offensives against a desperate enemy more concerned with obtaining food than engaging in battle. At the same time, General MacArthur deemed it politically unwise for Australians to take a prominent role in reclaiming the Philippines, an American territory, and he also found it politically unfavorable for American troops to participate in restoring Dutch and British authority in the Indies. Recognizing the urgent need to secure the oilfields of British and Dutch Borneo to supply accessible oil for the push toward Japan, Lieutenant-General Leslie Morshead’s 1st Australian Corps was designated for the operation to retake Borneo, known as Operation Oboe. Should note that after a period of illness, suffering from malaria and a skin condition, the fighting General George Alan Vasey had finally recovered by February 1945. General Blamey, who still had doubts about his physical fitness despite Vasey being given an A by an Army medical board, reluctantly appointed him to command the 6th Division, then in action in the Aitape-Wewak campaign. Vasey then flew north to take up his new command. The aircraft Vasey was travelling in, RAAF Lockheed Hudson A16-118, took off from RAAF Station Archerfield on the afternoon of March 5, 1945. Due to a cyclone that was ravaging the Queensland coast at the time, the aircraft crashed into the sea about 400 metres out from Machans Beach, just north of the mouth of the Barron River, 2 kilometres short of the Cairns Airport. Vasey was killed in the crash along with all those on board. His body was recovered from the crash site and was buried with full military honours in Cairns cemetery along with those of Major-General Rupert Downes and Lieutenant-Colonel G. A. Bertram. Vasey's concern for his men outlived him. The men called him 'Bloody George', not after his casualties, but after his favourite adjective, and Vasey's personable style of command attracted immense loyalty from them. "Vasey owns the 7th," wrote a Melbourne journalist, "but every man in the division believes he owns Vasey."
Thus now it fell to General Steven to retain command of the 6th Division at that time already engaged in combat at Aitape-Wewak, the initial plan was to land Brigadier David Whitehead’s 26th Brigade at Tarakan on April 23 to establish an airstrip for supporting aircraft for subsequent operations, specifically an assault on Balikpapan by the remaining forces of Major-General George Wootten’s 9th Division on May 18. Following that, ten days later, a brigade was set to land at Bandjarmasin to secure air support for the planned invasion of Java by the entire corps on June 27. Ultimately, the operations at Bandjarmasin and Java were cancelled; the Tarakan landing was postponed to May 1; the Balikpapan invasion would instead be conducted by Major-General Edward Milford’s 7th Division on July 1; and the 9th Division was tasked with the invasion of Brunei Bay on June 10. Consequently, by the end of March, Morshead’s headquarters and the entire 9th Division had relocated to Morotai, where they would prepare and rehearse for the impending invasion.
In March 1944, General Doihara Kenji organized the 7th Area Army to establish a new defensive line across Malaya, Singapore, Sumatra, Java, and Borneo. Yes you heard that right, General Doihara Kenji. For those of you who listen to my Fall and Rise of China podcast, this guy is that infamous intelligence officer who worked on nearly all the significant false flag operations during the second sino-Japanese war. Working as an intelligence officer he played a key role in the orchestration of the Huanggutun Incident, Mukden Incident, kidnapping of Emperor Puyi and Marco Polo Bridge Incident, amongst countless other “incidents”. He was a bonafide mastermind behind numerous false flag operations and the Manchurian drug trade earning the moniker Lawrence of Manchuria.
Now, anticipating an impending enemy invasion, Lieutenant-General Yamawaki Masataka reorganized the Borneo Defence Army into the 37th Army in September, placing it directly under General Terauchi's Southern Army. This force gradually received reinforcements from the 56th and 71st Independent Mixed Brigades, the 25th Independent Mixed Regiment, and several smaller units. Despite this, the command was understrength and poorly equipped, as most of the available equipment and experienced troops were reassigned to more critical locations in the Southwest Pacific. By the end of the year, under the leadership of Lieutenant-General Baba Masao, the 37th Army had stationed the majority of Major-General Nozaki Seiji's 56th Independent Mixed Brigade at Tawau, Major-General Yamamura Hyoe's understrength 71st Independent Mixed Brigade at Kuching, most of Colonel Iemura Shinichi's 25th Independent Mixed Regiment on Tawi-Tawi Island, Rear-Admiral Kamada Michiaki's 22nd Naval Special Base Force at Balikpapan, along with three battalions in Sandakan, two battalions and a naval unit in Tarakan, and one battalion each in Kudat, Beaufort, and Miri. However, in 1945, both Baba and Terauchi recognized that the enemy was likely to first target strategic locations on the east coast before establishing a strong presence in western Borneo to prepare for an invasion of Malaya. Consequently, they decided that the majority of the 37th Army should be concentrated around Brunei Bay, leading to orders for the 56th Independent Mixed Brigade to march overland toward northern Borneo.
The 370th Independent Battalion remained in Tawau, while the 369th Independent Battalion was sent to garrison Bandjarmasin. Additionally, half of the 454th Independent Battalion was dispatched to Balikpapan, and the other half to Bandjarmasin. This left only the 455th Independent Battalion and part of the 2nd Guard Unit at Tarakan. Early in April the strength of the Japanese force on Tarakan was estimated at about 4000 of whom 2500 were base troops. On the eve of the attack, however, largely because of information indicating that a battalion had been moved from Tarakan to Balikpapan, it was estimated that only 1500 to 2000 troops remained on the island. Aerial photographs showed five gun positions on the south-eastern tip of the island covering the channel along which ships normally entered Tarakan. Round Lingkas and Tarakan there seemed to be 15 anti-aircraft guns, and 9 medium and 5 light anti-aircraft guns seemed to be round the airfield. The whole of Lingkas beach was protected by parallel rows of posts, rails and pipes driven into the mud and extending into the sea to a distance of 125 yards from high-water mark; and between the beach and the road was an anti-tank ditch about 25 feet wide. A group of oil tanks was near the beach and, as it was possible that the Japanese might try to impede an attacker by flooding the oil over the sea and the swamp near the Pamusian River and setting it alight, the air force had taken pains to destroy these tanks. Field works could be seen; there were concrete pill-boxes built by the Dutch; and it was suspected that, here as elsewhere, tunnels had been dug into the hills.
Units stationed at Sandakan were also ordered to move toward Brunei, leaving the 554th Independent Battalion behind. Furthermore, due to the challenges in supplying Tawi-Tawi, the 25th Independent Mixed Regiment was withdrawn to Borneo in February and instructed to march toward Jesselton, where it was expected to arrive in May. During this time, little was done to enhance the island's defenses, and the overland marches took a significant toll on the soldiers' stamina. Meanwhile, enemy air raids intensified, severely disrupting communications. Between April 11 and 29, Air Commodore Arthur Harry Cobby’s Australian 1st Tactical Air Force, along with Major-General Paul Wurtsmith’s 13th Air Force, conducted several air assaults on Tarakan and Tawau, targeting oil storage tanks, artillery positions, radar stations, defenses, and various buildings. On April 27, Rear-Admiral Forrest Royal’s Task Group 78.1 departed Morotai, carrying Whitehead’s 26th Brigade, protected by Admiral Berkey’s cruisers and destroyers. Over the next two days, this force executed a naval bombardment on shore targets while a minesweeping unit cleared and marked the approach route within 800 yards of the beach and Sadau Island. Early on April 30, the 2/4th Commando Squadron landed unopposed on Sadau, where they established an artillery battery to support the engineers in clearing obstacles from the invasion beaches.
After successfully completing the task with just a few sniper and mortar attacks, the main convoy reached the southwest coast of Tarakan Island an hour before sunrise on May 1. Following a heavy air and naval bombardment prior to landing, Whitehead’s assault waves began their approach to the shore, supported by rocket fire from the LCI gunboats. Around 08:00, the 2/23rd and 2/48th Battalions landed on Green Beach and Red Beach, respectively, without facing any opposition. However, once they moved inland, they encountered intense fire from Lingkas Hill and Roach. The 2/23rd Battalion launched an attack and captured both locations while the 2/48th took the Finch and Parks positions as they advanced to secure the Collins Highway ridge. Throughout the day, the remaining units of the 26th Brigade landed despite poor beach conditions and overcrowding, with the 2/24th Battalion held in reserve along Anzac Highway. By nightfall, the brigade managed to hold an area 2,800 yards wide at the base and up to 2,000 yards deep. Early on May 2, the 2/23rd seized Milko with minimal resistance, advancing further north to the Pages feature and Hospital Spur. Simultaneously, the 2/48th quickly secured Lyons and the junction with Burke Highway, while the 2/24th effectively attacked the Wills, Sturt, and Frank positions with support from aircraft and artillery. In the late afternoon, as one company moved up Anzac Highway toward the airfield, Lieutenant-Colonel George Warfe’s other companies converged on the Essex feature, which was captured without opposition during the night. The next morning, the 2/24th attacked the airfield from the south and east; although they successfully took the airfield ridge at a high cost, their late assault on the Rippon position to the north was repelled by determined enemy defenders.
At the same time, the 2/48th conducted reconnaissance towards the Peter and Sykes features, while the 2/23rd managed to secure the area between Gleneleg Highway and Pamusian. However, their assaults on Hospital Spur and Tarakan Hill were unsuccessful. Fortunately, Burke Ridge was found abandoned on May 4. By then, Whitehead had already instructed the 2/23rd to advance east and join the 2/24th in their attacks on the airfield, with the 2/3rd Pioneer Battalion and the 2/4th Commando Squadron taking over their positions in the west. The commandos then launched an attack on Tarakan Hill. Despite being initially held down by fierce enemy fire, they eventually forced the defenders off the high ground through sustained pressure, tank support, and a sweeping maneuver to the right. Simultaneously, the 2/48th advanced and successfully took control of the Evans feature, while a company from the 2/24th attacked the Peningkibaru stronghold after an intense artillery barrage, managing to secure the position just in time to fend off the Japanese who had retreated during the bombardment. Additionally, Warfe planned another assault on Rippon, but heavy Japanese shelling ultimately compelled him to call it off. On May 5, as the commandos and pioneers continued to diminish the remaining strongholds on Tarakan Hill, the 2/48th successfully cleared the road north to Otway, although they faced greater resistance near Sykes. Rippon was also discovered to be abandoned and was swiftly captured, though the Japanese still controlled the high ground to the north. Finally, on May 6, the 2/48th launched another attack on Sykes and successfully cleared the hill this time. While capturing the airfield and town accomplished Whitehead’s primary objective, the Japanese continued to hold the rugged interior of Tarakan, indicating that much fighting lay ahead until the garrison was completely defeated. By the evening of 6th May fairly copious information obtained from prisoners and Indonesians and from captured documents indicated that the enemy had about 390 naval troops in the Mount Api area, about 400 troops and civilians in the Fukukaku headquarters area, 200 from Sesanip along Snags Track to Otway, 300 on Otway and in District 6, 300 in the Amal River area and 60 at Cape Juata. Having lost the airfield and the water-purifying plant and hospitals "the enemy at this time was displaying a decided disinclination to hold ground. In particular he was shunning any ground which could be subjected to heavy bombing, shelling, or attack by tanks; or against which large-scale attacks could be launched by our troops".The enemy was now directing his operations to delaying the attackers, particularly with mines, booby-traps, suicide raids, and isolated parties fighting to the death in tunnels and dugouts.
After the unsuccessful general attack on April 19, which yielded minimal gains, Generals Hodge and Buckner were preparing to push the offensive southward, fully aware that breaching the first Shuri defense ring would be a slow and costly endeavor. On the western front, the primary enemy positions on Kakazu Ridge had been entirely circumvented, with General Griner directing his troops to advance and focus on cleanup later. Consequently, on April 20, the majority of the 165th Regiment secured the coastal region before launching a southern attack that encountered immediate and fierce resistance in the rugged terrain north of Gusukuma, particularly around Item Pocket. The center of the Japanese resistance lay in the I section of Target Area 7777, which came to be called "Item Pocket", in military terminology I is called Item. Actually, the pocket was the hub of the enemy position; from it, like spokes of a giant wheel, extended four low ridges, separated from each other by ravines and rice paddies. Potter's Ridge ran north from the hub, Charlie Ridge to the northeast, Gusukuma Ridge to the southeast, and Ryan Ridge to the southwest. Lying between Gusukuma and Charlie Ridges and sloping to the east was a cone-shaped hill called by Americans "Brewer's Hill." A gulch ran along each side of the hill Anderson's Gulch on the north and Dead Horse Gulch on the south. Both ran in an easterly direction, crossing Route 1 at small bridges just north of Gusukuma. The ground was superbly suited for active defense. Typical Japanese positions were connected by tunnels along the sides and under the crests of the ridges; Ryan Ridge, in particular, was honeycombed with such defenses. From Item Pocket the enemy had excellent command both of the coastal areas to the north and west and of the open land to the east where Route 1 ran north-south. The Japanese had long been aware of the defensive value of this position against either a beach landing on the northwest or an attack from the north. Months before the Americans landed, Japanese troops and Okinawan laborers were boring tunnels and establishing elaborate living quarters and aid stations. The area was held by two companies of the 21st Independent Infantry Battalion of the 64th Brigade, 62nd Division, supported by an antitank company, a machine gun company, and elements of antiaircraft, artillery, and mortar units. At least 600 Japanese occupied the Pocket, reinforced by several hundred Okinawans.
Only through persistent effort was the 1st Battalion able to reach a position east of Gusukuma by nightfall, while the 2nd Battalion successfully took control of Potter's Ridge and Fox Ridge but failed in its attempts against Ryan Ridge and Item Pocket itself. The leading platoon was well up on the slope of Ryan when Japanese on top opened up with mortars, machine guns, and artillery, cutting off the rest of Company E. While the company commander, his clothes torn by bullets, and the rest of the company straggled back to Fox Ridge, the leading platoon continued doggedly ahead. Its leader, T/Sgt. Earnest L. Schoeff, managed to reach the top with eight of his men despite almost constant fire. He was ordered by radio to hold until relief came. The men hugged the ground as darkness slowly descended. Then from three directions from fifty to sixty heavily armed Japanese set upon the Americans. In wild hand-to-hand fighting the nine men beat off the attack. Pfc. Paul R. Cook fired four cases of ammunition into the enemy, shooting down at least ten before he was killed. With grenades, rifle butts, and the enemy's own weapons, Schoeff and his men killed another dozen before the Japanese withdrew. With two of his men killed, another missing, and two wounded, Schoeff led the survivors back to his company during the night.
To the east, the 106th and 105th Regiments tried to advance south towards the village of Iso and the Pinnacles but were hindered by heavy enemy gunfire. In response, Colonel Winn dispatched his 2nd Battalion to maneuver around the East Pinnacle to reach the village of Natama, where Companies F and G were ultimately repelled by a strong Japanese counterattack. As they retreated in chaos, they faced an ambush from Japanese infiltrators, resulting in significant casualties. Despite these challenges, the 106th Regiment and Winn’s 3rd Battalion managed to bypass the West Pinnacle and advance with relative ease, halting 200 yards southwest of Iso. Additionally, Winn’s 1st Battalion fought its way to the western edge of Kakazu village and nearly cleared Kakazu Ridge to its eastern point before being ordered back to the escarpment to support the 2nd Battalion and halt any enemy breakthroughs.
At the same time, General Bradley ordered the 381st and 382nd Regiments to advance toward Nishibaru Ridge and the Tanabaru Escarpment. In response, Colonel Dill’s 3rd Battalion moved along Tombstone Ridge, clearing out the enemy from caves and tombs, and reached the southern end just in time to join Colonel Halloran’s 1st Battalion for a surprise offensive against Nishibaru. They quickly captured the crest but were ultimately driven back by the determined defenders. However, this partial victory prompted Halloran to deploy the 2nd Battalion in the afternoon for another assault to the south. By day's end, the 381st was entrenched along the northern slope of Nishibaru Ridge, though at a significant cost. Further west, Dill’s 2nd Battalion also pushed forward despite persistent fire from the Rocky Crags, where attempts by the 184th and 17th Regiments to attack were unsuccessful. They could not catch up with the 3rd Battalion. Meanwhile, General Arnold targeted Ouki Hill, but his initial assault was quickly halted by enemy mortar and machine-gun fire. Two armored flamethrowers successfully advanced 400 yards ahead of the infantry, neutralizing an enemy mortar position on Ouki Hill's west slope. Consequently, the Americans concentrated their mortars and smoke to cover the enemy positions, allowing a composite company to launch a surprise attack that secured the crest of Ouki Hill, although the isolated troops would soon have to fend off a series of fierce counterattacks.
The next morning, the 32nd Regiment launched an attack down Skyline Ridge with two companies. However, they were quickly halted by mortar fire at a deep road cut in the middle of the ridge. Despite this setback, the troops persevered, largely due to Sergeant Theodore MacDonnell’s efforts, and eventually gained control of the entire forward face of the ridge. When, east of the road cut, a man in the stalled third platoon, Company E, was killed, Sgt. Theodore R. MacDonnell, a gist Chemical Mortar Company observer, was impelled to drastic action. MacDonnell had frequently joined men on the line and shown qualities of a determined infantryman. Now, infuriated, he gathered up a handful of grenades and ran in the face of the machine-gun fire along the slope to a point underneath the spot where he believed the enemy gun to be located, and then started up the 20-foot embankment. When he looked over the crest he failed to spot the gun, but he did see three enemy soldiers and grenaded them. He made two trips to the bottom of the embankment for fresh supplies of grenades, but it was not until his third trip to the crest that he located the machine gun. MacDonnell then slid back to the bottom, grabbed a BAR, and mounted the embankment with it, only to have the weapon jam after the first shot. He skidded to the bottom, seized a carbine, and went back up for the fifth time. On reaching the crest he stood up and fired point-blank into the machine-gun position, killing the gunner and two covering riflemen. MacDonnell then hurled the machine gun down the slope behind him. A mortar that he found in the position was also sent crashing down the hillside. Sergeant MacDonnell was later awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his heroism on this occasion. Lt. Fred Capp, commanding Company E, sent troops to reinforce MacDonnell immediately, and the position was consolidated. Then Company F, on orders given as a result of this sudden development, pressed the attack down Skyline Ridge, and by 18:00 the entire forward face of the ridge was occupied and only a knob at the lower tip was causing trouble.
To the west, while Colonel Pachler’s Company B attempted another attack on Rocky Crags, Dill’s 3rd Battalion reorganized and encircled to reach Nishibaru Ridge via the 381st Regiment, launching an eastward assault that made good headway until they were met with fierce enemy counterattacks that forced them to halt. Simultaneously, Halloran coordinated an attack on Nishibaru, which was successfully repelled by the defenders. Colonel May’s 3rd Battalion was then deployed to fill the gap at the gorge. Overnight, a large number of Japanese troops had moved from the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment to set up mortars and machine guns in the Kakazu Pocket, prompting the 27th Reconnaissance Troop to advance toward Kakazu, where they became pinned down at the village's edge. As a result, Colonel Stebbins’ 3rd Battalion was ordered to position itself on Kakazu West. Looking west, the majority of the 105th and 106th Regiments were tasked with neutralizing the Pinnacles, but with little success. They did manage to clear the road to the escarpment's summit of mines and obstructions to facilitate tank movements. Finally, Colonel Kelley’s 2nd Battalion launched another unsuccessful attack across the mouth of Item Pocket, while Company F attempted to advance along the coast using amphibious tractors but was likewise repelled by intense fire from Ryan Ridge. The 1st Battalion also pushed southwest into Gusukuma, but without armor support, they made minimal progress against the machine guns in the village and fire from Item Pocket attacking from the right rear.
The enemy's defense was very effective on the east. Here the 1st Battalion had a major supply problem on its hands. Two blown bridges along Route 1 east of the Item Pocket were holding up vehicles of support units. During the previous night, fire from the Pocket had driven off an engineer platoon working at the site and killed the platoon leader. Early on the 21st Lieutenant Golden, the Bailey bridge expert, came up with ten truckloads of material. His engineers worked for an hour but had to stop in the face of almost ceaseless fire from the Pocket. Colonel Kelley then ordered scouts to find another stream crossing. A bulldozer cut a bypass around Anderson's Gulch near the railroad, but when, about 10:00, the operator nosed his machine out in the open, he was shot in the ear. General Griner, in Colonel Kelley's observation post at the time, ordered Lt. Col. Walter F. Anderson, commander of the 193rd Tank Battalion, to push the bypass through. Anderson himself climbed into his battalion's sole remaining "tank-dozer" and completed the bypass. A 47-mm. anti-tank gun, hitherto silent, scored a direct hit on Anderson's tank, killing him and a guide. The bypass was now blocked and had to be abandoned. This break-down in supply over Route 1 seriously affected operations east of Gusukuma. Colonel Mahoney's 1st Battalion attacked southwest early on the 21st into Gusukuma, but without tanks or cannon the troops made little ground against machine guns in the village and fire from Item Pocket on the right rear. Mahoney's left company did reach a point 400 yards north of the village of Yafusu, the farthest advance yet registered by 24th Corps since April 19, but here the troops were stopped by a network of enemy positions.
Concerned about the significant vertical separation between his battalions, Kelley decided to deploy his 3rd Battalion in an effort to fill the gap and simultaneously penetrate Item Pocket. Consequently, the American forces advanced through Dead Horse Gulch, with Company K fighting nearly to the center of the pocket. However, they were ultimately compelled to retreat due to heavy losses and intense counterattacks. On April 22, Kelley opted to hold and enhance his current positions while conducting extensive patrols. Looking to the east, as the 105th Regiment regrouped following a night counterattack from Kakazu, Stebbins' 1st Battalion systematically located and neutralized enemy positions behind them along the escarpment. Brigadier-General William Bradford also took command in the Kakazu area, bolstered by the 3rd Battalion, 17th Regiment, and most of the 2nd Battalion, 165th Regiment, successfully containing the pocket. Further west, the 383rd Regiment replaced the weakened 382nd, while the 2nd Battalion advanced down Nishibaru Ridge to capture the village and higher ground facing Hill 143 to the south. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion made minimal progress toward the Gate of the Tanabaru Escarpment. Additionally, Pachler's Company B initiated another attack on the west side of the Rocky Crags, supported by howitzers, tanks, and armored flamethrowers. However, once again, they faced hand grenades and knee mortar shells raining down from above, resulting in heavy casualties and the need to retreat. Finally, the 32nd Regiment maintained control of the forward face of Skyline Ridge but made no attempt to advance, while patrols scoured extensive sections of the southern slope to reach the abandoned eastern face of Hill 178. That night, artillery provided cover to the beleaguered defenders as Colonel Yoshida's 22nd Regiment took over along Skyline Ridge.
Following several days of inactivity, 41 kamikaze planes were once again launched on April 22. They successfully sank the minesweeper Swallow and one LCS, while also damaging two destroyers and another minesweeper, resulting in the loss of 25 aircraft. The next day, the 32nd Regiment remained stationed on the north slope of Skyline Ridge, except when conducting patrols or securing caves. This allowed the Japanese defenders to withdraw overnight from their remaining positions around Hill 178. With Company B worn out, the rest of the 1st Battalion, 17th Regiment joined the assault on the Rocky Crags, which fell with little resistance. To the west, medium tanks and armored flamethrowers finally launched a direct attack on Nishibaru Ridge and the Tanabaru Escarpment, successfully destroying most of the enemy positions, although few territorial gains were made. Further west, Winn’s 1st Battalion executed a surprise attack on the East Pinnacle, managing to capture the position after fierce hand-to-hand combat. At the same time, the remaining defenders at West Pinnacle initiated a desperate banzai charge towards Iso, where they were ultimately overwhelmed. Kelley then ordered Company I to conduct a probing assault on Ryan Ridge and Item Pocket, while Company C ascended Brewer's Hill but was unable to descend the steep side to join the fight. On April 24, no new attacks were launched due to a confusing mix-up of orders, but preparations were made for an assault the following day. After an artillery barrage, Bradford’s task force finally attacked the Kakazu Pocket with four battalions; however, they faced no enemy resistance, as the Japanese had abandoned their positions overnight. To the east, the beleaguered defenders in front of the 96th Division had also retreated, leading to the fall of the Tanabaru Escarpment, its village, Hill 143, and the rest of Nishibaru Ridge without opposition.
In a similar manner, the 17th Regiment ascended Hill 178 with only a few scattered artillery rounds landing nearby. The Japanese forces had resisted fiercely for five days, but with the first ring of Shuri defenses breached at multiple points, they chose to withdraw under the cover of heavy mist and light fog the night before. Even so, this advancement was minimal, and it was clear that reaching Shuri would take considerable time given the rate of progress over the first three and a half weeks of the operation. Nonetheless, Buckner believed that any significant landing on the Minatoga beaches or between Machinato airfield and Naha could not be logistically supported and would be vulnerable to strong enemy counterattacks. Therefore, he dismissed proposals to deploy the 77th Division or the 1st Marine Division for these efforts. Instead, it was decided to move the 3rd Marine Corps and the 77th Division from northern Okinawa and Iejima to replace the 24th Corps in the Shuri area.
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In April 1945, the Allies launched the invasion of Borneo, led by General Morshead. Swift assaults secured strategic areas against demoralized Japanese troops. Despite fierce resistance, American forces gained ground, crippling Japanese defenses. This victory marked a pivotal moment in the Pacific War, signaling the end of Japanese influence in the region.